Remedial Law

Remedial Law

Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. v. DIGNO ALBAO JR. et al.

520 SCRA 539 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

When there‟s nothing remained to be resolved by the Regional Trial Court, it is a patent error for the appellate court to order the remand of the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), through its co-petitioner Janette Lagarejos (Lagajeros) granted a loan to Digno Albao et al. The loan was secured by a mortgage over a titled property with improvements. Respondents Albao et al. failed to pay their obligations as they fell due. When petitioner DBP‘s demands remained unheeded, it foreclosed the mortgaged property. Albao et al. then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) petition for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO) against DBP et al. and the Ex Officio Sheriff to enjoin them from selling Albao et al.‘s property during the public auction. The RTC issued the TRO prayed for by them.

DBP et al. moved for a reconsideration of the RTC‘s order invoking Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 385, which provides that ―no restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure‖

Accordingly, the RTC, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction, dismissed the main petition for Injunction and directed herein DBP and Lagajeros to proceed with the public auction. Respondents Albao et al. moved for a reconsideration of the RTC‘s order, while, in a separate move, they filed their Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). The RTC denied the Albao et al.‘s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for pre-trial and trial on the merits in the Injunction case filed by respondents HELD:

It bears emphasis that the complaint filed by Albao et al. from which the present petition arose was one for injunction as a main action, as opposed to injunction as a provisional remedy. Since the act sought to be prevented the sale at public auction of the property subject of the mortgage had occurred, nothing remained to be resolved by the RTC. It was thus a patent error for the appellate court to order the remand of the case for further proceedings. Section 5 of Rule 39, which provides that ―where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances,‖ is self-explanatory. If the executed judgment is reversed on appeal, "the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANDRES L. AFRICA, et al.


The grant of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within the sound discretion of the court.

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The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a complaint for the recovery of shares of stock that were allegedly registered under the names of Andres Africa, et al. All the respondents answered the Complaint, except for Andres Africa, Racquel S. Dinglasan, Evelyn A. Romero, and Rosario Songco. Unfortunately, Africa and Songco died. The Republic filed an amended complaint to implead the heirs of Africa and Songco, and to properly summon Racquel S. Dinglasan and Evelyn A. Romero. By Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic‘s Motion for failure to properly set it for hearing. Another Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint was filed. The same however was denied. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in assuming that the case at bar falls under Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court (amendments by leave of court) HELD:

Under Section 2 of Rule 10, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served, and thereafter, only upon leave of court. It is true that when the Republic filed its Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint most of the private respondents had already filed their respective answers. This does not bar the Republic from amending its original Complaint once, however, as a matter of right, against Andres L. Africa, Racquel S. Dinglasan, Evelyn A. Romero, and Rosario Songco, the non-answering private respondents.

As the proposed amendments pertain only to the non-answering private respondents, they may

still be made as a matter of right. Being a matter of right, its exercise does not depend upon the discretion or liberality of the Sandiganbayan. In fine, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Republic‘s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY “LAURO” DOMINGO


A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere affidavit executed after the lapse of considerable time.

Appellant Larry Domingo (Domingo) was charged with Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and two

(2) counts of Estafa before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Domingo, denied all the accusations against him and claimed that he was a driver hired by the real recruiter, Gimeno, whom he met inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for Manila in September, 2000 Domingo likewise presented as witnesses private complainants Enrico Espiritu and Roberto Castillo who corroborated his claim that it was Gimeno who actually recruited them, and that the filing of the complaint against appellant was a desperate attempt on their part to get even because Gimeno could not be located. Prosecution witness Simeon Cabigao (Cabigao) testified that he was among those who were recruited by Domingo, but he later on recanted his testimony. By Joint Decision, the trial court found Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and of 2 counts of Estafa. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Domingo maintained that the trial court erred for failing to give weight to Cabigao‘s retraction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on all accounts. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the retraction of Cabigao should be given weight HELD:

That one of the original complaining witnesses, Cabigao, later recanted, via an affidavit and his testimony in open court, does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any other testimony, the same is subject to the test of credibility and should be received with caution. For a testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere affidavit executed after the lapse of considerable time. In the case at bar, the Affidavit of Recantation was executed three years after the complaint was filed. It is thus not unreasonable to consider his retraction an afterthought to deny its probative value.

At all events, and even with Cabigao‘s recantation, the Supreme Court finds that the prosecution

evidence consisting of the testimonies of the four other complainants, whose credibility has not been impaired, has not been overcome.

ALEGAR CORPORATION v. EMILIO ALVAREZ 527 SCRA 289 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

If the defendant participated in the proceedings of the case, the purpose of summons, which is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against him, was sufficiently met.

By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, the Legarda family assigned its rights and interests over a parcel of land in favor of Alegar Corporation. The Legarda family verbally leased the property on a monthly basis to Catalina Bartolome. After Catalina‘s death, her children Amado, Isabelita, Pacita, Ramon, and Benjamin continued to occupy the property.

Because of non-payment of rentals, Alegar Corporation, by counsel, sent a letter addressed to the ―Heirs of Catalina Bartolome‖ demanding them to vacate the premises and pay their arrearages within 15 days from receipt of the letter. Its demands having remained unheeded, Alegar filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Heirs of Catalina Bartolome et al. Spouses Amado and ‗Jane Doe,‘ Bartolome, Spouses ‗John Doe‘ and Isabelita Anquilo, Spouses ‗Johanne Doe‘ and Pacita Landayan, Spouses Benjamin and ‗Joan Doe‘ Bartolome-Alvarez, Ramon Alvarez, and those persons claiming rights under them. Subsequently, the summons were received by one Gilberto Acosta.

Emilio Alvarez, son of the late Bartolome Alvarez questioned the service of only one set of

summons, despite the number of defendants. Consequently, he claims that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. MeTC held that the filing of an Answer constitutes voluntary appearance and submission to its jurisdiction. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC‘s decision. On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) via Petition for Review, the complaint was dismissed because the summons was merely left behind to a certain Gilbert Acosta, whose relation to the case is unknown. Hence, this petition for review before the Court. ISSUE:

Whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Emilio Alvarez HELD:

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The complaint names the defendants as follows: ―Heirs of Catalina Bartolome, Spouses Amado and „Jane Doe,‟ Bartolome, Spouses „John Doe‟ and Isabelita Anquilo, Spouses „Johanne Doe‟ and Pacita Landayan, Spouses Benjamin and „Joan Doe‟ Bartolome-Alvarez, Ramon Alvarez, and those persons claiming rights under them.‖ Admittedly, the therein named, now deceased, defendant Benjamin Alvarez is the father of Emilio. Ergo, Emilio, who is apparently residing in the questioned premises, is one who claims rights under him as in fact he proffers so. Emilio questioned the service of summons on one Guilberto Acosta who, by his claim, was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of the defendants. Assuming that Guilberto Acosta was not so authorized to receive summons on behalf of the defendants, the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, must have reached Emilio; otherwise, he could not have filed an Answer to the Complaint. Emilio in fact participated in all the proceedings of the case. Thus, the purpose of summons, which is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against him, was sufficiently met. That the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Emilio does not, however, extend to the other defendant Ramon Alvarez on whose behalf Acosta allegedly received the summons with copy of the complaint.

Based on the Return of Service of Summons submitted by the Process Server, it appears that indeed, only one set of summons and complaint was served – that which was received by Acosta. The rest of the therein named defendants-children of Catalina having died or are living elsewhere, it would appear that only the therein named defendant, Ramon Alvarez, together with those deriving rights under him, was served with summons thru Acosta. There is, however, no showing that substituted service of summons on Ramon Alvarez, under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

ALEGRIA P. BELTRAN v. JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, South Cotabato

502 SCRA 446 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) A judge who allows the direct filing of an information without preliminary investigation is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Criminal complaints for Falsification of Public Documents and Attempted Murder were filed by the local police before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) South Cotabato against Manuel Beltran. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol thereafter issued two (2) similarly worded Orders finding probable cause to hale the accused into court and consequently ordered the issuance of warrants for his arrest. Subsequently, however, upon motion of the accused, Judge Laureano T. Alzate of RTC Koronadal City, quashed the criminal complaints on the ground of, inter alia, absence of preliminary investigation. Thereafter, Alegria P. Beltran, wife of the accused, filed a Letter Complaint charging Judge Dinopol with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority.

Judge Dinopol argues that such procedural lapse was due to the serious medical conditions of his two successive prosecutors which rendered them unable to constantly attend hearings. He likewise submits that given the length of time that there was no prosecutor in the RTC of Koronadal City, he and Judge Alzate, of another branch of the court, agreed, to accept cases directly filed by the police on condition that after the arrest of the accused but before arraignment, the cases would be remanded to the Prosecutor‘s Office for ―further‖ preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Judge Dinopol is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law in forgoing

with the procedural requirement of Preliminary Investigation HELD:

Preliminary investigation of criminal cases is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial until the reasonable probability of his guilt has first been ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It also protects the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.

If, as Judge Dinopol tries to justify his questioned act, the city prosecutor had been sickly, he could have endorsed the criminal complaint to the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Koronadal City. The alleged instruction of the MTCC judge not to accept cases for preliminary investigation did not justify Judge Donopol‘s violation of the Rules. Neither did the alleged failure of the designated Acting City Prosecutor to attend to all criminal cases in the city. Under those circumstances, Judge Dinopol was not without any remedy.

Parenthetically, why would, by Judge Dinopol‘s own claim, allow the filing in the RTC of criminal cases which have not been subjected to preliminary investigations and, after issuing the warrants of arrest, ―remand [the cases] to the Prosecutor‘s Office for further preliminary investigation‖? A case of putting the cart before the horse!

PANFILO A. ABAIGAR v. JESUS A. ABAIGAR

506 SCRA 318 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Certification by principal party, not counsel, is required in a Certification against Non-Forum Shopping. On challenge are the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 30,

2004 and February 4, 2005 dismissing herein Panfilo Abaigar‘s Petition for Review on the ground that the Certification against Forum Shopping has been signed merely by his counsel.

Panfilo moved for reconsideration of the appellate court‘s dismissal of his petition, explaining that he had left for the United States before the filing of the petition, which fact should be deemed ―reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification;‖ and that he has a good and meritorious case and substantial justice could be better served if his petition is reinstated. The CA denied the Motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the circumstances surrounding the case requires a relaxation of the rule that a Certification against Non-Forum Shopping be signed by the principal party himself HELD:

A certification by counsel and not by the principal party himself is no certification at all. It is a defective certification which is tantamount to non-compliance with the requirement prescribed by the Rules of Court and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. This is because it is the petitioner and not the counsel who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of the petition. The appellate court, strictly speaking, was, therefore, correct when it dismissed the petition in this case. There have been instances, however, that the Rule on the matter has been relaxed such as when the interest of substantial justice overrides the procedural lapse.

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Panfilo, in this case, did not specify ―the prevailing circumstances‖ nor advance that he has or why he has a meritorious case to merit setting aside of technicalities.

LUDWIG H. ADAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. 464 SCRA 460 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J. )

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over falsification cases committed not in relation to office

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte awarded to Parents and Teachers Association (PTA)of Manawan National High School (MNHS) a contract for the construction of a school building at an agreed consideration of P111,319.50. Upon the completion of the project, PTA failed to receive the last installment payment amounting to P20,847.17.

PTA president Felix Mejorda (Mejorda) was informed by Hazel Peñaranda, DPWH Cashier, that the check for P20,847.17 had been released to Ludwig H. Adaza (Adaza). Subsequently, Mejorda found out that acknowledging receipt of the check bears his name and signature which was not his. He likewise noticed that Adaza‘s signature was affixed on the voucher. During that time, Adaza was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman. Upon examination of DBP Check issued to payee, Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures at the dorsal portion of it, his forged signature and another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of Adaza.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Adaza. The Sadiganbayan found Adaza guilty of the offense charged. It thereafter issued a Bench Warrant of Arrest. Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification case against Adaza which was not in relation to his position as municipal mayor HELD: In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions. The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense. . . . Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to the office of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all its acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio.

BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. 468 SCRA 166 (2005), THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.)

The counterclaim must be existing at the time of the filing of the answer, though not at the commencement of action.

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Having failed to comply with the Credit Line Agreement (CLA) obligation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) an application for an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties against Gabriel and Ma. Geraldine Locsin. Subsequently, the Locsins filed a complaint against BDO, the RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City, and Sheriff VI Marino V. Cahero, for Specific Performance, Tort and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The RTC denied the issuance of a TRO. A Supplemental Complaint was filed by the Locsins. They repleaded in toto the allegations in their Complaint and additionally alleged that BDO proceeded with the public auction of the properties covered by the mortgage in the CLA ―contrary to law.‖ BDO admitted that the public auction took place but it denied that it was contrary to law.

More than eight months after the Locsins filed their Supplemental Complaint, BDO filed a complaint against them before the Mandaluyong RTC for Collection of Sum of Money. To such, the Locsins filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it should have been raised as compulsory counterclaim in their complaint and by failing to raise it as such, it is now ―barred by the rules.‖ The RTC denied the same.

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the Mandaluyong

RTC finding that BDO‘s complaint was a compulsory counterclaim which should have been raised in its Answer to the Locsins‘ complaint, and having failed to do so, it is now barred. ISSUE: Whether or not BDO‘s complaint is barred for failure to raise it as a compulsory counterclaim in its Answer to the Locsins‘ complaint HELD: The Court held that until after the Locsins allegedly refused and failed to settle the alleged deficiency amount of their outstanding obligation, despite BDO‘s letter of demand sent to the Locsins, BDO‘s cause of action had not arisen. BDO could not, therefore, have set its claim assuming arguendo that it is a compulsory counterclaim. The counterclaim must be existing at the time of the filing of the answer, though not at the commencement of action-a premature counterclaim cannot be set in the answer. The party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff‘s suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation. The setting up of such ―after-acquired counterclaim,‖ is merely permissive, not compulsory. At all events, even if the claim of BDO is a compulsory counterclaim which should have been set up in its Answer to the Locsins‘ Supplemental Complaint, technicality should give way to justice and equity to enable BDO to pursue its ―after-acquired‖ claim against the Locsins.

LDP MARKETING, INC., et al. v. ERLINDA DYOLDE MONTER 483 SCRA 137 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

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The requirements in regard to the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping may be tempered by special circumstance or compelling reasons.

A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by Erlinda Dyolde Monter against LDP Marketing,

Inc. (LDP) and LDP's Vice-President-co-petitioner Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of Monter. LDP filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari wherein the Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping was accomplished by Dela Peña.

The Court of Appeals, citing Digital Microwave Corp. v. CA, dismissed LDP's petition for "failing to attach to the petition a copy of the company board resolution authorizing said Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña to sign the said Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping for and in behalf of LDP."

LDP filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a Secretary's Certificate quoting a Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of LDP during a special meeting giving authority to Dela Peña to represent the corporation in this case. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari should be granted despite the belated filing of a mandatory written authorization to sign the verification/certification against forum shopping HELD:

In the more recent case of Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals cited by LDP, the therein

petitioner Shipside Incorporated filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed it, citing absence of proof that the one who signed the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, its Manager Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was authorized to institute the petition for and in behalf of the petitioner. Shipside Incorporated filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which it attached a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that ten days before the filing of the petition, its board of directors authorized Balbin to file it. The Court of Appeals just the same denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is

formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.

The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission

thereof after the filing of the petition. In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification.

In the case at bar, the merits of LDP's case should be considered special circumstances or

compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping.

ROLANDO DE TUMOL v. JULIANA DE TUMOL ESGUERRA, et al.


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Dionisio De Tumol (De Tumol) was a beneficiary of farm holding located in Nueva Ecija, which was issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). He subsequently died leaving as heirs his wife Monica Sta. Ana de Tumol (Monica) and his four children namely respondents Juliana de Tumol Esguerra, Francisca Alejandro and petitioner Rolando de Tumol. Upon the request of De Tumol for the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), it noted that De Tumol‘s co-heirs executed a document waiving their rights and interests over the farmholding. Thereafter, DAR issued a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Beneficiary certificate to De Tumol. However, Monica, represented by Juliana De Tumol Esguerra et al., filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). De Tumol Esguerra et al. allege that De Tumol worked with deceit to transfer in his name the ownership of the landholding prejudicing his co-heirs. Esguerra et al. subsequently filed a petition against the De Tumol before the DARAB alleging that being a compulsory heir and considering that their mother is too old to bring an action, in the absence or due to incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be terminated among the heirs according to age.

De Tumol presented contends that the dispute was already settled, Esguerra et al had been given her share, which she, however sold to Magsakay. The Provincial Adjudicator ruled in favor of Esguerra et al., noting that the dispute was not yet settled and therefore Dionisio De Tumol‘s farmholding should be transferred and registered collectively in the names of the heirs. The Provincial adjudicator, thru the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, generated an Emancipation Patent in the names of all the heirs of the deceased. De Tumol appealed to DARAB. However, DARAB affirmed with the decision of Provincial Adjudicator.

On appeal before Court of Appeals (CA), De Tumol asserts that DARAB gravely erred in

cancelling the emancipation patents and allocating the subject property in favor of Esguerra et al. He further alleges that the action to cancel has already prescribed after the lapse of 3 years from 1985. The CA however dismissed the petition based on technical grounds. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the action to cancel has already prescribed after the lapse of 3 years HELD:

Answering the issue in the affirmative, De Tumol argued before the CA that, inter alia, the order for the cancellation of his emancipation patents has no legal basis, the action to cancel the same having prescribed after the lapse of three (3) years from 1985, following agrarian laws.

Without resolving the petition on the merits, the CA, by Resolution of December 22, 2000, dismissed it on technical grounds, it noting a discrepancy between the registry receipts evidencing proof of mailing of copies of the petition upon Esguerra et al. and the illegibility of the challenged DARAB Decision dated June 11, 1998 and Resolution dated May 24, 2000 as well as the other papers thereto

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attached, in breach of Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which requires the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers. x x x

Following Article 1141 of the Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Real actions over immovable property, like Esguerra et al.‘s petition to enforce her claim as successor to her father‘s farmholding, prescribe after 30 years.

Since Esguerra et al‘s cause of action accrued from her father‘s death in 1979, she had until 2009 to institute her claim as rightful successor to his father‘s farmholding.

In 1988, however, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which provides suppletory application of the provisions of the CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORM consistent with it was passed. The relevant provision of said Code which is not inconsistent reads:

Since Esguerra et al‘s petition before the DARAB Regional Office was filed on December 29, 1992, it is covered by the above-quoted CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORM provision on prescription. The 3-year prescriptive period should thus be reckoned, not from De Tumol‘s and Esguerra et al‘s father‘s death in 1979, but from the time CARL took effect which was on June 15, 1988. Hence, Esguerra et al. had until June 15, 1991 to file her case.

ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., v. METROPOLITAN

BANK & TRUST CO., et al. 482 SCRA 247 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Jurisdiction is determined from the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

Allgemein filed before Muntinlupa Regional Trial Court a motion for intervention, with prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) to consolidate its title and take possession of its properties. The RTC, however, denied the same. Hence, Allgemein filed a separate petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied Allgemein‘s prayer for the

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issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the subject properties. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed grave error in denying Allgemein‘s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction HELD: It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Allgemein‘s only prayer in CA-G.R. No. 71217 is "for the preservation of the status quo, that is, Allgemein, having in possession over the subject properties for several years, shall retain such possession until the controversy before the said trial court has been finally resolved and Metrobank be prevented from taking over such possession." Clearly, what Allgemein filed with the appellate court was an original action for preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however. Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should have been dismissed outright.

ELPIDIO BONDAD JR., Y BURAC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 574 SCRA 497 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act provides that failure of the apprehending or buy-bust team to conduct

inventory of the seized articles warrant the acquittal of the accused.

Elpidio Bondad, Jr. was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. During the trial, the prosecution witnesses averred that Bondad was arrested pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted where he was allegedly found to have been in possession likewise of two other sachets of white crystalline substance, later on found to be the prohibited drug, shabu.

The prosecution witnesses admitted and confirmed that there was no physical inventory taken of

the seized drugs, neither were there photographs taken thereof, immediately after its seizure and confiscation, contrary to the mandate of Section 21(1), R.A. 9165.

Bondad denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed that he was really arrested

while he was playing billiards. he further contested that, assuming a buy-bust operation had really been conducted, still the evidence presented by the prosecution could not really be admissible in evidence, as its integrity has clearly become highly questionable in the light of the unjustified failure of the prosecution witnesses, while acting as apprehending officers, to comply with the mandate of Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.

The RTC found Bondad guilty of the offense charge. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirned

the lower Court‘s decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the object evidence are admissible against Bondad despite non-

compliance with Section 21 (1) of R.A. 9165

HELD

In the present case, by the claim of one of the prosecution witnesses, he immediately marked the seized items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission, however, he did not conduct an inventory of the items seized. Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was thus failure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, Bondad in the present case questioned early on, during the cross

examination of one of the prosecution witnesses, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 , despite their awareness of such requirements.

In fine, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identity

of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against Bondad, his acquittal is in order.

VICTORIA J. ILANO v. HON. DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL, et al. 478 SCRA 365 (2005) (Carpio Morales, J.)

Where the allegations of a complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, its dismissal is not proper

for the defendant may ask for more particulars.

Amelia Alonzo is a trusted employee of Victoria Ilano. During those times that Ilano is in the Unied States for medical check-up, Alonzo was entrusted with Ilano‘s Metrobank Check Book which contains both signed and unsigned blank checks.

A Complaint for Revocation/Cancellation of Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange (Checks) with

Damages and Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Alonzo et al. before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. Ilano contends that Alonzo, by means of deceit and abuse of confidence succeeded in procuring Promissory Notes and signed blank checks. Alonzo likewise succeeded in inducing Ilano to sign antedated Promissory Notes. The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action and failure to allege the ultimate facts of the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing the complaint HELD:

While some of the allegations may lack particulars, and are in the form of conclusions of law, the elements of a cause of action are present. For even if some are not stated with particularity, Ilano alleged 1) her legal right not to be bound by the instruments which were bereft of consideration and to which her consent was vitiated; 2) the correlative obligation on the part of the defendants-respondents to respect said right; and 3) the act of the defendants-respondents in procuring her signature on the

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instruments through "deceit," "abuse of confidence" "machination," "fraud," "falsification," "forgery," "defraudation," and "bad faith," and "with malice, malevolence and selfish intent."

With respect to the checks subject of the complaint, it is gathered that, except for Check No.

0084078, they were drawn all against Ilano's Metrobank Account No. 00703-955536-7 shows that it was dishonored due to "Account Closed." When Ilano then filed her complaint, all the checks subject hereof which were drawn against the same closed account were already rendered valueless or non-negotiable, hence, Ilano had, with respect to them, no cause of action.

With respect to above-said Check No. 0084078, however, which was drawn against another

account of Ilano, albeit the date of issue bears only the year 1999, its validity and negotiable character at the time the complaint was filed was not affected.

It is, however, with respect to the questioned promissory notes that the present petition assumes

merit. For, Ilano's allegations in the complaint relative thereto, even if lacking particularity, does not as priorly stated call for the dismissal of the complaint.

HUN HYUNG PARK v. EUNG WON CHOI


If the evidence presented is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, it does not follow that the same is insufficient to prove his civil liability.

Eung Won Choi (Choi) was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati for issuing a postdated check in the amount of P1,875,000. The same was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Choi filed a demurer to evidence after the prosecution rested its case. The Makati Metropolitan Trial Court granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.

Hun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent‘s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that the defendant may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. ISSUES: Whether or not the remand of the case to the MeTC is proper HELD: When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved. In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not

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insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence. On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. Indicatively, Choi stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Park counters, however, that the payments made by Choi pertained to other transactions. Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.

AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., et al. v. POWER MERGE CORPORATION 476 SCRA 62 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Cause of action may be determined on the four corners of the complaint and the annexes attached to it may be considered parts thereof.

Amos P. Francia, Jr. and his sister Cecilia Zamora placed, on the suggestion of the bank manager, an investment at Westmont Investment Corporation (WINCORP). Every time his investment matures, Francia would instruct a roll over and he would be issued a receipt reflecting the amount of his placement, the net interest rate, and the duration of the placement. Soon, Francia and Cecilia attempted to withdraw their investments but they failed for the reason that WINCORP and Westmont Bank were facing financial difficulties.

Despite several attempts to forge an out-of-court settlement between Francia and Cecilia and

WINCORP and PMC, the same failed. Francia sent PMC a demand letter to pay within fifteen days the total amount of the maturity values of his placement. Receiving no response from PMC, Francia and Cecilia filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against WINCORP and PMC. WINCORP and PMC filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the allegations in the complaint and its annexes failed to state a cause of action. The trial court ruled in favor of Francia and Cecilia. PMC thereafter assailed the trial court's orders before the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. The CA reversed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint alleges a cause of action against PMC HELD:

A cause of action has three elements, to wit: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the determination of whether these elements are present, inquiry is generally confined to the four

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corners of the complaint and no other, but the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered, they being parts thereof.

A perusal of the complaint, together with its annexes, shows that each of the Confirmation

Advice issued by PMC to Francia and Cecilia provides that "WINCORP has acted in the client's behalf and/or for the client's benefit, risk and account without recourse or liability, real or contingent, to WINCORP in respect to the loan granted to the Borrower," the "borrower" being PMC. Each Confirmation Advice thus shows that the creditor-debtor relationship is between Francia and Cecilia and PMC, WINCORP having merely acted as PMC's agent.

In another vein, by filing a Motion to Dismiss, PMC hypothetically admitted the truth of the material allegations of the complaint.

In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of

the plaintiff's complaint. This hypothetical admission extends to relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deducible from, the complaint. Hence, to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? PMC cannot thus disclaim privity of contract with petitioners for whom WINCORP was merely acting as agent.

FIRST WOMEN’S CREDIT CORPORATION and SHIG KATAYAMA

v. HON. ROMMEL O. BAYBAY, et al. 513 SCRA 637 (2007), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.)

The trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the law involved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused.

First Women‘s Credit Corp. (First Women), represented by stockholder and director Shig

Katayama (Katayama), filed criminal charges against Ramon P. Jacinto (Jacinto), Jaime C. Colayco (Colayco), Antonio P. Tayao (Tayao) and Glicerio Perez (Perez) for falsification of private document and grave coercion.

The criminal charges did not pursue when Jacinto, et al., filed a ―Motion to Withdraw Informations and to Dismiss the Cases.‖ The same was granted by Acting Presiding Judge Rommel Baybay of MeTC of Makati.

Kayatama filed a ―Motion for Reconsideration‖ and was denied by the trial court. Kayatama questioned the decision of the RTC contending that the decision was not in accordance with law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court failed to comply with its mandate to make an independent assessment and evaluation before granting the motion of the accused HELD: Petition DENIED.

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Kayatama‘s assertion that the trial court failed to comply with its mandate to make an independent assessment and evaluation of the evidence before granting the motion does not persuade. The court said that the trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the law involved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused.

JUANITO AGULAN JR. v. TERESITA S. ESTEBAN 445 SCRA (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Clerk of Court, as the person directly responsible for all Court collections, is duty bound to have custody of official receipts or at least must have direct access to the place where the same are kept.

