Reports of Mental Imagery in Retrieval from Long-Term Memory

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 5, 265–287 (1996)ARTICLE NO. 0019

Reports of Mental Imagery in Retrieval from Long-Term Memory

WILLIAM F. BREWER1

Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois 61820

AND

JOHN R. PANI

College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332

Phenomenal reports were obtained immediately after participants retrieved informationfrom long-term memory. Data were gathered for six basic forms of memory (semantic,generic perceptual, recollective, motor skill, rote skill, cognitive skill) and for three forms ofmemory that asked for declarative information about procedural tasks (motor—declarative,rote—declarative, cognitive—declarative). The data show consistent reports of mentalimagery during retrieval of information from the generic perceptual, recollective, motor—declarative, rote—declarative, and cognitive—declarative categories; much less imagerywas reported for the semantic, motor, rote, and cognitive categories. Overall, the dataprovide support for the theoretical framework outlined in Brewer and Pani (1983). 1996

Academic Press, Inc.

In 1983 we wrote an ambitious chapter titled, ‘‘The structure of human memory,’’in which we attempted to describe the naturally occurring categories of human mem-ory (Brewer & Pani, 1983). Our analysis was, for the most part, not based on labora-tory memory data. Instead we drew from (a) our own introspections; (b) the workof philosophers on memory (e.g., Bergson, 1896/1911; Furlong, 1951; von Leyden,1961; Locke, 1971; Malcolm, 1963; Russell, 1921); and (c) early researchers in intro-spective psychology (Book, 1910; Crosland, 1921; Kuhlman, 1906, 1907). The pur-pose of the current paper is to provide laboratory data that can be used to examinesome of our earlier theoretical claims.

Data from Phenomenal Experience

In our earlier chapter we made an explicit metatheoretical commitment to use phe-nomenal reports as one important type of evidence in our analysis. In fact, we tooka very strong position on this issue and argued ‘‘that a complete psychology mustbe able to account for the data from phenomenal experience and that an information-processing account of the mind that excluded the data from phenomenal experiencewould be an incomplete science’’ (Brewer & Pani, 1983, p. 4). In a more recentpaper Brewer (1992) has reiterated the arguments for the importance of data fromphenomenal experience in understanding human memory and has attempted to reviewand organize the relatively scattered and unsystematic data relevant to these issues.

1 To whom correspondence and reprint requests should be addressed at Department of Psychology,University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, IL 61820.

2651053-8100/96 $18.00Copyright 1996 by Academic Press, Inc.All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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Given the limited data that are available on phenomenal experience in memorytasks, we decided to focus on this aspect of memory in the present paper. In particular,we have attempted to develop a methodology to study phenomenal experience duringretrieval from long-term memory and to apply this methodology to the importantforms of memory described in our earlier chapter (Brewer & Pani, 1983).

Six Types of Memory

In the first sections of our 1983 chapter we adopted an explicitly morphologicalapproach to human memory and attempted to provide descriptions of the commonforms of memory, much as a biologist might describe the species occurring in aparticular ecological niche. We described six forms of memory: semantic memory,generic perceptual memory, recollective memory (personal memory), motor skill,rote skill, and cognitive skill.

Semantic memory. One of the most important forms of memory we described wassemantic memory. We concluded that semantic memory is the subclass of generic(nonspecific) memory that involves memory for abstract knowledge (e.g., the knowl-edge used to answer questions such as, ‘‘What word means the same thing as ‘con-cept’?’’). We adopted the term semantic memory from Tulving’s classic 1972 paperand our usage was similar to his. We asserted that retrieval of information fromsemantic memory was not typically accompanied by mental imagery. Angell (1909,p. 224) had made a similar observation.

Generic perceptual memory. We asserted that generic perceptual memory is thesubclass of generic memory that involves memory for perceptual information (e.g.,the memory involved in answering a question such as ‘‘What shape are a GermanShepherd’s ears?’’). Generic perceptual memory is probably the form of memorypeople are referring to when they use the term ‘‘mental map.’’ We claimed thatgeneric perceptual memory is typically experienced in terms of mental imagery. Wewent on to assert that the image occurs in a single modality and that it tends to bea figure without an imaginal ground (see also, Kosslyn, 1980).

Recollective memory (personal memory). A recollective memory is a memory ofa particular episode from an individual’s past. In the 1983 chapter we referred to thisform of memory as ‘‘personal memory.’’ However, in a recent chapter Brewer (1996)has suggested that the term ‘‘recollective memory’’ be adopted for this form of mem-ory. In 1983 this form of memory had rarely been studied; however, it has receivedincreasing attention (for reviews see Brewer, 1986, 1996; Conway, 1990). Neverthe-less, the description given in 1983 contains the core elements of later accounts. Recol-lective memory is experienced as the representation of a particular time and location(i.e., a kind of mental ‘‘reliving’’ of the original event). On the issue of imagery inrecollective memory we asserted that it ‘‘seems always to be experienced in termsof some type of mental imagery—predominantly visual, since vision is the dominantsense’’ (p. 7).

Motor skill. Motor skill is the first of three forms of skill memory that we discussedin the 1983 chapter. Motor skill requires little explication—it is the execution ofsequences of motor actions (e.g., typewriting). Many investigators have suggestedthat practiced motor skills are carried out with little accompanying phenomenal expe-

PHENOMENAL REPORTS AFTER MEMORY RETRIEVAL 267

rience. A classic version of this view was given in William James’ (1890) chapteron habit.

