Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Policy

Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign PolicyAuthor(s): Michael D. Ward and Sheen RajmairaSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jun., 1992), pp. 342-368Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174479 .

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Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Policy

MICHAEL D. WARD SHEEN RAJMAIRA University of Colorado

This study examines the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations over the past 4 decades. The authors focus especially on the 1980s. There has been a marked shift in U.S.-Soviet conflictual and cooperative foreign policy behavior subsequent to Gorbachev's rise to power. The authors explore quantitatively the changes in conflictual and cooperative behavior in the context of reciprocity and evolving norms. Using event data from 1948 through 1988, they analyze the role of reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations as well as the nature of underlying norms that set broad parameters for U.S.-Soviet foreign policy behavior. Time-varying parameter estimates of memory and reactivity for both countries, as well as the interaction propensities of successive heads of state, suggest an increase in cooperation and a leveling off of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1985.

The nature of U.S.-Soviet relations during the 1980s was shaped greatly by changes in leadership and policy that occurred in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan came to power in the U.S. in 1981 with a foreign policy agenda based on regaining American military superiority

AUTHORS' NOTE: This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES-8910820. The government has certain rights in this material. This research was conducted at the Program on Political and Economic Change, Institute of Behavioral Science and the Center for International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA, 80309-0487 and at the University of Pierre Mend6s, France, where the support of the Facult6 des Sciences Economiques and the Centre d'Etudes de Defense et S6curit6 Internationales and the courtesy and hospitality of Jacques Fontanel and Jean-Francois Guilhaudis provided a welcome home away from home for Ward. This stay in Grenoble was facilitated by the Sabbatical Program and a Faculty Fellowship from the Council on Research and Creative Works, both of the University of Colorado. We thank Joshua S. Goldstein and reviewers of the journal for their comments and suggestions. Address correspondence to: Program on Political and Economic Change, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA, 80309-0487, or electronically via BITnet to Ward_M@Colo- rado.bitnet, or to Ward M%[email protected], via internet. Phone: 303-492-6405.

342



Ward, Rajmaira / RECIPROCITYAND NORMS 343

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Through active U.S. involvement in world affairs and a cautious, adversarial foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, a "second Cold War" emerged. Reagan's foreign policy agenda ushered in an era of high levels of U.S.-Soviet tensions.

Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 also altered the course of U.S.-Soviet relations; he sought to minimize hostility with the United States and concen- trated on the domestic economic and political problems that faced the Union. The policies instituted in the name ofperestroika and glasnost initiated arms control measures and cuts in defense spending while devoting resources to rebuilding the weary Soviet economy. It is plausible, then, that Gorbachev's measures minimized U.S.-Soviet hostility and launched a new era of relations based on reduced tensions and increased cooperation.

The purpose of this article is to examine the systematic effects on U.S.- Soviet relations of Reagan and Gorbachev's rise to power. Building on previous work (Rajmaira and Ward 1990), we explore these changes by focusing on the norms of behavior between the United States and the Soviet Union and the evolution of these norms as innovations in policies and leadership were introduced. The notion of evolving norms was developed in an earlier analysis of reciprocity and co-integration in U.S.-Soviet foreign policy behavior. The role of reciprocity in these norms is of particular importance because of its implications for facilitating cooperation. An empirical mapping of these norms demonstrates that the underlying equilibrium in U.S.-Soviet relations underwent considerable change.

An analysis of evolving norms concerns the nature of this underlying foreign policy behavior and the changes that occurred in these behavioral norms. Thus we posit that the conflictual and cooperative norms of U.S.- Soviet behavior changed since Gorbachev's rise to power. Specifically, we predicted a reduction in conflictual behavior exhibited by the Soviet Union and an increase in Soviet cooperative foreign policy behavior toward the United States. It appears that these changes were driven largely by Soviet initiatives. U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was cautious and somewhat less responsive than Soviet policies toward the United States.

We begin with a discussion of norms in U.S.-Soviet relations and present the theoretical basis for evolving norms and reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet foreign policy behavior. We then discuss the data and the methodology employed in our analysis of changes in norms of U.S.-Soviet relations, situating our analysis in the context of ongoing research on this topic by a variety of scholars. The following section presents our empirical results.



344 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

COOPERATION AND EVOLVING NORMS

The role of norms in promoting cooperation is important for understand- ing foreign policy interactions. Behavioral norms coordinate the behavior of states by regulating conflict among nation-states (Axelrod 1986). Interstate relations take place within the context of shared norms (Axelrod and Keohane 1984) as norms set the boundaries for the foreign policy behavior nation-states exhibit toward one another. These values, rules, and procedures have come to be viewed as institutions that shape and delimit the workings of international relations (see Krasner 1983).

The works of Axelrod (1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1984, 1986) examine the conditions necessary for cooperation to evolve in the international system. Axelrod relies on the concept of norms, contending that norms can facilitate cooperation among self-interested parties. Norms evolve through the "trial and error" of actors and through innovations in the behavior of states. Those strategies that are unsuccessful will be discarded by states as they imitate the policies of states that perform well in the international system. Thus there is no need for trust between actors; their rationality leads them to reciprocity because of its success as a strategy in foreign policy interactions.

According to Axelrod, the norm of reciprocity is of primary importance in promoting cooperation. Axelrod's tournaments illustrate the success of the "tit-for-tat" strategy because "the use of reciprocity can be enough to make defection unproductive" (Axelrod 1984, 174). Reciprocity as a norm can bring about the evolution of cooperation even within small groups whose members interact with one another at various levels. As this cluster of individuals comes to adopt "nice" strategies, they can afford some latitude in their relations with one another while protecting themselves from being taken advantage of by others (Axelrod 1981). Consequently, mutual cooperation can evolve from a group of individuals whose actions are shaped by the norm of reciprocity.

The recent work by Goldstein and Freeman (1990) explores the emergence and evolution of cooperation among three states. Focusing on Sino- Soviet-American relations, their empirical and historical evidence suggests that these three great powers have achieved mutual cooperation in the past, albeit on limited issues and in limited time periods. Goldstein and Freeman argue that great-power cooperation is indeed evolving, as the level of hostility in conflictual periods is decreasing over time. Thus, although an underlying level of conflict persists, the average levels of conflictual behavior are decreasing, and the prospects of mutual cooperation are promising.