Petitioner Juanito Agulan Jr, filed a complaint of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty against respondent Teresita Esteban in her capacity as Clerk of Court II of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nueva Ecija. Esteban allegedly issued an invalid release order copy pursuant to a cash bond allegedly posted by a ceratin Jesus Agulan. Executive Judge Johnson L. Ballutay of the Cabantuan City Regional Trial Court recommended that Esteban be suspended from service for 3 months without pay. However, the Office of Court Administration (OCA) modified the penalty to a fine of P 1,000.00. ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty HELD: A clerk of court who is directly responsible for all court collections, should have custody of official receipts or at least have direct access to the place where they are kept. In Esteban‘s case, she admittedly received the cash bond on a Sunday, August 8, 1999, but that as the key to the office was in the custody of the court aide, she issued the receipt only the following day, August 9, 1999, a Monday.

Why Esteban, a clerk of court, did not herself have a key to the court office or exert effort to contact the court aide who, like her, was residing in General Natividad, speaks of her irresponsibility or negligence.

It bears emphasis that the issuance of official receipt for any collections made by any government office, whether fiduciary or accruing to the government, is required to insure that funds are properly accounted for, not to mention that it is necessity in order to avoid the risk of losing or misappropriating them.

That no prejudice was caused to the government or any party due to Esteban‘s delay in issuing the receipt does not exempt her from administrative liability. The Court does not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or even just tends to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.

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EDWIN SALUSIANO MATUTINA v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK


A writ of preliminary injunction must be issued only upon showing that the petitioner has a right which may be violated.

Edna Linda Matutina-Cortes (Edna) obtained from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) a loan in the amount of One Million (P1,000,000) Pesos. To secure payment, she mortgaged her parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28714. Edna defaulted in the payment of her obligation, prompting the PNB to subject mortgaged property to public auction through an extra-judicial foreclosure.

Three days before the scheduled public auction sale, Edna‘s brother, herein petitioner Edwin

Salusiano Matutina (Edwin), filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. Edwin alleged in his complaint that the mortgaged property was owned by his now deceased father but that Edna, to his and their other siblings‘ exclusion, had it titled in her name.

The trial court grant said petition and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Finding that the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court

simply adopted the general allegations of the Edwin in his Complaint even if the same were not supported by proof. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court‘s decision and denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abuse its discretion in nullifying RTC‘s order and the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction HELD:

A perusal of the records of the case at bar shows, however, that the trial court, in arriving at its

―belie[f] that there is need to at least temporarily restrain the defendants . . . ,‖ just parroted petitioner‘s allegations in his ―STATEMENT OF FACTS‖ in the complaint and in his Affidavit in support of his prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The minutes of a purported ―session held on December 19 (sic) 2003‖ do not show that testimonial or documentary evidence was presented during the session-alleged ―summary hearing‖ on December 18, 2003, the spaces below the therein entries ―Testimonial Evidence‖ and ―Documentary Evidence‖ being blank.

While Edwin attached to his complaint a photocopy of the cancelled TCT No. 24274 in Edna‘s name from which TCT No. 28714 covering the mortgaged lot was (together with TCT No. 28713 covering another lot originally forming part of the property covered by TCT No. 24274) derived, nothing in TCT No. 24274 indicates that Edna acquired it from her and petitioner‘s father, Eduardo Matutina.

And while Edwin attached too to his complaint a photocopy of a SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (SPA) purportedly executed by Edna authorizing him and three others ―[t]o come to an agreement as and thereafter to sign for [her] in [her] name to divide the said lot as mentioned in TCT

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No. 24274,‖ not only is this SPA a mere photocopy. It is undated, unnotarized. Worse, the phrase ―to divide the said lot as mentioned in TCT No. 24274‖ means just that. Into how many portions the ―said lot‖ was going to be divided or why the ―said lot‖ was being divided or to whom the divided portions of the ―said lot‖ were going to be allotted, — it cannot be gathered therefrom. It is thus non sequitur to imply that petitioner and the three others mentioned in that SPA were, together with Edna, co-owners of the property covered by TCT No. 24274.

Oddly enough, Edwin does not challenge Edna‘s ownership of the above-said other lot covered by TCT No. 28713 into which TCT No. 24274 was divided, which lot was, by his own information, conveyed to one Editha M. Ramil.

There being then no showing or indication that Edwin had a right to the mortgaged property which may be violated by its sale at public auction, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prayer for and issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVELYN PATAYEK y CALAG, et al. 399 SCRA 490 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Absent any proof of intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against the

accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty stands. Evelyn Patayek (Patayek) and Arlene Goya (Goya) were charged with the crime of violation of

Section IV, Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 for selling and delivering approximately three (3) kilos of suspected marijuana dried leaves with flowering tops wrapped with newspaper pages and light brown masking tape placed in a black travelling bag with yellow strap, a prohibited drug, well knowing that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so.

Based on the testimonies of SPO1 Modesto Carrera (Carrera) who was designated as the poseur-

buyer during an entrapment operation, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found both of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale and delivery of three (3) kilos of marijuana as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of SPO1 Modesto Carrera HELD:

Two basic elements for the charge of sale of prohibited drugs to prosper are: (a) the identity of

the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. The prosecution has proven the elements of the crime charged. The object of the sale was found by the PNP chemist positive for marijuana. The buy-bust money was recovered from them after the transaction. All the elements of the crime were in fact established through Carrera‘s testimony.

Patayek and Goya assail the credibility of Carrera‘s testimony as not straightforward, claiming that he even appeared reluctant to testify in court and had, along with other NARCOM operatives, the propensity to fabricate cases. While the trial court observed that Carrera ―has time and again given himself away as clumsy in testifying,‖ it nevertheless held that ―such detracts nothing from the core of the testimony he has given in the case at bench which exonerably points to the guilt of the accused.‖

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Patayek and Goya‘s defense that they were merely framed-up does not thus persuade. It bears emphasis that frame-up as a defense has been invariably viewed with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. That is why clear and convincing evidence is required to prove the defense which, in their case, they failed to discharge.

Absent any proof of intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against Patayek and Goya, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty, as well as the doctrine that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect, must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellants that they had been framed-up.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY SUNGA, et al. 399 SCRA 480 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime.

Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-school girl at a coffee plantation, an

Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with Homicide against several suspects including Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.

Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition for bail underscoring the weakness of the

prosecution‘s evidence, there being no direct evidence against them. In the same proceeding, a motion was granted to discharge Locil to become a state witness while deferring the resolution of the bail petition.

Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision convicting Sunga and Lansang as

principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape.

ISSUE: Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged HELD: The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.

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The Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?

Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.

The observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her testimony, the improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a witness to their crime, and the failure of her description of Pascua‘s eyes to match the latter‘s actual physical feature cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against all appellants. The Court thus finds her uncorroborated account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant appellants‘ conviction.

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. v. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN


A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal. Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of land in his favor. Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran executed an ―Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person‖ adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in her name. Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status amd right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case. Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC‘s dismissal of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name HELD:

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The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal‘s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. 458 SCRA 200 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A special proceedings is a remedy which seeks to estalish a status, a right or a particular fact.

Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the Ormoc Regional Trial Court for the Declaration of Presumptive Death of her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc which was granted by Order of September 29, 1999.The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal as the present case is a special proceeding which requires that a record of appeal be filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals as its Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court was denied. The Republic contends that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding HELD:

As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999).

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Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSG's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court .

ROGER MANZANO v. LUZ DESPABILADERAS 447 SCRA 123 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

At any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of relevant documents.

Petitioner Roger Manzano (Manzano) filed an action for the enforcement of money debt with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga against Respondent Luz Despabiladeras (Despabiladeras) who received construction materials from the former on credit. During pre-trial, the parties agreed that Manzano shall submit an ―offer to stipulate‖ showing an itemized list of materials delivered to Despabiladeras together with the cost claimed by Manzano within 15 days. Despabiladeras shall state her objections if any or comment therein within the same period of time. Instead of submitting the same, Manzano filed a ―Request for Admission‖ asking Despabiladeras to admit the materials particularly described therein, that the value of the goods delivered amount to P314,610.50 and that only P130,000.00 has been paid. But Despabiladeras gave no response to the said request. The RTC ruled against Despabiladeras while The Court of Appeals held in her favor setting aside the implied admission which served as the basis of the RTC‘s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the unanswered request for admission has any legal consequences HELD: Rule 26 of the Rules of Court provides that at any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of relevant documents described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matters of fact set forth in the request. The above-quoted sections should not be disregarded as in fact the trial court did not, when it ordered Despabiladeras to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that Manzano

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submit ―an offer to stipulate.‖ For as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedy afforded any party after the issues have been joined.

Despabiladeras having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is to deny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the ―Request for Admission‖ she was deemed to have admitted that she received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated in the request and was indebted to the petitioner in the amount stated therein.

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA) v. HONORABLE

FELICIANO V. BUENAVENTURA et al. 545 SCRA 277 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

It is the NLRC, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction to enjoin the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Because of serious institutional problems brought about by failure to pay maturing bills,

National Electrification Administration (NEA) extended loans to Nueva Ecija III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (NEECO III). Consequently, the latter mortgaged its entire electric system or entire property to NEA. When NEECO III failed to pay its amortizations, NEA took over the properties and assets of the dissolved NEECO III.

Meanwhile, former employees of NEECO III subsequently filed complaints against NEECO III

for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, non-payment of salaries/backwages, 13th month pay, differentials, and bonuses. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the dismissed employees and ordered NEECO III to immediately reinstate them with full payment of backwages and other damages. They subsequently filed before the NLRC an Ex Parte Motion for Alias Writ of Execution to collect the amount representing the award. NEECO III failed to comply with the order. The Regional Trial Court thereafter issued an order for the Sheriff to auction movable or immovable properties of NEECO until the award is satisfied.

NEA assailed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City the Alias Writ of Execution. RTC denied the Motion on the ground that the trial court is powerless to restrain the Labor Arbiter whose decision became final and executory. ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to enjoin NLRC and its labor arbiters from enforcing judgment or order regarding actions involving labor disputes HELD:

The petition must be dismissed outright on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It is the NLRC,

not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over NEA's move for the quashal of the Alias Partial Writ of Execution. Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis-à-vis the alias writ of execution, including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the writ. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

In case of failure to collect the said amount in cash, you are hereby directed to cause the full satisfaction of the same from the movable or immovable properties of NEECO III is not exempt from

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execution in accordance with the provision[s] of the Labor Code of the Philippines and the New Rules of Court.

Precedents abound confirming the rule that said courts have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards, or orders. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment.

Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate cases regarding labor disputes pertains exclusively to the proper

labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. NEA's argument that the NLRC acquired no jurisdiction over it does not persuade.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO T. GARCIA 529 SCRA 519 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

When a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, a private parson may, without warrant, arrest a person.

Roberto T. Garcia and Melissa B. Cruz were caught in a buy-bust operation of possessing dangerous drug specifically Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). They were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The RTC rendered judgment finding Garcia and Cruz guilty of the offense charged.

On appeal, Garcia faulted the trial court in not finding that he was illegally arrested. He insisted

that none of the circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was present. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court‘s decision. ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was illegally arrested because a warrant of arrest was not presented by the law enforcers

HELD:

Here, the Supreme Court said that the accused was wrong in saying that a warrant of arrest should have been presented before the law enforcers arrested him. The Court said ―Garcia was caught in flagrante delicto – in the act of selling a sachet containing substances which turned out to be positive for shabu to poseur-buyer PO2 Barrameda. And as soon as he was arrested, he was frisked by the arresting officers in the course of which a sachet also containing substances which too turned out to be positive for shabu was found in his pocket.‖

Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Having committed the crime of selling shabu in the presence of the buy-bust operation team, and having been found to be in possession of another sachet of shabu immediately thereafter, Garcia‘s arrest without warrant is, unquestionably, justified.

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For a successful prosecution of a charge for illegal sale of a prohibited drug, the

following elements must concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the object evidence. Such requirements are present in this case.

MA. ELLAINE D. PANAGA v. COURT OF APPEALS 503 SCRA 676 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Ma. Ellaine D. Panaga filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Toyota Cubao, Inc. and its employees. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment against Toyota. Panaga thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed Panagas‘ petition on the ground that it was found to be fatally flawed for it failed to contain an Affidavit of Proof of Service required by Section 13 of Rule 13 and for appending only the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Panagas‘ counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court‘s resolution. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition HELD: While the initial determination of what pleadings or relevant or pertinent documents should be attached to the petition lies on petitioner, the final determination thereof lies on the appellate court. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. In the present case, the labor arbiter summarized in its decision the material allegations in the respective pleadings of the parties. The NLRC decision, on the other hand, fully quoted the report and recommendation on Panaga‘s appeal which summarized Toyota Cubao, Inc. et al.‘s memorandum of appeal. Given these, and taking into consideration the contents of the two documents appended to Panaga‘s petition for certiorari filed before it, the appellate court could determine whether the petition make out a prima facie case.

PASCUAL and SANTOS, INC. v. THE MEMBERS OF THE TRAMO WAKAS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.

442 SCRA 438 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) A petition for review may be dismissed if it does not comply with the requirements provided for in the Rules of Court.

The Director of the Land Managment Bureau (LMB) granted the petition of respondent, The Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc. (TRAMO WAKAS) which prayed for the grant of ownership over 3 parcels of land situated in Paranaque City. The same property is being

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claimed by petitioner Pascual and Santos Inc. (PSI). PSI appealed the said decision to higher adjudicatory bodies but was denied and dismissed for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals (CA) likewise dismissed the petition on the ground of Infirm Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping for the same does not show proof that the persons who signed therein were duly authorized by the corporation. The Court further ruled that the petition has not been filed on time. ISSUE: Whether or not the persons who executed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to PSI‘s petition were authorized to do so HELD: Section 6 (d) of Rule 43 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court mandates that a petition for review shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping in which the Pascual and Santos Inc. shall attest that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in this Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before this Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom.

For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7 of Rule 43 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The Court has ruled that the subsequent submission of proof of authority to act on behalf of a petitioner corporation justifies the relaxation of the Rules for the purpose of allowing its petition to be given due course.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.

FEDERICO A. POBLETE, et al. v. HONORABLE JUSTICES EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, et al.

426 SCRA (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a compliant or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.

The officers of Samahan ng Lahing Mandaragat ng Pulborista, Inc. (Samahan) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner municipal officials of Kawit, Cavite Federico A. Poblete, et al. The complaint alleges that the officials caused the registration of foreshore land in Barangay Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the Municipality of Kawit and subsequently sold the same to FJI Property Developers, Inc., notwithstanding that under Commonwealth Act No. 141,

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specifically, Title III, Chapter [8], Section 59 in relation to Section 61, the land is inalienable and cannot be disposed by any mode or transfer, except by lease. The complaint further avers that the sale of the land caused undue prejudice and injury to poor people, especially the indigent families who claimed it as communal fishing grounds since time immemorial, and gave private parties unwarranted benefits, the contract or transaction being manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government and the public. In an Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information to which the accused filed their Comment, the Ombudsman Prosecutor sought to amend the information by inserting the number of the lot under controversy and the amount representing the price paid by FJI Property Developers Inc. for it. Also, the Ombudsman recommending further amendments to the information, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information (second Amended Information). For lack of merit, the Sandiganbayan, denied the Motion to Quash the first amended information and by a subsequent Resolution, it granted the Motion to Admit the second amended Information. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the second amended Information HELD: As laid down by the Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second Amended Information which are also alleged in the first Amended Information does not change the basic theory of the prosecution, thus creating no material change or modification in the defenses of the accused. Clearly, the allegations of Poblete, et al. are factual and evidentiary in nature which may best be considered as matters of defense to be ventilated in a full-blown trial. Lack of probable cause during the preliminary investigation is not one of the grounds for a motion to quash. A motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information, which is evident on its face. The guilt or innocence of the accused, and their degree of participation, which should be appreciated, are properly the subject of trial on the merits rather than on a motion to quash. Poblete, et al. having failed to substantiate the grounds they invoked in their Motion to Quash the first Amended Information, and it having been established that the amendments introduced in the second Amended Information are mere matters of form, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolutions of October 10, 2001 and November 8, 2001.

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., v. BRIGHT FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.


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A private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal law may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings.

Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (SCEI) filed a complaint against Bright Future Technologies

Inc. for copyright and trademark infringement before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The RTC issued search warrants following which a raid was conducted on the premises of Bright Future Technologies, Inc. (BFTI).

BFTI filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Exclude or Suppress Evidence and Return Seized Articles. BFTI contends that SCEI had no personality to represent the People of the Philippines and to file the opposition to the motion because SCEI's agents were mere witnesses of the applicant for the issuance of the search warrants. However, the said motion was denied.

The RTC held that it would treat SCEI's counsel as an officer of the Court and that the two-witness rule was violated hence, it granted BFTI's Motion for Reconsideration. Subsequently, and return the items that were seized, subject to the filing of a bond.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SCEI has the right to participate in search warrant proceedings HELD:

In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.

When SCEI then opposed BFTI's Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Suppress or Exclude Evidence and Return Seized Articles, the RTC correctly recognized the participation of SCEI in the proceedings.

VIRGILIO SANTIAGO v. BERGENSEN D.Y. PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION 442 SCRA 486, (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Supreme Court has extended to 60 days the reglementary period filing of on appeal from the NLRC to the CA.

Petitioner Virgilio Santiago filed a suit for illegal dismmissal, non-payment of wages, overtime pay, vacation pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney‘s fees against Bergensen D.Y. Philippines (Bergensen) before the Labor Arbiter. However, it was dismissed by the same for lack of merit. On

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appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) the same was dismissed. Bergensen received a copy of the NLRC Resolution on August 18 1999. On October 11, 1999, he filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The same was dismissed on the ground that the appeal was not filed within the reglementary period. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was timely filed HELD: The reglementary period for filing an appeal was extended to 60 days as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC and as a rule of procedure, it may be retroactively applied to actions pending or undetermined at the time of their passage. And will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure. Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure which do not create nor take away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing do not come within the conception of a retroactive law or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedures of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The record shows that Bergensen received the NLRC resolution denying his Motion for reconsideration on 18 August 1999. Under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, he had 60 days or until 17 October 1999 to file a petition for certiorari before the appellate court. He filed one on 11 October 1999, well within the reglementary period.

RURAL BANK OF CORON PALAWAN, INC. et al. v. ANNALISA CORTES


Any modification to a final and executory decision of the Labor Arbiter is null and void. Annalisa Cortes (Cortes) was the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron and at the same time, Financial Assistant and the Personnel Officer of the two other corporations. Sandra Garcia Escat, daughter of the founder of the corporations, found out that Annalisa was involved in several anomalies and decided to terminate her. A complaint for illegal dismissal was thereafter filed. The Labor Arbiter ordered Rural Bank et al. to be jointly and severally liable to pay Annalisa a large amount of monetary award. The Rural Bank of Coron Palawan, Inc. et al. alleged that the corporations were under financial distress and the Rural Bank was under receivership and thus, filed their Motion for Reduction of Bond, they prayed that the amount of bond be substantially reduced, preferably one half thereof or even lower. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), while noting that the petitioners timely filed the appeal, held that the same was not accompanied by an appeal bond, a mandatory requirement under Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure. It ordered

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the dismissal of the complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Labor Arbiter is already final and executory ISSUE: In this case, the motion for reduction of appeal bond was filed only on the tenth or final day of the reglementary period. Under such circumstance, the motion for reduction can no longer be deemed to have stayed the appeal, and the Rural Bank of Coron Palawan, Inc. et al faces the risk, as had happened in this case, of summary dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection. Clearly then, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceeding held for that purpose. As the court decided, the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become final and executory.

SPOUSES NARCISO RAYOAN and PARALUMAN TOLENTINO v. ALLAN FRONDA and SPOUSES CHARLITO VALDEZ and AVELINA VALDEZ 468 SCRA 688 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The dismissal of an earlier “identical” complaint for failure to prosecute, which dismissal has become final and executory, had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits if the court did not declare otherwise. Paraluman Tolentino (Paraluman), assisted by her husband Narciso Rayoan (Rayoan), filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya against Allan Fronda (Fronda) and Spouses Charlito Valdez and Avelina Valdez (Spouses Valdez), for Cancellation/Annulment of Title and/or Reconveyance of Land and Damages on the ground that her title had been cancelled by virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale she and her husband purportedly executed in favor of Fronda. The latter subsequently executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Spouses Valdez. The allegations of Paraluman were denied by Spouses Valdez and Fronda. Fronda, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the case for failure of Tolentino to prosecute her case for an unreasonable length of time. This was granted by the RTC in which Tolentino. No Motion for Reconsideration nor appeal was filed. Tolentino and Rayoan filed another complaint which essentially echoed the first complaint. Fronda, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cause of action of Tolentino and Rayoan was barred by prior judgment. Again, the RTC dismissed the complaint. This prompted Rayoan to file a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court‘s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case

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HELD: This Court affirms the dismissal of the second complaint, not for failure to prosecute as held by the CA, but on the ground of res judicata. The dismissal of the first complaint, which admittedly was ―identical‖ to that in the second complaint, for failure to prosecute was not appealed, hence, it became final and executory several months before Tolentino and Rayoan filed their second complaint. The dismissal of the first complaint had the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, RTC not having declared otherwise.

ERIC JONATHAN YU v. CAROLINE YU 484 SCRA 485 (2006) THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

When a party files a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, he automatically submits the issue of custody over the children as an incident thereof.

Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the

absolute community of property before the Pasig Regional Trial Court. The petition contains a prayer for the award of sole custody of his daughter Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the Court of Appeals (CA) on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The CA dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus for becoming moot and academic. Caroline Tanchay-Yu, on the other hand, filed before the RTC Pasay a petition for habeas corpus, with a prayer for the award of the sole custody to her of Bianca. Both the Pasig RTC and the Pasay RTC asserted their jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE:

Whether or not the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the RTC Pasay or before the RTC Pasig HELD:

Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC, regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.

There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised in both actions – whether it would serve the best interest of Bianca to be in the custody of Eric rather than Caroline or vice versa.

Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is Caroline‘s alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code, the evidence to support this cause of action necessarily involves evidence of Caroline‘s fitness to take custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other, are present.

By Eric‘s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he

automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for Eric to replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.

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Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.

The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code

is when ―such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings,‖ which is not the case here. The elements of litis pendentia having been established, the more appropriate action criterion guides

this Court in deciding which of the two pending actions to abate. The petition filed by Eric for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the

more appropriate action to determine the issue of who between the parties should have custody over Bianca in view of the express provision of the second paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.

ALVIN TAN v. COURT OF APPEALS et al.


One of the essential elements of cause of action is the legal right of the plaintiff.

Respondent Arthur Dy Guani (Dy Guani), acting as representative of Guani Marketing Corporation, entered into a lease-financing contract with Cebu International Financing Corporation (CIFC) for the purchase of a Mercedes Benz being sold by petitioner Alvin Tan. However, after Dy Guani paid the down-payment and interests the Bureau of Customs (BOC) confiscated the car for failure to comply with the required customs duties and taxes. Separate actions were filed by the BOC and CIFC against Dy Guani. Dy Guani then filed an action for damages against Tan for his alleged fraudulent acts particularly in claiming that the customs requirements for the car had already been complied with.

In his defense, Tan asserts that Dy Guani had no legal personality to file the complaint being

merely an agent of Guani Marketing the lessee of the vehicle. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided in favor of Dy Guani which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that Dy Guani had no legal personality to file this action HELD:

It bears noting at the outset that the trial court failed, as did the CA, to address the issue raised

by Tan regarding Dy Guani not being the real party in interest. Both Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the law applicable at the time, and Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

require that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. It is fundamental that there cannot be a cause of action without an antecedent primary legal right

conferred by law upon a person. Evidently, there can be no wrong without a corresponding right, and no breach of duty by one person without a corresponding right belonging to some other person. Thus,

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the essential elements of a cause of action are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the aforesaid legal right.

From the facts of the case, Dy Guani merely acted as agent of Guani Marketing, lessee of the vehicle. He is thus not the real party in interest-plaintiff to prosecute the case. It is the corporation, which is a juridical person with a personality separate and distinct from its individual stockholders and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs,that is the real party in interest.

In fine, Dy Guani not being the real party in interest to file the complaint, he has no cause of action.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK v. HON. AMALIK P. ESPINOSA, et.al.


While a judge has the power to rule on a Motion for Execution, he will overstep his authority if he orders the execution of the court‟s decision when the same is not being the final resolution of a party‟s appeal. In a complaint for ejectment, docketed as G.R. No. 132051, private respondent Tala Realty Services Corp. (Tala) sought to eject petitioner Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (BFSMB) from its branch site in Iloilo City wherein Court ordered BFSMB to vacate the subject premises, restore possession thereof to Tala and to pay the rental up to the time it vacated the premises. BFSMB then filed for a motion for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of the case, En Banc division rendered a decision over the same case, G.R. No. 137533, which involved BFSMB‘s eviction from its branch site in Malolos, Bulacan wherein the Court held that is not liable for unpaid rentals since both parties having participated in the deceptive creation of a trust to circumvent the real estate investment limit under the General Banking Act. It held that Tala, however had the right to eject BFSMB from the Bulacan property on the ground of expiration of contract. The motion for reconsideration of G.R. No. 132051 by BFSMB was subsequently granted by the Court and held that Tala should not be allowed to collect rent from it. Such decisions were recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment having become final and executory.

Subsequently, Tala filed with the MTC in Iloilo City, a motion for execution of the Supreme Court‘s Decision in G.R. No. 132051. Conformably with the disposition of said decision, Tala prayed that BFSMB be ordered to vacate the Iloilo branch office and to restore possession thereof to it, to pay the monthly rental computed from April 1994 up to the time BFSMB vacates the premises, and to pay costs.

At the appointed time for the hearing of the Motion for Execution, BFSMB verbally opposed

the motion because the said Decision had been superseded by its decision granting the bank‘s motion for reconsideration. However, despite the objection, respondent Judge Malik Espinosa granted the motion for execution.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Judge Espinosa acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion for execution

HELD:

Unquestionably, Judge Espinosa has the power to rule on Tala‘s Motion for Execution following Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. It further provides that if the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

Judge Espinosa overstepped his authority, however, when he ordered the execution of the

Court‘s Decision of June 25, 2001, the same not being the final resolution of BFSMB‘s appeal as contemplated in the second paragraph of above-quoted Rule 39.

On its face, the Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 132051 showed that two Resolutions subsequent

to the June 25, 2001 Decision were also certified as having become final and executory. Clearly apparent from the chronology of dispositions is the fact that the June 25, 2001 Decision was later modified by the July 24, 2002 Resolution which, in turn, was reconsidered and set aside by the September 3, 2003 Resolution. This matter was brought to the attention of Judge Espinosa by BFSMB during the hearing of respondent‘s Motion for Execution on February 26, 2004.

GENOVEVA TOMACRUZ-LACTAO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact ARABELA A. LASAM v. JANNAH ANN ESPEJO

434 SCRA 588 (2004), Carpio Morales, J. The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. Respondent Jannah Ann Espejo (Espejo), along with four others, was tried for estafa before the Regional Trial Court which subsequently acquitted them, but rendered an adverse judgment with respect to the civil aspect of the case on basis of the unaccounted liabilities. Espejo complied with the accounting order, but the trial court found the same to be insufficient. Espejo argues that the order is not a decision on civil liability but merely an interlocutory order. Notwithstanding the motion for subpoena duces tecum filed by Espejo to prove her compliance with the order of accounting, which was denied, the trial court proceeded to issue a writ of execution based on the order mentioned. ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the trial court is an interlocutory order HELD: As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other.