Rote skill. Our analysis of rote memory is one of the more controversial parts ofthe 1983 chapter. We found it very difficult to know how to deal with rote memoryof the type studied in the area of verbal learning since the time of Ebbinghaus (1885/1964). We concluded that rote memory is a form of skill that involves the ability toproduce surface structure linguistic objects. We argued that rote skill differs fromother skills in that it is not generative (e.g., rote skill at saying the alphabet is onlya skill at performing that specific task and does not apply to other sets of rote items).Our 1983 chapter does not give a clear account of the phenomenal experience in-volved in carrying out a rote skill (i.e., in retrieving rote information). We suggestthat in the initial phase of acquisition of rote verbal material there may be visual orauditory imagery (p. 26) and we seem to imply that rote information is representedin terms of a ‘‘surface structure production schema’’ (p. 25) and that these do notinvolve imagery.

Cognitive skill. We used the term ‘‘cognitive skill’’ to capture the cases of skillthat involved practiced cognitive operations. These are generative skills that can beapplied to new instances (e.g., carrying out mental arithmetic). Given the limited dataavailable we were uncertain about the imagery involved in carrying out cognitiveskills. We suggested that they might be intrinsically nonimaginal or that they mightinvolve imagery in the earlier stages of acquisition, but not in the later highly prac-ticed stage.

Procedural to Declarative Memory

In our 1983 chapter we describe a very interesting class of memory phenomena.We noted that one can ask questions that require declarative answers for informationthat is in procedural form. We argued that one could do this for each of our skillcategories.

Motor skill—declarative. In order to show the declarative to procedural shift formotor tasks one simply asks a declarative question about some procedural aspect ofa well-practiced motor skill—for example, ‘‘When you write a short word in yourhandwriting that contains the letter ‘i’ do you dot the ‘i’ before or after you finishwriting the word?’’ In principle one could have this type of information in declarativeform (e.g., ‘‘I remember being taught that I must always dot my ‘i’s after finishingthe word so that must be how I do it’’). However, we think that for most motor tasksthis type of declarative information is not available. In these cases it seems to us thatthe individual has two options. They can physically carry out the action and observehow they do it or they can mentally simulate carrying out the action and mentallyobserve how they do it. In our 1983 chapter we argued that mental simulation wouldgive rise to vivid ‘‘appropriate’’ mental imagery (p. 30). We did not explicitly makea prediction about the modality of the image for motor skills, but it is clear that wethought it would be predominantly in the form of motor or kinesthetic images.

Rote skill—declarative. One can also ask declarative questions about informationfrom a well-practiced rote skill. For a simple discrete piece of information an individ-ual can simply directly output the rote item (e.g., ‘‘What is two times two?’’). In

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order to observe the individual make the rote to declarative transformation one canask for some piece of declarative information that requires the performance of a roteskill in order to obtain the answer (e.g., ‘‘What is the seventh letter of the alphabet?’’).It seems to us that the options for answering this type of question are similar to thoseoutlined for motor skills. An individual might happen to have the information indeclarative form (e.g., ‘‘My last name starts with ‘g’ and I know that I used to bein the seventh group to be called in alphabetical order’’). However, in most instancesthe rote information will not be in declarative form so the information will have tobe derived from the exercise of the rote skill. The rote skill could be carried outovertly (saying the alphabet out loud) and the declarative information tallied overtly(using fingers to count the letters) or the whole task could be carried out mentally.In the case of mental performance the individual presumably uses some form ofdivided attention in order to say the alphabet mentally while mentally counting therote instances produced.

In our 1983 chapter we asserted that individuals who produce the declarative infor-mation from a mental simulation would show vivid mental imagery. We were notexplicit about the modality of the imagery. However, in retrospect, it seems to usthat we were assuming that for rote skill the imagery would be predominately inauditory form.

Cognitive skill—declarative. Normally, many cognitive skills are exercised in con-junction with a cultural artifact (e.g., pencil and paper, a computer). However, oneought to be able to elicit the procedural to declarative shift by asking for the declara-tive product of a cognitive skill in the absence of the usual cultural artifacts (e.g.,ask, ‘‘What is the sum of sixty-two and twenty-three?’’ in the absence of paper andpencil or a computer). In our 1983 chapter we asserted that carrying out mental simu-lations of cognitive skills would typically produce vivid imagery. We did not makean explicit prediction about the modality of imagery in these cases. Given the com-plexity of many cognitive tasks it is hard, even in retrospect, to make a clear predic-tion here (e.g., is mental arithmetic typically done with visual or auditory or motoricimagery?).

Experimental Conditions

The purpose of the present experiment was to gather experimental evidence aboutthe phenomenal experiences involved with the retrieval of information from long-term memory. In order to study this issue we examined the six forms of memoryand the three forms of procedural to declarative shifts that were presented in our1983 chapter and have been discussed above; however, there were two additionalcategories that we included in the present experiment.