In terms of norms, Goldstein and Freeman (1990) argue that Sino-Soviet- American relations have operated within a regime of "limited reciprocity." A limited reciprocity regime implies high levels of policy inertia with weaker reciprocity in great-power relations. Thus, although reciprocity is important in shaping the bilateral relations of the United States, Soviet Union, and China, the evidence they find for this norm in overall great-power relations is somewhat weak. Instead, they find memory or "policy inertia" to be a strong predictor of foreign policy behavior. The actions of decision makers, then, are shaped by the boundaries set by this behavioral regime as they develop foreign policies (Goldstein and Freeman 1990). Within this environment, sustained, unilateral cooperative initiatives coupled with strong reciprocity in foreign policies and a focus on long-term gains, are likely to facilitate global cooperation. This, they argue, was Gorbachev's strategy vis-a-vis the United States.

Our concept of evolving norms also centers on reciprocity. We argue that reciprocity has two forms. One is the short-term ebb and flow of actions and reactions that may be important in times of crisis or other such situations in which day-to-day vigilance is necessary. The other views reciprocity as a more long-term process and highlights the evolutionary impact of reciprocity. That is, reciprocity exists on an extended time scale and can be viewed adequately as a set of norms for behavior that has short-term implications.

These norms can be said to represent an underlying level of expected patterns of behavior. These norms in turn set broad parameters for foreign policy interactions. If there is an underlying, equilibrium level of conflictual or cooperative behavior in U.S.-Soviet interactions, then these behaviors are said to be cointegrated (see Engle and Granger 1987; and Engle and Yoo 1987). We apply this notion of cointegration to U.S.-Soviet relations, and take the analysis one step further to examine how these countries react to innovations in existing foreign policy norms. In other words, if the series is

cointegrated and there is an equilibrium in foreign policy behavior, innovations that seek to alter these existing norms may be treated as "error" and will be reintegrated into the system so as to meet current expectations. At the same time, while these adaptive mechanisms endeavor to mitigate shocks, these shocks may also serve to alter the norms of behavior.

An earlier study examined U.S., Soviet, and Chinese relations from 1948 to 1978, focusing on reciprocity and evolving norms (Rajmaira and Ward

1990). These results supported the notion of an underlying level of expected behavior in the bilateral relations of the U.S., Soviet Union, and China. These expectations lead to foreign policy behaviors that tend to move together over




time. In addition, as great-power relations are pushed away from the equilibrium, they tend to drift back toward the "expected level," which itself may be undergoing contemporaneous revision due to policy innovations or leadership changes.

The purpose of the current research is to extend these previous ideas and analyses. Using event data from 1948 through 1988, we reanalyze the hypotheses outlined above for U.S.-Soviet relations. The focus is on the Reagan and Gorbachev eras, and the effects of the leadership and policy changes that occurred in 1981 and again in 1985. It is our contention that during this decade the norms of U.S.-Soviet relations were altered, specifically by Gorbachev's rise to power and the policies instituted by perestroika and glasnost. This hypothesis of less conflictual and more cooperative U.S.-Soviet relations is examined through time-varying parameter estimates of memory and reactivity, for both conflict and cooperation.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Using data on the event interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union for the period from 1948 to the present, we first explore the descriptive differences in foreign policy behaviors during each leadership period, focusing on U.S. presidents and Soviet premiers. Subsequently, we employ a simple structural model of action and reaction to probe the dynamics of reciprocity. Next, we use cointegration and error correction methods to explore the hypothesis that U.S.-Soviet foreign policies were in a long- term equilibrium governed by corrective mechanisms. Finally, we examine time-varying versions of the structural model and the error correction model in order to evaluate the drift of parameters over time in each model. We describe these procedures in more detail below.

OF PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS

Goldstein and Freeman (1990) found that their VAR (vector aggression) models of "superpower" reciprocity were affected by instability in coefficients across a variety of breakpoints. One interesting set of such breakpoints was related to leadership tenure in the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the current research is oriented toward an examination of changing norms, it seems important to examine a similar component herein. We choose a very simple baseline model in which we used a dummy variable approach to "explain" international conflict and cooperation between the United States



Ward, Rajmaira / RECIPROCITYAND NORMS

TABLE 1

Presidents and Prime Ministers

Leader Inclusive Dates of Office

U.S. presidents Truman 1948(Q3)-1953(04) Eisenhower 1953(01)-1960(Q4) Kennedy 1961(Q1)-1963(Q3) Johnson 1963(Q4)-1968(Q4) Nixon 1969(Q1)-1974(Q3) Ford 1974(Q4)-1976(04) Carter 1976(01)-1980(04) Reagan 1981(01)-1988(Q4)

Soviet leaders Stalin 1948(Q3)-1953(Q4) Khrushchev 1953(Q2)-1964(Q3) Brezhnev 1964(04)-1982(Q3) Andropov 1982(04)-1984(Q4) Chernenko 1984(02)-1984(Q4) Gorbachev 1985(01)-1988(Q4)

and the Soviet Union. Table 1 presents the dates of tenure for each head of state. We used these dates to create "dummy variables." We first use these to predict to levels of conflict and cooperation. This approach, although somewhat simplistic, should reveal whether the base level of U.S.-Soviet foreign policy behavior was different for different U.S. and Soviet leaders, and whether these levels showed any marked change over time. We also employ these variables as controls in examining other models.