FOUZIY ALI BONDAGJY v. SABRINA ARTADI 561 SCRA 633 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

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There is no identity of causes of action when the same are based on different periods during which the party allegedly neglected or failed to support his family and perform his marital obligations.

Petitioner Fouziy Ali Bondagjy and respondent Sabrina Artadi were married according to Islamic Law. Unfortunately, the marital union turned sour after a few years. On the ground of neglect or failure to provide support for her and the family, the Artadi filed a complaint for divorce by faskh before the Third Sharia Circuit Court at Isabela, Basilan which was dismissed since the grounds by which she relied upon do not exist and that she does not reside in Zamboanga City. It was also counter argued he does not neglect his wife and children, these are but allegations without evidence to support such claims.

After almost two years, the Artadi filed for declaration of nullity of marriage, custody and support before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City. The petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the parties since they were Muslims at the time of the marriage, hence, regular courts cannot acquire jurisdiction and on basis of res judicata because of the previous dismissal by Sharia Court. Subsequently, Artadi again filed for divorce by faskh before the Second Sharia Circuit Court at Marawi City for neglect and failure of the Bondagjy to provide support and to perform his martial obligations which was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and failure to comply with the rule on forum shopping. Artadi appealed to the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court of Marawi City which ruled that res judicata does not apply in the case at bar since the Artadi offered new evidences to prove that she is indeed entitled to divorce, hence it remanded the case to the Second Sharia Circuit Court for hearing on the merits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to the case HELD: For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) there must be, as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of action. If the same evidence would sustain both actions, they are considered the same and covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. It is with respect to the presence of the fourth requisite that the Court finds no such identity of causes of action. The causes of action are based on different periods during which Bondagjy allegedly neglected or failed to support his family and perform his marital obligations.

HEIRS OF THE LATE FERNANDO S. FALCASANTOS, et al. v. SPOUSES FIDEL YEO TAN and SY SOC TIU, et al.

597 SCRA 411 (2009), (Carpio Morales, J.)

When the petition fails to allege that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the same shall be dismissed.

Policarpio Falcasantos (Policarpio) owned a parcel of land in Zamboanga City, which he

transferred to Jose Falcasantos (Jose), one of his eight children. The land title was later on transferred to Spouses Fidel Yeo Tan and Sy Soc Tiu, et al. Heirs of Falcasantos et al., heirs of brothers Jose and Fernando Falcasantos (Heirs), filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for quieting of

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title and/or declaration of nullity of documents against Spouses Tan and Tiu, et al.. It alleged that Jose, through fraud, deceit and/or undue influence caused their father Policarpio to sign a Deed of Sale, making it appear that Policarpio sold him (Jose) one-half of the property on account of which Jose was able to have even the entire area of the property titled in his name.

The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that the prescriptive period had already expired. The

Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Since there was no appeal, a Certificate of Finality of Judgment was issued. Later on, the Heirs assailed the trial court‘s order via a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), contending that they were allegedly deprived of due process by the trial court for not giving them the opportunity to present evidence to prove the causes of action. The CA dismissed the complaint, holding that Certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a final order of the trial court and, in any event, the petition for Certiorari was not only filed one day late, but was also defective in form and substance. Hence, this petition. ISSUES:

Whether or not Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an appropriate remedy in the case at bar HELD:

The trial court‘s order of dismissal of the Heirs‘ complaint attained finality on September 2, 2005 following their failure to appeal it, which is a final, not an interlocutory order, within 15 days from August 18, 2005 when their counsel received a copy thereof.

Even if procedural rules were to be relaxed by allowing the Heirs‘ availment before the appellate

court of Certiorari, instead of appeal, to assail the dismissal of their complaint, not only was the petition for Certiorari filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. It glaringly failed to allege how the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. It merely posited that in dismissing the complaint, the Heirs were deprived of the opportunity to present evidence to "prove the causes of action." Such position does not lie, however, for the Heirs‘ complaint was dismissed precisely because after considering respondents‘ Motion to Dismiss and petitioners‘ 14-page "VEHEMENT OPPOSITION to the Motion to Dismiss" in which they proffered and exhaustively discussed the grounds for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

While in their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court‘s decision the Heirs explained

why the questioned dismissal by the trial court of their complaint was issued in grave abuse of discretion, the Court finds that just the same, the petition for Certiorari before the appellate court was doomed for it failed to allege that the trial court 1) acted without jurisdiction for not having the legal power to determine the case; 2) acted in excess of jurisdiction for, being clothed with the power to determine the case, it overstepped its authority as determined by law; and 3) committed grave abuse of discretion for acting in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

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RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO 413 SCRA 469 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and not a commencement of a new action while jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires the commencement of a new and original action. Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They had a dispute over a piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to obtain a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) alleging that he had been the owner of that land whereon he built a house and other improvements. However, Celestial protests that she has preferential right over the land because it is adjacent to and is the only outlet from her house. According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is therefore outside the commerce of man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain another MSA which was granted by the DENR. Due to conflicting interests of the parties, the land in dispute must be sold in a public auction. Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the DENR with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachopero‘s petition for certiorari as it is in the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and that the Cachopero has not exhausted all administrative remedies. ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition (b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is classified as outside the commerce of man HELD: RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over original petitions for certiorari, prohinition and mandamus.

Celestial has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a petition for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).

Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and not a commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a court's jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires the commencement of a new and original action therefore, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Section 21 of B.P. 129.

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The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the instant case falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, which provides ―that such is inapplicable if (1) it should appear that an irreparable injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order or (2) where appeal would not prove to be speedy and adequate remedy‖. This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto proceedings. A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to acquisitive prescription As for Celestial‘s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail. Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA v. SPOUSES EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO NOEL RONQUILLO, et al.


If a doctor, in scheduling the date of performance of a procedure, had just gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon, and negligence occurred, it could be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.

Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto Ronquillo had not been blessed

with a child despite several years of marriage. They thus consulted petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant and chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center. Dr. Ilao-Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient‘s abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her infertility.

The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be performed by Dr. Ilao-Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel, checked in at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center and underwent pre-operative procedures including the administration of intravenous fluid and enema. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure and no prior notice of its cancellation was

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received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila. The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke‘s Medical Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, costs of litigation, attorney‘s fees, and other available reliefs and remedies. The RTC decided in favor of Ronquillo spouses and awarded Eva Marie actual damages but ruled that the failure of the doctor to arrive on time was not intentional. It found no adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of any job contract while attending to his wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals and found that Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her failure to arrive at the

scheduled time for the procedure HELD:

It bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of her performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.

Dr. Ilao-Oreta‘s negligence not being gross, Ronquillo spouses are not entitled to recover moral

damages. Neither are the spouses entitled to recover exemplary damages in the absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, nor to award of attorney‘s fees as, contrary to the finding of the CA that the spouses ―were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest,‖ the records show that they did not exert enough efforts to settle the matter before going to court.

AGFHA INCORPORATED v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS 528 SCRA 463 (2001), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The assailed decision is a final judgment which fully disposed of the issue appurtenant to respondent‟s liability to petitioner on account of the loss of the shipment, and, as such, it is appealable with the CTA en banc. Agfha owned a shipment of bales of ―text grey cloth‖ which arrived at the Manila International Container Port and was later placed under a Hold Order, following a forfeiture proceedings for alleged violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.

The District Collector of Customs ordered the forfeiture of the shipment in favor of the government which prompted Agfha to lodge an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs. Commissioner of Customs denied the same. On appeal, Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) ordered the release of the shipment in favor of Agfha. Commissioner of Customs appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) and then to the Supreme Court (SC). In both instances, the CTA‘s decision was affirmed.

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CTA issued a writ of execution to release the shipment to Agfha but it was not implemented. Agfha filed before the CTA a motion to set case for hearing to determine the amount Commissioner of Customs should pay should the shipment be found to have been actually lost. CTA found the Commissioner of Customs liable for the loss of the shipment and ordered it to pay. On motion for reconsideration by both parties, CTA ordered that the taxes and duties on the shipment be deducted from the amount recoverable by Agfha. It then filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Resolution which was denied by the CTA. Agfha filed before SC a petition for certiorari. The Commissioner of Customs filed with the CTA en banc a petition for review while Agfha filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a petition for review is not the proper remedy to challenge an order of execution. The two petitions were consolidated in this petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTA en banc‘s order of execution is appealable HELD:

It is well settled that when, after judgment has been rendered and it has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask for the modification or alteration of the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.

The loss of the shipment, owing to the Commissioner‘s negligence, rendered impossible the enforcement of this Courts decision dated October 2, 2001 ordering the Commissioner to release the shipment. The loss presented a supervening event warranting the modification of this Courts decision.

Acting on the motion filed by petitioner for a determination of the amount respondent should pay on account of the loss of the shipment, the CTA issued the May 17, 2005 Resolution and the assailed resolution adjudging respondent liable for the commercial value thereof in the amount of US$160,348.08.

Contrary to Agfha view, the assailed resolution is not an interlocutory order since it left nothing to be done by the CTA with respect to the merits of the case. It is a final judgment which fully disposed of the issue appurtenant to respondent‘s liability to petitioner on account of the loss of the shipment. Under Section 18 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282, a party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc. Rule 8, Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Revised Rules of the CTA

also provides the same.

ALMA JOSE, et al. v. INTRA STRATA ASSURANCE CORPORATION 464 SCRA 496 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that extrinsic fraud, shall not be a valid ground for annulment of judgment if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Anhui-Alma Jose Hydrogeologic and Well Drilling Co., Inc. (ANHUI) and Intra Strata

Assurance Corporation (ISAC) executed in favor of the Bureau of Customs an ―Ordinary Re-Export Bond‖ to guaranty the re-export of tools and equipment for drilling and the payment of the duty, taxes and charges to be imposed by the Bureau of Customs. Porthos P. Alma Jose (Alma Jose) signed on behalf of ANHUI, of which he is President.

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Alma Jose, et al., all in their personal capacity, and ANHUI, executed an Indemnity Agreement in favor of ISAC agreeing at all times to jointly and severally indemnify ISAC against damages and expenses of whatsoever kind including counsel or attorney‘s fee which the ISAC shall or may incur in consequence of having become surety.

Claiming that Alma Jose, et al. failed to comply with their obligations of re-exporting the goods and/or pay taxes, duties and penalties despite demands of the Bureau of Customs, ISAC filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for collection of sum of money against ANHUI and the other signatories to the Indemnity Agreement.

The record indicated that summons upon the Alma Jose, et al. were served thru Atty. Leonides Bernabe (Atty. Bernabe) who was the Corporate Secretary of ANHUI. Atty. Bernabe filed a motion for extension of time to file answer on behalf of all defendants which was granted. But the Answer was not filed, Alma Jose, et al. were declared in default.

The RTC ordered Alma Jose, et al. to jointly and severally pay ISAC plus attorney‘s fees. The judgment thereafter became final and executory. Alma Jose, et al. then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that they were not properly served with summons, hence the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The petition was denied. The Court of Appeals (CA) subsequently dismissed their petition for certiorari.

Alma Jose, et al. filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment. CA held that since Alma Jose, et al. had already availed of the remedy of petition for relief from judgment, they may no longer institute a petition for annulment of judgment. It additionally held that since the RTC‘s judgment had long become final and executory, it could no longer be set aside, absent any showing that a party had been deprived of due process or that the judgment was procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alma Jose, et al. can institute a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that they have already availed of the remedy of petition for relief of judgment

HELD:

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Rule 47 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In their petition for annulment of judgment, Alma Jose et al. anchored it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons. As reflected above, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners had already availed of the remedy of petition for relief from judgment. Section 2, Rule 47 provides that the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. It further provides that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. As the 2nd paragraph of the above-quoted rule clearly provides, it is only extrinsic fraud, not lack of jurisdiction, which is excluded as a valid ground for annulment "if it was availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief." Since Alma Jose, et al. anchored their Petition for Relief from Judgment filed before the trial court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, they are not barred from filing a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA.

CARMELO C. BERNARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. 520 SCRA 332 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement would be granted or that they would be granted the length of time they pray for.

Carmelo Bernardo (Bernardo) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of

Manila with six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), for issuing six postdated checks in equal amounts of P22,500 to F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP.(Ylang Ylang Mktg). The MeTc rendered judgment finding Bernardo guilty of the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC judgment. Bernardo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). He filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review within 30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsel‘s receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion Partial Reconsideration.

The CA granted the motion for extension of time but only for 15 days. Apparently unaware of

the CA order, he used up the 30-day extension sought and filed his petition. Hence, the appellate court denied his petition having been filed 15 days later and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other pertinent and material documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in granting only 15 days extension

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Held: Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant an "additional period of 15 days

only" within which to file the petition for review. Albeit under the same section, a "further extension" not to exceed 15 days may be granted "for the most compelling reason," petitioner had no basis to assume that his request for a 30-day extension is meritorious and would be granted.

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the

court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement would be granted or that they would be granted the length of time they pray for.

The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is couched in restrictive terms. Section

1 of Rule 42 provides that "[n]o further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days."

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, et al., v. BENJAMIN CO, et al.


To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioner must establish, among other things, that there is

an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) sold two parcels of land situated in Pampanga to

Spouses Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro (Spouses Castro) and Richard and Editha Nogoy (Spouses

Nogoy). Bordering the lot was a residential property owned by Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.

Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with Three Kings Construction and Realty

Corporation for the development of the Northwoods Estates, which included constructing a wall along

the border of their property. Engineer Dale Olea, an independent contractor, constructed a wall that

blocked side access to the Spouses Nogoy‘s and Castro‘s property. Spouses Nogoy and Castro

communicated with Co, asking for a halt in the activities because the construction closed the only means

of ingress and egress of their property.

Co told the spouses that the construction could not be halted since the same was almost

finished, and that the disputed construction did not block the right of way of the two spouses‘ property.

The spouses thus filed a writ of preliminary injunction to temporarily stop the building activity. The

Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an injunction can be granted by mere claim of right of way

HELD:

Spouses Nogoy and Castro failed to prove that they will be prejudiced by the construction of the

wall. The spouses have not clearly shown that their rights have been violated and that they are entitled

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to the relief prayed for and that irreparable damage would be suffered by them if an

injunction is not issued.

To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the spouses Nogoy and Castro must

establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and

substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and

permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

While the Spouses Nogoy and Castro correctly argue that certain requirements must be observed

before encumbrances, in this case the condition of the lot's registration as being subject to the law, may

be discharged and before road lots may be appropriated gratuity assuming that the lot in question was

indeed one, enjoy the presumption of regularity and the legal requirements for the removal of the

memorandum annotated on Co‘s lot are presumed to have been followed.

LEONARDO C. ANDRES, et al. v. JUSTICE SECRETARY SERAFIN CUEVAS, et al. 460 SCRA 38 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court applies its policy of non-interference in the conduct of

preliminary investigation, leaving the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause.

Leonardo Andres, et al. (Andres, et al.) were the major stockholders of the Rural Bank of Pandi,

Bulacan who filed several petitions before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Belen G. Santos, et al. (Santos, et al.) who were the minority stockholders of the said bank. They alleged that Santos et al. committed acts of mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interests as directors and officers of the bank which resulted in the unlawful deprivation of income from the Andres‘, et al. investments. As a response, Santos, et al. charged Andres, et al. before the Metropolitan Trial Court with perjury for making willful and corrupt assertions of falsehood on material matters.

The City Prosecutor issued its resolution finding probable cause against Andres, et al. for perjury. They filed a Petition for Review which was dismissed by the Department of Justice‘s Assistant Chief of State Prosecutor. They appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Justice. Meanwhile SEC in its decision favored them.

Secretary of Justice Sivestre H. Bello III directed, by resolution, the withdrawal of the

Information for perjury against the Andres, et al. Around a year later, Justice Secretary Serafin R. Cuevas directed the refiling of the Information for perjury against Andres, et al. who moved for a reconsideration of the resolution of Secretary Cuevas. This was later on denied. Andres, et al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals (CA). The verification and certification against non forum shopping appended to the petition was signed only by Andres. Andres, et al. subsequently filed however, an Amended Petition to which was appended to the verification and certification against non forum shopping signed by all of them. The CA dismissed the original petition. Andres, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by lack of merit by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari. ISSUE:

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Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Cuevas‘ resolution finding probable cause for perjury against the petitioners HELD:

A party is given the right to file an amended pleading within the time and upon the conditions specified and without the necessity of obtaining leave of court since a party may amend his pleading once, whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced, as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities.

The appellae court‘s procedural faux pas notwithstanding, on the merits, the petition fails. Consistent with its policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigation, and to

leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for filing of an information against a supposed offender, this Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the appellate court that no grave abuse of discretion attended then Justice Cuevas‘ resolution finding probable cause for perjury against petitioners to hale them into court.

The issue of whether they acted in good faith is best determined, however, during the trial

proper. This is not the occassion for the full and exhaustive display of their evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

PROTACIO BANGUILAN et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS


A suit for reconveyance is not proper where the subject was a public land before free patents were issued.

In 1925, Serapio Banguilan (Banguilan) and nine other farmers filed a homestead application with the then Bureau of Lands. At the same time, Gregorio Manalo, filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands. After 25 years, Brigida Manalo-Velasco (Manalo-Velasco), heir of Manalo, again filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands contending that the homestead patent should be granted in favor of her family. The Director of Lands rejected the homestead application of Manalo-Velasco.

Years later or in December 1995, the Regional Office of the DENR issued the free patent titles covering portions of the subject land in favor of Manalo-Velasco. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment in the Quieting of Title and Damages case filed by Manalo-Velasco. Banguilan then filed a motion for reconveyance of the land given to Manalo-Velasco.

The RTC dismissed Banguilan‘s complaint for cancellation/annulment of titles and damages on the ground that Banguilan, et al. have no personality to institute the suit, it being essentially an action for

reversion.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not a suit for reconveyance is proper in obtaining a homestead patent

HELD:

A suit for reconveyance is not an available remedy to Banguilan. Considering that the subject was a public land before free patents were issued, Banguilan has no standing to ask for the reconveyance of the property to them.

The proper remedy, if at all, is an action for reversion granting that there were misrepresentations in the applications for the free patents. The appellants have no legal personality to institute a suit for reversion for the constant rule on this matter is that if Sales Patents and TCT‘s were in fact fraudulently obtained, the suit to recover the disputed property should be filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. The title having originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

The real party in interest is not the State but the heirs of Banguilan who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant. Banguilan in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the Manalo-Velasco‘s title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands.

A cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the Banguilan‘s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant‘s fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by Banguilan. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio.

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the Banguilan‘s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant‘s fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by Banguilan.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SONNY MAYAO


An accused charged with rape through one mode of commission may still be convicted of the crime if the evidence

shows another mode of commission provided that the accused did not object to such evidence.

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Sonny Mayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines

Sur at San Jose with four separate counts of qualified rape. Three of the victims were all

minors and one was the daughter of his common law wife. Mayao‘s appeal was premised on the ground

that he was convicted of the rape on statutory grounds (victim was below 12 years old) and depriving the

victims of consciousness while the charge sheet of the complaint specified that the rape was

consummated though force or intimidation. Mayao also contends that the trial court failed to examine

his defense and alibis for the four separate occasions of rape.

He maintains that he could not have successfully raped two of the victims inside a small room

where several persons were sleeping and with bamboo floorings which usually produce noise whenever

there is a movement. Mayao also presented a new alibi for the third rape on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court failed to convict the defendant on evidence beyond reasonable

doubt

HELD:

It is quite perplexing how Mayao could have missed out mentioning [his alibi] during his direct testimony that he was indeed in Pangasinan at the time the third rape of took place.

The Supreme Court impliedly recognized that an accused charged with rape through one mode

of commission may still be convicted of the crime if the evidence shows another mode of commission

provided that the accused. Even if the minor rape victim had conflicting statements as to the particular

hour of the day when the rape was committed, the Court held that the inconsistencies referred "only to

minor matters which do not detract from the credibility of the complainant or impair the evidence of the

prosecution." What is important is that, as the appellate court observed, CCC was "unfaltering in her

declaration of the occurrence of rape" and that she positively identified accused-appellant as the

perpetrator of the crime.

The Informations alleged that Mayao‘s is their stepfather. It appears, however, that he was, at the

time of the rapes, only the common-law spouse of their mother. The relationship of stepfather

presupposes a legitimate relationship. A stepfather is the husband of one‘s mother by virtue of a

marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO

398 SCRA 567, 5 March 2003, EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

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In a statutory rape case, the appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with ―AAA‖, three (3) years of age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.

―AAA‖ described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in her testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence.

Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic review of the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa HELD: A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.

Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative‘s testimony.

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim‘s age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.

Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that ―AAA‖ was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARLITO I. KHO et al.


To effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register, all the procedural requirements under Rule 108

regarding appropriate adversary proceeding should be followed.

Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth

certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from ―Chinese‖ to ―Filipino‖; (2)

delete ―John‖ from his name; and (3) delete the word ―married‖ opposite the date of marriage of his

parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents

Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.

The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048,

which allows first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer

approved of the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that the

correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals found in

favor of Kho.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Kho‘s request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an

adversarial proceeding

HELD:

It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito‘s

mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the ―married‖ status of Carlito‘s parents in his

and his siblings‘ respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel

involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the

changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.

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For the change involving the nationality of Carlito‘s mother as reflected in his

birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and

nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.

Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito‘s and his siblings‘ parents were ―married‖ alters

their filiation from ―legitimate‖ to ―illegitimate,‖ with significant implications on their successional and

other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as ―An Act

Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or

Typographical Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register

Without Need of Judicial Order,‖ has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial

precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be

effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.

When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate

adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is

satisfied.

SOUTHECH DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al. v. NATIONAL LABORS COMMISSION, et al.

448 SCRA 64, 12 January 2005, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Court has given imprimatur to the NLRC‟s disregard of procedural lapse in filing a belated appeal where

there is an “acceptable reason” to excuse the tardiness. Respondents, Rodrigo Lapez Sr. and Reynaldo Gamutan (Lapez and Gamutan) filed an illegal dismissal suit and such other monetary claims against Southech Development Corp. (Southech) with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case due to lack of merit but granted the payment of the 13 th month and service incentive leave pay as Southech failed to prove payment thereof. Corollary, counsel for Lapez and Gamutan appealed the said decision with the NLRC but was subsequently dismissed by the latter for non-compliance with the 10 day prescriptive period for filing an appeal. Delay was apparently caused by Lapez and Gamutan‘s counsel who was attending to other cases when the said notice of the decision was received.

The Court of Appeals however, set aside the dismissal and enjoined the NLRC to give due course to the case in the interest of substantial justice. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent‘s reason of delay is acceptable to excuse the procedural lapse HELD:

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The Court has given imprimatur to the NLRC‘s disregard of procedural lapse in filing a belated appeal where there is an ―acceptable reason‖ to excuse the tardiness. Among the reasons which have been recognized as acceptable are: (a.) counsel‘s reliance on the footnote of the notice of the Labor Arbiter‘s decision that ―the aggrieved party may appeal...within 10 working days‖, (b.) fundamental consideration of substantial justice, (c.) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision, and (d.) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved. The explanation-excuse of respondent‘s counsel that ―at the time copy of the labor arbiter‘s decision was received at his law office, he was attending to his cases in...his home province...‖, does not lie however. The receipt by respondent‘s counsel-law office of the labor arbiter‘s decision bound respondents, its clients. And the failure or negligence of respondent‘s counsel to timely lodge the appeal bound them. While the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client may be relaxed where adherence thereto would result in outright deprivation of the client‘s liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, respondents have not shown, nay alleged, why a relaxation of the rule is called for. On the contrary, the uncontroverted facts of the case incline against respondents.

ERLINDA P. VARCAS v. JUDGE RAFAEL P. OROLA, JR., et al. 483 SCRA 1 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Rules of Court provide that if the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared

forfeited and the bondsmen shall be given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail.

Erlinda P. Varcas (Varcas) charges Judge Rafael Orola, Jr. (Judge Orola) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dao-Ivisan with gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administration (OCA) found Orola guilty of

gross ignorance of the law, ordering him to pay a fine in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Orola is guilty of gross ignorance of the law HELD:

Orola is indeed guilty of gross ignorance of the law in light of the following discussions.

When an accused fails to appear when required, like during arraignment, Section 21 of Rule 114

of the Rules provides that if the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production and explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

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Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,

jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.

Orola did not, however, follow the above-quoted rule. Instead, he issued a bench warrant for Varcas‘ arrest and detention, with the requirement that she post a bailbond of P12,000 "for temporary liberty."

In the present case, Orola did not give Varcas a chance to be heard thereon by himself or counsel. He gave Varcas 10 days from receipt of the order or until January 16, 2004 to comply therewith. Yet Orola issued on January 16, 2004 his questioned order, despite the fact that Varcas had until the afternoon of that day to comply with it. If Varcas had filed via registered mail on January 16, 2004 her explanation in writing but that said explanation had not been received by the court, she certainly did not fail to comply with the January 6, 2004 Order on January 16, 2004, hence, the issuance by Orola of the January 16, 2004 was premature and, therefore, erroneous, to say the least.

By Orola‘s issuance of the questioned Order of January 16, 2004, Varcas was deprived of the opportunity to comment on the charge and to appear and explain her side.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Alladin Transit Corp. et al. 494 SCRA 358 (2006), Third Division (Carpio Morales J.)

A juridical entity it may only exercise its right to file a suit by a specific act of its board of directors or any duly

authorized officer or agent.

Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus lines, Inc. (Philippine Rabbit) and respondent Aladdin Transit Corporation (Aladdin Transit) are public utilities engaged in the land transportation business. One of the buses of the Philippine Rabbit had a vehicular accident with two buses of Aladdin Transit.

As a result, the Philippine Rabbit incurred damages. A written demand for Aladdin Transit to settle the amount of damage, but was remained unheeded. Philippine Rabbit then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for damages against Aladdin Transit and its drivers.

A motion to dismiss was filed by Aladdin Transit on two grounds one of which was that the

certification of non-forum shopping attached to the complaint was signed by the plaintiff‘s counsel and not by the party itself. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, thus Aladdin Transit filed its answer. On the scheduled pre-trial, Aladdin Transit was declared in default and Philippine Rabbit was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

The RTC held Aladdin Transit and one of its bus drivers liable for the vehicular accident. On

appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of RTC. It found that the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint due to the defective certification of non-forum shopping; that the documentary evidence presented by Philippine Rabbit contradicted the allegations of its complaint and the testimonies of its witnesses; and that the locations of the respective damages incurred by the three buses belied its claim. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping HELD:

Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court require that a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court should be verified and should contain a certificate of non-forum shopping.

The requirements are mandatory, failure to comply with which is sufficient ground for the

dismissal of the petition. The requirement that the Philippine sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to

corporations as the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons.

Philippine Rabbit is, however, a juridical entity, hence, it may only exercise its right to file a suit

by a specific act of its board of directors or any duly authorized officer or agent. A corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by

the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board of directors. "All acts within the powers of a corporation may be performed by agents of its selection; and, except so far as limitations or restrictions which may be imposed by special charter, by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general principles of law which govern the relation of agency for a natural person govern the officer or agent of a corporation, of whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for the corporation; and agents once appointed, or members acting in their stead, are subject to the same rules, liabilities and incapacities as are agents of individuals and private persons."