Semantic memory–association. In developing the items for the semantic memorycategory it seemed to us that certain questions directed at semantic memory mightelicit mental imagery through various forms of association. For example, we thoughtthat semantic memory questions such as, ‘‘What is the capital of France?’’ mightwell elicit an associated image (e.g., the Eiffel Tower). In order to study this phenom-enon more closely we selected a set of appropriate items for inclusion in the experi-ment. We attempted to restrict the items in the Semantic Memory condition so that


there would be few obvious imaginal associates and then we included another cate-gory of items, Semantic Memory—Association, which were explicitly designed tohave imaginal associations.

Recollective memory. Studies of recollective memory have investigated memoriesfor events ranging from just a few hours before testing to events that occurred almosta full lifetime earlier (for reviews see Brewer, 1986, 1996). We decided to make ageof recollective memories a condition in this study and developed one set of items,Recollective—Old, that was designed to elicit memories for events that had occurredat least several years in the past (e.g., ‘‘Who were you with the first time you drovea car?’’). In addition to the Recollective—Old items there were another set of items,Recollective—Recent, that were designed to elicit memories for events that had oc-curred within the last 24 h (e.g., ‘‘What was the first thing you had to drink today?’’).One of the reasons for adding this condition was that there was a clear hypothesisin the literature about the qualities of visual imagery for old and new recollectivememories. Nigro and Neisser (1983) elicited recollective memories from a group ofparticipants and asked these individuals about the point of view of the visual images.Nigro and Neisser were able to classify the images into ‘‘field memories’’ (thoserepresenting the scene as it was originally viewed) and ‘‘observer memories’’ (thoserepresenting the scene as an external observer might view it). Their data showed aweak tendency for recent memories to display a higher proportion of field memoriesthan did older memories. This finding has been replicated more recently by Robinsonand Swanson (1993). In addition to the issue of point of view we also thought itpossible that recollective memories for older events might be less vivid and moregeneric than recollective memories for more recent memories.

Experimental item categories. The final experiment thus consisted of a study of11 memory categories. There were the 6 original core memory categories from our1983 chapter (Semantic, Generic Perceptual, Recollective, Motor Skill, Rote Skill,and Semantic Skill). In addition, there were the 3 categories of items that requireddeclarative information derived from procedural information (Motor—Declarative,Rote—Declarative, and Cognitive—Declarative). Finally, the Semantic category wassubdivided into Semantic and Semantic—Association and the Recollective categorywas subdivided into Recollective—Recent and Recollective—Old. Having now de-scribed the item categories, we will turn to a formal account of the methods of theexperiment.

METHOD

Participants

The participants were 35 undergraduates at the University of Illinois who partici-pated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.

Materials

Item categories. There were 11 different categories of items developed from theconceptual framework presented above. All items asked the participant to recall oruse some type of information from long-term memory. Three of the item categories

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involved performing a skilled act. These items were presented as imperatives thatasked the participant to perform a particular task. The remaining 8 categories werein the form of ‘‘Wh’’ questions (Who, What, When, Which) that asked the participanta question that required the retrieval of information from long-term memory.

The 11 item categories were: (1) Semantic Memory. These items were designedto ask for purely abstract knowledge (e.g., ‘‘What is the opposite of falsehood?’’).(2) Semantic Memory—Association. These items also tested information from seman-tic memory, but were selected to have associates that might lead to an image duringrecall [e.g., ‘‘What is the capital of France?’’ (with the Eiffel Tower as a possibleassociated image)]. (3) Generic Perceptual Memory. These items were designed toretrieve generic perceptual information that was not already encoded in long-termmemory in some more abstract/propositional format (e.g., ‘‘How many places dolines meet in a capital M?’’). (4) Recollective Memory—Recent. These items askedfor information about unique events in the participant’s life that could be assumedto have occurred within the last 24 h (e.g., ‘‘Who was the last person you talked tobefore me?’’). (5) Recollective Memory—Old. These items asked for informationabout unique events in the participant’s life that could be assumed to have occurredfrom 1 to 10 years earlier (e.g., ‘‘Who were you with the first time you drove acar?’’).

The remaining 6 item categories were developed in pairs. One member of the pair,the skill category, included items that asked the participant to actually perform aparticular skilled task. The other member of the pair, the skill—declarative category,included items that asked for declarative information that was implicit in the skilledaction. An attempt was made to select information for the questions in the skill cate-gories that was not already available in declarative form in long-term memory. Theindividual items in the two categories were paired so that each skill—declarativeitem requested declarative information that was implicitly available in the corre-sponding skill item. (6) Motor Skill. These items requested that the participant carryout a motor skill that could be assumed to be well practiced for most college under-graduates (e.g., given a card containing the handwritten sentence, ‘‘The basic entityis truth,’’ the participant was presented with a typewriter and asked to ‘‘Type thissentence for me’’). The linguistic material used in the items involving typing andhandwriting was always an abstract sentence to reduce the possibility that the linguis-tic materials themselves would produce images. (7) Motor Skill—Declarative. Eachof these items was paired with an item from the Motor Skill category and asked adeclarative question about some aspect of the paired motor skill item (e.g., given acard with the handwritten sentence, ‘‘The basic entity is truth,’’ the participant wasasked, ‘‘If you were to type this out what finger would you type this letter with?’’(the experimenter pointed to the ‘‘r’’ in the word ‘‘truth’’). (8) Rote Skill. Theseitems asked the participant to perform a rote skill [e.g., ‘‘Say the alphabet until I tellyou to stop’’ (experimenter stops the participant at the letter ‘‘h’’)]. (9) Rote Skill—Declarative. Each of these items was paired with an item from the Rote Skill categoryand asked a declarative question about some aspect of the rote information from thepaired item (e.g., ‘‘What is the seventh letter of the alphabet?’’). (10) Cognitive Skill.These items asked the participant to carry out a highly practiced cognitive skill (e.g.,given a pencil and a card containing the numbers 41 and 52 in standard vertical


addition format the participant was asked to ‘‘Add up these numbers for me.’’).(11) Cognitive Skill—Declarative. Each of these items was paired with an item fromthe Cognitive Skill category and asked a declarative question about the product ofthe cognitive skill (e.g., ‘‘What is the sum of forty-one and fifty-two?’’).

