Releitura Gatt Artivo Xxiv

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ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SO PAULO DA FUNDAO GETULIO VARGASCENTRO DO COMRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO

Coordenadoras

Vera ThorstensenLuciana Maria de Oliveira

RELEITURA DOS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO RGO DE APELAO:

Efeitos na aplicao das regras do comrcio internacional

Acordo Geral sobre Tar i fas e Comrcio 1994 (GATT 1994)

Organizadora

Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin

Autores

Alessandra Deliberato ThoenenAlexandre Marques da Silva Martins

Alice Borges Fernandes PereiraCarina Costa de Oliveira

Carolina Szsz JaneteCynthia Kramer

Daniel Pezzutti Ribeiro TeixeiraFbio Morosini

Fabio Weinberg CroccoFabrizio Sardelli Panzini

Felipe de Andrade KrauszFrederico Arana Meira

Jacqueline Spolador LopesJoo Henrique Ribeiro Roriz

Jos Guilherme Moreno CaiadoJos Luiz Pimenta JniorLucas da Silva Tasquetto

Lucas Queiroz PiresLusa NiencheskiMatheus Bassani

Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin

Milena da Fonseca AzevedoNathalie Tiba SatoVera Kanas Grytz


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INTRODUO

Anlise do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comrcio de 1994 (GATT 1994) e da jurisprudncia consolidada pelo

rgo de Soluo de Controvrsias (DSB) da OMC

ACORDO GERAL SOBRE TARIFAS E COMRCIO (GATT 1994)

Artigo 1Vera Kanas GrytzFelipe de Andrade Krausz

IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls

Article I

General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment

1.1 With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection withimportation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports orexports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to allrules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all mattersreferred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity grantedby any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall beaccorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for theterritories of all other contracting parties.

1.2 The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not require the elimination of any preferences in

respect of import duties or charges which do not exceed the levels provided for in paragraph 4 of thisArticle and which fall within the following descriptions:

(a) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the territories listed in Annex A,subject to the conditions set forth therein;

(b) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories which on July 1, 1939, wereconnected by common sovereignty or relations of protection or suzerainty and which arelisted in Annexes B, C and D, subject to the conditions set forth therein;

(c) Preferences in force exclusively between the United States of America and the Republic ofCuba;

(d) Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries listed in Annexes E and F.1.3 The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to preferences between the countries formerly a part of

the Ottoman Empire and detached from it on July 24, 1923, provided such preferences are approvedunder paragraph 5 (1), of Article XXV which shall be applied in this respect in the light of paragraph1 of Article XXIX.

1.4 The margin of preference on any product in respect of which a preference is permitted underparagraph 2 of this Article but is not specifically set forth as a maximum margin of preference in theappropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement shall not exceed:

(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such Schedule, the differencebetween the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates provided for therein; if no


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preferential rate is provided for, the preferential rate shall for the purposes of this paragraphbe taken to be that in force on April 10, 1947, and, if no most-favoured-nation rate isprovided for, the margin shall not exceed the difference between the most-favoured-nationand preferential rates existing on April 10, 1947;

(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in the appropriate Schedule, thedifference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates existing on April 10,1947.

In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex G, the date of April 10, 1947, referred to insubparagraph (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be replaced by the respective dates set forth in that Annex.

Footnote 1: The authentic text erroneously reads subparagraph 5(a).

IB. Texto do Artigo em Portugus

Artigo ITratamento Geral de Nao mais Favorecida

1.1 Qualquer vantagem, favor, imunidade ou privilgio concedido por uma parte contratante em relao aum produto originrio de ou destinado a qualquer outro pas, ser imediata e incondicionalmenteestendido ao produtor similar, originrio do territrio de cada uma das outras partes contratantes ouao mesmo destinado, ste dispositivo se refere aos direitos aduaneiros e encargos de tda a naturezaque gravem a importao ou a exportao, ou a elas se relacionem, aos que recaiam sbre astransferncias internacionais de fundos para pagamento de importaes e exportaes, digam respeitoao mtodo de arrecadao dsses direitos e encargos ou ao conjunto de regulamentos ou formalidadesestabelecidos em conexo com a importao e exportao bem como aos assuntos incluidos nos 1e 2 do art. III.

1.2 As disposies do pargrafo primeiro do presente artigo no importaro na eliminao de quaisquer

preferncias com respeito a direitos aduaneiros ou encargos que no ultrapassem os limites fixados no 3 dste artigo e que se enquadrem nas seguintes descries:

(a) preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre dois ou mais dos territrios enumerados noAnexo A, subordinadas s condies nele estipuladas;

(b) preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre dois ou mais territrios que, em 1 de julho de1939, estavam sujeitos a uma soberania comum ou unidos por laos de proteo ou suzerania,os quais so enumerados nos Anexos B, C e D, dentro das condies nos mesmosestipulados;

(c) preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre os Estados Unidos da Amrica e a Repblica de

Cuba;

(d) preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre paises vizinhos mencionados nos Anexos E e F.

1.3 Quando no fr fixada especificamente a margem mxima de preferncia na correspondente listaanexada a ste Acrdo, a margem de preferncia sbre qualquer produto em relao ao qual sejapermitida uma, preferncia, de conformidade com o 2 do presente artigo, no poder exceder:

(a) relativamente aos direitos ou encargos sbre qualquer produto descrito nessa lista, a diferenaentre a taxa de nao mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial, que figuram na mesma lista; seno houver estipulao da taxa preferencial, esta, para os fins de aplicao do presentepargrafo, passar a ser a que estava em vigor em 10 de abril de 1947; se nenhuma taxa denao mais favorecida fr fixada, a margem no ultra-passar a diferena, existente em 10 deabril de 1947, entre a taxa aplicvel nao mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial;


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(b) no tocante aos direitos ou encargos sbre qualquer produto no descrito na listacorrespondente diferena, existente em 10 de abril de 1947, entre a taxa aplicvel naomais favorecida e a taxa preferencial.

No caso das partes contratantes mencionadas no Anexo G, a data de 10 de abril de 1947, citada nas alineas (a)e (b) do presente pargrafo, ser substituida pelas respectivas datas indicadas nesse anexo.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)

IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Na verso original do GATT em portugus, publicada pela Lei 313/1948, a traduo do pargrafo 3 estincorreta. Dessa forma, a traduo adequada do texto original deve compreender as disposies tal como soapresentadas, sugerindo-se a seguinte redao As disposies do pargrafo 1 no se aplicaro s prefernciasentre os pases que anteriormente foram parte do Imprio Otomano e dele se separaram em 24 de julho de1923, desde que tais preferncias sejam aprovadas nos termos do pargrafo 5, do Artigo XXV, que dever seraplicado de acordo com o pargrafo 1 do Artigo XXIX.

II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo I do GATT

1. Artigo IA interpretao do Artigo I do GATT pelos Painis e pelo rgo de Apelao foi construda com base nosseguintes elementos:

(a) Objeto e finalidade (Object and purpose);(b) mbito de aplicao (Scope of application);(c) Ordem de exame (Order of examination);(d) Qualquer vantagem, favor, privilgio ou imunidade concedida por qualquer Pas Membro (anyadvantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member):(i) Geral (General); e(ii) Atribuio de quotas tarifrias (Allocation of tariff quotas).(e) Produtos similares (like products);(f) Qualquer produto originrio ou destinado para outro pas (any product originating in or destined foranother country); e(g) Ser outorgada imediata e incondicionalmente (shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally).

a) Objeto e finalidadeRelatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Aff ecting the Automotive I ndustry(Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R eWT/DS142/AB/R,para. 84

esse caso o rgo de Apelao aponta que o objeto e a finalidade do Artigo I do GATT so plenamenteidentificveis como mandamento para aplicao do princpio da no discriminao no tratamento destinadoaos produtos similares importados, ao mesmo tempo em que tambm pretende ser incentivo para que hajacontinuidade nas concesses tarifrias negociadas, e sua consequente generalizao entre todos os Membros.

Para. 84.The object and purpose of Article I:1 supports our interpretation. That object and purpose is toprohibit discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries. The prohibitionof discrimination in Article I:1 also serves as an incentive for concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be

extended to all other Members on an MFN basis.b) mbito de aplicao


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Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Aff ecting the Automotive I ndustry(Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R eWT/DS142/AB/R, para. 78

esse caso o rgo de Apelao estabeleceu que a cobertura da clusula da nao mais favorecida, tal comoestipulada pelo Artigo I do GATT, no limitada apenas ao seu mbito normativo, como proibio que seriao somente destinada as medidas restritivas e discriminatrias assim identificadas unicamente atravs de suas

disposies legais. Na verdade, inexiste qualquer limitao para proibio de medidas discriminatrias, sejamelas jurdicas ou na prtica contrrias ao Artigo I do GATT (de jureou de facto, respectivamente).