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. HON. LORNA NAVARRO-DOMINGO


Prior notice is still required and mandated even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity or immediate disconnection is warranted under the circumstances, or the consumer is caught in flagrante delicto committing the prohibited acts under Republic Act No. 7832 or the Electricity Pilferage Act.

Service inspectors of the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) conducted an inspection of

Carmencita B. Lota‘s electric metering installation at her residence and found therein a two-line "jumper" using a stolen meter, hence they disconnected her services. MERALCO then returned after a few hours to Lota's house and served a Notice of Disconnection and Meter Facilities Inspection Report upon her son Raymond. Lota refused to settle the bill and MERALCO refused to reconnect her service line.

Lota thus filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for reconnection of electric service line with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and damages which granted the motion with damages. The RTC further decreed that MERALCO reconnect the electricity in Lota‘s home pending a 10,000 peso bond.

MERALCO contended that the injunction violated Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7832 or the

Electricity Pilferage Act which prohibits injunctions to cases of disconnection and further allege that the

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10,000 peso bond is not sufficient since the differential billing that must be settled is more that 1 million pesos. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of the Order directing the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction requiring MERALCO to reconnect Lota‘s electric service, conditioned upon her posting of a P10,000 bond is proper

HELD:

Unless, therefore, there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection of electric service was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority, a writ of injunction or restraining order may not issue against any private electric utility or rural electric cooperative exercising the right and authority to disconnect such service.

By MERALCO‘s witness Almeda‘s own admission however, the Notice of Disconnection was served on her son three hours after the disconnection of Lota‘s electric service. Evidently, the prior notice requirement under the law was violated. This prima facie evinces bad faith or grave abuse of authority on the part of petitioner which sufficed as basis for the grant of the order for the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

The requirement of prior notice before disconnection of electric service is not a futile expletive in the law. In fact, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity and immediate disconnection is warranted under the circumstances, prior notice is still required as mandated under Section 4 of R.A. 7832.

And even if the consumer is caught in flagrante delicto committing the acts enumerated in Section

4(a), Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832, it still requires prior written notice or warning.

MEDIAN CONTAINER CORPORATION v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY


If before the actual filing of the complaint, a Board Resolution was filed authorizing a lawyer to accomplish a certificate against non-forum shopping on behalf of a bank, it is deemed a ratification of the lawyer‟s prior execution of the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping on an earlier date of the filing of the complaint, thus curing any defects thereof. A complaint for sum of money was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati by the respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) against petitioner Median Container Corporation (MCC) and Spouses Carlos and Fely Ley, Vice President/Treasurer of MMC, for failure to settle the outstanding balance of loan contracted by MCC which was represented by Fely Ley. MCC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the verification on certificate against non-forum shopping was defective. MCC questioned the authority of Atty. Alexander P. Mendoza to sign the same on behalf of Metrobank. MCC contends that the authorization was given only to Atty. Mendoza on June 03, 2003 and the verification and certification against non-forum shopping, which was verified and

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signed by the said counsel, was dated on May 28, 2003. In effect, the verification and certification by the Metrobank has no valid effect. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati denied MCC‘s Motion to Dismiss. The matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which denied the appeal. ISSUE: Whether there was defective verification and certificate against non-forum shopping on Metrobank‘s part HELD:

As for the required certification against forum shopping, failure to comply therewith is generally not curable by its submission subsequent to the filing of the petition or by amendment. However, the Court relaxed the application of these requirements upon appreciation of attendant special circumstances or compelling reasons. In the case at bar, simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, Metrobank submitted both a certification of non-forum shopping and proof that Atty. Mendoza who signed it on its behalf was authorized to do so. The proof of authorization of Atty. Mendoza was dated later than the date of his signing of the certification of non-forum shopping, however, thus giving the impression that he, at the time he affixed his signature, was not authorized to do so. The passing on June 3, 2004 of a Board Resolution of authorization before the actual filing on June 23, 2004 of the complaint, however, is deemed a ratification of Atty. Mendoza‘s prior execution on May 28, 2004 of the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.

RODOLFO R. MAGO v. JUDGE AUREA G. PEÑALOSA-FERMO


A judge may not delegate the examination of a complainant in a case to the stenographer, and allow the witnesses

to "read/study the written questions" to be propounded to them and to "write their answers thereto".

Rodolfo R. Mago (Mago) alleged that Judge Aurea G. Peñalosa-Fermo, committed gross

ignorance of the law and bias in the disposition of his complaint and of the counter-charge against him.

Mago claims that when he filed a complaint for Grave Coercion against one Alex Roberto Angeles, he

received a subpoena to attend the preliminary investigation of said criminal case. In compliance, he and

his witnesses attended and they were examined through a prepared set of questions handed to them by

the stenographer. Judge Peñalosa-Fermo was not present then.

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Judge Peñalosa-Fermo admitted that the court stenographer has a prepared sheet

of questions during the preliminary examination but she claimed that this is for the

convenience of the court stenographer and the witnesses.

The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Peñalosa-Fermo guilty of gross ignorance of

the law or procedure.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Judge Peñalosa-Fermo committed gross ignorance of the law or procedure

HELD:

Prior to the amendment on October 3, 2005 of Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules of Court via A.M.

No. 05-8-26-SC, Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by Removing the

Conduct of Preliminary Investigation from Judges of the First Level Courts, judges of municipal trial courts were

empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in which they exercised discretion in determining

whether there was probable cause to hale the respondent into court. Such being the case, they could not

delegate the discretion to another.

An officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being

that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion,

and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his

duties to another. Then, as now, a personal examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his

witness/es was required. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court before its

amendment, the "investigating fiscal" was required to "certify under oath that he, or as shown by the

record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses . . . "

By the Judge Peñalosa-Fermo ‘s delegation of the examination of the sheriff-complainant in the

grave threats case to the stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to "read/study the written

questions" to be propounded to them and to "write their answers thereto" upon the judge‘s justification

that the scheme was for the convenience of the stenographers, Judge Peñalosa-Fermo betrayed her lack

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of knowledge of procedure, thereby contributing to the erosion of public confidence in the

judicial system.

ALBERTO LOPEZ a.k.a. CESAR A. LOPEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

434 SCRA 597 (2004), (Carpio Morales, J.)

A judgment granting support never becomes final, hence the party assailing the amount of support may file a motion with the trial court for its modification.

The Regional Trial Court rendered decision declaring the nullity of marriage between respondent Cherry Pie Lopez and petitioner Alberto Lopez a.k.a Cesar Lopez (Cesar). Cesar moved to reconsider the support aspect of the decision but was denied.

Cesar filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) but failed to pay the full amount of the docket fees hence his petition was dismissed. Cesar filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on the ground that the same did not contain an affidavit or proof of service and that it did not state on its face the material dates determinative of its timeliness. Cesar filed a second motion for reconsideration but was again denied on the ground that no second motion by the same party can be entertained.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cesar‘s Petition for Certiorari may be entertained

HELD:

Since Lopez assails final resolutions of the Court of Appeals, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. On this score alone, the petition should be dismissed. Remedial faux pas aside, even if a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 were to be, in the greater interest of justice, allowed, the petition just the same is dismissable for having been filed out of time.

As Lopez‘s motion for reconsideration of the questioned Resolution of the appellate court did not contain an affidavit or proof of service as required by Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure nor did it state the material dates in order to determine its timeliness, it is considered a mere scrap of paper, and did not thus toll the running of the period to file the motion. In fact, Lopez did not even state when he received the said resolution, hence, it cannot even be determined when the reglementary period expired.

Assuming that Lopez received the March 19, 2001 Resolution on the same date it was promulgated, Lopez had 60 days or until May 18, 2001 to file the present petition. He filed it, however, only on July 4, 2001.

En passant, the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, Lopez is not without remedy. For as what he seeks to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged to provide, he can file a motion with

the trial court for its modification since a judgment granting support never becomes final.

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LANIE CERVANTES v. JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN and CLERK

OF COURT III CARMENCHITA P. BALOCO, both of MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT

TRIAL COURT, CUYO-AGUTAYA-MAGSAYSAY, PALAWAN


The requirement to post bail is no longer necessary under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure or for violation

of municipal or city ordinances, and for criminal offenses when the prescribed penalty is not higher than arresto mayor or fine

of P2,000 or both, specifically the case of Slander.

Respondent Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan issued a warrant of arrest in a criminal case for

Slander against the petitioner Lannie Cervantes (Cervantes) who subsequently posted bail. On

arraignment, Cervantes pleaded not guilty. She later filed a Motion to Admit Counter-Affidavit with her

Ganting Salaysay (Motion). Respondent Clerk of Court Carmenchita P. Baloco (Baloco) however refused

to accept the Motion in the absence of Judge Pangilinan, being apprehensive that he might scold her. As

instructed by Baloco, Cervantes returned but was told by the former not to see the judge that day as he

was still tired from his trip. The following day, Judge Pangilinan advised Cervantes that he could not

accept her belatedly filed Motion because she had already been arraigned. Cervantes then filed a

complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

Baloco explained that she refused to receive the Motion because there was no proper proof of

service, but she advised Cervantes to serve a copy thereof on the Chief of Police, the designated

prosecutor. Judge Pangilinan justified the non-receipt of Cervantes‘ motion for lack of proper proof of

service, and alleged that Cervantes, instead of heeding the advice to comply therewith, went to Puerto

Princesa City to air her grievance over a local radio station.

The OCA thus recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and

that Judge Pangilinan be fined in the amount equivalent to one-half of his monthly salary, with stern

warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely, and that the

complaint against Baloco be dismissed but with admonition for her to be more circumspect in dealing

with litigants.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Judge Pangilinan and Baloco committed gross ignorance of the

law

HELD:

Instead of first ruling whether the case fell under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,

Judge Pangilinan immediately issued a warrant of arrest and fixed complainant‘s bail at P2, 000. There

being no showing that Cervantes failed to appear in court when required by Judge Pangilinan, the

warrant of arrest he issued had no legal basis.

In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles, the Court noted that the requirement to post bail is no longer

necessary under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Further, in Martinez, Sr. v. Judge Paguio, the

Court observed that under Republic Act No. 6036, bail is not generally required for violation of

municipal or city ordinances, and for criminal offenses when the prescribed penalty is not higher than

arresto mayor or fine of P2,000 or both, as in the case for Slander against Cervantes which is covered by

Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code.

DEE HWA LIONG ELECTRONICS CORPORATION (DEECO), et al. v. EMELINDA PAPIONA


The party invoking a liberal application of the Rules of Court should at least proffer a reason behind its failure to

comply therewith, an exceptionally meritorious one to warrant liberality

Emelinda Papiona (Papiona) was employed as a sales clerk by petitioner Dee Hwa Liong

Electronics Corporation (DEECO) of which its Janet Dee (Dee) is a co-owner. On February 22, 2003, Papiona had a heated altercation with petitioner Dee in the presence of employees and store customers. Papiona immediately went home as, by her claim, she feared for her life. Two days later, Papiona filed a complaint for illegal constructive dismissal DEECO in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Papiona‗s complaint but awarded backwages to her. DEECO

appealed the decision arguing that since both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that there was no illegal dismissal, Papiona should not be entitled to separation pay. By Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari because DEECO‘s counsel failed to sign the petition and include a verification in the pleadings which violated 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. DEECO appealed the ruling contending that Article 279 of the Labor Code warrants liberal application of the Rules of Court as an instrument of justice.

ISSUES:

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Whether or not, the Rules of Court warrants a liberal construction in the filing of a petition for review in dismissal cases founded on Article 279

HELD:

DEECO have, neither invoked such liberality nor offered any reason for its failure to comply with the Rules of Court – whether in their present Petition for Review on Certiorari or in their Reply. The general rule must thus stand; to rule otherwise would be to countenance DEECO‘s glaring disregard of the Rules. Concomitant to a liberal application of the Rules, however, the party invoking it should at least proffer a reason behind its failure to comply therewith, an exceptionally meritorious one to warrant liberality.

While Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides for a liberal construction of the rules in

order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, the same cannot be used as a vehicle to ignore the Rules at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO 569 SCRA 747 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Ombudsman has no exclusive power over disciplinary cases of public school teachers, however, when one had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman, he is barred from assailing Ombudsman‟s acts under the principle of estoppel.

Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher filed before the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman a sworn letter-complaint against her superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) (criminal case), and grave misconduct (administrative case). While the administrative case was pending investigation, Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive Suspension, and was granted by the Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension of Medrano for six months without pay. Medrano moved for lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension order. The Ombudsman rendered its decision with the administrative case and found Medrano guilty of grave misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision and assailed not only the factual findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for the first time, challenged its jurisdiction over the case. With regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Medrano and a criminal case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Biñan, Laguna against him. By joint order, the Ombudsman affirmed its Resolution in the criminal case but modified its decision in the administrative case. Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction over the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsman‘s decision in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the sole ground that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA‘s decision but was denied. ISSUE:

Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against Medrano even if an affidavit of desistance has already been filed by Dumalaog

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HELD:

The flaw in Medrano‘s argument that the execution of Dumalaog‘s Affidavit of Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the administrative case is that it ignores the whale of a difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court stressed the distinct and independent character of the remedies available to an offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a public officer. It provides the three remedies available: 1.) civil, 2.) criminal, and 3.) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with suspicion and

reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. And there is always the probability that it would later be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. Hence, such desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court.

With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint, Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution ―created the independent Office of the Ombudsman.‖ Hailed as the ―protectors of the people,‖ the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties to act on complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13.

When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however, Section 9 of

the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be heard initially by an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers‘ organization, and a supervisor of the division. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner ―may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees.‖ In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd. While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against Medrano and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is now barred from assailing Ombudsman‘s acts under the principle of estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked Ombudsman for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsman‘s acts belatedly.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RESTITUTO SARMIENTO 518 SCRA 250 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A private person bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the lot he seeks to register forms part of the

alienable agricultural land of the public domain despite the absence or weakness of the opposition‟s evidence.

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Restituto Sarmiento filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) an application

for registration of a parcel of land. He claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.

The Solicitor General, through the Prosecutor of Taguig, filed an opposition to Sarmiento‘s

application for registration. One of the contentions is that the lot is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, not subject to private appropriation.

The MeTC granted Sarmiento‘s application for registration and ordered the issuance of decree of

registration. The MeTC found that Sarmiento and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) held that the lot was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of the plan and the technical description, the presentation of the original tracing cloth ceased to become indispensable for the grant of the application and affirmed the decision of the MeTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcel of land should be awarded to Sarmiento Held:

It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.

Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the Public Land Act, one of the means by

which public agricultural lands may be disposed. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove that (a) the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

The absence or weakness of the evidence for Republic notwithstanding, Sarmiento still bears the

burden of overcoming the presumption that the lot he seeks to register forms part of the alienable agricultural land of the public domain.

ELENA ONG v. FRANCISCO MAZO, et al. 431 SCRA 56 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A petition or motion for reconsideration shall be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or

resolution, counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

A complaint for damages was filed by Elvira C. Lanuevo and Charito A. Tomilloso before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) against petitioner Elena Ong along with Iluminado J. Caramoan arising from

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a vehicular accident whereby a bus owned by Ong and driven by Caramoan allegedly

bumped a jeep owned and driven by Lanuevo, with Tomilloso as her passenger at the

time.

Ong served written interrogatories, filing a motion before the RTC to direct Lanuevo and

Tomilloso to answer the interrogatories. RTC denied the motion upon the ground that such constituted

a ―fishing expedition‖ which would be more properly ventilated in a pre-trial conference.

Ong filed a motion for reconsideration on which was denied by resolution dated July 4, 2000.

Ong filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) on August 4, 2000 after she received the

order on July 18, 2000.

CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it was belatedly filed. Hence, this present petition

for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition was filed out of time

HELD:

Section 4 of Rule 65 as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1

states that a petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or

resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is

required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said

motion.

In Systems Factors Corporation v. NLRC and Unity Fishing Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court applied retroactively the above-quoted amended rule on a fresh 60-day period for the filing of certiorari petitions from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Thus, a petition for certiorari admittedly filed past the 60-day period under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, but filed on time were considered under the amendment in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, was held to be seasonably filed.

Applying retroactively too Sec. 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, since Ong‘s petition for certiorari was filed with the appellate court on August 4, 2000, after receipt on July 18, 2000 by petitioner of the order of the trial court denying her motion for reconsideration from which latter date the 60-day period should be reckoned, the petition was seasonably filed. It was thus error for the trial court to dismiss the same.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE NIMFA SIAM, REPRESENTED BY CHARITO J. SIAN-PARRENO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK


Jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as a ground for annulment of judgment.

Petitioners Nimfa Sian, et al. filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Negros

Occidental for cancellation of mortgage liens annotated on three titled properties against Bacolod branch

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of the Petitioner Philippine National Bank-Republic Bank (PNB-RB), now Maybank

Philippines, Inc. (Maybank), and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Sian, et al.

died and was substituted by her sister. PNB filed a Motion for Substitution and Motion to Dismiss

alleging that Maybank referred the case to PNB for it acquired legal interest over the properties subject

of the petition. Sian, et al. opposed the said motion as there was no evidence to support the claim. The

contention was well taken by the trial court as such favored Sian, et al. PNB consequently applied for

annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. The same was affirmed since it was of the opinion

that PNB was denied due process.

Sian, et al. contend that the petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available to PNB

since it failed to avail of the remedy of appeal through its own fault and negligence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PNB was denied of due process and hence, if it can be a ground for an

annulment of judgment

HELD:

The Court said that although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the

annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud

and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes as additional ground therefore denial of due process.

Sian, et al.‟s argument that PNB could no longer avail of a petition for annulment of judgment

due to its failure to appeal to the Trial Court‘s order dated August 15, 2002 fails. The court said that

since the Motion for Substitution of PNB was denied, PNB had no personality to assail the said order.

It was not PNB‘s fault if it was not given the opportunity to present his side of the story. The

court said that whatever prompted the trial court to deny petitioner‘s motion to include PNB as

defendant is not for the court to reason why. The undeniable fact remains that PNB in not a party in this

case and any portion of the trial‘s court‘s judgment cannot be binding on it.

MEL V. VELARDE v. LOPEZ, INC.

419 SCRA 422, 14 January 2004, THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)

In determining which has jurisdiction over a case, the averments of the complaint/counterclaim, taken as a whole

are considered.

With regards to Mel Velarde‟s claim for unpaid salaries, unpaid share in net income, reasonable return on the

stock ownership plan and other benefits for services rendered to Sky Vision, jurisdiction thereon pertains to the Securities

and Exchange Commission even if the complaint by a corporate officer includes money claims since such claims are actually

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part of the prerequisite of his position and, therefore interlinked with his relations with the corporation. The

question of remunerations involving a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer of the

corporation is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management as is

in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.

Lopez Inc., granted a loan to Mel V. Velarde (Mel), the General Manager of Sky Vision which is

a subsidiary company owned by Lopez Inc. However, Mel was not able to pay the loan and Lopez Inc.

proposed that he may use his retirement benefits to partially settle his loan, but because of disagreement

on the amount of his retirement benefits, Mel refused the proposal which led Lopez Inc. to file a

complaint for the claim of the payment with interest. On his answer, Mel claims that the loan was only a

―cover document‖ and that it was really a reward for his loyalty and excellent performance in the

company and counterclaimed that he was entitled to a much larger amount of retirement benefits than

what Lopez Inc., was alleging.

Lopez Inc., petitioned to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction which drew MEL to assert that

the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced to hold Lopez Inc., liable for his counterclaims. The

Regional Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. Lopez Inc., then

filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which held that Lopez Inc., is not a real party-in-

interest on the counterclaim and that there was a failure to show the presence of any of the

circumstances to justify the application of the principle of ―piercing the veil of corporate fiction.‖

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mel Velarde, on a complaint for collection of sum of money can raise a

counterclaim for retirement benefits, unpaid salaries and incentives arising from services rendered by

him in a subsidiary company of Lopez Inc.

HELD:

While Mel Velarde correctly invokes the ruling in Atienza v. Court of Appeals to postulate that not

every denial of a motion to dismiss can be corrected by certiorari under Rule 65 and that, as a general

rule, the remedy from such denial is to appeal in due course after a decision has been rendered on the

merits, there are exceptions thereto, as when the court in denying the motion to dismiss acted without or

in excess of jurisdiction or with patent grave abuse of discretion, or when the assailed interlocutory order

is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, or

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when the ground for the motion to dismiss is improper venue, res judicata, or lack of

jurisdiction as in the case at bar.

In determining which has jurisdiction over a case, the averments of the complaint/counterclaim,

taken as a whole are considered.

With regards to Mel Velarde‘s claim for unpaid salaries, unpaid share in net income, reasonable

return on the stock ownership plan and other benefits for services rendered to Sky Vision, jurisdiction

thereon pertains to the Securities and Exchange Commission even if the complaint by a corporate officer

includes money claims since such claims are actually part of the prerequisite of his position and,

therefore interlinked with his relations with the corporation. The question of remunerations involving a

person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer of the corporation is not a simple labor

problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management as is in fact a

corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.

Mel Velarde argues nevertheless that jurisdiction over the subsidiary is justified by piercing the

veil of corporate fiction. Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is warranted, however, only in cases when

the separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend

crime, such that in the case of two corporations, the law will regard the corporations as merged into one.

MA. CRISTINA CORTEZ-ESTRADA v. HEIRS OF DOMINGO SAMUT/ ANTONIA SAMUT


A prayer for injunctive relief should not be granted for the purpose of taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute. Emiliano Cortez (Emiliano), father of petitioner Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada (Cortez-Estrada), filed Free Patent Application with the Bureau of Lands (Bureau) covering two parcels of land which was approved. Domingo Samut (Samut) represented by Antonia Samut filed before the Bureau a protest claiming that he has since the Second World War been in possession of the properties subject to Free Patent Application. Thus, an investigation was conducted on the grant of Cortez-Estrada‘s patent.

After the death of Emiliano, a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in favor of his

widow, Antonia. Antonia subsequently died intestate and is survived by her children. Upon investigation on the grant of Cortez-Estrada‘s patent and title inspired by Samut‘s assertion that such were obtained by fraud, the Bureau cancelled the patent and title of Cortez-Estrada while directing the heirs of Samut to file the appropriate public land application covering certain lots situated at Libertad Echague, Isabela. No appeal from the above Order was filed.

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The State represented by the Director of Lands, filed a complaint for Reversion of Land to Public Domain before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging that Cortez-Estarda deliberately made fraudulent representation in her Free Patent Application, hence the patent and title granted to her should ipso facto be cancelled. In her an swer with the Third Party Complaint, Cortez-Estrada averred that respondent Samut cannot legally acquire the properties by possessory rights despite the alleged period of occupation, for Cortez-Estarada and Joaquin Samut (Joaquin), son of Domingo Samut executed a Contract of Lease.

Under the said contract, Joaquin as lessee, agreed to plant agricultural crops on the properties

and deliver to Cortez-Estrada, twenty percent of the crops harvested every year. Thus, Cortez-Estrada prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Samut from selling or cultivating the properties or introducing any improvements thereon. The RTC denied Cortez-Estrada‘s plea. Subsequently, her Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Cortez-Estrada filed a petition for certiorari and a succeeding Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals which were both denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to grant the Cortez-Estrada‘s writ of preliminary injunction HELD:

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve

and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.

Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive power to alter such status.

To entitle a petitioner to the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction, he must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

Sine dubio the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of discretion.

In fine, a prayer for injunctive relief should not be granted for the purpose of taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the possession of one person and putting it into the hands of another before the right of ownership is determined. The reason for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in light of the evidence presented, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other.

It is with respect to Cortez-Estrada‘s prayer that Heirs of Samut be restrained from selling the properties or portions thereof that the present petition assumes merit. For pending the final determination of the ownership of the properties, private respondents can not exercise the attribute of ownership of jus disponendi. For only the owner can transfer his ownership to another.

NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF SAUDI ARABIA v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION

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The motion for reconsideration, however, being fatally defective for lack of notice of hearing, cannot be cured by a

belated filing of a notice of hearing, more so where the Motion to Set the “Motion for Reconsideration” was filed after the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.

National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) filed a case against respondent Philippine

Banking Corporation (PBC) to recover the duplicate payment of the proceeds of a letter of credit issued by NCBSA in view of the fact that both the head office and Makati branch of PBC collected the proceeds.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati ruled in favor of NCBSA. PBC filed a Motion for

Reconsideration. The motion, however, did not contain a notice of hearing. PBC tried to cure the defect by subsequently filing a Motion to Set ―Motion for Reconsideration‖ for Hearing nine days after the period for filing the Notice of Appeal had expired which was vigorously opposed by NCBSA.

NCBSA called for the strict application of the Philippines‘ rules of procedure to prevent any

more delay in the disposition of the case, which has been pending for more than seventeen years. On the other hand, PBC invokes a just and fair determination of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the unrippled doctrine that a motion filed without the requisite notice of hearing may be cured by subsequently filing a motion to set ―the motion‖ for hearing HELD:

The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 in connection with Section 2, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory. The absence of a notice of hearing is fatal and, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency. In the case at bar, it is not disputed that PBC‘s Motion for Reconsideration of the August 24, 1993 decision of the trial court did not contain the requisite notice of hearing.

The motion for reconsideration, however, being fatally defective for lack of notice of hearing,

cannot be cured by a belated filing of a notice of hearing. More so in the case at bar where the Motion to Set the ―Motion for Reconsideration‖ was filed after the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.

PBC‘s appeal for justice and fairness does not lie, however, there being nothing on record to

show that it has been a victim of injustice or unfairness. On the contrary, as found by the Court of Appeals in its original decision, PBC had the opportunity to participate in the trial and present its defense and had actually made full use of the remedies under our rules of procedure. More importantly, there was no oppressive exercise of judicial authority that would call for the annulment of the trial court‘s resolutions.

MIRAMAR FISH CO. INC. v. BIENVENIDO JALON, et al.

474 SCRA 22 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J.)

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For the enforcement of judgment for money, the sheriff must initially demand from judgment obligor the immediate

payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees, and must first levy upon real property, instead

of personal property.

Sheriffs III Bienvenido F. Jalon, Danilo T. Han, and Candido J. Abrera (Jalon, et al.) enforced a writ

of execution of the decision of the Court in ―Mar Fishing Company Inc. v. Court of Appeals, National

Federation of Labor NFWU-NFL, et al.,‖ ordering Mar Fishing Company, Inc. (Mar Fishing) to reinstate its

dismissed employees to their former positions and to pay them full backwages or, if reinstatement is no

longer possible, to pay them separation pay, and to pay attorney‘s fees equivalent to 10% of the total

amount awarded. Jalon et al. in enforcement of the writ of execution, issued a Notice of Levy upon

realty attaching real properties of Mar Fishing and five (5) motor vehicles registered in the name of Mar

Fishing. The vehicles had, however, been priorly conveyed to Trade and Investment Development

Corporation (TIDCORP) and subsequently sold by the latter to Miramar Fish Co., Inc. (Miramar).

