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REPORT JOLTS FBI LAB INTO REFORM Whistle-blower's charges, partly upheld by Justice's inspector general, spur the fabled crime lab to alter practices

Lois R. Ember C&EN Washington

At 9:02 AM on April 19, 1995, a 2-ton ammonium nitrate fertilizer fuel 1 bomb stuffed into a rental truck det­

onates in front of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, partially level­ing the nine-story federal building and kill­ing 168 people and injuring hundreds more.

A decorated Persian Gulf War veteran with anarchist beliefs is swiftly arrested and charged with this terrorist act. On June 2—a little more than two years after the bombing—a jury finds Timothy J. McVeigh guilty on all 11 counts of con­spiracy, bombing, and first-degree mur­der. (At C&EN press time, McVeigh is awaiting sentencing.)

The case unwittingly showcased the Federal Bureau of Investigation laborato­ry. The defense team, probing for prose­cution soft spots, tried to introduce a Jus­tice Department report on the lab that was released in April. This scathing re­port, by the department's inspector gen­eral (IG), reveals a wealth of shoddy pol­icies and practices, which the FBI is now in the throes of correcting.

Judge Richard P. Matsch, however, lim­ited testimony on problems at the FBI crime lab to those issues directly related to the McVeigh case. Only three pages of the 517-page IG report were allowed to be admitted as evidence.

The skillfully managed, scaled-down fed­eral case against McVeigh was circumstan­tial, but compelling. No witnesses were called to put him at the site of the bomb­ing or to prove that he actually built the bomb. But, using a paper trail of phone records, hotel slips, and storage receipts, the prosecutors were able to show that McVeigh was always in the right place at the right time to implicate him in the mak­ing and storage of the device.

Additionally, McVeigh's fingerprints were found on a receipt for a ton of am­

monium nitrate fertilizer. Forensic analy­ses uncovered traces of explosive resi­dues (including PETN, or pentaerythritol tetranitrate, used in detonating cord) on clothing he was wearing when he was stopped for a traffic violation 75 minutes after the blast.

The paper trail and forensic evidence coupled with sworn testimony that Mc­Veigh had vowed to bomb the Murrah building convinced the jury of his guilt. McVeigh's conviction, in part, became the first step toward a public burnishing of the tarnished image of the once-fabled FBI lab.

In the end, McVeigh's attorneys were unable to prove the FBI crime lab en­gaged in "forensic prostitution," as lead defense attorney Stephen Jones had charged in his opening remarks. Not even the defense's star witness, FBI whistle-blower Frederic W. Whitehurst—whose hundreds of complaints prompted the crit­ical IG investigation—dented the prose­cution's case.

Whitehurst testified to finding contam­ination in the Explosives Unit lab just weeks after the bombing. And he said procedures for preventing such contami­nation were so lax at the time the lab was testing evidence from the blast site that the evidence could well have be­come tainted. But on cross-examination, he was forced to admit that he had no firsthand knowledge that any evidence in the case had been contaminated.

On the stand, Whitehurst also ques­tioned the finding of ammonium nitrate crystals on a shard, found near the blast, believed to be part of the truck used in the bombing. This was the only finding of ammonium nitrate at the bomb site and, if true, would show absolutely that the bomb was a fertilizer device.

However, it had rained heavily the day of the bombing, and any such crystals, Whitehurst argued, would have dis­solved. The FBI examiner who analyzed the shard, Steven G. Burmeister, acting

Bromwich: lab management failed

chief of what was formerly called the Chemistry-Toxicology Unit, was unable to explain how such crystals could survive a downpour. "You've entered the realm of the amazing world of explosives," Bur­meister said.

The IG report bluntly criticized the FBI lab for its storage and handling of foren­sic evidence in the McVeigh case. It also censured another lab examiner, David Wil­liams, for concluding that the bomb was composed of ammonium nitrate fertiliz­er. Williams reached this conclusion, not from valid scientific analysis, but from speculation after learning that McVeigh had purchased large quantities of the fer­tilizer, the report states.

IG Michael R. Bromwich concluded that in two major FBI cases—the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bomb­ings—Williams "repeatedly reached con­clusions that incriminated the defendants without a scientific basis." Bromwich re­served his harshest language for Wil­liams, saying, "All cases handled by the lab deserve professional, diligent treat­ment." Williams' performance "in the Oklahoma City case—a prosecution of enormous national significance—merits special censure."