Para. 78.In approaching this question, we observe first that the words of Article I:1 do not restrict its scopeonly to cases in which the failure to accord an advantageto like products of all other Members appears onthe face of the measure, or can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of the measure. Neither the wordsde jurenor de factoappear in Article I:1. Nevertheless, we observe that Article I:1 does not cover onlyin law, or de jure, discrimination. As several GATT panel reports confirmed, Article I:1 covers also infact, or de facto, discrimination. (2)Like the Panel, we cannot accept Canada's argument that Article I:1

does not apply to measures which, on their face, are origin-neutral. (3)

c) Ordem de exame

Relatrio do Painel no litgio I ndonesia - Certain Measures Af fecting the Automobil e I ndustry (I ndonesia- Autos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Japo, EUA e Japo, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R,WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, para. 14.138

Neste Relatrio o Painel estrutura a ordem de exame das medidas potencialmente discriminatrias adotadasem face aos produtos similares importados, quando submetidas apreciao pelo DSB. Primeiramente, ficaestabelecido que a anlise das medidas deve ser realizada sob a tica das vantagens previstas no prprioArtigo I do GATT. Se os benefcios tarifrios e aduaneiros restarem classificados como tais vantagens,

caber ao Painel (ou ao rgo de Apelao) decidir se esses mesmos benefcios so oferecidos a todos osprodutos importados similares e se sua concesso realizada de maneira incondicional.

Para. 14.138.The Appellate Body, inBananas III, confirmed that to establish a violation of Article I, theremust be an advantage, of the type covered by Article I and which is not accorded unconditionally to all likeproductsof all WTO Members. Following this analysis, we shall first examine whether the tax and customsduty benefits are advantages of the types covered by Article I. Second, we shall decide whether theadvantages are offered (i) to all like products and (ii) unconditionally.

Relatrio do Painel no litgio Uni ted States - Defin iti ve Anti-Dumping and Countervaili ng Duti es onCertain Products fr om China (US - Anti -Dumping and Countervaili ng Duties) (China), Demandante:China, WT/DS379/R, para. 14.166

este Relatrio o Painel retoma os posicionamentos estabelecido em Indonesia - Certain Measures Affectinghe Automobile IndustryeEC - Bananas, quais sejam uma vantagem tal como definida pelas disposies dortigo I do GATT e sua extenso, incondicional ou no, para os produtos similares dos outros Membros,

consolidando os elementos a serem analisados durante o exame de conformidade de uma medida em relao asdisposies presentes ao Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 14.166.By its terms, three elements must be demonstrated to establish a violation of Article I:1: theremust be an advantage, (of the type covered by that provision) which is not accorded to all like productsof all WTO Members, unconditionally. (4)

d) Qualquer vantagem, favor, privilgio ou imunidade concedida por qualquer Membro


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(i) GeralRelatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Aff ecting the Automotive I ndustry(Canada - Autos), Demandantes: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R eWT/DS142/AB/R, para. 79

esse Relatrio o rgo de Apelao ressalta o carter abrangente da proibio contra medidasdiscriminatrias, destacando a incluso da totalidade das vantagens concedidas para quaisquer produtosdentro das disposies previstas no Artigo I do GATT. Nesse diapaso, cabe destacar que tais vantagens paraos seus respectivos produtos devem ser estendidas para quaisquer outros produtos similares, originrios deodos os Membros, de forma imediata e incondicional. Nota-se, portanto, o carter eminentemente amplo e

inclusivo das disposies do Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 79. We note next that Article I:1 requires that any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity grantedby any Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accordedimmediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all otherMembers.(emphasis added) The words of Article I:1 refer not to someadvantages granted with respect tothe subjects that fall within the defined scope of the Article, but to any advantage; not to some products,

but to any product ; and not to like products from some other Members, but to like products originating inor destined for all other Members.

(ii) Atribuio de quotas tarifrias

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio European Communi ties - Regime for the Importation, Sale andDistri bution of Bananas (EC - Bananas I I I ), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico eEUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 206

esse caso, o rgo de Apelao, em concordncia com a deciso anterior do Painel, aponta que quotasarifrias que resultam em vantagens, mas que apresentem requisitos discriminatrios para sua extenso

imediata s importaes de produtos similares de outros Membros, so proibidas pelo Artigo I:1 do GATT.

Para. 206. On the first issue, the Panel found that the procedural and administrative requirements of theactivity function rules for importing third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas differ from, and gosignificantly beyond, those required for importing traditional ACP bananas. This is a factual finding. Also, abroad definition has been given to the term advantage in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by the panel inUnited States - Non-Rubber Footwear. (5) It may well be that there are considerations of EC competitionpolicy at the basis of the activity function rules. This, however, does not legitimize the activity function rulesto the extent that these rules discriminate among like products originating from different Members. For thesereasons, we agree with the Panel that the activity function rules are an advantage granted to bananasimported from traditional ACP States, and not to bananas imported from other Members, within the meaningof Article I:1. Therefore, we uphold the Panel's finding that the activity function rules are inconsistent withArticle I:1 of the GATT 1994.

Relatrio do Painel em Eur opean Communit ies - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distri bution ofBananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico e EUA,WT/DS27/R/MEX, para. 7.239

esse caso o Painel recorda que o Artigo I:1 do GATT no permite que os Membros concedam tratamentosdiferenciados nos diversos procedimentos relativos importao de produtos, de modo que a discriminaoentre origens pudesse ser equilibrada atravs de diferentes concesses mais ou menos favorveis a dependerdo procedimento e da origem do produto.

Para. 7.239.The requirement to match EC import licences with BFA export certificates means that those

BFA banana suppliers who are initial holders of export certificates enjoy a commercial advantage comparedto banana suppliers from other third countries. (6)We note that it is not possible to ascertain how many of


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the initial BFA export certificate holders are BFA banana producers or to what extent the tariff quota rentshare that accrues to initial holders of BFA export certificates is passed on to the producers of BFA bananasin a way to create more favourable competitive opportunities for bananas of BFA origin. However, we alsonote that the possibility does exist to pass on tariff quota rent to BFA banana producers in such a way,whereas there is no such possibility in respect of non-BFA third-country banana producers. Thus, the EC'srequirement affects the competitive relationship between bananas of non-BFA third-country origin andbananas of BFA origin. It is certainly true that Article I of GATT is concerned with the treatment of foreignproducts originating from different foreign sources rather than with the treatment of the suppliers of theseproducts. In this respect, we note that the transfer of tariff quota rents which would normally accrue to initialholders of EC import licences to initial holders of BFA export certificates does occur when bananasoriginating in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua are, at some point, traded to the EC. Therefore, in ourview, the requirement to match EC import licences with BFA export certificates and thus the commercialvalue of export certificates are linked to the product at issue as required under Article I. In practice, from theperspective of EC importers who are Category A or C operators, bananas of non-BFA third country originappear to be more profitable than bananas of BFA origin. This is confirmed by the fact that EC importlicences for non-BFA third-country bananas and Category B licences for BFA bananas are typicallyoversubscribed in the first round of licence allocations, while Category A and C licences for BFA bananas

are usually exhausted only in the second round of the quarterly licence allocation procedure. The EC arguesthat the fact that licences allowing the importation of non-BFA bananas at in-quota tariff rates are usuallyexhausted in the first round amounts to an advantage for bananas of Complainants' origin. While we do notendorse the EC's view, even if this were to constitute an advantage, we note that Article I:1 does not permitbalancing more favourable treatment under some procedure against a less favourable treatment underothers. (7)

e) Produtos similares

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio I ndonesia - Certain Measures Af fecting the Automobil eIndustry (I ndonesia - Autos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Japo, EUA e Japo,WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, para. 14.141

esse caso o rgo de Apelao, ao confrontar-se com a questo de similaridade entre produtos nacionais eimportados, realiza uma anlise sobre as especificidades dos produtos em pauta, tendo como parmetros osargumentos sobre as suas caractersticas especficas tal como apresentados pelos Membros envolvidos emma controvrsia. Para o rgo de Apelao resta patente que se os produtos nacionais no forem singulares,

quando tanto eles quanto os produtos estrangeiros compartilham o mesmo segmento de mercado, semdiferenas relevantes no consumo, e sem evidencias que afastem a presuno de similaridade evidenciadadurante os procedimentos de soluo da controvrsia, o produto importado ser considerado como similar aoroduto nacional.