Consequently, Miramar charged Jalon et.al. to have committed grave abuse of authority in

attaching the vehicles the value of which exceeded One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos despite their

awareness that they were no longer owned by Mar Fishing and that the award sought to be satisfied

amounted to less than half a million pesos only. Jalon et al., however, jointly asserted that they were only

performing their lawful duty ―with reasonable diligence and with reasonable promptness.‖ The Office of

the Court Administrator (OCA) finds that while Jalon et.al., did not err in attaching the personal

properties registered in the name of the judgment obligor Mar Fishing, they appear to have failed to

observe the proper procedure in the enforcement of execution of judgments for money as laid down in

Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of authority in attaching the properties of Miramar the

value of which exceeded the award sought to be satisfied and despite their awareness that they were no

longer owned by Mar Fishing

HELD:

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The procedure for the enforcement of judgment for money is self-explanatory. Yet,

Jalon et al. not only do not claim to have first demanded from judgment obligor Mar

Fishing the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution – a total of

P401,783.35 – and all lawful fees. They are completely silent on why they first levied upon real property,

instead of personal property, and why properties said to be valued at millions of pesos had been levied

when the judgment obligation was only more than P400,000.00.

Jalon et al. rendered nugatory the option given the judgment obligor to choose which property or

part thereof may be levied upon by a mere claim of expediency in the execution of judgments. While the

expeditious and efficient execution of court orders and writs is commendable, it should not, under any

circumstance, be done by departing from the Rules governing the same.

JULIO MERCADO v. EDMUNDO MERCADO 582 SCRA 474 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Jurisdiction over a case does not cease the moment a certificate of title is issued, for the issuance of such certificate is not a mode of transfer of property but merely an evidence of such transfer.

Julio Mercado (Julio) was a tenant of an agricultural land owned by the grandfather of Edmundo

Mercado (Edmundo). Julio acquired a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) and an Emancipation Patent

(EP). Edmundo then filed a complaint against Julio for rescission of contract, cancellation of the CLT

and EP on the ground that the same were irregularly issued because such were covered by his Certificate

of Retention. The Provincial Adjudication Board dismissed Edmundo‘s complaint. On appeal, the

Department of Agricultural Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed the decision of the

Provincial Adjudication Board (PARAB) on the ground that Julio deliberately failed to comply with the

law.

Julio filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari which was then denied. Julio subsequently filed a

Relief for Judgment of the DARAB which was also denied. Julio then challenged the denial with the

Court of Appeals which was later denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DARAB committed a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed

resolutions denying the petition and Julio‘s Motion for Reconsideration

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HELD:

The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long become final and executory, hence,

immutable and unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is

meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Excepted from this rule is when the modification

involves correction of 1) clerical errors, 2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and

3) void judgments. None of these exceptions is present in the case at bar, however.

Jurisdiction over a case does not thus disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued, for the issuance of such certificate is not a mode of transfer of property but merely an evidence of such transfer. In any event, Julio may not question the jurisdiction of the DARAB and its adjudicative arm at this late

juncture of the proceedings, he having actively participated in the proceedings.

Relief from judgment is available only against the decision of an adjudicator, to be filed before

the adjudicator, when the party seeking it has no other adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary

course of law. In the case at bar, Julio sought relief from the decision of the DARAB, not that of the

adjudicator, before the DARAB.

EUGENIA D. POLIDO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 170632, July 10, 2007, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, the Court also

recognizes that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

After the death of her husband, Julian Polido, petitioner Eugenia D. Polido (Polido) sought to

withdraw money from the joint savings deposit she and her husband maintained with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Petitioner Polido, however, failed to make the said withdrawal as private respondent, Mariano Gasat (Gasat), who claimed to be the couple‘s adopted child, objected thereto.

Petitioner Polido then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a motion for the

issuance of a preliminary injunction against Gasat. In his answer with compulsory counterclaim, he alleged that he is an adopted child of the couple. Gasat subsequently filed an Omnibus Motion withdrawing the allegation he had made that he is an adopted son of the couple. He moved to convert the case to an action for partition of the estate of his grandfather, Narciso Polido. To Gasat‘s prayer to convert the action to one for partition, Polido filed an Opposition. And she moved for Judgment on the Pleadings.

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The trial court denied Gasat‘s motion to convert the case to an action for partition

and granted Polido‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed his appeal for failure to pay the required docket fee on time. However, on motion for reconsideration, the CA admitted Gasat‘s docket fee. ISSUE:

Whether or not the rule on non-payment of docket fees may be relaxed to allow a belated payment thereof HELD:

Indeed, jurisprudence allows the relaxation of the Rule on non-payment of appellate docket fees. Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, the Court also recognizes that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

The relaxation by the appellate court of the rule on non-payment of the appellate docket fee

appears justified as a perusal of the records of the case shows persuasive and weighty reasons to give due course to the appeal.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. FELINO M. TIMBOL et al.,


To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, an applicant must show that (1) he has a right in esse or a right to be protected, and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

The Philippine National Bank International Finance Limited (PNB-IFL), a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), granted Karrich Holdings Limited based in Hongkong and owned by respondent Felino Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), a revolving credit line and/or for the opening of letters of credit with Trust Receipt Financing.

To secure the payment of obligation, Timbol executed three separate Real Estate Mortgages (REMs) and promissory notes for and on behalf of Karrich Holdings Ltd. The credit facilities were later renewed, revised and reduced.

As the borrowers defaulted in the payment, PNB sent a demand letter and warned the borrowers

that PNB would be constrained to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgages if they failed to pay. The borrowers then requested for additional time to pay their obligation. But such was denied by PNB and it moved for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages.

More than 3 months shy of the one year period to redeem the foreclosed, Timbol filed before

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against PNB for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Auction Sale and for Accounting, Damages and Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction. The trial court granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the same.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction HELD:

Rule 58, Sec. 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction. To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, an applicant must show that (1) he has a right in esse or a right to be protected, and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. That is settled.

From a considered scrutiny of the records of the case, the main thesis of respondents in praying

for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is that "the foreclosure by the Notary Public is highly irregular, not valid and thus illegal" because "it was not in accordance with Administrative Order No. 3 of the Supreme Court dated 24 October 1984", and the amount of their obligation was "deliberately bloated" to a "staggering" amount of P101,117,800.00, way above the granted credit facilities amounting to US$848,300.00.

Timbol et al.‟s claim of irregularity in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was belied,

however, by the testimonial and documentary evidence of PNB which correctly argued that Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3 does not apply, the extrajudicial foreclosure having been conducted by a notary public to which mode of foreclosure respondents agreed in the REMs, hence, proper.

The issuance by the trial court, therefore, of the Order granting a writ of preliminary injunction

in order, so it declared, to "better serve the cause of justice" considering Timbol et al.‘s claim that the foreclosure was irregular and PNB bloated their obligation, was attended with grave abuse of discretion.

It was, therefore, error for the appellate court to find no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance

of the trial court‘s order and accordingly dismiss PNB‘s petition for certiorari.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. DEANG MARKETING CORPORATION et al. 573 SCRA 375 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be

extended.

Deang Marketing Corporation (DMC), et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Philippine National Bank (PNB) for reformation of contract and specific performance claiming that the dacion en pago arrangement forged by them already transformed DMC‘s loan obligation.

Summons was served on PNB requiring it to Answer until May 5, 2006. DMC subsequently filed a Motion to Declare PNB in Default. The RTC thereafter received a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer. On May 16, 2006, RTC granted PNB's Motion. DMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of RTC‘s order denying their Motion to Declare PNB in default. The RTC denied such motion. DMC subsequently assailed RTC‘s Orders of May 16, 2006 and August 9, 2006 via certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA annulled the RTC‘s orders.

ISSUES:

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Whether or not the CA erred in declaring PNB in default HELD: PNB‘s Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer was laden with glaring lapses. It had, following the reglementary 15-day period after service of summons (unless a different period is fixed by the court), until May 5, 2006 within which to file an Answer or appropriate pleading. It filed the Motion for Extension, however, via a private courier on May 14, 2006, which was received by the trial court on May 15, 2006 or ten days late.

It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. The court's discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such motion's timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to entertain or grant it. Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to extend. PNB was not candid enough to aver in the Motion for Extension that the period had lapsed, as it still toyed with the idea that it could get away with it. The allegations therein were crafted as if the said motion was timely filed. Notably, the May 16, 2006 Order expressed no inkling that the motion was filed out of time. The trial court either was deceived by or it casually disregarded the apparent falsity foisted by petitioner. In denying DMC's Motion for Reconsideration of its grant of PNB's Motion for Extension, the RTC ruled that it was inclined to reconsider or lift an order of default. By such ruling, the trial court preempted the dictates of orderly procedure by unduly anticipating and signifying a slant toward the remedies and arguments yet to be availed of and raised by PNB.

In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the tardiness of the Answer and no compelling reason was given to justify its admission. The intention to delay was rather obvious. The Court thus finds PNB's negligence inexcusable, as the circumstances behind and the reasons for the delay are detestable.

GLANIE FLORES, et al. v. MYRNA S. LOFRANCO A.M. No. P-04-1914, 30 April 2008, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Since the affidavit of the complainant brothers was not identified by either of them during cross examination because of their failure to show up, it is deemed hearsay, hence inadmissible.

Complainant brothers Richard, Danny, Virgilio, Timoteo, and Leonardo all surnamed Flores charged respondent Myrna Lofranco (Lofranco), Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Digos City of immorality, misconduct, and violation of Republic Act 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards). In their complaint, brothers Flores allege that Lofranco, while married to another is illicitly living with Sabino Flores, brother of the Flores brothers. For her part, Lofranco denied having any amorous relationship with Sabino.

Upon recommendation of the Office of Court Administrator (OCA), the Court redocketed the complaint as regular administrative case and referred it to Executive Judge of Regional Trial Court of Digos for investigation, report, and recommendation. Executive Judge Marivic Daray said in her Report

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and Recommendation that Flores brothers did not show up hence, they were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence. Consequently, Judge Daray found that the only evidence to prove Lofranco‘s misconduct was Sabino‘s son‘s Affidavit. Thus, Judge Daray recommended the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not complaint against Lofranco was rightly dismissed

HELD:

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence. It bears stressing that the original affidavit had not been identified by him. It thus remains hearsay, bereft of substantial evidentiary value.

The failure of the Flores brothers ‗counsel to put [the affiant] on the stand is fatal to the case of petitioner and renders the affidavit . . . inadmissible under the hearsay rule. Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by he one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

YOLANDA O. ALFONSO v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION,


The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one‟s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Petitioner Yolanda O. Alfonso (Alfonso), then the register of deeds of Caloocan City, was found

administratively liable for allegedly acquiescing to the change of the date of the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Consequently, she was dismissed from government service for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Alfonso was investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon the request of Phil-Ville Development Corporation (Phil-Ville) who purchased some parts of the land. Phil-Ville‘s letter-complaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement which found that Alfonso acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith hence it recommended the filing of administrative cases against her and her conspirators. On the other hand, LRA finds her guilty of Grave Misconduct and recommended her dismissal. Upon review by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of the LRA decision, it recommended to the Office of the President (OP) that Alfonso, a presidential appointee, be found guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty and be dismissed from the service. Consequently, OP issued an Administrative Order ordering the dismissal of Alfonso. Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Administrative Order. Alfonso came to Supreme Court to seek a reversal of the CA‘s Decision and its Resolution affirming her dismissal ordered by OP.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding decision of the Office of the President because Alfonso‘s right to due process was violated

HELD:

Alfonso was given every opportunity to explain her side and to present evidence in her defense during the administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently show that in compliance with the ―show-cause‖ letter of the LRA Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and that during the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary evidence.

Likewise, the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is only substantial

evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct. In the case at bar, petitioner stood charged not for changing the date of registration of OCT No. 994 but rather, she was indicted for acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting ―certifications‖ on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994; and (2) for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she had no hand in the alteration are unavailing.

ERNESTO C. DEL ROSARIO and DAVAO TIMBER CORPORATION v. FAR EAST BANK

& DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

537 SCRA 571 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) A party cannot escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice

litigated by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances.

Petitioner Davao Timber Corporation (Davao Timber) and respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (Private Development) entered into a loan agreement under which Private Development extended to Davao Timber a foreign currency loan and a peso loan. The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six parcels of land, one of which was registered in the name of petitioner Ernesto C. Del Rosario (Rosario). The loan left Petitioners Davao Timber and Rosario with a substantial amount of outstanding balance from the aforementioned loans. Petitioners Davao Timber and Rosario then filed a complaint against Private Development for violation of Usury Law, annulment of contract and damages This Court ordered Davao Timber and Rosario to pay Php 1.4 Million to Private Development. It must also be noted that pending the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, Private Development assigned its rights over the receivables from Davao Timber and Rosario. Thereafter, Davao Timber and Rosario entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Far East agreeing to pay and actually paid Far East.

Thus, Davao Timber and Rosario filed a complaint (first complaint) before the Regional Trial

Court of Makati (RTC) for the recovery of the excess payment made from Private Development and Far East. RTC ordered Private Development to pay Davao Timber and Rosario while the complaint against Far East was dismissed for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the CA held that despite the excess

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payment of Php 5 Million, only the amount of P965,000 from Far East may be recovered by Davao Timber as claimed by it in the complaint. Such decision was affirmed by this Court.

Davao Timber and Rosario then filed a complaint (second complaint) against Far East for the

recovery of the balance of the excess payment in the amount of Php 4.335 Million before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata and splitting of the cause of action. The trial court also held that the decision in the first complaint had already become final and executory and that the Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment was already filed by the parties. ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint is dismissible on the ground of res judicata and splitting of the case

HELD:

Section 49(b) enunciates the first rule of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment" or

"estoppel by judgment," which makes the judgment rendered in the first case an absolute bar to the subsequent action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein. The second rule of res judicata embodied in Section 47(c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of judgment". It refers to a situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or which were necessarily included therein.

The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior judgment," viz: (a) finality of the former judgment, (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, (c) it must be a judgment on the merits, and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to the first complaint was a final

judgment. Not only did it dispose of the case on the merits; it also became executory as a consequence of the denial of Far East‘s motion for reconsideration and appeal. Neither is there room to doubt that the judgment in the first complaint was on the merits for it determined the rights and liabilities of the parties.

Right or wrong, judgment bars another case based upon the same cause of action if the same

facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. In the two cases, Davao Timber and Rosario imputed to Far East the same alleged wrongful act of mistakenly receiving and refusing to return an amount in excess of what was due it in violation of their right to a refund. The same facts and evidence presented in the first complaint were the very same facts and evidence that petitioners presented in the second complaint.

Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury. It is well established, however, that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting

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his case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as herein Davao Timber and Rosario are doing, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al. 492 SCRA 747 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage determines the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari against the respondent Sandiganbayan challenging the denial by the Sandiganbayan, of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Solicitor General alleges that its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must first be resolved, as a continuation of the proceedings in the civil case by the Sandiganbayan might be rendered unnecessary in the event that its petition before the Supreme Court is resolved in its favor. ISSUE:

Whether or not a writ of preliminary injuction can be granted during the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari against the Sandiganbayan

HELD:

The mere elevation of an interlocutory matter to this Court through a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, like in the present case, does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before a public respondent, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent.

The burden is thus on the petitioner in a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of suspending the proceedings before the public respondent. Essential for granting injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage.The Court finds that petitioner has failed to discharge the burden. The ground on which it bases its urgent motion is the alleged futility of proceeding with the trial of the case. This assertion, however, is speculative, anchored on the mere supposition that the petition would be decided in its favor. There is thus, in this case, a marked absence of any urgent necessity for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

The Supreme Court takes notice that in most cases where its interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court, Sandiganbayan, suspends proceedings in the cases in which these assailed interlocutory orders are issued despite the non-issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction and the absence of a strong probability that the issues raised before this Court would be rendered moot by a continuation of the proceedings before it.

LAGRIMAS PACAÑA-GONZALEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL CARBONELL PHUA


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Modes of service of summons must be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The purpose of which is to afford the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.

Spouses Amarillo were the registered owners of a lot which is the subject of the dispute of this case. Spouses Amarillo conveyed such land to Manuel Carbonell cancelling the title of the former and in its place TCT No. 62176 which was issued in the name of Phua.

More than a decade later, the Heirs of Josefa Gacho Pacaña filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Title and Annulment of the Deed of Sale covering the subject lot against the Amarillo Spouses and Phua. The summons together with the copy of the complaint was served to the Amarillo Spouses but not to Phua who was unknown at his given address at Salinas Compound, Salinas Drive, Lahug, Cebu City. The service of summons were effected by postal service but such failed, the Heirs of Pacaña filed a motion to effect service of summons by publication which motion was granted. The summons and copy of the complaints were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Visayan Herald.

The trial court declared Phua in default for not answering within the reglamentary period, the Heirs of Pacaña were allowed to present their evidence. On April 3, 1991, the trial court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiff Heirs of Pacaña. After having known the decision, Phua filed in November 1995 a petition for Annulment of Judgement before the appellate court raising the issue of the validity of the service of summons by publication. The Court of Appeals granted Phua‘s petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting Phua‘s petition on the invalidity of the service of

summons by publication HELD:

Summons by publication was correctly availed by the Heirs of Pacaña since Phua‘s whereabouts were unknown and could not be ascertained by diligent inquiry. However, the motion to be allowed to serve summons by publication requires a supporting ―affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf setting forth the grounds for the application.‖ The Heirs of Pacaña failed to comply with the Rules as the ‖Motion for Service of Summons by Publications‖ filed by their counsel as it bears no supporting affidavit. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Phua and as a consequence the court could not render a valid judgement against him because the summons intended for him were invalid.

Modes of service of summons must be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire

jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The purpose of which is to afford the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him.

REBECCA GUTIERREZ v. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, et al.


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A strict and rigid application of procedural rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. Petitioner Rebecca Gutierrez filed a complaint for illegal deduction from and withholding of salaries against respondent Rempac Placement Agency (REMPAC) before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Her complaint was dismissed and so were her other succeeding petitions with the higher juridical bodies due to non-compliance with the procedural requirements particularly on the contents and the filing of petitions. ISSUE: Whether or not adherence to Civil Procedures is to be applied strictly on labor controversies HELD: There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. Hence, a strict and rigid application of technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. If the Court were to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and technical sense, as the Court of Appeals would have it in this case, the ends of justice would be defeated.

The Court further declared that cases should be determined by the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest

opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.

PNB CREDIT CARD CORPORATION v. MATILDE M. RODRIGUEZ


The dismissal without prejudice is not merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.

Allegedly failing to settle her account arising from her availment of her PNB Credit Card to

which she charged her purchases inclusive of interest and penalty, PNB Credit Card Corporation filed a

complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against Matilde M. Rodriguez (Matilde),

together with Lorenzo Y. Villalon (Villalon), her co-obligor.

The complaint was subsequently dismissed ―for lack of interest to prosecute, without

prejudice.‖ The records do not show that the Matilde and Villalon were furnished copy of the order. A

second order was issued by the trial court which again dismissed the case without prejudice.

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A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by Matilde arguing that the order of

dismissal without prejudice did not become final as it could be ―revived within a

reasonable period of time,‖ citing Medrano & Associates v. Roxas & Company.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court‘s first or second order dismissing Matilde‘s complaint had become final HELD: The facts and circumstances attendant to Medrano cited by Matilde, wherein the Court held that even assuming that the therein order of dismissal without prejudice had become final, ―[t]here was no reason why instead of asking plaintiff to refile the case, the case cannot be reopened in the interest of justice,‖ are clearly different from those of the present case. In Medrano, the trial court, by Order of March 5, 1986, motu propio dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to prosecute. On May 5, 1986, the plaintiff filed a motion to set the case for hearing on May 9, 1986. Before that or on May 7, 1986, the plaintiff‘s counsel received a copy of the March 5, 1986 order of dismissal. Although the March 5, 1986 order of dismissal appears to have become final as plaintiff failed to appeal therefrom or to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the reason plaintiff failed to act accordingly appears to be that even before receipt of said notice of the dismissal order he filed a motion to set the case for hearing. He was obviously awaiting action on the same. Nevertheless, the trial court reset the hearing of the case not once but three times. The only logical consequence of these actions is that the trial court effectively reconsidered its order of dismissal dated March 5. In other words, in Medrano, this Court took into account the fact that, among other things, before the plaintiff received a copy of the dismissal without prejudice order, it filed before the trial court a motion to set the case for hearing, which the trial court granted when it set the case for hearing three times, which action of the trial court this Court took to logically mean that the order of dismissal was ―effectively reconsidered.‖

ARTURO MUYALDE, et al. v. BONIFACIO REYES, JR. 560 SCRA 260 (2008) SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.)

The mandatory requirement of payment of appellate docket fees is qualified by the following: 1)

failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic dismissal; and 2) such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances.

A commercial land was inherited by the sisters Fortunata Muyalde (Fortunata), Cresencia Reyes

(Cresencia) and Felicidad Revilla (Felicidad) from their brother. In a “Compromise Agreement”, Cresencia agreed to give to her sister Fortuna’s six children one-third of a lot they owned in Pangasinan which was registered under the name of Spouses Cresencia and Bonifacio Reyes, Sr.

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Arturo Muyalde, et al., heirs of Fortuna filed a complaint for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan against Bonifacio Reyes. Subsequently, a complaint for “Ownership, Reformation of instrument, Partition and Delivery of Share” was also filed. Reyes filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and failure to state a cause of action. The RTC brushed aside Reyes’ allegation of res judicata and dismissed the complaint.

Muyalde et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s Order which was denied,

accordingly. Muyalde et al. filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. While Reyes, on the other hand, also filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, that is accompanied by two supplemental motions, citing, Muyalde et al.’s failure to pay the appellate docket fees within the reglementary period. The RTC gave due course to Muyalde et al.’s appeal and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA strictly applied the rule on the payment of appellate docket fees and dismissed Muyalde et al.’s appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in dismissing Muyalde et al.’s appeal

HELD:

In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, this Court, in the exercise of its “sole prerogative to amend,

repeal, or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases”.

Neypes v. Court of Appeals was decided on September 14, 2005, during the pendency of the case at bar before the Court of Appeals. It is settled that procedural laws and rules are considered as applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Petitioners having received copy of the trial court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration on September 10, 2004, they had until September 25, 2004 to perfect their appeal. Since they paid the docket and other fees on September 20, 2004, they perfected their appeal within the reglementary period.

SPS. RODRIGO LACIERDA, et al. v. DR. ROLANDO PLATON, et al.


A court cannot be divested of jurisdiction by the ingenuous omission by a plaintiff of any reference to a matter

which clearly shows that the said court has jurisdiction.

Petitioners Rodrigo Lacierda, Erlinda Cruz-Lacierda, Jessica and Renan Saliente, Ruby Salde and

Armniel Sim (Lacierda, et al.) were all employees/officers of Southeast Asian Fisheries Development

Center (SEAFDEC), an international agency which is immune from suits, it being clothed with

diplomatic immunity. Meanwhile, respondents Rolando Platon, Agnes Lacuesta, Dan Baliao, Amelita

Subosa, Merlita Junion, Teresita Hilado, Demetrio Estenor, Salvador Rex Tillo, Teresita Natividad,

Teresa Mallare, Jocelyn Coniza and Nelda Ebron (Platon, et al.) are officers and with the management of

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SEAFDEC, Aqua Culture Development (AQC), an international organization composed

of governments of Southeast Asia created by virtue of a treaty of which the Philippines is a

signatory.

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and SEAFDEC entered into a Memorandum of

Agreement (MOA) where the former has found the Department of Agriculture (DA) through

SEAFDEC to be qualified in providing the necessary services and in implementing JICA‘s Third

Country Training Programme on Responsible Aquaculture Development (training program). Regarding

the liquidation, such shall be made by submitting a statement of expenditures containing the itemized

breakdown of all expenses incurred, attaching therewith all copies of supporting documents and

evidences and receipts certifying the said expenditures (original copies will be kept by SEAFDEC). In

case there will be an excess in the amount consigned, the excess amount will be returned to JICA.

Lacierda, et al. were selected by SEAFDEC to take part in the training program. After such was

concluded, Lacierda, et al. submitted to SEAFDEC documents in support of their liquidation of cash

advances and claim for reimbursement of expenses but an audit of the same showed that ―hotel receipts

submitted were much higher that the actual amount that they paid on accommodation.‖ Thus, Lacierda,

et al. were terminated for cause ―on the ground of misrepresentation or false statements with intent to

gain or take advantage and fraudulent machination for financial gain.

More than a year later, Lacierda, et al. filed a complaint against Platon, et al. alleging that they are

suing them in their individual and personal capacities for their commission of malicious, oppressive and

inequitable actionable acts. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo for want of

jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and the person of Platon, et al., it holding that assailed acts

could only be performed by them in their official functions as administrators of SEAFDEC.

Also, Lacierda, et al. prayed to be restored and returned to their respective work/positions in

SEAFDEC; to be given the salaries, benefits and other privileges; to be awarded actual damages by

reason of the deprivation of the salaries and benefits they should have received; and to be paid moral

damages. Such allegations and reliefs clearly indicate that their cause/s of action arose out of employer-

employee relationship which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and not

the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Lacierda, et al.‘s complaint

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HELD:

A court cannot be divested of jurisdiction by the ingenuous omission by a plaintiff of any

reference to a matter which clearly shows that said court has jurisdiction, nor can a court be conferred

with jurisdiction where it has none by a contrived wording by a plaintiff‘s allegations in the complaint in

order to impress that it is within said court‘s jurisdiction.

Lacierda, et al.‘s primary prayer — for the Platon, et al. to be ordered ―to restore and return

Lacierda, et al. to their respective work/positions in SEAFDEC and to all the salaries, benefits and other

privileges appurtenent thereto without loss of seniority, diminution of ranks or pay to continue during

the pendency of this case,‖ betrays their cause of action, however. If Platon, et al. were sued in their

personal capacity as emphatically stressed by Lacierda, et al., for tort and damages, they would under no

circumstance, power or authority be able to carry out such primary prayer.

MA. ROSARIO SANTOS-CONCIO, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al. 543 SCRA 70 (2008), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.)

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an

injudicious performance of functions. For one's dispatch may be another's undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

On February 4, 2006, ―Wowowee,‖ a noontime game show aired by ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, is supposed to celebrate its anniversary episode at the Philsports Arena (formerly Ultra). Hours before the start of the show and minutes after the people were allowed entry, a stampede occurred which claimed 71 lives and left hundreds wounded. This tragedy prompted the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to immediately investigate the circumstances surrounding the stampede.

Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzalez constituted an Evaluating Panel. The purpose is to evaluate the DILG Report and determine whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The Panel found none.

Acting on the referral of the Panel to hold further investigations, the National Bureau of Investigation-National Capital Region (NBI-NCR) submitted to the DOJ an investigation report recommending the conduct of preliminary investigation for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries against Concio, et al., and seven others as respondents. Gonzales acted on such recommendation by creating a panel of state prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.