Five items were developed for each of the 11 categories for a total of 55 experimen-tal items. For each category an attempt was made to sample as broad a range ofexemplars as possible. The items were constructed so that the requested informationwould be known by most undergraduate participants. All 55 experimental items aregiven in the Appendix.

Experimental lists. A set of five experimental lists was developed such that eachlist contained 1 question from each of the 11 item categories with no item repeated.Items from the skill and the skill—declarative categories were counterbalanced sothat a single list never contained the same information tested both as performanceand as a Wh- question. Thus, the same experimental list would never contain an itemasking a participant his or her social security number and an item asking how manynumbers there were in his or her social security number. Four filler items were addedto each experimental list in order to approximately balance the number of questionswhich were predicted to produce imagery and not to produce imagery. For a givenexperimental list the 4 filler items consisted of one member of each of the nonimageitem categories (Semantic Memory, Motor Skill, Rote Skill, Cognitive Skill) fromone of the other experimental lists. An item was used as a filler only one time acrossthe experimental lists. Thus, each experimental list contained 11 experimental itemsand 4 filler items for a total of 15 questions. Each of the experimental lists waspresented to seven participants.

Individual lists. Each participant received the questions in a unique order. Theorder of the items of the individual lists was randomized with the constraint that anexperimental item testing a particular category of information always occurred earlierin the list than a filler item of the same type.

Procedure

Tasks. Participants were seen individually. The experimenter asked 1 of the ques-tions and then, after the participant responded, the experimenter administered a seriesof self-report scales for that question. This procedure was repeated until all of the15 questions from an individual list had been completed.

Instructions. The experimenter read the instructions to the participant. The instruc-tions stated that the experimenter would ask the participant a series of general infor-mation questions. In addition, the participants were told they would be asked ques-tions about ‘‘what may have gone through your mind as you were coming to youranswer.’’ The participants were told that they should answer the information ques-tions in an immediate and natural way. They were informed that for a self-report‘‘there is no right or wrong report of what went through your mind. . . . We realizethat different people arrive at conclusions in a different way, and that the same personcan arrive at a conclusion in different ways at different times. The only thing wewant is for you to give us the most accurate report you can about whatever did, ordid not, happen as you were coming to your answer.’’ Finally, the experimenter went

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through a complete example of a memory question and the self-report scales withthe participant.

Self-report scales. The self-report scales were administered immediately followingthe participant’s answer to the question. For the skill questions that involved an actionsomewhat extended in time the experimenter’s questions always focused on a rela-tively recent and brief component of the action (e.g., ‘‘As you typed this letter . . .’’).

The self-report questions (in the order asked) were: (1) ‘‘Did a particular occasionfrom your life come to mind as you were coming to your answer?’’ (2) ‘‘Was thereany visual image as you were coming to your answer?’’ (3) ‘‘Was there any imageof sound, including mental words, as you were coming to your answer?’’ (4) ‘‘Wasthere any image of carrying out an action as you were coming to your answer?’’(5) (If visual imagery was reported) ‘‘Was the visual imagery a single static image,a series of static images, or a continuous event in an image?’’ (6) (If visual imagerywas reported) ‘‘How vivid was the visual imagery, from one to five?’’ (7) (If a visualimage and if a particular occasion were reported) ‘‘Was the visual image from thepoint of view you had at the time of the occasion, or was it the view that some otherperson, an onlooker, could have had?’’ (8) (If visual imagery was reported) ‘‘Didthe image have an isolated object or objects in it, or was there a setting, or scene,with a background?’’ (9) ‘‘What was the visual image an image of?’’ (10) (If soundimagery was reported) ‘‘For the sound image, was there a single brief image or wasit a series of images?’’ (11) (If sound imagery was reported) ‘‘How vivid was thesound imagery from one to five?’’ (12) (If sound imagery was reported) ‘‘What wasthe sound image an image of?’’ (13) (If action imagery was reported) ‘‘How vividwas the imagery of carrying out an act?’’ (14) (If action imagery was reported) ‘‘Whatact did you have an image of carrying out?’’

The purpose of most of the questions is self-evident. We wanted to establish thepresence or absence of imagery in each of three modalities and if there was imagery,to obtain measures of the vividness of the image, some index of the static/dynamiccharacteristics of the image, and a qualitative description of the image. The questionabout ‘‘a particular occasion’’ (Question 1) was designed to help distinguish recol-lective memories of a particular event (Brewer, 1986, 1996) from nonspecific mentalimages (Brewer & Pani, 1983). The question about visual point of view (Question7) was designed to gather information on Nigro and Neisser’s (1983) distinctionbetween ‘‘field memories’’ and ‘‘observer memories.’’