Para. 14.141.We have found in our discussion of like products under Article III:2 that certain importedmotor vehicles are like the National Car. (8)The same considerations justify a finding that such importedvehicles can be considered like National Cars imported from Korea for the purpose of Article I. We alsoconsider that parts and components imported from the complainants are like imports from Korea. Indonesiaconcedes that some parts and components are exactly the same for all cars. As to the parts and componentswhich arguably are specific to the National Car, Indonesia does not contest that they can be produced by thecomplainants companies. This fact confirms that the parts and components imported for use in the NationalCar are not unique. As before, we note in addition that the criteria for benefitting from reduced customsduties and taxes are not based on any factor which may affect per sethe physical characteristics of those carsand parts and components, or their end uses. In this regard, we note that past panels interpreting Article Ihave found that a legislation itself may violate that provision if it could lead in principle to less favourabletreatment of the same products.(9)

Relatrio do Painel no litgio Colombia - I ndicative Pri ces and Restri ctions on Ports of Entry(Colombia -Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panam, WT/DS366/R, para. 7.356


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esta deciso o Painel reconhece que medidas que possuem como critrio de incidncia para sua aplicao aorigem dos produtos, so contrrias s disposies do Artigo I do GATT, ainda que tal distino entre osrodutos similares somente pudesse ser realizada hipoteticamente. Observa-se que a clusula da nao mais

favorecida compreende obrigaes para com Membros que ainda no produzem o produto similar sujeito sedidas, mas que caso comeassem a produzi-los, estes estariam sujeitos a distines discriminatrias

nicamente por causa de sua origem.

Para. 7.356.The Appellate Body has previously recognized the possibility of using hypothetical imports todetermine whether a measure violates Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. (10) Under the advance importdeclaration and legalization requirements, the distinction between products is based on the circulation andpoints of departure of textile, apparel and footwear products prior to the products' arrival in Colombia. Inparticular, since Panama does not currently produce any of these products for export to Colombia, but in lightof the fact that the Panel views it as proper to consider Panama's claim, hypothetical imports from Panama orthe CFZ are appropriate for consideration. An advance import declaration, advance payment of customsduties and taxes, and special rules concerning legalization would be required simply because of the products'origin. In the Panel's view, the hypothetical origin-based distinction that would arise if Panama were toproduce the subject goods and export those goods to Colombia is sufficient for the Panel to proceed in

considering Panama's claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.

Relatrio do Painel em United States - Certain M easures Af fecting Imports of Poul try from China(USPoultry) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R, paras. 7.423-7.429

esse caso o Painel discorre sobre a questo da comparao entre produtos nacionais e importados e suaconsequente similaridade. A problemtica central se a comparao entre produtos vis--vis deveria seripottica, considerando apenas se a origem o fator discriminatrio na aplicao de medidas restritivas na

importao. O Painel ressalta que esta anlise deve ser feita para cada caso individualmente, a fim deapurarem-se as suas especificidades particulares, determinantes na definio de similaridade entre produtos.

Para. 7.423.The Panel notes that Article I:1 requires a comparison between like products originating from

one country vis--visproducts originating from a WTO Member. The products to be compared in this disputeare the products at issue poultry products as defined by the PPIA originating from China vis--vispoultryproducts originating in the territory of other WTO Members which have been deemed equivalent by the FSIS.China argues that the Panel should follow a hypothetical like product analysis as several panels have donewhen confronted with origin-based discrimination (11), while the United States argues that the Panel shouldrely on the approach of the panel in the EC - Asbestosdispute because it dealt with the issue of likenessinthe context of products with different safety levels.(12)

Para. 7.424.The concept of like product has been abundantly interpreted in the prior decisions of panels andthe Appellate Body. Whatever the provision at issue, the Appellate Body has explained that a like productanalysis must always be done on a case-by-case basis.(13)

Para. 7.425.The traditional approach for determining likenesshas, in the main, consisted of employingfour general criteria: (14) (i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of theproducts; (iii) consumers' tastes and habits more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions andbehaviourin respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products.(15)

Para. 7.426.A different approach used by panels and the Appellate Body to determine the likeness of theproducts has been to assumehypotheticallythat two like products exist in the market place when one oftwo situations arises: first cases concerning origin-based discrimination, and second, cases where it was notpossible to make the like product comparison because offor examplea ban on imports.(16)

Para. 7.427.The panel in China Publications and Audiovisual Products(17)recalled the relevant WTO

jurisprudence which supports a hypothetical like product analysis where a difference in treatment betweendomestic and imported products is based exclusively on the products' origin. In these cases, the complainantdid not need to identify specific domestic and imported products and establish their likeness in terms of the


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traditional criteria in order to make a prima facie case of likeness. Instead, when origin is the sole criteriondistinguishing the products, it has been sufficient for a complainant to demonstrate that there can or will bedomestic and imported products that are like. (18) For example, the panels in Argentina Hides andLeather and Canada Wheat Exports and Grain Imports found in the context of Article III:2 of theGATT 1994, that where a Member draws an origin-based distinction in respect of internal taxes, acomparison of specific products is not required and, consequently, it is not necessary to examine the variouslikeness criteria.(19)We also note that panels have found that foreign origin cannot serve as a basis for adetermination that imported products are unlikedomestic ones.(20)

Para. 7.428.The panel in ColombiaPorts of Entryapplied a hypothetical like product analysis in respectof products originating from Panama and other WTO Members in the context of Article I:1. The measure atissue affected products coming from Panama into Colombia, whether originating or not in Panama. Panamadid not appear to produce goods for export to Colombia, but nevertheless the Panel considered Panama'sclaim. Based on the above jurisprudence under Article III of the GATT 1994 (21), the panel adopted ahypothetical likeness approach on the premise of an origin-based distinction that would arise if Panama wereto produce the subject goods and export them to Colombia. (22)The panel considered that if Panama were toproduce textiles, apparel and footwear, goods originating in Panama would be like products to those

originating in other countries.(23)Para. 7.429.We note that the United States has argued that the differing safety levels of poultry from Chinavis--vis other WTO Members may have an impact on the like products analysis. (24) However, theUnited States did not provide specific evidence relating to different safety levels between poultry productsfrom China and other WTO Members. Therefore, we see no reason not to proceed with the hypotheticallike products analysis and base our determination on whether the products alleged to be like aredistinguished solely because of their origin.

f) Qualquer produto originrio ou destinado para outro pas

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio European Communi ties - Regime for the Importation, Sale and

Distri bution of Bananas (EC - Bananas I I I ), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico eEUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190

essa disputa o rgo de Apelao ressalta a essncia do princpio da no discriminao, qual seja a origemdos produtos no poder ser caracterstica que os submeta a quaisquer medidas discriminatrias. Produtossimilares devem ser tratados de forma igual, independentemente de sua origem. Dessa forma, at mesmo oratamento domstico dispensado aos produtos similares, em determinados pases, no pode ser considerado,or outro Membro, como fundamento para tratamento discriminatrio na importao destes mesmosrodutos, uma vez que a distino na concesso de vantagens seria um critrio preponderantemente baseado

em origem de produtos.

Para. 190.The issue here is not whether the European Communities is correct in stating that two separateimport regimes exist for bananas, but whether the existence of two, or more, separate EC import regimes is ofany relevance for the application of the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex1A agreements. The essence of the non-discrimination obligations is that like products should be treatedequally, irrespective of their origin. As no participant disputes that all bananas are like products, the non-discrimination provisions apply to all imports of bananas, irrespective of whether and how a Membercategorizes or subdivides these imports for administrative or other reasons. If, by choosing a different legalbasis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying different tariff rates, a Member could avoid theapplication of the non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like products from different Members, theobject and purpose of the non-discrimination provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for aMember to circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1Aagreements, if these provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established by that Member.

g) Ser outorgada imediata e incondicionalmente


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Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio I ndonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobil eIndustry (I ndonesia - Autos), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Japo, EUA e Japo,WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R,paras. 14.145-14.147

esse Relatrio o rgo de Apelao observa que as vantagens concedidas a um produto importado devemser igualmente estendidas, ou seja, concedidas aos produtos similares de outras origens imediata eincondicionalmente. Dessa forma, no permitido suspender ou mesmo proibir a aplicao de vantagens aosrodutos similares em face de qualquer condio, inclusive estabelecer objees originrias de relaes

contratuais de mbito privado, o que tambm seria inconsistente com o escopo e as disposies do Artigo Ido GATT.