A Structural Model of Action-Reaction

The equations we employ are:

Yt = a + PI, ly- + P1, 2Xt + el, (1)

Xt = C2 + 2, IXt- 1 + P2, 2Yt + e2, t (2)

where x, and y, depict the foreign policy behavior of nations x and y respectively, and x,_ 1 and y,_ 1 represent behavior sent at the previous time period. If reciprocity were found to influence greatly the level of behavior

347




(conflictual or cooperative) a state sends to its rival, we would expect P,3 2 and 2, 2 (the coefficients of the reciprocal variablesx, and y) to be statistically significant. If short-term memory of one's prior actions is an important component affecting current behavior, then P,3 , and P,, 2 should be statistically significant. It is reasonable to assume that all coefficients will be positive, although the literature would suggest a variety of prior distributions are also plausible. We employ a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator to analyze these structural equations. If serial correlation is shown by a Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals, then we transform the equation to account for the serial error correlation and directly reestimate the system with the FIML estimator. We report these results, along with some standard diagnostic tests. In these and all tests in this research, we adopt a 5% probability level for interpreting statistical significance.

We choose this structural specification for an overriding reason: It is the simplest version of an action-reaction model that includes some memory term, or inertial term. Thus, if action-reaction is truly dominant, it should show up in simple specifications and should not require more complicated specifications to be revealed. Second, this model serves primarily as a benchmark, not only within this study, but also across other studies of the action-reaction phenomena between the United States and Soviet Union (Goldstein and Freeman 1990; Goldstein 1991b; Rajmaira and Ward 1990; Leng and Wheeler 1979; Ward 1982; Freeman 1983; King 1989a, 1989b; Dixon 1988). Third, this model is also the closest specification to a simple action-reaction specification in the game-theoretic tradition of prisoner's dilemma. Fourth, with an appropriate time aggregation, it should reveal reciprocity through the contemporaneous covariation of sent and received conflict and cooperation, if such reciprocity exists. Other strategies will be necessary to untangle the exact timing of such sequential responses. It is our belief that the sequential timing is unlikely to be constant, and that less aggregate approaches will be required.

COINTEGRATION AND ERROR CORRECTION

Next, we test whether there was a long-run relationship between U.S. and Soviet foreign policy behavior using an error correction approach. The basic logic is as follows: If U.S. and Soviet foreign policy behaviors are cointegrated, then this implies a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two. If one can establish cointegration, then it has been shown (Granger 1983, 1986) that an error correction mechanism must exist that keeps the system moving toward equilibrium. This mechanism entails both short-run dynam-




ics and long-run equilibrium. Such a mechanism is a more appropriate representation of the processes than, for example, a VAR representation, because it already specifically includes the restrictions necessary to validate a VAR approach.

The first step in this analysis is to verify the nonstationarity of the series being analyzed. This is accomplished using a Dickey-Fuller test on the raw series. If the t statistic for this test is greater than the critical value, one may reject the hypothesis of stationarity.

Testing for actual cointegration was done using three separate tests. The first test, the Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW), is a bivar- iate regression in which one series is regressed on another plus a constant. Engle and Granger (1987) and Engle and Yoo (1987) have shown in Monte Carlo studies that the Durbin-Watson statistic may be used to provide a gauge of whether two series are cointegrated; the critical values we employ are taken from these studies. If the Durbin-Watson statistic of the cointegrating regression is greater than the critical value, one may reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. This is the weakest test for cointegration.

The second test is more powerful. It is a first-order Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals of the cointegrating equation. If the t statistic is larger than its critical value, one may again reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Critical values are taken from Monte Carlo studies by Engle and Granger (1987) and Engle and Yoo (1987).

The third test for cointegration is a higher order Dickey-Fuller test, called an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Again, critical t values were established in the work of Engle and Granger (1987) and Engle and Yoo (1987). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is

Au, = -pu, _ 1 + YlAUt 1 + ... + YiAUt _p + et

where y, and x, are the original series and u, represents the residuals from each cointegrating regression. The test statistic, the t ratio for u, _ , is examining the null hypothesis of no cointegration (see Engle and Granger 1987, 268). We assume that as many as eight augmentation lags are sufficient, thus p = 8.

Finally, if we can assume an equilibrium level of foreign policy behavior for the U.S.-Soviet dyad, it can be argued that deviations from this normal level of behavior are perturbations in the system that were reintegrated into the system by adjustments in foreign policies. This error correction model is:

Axt = c + av-_ I + ac2A t-+ ... + Cp + iAXt_p +

ap +2AYt+ - 1 . + cp ++ q + AYt-q + Ex (3)




Ayt = c + l,_ + a2^ ,- 1 + ... + r + 1 AYt-r + Pr + 2Ax _ 1 +.. .+Pr, + s+1 a,t-s+ EY (4)

where p, q, r, and s represent the number of augmentation lags included. We assume that p = q = r = s = 8; a test of this assumption is described below.

The terms ut_ - and v, 1 are the error terms from the cointegrating regression. Error correction behavior will be evident from a statistically significant negative coefficient for the lagged residuals, ca and P3. In such a situation, past "errors" are self-correcting in the sense that they get integrated into the production of current behaviors. A positive value for this coefficient will imply error propagation.

ANALYSIS OF PARAMETER DYNAMICS

Finally, we generate time-varying parameter estimates of memory and reciprocity in the structural equation model as well as the error correction coefficients. The trajectory of these parameters for conflict and cooperation can tell us a great deal about the patterns of reciprocity and memory over time and the trajectory of the error correction coefficients would capture changes in foreign policy behavior after Reagan and after Gorbachev.

These time-varying estimates were obtained by analyzing the action- reaction and error correction equations for "windows" of 50 observations each, dropping one quarter from the beginning of the subsample and adding one quarter to the end of the subsample. Thus the first window analyzed for the action-reaction equations spans the time from the 4th quarter of 1948 to the 1st quarter of 1960; the second window spans the 1st quarter of 1949 to the 2nd quarter of 1960; and so on. We have listed the endpoints of these windows in the graphs in order to maintain temporal awareness. We chose the 50 observations as a minimum window size because it is the smallest sample on which Monte Carlo evidence about the statistical significance of error correction models is available. Inclusion of the small number of quarters of data for the Reagan and Gorbachev eras is the most scientifically conser- vative strategy, because a few periods of data are unlikely to influence the parameter estimates unless these periods have significantly different underlying mean values.