Bromwich's comments on the bomb­ing cases are a small part of the April re­port that looked into Whitehurst's allega­tions of wrongdoing and improper practic­es in only three of 27 units that make up the FBI lab. These units—Explosives, Mate­rials Analysis, and Chemistry-Toxicology— are part of the Scientific Analysis Section (SAS), headed by Randall S. Murch. SAS is one of five sections of the lab.

The report investigates so small a part

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Whitehurst: Chemist, lawyer, war hero, whistle-blower

On paper he's a prosecutor's dream. He has a Ph.D. in quantum chemistry from Duke University and a law degree from Georgetown University Law School. He was honored for his military service in Vietnam with four Bronze Stars. Some of his superiors at the Federal Bureau of In­vestigation have given this crime lab sci­entist excellent performance ratings over the years.

But critics of this 49-year-old who blew the whistle on some very unscientific practices in the FBI's acclaimed crime lab say he is unbending, obsessive, prick­ly, eccentric, a rogue. In his report on Frederic W. Whitehurst's allegations, Justice Department Inspector General (IG) Michael R. Bromwich writes that Whitehurst "lacks the judgment and common sense necessary for a forensic examiner.''

Whitehurst laughs when this com­ment is quoted to him. "Read my perfor­mance appraisals... they don't speak to a guy who uses poor judgment or lacks common sense," he tells C&EN. Read the IG's report, he challenges. It lists "12 sins," some of which he ticks off: "We have people [with no scientific training) rewriting other people's reports. We have people testifying outside their area of expertise. We have false testimony. We have colossal management failure. At the end of the 12 sins, I'm reading that some­body considers that I didn't use good judgment and that I don't have common sense, and I just have to laugh about that, you know."

Since January, Whitehurst has been on administrative leave with pay, pending the Justice Department's decision on his fate. Arguing that Whitehurst has caused "considerable harm . . . to the reputa­tions of innocent persons . . . and his frequently overstated and incendiary way of criticizing [lab] personnel will make it extremely difficult, if not im­possible, for him to work effectively within the [lab]," Bromwich recom­mends against his return to the lab. In­stead, he suggests the FBI consider "what role, if any, [Whitehurst] can use­fully serve in other components of the FBI."

Whitehurst began his career with the FBI in 1982, investigating narcotics and organized crime cases in several of the bureau's field offices. In 1986, he joined the crime laboratory at the FBI's Wash­ington, D.C., headquarters, working for the next 10 years in the Materials Analy­sis Unit During this period, he analyzed a variety of materials, but focused prima­rily on explosives and explosive resi­dues, and then on paints and polymers.

In late 1996, Whitehurst was trans­ferred to the newly formed Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU). When he was placed on administrative leave, Whitehurst was busy locating sophisti­cated analytical instrumentation and ro­botics suitable for the unit's mission. HMRU was set up as the FBI's answer to new crime threats: chemical, biological, and nuclear terrorism and environmen­tal crimes.

Whitehurst has been lodging charges of lab contamination, sloppy lab practic­es, improper evidence handling, errone­ous testimony, perjury, and fabrication of evidence since 1989. Then, "in 1992," he dis­covered that his lab "re­ports had been rewritten for the past four or five years,'' generally by non-scientists, he says.

He asked his superiors to look into his allega­tions, and he was repeat­edly rebuffed. "I had reached a point in 1989 where I didn't have a lot of faith in the system. No­body was listening."

Finally, Whitehurst de­cided to throw "ice water in the face of the system." He brought his host of al­legations to Bromwich's attention, which resulted in an 18-month investi­gation culminating in a widely publicized, highly critical April 1997 report

Bromwich couldn't sub­stantiate most of White­hurst's hundreds of alle­gations, including those of perjury or fabricated evidence. But Whitehurst cast so wide a net that Bromwich found some of the charges—substan­dard analytical work and other deficient practices and testimonial error—to have merit

"I had to lose my job in order for something to be done," Whitehurst tells C&EN. His whistle-blowing "was essen­tially the end of my career," he explains. "You don't think I could go one step be­yond where I was at in 1989 in my ca­reer. That isn't going to happen."