Para. 14.145.Indeed, it appears that the design and structure of the June 1996 car programme is such as toallow situations where another Members like product to a National Car imported by PT PTN from Koreawill be subject to much higher duties and sales taxes than those imposed on such National Cars. For example,customs duties as high as 200% can be imposed on finished motor vehicles while an imported National Carbenefits from a 0% customs duty. No taxes are imposed on a National Car while an imported like motorvehicle from another Member would be subject to a 35% sales tax. The distinction as to whether one product

is subject to 0 % duty and the other one is subject to 200% duty or whether one product is subject to 0% salestax and the other one is subject to a 35% sales tax, depends on whether or not PT TPN had made a dealwith that exporting company to produce that National Car, and is covered by the authorization of June 1996with specifications that correspond to those of the Kia car produced only in Korea. In the GATT/WTO, theright of Members cannot be made dependent upon, conditional on or even affected by, any private contractualobligations in place. (25)The existence of these conditions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article I:1which provides that tax and customs duty benefits accorded to products of one Member (here on Koreanproducts) be accorded to imported like products from other Members immediately and unconditionally.(26)

Para. 14.146. We note also that under the February 1996 car programme the granting of customs dutybenefits to parts and components is conditional to their being used in the assembly in Indonesia of a National

Car. The granting of tax benefits is conditional and limited to the only Pioneer company producing NationalCars. And there is also a third condition for these benefits: the meeting of certain local content targets.Indeed under all these car programmes, customs duty and tax benefits are conditional on achieving a certainlocal content value for the finished car. The existence of these conditions is inconsistent with the provisionsof Article I:1 which provides that tax and customs duty advantages accorded to products of one Member(here on Korean products) be accorded to imported like products from other Members immediately andunconditionally.

Para. 14.147. For the reasons discussed above, we consider that the June 1996 car programme whichintroduced discrimination between imports in the allocation of tax and customs duty benefits based onvarious conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves and the February 1996 carprogramme which also introduce discrimination between imports in the allocation of customs duty benefits

based on various conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves, are inconsistent with theprovisions of Article I of GATT.

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Aff ecting the Automotive I ndustry(Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R eWT/DS142/AB/R, paras. 81-82

esse Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao destaca a influncia e a penetrao da clusula da nao maisfavorecida para alm do Artigo I do GATT, com ocorrncia sistemtica em outras disposies do Quadro

ormativo da OMC, notadamente com reflexos diretos nas demais disposies do GATT.

Para. 81.Thus, from both the text of the measure and the Panel's conclusions about the practical operationof the measure, it is apparent to us that [w]ith respect to customs dutiesimposed on or in connect ion withimportation,Canada has granted an advantageto some products from some Members that Canada has


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not accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products originating in or destined for theterritories of all other Members.(emphasis added) And this, we conclude, is not consistent with Canada'sobligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.

Para 82.The context of Article I:1 within the GATT 1994 supports this conclusion. Apart from Article I:1,several MFN-type clauses dealing with varied matters are contained in the GATT 1994. (27) The veryexistence of these other clauses demonstrates the pervasive character of the MFN principle of non-discrimination.

Relatrio do Painel no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive I ndustry (Canada -Autos), Demandantes: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/R e WT/DS142/R, paras. 10.2210.25

esse caso, o Painel discorre sobre certos elementos presentes no Artigo I do GATT. Para o Painel, no ossvel identificar se uma vantagem foi estendida incondicionalmente sem um exame de possveis

discriminaes entre produtos similares de Membros diferentes. Sobre essa faceta do Artigo I do GATT, ecessrio destacar que a extenso incondicional de vantagens obrigao dos Membros da OMC, no

sendo possvel sua relativizao em face da situao ou conduta de outros Membros. Contudo, o Painelambm destaca que condies impostas, quando no relacionadas aos produtos em si e a sua origem, noso necessariamente contrrias ao Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 10.22. As explained below, we believe that this interpretation of Japan does not accord with theordinary meaning of the term unconditionally in Article I:1 in its context and in light of the object andpurpose of Article I:1. In our view, whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is accordedunconditionally cannot be determined independently of an examination of whether it involvesdiscrimination between like products of different countries.

Para. 10.23.Article I:1 requires that, if a Member grants any advantage to any product originating in theterritory of any other country, such advantage must be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the

like product originating in the territories of all other Members. We agree with Japan that the ordinarymeaning of unconditionally is not subject to conditions. However, in our view Japan misinterprets themeaning of the word unconditionally in the context in which it appears in Article I:1. The wordunconditionallyin Article I:1 does not pertain to the granting of an advantageper se, but to the obligationto accord to the like products of all Members an advantage which has been granted to any product originatingin any country. The purpose of Article I:1 is to ensure unconditional MFN treatment. In this context, weconsider that the obligation to accord unconditionally to third countries which are WTO Members anadvantage which has been granted to any other country means that the extension of that advantage may not bemade subject to conditions with respect to the situation or conduct of those countries. This means that anadvantage granted to the product of any country must be accorded to the like product of all WTO Memberswithout discrimination as to origin.

Para. 10.24.In this respect, it appears to us that there is an important distinction to be made between, on theone hand, the issue of whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is subject to conditions, and, onthe other, whether an advantage, once it has been granted to the product of any country, is accordedunconditionallyto the like product of all other Members. An advantage can be granted subject to conditionswithout necessarily implying that it is not accorded unconditionallyto the like product of other Members.More specifically, the fact that conditions attached to such an advantage are not related to the importedproduct itself does not necessarily imply that such conditions are discriminatory with respect to the origin ofimported products. We therefore do not believe that, as argued by Japan, the word unconditionally inArticle I:1 must be interpreted to mean that making an advantage conditional on criteria not related to theimported product itself isper seinconsistent with Article I:1, irrespective of whether and how such criteriarelate to the origin of the imported products.


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Para. 10.25.We thus find that Japan's argument is unsupported by the text of Article I:1. We also considerthat there is no support for this argument in the GATT and WTO reports cited by Japan. A review of thesereports shows that they were concerned with measures that were found to be inconsistent with Article I:1 notbecause they involved the application of conditions that were not related to the imported product but becausethey involved conditions that entailed different treatment of imported products depending upon their origin.

Relatrio do Painel em Colombia - I ndicative Pr ices and Restr ictions on Ports of Entry(Colombia - Portsof Entry), Demandante: Panam, WT/DS366/R, para. 7.366

esse Relatrio, o Painel reitera o posicionamento estabelecido em Canada Autoquanto proibio dediscriminao da concesso de vantagens em razo da origem dos produtos. Nesse escopo, a legislaoaduaneira, mesmo que com objetivo de evitar ilcitos, fica proibida de aplicar normas distintas com base naorigem dos produtos importados.

Para. 7.366.With respect to Colombia's view that it may condition its customs procedures on the need tocontrol and verify imported merchandise from Panama and to avoid circumvention of such laws andregulation through under-invoicing, fraud and smuggling, without violating Article I:1, the Panel reiterates

the view expressed in CanadaAutos (28) that conditions attached to an advantage granted in connectionwith the importation of a product will violate Article I:1 when such conditions discriminate with respect tothe origin of products. As such, in the Panel's view, Article I:1 prohibits Members from addressing suchconcerns through the use of customs rules that are applied on the basis of origin.

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Aff ecting the Automotive I ndustry(Colombia - Ports of Entr y), Demandante: Panam,WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R, paras. 83-84

essa deciso o rgo de Apelao aponta que, apesar do carter expansivo da clusula da nao maisfavorecida, existem diversas excees s disposies do Artigo I previstas no prprio GATT, como os

rtigos XX, XXI e XXIV.

Para. 83. The drafters also wrote various exceptions to the MFN principle into the GATT 1947 whichremain in the GATT 1994. (29)Canada invoked one such exception before the Panel, relating to customsunions and free trade areas under Article XXIV. This justification was rejected by the Panel, and the Panel'sfindings on Article XXIV were not appealed by Canada. Canada has invoked no other provision of theGATT 1994, or of any other covered agreement, that would justify the inconsistency of the import dutyexemption with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.

Para. 84.The object and purpose of Article I:1 supports our interpretation. That object and purpose is toprohibit discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries. The prohibitionof discrimination in Article I:1 also serves as an incentive for concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to beextended to all other Members on an MFN basis.

Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - I mport measures on certain products fr om theEuropean Communiti es (US - Certain EC Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias,WT/DS165/R, para. 6.54

esse caso, o Painel identifica diferenciao na regulamentao entre produtos domsticos e similaresimportados, e o exclusivo substrato para tal distino a origem destes produtos, e no as suas caractersticasrprias. Tal diferenciao discriminatria e, portanto, contrria ao Artigo I do GATT.

Para. 6.54. We find that the 3 March additional bonding requirements violated the most-favoured-nationclause of Article I (30) of GATT, as it was applicable only to imports from the European Communities,although identical products from other WTO Members were not the subject of such an additional bonding

requirements. The regulatory distinction (whether an additional bonding requirement is needed) was not


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based on any characteristic of the product but depended exclusively on the origin of the product and targetedexclusively some imports from the European Communities.(31)

Relatrio do Painel no litgio European Communiti es - Conditions for the Granting of Tar if f Preferencesto Developing Countr ies (EC - Tar if f Preferences), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS246/R, paras. 7.59-7.60

esse Relatrio, o Painel reconhece que a incondicionalidade da extenso das vantagens acordadas pararodutos similares podem relacionar-se a condies de compensaes comerciais. Entretanto, o Artigo I do

GATT tem uma abrangncia superior questo de exigncia de compensaes, que justamente coaduna-secom o sentido usual de incondicionalmente, qual seja, sem limitao ou sujeio a quaisquer condies.