Meanwhile, Concio, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. CA granted the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

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The Investigating Panel found probable cause to indict Concio, et al. for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries, and recommended the conduct of a separate preliminary investigation against certain public officials. Concio, et al. filed a petition. ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the DOJ can validly conduct criminal investigation and preliminary investigation at the same time for the same case

2) Whether or not the complaint-affidavits filed against Santos-Concio, et al. are defective for not being under oath and for failing to state the acts or omissions constituting the crime

3) Whether or not DOJ, et al. have already prejudged the case, as shown by the public declarations

of the Secretary of Justice and the Chief Executive, and by the indecent haste by which the proceedings were conducted

H ELD: On the Investigatory Power of the DOJ

The measures taken by the Evaluating Panel do not partake of a criminal investigation, they having been done in aid of evaluation in order to relate the incidents to their proper context. Concio et al.‘s own video footage of the ocular inspection discloses this purpose. Evaluation for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation entails not only reading the report or documents in isolation, but also deems to include resorting to reasonably necessary means such as ocular inspection and physical evidence examination. For, ultimately, any conclusion on such sufficiency or insufficiency needs to rest on some basis or justification.

Had the Evaluating Panel carried out measures partaking of a criminal investigation, it would have gathered the documents that it enumerated as lacking. Notatu dignum is the fact that the Evaluating Panel was dissolved functus oficio upon rendering its report. It was the NBI, a constituent unit of the DOJ, which conducted the criminal investigation. It is thus foolhardy to inhibit the entire DOJ from conducting a preliminary investigation on the sheer ground that the DOJ‘s constituent unit conducted the criminal investigation.

Moreover, the improbability of the DOJ contradicting its prior finding is hardly appreciable. It bears recalling that the Evaluating Panel found no sufficient basis to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation. Since the Evaluating Panel‘s report was not adverse to petitioners, prejudgment may not be attributed vicariously,‖ so to speak, to the rest of the state prosecutors. Partiality, if any obtains in this case, in fact weighs heavily in favor of petitioners. On the Alleged Defect of the Complaints

A complaint for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation differs from a complaint for purposes of instituting a criminal prosecution. Confusion apparently springs because two complementary procedures adopt the usage of the same word, for lack of a better or alternative term, to refer essentially to a written charge. There should be no confusion about the objectives, however, since, as intimated during the hearing before the appellate court, preliminary investigation is conducted precisely to elicit further facts or evidence. Being generally inquisitorial the preliminary investigation stage is often the only

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means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the preparation of a complaint or information.

As clearly worded, the complaint is not entirely the affidavit of the complainant, for the affidavit is treated as a component of the complaint. The phraseology of the above-quoted rule recognizes that all necessary allegations need not be contained in a single document. It is unlike a criminal ―complaint or information‖ where the averments must be contained in one document charging only one offense, non-compliance with which renders it vulnerable to a motion to quash.

A preliminary investigation can validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. After all what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of the cases in court.

In the present case, there is no doubt about the existence of affidavits. The appellate court found that ―certain complaint-affidavits were already filed by some of the victims,‖ a factual finding to which this Court, by rule, generally defers.

A complaint for purposes of conducting preliminary investigation is not required to exhibit the attending structure of a ―complaint or information‖ laid down in Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) which already speaks of the ―People of the Philippines‖ as a party, an ―accused‖ rather than a respondent, and a ―court‖ that shall pronounce judgment. If a ―complaint or information‖ filed in court does not comply with a set of constitutive averments, it is vulnerable to a motion to quash. The filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit is proscribed by the rule on preliminary investigation, however. The investigating officer is allowed to dismiss outright the complaint only if it is not sufficient in form and substance or ―no ground to continue with the investigation‖ is appreciated. On the claim of bias and pre-judgment

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one‘s prompt dispatch may be another‘s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officer‘s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, Concio et al. failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel‘s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.

As for Concio et al.‘s claim of undue haste indicating bias, proof thereof is wanting. The pace of the proceedings is anything but a matter of acceleration. Without any objection from the parties, DOJ et al. even accorded Concio et al. a preliminary investigation even when it was not required since the case involves an alleged offense where the penalty prescribed by law is below Four Years, Two Months and One Day.

Neither is there proof showing that Gonzalez exerted undue pressure on his subordinates to

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tailor their decision with his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined result. The Evaluating Panel in fact even found no sufficient basis, it bears emphatic reiteration, to proceed with the conduct of a preliminary investigation, and one member of the Investigating Panel even dissented to its October 9, 2006 Resolution.

To follow Concio et al.‘s theory of institutional bias would logically mean that even the NBI had prejudged the case in conducting a criminal investigation since it is a constituent agency of the DOJ. And if the theory is extended to the President‘s declaration, there would be no more arm of the government credible enough to conduct a criminal investigation and a preliminary investigation.

PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION et al. v. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS 460 SCRA 260 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

It is the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or

nature of the action. Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed credit facilities of respondent Banque

Nationale De Paris (BNP). In order to assure payment, co-petitioners Automotive Corporation, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group executed a corporate guarantee.

Proton failed to comply with his obligation to BNP. Thereafter, BNP demanded the payment of

Proton‘s obligation to its co-petitioners pursuant to corporate guarantee. But the same remained unheeded. BNP then filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Proton et al. The clerk of court assessed the docket fee. Proton et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case because BNP did not properly pay the docket fees. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the motion of Proton et al. Hence this present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the court does not acquire jurisdiction when there is an improper payment of docket fees HELD: The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. It also stated that where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

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In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

DATU OMAR S. SINSUAT and MARIANO H. PAPS v. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO 561 SCRA 38 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Anonymous complaint, as a rule, is received with caution yet it should not be dismissed outright if its averments

may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.

Petitioners Attys. Datu Omar Sinsuat and Mariano Paps filed an administrative case against respondent Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo. Attys. Sinsuat and Paps were counsel for the defendant in a civil case pending before the sala of Judge Hidalgo. Attys. Sinsuat and Paps question, among other things, the authority of the Judge Hidalgo to issue in the abovementioned civil case a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) from holding a bidding for wooden poles required for the ―O-Ilaw Project – An Accelerated Rural Electrification Program‖. According to Attys. Sinsuat and Paps, Judge Hidalgo disregarded the clear proscription of the Presidential Decree No. 181881 and Republic Act No. 8975 and the Court‘s Administrative Circular No. 11-200083 against the issuance of TROs and Writs of Injunction on government infrastructure projects. Judge Hidalgo, on the other hand, contends that the complaint against him should be dismissed because the complaint and subsequent communications of the Attys. Sinsuat and Paps were not verified, in violation of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: Whether of not the complaint may be ruled upon even if the same did not comply with the requirements stated in Rule 140 of the Rules of Court HELD: Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides how proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted. It states that proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Under the above-quoted Rule, there are three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be instituted: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.

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While the copy of the Motion which the Attorneys furnished the OCA was

unverified as were their subsequent letters, the OCA correctly treated them as anonymous complaint. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, been entertaining complaints of this nature especially where respondents admitted the material allegations of the complainants as in Judge Hidalgo‘s case.

Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution. They should not be dismissed

outright, however, where their averments may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.

Here, the motion and letters sufficiently averred the specific acts upon which Judge Hidalgo‘s

alleged administrative liability was anchored. And the averments are verifiable from the records of the trial court and the Court of Appeal‘s Decision.

THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ILOCOS NORTE et al. v. BRUNO LORENZO and LORENZA DELA CRUZ LORENZO


The Sheriff must enforce the writ of execution including the conduct of the sale at public auction with certainty and regularity.

The Workmen‘s Compensation Commission (WCC) affirmed the decision of the Hearing

Officer of its Regional Office ordering Bruno Lorenzo and Lorenza Dela Cruz Lorenzo to pay the amount of P 4,230.00 to Natividad Vda. De Ravina, widow of the late Apolonio Ravina who died under the employ as mechanic of the Lorenzos. A petition for execution of the WCC decision was filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte against the Lorenzos. The RTC granted the petition for execution.

The Lorenzos then filed a complaint for annulment of Sheriff‘s sale of their properties before

the CFI. It was only after twenty years that the case was decided by the now Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Norte. The lower court ruled in favor of the Lorenzos on the basis of its observation that the execution of judgment was done in posthaste. Both parties appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA). The Ravinas faulted the trial court for holidng that the execution of the judgement was done posthaste and that there was no time for the sheriff to look into the goods or chattels of the judgment debtors. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sheriff complied with the Rules on Execution of Judgments HELD:

As reflected above, the Sheriff‘s testimony relied upon by petitioners is not straightforward. He is not certain on some matters relevant to the issue of regularity of the enforcement of the writ of execution including the conduct of the sale at public auction. This Court is not thus prompted to hold that he followed the mandate of the Rules, particularly Sec. 9(b) which provides how execution of judgments are enforced. One of the modes is Satisfaction by levy where if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving

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the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.

When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment. The implementation of the writ of execution was thus flawed.

SONIA MACEDA and GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY v. ENCARNACION DE

GUZMAN VDA. DE MACATANGAY 481 SCRA 415 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Personal service or filing if practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person is mandatory as the general rule; it is only when it is not practicable that other modes of service may be resorted to as the exception.

Spouses Sonia Maceda and Bonifacio Macatangay, executed a Kasunduan whereby they agreed to live separately. Bonifacio soon lived with his common law wife Carmen Jaraza. When Bonifacio died, Sonia claimed for his Social Security System (SSS) benefit, which was granted to her. However, the Social Security Commission (SSC) later ordered Sonia to refund the benefits in favor of Encarnacion De Guzman Macatangay, Bonifacio‘s mother, and his illegitimate children, on the ground that the Kasunduan

is a proof that Sonia is not dependent upon Bonifacio for support.

Sonia filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the same was dismissed due to their failure to explain why they failed to personally serve copies of the petition to Encarnacion which is required in Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In her affidavit, Sonia explains that they resorted to service by mail due to the distant addresses of Encarnacion‘s lawyer in Lopez, Quezon and Sonia‘s counsel in Lucena City, thereby making personal service impracticable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the distant addresses made the personal service impracticable making the service by mail valid

HELD:

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".

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The Court thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.

In the case at bar, the address of Encarnacion‘s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while Sonia‘s counsel‘s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the merits of Sonia‘s petition, if Sonia‘s allegations of fact and of law therein are true and the outright dismissal of their petition is upheld without giving them the opportunity to prove their allegations, Sonia would be deprived of her rightful death benefits just because of the Kasunduan she forged with her husband Bonifacio which contract is, in the first place, unlawful. The resulting injustice would not be commensurate to Sonia‘ counsel‘s "thoughtlessness" in not explaining why Encarnacion were not personally served copies of the petition.

LOURDESITA M. BIBAS v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYA) and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI

559 SCRA 591 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) It would hardly make much sense to allow a late or improperly filed appeal and disregard the rule on the binding effect of counsel‟s negligence when it is evident that a party is, at all events, unable to present a convincing case on the merits. Petitioner Lourdesita M. Bibas was Disbursing Officer II in the City Treasurer‘s Office, Silay City. She releases the salaries of government employees of Silay. Before each payday, she and her fellow disbursing officers would secure cash advances to defray the salaries, and after disbursement, they would present to their immediate supervisors the payrolls and remaining funds left in their possession. After the cash and accounts of the Bibas were examined, it was found that the cash on her account was short. Bibas explained that she misplaced two bundles of paid payrolls which she reported to their treasurer and their City Accountant Arsenal. An action was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. The latter found Bibas liable for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The Ombudsman subsequently modified its decision and found Bibas guilty of Dishonesty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for certiorari on procedural grounds. Bibas filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court‘s Resolution but was denied for having been filed twenty-two (22) days late. Bibas‘ contention that the reglementary period should be counted from the day she personally obtained a copy of the Resolution when she visited her then counsel, and not the date when her counsel received copy thereof. The CA echoed the rule that notice to counsel is notice to the client. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Bibas‘ action

HELD:

There have thus been instances when lack of participatory negligence of a party and the seriousness of the penalty imposed on it persuaded the Court to relax procedural rules as well as the time-honored rule regarding the binding effect of counsel‘s negligence. Alongside these considerations, the question of whether a case is meritorious, at least on its face, carries much weight in determining whether a relaxation of the rules is warranted. Indeed, it would hardly make much sense to allow a late or improperly filed appeal and disregard the rule on the binding effect of counsel‘s negligence when it is evident that a party is, at all events, unable to present a convincing case on the merits. In such instances, allowing the appeal to run its course would be a mere waste of time, both for the parties and the appellate court. Interestingly, Bibas admits that the merits of her case have been ventilated well enough both in the Petition itself and the Reply to the Comments of COA which she filed with this Court. If she fails then to present a strong case through the pleadings she has submitted to this Court, there would be no point remanding her case to the appellate court. As will be shown below, Bibas has failed to do just that. Neither then the procedural rules nor the rule on the binding effect of counsel‘s negligence should be relaxed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO AND FELICIANA MATEO 436 SCRA 502 (2004), THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.)

The order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents.

Spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed a Petition for the Reconstitution of the Original Copy as well as the Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan in the name of Jose Tan. The property under the said title was purchased by the Spouses Mateo from Jose Tan. Nevertheless, the original copy of the said TCT was deemed lost and cannot be located in the Registry of Deeds. The Regional Trial Court of Balanga denied the petition and the Motion for Reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court‘s decision and held that Mateo satisfactorily proved that the original TCT was lost. Hence, the filing of this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Mateo‘s Petition for Reconstitution must be granted HELD:

As correctly noted by the RTC ―there is no showing how the parcels of land in question were transferred to Jose Tan‖. The said order and decree, therefore, establish only the prior existence of OCT No. N-205 but not that of TCT No. T-38769 in the name of Jose Tan. The CA‘s reliance on the certified photocopy of Judge Tizon‘s decision awarding to Donato Echivarria from whose OCT the TCT subject of reconstitution was transferred does not lie for, in the first place, ―there is no showing how the parcels of land were transferred to Jose Tan,‖ the spouses Mateo‘s predecessor-in-interest. Since the Mateos

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have failed to present any of the other documents, the rule on secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130 applies.

The order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The

order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.

Assuming that the existence and execution of the original of the TCT has been satisfactorily

shown and that it was taken in 1973 by the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in connection with the investigation of the judge on whose order the OCT from which the TCT was transferred, which OCT was also taken by said government agencies, there is no satisfactory showing that the TCT has been lost.

In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is

no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos‘ petition for reconstitution fails.

KALAYAAN ARTS AND CRAFTS, INC. v. MANUEL ANGLO and JORGE YANSON 407

SCRA 146 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Petitioner should not be faulted for the perceived defects of the certified true copy of the decision of the voluntary

arbitrator attached to its petition and filed before the Court of Appeals as petitioner did not have a hand in the preparation

and issuance thereof.

In accordance with an agreement between Kalayaan Arts and Crafts, Inc. (KACI) and the

Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa KACI, the issue of the termination of employment of respondents

Manuel Anglo (Anglo) and Jorge Yanson (Yanson) was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The

voluntary arbitrator ruled that Anglo and Yanson were illegally terminated.

KACI received a copy of the arbitrator‘s decision. Fourteen (14) days later, KACI filed with the

Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. On May 15, 2000, KACI

filed by registered mail its petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On even date, KACI received a

copy of said court‘s Resolution denying its motion for extension of time to file a ―petition for review on

certiorari‖ on the ground that the assailed decision had become final and executory.

KACI filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. The CA denied the motion for

reconsideration because the examination of the petition for review reveals that the copy of the assailed

decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator as well as the material portions and other supporting papers are

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neither duplicate originals nor certified true copies, and are clearly mere photocopies of

said papers, in violation of Section 6, Rule 43 in relation to Section 7, Rule 43 of the same

1997 Rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not KACI has the right to file a petition for review

HELD:

In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that Section 6 of Rule 43 does not require that all

of the supporting papers or annexes accompanying the petition should be certified true copies or

duplicate originals. What is mandatory is the attachment of clearly legible duplicate originals or certified

true copies of the judgment or final orders of the lower courts.

In KACI‘s case then, with the exception of the assailed resolution of the voluntary arbitrator,

there was no need for it to attach duplicate or certified true copies of the other supporting papers.

In the recent case of Molina vs. Court of Appeals which has facts similar to those of the case at bar, the Court of Appeals dismissed a special civil action for certiorari because the attached copies of the orders of the trial court (1) did not show the authority of the person certifying the same and (2) the seal of the trial court could not be identified.

As in Molina, KACI in the case at bar should not be faulted for the perceived defects of the

certified true copy of the decision of the voluntary arbitrator attached to its petition filed before the

Court of Appeals as KACI did not have a hand in the preparation and issuance thereof.

A comparison of the ―Certified True Copy‖ of the decision submitted before the Court of

Appeals with the ―Certified True Copy‖ of the decision submitted before this Court all pages of which

latter copy bear the stamped words ―Certified True Copy‖ and appear to have been signed by the same

signatory as that submitted before the Court of Appeals shows that the two documents are identical.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS,et.al. 458 SCRA 200 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (CARPIO MORALES, J.)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/feb2000/128772.html

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jan2003/143156.htm

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A petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is a summary proceeding under the Family Code and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court‟s order sufficed. Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the Ormoc Regional Trial Court for the Declaration of Presumptive Death of her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc. The petition was thereafter granted by the trial court. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the present case is a special proceeding which requires that a record of appeal be filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding. The CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. HELD:

Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW contains Article 238 which provides that unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in the said Title shall apply in all cases provided for in the Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required and is therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code as her purpose was to contract a valid subsequent marriage, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court‘s order sufficed.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY v. WMC RESOURCES

INTERNATIONAL PTY. LTD. and WMC (PHILIPPINES), INC.


In a contract denominated as ―Tampakan Option Agreement‖, respondent WMC Resources

International Pty. Ltd. (WMC), through its local subsidiary Western Mining Corporation (Philippines),

Inc. (WMCP), acquired the mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato of the Tampakan Companies.

The ―Tampakan Option Agreement‖ was amended by subsequent agreements under which the

Tampakan Companies were given preferential option to acquire the shares of WMC in WMCP and

Hillcrest Inc. in the event WMC decided to sell them. WMC, by a Sale and Purchase Agreement, sold to

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (Lepanto) its shares of stock. As the Tampakan Companies later

availed of their preferential right under the ―Tampakan Option Agreement,‖ a Sale and Purchase

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Agreement was concluded between WMC and the Tampakan Companies over the same

shares of stock priorly purchased by Lepanto.

The Tampakan Companies notified the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of

the DENR of the exercise of their preemptive right to buy WMC‘s equity in WMCP and Hillcrest, Inc.

Lepanto wrote the DENR Secretary about the invalidity of said agreement and reiterated its request for

the approval of its acquisition of the disputed shares.

Lepanto subsequently filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a complaint against

WMC, WMCP, Tampakan Companies. WMC et al. filed before the RTC a Joint Motion to Dismiss on

the ground of forum shopping. The RTC denied WCM et al.‘s Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, the CA

granted the petition of respondents ruling that Lepanto is guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners filed a

motion for reconsideration with the CA. The CA denied said motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lepanto is guilty of forum shopping

HELD:

It is clear from the proceedings before the DENR, specifically before the MGB, that the issue of

which –– between petitioner and respondent Tampakan Companies –– possesses the better right to

acquire the mining rights, claims and interests held by WMC through its local subsidiary WMCP,

especially with respect to the 1995 FTAA, had been brought to the fore. The MGB cannot just assess

the qualifications of petitioner and of the Tampakan Companies as potential transferee or assignee of the

rights and obligations of WMCP under the FTAA without also resolving the issue of which has priority

of right to become one.

True, the questioned agreements of sale between Lepanto and WMC on one hand and between

WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock from one entity

to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or interest in mining

agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the questioned agreements of sale,

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which was raised by Lepanti before the DENR, is inextricably linked to the very nature of

such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law. Unavoidably, there

is identity of reliefs that Lepanto seeks from both the MGB and the RTC.

Forum shopping exists when both actions involve the same transactions, same essential facts and

circumstances and raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. Such elements are

evidently present in both the proceedings before the MGB and before the trial court. The case instituted

with the RTC was thus correctly ordered dismissed by the appellate court on the ground of forum

shopping. Besides, not only did Lepanto commit forum shopping but it also failed to exhaust

administrative remedies by opting to go ahead in seeking reliefs from the court even while those same

reliefs were appropriately awaiting resolution by the MGB.

MANIGO K. RAMOS v. PURITA G. ALVENDIA, et al.


The dismissal of a complaint for failure to file pre-trial brief is discretionary on the part of the trial court.

Manigo filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas for the cancellation of the

titles of Spouses Severino and reconveyance of the parcels of land. Manigo alleged that Hermilina

Casalan deceived him, and colluded with Purita Alvendia, by making it appear that Manigo and his

deceased brother Orlando donated to Purita the parcels of land. It was further alleged that Purita

transferred the titles to their names and then donated the same to Jose and Araceli Severino.

The RTC issued an Order declaring Manigo non-suited for failure of his counsel to appear and

to file pre-trial brief. The trial court accordingly dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the procedural rules in relation to the filing of Pre-Trial brief should be relaxed

HELD:

The dismissal of a complaint for failure to file pre-trial brief is discretionary on the part of the

trial court. While Manigo's counsel's explanation behind his failure to file pre-trial brief may not be

convincing, given, among other considerations, Manigo‘s presence when the case was called for pre-trial,

the nature of the case, the subject involved - real properties and the eventual appearance in the court of

Manigo's counsel whose claim that he was, on arrival initially barred from entering it and was even

shouted upon by the trial judge has not been disputed, the dismissal of the case by the trial court had

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been too precipitate and was not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by

Manigo's counsel with the order of the court.

The phrase "in the interest of substantial justice" is not, of course, a magic wand that would

automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules. But exigencies and situations might

occasionally demand flexibility in their application. Considering the circumstances attendant to the

present case, substantial justice can be best served if both parties are given the full opportunity to

ventilate their respective claims in a full-blown trial.









The RTC issued an Order declaring Manigo non-suited for failure of his counsel to appear and

to file pre-trial brief. The trial court accordingly dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:


HELD:







been too precipitate and was not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by Manigo's counsel

with the order of the court.




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present case, substantial justice can be best served if both parties are given the full

opportunity to ventilate their respective claims in a full-blown trial.

PILAR Y. GOYENA v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO 395 SCRA 117 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

When it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.

Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over the person and property of her sister Julieta since she is not in a position to take care of herself anymore due to her old age, general weakness, and suffering from a mini-stroke thereby requiring the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in various enterprises.

Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta‘s close friend for more than six decades, opposed the petition. She claims that Julieta is competent and sane enough to manage her person and property. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared Julieta to be ―incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property‖ and Gustilo was appointed to be her guardian. The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in finding Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself HELD:

It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law. The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it is question of fact.

In support of an affirmative answer, Goyena posits as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals‘ basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests between Julieta and Amparo is contrary to the evidence on record,

2. The Court of Appeals‘ erred in holding that there is no showing that Amparo is hostile to the best interest of Julieta, and

3. Julieta Ledesma‘s appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as her guardian.

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of Goyena‘s position require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at bar. The Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit.

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That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by Goyena in her Reply. Goyena claims that the petition falls within the exceptions to the rule because the findings of the Court of Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on record.

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties. As the Court said in Feliciano v. Comahort: ―As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.‖

In the case at bar, Goyena has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. Goyena‘s assertion that Amparo‘s intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta‘s properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., et al. v. HONORABLE VICENTE Q. ROXAS, et al. 513 SCRA 457 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The failure to report to the court the fact that a similar action had been filed or is already pending before the other courts, regardless of who initiated such similar action amounts to forum-shopping.

Respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a contract with Westinghouse Electric S.A. (WESA), an affiliate or subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE), whereby WESA undertook to construct in favor of the NPC a 620-megawatt nuclear power plant at Morong, Bataan. WESA subsequently executed a deed of assignment transferring all its rights and responsibilities in the contract to its construction arm-agent, respondent Westinghouse International Projects Company (WIPCO). Pres. Corazon Aquino issued an executive order transferring ownership of the already constructed power plant, together with its equipment, materials and facilities, records and uranium fuel to the National Government or its duly constituted agency. After series of talks, the government panel and Westinghouse eventually agreed on a settlement involving a package of more than 100 million dollars. Petitioners Public Interest Inc., et al., (PICI), as tax payers, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for declaration of nullity the contract with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that PICI were engaged in forum-shopping, their counsel Atty. Reyes having previously filed cases with causes of action identical thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not PICI are engaged in forum-shopping and thus can affect the dismissal of their complaint HELD: In this case, the court said that granted the PICI were initially unaware of the existence of the first set of cases, albeit their counsel was one of the petitioners therein; such fact was already brought to their attention during a hearing. They failed to report the pendency of the petition for mandamus before the appellate court bearing on the dismissal by the Manila RTC. Thus, the dismissal of PICI‘s complaint is in order.

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PICI violated the requirement to report to the courts the fact that a similar action had been filed or is already pending before the courts, regardless of who initiated such similar action. As stated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court for Certification against forum-shopping: The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification: c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO AND FELICIANA MATEO 436 SCRA 502 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available, on this score alone, the Mateos‟ petition for reconstitution fails.

Respondent spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed a petition for the Reconstitution of the Original Copy as well as the Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on 16 July 1971 in the name of Jose Tan. The property under the said title was purchased by the spouses Mateo from Jose Tan, however, the original copy of the said TCT was deemed lost and cannot be located in the Registry of Deeds. The RTC of Balanga denied the petition and the Motion for Reconsideration while the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and granted the same. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari lodged by the Republic. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to the certified photocopy of the title as basis for the reconstitution of the original and owner‘s copy of the title HELD:

As correctly noted by the RTC ―there is no showing how the parcels of land in question were transferred to Jose Tan‖. The said order and decree, therefore, establish only the prior existence of OCT No. N-205 but not that of TCT No. T-38769 in the name of Jose Tan. The CA‘s reliance on the certified photocopy of Judge Tizon‘s decision awarding to Donato Echivarria from whose OCT the TCT subject of reconstitution was transferred does not lie for, in the first place, ―there is no showing how the parcels of land were transferred to Jose Tan,‖ the spouses Mateo‘s predecessor-in-interest.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, ―AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE

RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED,‖ which has been quoted by the trial court in its decision, enumerates the sources-documents-bases of a reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. To repeat, they are, in the following order:

1. the owner‘s duplicate of the title

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2. the co-owner‘s mortgagee‘s, or lessee‘s duplicate of the title 3. a certified copy of the title previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal

custodian 4. an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,

pursuant to which the OCT was issued 5. a document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property . . . is . . .

encumbered or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed title.

Since, except for the last above-enumerated document, the Mateos have failed to present any of

the other documents, the rule on secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130 applies. Section 5 of the rule provides that ―when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on its part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated‖.

As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules directs, the order of presentation of secondary

evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.



In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos‘ petition for reconstitution fails.

In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or is no longer available, not

only is the photocopy of the alleged owner‘s duplicate copy thereof – Exh. ―1‖ partly illegible. When, where and under what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where it was kept to spare it from being also ―lost‖ were not even shown. These, not to mention the conduct by the Department of Justice and NBI of an investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT cautioned and led the Court to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos‘ evidence and propriety of a grant of their petition for reconstitution.

ZENAIDA GONZALES SERZO v. ATTY. ROMEO M. FLORES


A notary public is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized

may act as notary public.

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Petitioner Zenaida Gonzales Serzo filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.

Romeo M. Flores arising from his notarization of Deed of Absolute Sale covering a parcel of land owned

by Serzo‘s deceased father Neybardo Gonzales. In the Deed of Absolute Sale, the deceased Gonzales

purportedly sold the land to Yolanda dela Cruz, whose signature, as well as that of Gonzales, appears

thereon. Further, Amelia Gonzales Laureno, Serzo‘s sister, signed in the document on behalf of their

mother, giving marital consent.