But, he adds, "as far as I'm concerned, my career is not as important to me as due process of law." When asked if he would still go public knowing the conse­quences of his actions, he answers em­phatically yes. "I spent three years in

Vietnam and I saw a government in an­archy. I saw due process of law as some fantasy. I know the alternative, and it breaks my heart to think that we would put people in prison based on flawed ev­idence that we know is flawed." He is more "terrified" of that than he is "of any silly little name-calling, or threats, or whatever against me. I'm very proud of what I did," he tells C&EN.

Besides, Whitehurst says, he had no choice. By presidential order, "I was re­quired to . . . report indications of mis­conduct." Also, he says, "The bureau hired me because . . . I had high ethical standards. They did. They did. "

Whitehurst says he worked very long

hours, seven days a week, "rebuilding equipment, writing protocols, bringing in qualified people, attending conferenc­es, doing the analyses, running the equipment, working with technicians." The lab, he says, "is a beautiful place to work. If you are a chemist, you would die and be reborn when you walked in there."

Whitehurst insists that the FBI is "go­ing to ask me to come back. They want me back in the lab. They really do."

But a source familiar with the culture and climate at the FBI says: "I'll be sur­prised to see Whitehurst go back to the lab. He is damaged goods within the FBI.

26 JUNE 16, 1997 C&EN

He can't work cases and he can't serve as a high-profile liaison." No matter how good a chemist, no matter how correct his analyses, no prosecutor would call Whitehurst to the stand, this source in­sists. "He'd be asked to report about stuff [in the IG's report], not about the case at hand."

If the Justice Department's Manage­ment Division follows Bromwich's recom­mendation, Whitehurst will not return to the lab he so loves. Short of lab reinstate­ment, the Justice Department can recom­mend that Whitehurst be reassigned to an­other FBI division or be fired. Reassign­ment or firing will bring down the wrath of Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), a staunch critic of the FBI's handling of Whitehurst and his allegations.

From a conversation with C&EN, it's clear that Whitehurst is not expecting to have to pay what to him would be the ultimate price—not being able to return to the lab. When asked what he would do if he is not permitted back, he an­swers: "I don't think they are going to recommend that So I don't really con­sider it. I think [FBI Director Louis J.] Freeh wants me back in that lab be­cause, at least, he'll know what's going on."

Most whistle-blowers "don't expect any adverse consequences or way under­estimate the consequences," explains psychologist Renana Brooks, founder of the Sommet Institute for the Study of the American Unconscious, a nonprofit re­search institute in Washington, D.C.

With the caveat that she hasn't spo­ken personally to Whitehurst, Brooks be­lieves that he has thought through the repercussions of his actions on his ca­reer. But, she believes, he has underesti­mated the bigger picture. Most whistle-blowers, she says, expect to be treated as heroes. But the IG report certainly doesn't treat Whitehurst as one.

Brooks thinks that Whitehurst is, in many ways, what she calls the ideal whis­tle-blower. He is willing to sacrifice him­self for a cause he believes in, and be­lieves he is the only one who can do it. His actions fit his sense of meaning in life. But, Brooks says, from public ac­counts of Whitehurst, it is not clear that he has conceived the need to carve out a new identity, or has fully thought through the cost of his actions on other people involved.

While Whitehurst awaits a decision on his future with the FBI, he says he is busy "clearing the field at my church to make a park. I am writing law science papers. And I am reviewing thousands of pages of Freedom of Information Act informa­tion" searching for egregious practices in the FBI lab.

of the huge FBI lab that Bromwich cau­tions that its findings should not be "im­puted to" other SAS units or to other sec­tions of the lab. Whitehurst, even more precise, says it is not the units that are at fault, but "a small number of people in those three units. What's tragic is the man­agement failure to control those people— and what they got away with."

The 18-month investigation addressed an incredible number of charges lodged by Whitehurst. (During the investigation, Whitehurst filed more than 230 l e t t e r s -over 1,000 pages—with Bromwich.) Most of his allegations—especially the more in­flammatory ones of perjury and fabrica­tion of evidence—were not substantiat­ed. But many serious charges—of defi­cient lab practices and of nonexistent or poorly implemented policies—were.

Bromwich and his staff of five consult­ing forensic scientists and four experi­enced federal prosecutors uncovered in­accurate testimony, testimony beyond a lab examiner's expertise, insufficient doc­umentation of test results, improper prep­aration of lab reports, and scientifically flawed reports. The IG team found an in­adequate record management and record retention system. But it found no evi­dence of lab contamination, one of White-hurst's most persistent charges.