Para. 7.59.In the Panel's view, moreover, the term unconditionallyin Article I:1 has a broader meaningthan simply that of not requiring compensation. While the Panel acknowledges the European Communities'argument that conditionality in the context of traditional MFN clauses in bilateral treaties may relate toconditions of trade compensation for receiving MFN treatment, the Panel does not consider this to be the fullmeaning of unconditionally under Article I:1. Rather, the Panel sees no reason not to give that term itsordinary meaning under Article I:1, that is, not limited by or subject to any conditions.(32)

Para. 7.60.Because the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are accorded only on the conditionthat the receiving countries are experiencing a certain gravity of drug problems, these tariff preferences arenot accorded unconditionally to the like products originating in all other WTO Members, as required byArticle I:1. The Panel therefore finds that the tariff advantages under the Drug Arrangements are notconsistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994.

III. Comentrios

O Artigo I do GATT dispe sobre um dos pilares fundamentais para o sistema multilateral de comrcio, qualseja o princpio ou clusula da nao mais favorecida (most favoured nation). Estabelece o Artigo emreferncia vedao discriminao quando da concesso de quaisquer vantagens e benefcios a determinados

produtos de certa origem, importando na exigncia de imediata extenso destas vantagens para outrosprodutos similares originrios ou destinados a todos os demais Membros da OMC. Prestigia-se, assim, aequidade no trato das relaes comerciais internacionais, com a disseminao de condies congruentes decompetio entre os diversos pases, caracterstica indissocivel da configurao do multilateralismo atual.

Tais disposies positivam a obrigao jurdica de manuteno da concorrncia entre produtos similares,independentemente de sua origem ou destino, na medida em que ingerncias discriminatrias de polticacomercial, quando institudas pelos Membros, so proibidas. Exige-se, assim, que a cada Membro sejamconcedidas vantagens como se fossem as mais benficas, simultaneamente expanso de benefciosnegociados aos demais Membros da OMC. Estabelece-se uma implicao automtica e direta das concessesbilaterais, que se tornam coletivas, uma vez que todos os Membros, mesmo que no tenham participadodiretamente das negociaes, adquiram as mesmas vantagens acordadas por aqueles que as negociaram.

As disposies do Artigo I do GATT fazem referncia medida a qual constitua vantagem, favor, imunidadeou privilgio (advantage, favour, privilege or immunity), o que representa, de modo geral, as possibilidadesde atuao dos Membros no mbito do comrcio internacional. Predendeu-se dimensionar a incidncia doprincpio da no discriminao todas as vantagens acordadas, extrapolando qualquer condicionanterelacionada concesso da medida em si. Mostra-se inequvoco o destaque objetiva limitao proibitiva deviolaes clusula da nao mais favorecida consubstanciada neste Artigo.

Nesse sentido, em Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, o rgo de Apelaoposicionou-se decisivamente sobre a extenso do princpio da no discriminao sob a gide do Artigo I doGATT, que extrapola qualquer restrio originria de eventual distino de jureou de facto, aplicveis a

uma medida que seja contestada. Em verdade, tal distino no est presente no Artigo I do GATT,exatamente por almejar a uma efetiva proibio contra a discriminao para alm do mbito puramentenormativo e a priori, propriamente abrangendo os efeitos provenientes da adoo de uma medida (i.e. muitas


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vezes o tratamento discriminatrio somente pode ser verificado quando da anlise da aplicao efetiva damedida, uma vez que seus efeitos concretos no poderiam ser depreendidos unicamente pela apreciao desuas disposies legais em abstrato).

Identifica o rgo de Apelao, que concedida medida que implique em qualquer vantagem para certosprodutos, esta deve ser estendida, imediata e incondicionalmente, a todos os outros Membros, sob pena deconsequente infrao ao Artigo I:1 do GATT. Portanto, a demonstrao da existncia desses trs elementos:(i) uma vantagem conferida ao produto oriundo de certa origem; (ii) no estendida a todos os produtossimilares dos demais Membros da OMC; ou, (iii) com imposio de condies para tanto, caracterizaviolao aos preceitos do Artigo I:1 do GATT, conforme destacado pelo rgo de Apelao em US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China).

O rgo de Apelao reafirmou, em EC - Bananas, seu entendimento sobre a caracterizao de violao aoArtigo I do GATT, quando da anlise de caso concreto sujeito ao sistema de soluo de controvrsias daOMC. Assim sendo, para que se estabelea uma violao clusula de nao mais favorecida, dever existiruma vantagem, do tipo compreendido pelo Artigo I do GATT, e que no concedida incondicionalmente, deforma generalizada para todos os Membros da OMC. A apreciao pelos Painis e pelo rgo de Apelao

em cada caso seguir essa avaliao segmentada em etapas.

O rgo de Apelao esclarece, em Canada - Auto, sobre a finalidade intrnseca que subjaz clusula danao mais favorecida, e que tambm seria consequncia de sua incidncia. Trata-se do estmulo que o ArtigoI:1 do GATT providencia para a concesso de novos benefcios, por consubstanciarem vantagens a seremestendidas, indiscriminadamente, a todos os Membros, multilateralizando as negociaes automaticamente.

As observaes do Painel em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China,fundamentadas na anterior deciso de outro Painel, em India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, soessenciais para uma compreenso adequada dos termos dispostos no Artigo I do GATT, fundamentalmentepara a abordagem apropriada de um caso concreto. Nesse sentido, Painel determinou que sero consideradasmedidas relacionadas importao, tal como prescrito no Artigo I do GATT, aquelas inteiramente

relacionadas ao processo de importao, assim como aquelas relacionadas aos demais aspectos relativos ouque impliquem em consequncias na importao.

No caso EC - Bananas, o Painel fixou o sentido de vantagenscom preciso, como sendo aquele ato queacarreta oportunidades competitivas mais favorveis ou que afeta a relao comercial de produtos de origensdiferentes. Retiram-se restries na abordagem dos resultados de medidas adotadas pelos pases, para alm dedistores pontuais no fluxo do comrcio, efetivamente se analisando as deformidades provocadas aoinstituir-se uma medida contrria ao Artigo I do GATT. Tal viso coaduna-se, assim, com a posio adotadapelo rgo de Apelao desde Canada - Auto, ou seja, a valorizao da grande amplitude da incidncia dadisposio legal qualquer vantagem(any advantage).

Ressalta o Painel, em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, que o

Artigo I:1 do GATT demanda que seja realizada uma comparao vis--vis entre produtos importados decertas origens em relao a produtos similares importados provenientes de outras origens, sendo estas todosos Membros da OMC. Nesse sentido, o Painel em Colombia - Ports of Entryutilizou-se de uma comparaohipottica entre produtos similares das demais origens, uma vez que a anlise dos produtos em concreto nofoi possvel.

Estabeleceu-se, consequentemente, a possibilidade de uma esfera de atuao para os Painis ou rgo deApelao que extrapola a limitao aos dados apresentados pelos Membros, podendo ser a medida submetidaa uma ponderao que considere danos futuros, em sincronia, portanto, com as disposies do Artigo I doGATT.

A expanso imediata e incondicionaldas vantagens concedidas tambm necessitou de uma abordagem parater seu contedo definido. Em CanadaAuto,prevaleceu o entendimento de que uma vantagem, na acepodo Artigo I do GATT, somente poder ser considerada como incondicionalmente concedida atravs de um


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levantamento sobre a ocorrncia, ou no, de discriminao entre produtos similares de diversas origens.Dessa forma, conforme tambm reforado em United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from theEuropean Communities, a concesso de vantagem diz respeito no somente a ela em si, mas, de formaindiscriminada, a quaisquer condies proporcionadas aos produtos originados de qualquer Membro.

A obrigao de no discriminao em relao s diferentes origens, encontra-se disposta no Artigo I:1. EsteArtigo versa sobre o tratamento oferecido pela clusula de nao mais favorecida, em que toda vantagemconcedida ao produto importado de qualquer pas deve ser extendida ao produto similar de todos os outrosMembros da OMC, independentemente de sua situao ou conduta. De modo similar, em Colombia -Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry,confirmou-se que a concesso de uma vantagem a umproduto importado em razo de sua origem proibida.