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The basic data consisted of the responses to 385 questions (35 participants eachanswering 1 question from each of 11 categories). There were 9 responses of Don’tKnow (2% of the data). Because we did not know what mental processes were oc-curring in these cases, no phenomenal data were gathered for these responses, sothey did not contribute to the data set.

Errors

There were 13 identifiable errors (3% of the data). The data from these itemswas included for analysis. It seems unlikely that the mental processes involved in


responding that ‘‘the speed of sound is faster than the speed of light’’ were verydifferent from those occurring for the response that ‘‘the speed of light is faster thanthe speed of sound.’’ In addition, for some categories of questions (e.g., recollectivememory) we have no way of determining the accuracy of the responses, so removingthe errors would be inconsistent across the categories. In any event, the number oferrors was so small that either including or excluding them could have little impacton the overall patterns of findings.

Overt Motor Responses

The instructions to participants did not explicitly say they could not use overtmotor responses to help answer the questions (e.g., the instructions did not forbidthem from typing on a pretend typewriter to answer the question about which fingeris used to type the ‘‘a’’ in ‘‘quality.’’). However, given the rarity of overt motorresponses for the procedural to declarative items, it seems likely that most participantsassumed that such a strategy would not be ‘‘fair.’’ There were three responses toCognitive—Declarative questions and two responses to Motor—Declarative ques-tions that involved the use of an overt motor strategy. Given our theoretical approachwe are forced to predict that the mental processes for these responses are differentfrom the other responses (i.e., a person who overtly moves their fingers as if theywere typing should have mental processes more like those who actually type thanlike those who have to generate some form of mental representation to answer thequestion.) Therefore, the five responses accompanied by theoretically important ex-plicit overt motor activity (1% of the data) were removed from the data set and wereexamined individually.

The first sections of the results will provide an overview of the phenomenal reportdata for the 11 categories of memory retrieval. The last section will examine theresults for each individual category of memory retrieval.

Categorical data were tested with sign tests. The data giving means based on therating scales were tested with t tests. The term reliable will be used to indicate asignificance level of less than .05.

Frequency of Occurrence and Vividness of Visual Imagery

The basic data on mental imagery are given in Table 1. The data are provided inthree different forms. The first column shows, for each category, the percentage ofparticipants who gave any image response for any of the three modalities of imagery(visual, auditory, motor). This is a very liberal scoring criterion and provides thehighest possible imagery scores. The second column shows, for each category, thepercentage of participants who gave a very vivid image response (an image rated 4or 5 on the 0–5 vividness scale) for at least one of the three forms of imagery. Thisis a much stricter criterion and shows the frequency of occurrence of relatively vividimagery. The final column gives, for each category, the mean overall image scoreacross the three forms of imagery (with no image responses given a score of 0). Thisindex takes into account both the amount and the vividness of reported imagery.

The overall pattern of data shows a very consistent finding. For each scoring crite-rion the six forms of memory retrieval that were predicted to show imagery (Generic

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TABLE 1Percent Any Imagery, Percent Vivid Imagery, and Mean Overall Imagery for Each Item Category

Percent any Percent vivid Mean overall Number ofItem category imagea imageb image ratingc observations

Semantic 56 22 .86 (32)Semantic—Association 74 35 1.08 (31)Generic Perceptual 100 46 1.29 (35)Recollective—Recent 100 80 2.24 (35)Recollective—Old 97 66 2.16 (35)Motor 37 26 .72 (35)Motor—Declarative 97 69 2.33 (32)Rote 46 37 .81 (35)Rote—Declarative 91 63 1.90 (35)Cognitive 51 31 .81 (35)Cognitive—Declarative 94 58 1.62 (31)

a Percentage of responses with any (1–5) visual, or auditory, or motor imagery.b Percentage of responses with at least one visual, auditory, or motor image rated 4 or 5 on the 1 to

5 vividness scale.c Mean imagery scores averaged across visual, auditory, and motor imagery vividness (0–5 scale, with

no imagery 5 0).

Perceptual, Recollective—Recent, Recollective—Old, Motor—Declarative, Rote—Declarative, Cognitive—Declarative) show higher image scores than the forms ofmemory retrieval not predicted to show imagery (Semantic, Motor, Rote, Cognitive).This difference was highly reliable for each scoring criterion. The absolute levels ofimagery are also striking. For the liberal scoring criterion (percent any imagery) fourof the categories with predicted imagery show essentially 100% imagery and theother two categories (Rote—Declarative, Cognitive—Declarative) show greater than90% imagery responses.

The most surprising aspect of the data are the relatively high levels of imageryfor the forms of memory that were predicted to show little or no imagery (Semantic,Motor, Rote, Cognitive). Using the liberal scoring criterion these categories showfrom 37 to 56% imagery responses. Some of this imagery (particularly for the Motor,Rote, and Cognitive categories) is almost certainly an artifact due to the fact that wedid not carry out a long sequence of similar exemplars of a task, but instead askedthe participants to carry out one relatively discrete task (cf. the classic work of Book,1910).

Item Analysis

In an attempt to better understand the origin of the unpredicted imagery for thefour forms of retrieval that were not predicted to show imagery we carried out anitem analysis of the quantitative and qualitative information for each vivid imageresponse that occurred in these categories. Most of the unpredicted imagery responsesfell into one of three categories—associations, idiosyncratic recollective recalls, andimaginal restatements of the question.