Atty. Flores does not deny having notarized the document but he alleged that

the parties to the document, especially dela Cruz who is known or familiar to the staff of Atty. Flores‘

office had previous records of executed instruments and documents relating to the land subject of the

complaint. The person of the Gonzales may have not been disclosed to him but instead, confused him

with another person purporting to be Gonzales, thus, faking the latter‘s presence and allowing the entry

of said date. Flores also alleged that he could no longer recall the names and the parties to the Deed of

Absolute Sale for they are not familiar to him and considering that the document was notarized almost

two (2) years ago.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), found Flores guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as notary public ―by failing to establish the identity of the person appearing before him‖. ISSUE: Whether or Not Flores should be found guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as notary public HELD:

The Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public

interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Having, by his act, undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. More particularly Rule 1.01 thereof which enjoins a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, respondent must indeed be faulted.

LAURENCE M. SISON v. EUSEBIA CARIAGA 594 SCRA 661 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The nature of the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the Answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.

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Laurence Sison (Laurence) and his siblings were the donee of a parcel of land donated by Teofilo and Nelson Sison. They later found out that the house of Eusebia Cariaga (Cariaga) was built in a portion of the land donated to Laurence and his siblings. Laurence repeatedly demanded Cariaga to vacate the property but the same was kept unheeded. Laurence thereafter filed a complaint to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for unlawful detainer against Cariaga. Cariaga claimed that the land where her and her siblings‘ house stands is covered by Torrens Title in the name of her deceased father Juan Cariaga who possesses the land since 1940. The MCTC ruled in favor of Laurence. The Regional Trial Court, however, reversed the decision of the MCTC and ruled that the Laurence failed to substantiate his allegation that Cariaga‘s occupation was merely tolerated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy because what is involved is possession de jure since both parties claim ownership on the subject lot. It further held that what was involved was a boundary dispute and not a simple case of who has the better right of possession. ISSUE: Whether or not unlawful detainer is the proper remedy to be sought HELD: The nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction over it are determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. They cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the Answer or pleadings filed by the defendant, and neither can they be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. Laurence‘s complaint established the basic elements of a complaint for unlawful detainer to vest jurisdiction over it in the MCTC. That Cariaga has, in her Answer, claimed that her father owned the lot on which her house stands did not render the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissible, for the issue of ownership may, in an ejectment case, be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC., v. SPOUSES GEORGE M. DAI and DIVINA DAI, 539 SCRA 9 (2007), 2ND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Plaintiff cannot evade the application of res judicata by varying the form of its action since the causes of action in the first case and in the present suit are clearly identical. Spouses George and Divina Dai, (Spouses Dai) obtained a loan from PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (PCI) for the sum of P3,352,892 payable in monthly installments of P152,265 for the financing of a vessel-fishing boat. To secure the payment of the loan, Spouses Dai executed a chattel mortgage over the vessel in favor of PCI Leasing.

Both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage provided that, in case of failure to pay the installments or interest due thereon, the entire amount remaining unpaid shall immediately become due and payable. Spouses Dai failed to pay the second and third installments. This prompted PCI a

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complaint of replevin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In their Answer, Spouses Dai claimed that, the possession of the vessel including its registration certificate had been surrendered to PCI before the filing of the complaint. Spouses Dai thus prayed for the award of damages and attorney‘s fees by way of Counterclaim. The RTC of Cebu resolved both issues but did not award any damages for both parties. No appeal was filed by either parties making the decision final and executory. After more than a year, PCI filed another complaint for deficiency judgement and/or collection of sum of money before the Cebu RTC. In its complaint PCI alleged that there is still a deficiency of P961,000.00 as of January of 1995 and prayed for other damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the PCI LEASING INC. can still file a claim for deficiency of payment after a previous decision of the same facts and evidence has already been decided HELD:

For res jusdicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam — in rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.

PCI after realizing the amount of P2,000,000.00 from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, could have prayed for a deficiency judgment in the same action as in fact it pursued its claim for attorney's fees and liquidated damages therein, which claim was however, dismissed by the trial court. PCI, however, did not press any demand for such deficiency judgment in said case and instead filed this present suit for deficiency judgment long after the trial court rendered judgment in the earlier case. It cannot, however, evade the application of res judicata by varying the form of its action herein since the causes of action in the first case and in the present suit are clearly identical.

HEIRS OF THE LATE FERNANDO S. FALCASANTOS, et al. v. SPOUSES FIDEL YEO

TAN and SY SOC TIU, et al.

541 SCRA 211 (2009), ______________, (Carpio Morales, J.)

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The Court may dismiss a Petition for Certiorari if it failed to state that the trial court committed

grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.

Policarpio Falcasantos owned a parcel of land in Zamboanga City, which he transferred to Jose

Falcasantos, one of his eight children. The land title was later on transferred to Spouses Fidel Yeo Tan

and Sy Soc Tiu, et al. Falcasantos, et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City a

complaint for quieting of title and/or declaration of nullity of documents against respondent Spouses

Tan and Tiu, et al.. It alleged that Jose, through fraud, deceit and/or undue influence caused their father

Policarpio to sign a Deed of Sale, making it appear that Policarpio sold to him one-half of the property

on account of which Jose was able to have even the entire area of the property titled in his name.

The RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the prescriptive period had already expired. The

Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Since there was no appeal, a Certificate of Finality of

Judgment was issued. Later on, the Heirs assailed the trial court‘s order via Certiorari before the Court of

Appeals (CA), contending that they were allegedly deprivation of due process by the trial court for not

giving them the opportunity to present evidence "to prove the causes of action." The CA dismissed the

complaint, holding that Certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a final order of the trial court and, in

any event, the petition for Certiorari was not only filed one day late, but was also defective in form and

substance. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an appropriate remedy in the

case at bar

HELD:

The trial court‘s order of dismissal of the Heirs‘ complaint attained finality on September 2, 2005

following their failure to appeal it, which is a final, not an interlocutory order, within 15 days from

August 18, 2005 when their counsel received a copy thereof.

Even if procedural rules were to be relaxed by allowing the Heirs‘ availment before the appellate

court of Certiorari, instead of appeal, to assail the dismissal of their complaint, not only was the petition

for Certiorari filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. It glaringly failed to allege how the trial court

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committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. It merely posited that in

dismissing the complaint, the Heirs were deprived of the opportunity to present evidence

to "prove the causes of action." Such position does not lie, however, for the Heirs‘ complaint was

dismissed precisely because after considering respondents‘ Motion to Dismiss and petitioners‘ 14-page

"VEHEMENT OPPOSITION to the Motion to Dismiss" in which they proffered and exhaustively

discussed the grounds for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on

the ground of prescription.

While in their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court‘s decision the Heirs explained

why the questioned dismissal by the trial court of their complaint was issued in grave abuse of discretion,

the Court finds that just the same, the petition for Certiorari before the appellate court was doomed for it

failed to allege that the trial court 1) acted without jurisdiction for not having the legal power to

determine the case; 2) acted in excess of jurisdiction for, being clothed with the power to determine the

case, it overstepped its authority as determined by law; and 3) committed grave abuse of discretion for

acting in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be

said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

RAMON J. QUISUMBING v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al. 571 SCRA 7 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court as a party-plaintiff in an action. The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan for recovery, conveyance and accounting of various properties and assets of Benjamin Romualdez, et. al. Among the properties subject of the complaint are those of the Philippine Journalist Inc. (PJI) including untitled parcels of land situated in Mabini, Batangas (Mabini lots). During the pendency of the case, then PCGG- appointed members of the PJI Board of Directors, executed a Contract of Sale and a Deed of Absolute Conveyance covering the Mabini lots in favor of petitioner Ramon Quisumbing. Said Deeds were in the nature of management contracts. The Sandiganbayan nullified said management contracts. Jaime Cura, then President of the PJI who was the signatory to the contracts, assailed via certiorari the Sandiganbayan Resolution. Sandiganbayan held that PJI is a sequestered corporation and all its properties and assets are considered as under custodia legis.

PCGG and PJI filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Quisumbing and the PCGG-

appointed PJI members of the Board, for reconveyance of the Mabini lots. Quisumbing filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action on the part of the PCGG and the Republic. The Sandiganbayan denied Quisumbing's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. ISSUES: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that the Republic is the real party in interest HELD:

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Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that, ―a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest‖.

―Interest‖ within the meaning of the immediately-quoted Rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the Rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court as a party-plaintiff in an action; if he does, the suit is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Prescinding from these precepts, the Court holds that, contrary to Quisumbing's assertion, the Republic is a real party in interest in Civil Case No. 0172. Quisumbing's arguments that the Republic's failure to pray for the reconveyance to it of the Mabini lots reflects its not being a real party in interest, and that since PJI is already represented by the PCGG, it is superfluous for the Republic to be a co-plaintiff fail. The purpose of going after the assets and properties of the deposed President et al. is to protect the interests of the Filipino people and the Government, on the premise that those assets and properties were illegally acquired with the use of public funds or government resources or by taking advantage of their power. Hence, in filing the action for reconveyance, the Republic, through the PCGG, is protecting its interests in the Mabini lots owned by PJI which, as earlier determined by the Court, is a sequestered corporation. As the Court cautioned in Meralco v. Sandiganbayan, the deterioration and disappearance of sequestered assets "cannot be allowed to happen, unless there is a final adjudication and disposition of the issue of whether they are ill-gotten or not, since they may result in damage or prejudice to the Republic."

CONRADO QUESADA et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS et al. 581 SCRA 362 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Dismissal of a notice of appeal for filing beyond the reglementary period is a lost of remedy of appeal and is not

allowed to avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Epitacio Asuncion, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners Conrado Quesada, et al. was the owner of the subject lot. One-and-a-half (1 ½) hectares of the lot were leased to one Claro San Luis. The lot is separated from the land occupied by Querubin Derequito, predecessor-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Ildefonso Derequito. Querubin converted a portion of the Balabag River into a fish pond and occupied a portion of the lot leased to San Luis.

Querubin later filed a complaint for forcible entry against San Luis. The Court of First Instance (CFI) rendered a decision in favor of San Luis. The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court but the same was not implemented.

The contract of lease of San Luis expired in 1977. After Querubin died, the Heirs of Querubin

succeeded in the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the questioned portion of the lot. San Luis, together with Quesada et al., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint to revive the

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judgment for forcible entry which was decided in favor of San Luis. The RTC ruled in favor of Quesada et al.

The heirs of Querubin filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied due course since it was filed

beyond the reglemantary period. A writ of execution was thus issued. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of the heirs of Querubin and held that prescription had set in as 30 years had "already passed" from the time the decision in the forcible entry case became final and executory and that the said decision "may no longer be reviewed in the new action for its enforcement." ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly gave due course to the heirs of Querubin‘s petition anent the earlier denial of said their Appeal HELD:

One of the requirements for certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Heirs of Querubin had the remedy of appeal when the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Quesada et al. Heirs of Querubin did in fact file a Notice of Appeal, which was denied due course, however, because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Having lost the remedy of appeal, they should not have been allowed by the Court of Appeals to avail of the remedy of certiorari.

Respecting the issue of prescription, contrary to the heir‘s contention, the action to revive the judgment in the forcible entry case had not prescribed. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered on August 25, 1975 and the motion for reconsideration of the said judgment was denied on September 15, 1976. A writ of execution was in fact issued.

The writ of execution was not enforced, however, within five years or up to or on or about September 15, 1981. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No. 16681 the action for revival of judgment on August 26, 1985, was well within the 10-year prescriptive period. STRANGELY, the appellate court, in its challenged decision of May 31, 2006, appears to have reckoned the 10-year prescriptive period from the finality of the trial court‘s decision up to the promulgation of its (the appellate court‘s) decision on May 31, 2006, hence, its ruling that 30 years had already passed from the finality of the trial court‘s decision.

ANDY QUELNAN v .VHF PHILIPPINES, INC. et al. 433 SCRA 631 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The trial court has the ministerial duty to give due course to a notice of appeal which has been filed within the reglementary period.

Petitioner Andy Quelnan purchased from respondents VHF Philippines, Inc. (VHF) and Vicente Tan a unit 15-0 of Legaspi Tower condominium for which he made an overpayment. Moreover, he claims that under a verbal agreement with VHF, the said overpayment shall be applied to the purchase of Unit 20-G for which, the balance, he would pay before the end of June 1991 without any interest thereon.

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Pursuant to the verbal agreement, he immediately took possession of Unit 20-G and made several payments therefor. However, in May 1991 when he offered to settle his remaining balance, he was informed that Unit 20-G was mortgaged in favor of Philippine Trust Company and that he was being charged by VHF the interest and penalties due on the mortgage obligation. VHF claimed that it merely leased said unit to Quelnan and since he failed to pay, the respondents VHF, et al. filed an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

The MeTC ordered the ejectment of Quelnan. He did not appeal said decision, thus he was

ejected from said unit.

Close to two years later, Quelnan filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for rescission of the alleged verbal contract of sale and damages against VHF from which a pre-trial of the case was set. However, during the scheduled pre-trial on January 17, 1997, Quelnan and his counsel (despite that he was given a Special Power of Attorney to represent Quelnan) did not show up, thus, the presiding judge dismissed the complaint.

Quelnan‘s counsel, instead of filing an appeal, moved to file a Manifestation and Ex-parte

motion to set aside the said dismissal invoking excusable negligence — that he overlooked to transfer from his 1996 diary the entry regarding the scheduled pre-trial conference on January 17, 1997 to his 1997 diary. When the motion was denied, he filed an Omnibus motion (Notice of appeal) but the same was denied by order of March 12, 1997 upon the holding of the trial court that it was filed out of time. As a result, Quelnan filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA however, treated the said action as one for certiorari, as in essence, the petition alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court thus denying Quelnan‘s petition on the ground that the order of the trial court is not appealable.

The CA moreover, assails that since it was the Order of March 12, 1997 denying Quelnan‘s Omnibus Motion-Motion for Reconsideration of the January 17, 1999 order of dismissal, and not the latter order, which was appealed, said Order of January 17, 1999 had long attained finality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the notice of appeal was seasonably filed HELD: The timeliness of the filing of a notice of appeal determines whether the trial court‘s giving due course to it is ministerial. If the notice of appeal is filed within the reglementary period, it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to give it due course. If not, the trial court cannot be compelled by mandamus to do so.

Quelnan‘s counsel received the January 17, 1997 Order declaring Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed the complaint on February 12, 1997. When Quelnan‘s counsel filed a Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion on January 24, 1997, prior to his receipt on February 12, 1997 of the January 17, 1997 Order, the 15-day period to appeal did not begin to run, for such period is reckoned from notice of such judgment or final order or any subsequent amendment thereof, and it is interrupted by the timely filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.

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When Quelnan‘s counsel received then on February 12, 1997 a copy of the January 17, 1997 Order declaring him non-suited, and filed on February 24, 1997 an Omnibus Motion to set aside said order, 12 days of the 15-day period had elapsed. The filing of the Omnibus Motion interrupted the period of appeal, and it began to run again when, on March 19, 1997, Quelnan‘s

counsel received a copy of the Order of March 12, 1997 denying Quelna‘s Omnibus Motion.

The appellate court noted, however, that since it was the Order of March 12, 1997 denying Quelnan‘s Omnibus Motion-Motion for Reconsideration of the January 17, 1997 Order of dismissal, and not the latter order, which was appealed, said Order of January 17, 1999 had "long attained finality."

PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS


The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition and

is ought to be inextendible.

ARMCO Industrial Corporation filed a bond with respect to the writ of attachment issued by

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Mariano Ong and several defendants in another case. In the said

bond, ARMCO and petitioner Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Inc. (Prudential), solidarily bound

themselves to pay all the costs and all damages, which may be adjudged to Ong. However, due to failure

of ARMCO to pay the corresponding premiums to the Prudential on the succeeding years, the latter filed

an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Cancellation of Bond and Release of Surety, which the RTC denied.

Prudential subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was also denied. On appeal, the

Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the petition was filed three (3)

days late. The CA also denied the Motion for Reconsideration holding that failure to file the petition

within the reglementary period required by law will make the order final and executory. Hence, this

petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not delay in filing of Petition for Certiorari may be set aside as a mere technicality

Held:

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Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, certiorari should be

instituted within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or

resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party

to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period

was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the

parties to a speedy disposition of their case. For these reasons, the 60-day period ought to be considered

inextendible.

Further, Rules of procedure prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done or

certain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the

orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance therewith is thus mandatory and

imperative.

However, the Rules of Procedure may be relaxed ―for the most persuasive of reasons.‖

Concomitant to a liberal application of such rules should be an effort on the part of the party invoking

liberality to at least proffer a reason for its failure to comply therewith. Prudential however failed to

persuade the Court to allow extension of time to appeal.

DUNDEE A. VIERNES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 494 SCRA 247 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Conviction of an accused may be based on the testimony of one witness alone, provided it is positive and credible and is not tainted with inconsistencies.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila convicted appellant Dundee Viernes for violation of P.D. No. 532 (the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), in relation to a robbery committed inside a passenger jeepney, which resulted in the death of a certain Ronaldo Lopango. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court decision by finding petitioner guilty of simple robbery under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

Viernes argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because of the failure of the prosecution to show that the illumination of the jeepney, which allegedly bore Josefina and her husband, Ronaldo Lopango, was adequate enough to enable one to identify him. However, Josefina was hesitant to identify him as one of the malefactors. Moreover, the prosecution failed to present any of the police officers who apprehended and investigated him. Viernes further draws attention to inconsistencies in the statements of Josefina, and accuses Josefina of conspiring with the police officers in torturing him so as to force him to admit his participation in the crime.

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ISSUES:

Whether or not Dundee Viernes is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of violation of P.D. No. 532

HELD:

After a considered review of the records of the case, this Court finds that the guilt of Viernes has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In crimes of robbery, the offender must be proven to have unlawfully taken personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.

While the general rule is that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a

witness and his sworn statement do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte statements are generally incomplete, the rule is not without exception as, e.g., when the omission in the sworn statement refers to a very important detail of the incident which the one relating the incident as an eyewitness would not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn statement substantially contradicts the testimony in court.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. v. HONORABLE RAMON S. CAGUIOA et al. 536 SCRA 193 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, it must be shown that there is a clear legal right that ought to be protected.

Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act

of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Section 12 of R.A No. 7227 of the law provides that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to the law, Indigo

Distribution Corporation, et al., which are all domestic corporations doing business at the SBF, applied for and were granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA.

Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, which provides that all applicable taxes, duties,

charges, including excise taxes due thereon shall be applied to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic Economic Freeport Zone. On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued a Memorandum declaring that, all importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, shall be treated as ordinary importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes.

Upon its implementation, Indigo et al., sought for a reconsideration of the directives on the

imposition of duties and taxes, particularly excise taxes by the Collector of Customs and the SBMA Administrator. Their request was subsequently denied prompting them to file with the RTC of Olongapo City a special civil action for declaratory relief to have certain provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. They prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same was subsequently

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granted by Judge Ramon Caguioa. The injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos (P1,000,000). ISSUES:

Whether or not public respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction in peremptorily and unjustly issuing the injunctive writ in favor of private respondents despite the absence of the legal requisites for its issuance HELD:

One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when Judge Caguioa issued his Order of May

4, 2005 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 11, 2005 despite the absence of a clear and unquestioned legal right of private respondents. In holding that the presumption of constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by private respondents for the reasons public respondent cited in his May 4, 2005 Order, he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, private respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that ought to be protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right would not justify an injunctive relief.

Indeed, Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC provide for the recovery of erroneously or illegally

collected taxes which would be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private respondents should Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334 be declared unconstitutional or invalid.

The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into the delicate area which courts are

cautioned from taking when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Having ruled preliminarily against the prima facie validity of R.A. No. 9334, he assumed in effect the proposition that private respondents in their petition for declaratory relief were duty bound to prove, thereby shifting to petitioners the burden of proving that R.A. No. 9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid.

In the same vein, the Court finds Judge Caguioa to have overstepped his discretion when he

arbitrarily fixed the injunction bond of the SBF enterprises at only P1million. Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all damages which it may sustain by reason of the injunction. The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.

Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it to stress that being possessed of

the power to act on the petition for declaratory relief, public respondent can proceed to determine the merits of the main case. Moreover, lacking the requisite proof of public respondent‘s alleged partiality, this Court has no ground to prohibit him from proceeding with the case for declaratory relief. For these reasons, prohibition does not lie.

SIENA REALTY CORPORATION and LILIBETH MANLUGON v. HON. LOLITA GALANG, ANITA CO NG and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 145169, 13 May 2004, THIRD DIVISION, (CARPIO MORALES, J.)

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Judicial Departments should take mandatory judicial notice of a resolution pertaining to procedural matters even if said resolution does not expressly provide for retroactivity.

Petitioners Siena Realty Corporation and Lilibeth Manlugon (Siena) filed a Petition for Certiorari

before the Court of Appeals (CA) concerning the Regional Trial Court of Manila‘s (RTC) Order dismissing Siena‘s complaint. Upon CA‘s dismissal of the petition, Siena filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Pending resolution of the motion, the Supreme Court issued a resolution approving the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The said resolution provided that in case of the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the 60-day period ―shall be counted from the denial of the said motion‖. CA then dismissed Siena‘s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the said amendment applies to Siena‘s motion. Hence, this present petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion for applying the amendment

retroactively HELD:

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence states that judicial departments are mandated to

take judicial notice even without the introduction of evidence, hence, even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, it should have taken mandatory judicial notice. The resolution did not have to specify that it had retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter.

The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, Siena‘s petition fails. At the time Siena filed

before the appellate court their Petition for Certiorari on the 60th day following their receipt of the Order of RTC, the said Order had become final and executory after the 15th day following Siena‘s receipt thereof.

VIRGILIO SINDICO and VIRGINIA TORCUATOR SINDICO v. HON. GERARDO D. DIAZ et al.

440 SCRA 50 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and not by the pleas that the defendant may set up on his pleas. Spouses Virgilio and Virginia Sindico (Sindico) sued respondents Felipe and Erlinda Sombrea (Sombrea) who refused to return the land owned by the former. The arrangement arose from the request of Sombrea‘s parents from the Sindicos that former will cultivate the disputed land in exchange of an income sharing. After the death of the Sombrea‘s parents, Spouses Sindico demanded the return of the said land which brought about the suit filed with the Regional Trial Court. The Sombreas assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case as they assert that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has exclusive and original jurisdiction as provided under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The RTC dismissed the case ruling in consonance with the Sombreas‘ contention and subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Sindico. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the RTC has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the pending case HELD: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas set up by the defendant in his answer or in a motion to dismiss, otherwise, jurisdiction would be dependent on his whims. The allegations in petitioner‘s complaint show that the action is one for recovery of possession, not one which involves an agrarian dispute.

Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines agrarian dispute over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as ―refer[ing] to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture…‖

That respondents only basis in assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court is that the subject matter of the case is an agricultural land and that they do not deny at all the allegation of the complaint of petitioners that there is no tenancy or leasehold agreement between them unmistakably show that there is no agrarian dispute to speak of over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction.

Finally, since petitioners‘ action is one for recovery of possession and does not involve an agrarian dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over it.

FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA v. PEDRO NOBLEZA

G.R. No. 144560, 13 April 2004, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem which deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.

Florentino Zaragoza (Zaragoza) filed a complaint for the Termination of Leasehold Relationship

against Respondent Pedro Nobleza (Nobleza). The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ruled in favor of Nobleza. Zaragoza filed a Motion for Extension to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Said Motion for Extension was granted by CA for a non-extendible period of 15 days ending on March 30, 2000. Zaragosa‘s petition for review which was filed through registered mail, however, was denied by CA for having been mailed on April 12, 2000, 13 days after March 30.

ISSUE:

Whether or not procedural rules should be applied liberally in order that Zaragoza will not be

deprived of his right to use and enjoy his real property

HELD: Since the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only

mandatory but also jurisdictional, the failure of Zaragoza to so perfect his appeal rendered the questioned decision final and executory. This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity

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for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal is not a mere technicality as it raises a jurisdictional problem which deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Only under exceptionally meritorious circumstances may a departure from an otherwise stringent rule be allowed.

In the case at bar, there is no showing of a factual setting which warrants a liberal application of

the rules on the period of appeal. Having been extended an additional fifteen (15) day period within which to file his petition for review, it was incumbent upon Zaragoza to strictly comply with such deadline. That he paid the appropriate docket fee upon filing his Motion for Extension of Time with the appellate court does not help his cause any. The inevitable consequence of his grave inadvertence is to render the DARAB‘s decision dismissing the case final and executory.

IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR. 498 SCRA 6 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest.

Anthony John Apura (Apura) was invited for questioning relative to the killing of Mark James

Enriquez. A warrant of arrest was thereafter issued by Judge Apolinario Taypin. Apura alleges that his arrest was illegal because he went to the police station upon invitation, but immediately thereafter, he was placed under custody of the police. The motion was heard by Presiding Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento. Judge Sarmiento believing that there was lack of preliminary investigation, ordered the release of Apura and ordered Criminal Investigation and Detection Group Unit (CIDGU) to conduct a preliminary investigation. He subsequently ordered the release of Ampura, on bail, without conducting a hearing. ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge Sarmiento knowingly rendered an unjust order and gross ignorance of the law and procedure for ordering the release of Apura on bail without first conducting a hearing for the purpose

HELD:

The lack of preliminary investigation, in light of the finding that Apura was not lawfully arrested

without warrant, he having gone to the CIDGU in response to its invitation, did not justify Judge

Sarmiento‘s disregard of the mandatory procedure governing the grant of bail.

Indeed, a preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the filing of the

Amended Information. A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A

preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to

engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty

thereof, and should be held for trial". An inquest is "a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for

the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on probable cause."

The conduct of an inquest investigation does not fulfill the requirement for the conduct of a

preliminary investigation before the filing of an information or complaint involving any such offenses,

except when the accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant.

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In the case at bar, Apura was not even arrested. He repaired to the CIDGU on its invitation. He should thus have been subjected to a preliminary investigation, not a mere inquest investigation.

REYNOSA VALTE v. COURT OF APPEALS et al. 433 SCRA 290 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement.

Petitioner Reynosa Valte filed an Application for Free Patent before the Bureau of Lands District Office. The application was subsequently granted and a free patent was issued in his favor. Jose Gonzales and Pedro Mendoza, on the other hand, filed a protest to the grant of free patent on the ground of fraud. The Regional Executive Director of DENR Region III rendered a decision in favor of Mendoza. Valte filed an appeal to the Office of the President alleging that he was deprived an opportunity to be heard. After a pre-trial conference, the DENR thereafter dismissed the protest. On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) reversed the decision of the DENR. The OP ruled that Mendoza and Gonzales are the actual possessors of the land. Valte appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals (CA) but the same was dismissed for not having complied with the rule on non-forum shopping. ISSUE:

Whether or not Valte‘s petition complied with the rule on forum shopping

HELD: Valte admits having failed to undertake to report to the appellate court within 5 days from

knowledge of any case involving the same issues filed in other courts or tribunals. She argues, however, that such failure maybe overlooked provided there is actually no forum shopping, she citing this Court‘s ruling in, inter alia, Cabardo v. Court of Appeals that failure to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping that he undertakes to inform the Court of any petition which might be filed, as required under Revised Circular No. 28-91, may be overlooked since it does not appear that any petition related to this case has ever been filed in any other court. On the other hand, to dismiss the petition on this ground would be to uphold technicality over substantial justice.