Apesar da importncia sistmica, algumas excees so permitidas, quando da adoo de certas medidaspelos Membros, em razo do princpio da nao mais favorecida. Tais ressalvas garantem o afastamento legale autorizado do Artigo I do GATT nos casos de direitos anti-dumping e compensatrios, trfego fronteirio eunies aduaneiras, waivers para tratamento tarifrio preferencial a PEDs e PMDRs, a enabling clause(clusula de habilitao) e mesmo as excees gerais contidas no Artigo XX do GATT.

De tais excees, cabe tecer comentrios adicionais sobre a enabling clause. Para tanto, o rgo de Apelaodeterminou, confirmando deciso anterior do Painel emEC - Tariff Preferences, que a enabling clause umaexceo ao Artigo I. Isso porque a funo da enabling clause justamente permitir a adoo de medidas queproporcionem tratamento diferencial e mais favorvel a alguns Membros em desenvolvimento, sem umaextenso imediata e incondicional aos demais Membros da OMC, o que, fora do mbito especial da enablingclause,consistiria em patente desrespeito s disposies do Artigo I do GATT.

Todavia, o rgo de Apelao tambm declarou que a regra consubstanciada no Artigo I:1 do GATTcontinua vigente e aplicvel nas hipteses de enabling clause. Dessa forma, o estudo da consistncia de umamedida deve passar primeiramente pelo crivo do Artigo I do GATT e, constatada infrao ao dispositivo emreferncia, dever proceder-se com a anlise da enabling clause como justificativa legal para tanto, uma vez

que incorpora uma regra mais especfica, a qual prevalece em caso de conflito.

Sobre a no discriminao no tratamento preferencial, declarou tambm, que o pargrafo 2(d) no constituiexceo ao pargrafo 2(a) da enabling clause,uma vez que se reconhece a existncia da categoria de Pasesde Menor Desenvolvimento Relativo (PMDRs), que podem receber, dada sua natureza especial, certasvantagens tarifrias, independentemente de sua extenso automtica aos demais Membros beneficiados.Ainda, dos pargrafos 3(a) e 3(c) se depreende que no h necessidade de que as preferncias tarifrias sejamproporcionadas igualmente, exatamente pelas necessidades objetivamente diferentes destes pases,ressalvando-se que existe a impossibilidade proibitiva de que tais condies resultem em gravameinjustificado aos demais Membros da OMC.

Finalmente, levantada a questo do nus de prova em relao aos fatos necessrios para indicar a

incompatibilidade da medida com o Artigo I do GATT e com a enabling clause. Para o rgo de Apelao,devido importncia dessa relao probatria, o encargo ser majoritariamente do Membro demandado,cabendo, entretanto, ao demandante a indicao de quais disposies da enabling clauseesto, teoricamente,sendo descumpridas.

Depreende-se, que os Painis e, principalmente, o rgo de Apelao, foram responsveis pela instituio deprecedentes especficos para a determinao do significado objetivo, e do processo de anlise, sobre medidasimpostas pelos Membros em relao s disposies do Artigo I do GATT, o que propiciou umauniformizao da abordagem deste tema no sistema de soluo de controvrsias da OMC. Ainda, possvelaveriguar que em diversos casos em que foi levantada a questo de violao ao Artigo I do GATT, no houveuma abordagem substancial da questo, seja por sucesso na fase de consulta, falha de argumentao dasPartes, ou pelo recurso economia judicial pelo Painel ou rgo de Apelao, consequncias representativasdo carter universal do princpio da no discriminao e da clusula de nao mais favorecida, e da suadisseminao no multilateralismo atual como reflexo do disposto no Artigo I do GATT.


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FOOTNOTES:

Footnote 2: We note, though, that the measures examined in those reports differed from the measure in this case. Two of thosereports dealt with like product issues: panel report, SpainTariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135, adopted 11 June 1981,BISD 28S/102; panel report, Canada/Japan Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, L/6470, adopted 19July 1989, BISD 36S/167. In this case, as we have noted, there is no dispute that the motor vehicles subject to the import duty

exemption are like products. Furthermore, two other reports dealt with measures which, on their face, discriminated on a strictoriginbasis, so that, at any given time, either everyproduct, or noproduct, of a particular origin was accorded an advantage. Seepanel report, Belgian Family Allowances, G/32, adopted 7 November 1952, BISD 1S/59; panel report, European EconomicCommunityImports of Beef from Canada, L/5099, adopted 10 March 1981, BISD 28S/92. In this case, motor vehicles imported intoCanada are not disadvantaged in that same sense.Footnote 3:Panel Report, para. 10.40.Footnote 4:Panel Report onIndonesiaAutos, para. 14.138, citing to Appellate Body Report onECBananas III.Footnote 5:Adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, para. 6.9.Footnote 6: Whereas the framework agreement provides that the signatory countries are authorized to issue export licences forseventy percent of their allocations, which licences are to be presented in order to obtain import licences of Category A and C forimport into the Community, in conditions which may improve the regularity and stability of commercial transactions and guaranteethe absence of any discriminatory treatment among operators(emphasis added). Recital 8 of Regulation 478/95.Footnote 7:The Panel ... considered that Article I:1 does not permit balancing more favourable treatment under some procedureagainst a less favourable treatment under others. If such a balancing were accepted, it would entitle a contracting party to derogatefrom the most-favoured nation obligation in one case, in respect of one contracting party, on the ground that it accords more

favourable treatment in some other case in respect of another contracting party. In the view of the Panel, such an interpretation ofthemost-favoured-nation obligation of Article I:1 would defeat the very purpose underlying the unconditionality of that obligation .Panel Report on United States - Denial of Most-favoured-nation Treatment as to Nonrubber Footwear from Brazil, adopted on 19June 1992, BISD 39S/128, 151, para. 6.10. Likewise, in the context of Article III a panel found that an element of more favourabletreatment would only be relevant if it would always accompany and offset an element of differential treatment causing less favourabletreatment.Panel Report on United States - Section 377 of the TariffAct of 1930, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, 388,para. 5.16.Footnote 8:We refer to our discussions in paragraphs 14.110 and 14.111 where we found that given that the Timor, Escort, 306,Optima and Corolla models are in the same market segments, there would not appear to be any relevant differences in respect ofconsumers' tastes and habits sufficient to render these products unlike. In our view, this evidence is also sufficient to establish apresumption of likeness between the Timor, Corolla, Escort, 306 and Optima for purposes of Article I of GATT. Since Indonesia hassubmitted no evidence or argument to rebut the presumption of likeness for purposes of Article I of GATT, we find that at least theseimported motor vehicles are like the National Car for purposes of Article I of GATT.Footnote 9: See for instance the Panel Report on United States - Denial of Most-favoured-nation Treatment as to Non-rubber

Footwear from Brazil, adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, para. 6.12.Footnote 10:Appellate Body Report, CanadaPeriodicals, pp. 20-21; see also Panel Report,IndonesiaAutos, para. 14.113.Footnote 11:China's first written submission, para. 89.Footnote 12:United States' first written submission, para. 98.Footnote 13:Appellate Body Report,ECAsbestos, para. 102.Footnote 14:Appellate Body Report,JapanAlcoholic Beverages II, p. 21, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 113 and, in particular, fn. 46; PanelReport, USGasoline, para. 6.8 (where the approach set forth in theBorder Tax Adjustment case was adopted in a dispute concerningArticle III:4 of the GATT 1994).Footnote 15:The fourth criterion, tariff classification, was not mentioned by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, but wasincluded by subsequent panels (e.g., GATT Panel Report, EEC Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2; GATT Panel Report, Japan Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.6; and Panel Report, USGasoline,para. 6.8; Appellate Body Report,JapanAlcoholic Beverages II,pp. 21-22, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 114.Footnote 16:Panel Report, CanadaPeriodicals, paras. 5.22-5.23 upheld by the Appellate Body Report, Canada Periodicals, p.12.Footnote 17:Panel Report, ChinaPublications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.1446.Footnote 18:Panel Report, IndonesiaAutos, para. 14.113; Panel Report, ArgentinaHides and Leather, paras. 11.168 -11.170;Panel Report, CanadaAutos, para. 10.74; Panel Report, IndiaAutos, paras. 7.174-7.176.Footnote 19:Panel Report, CanadaWheat Exports and Grain Imports, footnote 246 to para. 6.164.Footnote 20:Panel Report, USFSC(Article 21.5EC II), para. 8.133.Footnote 21:The panel referred to the Appellate Body Report, Canada Periodicals, pp. 20-21; Panel Report, IndonesiaAutos,para. 14.113. Panel Report, ColombiaPorts of Entry, footnote 648 to para. 7.356.Footnote 22:Panel Report, ColombiaPorts of Entry,para. 7.356.Footnote 23:Panel Report, ColombiaPorts of Entry,para. 7.357.Footnote 24:United States' first written submission, para. 98.Footnote 25: For instance in the FIRA case, the Panel rejected Canadas argument that the situation under examination was theconsequence of a private contract with an investor: 5.6 The Panel carefully examined the Canadian view that the purchaseundertakings should be considered as private contractual obligations of particular foreign investors vis--vis the Canadiangovernment. The Panel recognized that investors might have an economic advantage in assuming purchase undertakings, taking intoaccount the other conditions under which the investment was permitted. The Panel felt, however, that even if this were so, private

contractual obligations entered into by investors should not adversely affect the rights which contracting parties, including contracting


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parties not involved in the dispute, possess under Article III:4 of the General Agreement and which they can exercise on behalf oftheir exporters.SeeFIRA, op. cit, para. 5.6.Footnote 26:See Working Party Report on the Accession of Hungary, BISD 20S/34 adopted on 30 July 1973.Footnote 27: These relate to such matters as internal mixing requirements (Article III:7); cinema films (Article IV(b)); transit ofgoods (Article V:2, 5, 6); marks of origin (Article IX:1); quantitative restrictions (Article XIII:1); measures to assist economicdevelopment (Article XVIII:20); and measures for goods in short supply (Article XX(j)).Footnote 28:Panel Report, CanadaAutos, para. 10.23.