Associations. Examples of responses that seemed to be associations were: (Motor)


One participant asked to type a sentence reported a nonspecific visual and motorimage of typing. (Rote) Three participants asked their social security number reporteda nonspecific visual image of their University identification card (the social securitynumber is also the University identification number).

Recollective memories. Examples of responses that seemed to be idiosyncratic rec-ollective memories were: (Semantic) One participant asked ‘‘What is the oppositeof theory?’’ reported visual, auditory, and motor images of a specific occasion whenthey were raising their hand in a classroom and then were embarrassed. (Motor)Another participant asked to tie an untied shoe reported a visual and motor image ofa specific occasion when their mother laced their first high-top shoes. (Rote) Anotherparticipant asked to complete the phrase ‘‘Where there’s a will, there’s a ’’reported a visual and auditory image of a specific occasion when a tutor said thisphrase to them. (Cognitive) Another participant asked a simple algebra question re-ported a visual and motor image of a specific occasion of being at the blackboardworking a problem in high school.

Restatements. Examples of responses that seemed to involve the mental re-statement of the problem and/or answer were: (Semantic) One participant asked‘‘What is the opposite of falsehood?’’ reported a nonspecific auditory image of thewords ‘‘falsehood’’ and ‘‘truthful.’’ (Motor) Another participant asked to copy asentence reported nonspecific auditory imagery of saying the sentence they were tocopy. (Rote) Another participant asked ‘‘What is seven times three?’’ reported anonspecific visual and motor image of the problem. (Cognitive) Another participantasked to add 41 and 52 reported a nonspecific auditory image of talking through theadditions.

This item analysis suggests to us that the participants who give imagery responsesfor memory categories that we thought would not involve imagery are giving us anaccurate report of their phenomenal experience. It simply appears that we were wrongin thinking that the particular question we were asking the participant would be theonly determinant of imagery in our tasks. The items analysis strongly suggests that intasks such as ours vivid imagery will occasionally be produced by item associations,idiosyncratic recollective memories, and mental restatements of the problem.

Imagery Modality

Table 2 presents the imagery data by modality (visual, auditory, motor). The resultsare given for the percent of any imagery, for the percent vivid imagery, and for themean overall imagery score. It is clear that some of the memory retrieval categoriesproduce different patterns of imagery by modality. Some of these differences can beseen more clearly in Table 3.

Imagery dominance. In order to explore the relative strength of the three forms ofimagery for the memory categories, an index of imagery dominance was developed.For each response for which there was imagery, the imagery vividness scores forvisual, auditory, and motor imagery were examined. The modality with the highestvividness score was considered the dominant image modality (ties were excluded).Examination of the imagery dominance data in Table 3 shows that, overall, visualimagery is clearly the dominant modality across the categories with dominance scores

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TABLE 2Percent Any Imagery, Percent Vivid Imagery, and Mean Imagery for

Each Imagery Modality for Each Item Category

Percent any imagea Percent vivid imageb Mean image ratingc

Item category Visual Auditory Motor Visual Auditory Motor Visual Auditory Motor

Semantic 44 25 12 9 16 3 1.28 .91 .41Semantic—

Association 68 19 6 32 10 3 2.32 .68 .23Generic

Perceptual 100 3 11 40 0 9 3.34 .06 .46Recollective—

Recent 94 29 37 74 23 26 3.94 1.20 1.57Recollective—

Old 94 31 51 60 14 26 3.60 1.09 1.80Motor 29 11 26 17 6 20 .89 .34 .94Motor—

Declarative 97 9 81 59 9 47 3.50 .44 3.06Rote 37 11 9 29 11 9 1.54 .51 .37Rote—

Declarative 74 51 23 40 43 17 2.69 2.09 .91Cognitive 34 23 11 14 17 9 1.09 .83 .51Cognitive—

Declarative 90 32 13 55 23 10 3.16 1.23 .48

Note. The number of observations for each category is the same as that shown on Table 1.a Responses with any (1–5) imagery.b Responses with an image rated 4 or 5 on the 1 to 5 vividness scale.c Mean imagery vividness scores (0–5 scale, with no imagery 5 0).

TABLE 3Percent Imagery Dominance and Mean Cross-Modality Imagery Scores for Each Item Category

Dominancea

CrossItem category Visual Auditory Motor Observations modalityb Observations

Semantic 59 35 6 (17) 1.44 (18)Semantic—Association 76 19 5 (21) 1.26 (23)Generic Perceptual 94 0 6 (34) 1.14 (35)Recollective—Recent 77 8 15 (26) 1.60 (35)Recollective—Old 83 0 17 (24) 1.82 (34)Motor 56 11 33 (9) 1.77 (13)Motor—Declarative 52 0 48 (21) 1.94 (31)Rote 71 14 14 (14) 1.25 (16)Rote—Declarative 62 38 0 (21) 1.63 (32)Cognitive 43 43 14 (14) 1.33 (18)Cognitive—Declarative 78 17 4 (23) 1.45 (29)

a Image modality with highest vividness rating (ties not included).b Image occurrence in 1 modality 5 1; 2 modalities 5 2; 3 modalities 5 3.