DATA

We use the COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank) data set spanning the years from 1948 to 1978. The data from 1979 to 1988 were WEIS events that we coded into the 15-point COPDAB scale. Rodney Tomlinson gener-




ously made updated WEIS data available to us. Using the entire 1948-1988 data set, we developed conflict and cooperation series for both the United States and the Soviet Union. Specifically, we updated the basic COPDAB data set, adding information from the beginning of 1979 to the end of 1988. The basic procedure involved using the textual descriptions from the WEIS data base and having coders apply the COPDAB coding procedures to these textual descriptions. Where textual descriptions were inadequate or confus- ing, we consulted the New York Times. For an initial period of 2 years (1979-1980), this coding was undertaken separately by two sets of coders; where differences existed among coders, these were resolved by discussion. After it had been established that few coding differences existed among coders, the entire series was coded. Unlike some other studies, we did not adopt numerical transformations of COPDAB into WEIS weights as suggested by Vincent (1983). Goldstein's recent work (1991a) on scale devel- opment also addresses such issues. We actually recoded WEIS text into COPDAB categories, and the conflictual or cooperative events were then weighted according to their intensity as developed by the COPDAB coding procedures. Excluding the neutral events, these events were then aggregated into quarterly conflict and cooperation scores of bilateral U.S. and Soviet foreign policy behavior. Notice that the WEIS textual descriptions that were coded into COPDAB categories begin in 1979. We focus on quarterly aggregations, although we also examined monthly and weekly aggregations.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND HEADS OF STATE

Tables 2 and 3 present the ordinary least squares (OLS) results of four simple equations, in which U.S. and Soviet conflict and cooperation with one another are taken to be simple linear functions of leadership tenure. Dummy variables are equal to 1 in quarters in which the corresponding leader was in office, zero otherwise. No constant was included.

Although the descriptive model used is very simple, it proves to be very powerful. With three solitary exceptions (Ford in the U.S. conflict equation, Ford in the Soviet Union conflict equation, and Truman in the Soviet Union cooperation equation), all coefficients are statistically significant with relatively low probability levels. Several interesting patterns emerge in analyzing these coefficients. First, in relation to U.S. presidents, both U.S. and Soviet respective conflict shows a basic U-shape pattern of coefficients, with high values during the (early) Truman and (more recent) Reagan years. The base




TABLE 2

U.S. Presidents and U.S.-Soviet Interactions

Coefficient Standard Error t Statistic p Value

Dependent variable: U.S. conflict toward USSR 269.6316 29.9016 9.0173 0.0000 137.0938 23.0407 5.9501 0.0000 160.4545 39.2984 4.0830 0.0001 60.5714 28.4421 2.1296 0.0348 83.7826 27.1774 3.0828 0.0024 47.5556 43.4460 1.0946 0.2754

168.2500 32.5845 5.1635 0.0000 243.0938 23.0407 10.5506 0.0000

Dependent variable: U.S. cooperation toward USSR 28.4737 13.4172 2.1222 0.0354 53.6250 10.3387 5.1868 0.0000 57.8182 17.6337 3.2788 0.0013 38.9048 12.7623 3.0484 0.0027

107.2609 12.1948 8.7956 0.0000 80.3333 19.4948 4.1208 0.0001 88.1250 14.6211 6.0273 0.0000

140.3438 10.3387 13.5746 0.0000

Dependent variable: USSR conflict toward United States 279.2632 37.8386 7.3804 0.0000 193.5625 29.1566 6.6387 0.0000 399.6364 49.7297 8.0362 0.0000 239.2381 35.9917 6.6470 0.0000 111.2609 34.3913 3.2351 0.0015 46.0000 54.9783 0.8367 0.4040

168.9375 41.2337 4.0971 0.0001 262.6875 29.1566 9.0095 0.0000

Dependent variable: USSR col Truman 26.8947 13.8404 Eisenhower 69.6875 10.6647 Kennedy 102.2727 18.1898 Johnson 50.1905 13.1648 Nixon 89.7391 12.5794 Ford 59.5556 20.1096 Carter 73.7500 15.0822 Reagan 127.3750 10.6647

NOTE: There were 163 cases. An OLS estimator was used.

operation toward United States 1.9432 0.0538 6.5344 0.0000 5.6225 0.0000 3.8125 0.0002 7.1338 0.0000 2.9616 0.0035 4.8899 0.0000

11.9436 0.0000

Variable

Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter

Reagan


Reagan


Reagan




TABLE 3

Soviet Leaders and U.S.-Soviet Interactions

Variable Coefficient Standard Error t Statistic p Value

Dependent variable: U.S. conflict toward USSR Log-likelihood = -1026.6328

263.9000 29.9733 8.8045 0.0000 134.4348 19.7638 6.8021 0.0000 103.6944 15.7973 6.5640 0.0000 270.0000 54.7236 4.9339 0.0000 179.3333 77.3908 2.3172 0.0218 267.9375 33.5112 7.9955 0.0000

Dependent variable: U.S. cooperation toward USSR Log-likelihood = -888.8281

28.1500 12.8698 2.1873 0.0302 54.6739 8.4861 6.4428 0.0000 79.7083 6.7830 11.7513 0.0000

113.6667 23.4969 4.8375 0.0000 156.0000 33.2296 4.6946 0.0000 177.1250 14.3888 12.3099 0.0000

Dependent variable: USSR conflict toward United States Log-likelihood = -1067.7919

277.2500 38.5832 7.1858 0.0000 237.9565 25.4410 9.3533 0.0000 157.7083 20.3352 7.7555 0.0000 411.3333 70.4430 5.8392 0.0000 359.6667 99.6215 3.6103 0.0004 225.5625 43.1374 5.2289 0.0000

Stalin Khrushchev Brezhnev

Andropov Chernenko Gorbachev

NOTE: There were 163 case

Dependent variable: USSR cooperation toward United States

Log-likelihood = -889.3787 26.9000 12.9133 2.0831 0.0389 77.4783 8.5148 9.0993 0.0000 70.0556 6.8059 10.2933 0.0000 90.0000 23.5764 3.8174 0.0002

122.0000 33.3420 3.6590 0.0003 170.2500 14.4375 11.7922 0.0000

s. An OLS estimator was used.

level of conflict sent and received by the United States and the Soviet Union

during these two periods was roughly equal. Second, one sees a steady climb - except during the Johnson and Ford presidencies - of U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union; Soviet cooperation is greatest during the Reagan










presidency. Third, consonant with much diplomatic history, Soviet conflict behavior was lowest during the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras. However, U.S. conflict was high and roughly equal during the Stalin and Gorbachev eras. Finally, in terms of cooperation, one sees a steady climb both for the Soviet Union and the United States over time through the successive leadership periods of Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chemenko, and Gorbachev. For the analysis using Soviet leaders, all variables were positive and statistically significant.