Footnote 29: Such as in Articles XX (general exceptions), XXI (security exceptions) and XXIV (customs unions and free tradeareas).Footnote 30: Article I:1 of GATT reads as follows: With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or inconnection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respectto the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation andexportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunitygranted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately andunconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. Footnote 31:Panel Report onIndonesiaCertain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry(IndonesiaAutomobiles), adoptedon 23 July 1998, WT/DS54,55,59, 64/R, para.14.147: For the reasons discussed above, we consider that the June 1996 carprogramme which introduced discrimination between imports in the allocation of tax and customs duty benefits based on variousconditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves and the February 1996 car programme which also introduceddiscrimination between imports in the allocation of customs duty benefits based on various conditions and other criteria not related tothe imports themselves, are inconsistent with the provisions of Article I of GATT.

Footnote 32:The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 3465.


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Artigo IIFabrizio Sardelli PanziniFrederico Arana MeiraJacqueline Spolador LopesJos Luiz Pimenta Jnior

IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls

Article I ISchedules of Concessions

2.1 (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting partiestreatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriateSchedule annexed to this Agreement.

(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which arethe products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the

territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualificationsset forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those setforth and provided therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties orcharges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of thoseimposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to beimposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.

(c) The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting party which arethe products of territories entitled under Article I to receive preferential treatment uponimportation into the territory to which the Schedule relates shall, on their importation intosuch territory, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule,be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part

II of that Schedule. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges ofany kind imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those imposed on thedate of this Agreement or those directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter bylegislation in force in the importing territory on that date. Nothing in this Article shallprevent any contracting party from maintaining its requirements existing on the date of thisAgreement as to the eligibility of goods for entry at preferential rates of duty.

2.2 Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time on theimportation of any product:

(a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from which

the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part;

(b) any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of ArticleVI;

(c) fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered.

2.3 No contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of converting currenciesso as to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexedto this Agreement.

2.4 If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a monopoly of theimportation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, suchmonopoly shall not, except as provided for in that Schedule or as otherwise agreed between the


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parties which initially negotiated the concession, operate so as to afford protection on the average inexcess of the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule. The provisions of this paragraphshall not limit the use by contracting parties of any form of assistance to domestic producerspermitted by other provisions of this Agreement.

2.5 If any contracting party considers that a product is not receiving from another contracting party thetreatment which the first contracting party believes to have been contemplated by a concessionprovided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, it shall bring the matter directlyto the attention of the other contracting party. If the latter agrees that the treatment contemplated wasthat claimed by the first contracting party, but declares that such treatment cannot be accordedbecause a court or other proper authority has ruled to the effect that the product involved cannot beclassified under the tariff laws of such contracting party so as to permit the treatment contemplatedin this Agreement, the two contracting parties, together with any other contracting partiessubstantially interested, shall enter promptly into further negotiations with a view to a compensatoryadjustment of the matter.

2.6 (a) The specific duties and charges included in the Schedules relating to contracting parties

members of the International Monetary Fund, and margins of preference in specific dutiesand charges maintained by such contracting parties, are expressed in the appropriatecurrency at the par value accepted or provisionally recognized by the Fund at the date of thisAgreement. Accordingly, in case this par value is reduced consistently with the Articles ofAgreement of the International Monetary Fund by more than twenty per centum, suchspecific duties and charges and margins of preference may be adjusted to take account ofsuch reduction; provided that the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e., the contracting partiesacting jointly as provided for in Article XXV) concur that such adjustments will not impairthe value of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule or elsewhere in thisAgreement, due account being taken of all factors which may influence the need for, orurgency of, such adjustments.

(b) Similar provisions shall apply to any contracting party not a member of the Fund, as from thedate on which such contracting party becomes a member of the Fund or enters into a specialexchange agreement in pursuance of Article XV.

2.7 The Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of thisAgreement.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Portugus

Artigo IIListas de Concesses

2.1 (a) Cada Parte Contratante conceder s outras Partes Contratantes, em matria comercial,

tratamento no menos favorvel do que o previsto na parte apropriada da listacorrespondente, anexa ao presente Acordo.

(b) Os produtos das Partes Contratantes, ao entrarem no territrio de outra Parte Contratante,ficaro isentos dos direitos aduaneiros ordinrios que ultrapassarem os direitos fixados naParte I da lista das concesses feitas por esta Parte Contratante, observados os termos,condies ou requisitos constantes da mesma lista. Esses produtos tambm ficaro isentosdos direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza, exigidos por ocasio da importao ou quecom a mesma se relacionem, e que ultrapassem os direitos ou encargos em vigor na data dopresente Acordo ou os que, como consequncia direta e obrigatria da legislao vigente nopas importador, na referida data, tenham de ser aplicados ulteriormente.

(c) Os produtos enumerados na Parte II da lista relativa a qualquer das Partes Contratantes,originrios de territrio que, em virtude do Artigo I, goze do direito de tratamento


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preferencial no tocante importao, ao serem importados, estaro isentos no territriocorrespondente a essa lista, da parte que exceder dos direitos aduaneiros ordinrios fixadosna Parte II dessa Lista. observados os termos, as condies ou requisitos constantes damesma. Esses produtos tambm ficaro isentos dos direitos ou encargos de qualquernatureza, exigidos por ocasio da importao ou que com a mesma se relacionem, e queultrapassem os direitos ou encargos em vigor na data do presente Acordo ou os que, comoconsequncia direta e obrigatria da legislao vigente na referida data, no pas importador,tenham de ser aplicados ulteriormente. Nenhuma disposio do presente Artigo impedir quequalquer Parte Contratante mantenha exigncias existentes na data do presente Acordo,quanto s condies de entrada dos produtos sujeitos s taxas dos direitos preferenciais.

2.2 Nenhuma disposio do presente Artigo impedir que, uma Parte Contratante, a qualquer tempo,aplique no tocante importao de qualquer produto:

(a) encargo equivalente a um imposto interno exigido, de conformidade como o disposto nopargrafo 2 do Artigo III, sobre um produto nacional similar ou uma mercadoria com a qualo produto importado tenha sido fabricado ou produzido no todo ou em parte;

(b) direitos destinados a contrabalanar ou a compensar o dumping quando, aplicados deconformidade com o disposto no Artigo VI (33);

(c) taxas ou outros encargos que guardem proporo com os custos dos servios prestados.2.3 Nenhuma Parte Contratante modificar seu mtodo de avaliao, para fins aduaneiros, ou de

converso de moedas, de maneira a diminuir o valor das concesses constantes da listacorrespondente, anexa ao presente Acordo.

2.4 Se uma das partes estabelecer, mantiver ou autorizar, de direito ou de fato, um monoplio daimportao de qualquer produto descrito na lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, tal

monoplio, ressalvadas as disposies em contrrio constantes dessa lista ou que, de outro modo,tenham sido acordadas entre as partes que inicialmente negociaram a concesso, no dever ter porefeito assegurar proteo mdia superior quela que prevista nessa lista. As disposies do presentepargrafo no limitaro o recurso das Partes Contratantes a qualquer forma de auxlio aos produtoresnacionais, permitida em outros dispositivos do presente Acordo.