TABLE 4Percent Image Dynamics for Visual and Auditory Images for Each Item Category

Visual nonstatica Auditory nonstaticb

Item category Percent Observations Percent Observations

Semantic 14 (14) 75 (8)Semantic—Association 29 (21) 50 (6)Generic Perceptual 26 (35) 0 (1)Recollective—Recent 79 (33) 80 (10)Recollective—Old 67 (33) 55 (11)Motor 50 (10) 75 (4)Motor—Declarative 61 (31) 100 (3)Rote 31 (13) 100 (4)Rote—Declarative 46 (26) 67 (18)Cognitive 42 (12) 75 (8)Cognitive—Declarative 43 (28) 70 (10)

a Nonstatic image reports (includes sequences of static images).b Nonstatic image reports (includes series of static images).

ranging from 43 to 94%. Visual imagery is almost completely dominant for the Ge-neric Perceptual category and the recollective memory categories also show a fairlystrong visual dominance. One clear exception to the visual dominance is the Motor—Declarative category, with a motor dominance score of 48%. Retrieving implicit mo-tor information in question form causes motor imagery to be dominant for almosthalf of the participants.

Cross modality. Some of the categories tend to elicit imagery that is restricted toone modality whereas other categories produce imagery across the three modalities.In order to examine this aspect of the data each response with imagery reported inat least one imagery modality was assigned a score of 1 for the occurrence of imageryin only one modality, a 2 for two modalities, and a 3 for three modalities. Table 3gives the mean Cross Modality scores for the categories. The data show that GenericPerceptual responses (with a score of 1.14) tend to be restricted to one modality(visual) whereas responses for the Motor—Declarative category (1.94) tended to oc-cur for two modalities (visual and motor). The Recollective Memory categories andthe Rote—Declarative categories also showed frequent multimodal reports, with re-sponses occurring in all three modalities.

Image Dynamics

Another aspect of the image that we explored was the degree to which imageswere experienced as static or as changing over time. Table 4 gives, for each category,the percentage of participants with a visual image who indicated that their experiencewas either a series of static images or a continuous changing visual event. The secondcolumn in Table 4 gives, for each category, the percentage of participants with anauditory image who indicated that their experience was a series of images. This indexshows the visual images in the Generic Perceptual category tend to be relatively static(26%) while those for the Recollective memory categories (recent 79%; old 67%)

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TABLE 5Percent Specific Memories, Percent Specific Visual Images with Own Point of View, and

Percent Visual Images with Context for Each Category

Item category Specifica Point of viewb Contextc

Semantic 25 80 36Semantic—Association 32 78 81Generic Perceptual 14 100 34Recollective—Recent 86 67 91Recollective—Old 94 69 97Motor 14 80 50Motor—Declarative 25 86 45Rote 17 100 31Rote—Declarative 3 100 4Cognitive 20 83 67Cognitive—Declarative 13 67 4

a Percent ‘‘yes’’ responses to ‘‘Did a particular occasion from your life come to mind?’’b Percent ‘‘yes’’ responses to ‘‘Was the visual image from the point of view you had at the time?’’

for specific, visual image responses.c Percent ‘‘yes’’ responses to ‘‘Was there a setting, or scene, with a background?’’ for visual image

responses.

tend to be less static. Most of the other categories fall in between. The scores forauditory imagery are based on too few responses to be very informative.

Image Qualities

Specific/generic. In order to distinguish memories of specific episodic events fromgeneric memories after answering each question the participants were asked if ‘‘aparticular occasion from your life came to mind as you were coming to your an-swer?’’ The data on the percentage of specific responses is given in Table 5. TheRecollective memory responses, as expected, are reported as being retrievals of spe-cific episodes (recent 86%; old 94%). Answering questions dealing with GenericPerceptual Memory (14%) and answering declarative questions about skills (motor25%; rote 3%; cognitive 13%) are much less likely to be experienced as involvinga specific episode from the past. These four categories show reliably fewer specificresponses than do the recollective categories.

Point of view. If a participant indicated that they had a visual image of a particularoccasion they were asked if the visual image was experienced ‘‘from the point ofview you had at the time of the occasion, or was it from the view that some otherperson, an onlooker, could have had?’’ The second column in Table 5 gives, for eachcategory, the percentage of participants who indicated that they experienced the visualimage from the original point of view. Given that a specific visual image was reportedthere is a strong overall tendency for it to be reported as being experienced from theoriginal point of view. The two recollective memory categories show modest numbersof images from another point of view (recent 33%; old 31%). Clearly the data do notsupport the prediction that old recollective memories will show a higher percentage ofobserver memories (other point of view) than do recent recollective memories.