These interesting results, although descriptive in nature, suggest marked transformation in U.S.-Soviet relations. That transformation is characterized by a cyclical pattern of conflict behavior over successive U.S. leaders, and by a steady climb of cooperative interactions in regard to successive Soviet leaders. Descriptively, the norms of interactions, both cooperative and conflictual, appeared to change rather regularly. We return to these results in the analysis of our causal models.

ACTION-REACTION MODELS

Table 4 presents the full information maximum likelihood estimates of structural equations 1 and 2. In general, one can see that both memory and reactivity are important predictors of U.S.-Soviet foreign policy interactions.

With the exception of Soviet conflict reciprocity, all of the variables have t ratios considerably larger than the critical value. With the exception of U.S. cooperative reciprocity, these coefficients all have positive values, as we hypothesized. In all instances, lagged values of each nations' prior behavior is strongly linked to current behavior.

Reciprocity, however, does not exhibit this symmetry of response. In particular, these results suggest that U.S. conflict behavior during this period was a function of the conflict it received from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not pay much attention to the level of conflict it received from the United States, apparently; instead, its conflict behavior was driven largely by memory of prior Soviet conflict actions. On the cooperative front, the asymmetry is reversed. The Soviet Union reciprocated cooperation it received from the United States with cooperation; the United States, on the other hand, reduced its cooperation with the Soviet Union in proportion to the level of cooperation it received.

We also check a model in which the raw series are logged and then differenced in order to ensure mean and variance stability. In such a model, proportional reciprocity would only be indicated by positive parameters in the interval of (0,1]. Our results again show the absence of mutual reciprocity




TABLE 4

Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates of U.S.-Soviet Conflict and Cooperation, 1948-1988

Lagged Endogenous Reciprocal Testfor Serial

Dyad Constant Variable Variable R Correlation

Conflict U.S. to USSR 47.65 .359 .238 .37 t = -.545

(2.64) (6.74) (5.60) USSR to U.S. 96.74 .595 -.101 .29 t = -.297

(3.52) (10.11) (1.302) Cooperation

U.S. to USSR 22.22 .900 -.181 .28 p = -.308

(2.93) (14.78) (3.57) corrected USSR to U.S. 23.40 .227 .480 .63 t = 1.54

(3.27) (4.28) (9.59)

NOTE: Values in parentheses are t statistics with signs omitted; N = 162 quarters. Equations exhibiting serial correlation have been corrected and the equation set in which they occur reestimated with N = 161 quarters. The critical value of t statistics for a 5% probability level is 1.96. These t statistics are based on robust standard errors.

ity when we use differenced logs of the raw series. We will subsequently examine further the stability of the series in the error correction model.

The story that these coefficients suggest is perhaps a story of the second Cold War, now waning. The United States was very attentive and responsive to Soviet conflict. In terms of cooperation, the United States was wary of cooperative initiatives, even reducing cooperation with the Soviet Union in response to Soviet cooperation. When Soviet cooperation waned, the U.S. increased cooperative initiatives. For the Soviet Union, foreign policy seems largely to have ignored U.S. conflict toward the USSR. Yet it appears that the Soviet decision makers were inclined to respond positively to U.S. cooperation. Neither of these patterns is mutually reinforcing. The cooperation "spiral" was blocked by U.S. reluctance to reciprocate cooperative Soviet moves; the conflict spiral was blocked by Soviet disregard for U.S. conflict.

In order to check whether the leadership styles of different U.S. and Soviet heads of state might influence the stability of this model, we regressed the errors from these equations (1 and 2) against the dummy variables for leadership tenure. The residuals of U.S. conflict behavior to the Soviet Union were correlated with the leadership tenure of Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and Mikhail Gorbachev. U.S. cooperative behavior toward




the Soviet Union was correlated with the tenure, however short, of Konstantin Chernenko, and Soviet cooperation was correlated with Gorbachev's tenure in office. No other variables were correlated with the residuals from the action-reaction model. Accordingly, we introduced these dummy variables into our model and reestimated it. The full results are available from the authors. The results of the FIML estimations showed that Truman and Gorbachev remain significant influences on U.S. conflict behavior, beyond the action-reaction dynamic, but that the other leadership variables are insignificant influences in system estimation. Thus, in the early days after the Second World War, U.S.-Soviet relations were driven both by an action-reaction dynamic and by other influences during the Truman years. In a similar way, the action-reaction dynamic is complemented by different levels of conflict behavior during the Gorbachev years. The cooperation results do not show evidence that leadership variables add additional information to the action-reaction cycle.

Further, to compare our results with those reported in Goldstein (1991b), we analyzed the action-reaction model for monthly as well as weekly aggregations. By and large the monthly aggregations revealed the same pattern of coefficients as the quarterly results. Weekly aggregations, however, showed no evidence of conflictual reciprocity whatsoever. Weekly cooperative reciprocity was evident for the United States but largely absent for the Soviet Union. Thus the quarterly and monthly patterns are consistent with one another, but these patterns do not appear when the data is analyzed on a weekly basis.

ERROR CORRECTION MODELS

The results of the cointegration and error correction tests are presented in Table 5.