2.5 Quando uma Parte Contratante considerar que um produto no est recebendo de uma outra ParteContratante tratamento que a primeira acredita ter sido atribudo por uma concesso constante dalista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, poder levar a questo diretamente consideraoda outra Parte Contratante. Se esta ltima concordar em que o tratamento reclamado o que estavaprevisto, mas declarar que tal tratamento no pode ser concedido por haver um tribunal ou outraautoridade competente decidido que ao produto em questo no pode ser classificado, consoante a

legislao alfandegria respectiva, de modo a permitir o tratamento previsto no presente Acordo, asduas partes constantes, juntamente com outras interessadas de modo substancial, iniciaro, o maisdepressa possvel, novas negociaes com o fim de alcanar um ajuste compensatrio.

2.6 (a) Os direitos especficos e encargos includos nas listas relativas s Partes Contratantes quesejam membros do Fundo Monetrio Internacional e as margens de preferncia nos direitosespecficos e encargos mantidos por essas Partes Contratantes so representados, nas moedasrespectivas, dentro da paridade aceita ou reconhecida provisoriamente pelo Fundo na data dopresente Acordo. Consequentemente, no caso de ser esse valor for reduzido, deconformidade com as clusulas estatutrias do Fundo Monetrio Internacional em mais devinte por cento, tais direitos especficos e encargos e as margens de preferncia podem serajustados de forma a levar em considerao essa reduo; desde que as Partes Contratantes(isto , as Partes Contratantes quando em ao conjunta, nos termos do Artigo XXV)convenham em que esses ajustamentos no importem em diminuir o valor das concesses


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constantes da lista respectiva ou de qualquer outra parte desse Acordo, levados em contatodos os fatores que possam influir quanto necessidade ou urgncia de tais ajustamentos.

(b) A qualquer Parte Contratante que no seja membro do Fundo, sero aplicveis disposiesanlogas a partir da data em que a mesma passe a ser membro do Fundo ou conclua umacordo especial de cmbio, na conformidade do que dispe o Artigo XV.

2.7 As listas anexas ao presente Acordo passam a constituir parte integrante da Parte I do mesmo.

Footnote 33:A verso original da Lei 313 de 30/07/1948 estabelece erroneamente ... no Artigo IV.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)

IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a observar.

II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo II

1. Artigo II Geral

O DSB identificou a importncia das concesses tarifrias seguirem os objetivos e propsitos do Acordo daOMC e do GATT 94, no que se refere segurana e previsibilidade.

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communit ies - Customs Classif ication of F rozen Boneless ChikenCuts(EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/R, paras. 7.328 e 7.427

Para. 7.328. In the Panel's view, the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion oflong-term preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule runs

counter to one of the objects and purposes of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994, namely that thesecurity and predictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements must be preserved.Therefore, the Panel concludes that an interpretation of the term salted in that concession to include thecriterion of long-term preservation could undermine the object and purpose of security and predictability,which lie at the heart of both the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994.

Para. 7.427.() the Panel recalls that a fundamental object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and theGATT 1994 is that the security and predictability of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangementsmust be preserved. In the Panel's view, a Member's unilateral intention regarding the meaning to be ascribedto a concession that Member has made in the context of WTO multilateral trade negotiations cannot prevailover the common intentions of all WTO Members as determined through an analysis undertaken pursuant toArticles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communi ties - Customs Classif ication of F rozenBoneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/AB/R e WT/DS286/AB/R,paras. 239 e 249

Para. 239.Having said this, we caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the purported objectand purposeof specific provisions, paragraphs or subparagraphs of the WTO agreements, or tariff headingsin Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty on the whole. Even if, arguendo, onecould rely on the specific object and purposeof heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule in isolation, we wouldshare the Panel's view that one Member's unilateral object and purpose for the conclusion of a tariffcommitment cannot form the basisfor an interpretation of that commitment, because interpretation in thelight of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention must focus on ascertaining the common intentions ofthe parties.


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Para. 249. In the light of these considerations, we see no reason to disturb the Panel's finding, in paragraph7.328 of the Panel Reports, that the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of long-term preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule ... couldundermine the object and purpose of security and predictability, which [underlie] both the WTO Agreementand the GATT 1994.

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communi ties and its Member States - Tari ff Treatment of CertainI nformation Technology Products (EC - IT Products),Demandante: EUA, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/Re WT/DS377/R, para. 7.1327

Para. 7.1327. On this basis, we consider that tariff concessions made by WTO Members should beinterpreted in such a way to further the objectives of preserving and upholding the security andpredictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantialreduction of tariffs and other trade barriers to trade. This includes consideration of the general objective ofthe expansion of trade and the substantial reduction of tariffs. However, a panel should take care not todisturb the balance of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions negotiated by parties.

2.

Artigo II.1(a)

a) Geral

O rgo de Apelao estabeleceu que as concesses devem ser consideradas no contexto do resultado de umentendimento recproco, conforme estabelecido na Conveno de Viena e em contraposio visounilateral das expectativas de apenas uma das Partes.

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain ComputerEqui pment (EC - Computer Equipment),Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R e WT/DS68/R,paras. 8.23-8.24, 8.26-8.27 e 8.45

Para. 8.23.The meaning of a particular expression in a tariff schedule cannot be determined in isolationfrom its context. It has to be interpreted in the context of Article II of GATT 1994 - a provision that gives therationale for the specification of products and duty rates in tariff schedules in the first place: i.e., theyconstitute a binding commitment arising out of a negotiation. It should be noted in this regard that theprotection of legitimate expectations in respect of tariff treatment of a bound item is one of the mostimportant functions of Article II. ()

Para. 8.24. () Although Article II:5 is a provision for the special bilateral procedure regarding tariffclassification, not directly at issue in this case, the existence of this provision confirms that legitimateexpectations are a vital element in the interpretation of Article II and tariff schedules.

Para. 8.26.In our view, it may, as a matter of fact, be the case that in nearly all instances, the ordinarymeaning of the terms of the actual description in a tariff schedule accurately reflects and exhausts the contentof the legitimate expectations. It is clearly the case that most descriptions are to be treated with the utmostcare to maintain their integrity precisely because, on their face, they normally constitute the most concrete,tangible and reliable evidence of commitments made. In our view, however, this cannot be the case a priorifor all tariff commitments. It must remain possible, at least in principle, that parties have legitimately formedexpectations based on other particular supplementary factors.

Para. 8.27.To deny this a priori would be to reduce the nature and meaning of commitments under ArticleII to a purely formal and mechanical task of noting descriptions in schedules. This would be to rob suchcommitments of the reality of the context in which they clearly occur in Article II.

Para. 8.45. We now turn to the examination of whether the actual tariff treatment of LAN equipmententitles the United States to legitimate expectations in this regard sufficient to establish its claim of a


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violation of Article II of GATT 1994 by the European Communities. In our view, an exporting Member'slegitimate expectations regarding tariff commitments are normally based, at a minimum, on the assumptionthat the actual tariff treatment accorded to a particular product at the time of the negotiation will becontinued unless such treatment is manifestly anomalous or there is information readily available to theexporting Member that clearly indicates the contrary. The existence of such expectations in tariffnegotiations can be seen in the fact that negotiators normally use actual trade data to calculate the effect ofrequestsand offers, and to evaluate the resulting tariff reductions in terms of trade-weighted average. Inother words, they work on the general assumption that the actual tariff treatment accorded to a particularproduct as traded is the relevant item for the purposes of negotiations.

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Eur opean Communi ties - Customs Classif ication of CertainComputer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/AB/R,WT/DS67/AB/R e WT/DS68/AB/R, paras. 81 e 84

Para. 81.Second, we reject the Panel's view that Article II:5 of the GATT 1994 confirms that legitimateexpectations are a vital element in the interpretationof Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 and of Members'Schedules. It is clear from the wording of Article II:5 that it does not support the Panel's view. This

paragraph recognizes the possibility that the treatment contemplated in a concession, provided for in aMember's Schedule, on a particular product, may differ from the treatment accorded to that product andprovides for a compensatory mechanism to rebalance the concessions between the two Members concernedin such a situation. However, nothing in Article II:5 suggests that the expectations of only the exportingMember can be the basis for interpreting a concession in a Member's Schedule for the purposes ofdetermining whether that Member has acted consistently with its obligations under Article II:1. Indiscussing Article II:5, the Panel overlooked the second sentence of that provision, which clarifies that thecontemplated treatmentreferred to in that provision is the treatment contemplated by both Members.

Para. 84.The purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is to ascertain thecommon intentions of the parties. These common intentions cannot be ascertained on the basis of thesubjective and unilaterally determined expectations of one of the parties to a treaty. Tariff concessions

provided for in a Member's Schedule - the interpretation of which is at issue here - are reciprocal and resultfrom a mutually-advantageous negotiation between importing and exporting Members. A Schedule is madean integral part of the GATT 1994 by Article II:7 of the GATT 1994. Therefore, the concessions providedfor in that Schedule are part of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only rules which may be applied ininterpreting the meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty in

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Releitura Gatt Artivo Xxiv