Paul B. Ferrara, one of the IG's foren­sic consultants and the director of Virgin­ia's Division of Forensic Science, says the team "saw no hard evidence to support contamination in the labs investigated. But that doesn't mean none existed."

Perhaps the one condition found that most undermined the functioning of the lab was the absence of sound manage­ment. And the irony is that those manag­ers most at fault over the past 10 years have already retired from the FBI.

The report documents a management that had failed "to resolve serious and credible allegations of incompetence" and scientific disagreements among lab exam­iners. It describes a management that had failed "to establish and enforce validated procedures and protocols."

"Many of the problems we observed," says Ferrara, "I attribute to poor manage­ment in the lab." In fact, he says, "we don't condemn [Whitehurst] as much as management and its [lack of] reaction to his concerns."

From the IG's findings flow a list of rec­ommendations concerning specific lab su­pervisors and examiners. But even more pertinent to the future functioning of the lab are some 40 systemic suggestions for correcting or improving lab practices and

Ferrara: no evidence of contamination

procedures. The FBI, for the most part, has endorsed these recommendations. In fact, the lab has already implemented some. The full report has been sent to the Public In­tegrity Section of the Criminal Division at Justice for review.

The IG does not spare Whitehurst. He notes that Whitehurst is "an experienced scientist who identified significant prob­lems in certain cases and in certain prac­tices within the lab." But, Bromwich says, Whitehurst's "overstated and incendiary" criticisms of colleagues caused "consider­able harm . . . to the reputations of inno­cent persons."

Whitehurst has been on administra­tive leave with pay since January. And Bromwich recommends that he not be allowed to return to the lab. Instead, the IG says, the FBI should weigh the good against the bad when deciding what role, if any, Whitehurst could play in another FBI division. The FBI, however, has tossed this hot potato to the Justice Depart­ment's Management Division, which is ex­pected to rule on Whitehurst's (and oth­er lab examiners') fate in the next few months.

In recent testimony before the Crime Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Bromwich defended his recommendations concerning White­hurst. They were not a "shoot the mes­senger" action, he insisted.

Although Whitehurst was not fully vin­dicated, he tells C&EN that he is "elated with the whole report. I am ecstatic." For the first time, some of his charges—what he calls the "12 sins"—have been corrob­orated and are "now in writing" for all to see.

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"The findings of the IG are extremely important as far as I am concerned," he says. The report makes it clear that the FBI is not Mount Olympus and its agents aren't gods, Whitehurst tells C&EN.

Heading the list of suggestions for im­provement, the IG recommends that the FBI lab pursue accreditation by the Ameri­can Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/ Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/ LAB), the only accrediting body for foren­sic labs in the U.S.

Forensic chemist Nicholas S. Cart-wright, a consultant on the IG team and manager of the Canadian Police Research Center, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Ot­tawa), cautions, "Accreditation is a very im­portant and integral step in producing qual­ity work in an organization. But in itself it is not enough." He insists that "you have to establish a culture that does the right thing and does it right."

At least initially, Bromwich's office will be monitoring imple­mentation, including accredita­tion, of the recommendations. But to ensure a cultural change, Whitehurst believes that an orga­nization like the National Acade­my of Sciences or the National Institute of Standards & Technol­ogy should oversee the function­ing of the FBI lab.

In 1994, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh said the lab would seek ac­creditation at the earliest possi­ble time. In responding to the January draft of the IG's report, the FBI noted that the lab "could and should have sought ASCLD/ LAB accreditation a decade ago." Murch, Whitehurst says it didn't out of fear: "We couldn't have passed it."

ASCLD/LAB accreditation is a voluntary program that certifies that management op­erations, staff, procedures and instru­ments, physical plant and security, and safe­ty procedures meet specified standards. To become accredited, a lab has to undergo a rigorous on-site inspection by a team of experienced forensic scientists. And to re­main accredited, the lab has to submit an­nual review reports and undergo full rein­spection every five years.

Murch, the bureau's point man in see­ing that the IG's recommendations are carried out, says the lab is "doing internal assessments and audits to align [itself] with ASCLD guidelines. We are imple­menting what we have to do in order to subject ourselves to a preinspection au­dit in September."

This audit will be conducted by the

St. Petersburg, Fla.-based National Foren­sic Science Technology Center. NFSTC Ex­ecutive Director William J. Tilstone, a forensic biochemist, will be part of the eight-member team, which will be head­ed by Jennifer Evans. Evans is manager of the Australian National Association of Testing Authorities, the oldest national-standards-setting body in the world.