Our earlier results for WEIS (1966-1979) and COPDAB (1948-1978) data for the shorter time frames suggested that U.S. and Soviet behavior (both conflict and cooperation) were cointegrated. That is, an underlying linkage between U.S.-Soviet behavior perpetuated the system and sustained it in long-run equilibrium. Short-term action-reaction may have been present, but it is clear that long-run properties of the system of U.S.-Soviet interactions were a set of trajectories coupled together. The results from the longer, integrated data set used here (1948-1988) are basically the same, although slightly stronger.

All series show evidence of statistically significant error correction. We find that the presence of information from the previous eight quarters, errors from simple contemporaneous predictions served to influence changes in




TABLE 5

Cointegration Tests for U.S.-Soviet Conflict and Cooperation, 1948-1988

Equation Test for Stationarity CRDW DF ADF Error Correction

Conflict U.S. to USSR 14.03 1.27 8.63 3.94 3.31 USSR to U.S. 19.11 0.98 7.28 3.58 2.93

Cooperation U.S. to USSR 19.59 1.13 7.99 4.37 2.04 USSR to U.S. 15.62 1.46 9.62 3.51 2.09

Critical values: t DW t t t 5% 1.96 0.386 3.37 3.17 1.96

NOTE: Signs have been omitted from the t tests. Critical values for CRDW, DF, and ADF were taken from Engle and Granger (1987) and Engle and Yoo (1987) and standard t values were used for stationarity and error correction tests. For the ADF tests, eight augmentation lags were included, that is, 2 years prior. For the error correction model, eight lags were included for each model. This proved nonsignificant for Soviet-U.S. cooperation, as did four augmentation lags. We found that three augmentation lags were significant, however.

U.S. and Soviet conflict and cooperation with each other. For the case of Soviet cooperation, more than three lags of prior information turned out to be nonsignificant.

In order to check the robustness of these findings against plausible nonstationarity of the residuals, namely changes in leadership, we reexam- ined the error correction model, including the leadership variables.

With a single exception, no leadership variables were significant in any of the error correction equations. Lyndon Johnson's presidency provided that exception, showing a negative coefficient in the U.S. conflict error correction model (p = .0468). This suggests that to a greater degree than the action-reaction models, the error correction models tend to capture the underlying changes in the norms of interaction.

In Table 6 we present the statistical results of the simple error correction models, without augmentation lags, using a SURE estimator. These show the presence of strong error correction, in view of the statistically significant negative coefficients. The United States appeared to pay more attention to the conflict errors, whereas the Soviet Union had a relatively higher coefficient for the cooperative term.

A plausible rendition of this statistical information is that in attempting to predict each other's foreign policy, past "errors," that is, underestimation or overestimation of prior behaviors, tended to be useful pieces of information. Prior mistakes are strong predictors of changes in current policy. Memory of the past appears to have included information at least 2 years prior for



358 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

TABLE 6

Error Correction Estimates

Constant Error correcti(

Constant Error correcti



Coefficient Standard Error t statistic p Value

Dependent variable: First difference of U.S. conflict toward USSR

Log-likelihood = -2042.1296 -1.3064 10.3802 -0.1259 0.9000 -0.5374 0.0773 -6.9497 0.0000 on

Dependent variable: First difference of USSR conflict toward United States Log-likelihood = -2042.1296

-2.4478 11.8414 -0.2067 0.8365 on -0.3396 0.0724 -4.6928 0.0000

Dependent variable: First difference of U.S. cooperation toward USSR Log-likelihood = -1716.1917

0.0606 4.5663 0.0133 0.9894 on -0.2000 0.0917 -2.1806 0.0306

Dependent variable: First difference of USSR cooperation toward United States

Log-likelihood = -1716.1917 -0.0199 4.8047 -0.0041 0.9967

on -0.5978 0.1000 -5.9777 0.0000

NOTE: There were 162 cases. A SURE estimator was used for the conflict and cooperation equations.

conflictual interactions. However, it does appear that the Soviet Union had a rather shorter time horizon for evaluating the importance of its past mispredictions of U.S. behavior.

Thus the cointegration analysis reveals that despite the fact that reinforcing interaction between the United States and Soviet Union was not revealed by the structural model, internally self-correcting processes were at work within each nation. It is our contention that these internal self-corrections served to reinforce the blocking of conflict and cooperation spirals. We have examined the cointegration model for monthly as well as weekly aggregations, to check Freeman's (1990) and Goldstein's (1991b) assertions that larger aggregations tend to wash out reciprocity effects. We found that for quarterly aggregations, as in both monthly and weekly aggregations, conflict and cooperation are cointegrated and that an error correction term is an important and statistically significant predictor of behavior patterns. Suc- cinctly, quarterly, monthly, and weekly aggregations all show the same

Variable




'0.8;

*: * ?. o 0.6 ' .

g 0.4-

0.2 J ?

o- |Reagan

-0 .2 i~ ,,. . . I ,

,, ,

,,r I.. ., ,I I J v. IT I Ill IT ,, ,i .... , ,, IT l - - ,T . Ill I 62:1 64:1 66:1 68:1 70:1 72:1 74:1 76:1 78:1 80:1 82:1 84:1 86:1 88:1

Year

United States --

Soviet Union

Figure 1: Time-Varying Conflict Memory Coefficients

pattern of cointegration and error correction mechanisms. These results are available from the authors.

TIME-VARYING MODELS

Using a 50-quarter moving time frame, we estimated the coefficients of the action-reaction structural equations as well as the error correction coefficients. These were estimated using a FIML estimator for the conflict and cooperation equations separately, without correcting for serial correlation. Figure 1 portrays the time evolution of the "memory" coefficient in the action-reaction model, for both the United States and the Soviet Union.

U.S. memory of past conflict levels with the Soviet Union was not drastically altered by either Reagan's or Gorbachev's assumptions of power. There is some evidence of a decrease in the magnitude of U.S. conflict memory after 1980, and some evidence of an increase in conflict memory subsequent to 1985, but these fluctuations are not all that startling or impres-




IReagan 0.5 : | L

C. . .. .5

0' C) * * o ~ .

C)

United States -- Soviet Union

50% during the Gorbachevev regime.