Valte hastens to add that she had not filed in any court, tribunal or agency any action or petition

involving the same issues as those presented in the case at bar, hence, she asserts that she had not committed any act of forum shopping.

Special circumstances or compelling reasons have been held to justify relaxing the rule requiring

certification on forum-shopping. For technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. The certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. Nonetheless, this requirement must not be interpreted too literally to defeat the ends of justice.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/may1998/118202.htm

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CRISPINA UNIDA et al. v. HEIRS OF AMBROSIO URBAN 460 SCRA 68 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of

the possession, otherwise it shall be invalid.

Respondent Heirs of Ambrosio Urban filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a complaint for unlawful detainer against Crispina Unida, et al. The heirs claim ownership over the property. They contend that since the property was previously infested by NPA insurgents, the owners of the property did nothing but to tolerate the stay of Unida, et al. Unida et al. likewise claim ownership over the said property, stating that the title of the property was fraudulently obtained by the said heirs. The MTC rendered a decision against Unida et. al.

The Regional Trial Court reversed the MTC decision, holding that since the complaint itself asserted that Unida et al.‘s entry into the property was unlawful from the very beginning, the allegation of heirs regarding the tolerance cannot be considered as tolerance in contemplation of law in unlawful detainer case. Moreover, there is no forcible entry or violence attending the case; hence, the action for unlawful detainer was improper. The RTC suggested that the proper remedy was to file an accion reivindicatoria. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action for unlawful detainer is an improper remedy

HELD:

Unida et al.‟s entry into the property was, by the heirs‘ own information, unlawful from the very

beginning. The heirs, nonetheless, claimed that it merely tolerated Unida et al.‘s presence in the property.

Clearly, an unlawful detainer action does not lie.

For to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present

at the beginning of the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action

for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.

As correctly held then by the RTC, the case cannot be considered as an unlawful detainer case, the

―tolerance‖ claimed by heirs not being that contemplated by law in unlawful detainer cases; neither can

the case be considered as one for forcible entry because the entry of Unida et al. was not alleged to have

been by means of force, intimidation, threats, stealth or strategy.

Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful

detainer or forcible entry, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that the Court finds that the RTC correctly found that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

ROLANDO TING v. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO


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In a registration proceeding, the judgment of the court confirming the title constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu granted an application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and

Flora Atienza for registration of a certain parcel of land. A certificate of title was thereafter issued to Spouses Lirio. On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title over the same lot. The RTC dismissed Ting‘s application on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether or not the application for land registration should be barred for being res judicata Held:

In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court‘s approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza‘s application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including Ting.

Ting insists that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely

ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings." As for Ting‘s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said

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ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND PEDRO BALUBAL 519 SCRA 432 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to

the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.

Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of providing

public transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC). PNCC‘s Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident. The bus was turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own investigation. Because of lack of adequate space, traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus be towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound. Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but Balubal refused. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the same value for the reconstruction of the damaged radio room.

Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC an amount of P40, 320.00, representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and concluded that the case should have been brought against the police authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper

HELD: Contrary to PNCC‘s contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is

whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.

In the case at bar, Superlines‘ ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC, consideration of

whether PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on the request of Lopera in violation of constitutional right against unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding of Superlines‘s bus, on Lopera‘s request, were unquestionably violative of ―the right to be let alone‖ by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same without

impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to PNCC for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties Lopera and any other responsible police officers.

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SU ZHI SHAN @ ALVIN CHING SO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/SOLICITOR

GENERAL


The testimonies of the poseur-buyer, if supported by overwhelming documentary and object evidence, will suffice

to convict the accused.

A confidential informant reported to the Philippine National Police (PNP) that Su Zhi Shan,

alias Alvin Ching So (Su Zhi Shan), was selling prohibited drugs in Manila. The PNP Narcotics

Group thereafter conducted a 10-day surveillance within the vicinity of his residence. As part of the

surveillance, they conducted a test-buy operation, during which they gathered a substance, which

later on was tested and found positive for shabu.

SPO1 Badua subsequently arranged a buy-bust operation. It was SPO1 Guste who acted as a

poseur-buyer. During the operation, SPO1 Guste, in exchange of boodle money, received a red plastic

containing a shabu. Su Zhi Shan was then arrested. Su Zhi Shan denied the allegations against him.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Su Zhi Shan guilty of illegal possession and selling of

illegal drugs. It imposed death penalty as punishment. The Court of Appeals lowered the penalty from

death to reclusion perpetua. On appeal, Su Zhi Shan avers that the testimonies of SPO1 Guste were mere

hearsay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies of SPO1 Guste should be given credence

HELD:

SPO1 Guste‘s testimony was not hearsay. He was the poseur-buyer who participated in the buy-

bust operation. His testimony was corroborated by the Chief Inspector. SPO1 Guste‘s account is

likewise complemented by overwhelming documentary and object evidence, including his request for

laboratory examination of the seized substance, the laboratory examination reports, the buy-bust money

used, the pre-operational coordination sheet of the PNP Narcotics Group, the Booking Sheet/Arrest

Report, and the substance obtained during the buy-bust operation and a photograph thereof. That the

prosecution failed to present SPO1 Badua and the confidential informer does not weaken its case as the

discretion to choose witnesses to be presented for the State and to dispense with the testimonies of

witnesses who would only give corroboration rests on the prosecution.

That no evidence was presented on the conduct of the surveillance and of the venue for the test-

bust operation and that the surveillance was for the purpose of procuring the search warrant do not help

Su Zhi Shan‘s case. For even if no prior surveillance were made, the validity of an entrapment operation,

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especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their

informant, as in the case at bar, is not affected.

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC. v. BRIGHT FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.


The two-witness rule governing the execution of search warrant is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution

of the search warrant.

Petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (SCEI) filed a complaint against respondent Bright Future Technologies Inc. (BFTI) for copyright and trademark infringement. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued search warrants and thereafter conducted a raid on the premises of BFTI and seized several items.

BFTI filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Exclude or Suppress Evidence and Return Seized Articles. BFTI argued that SCEI had no personality to represent the People of the Philippines and to file the opposition to the motion because SCEI's agents were mere witnesses of the applicant for the issuance of the search warrants. However, the said motion was denied.

BFTI filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC granted the motion for reconsideration and held that the two-witness rule was violated. BFTI subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion to Return Seized Articles which the RTC granted. BFTI subsequently filed the required bond and the seized items were turned over to its custody.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid search was conducted on the premises of BFTI HELD:

The issue of whether a private complainant, like SCEI, has the right to participate in search warrant proceedings was addressed in the affirmative in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip which stated that a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.

When SCEI then opposed BFTI‘s Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Suppress or Exclude

Evidence and Return Seized Articles, the RTC correctly recognized the participation of SCEI in the

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proceedings.

As for the use of a bolt cutter to gain access to the premises of BFTI, it was, under the

circumstances, reasonable, contrary to the RTC‘s finding that it was unnecessary. For, as the RTC itself

found, after the members of the searching team introduced themselves to the security guards of BFTI

and showed them the search warrants, the guards refused to receive the warrants and to open the

premises, they claiming that ―they are not in control of the case.‖

The RTC‘s finding that the two-witness rule governing the execution of search warrant was not

complied with, which rule is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant, is in

order, however.

SCEI insists, however, that the searching team waited for the arrival of the barangay officials

who were summoned to witness the search, and that ―even when the enforcing officers were moving

towards the actual BFTI premises . . . they were accompanied at all times by one of the security guards

on duty until the barangay officials arrived.‖ SCEI‘s position raises an issue of fact which is not proper

for consideration in a petition for review on certiorari before this Court under Rule 45, which is

supposed to cover only issues of law. In any event, a security guard may not be considered a ―lawful

occupant‖ or ―a member of [the lawful occupant‘s] family‖ under the earlier quoted Section 8 of Rule

126.

As the two-witness rule was not complied with, the objects seized during the April 1, 2005 search are inadmissible in evidence. Their return, on motion of BFTI, was thus in order.

DATU OMAR S. SINSUAT and MARIANO H. PAPS v. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO 561 SCRA 38 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Anonymous complaint, as a rule, is received with caution yet it should not be dismissed outright if its averments

may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.

Petitioners Attys. Datu Omar Sinsuat and Mariano Paps filed an administrative case against respondent Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo. Attys. Sinsuat and Paps were counsel for the defendant in a civil case pending before the sala of Judge Hidalgo. Attys. Sinsuat and Paps question, among other things, the authority of the Judge Hidalgo to issue in the abovementioned civil case a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the Philippine National Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) from holding a bidding for wooden poles required for the ―O-Ilaw Project – An Accelerated Rural Electrification Program‖. According to Attys. Sinsuat and Paps, Judge Hidalgo disregarded the clear proscription of the Presidential Decree No. 181881 and Republic Act No. 8975 and the Court‘s

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Administrative Circular No. 11-200083 against the issuance of TROs and Writs of Injunction on government infrastructure projects. Judge Hidalgo, on the other hand, contends that the complaint against him should be dismissed because the complaint and subsequent communications of the Attys. Sinsuat and Paps were not verified, in violation of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: Whether of not the complaint may be ruled upon even if the same did not comply with the requirements stated in Rule 140 of the Rules of Court HELD: Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides how proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted. It states that proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Under the above-quoted Rule, there are three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be instituted: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.

While the copy of the Motion which the Attorneys furnished the OCA was unverified as were

their subsequent letters, the OCA correctly treated them as anonymous complaint. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, been entertaining complaints of this nature especially where respondents admitted the material allegations of the complainants as in Judge Hidalgo‘s case.

Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution. They should not be dismissed

outright, however, where their averments may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.

Here, the motion and letters sufficiently averred the specific acts upon which Judge Hidalgo‘s

alleged administrative liability was anchored. And the averments are verifiable from the records of the trial court and the Court of Appeal‘s Decision.

THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ILOCOS NORTE et al. v. BRUNO LORENZO and LORENZA DELA CRUZ LORENZO


The Sheriff must enforce the writ of execution including the conduct of the sale at public auction with certainty and regularity.

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The Workmen‘s Compensation Commission (WCC) affirmed the decision of the

Hearing Officer of its Regional Office ordering Bruno Lorenzo and Lorenza Dela Cruz Lorenzo to pay the amount of P 4,230.00 to Natividad Vda. De Ravina, widow of the late Apolonio Ravina who died under the employ as mechanic of the Lorenzos. A petition for execution of the WCC decision was filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte against the Lorenzos. The RTC granted the petition for execution.

The Lorenzos then filed a complaint for annulment of Sheriff‘s sale of their properties before

the CFI. It was only after twenty years that the case was decided by the now Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Norte. The lower court ruled in favor of the Lorenzos on the basis of its observation that the execution of judgment was done in posthaste. Both parties appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA). The Ravinas faulted the trial court for holidng that the execution of the judgement was done posthaste and that there was no time for the sheriff to look into the goods or chattels of the judgment debtors. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sheriff complied with the Rules on Execution of Judgments HELD:

As reflected above, the Sheriff‘s testimony relied upon by petitioners is not straightforward. He is not certain on some matters relevant to the issue of regularity of the enforcement of the writ of execution including the conduct of the sale at public auction. This Court is not thus prompted to hold that he followed the mandate of the Rules, particularly Sec. 9(b) which provides how execution of judgments are enforced. One of the modes is Satisfaction by levy where if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.

The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.

When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment. The implementation of the writ of execution was thus flawed.

SONIA MACEDA and GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY v. ENCARNACION DE

GUZMAN VDA. DE MACATANGAY 481 SCRA 415 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

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Personal service or filing if practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person is mandatory as the general rule; it is only when it is not practicable that other modes of service may be resorted to as the exception.

Spouses Sonia Maceda and Bonifacio Macatangay, executed a Kasunduan whereby they agreed to live separately. Bonifacio soon lived with his common law wife Carmen Jaraza. When Bonifacio died, Sonia claimed for his Social Security System (SSS) benefit, which was granted to her. However, the Social Security Commission (SSC) later ordered Sonia to refund the benefits in favor of Encarnacion De Guzman Macatangay, Bonifacio‘s mother, and his illegitimate children, on the ground that the Kasunduan

is a proof that Sonia is not dependent upon Bonifacio for support.

Sonia filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the same was dismissed due to their failure to explain why they failed to personally serve copies of the petition to Encarnacion which is required in Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In her affidavit, Sonia explains that they resorted to service by mail due to the distant addresses of Encarnacion‘s lawyer in Lopez, Quezon and Sonia‘s counsel in Lucena City, thereby making personal service impracticable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the distant addresses made the personal service impracticable making the service by mail valid

HELD:

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".

The Court thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.

In the case at bar, the address of Encarnacion‘s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while Sonia‘s counsel‘s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the merits of Sonia‘s petition, if Sonia‘s allegations of fact and of law therein are true and the outright dismissal of their petition is upheld without giving them the opportunity to prove their allegations, Sonia would be deprived of her rightful

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death benefits just because of the Kasunduan she forged with her husband Bonifacio which contract is, in the first place, unlawful. The resulting injustice would not be commensurate to Sonia‘ counsel‘s "thoughtlessness" in not explaining why Encarnacion were not personally served copies of the petition.

LOURDESITA M. BIBAS v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYA) and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI

559 SCRA 591 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) It would hardly make much sense to allow a late or improperly filed appeal and disregard the rule on the binding effect of counsel‟s negligence when it is evident that a party is, at all events, unable to present a convincing case on the merits. Petitioner Lourdesita M. Bibas was Disbursing Officer II in the City Treasurer‘s Office, Silay City. She releases the salaries of government employees of Silay. Before each payday, she and her fellow disbursing officers would secure cash advances to defray the salaries, and after disbursement, they would present to their immediate supervisors the payrolls and remaining funds left in their possession. After the cash and accounts of the Bibas were examined, it was found that the cash on her account was short. Bibas explained that she misplaced two bundles of paid payrolls which she reported to their treasurer and their City Accountant Arsenal. An action was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. The latter found Bibas liable for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The Ombudsman subsequently modified its decision and found Bibas guilty of Dishonesty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for certiorari on procedural grounds. Bibas filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court‘s Resolution but was denied for having been filed twenty-two (22) days late. Bibas‘ contention that the reglementary period should be counted from the day she personally obtained a copy of the Resolution when she visited her then counsel, and not the date when her counsel received copy thereof. The CA echoed the rule that notice to counsel is notice to the client. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Bibas‘ action HELD:

There have thus been instances when lack of participatory negligence of a party and the seriousness of the penalty imposed on it persuaded the Court to relax procedural rules as well as the time-honored rule regarding the binding effect of counsel‘s negligence. Alongside these considerations, the question of whether a case is meritorious, at least on its face, carries much weight in determining whether a relaxation of the rules is warranted. Indeed, it would hardly make much sense to allow a late or improperly filed appeal and disregard the rule on the binding effect of counsel‘s negligence when it is evident that a party is, at all events, unable to present a convincing case on the merits. In such instances, allowing the appeal to run its course would be a mere waste of time, both for the parties and the appellate court. Interestingly, Bibas admits that the merits of her case have been ventilated well enough both in the Petition itself and the Reply to the Comments of COA which she filed with this Court. If she fails then to present a strong case through the pleadings she has submitted to this Court, there would be no

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point remanding her case to the appellate court. As will be shown below, Bibas has failed to do just that. Neither then the procedural rules nor the rule on the binding effect of counsel‘s negligence should be relaxed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO AND FELICIANA MATEO 436 SCRA 502 (2004), THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.)

The order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents.

Spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed a Petition for the Reconstitution of the Original Copy as well as the Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan in the name of Jose Tan. The property under the said title was purchased by the Spouses Mateo from Jose Tan. Nevertheless, the original copy of the said TCT was deemed lost and cannot be located in the Registry of Deeds. The Regional Trial Court of Balanga denied the petition and the Motion for Reconsideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court‘s decision and held that Mateo satisfactorily proved that the original TCT was lost. Hence, the filing of this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Mateo‘s Petition for Reconstitution must be granted HELD:

As correctly noted by the RTC ―there is no showing how the parcels of land in question were transferred to Jose Tan‖. The said order and decree, therefore, establish only the prior existence of OCT No. N-205 but not that of TCT No. T-38769 in the name of Jose Tan. The CA‘s reliance on the certified photocopy of Judge Tizon‘s decision awarding to Donato Echivarria from whose OCT the TCT subject of reconstitution was transferred does not lie for, in the first place, ―there is no showing how the parcels of land were transferred to Jose Tan,‖ the spouses Mateo‘s predecessor-in-interest. Since the Mateos have failed to present any of the other documents, the rule on secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130 applies.

The order of presentation of secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The

order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.



In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is

no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos‘ petition for reconstitution fails.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS,et.al. 458 SCRA 200 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (CARPIO MORALES, J.)

A petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is a summary proceeding under the Family Code

and not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court‟s order sufficed. Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the Ormoc Regional Trial Court for the Declaration of Presumptive Death of her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc. The petition was thereafter granted by the trial court. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the present case is a special proceeding which requires that a record of appeal be filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding. The CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding. HELD:

Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW contains Article 238 which provides that unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in the said Title shall apply in all cases provided for in the Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required and is therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code as her purpose was to contract a valid subsequent marriage, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court‘s order sufficed.









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The RTC issued an Order declaring Manigo non-suited for failure of his counsel

to appear and to file pre-trial brief. The trial court accordingly dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:


HELD:







been too precipitate and was not commensurate with the level of non-compliance by Manigo's counsel

with the order of the court.




present case, substantial justice can be best served if both parties are given the full opportunity to

ventilate their respective claims in a full-blown trial.



Respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a contract with Westinghouse Electric S.A. (WESA), an affiliate or subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE), whereby WESA undertook to construct in favor of the NPC a 620-megawatt nuclear power plant at Morong, Bataan. WESA subsequently executed a deed of assignment transferring all its rights and responsibilities in the contract to its construction arm-agent, respondent Westinghouse International Projects Company (WIPCO). Pres. Corazon Aquino issued an executive order transferring ownership of the already constructed power plant, together with its equipment, materials and facilities, records and uranium fuel to the National Government or its duly constituted agency. After series of talks, the government panel and Westinghouse eventually agreed on a settlement involving a package of more than 100 million dollars. Petitioners Public Interest Inc., et al., (PICI), as tax payers, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for declaration of nullity the contract with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the

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complaint on the ground that PICI were engaged in forum-shopping, their counsel Atty. Reyes having previously filed cases with causes of action identical thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not PICI are engaged in forum-shopping and thus can affect the dismissal of their complaint HELD: In this case, the court said that granted the PICI were initially unaware of the existence of the first set of cases, albeit their counsel was one of the petitioners therein; such fact was already brought to their attention during a hearing. They failed to report the pendency of the petition for mandamus before the appellate court bearing on the dismissal by the Manila RTC. Thus, the dismissal of PICI‘s complaint is in order. PICI violated the requirement to report to the courts the fact that a similar action had been filed or is already pending before the courts, regardless of who initiated such similar action. As stated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court for Certification against forum-shopping: The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification: c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing.



Respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a contract with Westinghouse Electric S.A. (WESA), an affiliate or subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE), whereby WESA undertook to construct in favor of the NPC a 620-megawatt nuclear power plant at Morong, Bataan. WESA subsequently executed a deed of assignment transferring all its rights and responsibilities in the contract to its construction arm-agent, respondent Westinghouse International Projects Company (WIPCO). Pres. Corazon Aquino issued an executive order transferring ownership of the already constructed power plant, together with its equipment, materials and facilities, records and uranium fuel to the National Government or its duly constituted agency. After series of talks, the government panel and Westinghouse eventually agreed on a settlement involving a package of more than 100 million dollars. Petitioners Public Interest Inc., et al., (PICI), as tax payers, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for declaration of nullity the contract with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the

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complaint on the ground that PICI were engaged in forum-shopping, their counsel Atty. Reyes having previously filed cases with causes of action identical thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not PICI are engaged in forum-shopping and thus can affect the dismissal of their complaint HELD: In this case, the court said that granted the PICI were initially unaware of the existence of the first set of cases, albeit their counsel was one of the petitioners therein; such fact was already brought to their attention during a hearing. They failed to report the pendency of the petition for mandamus before the appellate court bearing on the dismissal by the Manila RTC. Thus, the dismissal of PICI‘s complaint is in order. PICI violated the requirement to report to the courts the fact that a similar action had been filed or is already pending before the courts, regardless of who initiated such similar action. As stated in principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification: c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided upon motion and after hearing.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO AND FELICIANA MATEO 436 SCRA 502 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available, on this score alone, the Mateos‟ petition for reconstitution fails.

Respondent spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed a petition for the Reconstitution of the Original Copy as well as the Owner‘s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan on 16 July 1971 in the name of Jose Tan. The property under the said title was purchased by the spouses Mateo from Jose Tan, however, the original copy of the said TCT was deemed lost and cannot be located in the Registry of Deeds. The RTC of Balanga denied the petition and the Motion for Reconsideration while the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and granted the same. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari lodged by the Republic. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to the certified photocopy of the title as basis for the reconstitution of the original and owner‘s copy of the title HELD:

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As correctly noted by the RTC ―there is no showing how the parcels of land in question were transferred to Jose Tan‖. The said order and decree, therefore, establish only the prior existence of OCT No. N-205 but not that of TCT No. T-38769 in the name of Jose Tan. The CA‘s reliance on the certified photocopy of Judge Tizon‘s decision awarding to Donato Echivarria from whose OCT the TCT subject of reconstitution was transferred does not lie for, in the first place, ―there is no showing how the parcels of land were transferred to Jose Tan,‖ the spouses Mateo‘s predecessor-in-interest.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26, ―AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE

RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED,‖ which has been quoted by the trial court in its decision, enumerates the sources-documents-bases of a reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title. To repeat, they are, in the following order:

1. the owner‘s duplicate of the title 2. the co-owner‘s mortgagee‘s, or lessee‘s duplicate of the title 3. a certified copy of the title previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal

custodian 4. an authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,

pursuant to which the OCT was issued 5. a document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property . . . is . . .

encumbered or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed title.

Since, except for the last above-enumerated document, the Mateos have failed to present any of

the other documents, the rule on secondary evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130 applies. Section 5 of the rule provides that ―when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on its part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated‖.

As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules directs, the order of presentation of secondary

evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may, however, be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.



In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been lost or is no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos‘ petition for reconstitution fails.

In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or is no longer available, not

only is the photocopy of the alleged owner‘s duplicate copy thereof – Exh. ―1‖ partly illegible. When, where and under what circumstances the photocopy was taken and where it was kept to spare it from

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being also ―lost‖ were not even shown. These, not to mention the conduct by the Department of Justice and NBI of an investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT cautioned and led the Court to rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos‘ evidence and propriety of a grant of their petition for reconstitution.

FELICITO G. SANSON et al. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH

DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN BON FING SY


Dead Man‟s Statute renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted; the rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Petitioners Felicito G. Sanson (Felicito), his sister Celedonia (Celedonia) Sanson-Saquin, Eduardo Montinola Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Sanson, et al) claimed that the deceased Juan Bon Fing Sy was indebted to them. Hence, in their capacity as creditors, they filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the deceased before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City. During the hearing, Felicito and Celedonia testified in favor of each other‘s claim, and Jade Montinola testified in favor of her husband‘s (Eduardo) and her mother-in-law‘s (Angeles) claim. Their testimonies were supported by checks allegedly issued by the deceased before his death. These testimonies and evidences were countered by Melencia T. Sy, the surviving spouse and appointed administratrix of the deceased‘s estate by invoking the Dead Man‘s Statute which according to her, disqualifies the witnesses from testifying. The RTC, upon finding that the Dead Man‘s Statute does not apply to the witnesses ruled in favor of Sanson, et al. Thus, ordering the administratrix to pay in due course the respective amount due to Sanson et al. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) set aside RTC‘s decision. Hence, this appeal to the High Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Dead Man‘s Statute applies to the witnesses presented by Sanson, et al. HELD: As for the administratrix‘s invocation of the Dead Man‘s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.(Underscoring supplied) Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks. As to the second assigned error, Sanson, et al. argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each other‘s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man‘s

Statute; besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.

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The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review. The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each other‘s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased. Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of ―parties or assignors of parties to a case.‖ Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other‘s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied) But Sanson‘s and Celedonia‘s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia‘s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sanson‘s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other‘s transaction. In any event, what the Dead Man‘s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks. This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonia‘s account, she ―knows‖ the signature of the deceased. While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides that ―the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person‖ x x x not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison with the naked eye of the deceased‘s signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand. In fine, as Sanson, et al. have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims.

MARCELINO TAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and JOHN GIBERSON G.R. No. 138526, 16 August 2006, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

If the appellant does nothing to press his appeal, it may safely be concluded that he believes the judgment of the trial court to be correct and his appeal aims to accomplish nothing more than mere delay in the execution of the adverse judgment, certainly unfair to the appellee who is denied the enjoyment of the fruits of his victory in the case as long as the appeal is not resolved.

John Giberson filed a complaint against Spouses Marcelino and Dorothy Tan for collection of

rentals, replevin and damages filed with the Cebu Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC ruled in favor of

Gilbertson. Spouses Tan filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court through their counsel Atty.

Leandro Hilongo. Subsequently, Atty. Hilongo filed with the trial court a Notice of Withdrawal of

Appearance as counsel for Tan. On even date, the law firm Gica Del Socorro & Espinoza filed its

Notice of Appearance as the couple's new counsel.

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About five months later, instead of sending notice to pay docket fees to the new

counsel of Spouses Tan, the Court of Appeals sent the same to Atty. Hilongo. No docket

and other legal fees having been paid by Spouses Tan, the appellate court considered their appeal

abandoned and accordingly dismissed it pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure.

Spouses Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. It noted that as

gathered from the original records of the case, Spouses Tan filed on "April 23, 1998" [sic] the Notice of

Appeal through their counsel Atty. Hilongo and that two days after or on April 25, 1998 "they were

already notified [by the appellate court] that the original records of the case were being processed and

that as of that date they were already required" to pay the amounts covering docket and other legal fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal HELD:

In the present case, the index of the RTC records attached to the records of CA-G.R CV UDK

No. 4347 shows that the Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Hilongo was indeed filed on May

8 1997, with the trial court as was on even date and also with the trial court the Notice of Appearance of

petitioner's new counsel.

Tan‘s new counsel's awareness of the filing of the Notice of Appeal on April 21, 1997

notwithstanding, it did not verify the status of the appeal, despite the lapse of a considerable length of

time.

While Tan‘s new counsel asserts that it in fact followed up with the trial court the status of the

appeal, it offered no proof thereof. At any rate, if it indeed made an earnest follow up, it would have

learned that five months from the time it entered its appearance on May 8, 1997 or on October 8, 1997,

the RTC forwarded the records of the case to the appellate court.

At all events, the present petition was belatedly filed. Tan received on December 28, 1998 the

Court of Appeals Resolution of November 27, 1998 denying his Motion for Reconsideration of said

court's Resolution dismissing his appeal. He, therefore, had 60 days or up to February 22, 1998 to file the

present petition for certiorari. He filed it only on May 3, 1999, however, or more than two months late.

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