Except for Evans, all others on the team are members of ASCLD and all are experienced forensic scientists. The rig­orous audit is expected to take 10 days, and an audit report will be delivered to the FBI in October.

The FBI will apply to ASCLD/LAB for accreditation at the end of the year. "Then, hopefully, by April 1998, ASCLD/ LAB will have its team come to us to do the on-site inspection," says Murch. Giv­en the size of the FBI lab, the on-site in-

preparing for accreditation

spection could take 15 to 20 inspectors several weeks to complete.

The earliest the FBI can be accredited is the end of 1998—four years after Freeh said the FBI would seek certification ex­peditiously.

A source familiar with the FBI lab tells C&EN that using ASCLD/LAB for accred­itation puts the FBI in a conflict-of-in­terest situation. This source explains that the FBI was instrumental "in putting ASCLD together 20 years ago, and it has had a long­standing financial relationship with ASCLD." The FBI, he explains, hosts and funds ASCLD s annual meetings at its Quantico, Va., campus.

Because he believes ASCLD "has been bought and owned by the FBI for the past 20 years," he says ASCLD "is an in­appropriate group for accreditation. The FBI should use ISO 9000."

Ferrara calls the conflict of interest charge "nonsense." And Kevin Lothridge, ASCLD president, explains why: ASCLD/ LAB was spun off from ASCLD "in the early eighties," and is a totally indepen­dent, not-for-profit organization.

Jo Ann Given, ASCLD/LAB chairwom­an and director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service in Norfolk, Va., con­firms the independence of the accredit­ing group. She also explains that ISO 9000 is a quality management system that is not entirely appropriate for labs. "More applicable is ISO 25," a set of criteria or guidelines for good lab practice by which forensic labs can be accredited, she says.

In some ways, Given says, "ASCLD/ LAB standards are much stricter than ISO 25, but in other ways, they are less strin­gent." Eventually, the U.S. organization will merge the two systems, taking the best

from both. Australia has already | done so. It took the ASCLD stan-i§ dards and married them to "a few 3 things in the ISO 25 guidelines," -Q Tilstone explains. I Accreditation is just one of the

steps the FBI is taking to reform its lab. Even before the release of the IG report, which called for a restructuring of the Explosives Unit, Murch had dissolved it. He merged elements of the Explo­sives Unit with the Chemistry-Toxicology Unit and Materials Analysis Unit and called the re­sulting entities the Chemistry and the Materials & Devices Units, re­spectively. All examiners and unit chiefs in the combined units will have scientific or engineering backgrounds, which had not

been required previously, but was recom­mended by the IG.

The FBI has revised and/or instituted new policies to sharpen report prepara­tion and case-review procedures. New standardized protocols are being written and validated. A revised courtroom testi­mony policy is being adopted. And evi­dence collection and preservation poli­cies are being refined.

Murch has just been named to a new position, deputy assistant director of sci­ence—the chief science officer for the lab. And "a leading [Ph.D.] scientist of national import" is being sought to lead the lab division, Murch says. This person is expected to be named in August to serve as the assistant director of the lab.

According to Murch, the FBI is further seeking to beef up its science capabilities by creating four deputy chief scientist po-

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Blueprint for excellence in the government's premier forensic science lab

The Office of Inspector General recommends: The Federal Bureau of Investigation responds:

• Seek accreditation and periodic external reviews.

• Restructure Explosives Unit (EU) to ensure that scientific analyses are performed by qualified chemists, metallurgists, or engineers; such scientists should assist and advise in gathering of evidence at bombing scenes, but primary responsibility for conducting investigations and directing crime-scene management should rest with FBI agents outside the Scientific Analysis Section (of which EU is a part), possibly the Evidence Response Team.

• In place of principal and auxiliary examiners, name a coordinating examiner for each case to coordinate work of other examiners within the lab; develop and implement guidelines for roles of the various examiners, for preparation of reports, and for presentation of testimony; resolve disagreement among examiners over forensic methods or interpretation of results based on relevant scientific knowledge.