: :

-2.5 '

62:1 64:1 66:1 68:1 70:1 72:1 74:1 76:1 78:1 80:1 82:1 84:1 86:1 88:1

Year

W- United States -raw Soviet Union

Figure 2: TimeVarying Conflict Reciprocity Coeifficients

sive. Much more dramatic changes may be seen in Soviet memory coefficients. Following a sharp decline in conflict memory in 1979, values for the Soviet memory coefficients climbed to new heights during the first 4 years of the Reagan presidency, then equally dramatically fell off again by about 50% during the Gorbachev regime.

We note that the raw series do not exhibit implausible changes across the change of coding regimes as we asserted. This is difficult to untangle, however, because the last quarter of 1979 was a fairly conflictual period in U.S.-Sov iet relations, including as it did the December invasion of Afghan- istan. If the coding were at issue, one would expect that the first quarter of 1979 would show scale changes. It does not. However, there is a significantly larger volume of transactions, conflictual and cooperative, in the post-1978 period. We believe that this reflects the reality of U.S.-Soviet relations during this period.

Figure 2 illustrates the changes in conflict reactivity over time and in relation to the Reagan and Gorbachev regimes.

During the last one-half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union has a large, negative coefficient for reactivity, indicating that it reduced its conflict with




CE 15-- Gorbachev /

a) \ O o

1[Reaganj E

0.5

.... -_ - .....

. 5 t r I I t 1 I t I II 1111 1 1 I t I I II I ,I I I Tt III tI I I I I I ITi i j 1 1 1i T i i 1 1 1 1 1 I T r i 62:1 64:1 66:1 68:1 70:1 72:1 74:1 76:1 78:1 80:1 82:1 84:1 86:1 88:1

Year

- United States ---- Soviet Union

Figure 3: Time-Varying Cooperation Memory Coefficients

the U.S. in the face of U.S. conflict, and further that decreased U.S. conflict was associated with increased Soviet conflict. This situation is markedly changed after 1980 and again in 1985. U.S. conflict reactivity remained positive throughout the entire period, showing an increase during Reagan's first term and a slight decrease during the first several years of Gorbachev's regime.

Turning to the cooperative interactions, portrayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4, we see the basic story of the 1980s. In particular, U.S. memory of Soviet cooperation was very low and declining during the first 4 years of Reagan's presidency. Similarly, Soviet memory of U.S. cooperation was also very weak and declining-until Gorbachev gains power in the Soviet Union. Thereafter, U.S. memory of Soviet cooperation grew at a very rapid pace to a level that is above 2.0. After 1985, Soviet memory of U.S. cooperation behaviors began to grow as well, though not as fast. Cooperation reactivity (Figure 6) was constant in the U.S. from 1980 to 1985, but grew quickly negative (and large) after Gorbachev assumes the leadership of the Soviet Union.



362 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

0 Gorbachev 01 ...

0

t-2 A

-3-- -

62:1 64:1 66:1 68:1 70:1 72:1 74:1 76:1 78:1 80:1 82:1 84:1 86:1 88:1 Year

- United States --.- Soviet Union

Figure 4: Time-Varying Cooperation Reciprocity Coefficients

Thus after Gorbachev, increases in cooperation from the Soviet Union were likely to be responded to with (larger) decreases in U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union, but at the same time the U.S. began to recognize and "remember" past Soviet cooperation in a diligent way.

Finally, we display the time-varying error correction coefficients for our 50 quarter windows in Figure 5 and Figure 6. In these figures, positive error correction coefficients suggest that error amplification is taking place. If the level of conflict sent last quarter, for example, were not reciprocated at the same level, this would suggest a positive error, and a positive error correction coefficient would then basically suggest that even more conflict should be sent in the current period. If the error correction coefficient is negative, then a positive error would suggest a reduction in the amount of conflict sent

during the current period. During the first part of the period analyzed there is a strong degree of error

correction in U.S. foreign policy decision making. This falls off dramatically during the middle of the time frame, and it is not until after the first quarter of 1981 that values again begin to indicate strong error correction. In terms of Soviet conflict error correction coefficients, they begin at modest levels




(,)

0

O ; ' Gorbachev

- -0.6 - 0s 2 A

-0.8 V,^ V \

621 64:1 66:1 68:1 70:1 72:1 741 76:1 78:1 80:1 T82:1 84:1 86:1 88:1 621 64:1 66:1 68:1 70:1 721 74:1 761 781 801 821 841 86 88:1 Year

|-- United States ---- Soviet Union |

Figure 5: Time-Varying Conflict Error Correction Coefficients

during the early time frames (the 1950-1960 period roughly); then they fluctuate around a value of zero, indicating disregard for past mispredictions of U.S. conflict; then one sees a strong movement toward error correction behavior during the 1960s and 1970s, roughly corresponding to the early Brezhnev years. Subsequently, and after the fall of Saigon, these values tend to move back toward the indifference point. Finally, after Gorbachev takes office in March of 1985, the Soviets appear to disregard or pay very little attention to their mispredictions of U.S. conflict behavior in determining their own behavior toward the United States.

In terms of cooperative error correction, we note that the U.S. coefficient indicates behavior that was "dysfunctional" until the 1970s; that is, U.S. behavior amplified its past mispredictions in generating current behavior. However, after the 1970s this is reversed, and the United States showed strong increases in error correction behavior until the Gorbachev era when the extent of error correction is again reduced. Soviet error correction was strongly negative, although it began to fluctuate after 1981.

In terms of the general dynamic suggested by these coefficients, we note that except for brief periods, it was not until recent years that U.S. and Soviet




o co ?ea/ ap r t Gorbachevt 0

0 -0.5 '. '

o -1 0

LU -1.5 Reagan

-2 62:1 64:1 66:1 68:1 70:1 72:1 74:1 76:1 78:1 80:1 82:1 84:1 86:1 88:1

Year

- United States ------ Soviet Union

Figure 6: Time-Varying Cooperation Error Correction Coefficients

self-correcting foreign policy mechanisms were all working in the same

direction, both for conflict and cooperation. One notices in the graphs that

cooperation appears to be characterized by the United States and Soviet Union typically being out of synch with one another, especially during the

period prior to 1976. Moreover, one sees that the dynamics themselves tended to undergo considerable change from time to time, but that recently- especially after Gorbachev - we find some reasons to be increasingly hope- ful that a cooperative norm may emerge, that is, one that is not blocked by nonreciprocity or asynchronous responses.

The results of the time-varying action-reaction and error correction models both indicate that U.S.-Soviet relations changed over the past decade.

Time-varying estimates of the action-reaction model illustrate a sharp decrease in Soviet conflict memory during the Gorbachev regime whereas Soviet cooperation memory grew rapidly after Gorbachev's rise to power. Similarly, although Soviet cooperation remained relatively stable under

Gorbachev, there was a dramatic decrease in U.S. reciprocity to Soviet




cooperative behavior. Thus even though the U.S. recognized these changes, it was slow to adjust to these policy innovations.

The results of the time-varying estimates for the error correction model also support this assertion. It was only recently that the tendency toward error amplification of Soviet conflict behavior by the United States was muted. Increasingly, the Soviets have ignored U.S. conflict behavior, especially after the rise of Gorbachev.

CONCLUSIONS

We conducted several analyses, which we summarize here. Using a simple "dummy variable" approach, we demonstrated that different leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have exhibited different underlying levels of cooperation and conflict toward one another, and that these underlying levels have undergone considerable change over the last 4 decades. We then developed empirical estimates of structural parameters for an action-reaction process in U.S.-Soviet foreign policy interactions. These results indicate that memory played an important part in U.S.-Soviet relations and that U.S. and Soviet decision makers had different memories of similar lengths. The United States remembered a longer history of conflict behavior and the Soviet Union remembered a shorter history of U.S. cooperative behavior. We also found the "norm" of reciprocity shaped U.S.-Soviet relations, especially so when the 1980s are included in the analysis. In addition, the Soviet Union responded to received cooperation with further increases in the level of cooperation, whereas the U.S. tended to reduce cooperative behavior under such circumstances. Finally, Soviet cooperative initiatives altered the norms of behavior, but these changes tended to be viewed warily by U.S. decision makers. We found that introduction of leadership variables served to augment the explanatory power of the action-reaction model, in particular that both the Truman period and Gorbachev years, showed important deviations from the underlying model. Thus the model provided evidence that both memory and reaction were important, changing, and complicated aspects of U.S.- Soviet foreign policy interactions.

But what exactly does this memory and reaction look like? We examined an error correction model to further probe this question. What we found that conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union to be self-correcting. Second, although cooperation was also self-equilibrating, the Soviet Union exhibited a shorter time frame in evaluating U.S. policies (3 quarters) than




the U.S. in evaluating Soviet policies (8 quarters). We also noticed that in comparison to analyses of shorter time frames (e.g., 1948-1978 and 1966- 1979), the inclusion of the Reagan and Gorbachev eras - basically the decade of the 1980s-illustrated the changing nature of the norms of U.S.-Soviet interactions. Generally, we found that the error correction models were not improved by the addition of leadership variables, suggesting that the basic mechanism is one that applies across leadership eras.

Finally, in the face of evidence of changing norms, we examined time- varying versions of our models, focusing on the time evolution of memory, reaction, and error correction coefficients. Most important, these results illustrate that the Reagan and Gorbachev regimes brought about real shifts in the structure and the process of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Many prior efforts to analyze U.S.-Soviet foreign policy interactions have concluded that reciprocity is important, but that it exists only within certain time periods and not within others. Goldstein (1991b), for example, has shown that during the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. reciprocity was more consistent than Soviet reciprocity, but that this pattern has reversed itself in the last 2 decades. Thus it would appear that the reciprocity linkage is one that is not invariant over time. The cointegration approach followed here allows one to join the insights of the autoregressive approach with a mechanism that not only is more general, but also allows one to track the movement of the underlying linkages over time. Error correction mechanisms show how the short-term fluctuations and long-term equilibria are joined together.

The methodological implication is that the strong temporal restrictions of a VAR approach can be effectively complemented by specifying the error correction mechanism, thus removing another ad hoc constraint to under- standing reciprocity. The error correction tells how one stable "mini-epoch" may be transformed into another that has a different underlying equilibrium level. It shows how the conflictual norms of the 1950s and 1960s have been changed into more mixed norms in the 1970s and 1980s, and how they may continue to move toward more cooperative norms in the future.

The substantive implication is quite striking, also. If U.S. and Soviet foreign policies were linked together by a long-term relationship that was supported by and modified by their ability to monitor the environment and to make putatively corrective responses to it, it means that either the United States or the Soviet Union and its successor states can impart some "control" over the course of relations. We see clear evidence of this following the election of Reagan and also following the rise to power of Gorbachev. It would appear that the stable "rivalry" uncovered in the work of McGinnis and Williams (1989) is one that was altered effectively by each side. Setting




aside considerations of how "rational" these actors may be, it is still safe to conclude that the models and data employed here do not suggest the necessary continuation of lock-step rivalry in superpower relations. Rather, they suggest that all partners to a relationship have the power to redefine the long-term equilibrium of relations among them.

This analysis does not include the period from the beginning of 1989 to the present, a period of great change in the political terrain of the world. Nor does it encompass the fundamental changes in Europe, and notably the dis- integration of the Soviet Union and the widespread conflict in the Balkans. As domestic instability threatens to overwhelm foreign policy, the tempo for long-term cooperative stability threatens to disappear. Many are justifiably reluctant to use the term superpower in the 1990s, but it is well to remember that, although the military might not be all that it is or once was "cracked up to be," both the U.S. and the successors to the Soviet Union have potent arsenals. As seemingly fantastic as the crumbling of the Berlin Wall was in November of 1990, so was its erection in August of 1961. So too, was the brutal crushing of the pro-Democracy movement in China.

The world continues to be a dangerous place. The continued cooperation of the world's two most potent military forces is an opportunity that needs to be nurtured in these early days of the post-Yalta world.

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Reciprocity and Norms in U.S.-Soviet Foreign Policy