• Instead of a report assembled by the principal examiner from the reports of the various auxiliary examiners, each examiner analyzing evidence should prepare and sign a separate report; reports should include all pertinent information and findings, and conclusions should be limited to those that flow logically from the underlying data and analytical results; before being released, reports should be reviewed by unit chief or qualified examiner to confirm that conclusions are reasonable and scientifically based.

• All case files should include all notes, printouts, charts, and other data or records used by examiners to reach their conclusions; another qualified scientist should be able to understand all analyses done, results obtained, and conclusions reached.

• The lab must develop a record retention and retrieval system that ensures case files are complete and readily retrievable.

• A uniform curriculum for examiner training addressing case documentation, report preparation, examiner ethics, and testimony should be implemented; moot courts used in the qualification process should address knowledge, presentation skills, and the examiner's ability to recognize the limits of his or her opinions and expertise.

• Written guidelines should be adopted that state that examiners, in testifying, should accurately and completely disclose their involvement in the matter, be clear and objective in their answers to questions on direct and cross-examination, limit their conclusions to those that logically follow from the data and analytical results, decline to answer questions beyond their expertise, and be accurate and complete in describing the analyses done or conclusions reached by others.

• Written protocols should be completed quickly and the lab should take steps to ensure that authorized protocols are followed in practice.

• Written procedures for handling evidence and for avoiding contamination should be refined and the new lab facility in Quantico, Va., should be designed to incorporate these.

• Lab director and others with key management responsibilities in the lab should have scientific backgrounds, preferably in forensic science.

Agrees. Target date for accreditation is end of 1998; requests the Inspector General's (IG) Office review progress of the FBI implementation of recommendations every six months until they are fully implemented; is seeking peer review relationships with other forensic labs.

Generally agrees. The unit has been restructured. But the FBI disagrees with the role of EU examiners (scientists) at crime scenes; the FBI will continue to have experienced explosives examiners participate in postincident examinations at the crime scene and will not transfer EU's investigative and crime-scene management functions to the Evidence Response Team as suggested by IG.

Agrees. Examiners have already been redesignated as recommended; additional guidelines were targeted for completion May 1, but the FBI won't confirm that deadline has been met; FBI has distributed communication detailing procedures for resolving scientific disputes, and these procedures will be incorporated into the laboratory's quality manual.

Agrees. Even before the IG's recommendation, the lab had implemented a requirement that each examiner prepare and sign a separate report, and the FBI now requires that, before release, all reports be reviewed by unit chief or another qualified examiner.

Agrees. Existing policy requires that all reports be supported by adequate documentation prior to release; a new internal audit program has been adopted that will subject reports to annual audits by the Quality Assurance Unit to confirm that all necessary documents are in the case file.

Agrees. A new lab case file room was to be operational by June 1 ; FBI will not confirm that this deadline has been met.

Agrees. To implement this recommendation, the lab is refining its current mandatory core curriculum for new examiner qualification; these modifications were scheduled to be completed by June 1 ; the FBI will not confirm that the deadline has been met.

Agrees. To maintain their objectivity and credibility, lab examiners must ensure that their responses on direct and cross-examination are not overstated or misleading and are supported by facts and data; the FBI has always recognized this, and to imply a complete absence of these standards and that requiring accurate testimony would be new to the FBI is misleading.

Agrees. Validated protocols were to be completed by June 1 ; the FBI will not confirm that the deadline has been met.

Agrees. The lab's revised Evidence Control Policy specifies detailed procedures for handling evidence; evidence and contamination issues are high priorities in the design of the new lab facility.

Agrees. The FBI is conducting a national search for the best qualified scientist from outside the FBI to direct the lab; this person is expected to be named in August to serve as the assistant director of the lab; in addition, the FBI's Randall S. Murch has been named to the new position of deputy assistant director of the lab.

sitions, and by hiring, at a lower level, additional scientists and engineers. These positions have not yet been approved or funded, however.

Murch believes the IG review, al­though painful, was "a good opportunity for us to become better. I think we are a good lab, in many parts a great lab. But

we will become even better and stronger because of the investigation."

Despite Murch's optimism, regaining its once-vaunted stature will not be easy or quick for the lab. Canadian consult­ant Cartwright contends the lab's imme­diate future will be very trying. "The IG findings will be brought up over and

over again, and presentation of evidence [at trials] will be difficult." But, he be­lieves, "Over time, if the scientific analy­ses are done openly and validated proto­cols are properly followed, the resulting data and interpretations should hold up— and the credibility of the FBI lab should return."^

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