TABLE 6Mean Image Vividness Scores for Images That Did Occur for

Each Image Modality for Each Category

Visual Auditory Motor

Item category Vivid Observations Vivid Observations Vivid Observations

Semantic 2.93 (14) 3.62 (8) 3.25 (4)Semantic—Association 3.43 (21) 3.50 (6) 3.50 (2)Generic Perceptual 3.34 (35) 2.00 (1) 4.00 (4)Recollective—Recent 4.18 (33) 4.20 (10) 4.23 (13)Recollective—Old 3.82 (33) 3.45 (11) 3.50 (18)Motor 3.10 (10) 3.00 (4) 3.67 (9)Motor—Declarative 3.61 (31) 4.67 (3) 3.77 (26)Rote 4.15 (13) 4.50 (4) 4.33 (3)Rote—Declarative 3.62 (26) 4.06 (18) 4.00 (8)Cognitive 3.17 (12) 3.62 (8) 4.50 (4)Cognitive—Declarative 3.50 (28) 3.80 (10) 3.75 (4)

Context. If a participant indicated that they had a visual image they were askedto indicate if the image was experienced as an isolated image or if it occurred witha setting or background. The third column of Table 5 gives, for each category, thepercentage of participants who indicated that their visual image occurred in a context.The data show that the visual images experienced in the recollective memory catego-ries typically involved a context (recent 91%; old 97%), whereas the visual imagesin the Rote—Declarative, Cognitive—Declarative, and Generic Perceptual catego-ries were much less likely to be experienced as having a context (4%; 4%; 34%).These three categories show reliably fewer context responses than do the recollectivememory categories. In the categories with few reports of context it appears that theparticipants were generating focused images of relatively generic information.

Vividness Scores for Images That Did Occur

The earlier analysis showed that there were strong differences in the degree towhich imagery occurred in the different memory categories. However, one can alsoexamine the degree of image vividness for the images that did occur. Table 6 gives,for each category and for each modality, the mean vividness scores for the imagesthat did occur (some of the means are based on relatively small numbers of re-sponses). Our earlier analysis of mean vividness with no image counted as a 0 (thelast column of Table 2) show very large differences across the memory categories.The results in Table 6 show fewer differences among the categories, with all catego-ries showing relatively high vividness scores. This indicates that when images dooccur they tend to be relatively vivid even if they appear in a category that, overall,produces relatively few images. This finding of relatively vivid images in the catego-ries with fewer images is consistent with the earlier item analysis which showed thatmany of the images in these categories appeared to be associations, recollections,and mental reinstatements.

Even though the biggest effect seen in Table 6 is the overall high level of imagery

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across the categories there appear to be some remaining small category differencesin vividness. For example, the visual images in the recollective memory categoriestend to be fairly vivid (recent 4.18; old 3.82) while the images in the Generic Percep-tual category are a bit less vivid (3.34).

Overt Motor Strategy

Earlier we noted that there were three responses to Cognitive—Declarative ques-tions and two responses to Motor—Declarative questions that involved the use ofan overt motor strategy. The use of overt motor responses in conditions where wewere trying to force the participants to rely on mental representations to answer thequestions, can, to some extent, be thought of as shifting these items to the equivalentnondeclarative category (e.g., Motor—Declarative items answered with overt motorresponses should behave like Motor items). Therefore, we have to predict that itemsanswered with the use of overt motor movements should show reduced imagery.

Examination of the individual data from the three Cognitive—Declarative itemsdoes not support our prediction. The data from these three items look much likethe data from the Cognitive—Declarative items without motor accompaniment. Forexample, all three reported imagery and the mean visual vividness ratings were 3.33,which is slightly higher than the mean visual vividness for the items without motoraccompaniment (3.16). The mean motor vividness ratings for these three items was2.67, which was considerably higher than the mean motor image ratings for the itemswithout motor accompaniment (0.48). The overt motor actions for two of these itemsconsisted of writing on an imaginary blackboard while trying to add 62 and 23. Ap-parently the use of the overt motor strategy did not reduce the occurrence of visualand motor imagery for other aspects of these cognitive tasks (e.g., imaging the black-board).

Examination of the individual data from the two Motor items provides strong sup-port for our prediction. The Motor—Declarative items without motor accompanimentshowed visual imagery for 97% of the responses and motor imagery for 81% of theresponses, yet, neither of the two items with overt motor accompaniment showedany visual or motor imagery. On the imagery scale the items without motor accompa-niment show a mean of 3.50 for visual imagery and 3.06 for motor imagery, whereasthe two items with overt motor responses show means of 0.0. Thus, it appears thatwhen an individual types on an imaginary typewriter to answer the question of whichfinger is used to type the letter ‘‘a’’ the need for mental imagery can be essentiallyeliminated. In the next section we will organize and discuss the data—category bycategory.

Memory Retrieval Categories

Semantic Memory. Answering questions that involve abstract semantic knowledgeshows relatively little involvement of imagery (e.g., only 22% of the responses showvivid imagery). In addition an item analysis of the vivid image responses for thiscategory suggested that most of the images that do occur are restatements of thequestion or recollective memory experiences related to the question. It would appear


that when answering a question that does not involve phenomenally experienced im-agery there is the opportunity for imagery from other sources to be experienced.

Semantic Memory—Association. The Semantic Memory—Association categorywas included to explore what happens when individuals are asked for semantic infor-mation that is strongly associated with imageable information (e.g., ‘‘What is thecapital of France?’’). It appears that the responses are a mixture of imageless re-sponses and responses containing associated images (e.g., four of seven responsesfor the capital of France question included images of the Eiffel Tower).

Generic Perceptual Memory. Throughout the analyses the Generic PerceptualMemory category had a strong tendency to stand out as a unique category. Answeringquestions about generic perceptual information produced 100% imagery responses.The images were essentially always visual. They were nonspecific, static, and tendednot to have context. If any form of imagery is to be described as a simple ‘‘picturein the head’’ then it is the imagery experienced in answering questions about genericperceptual information.

Recollective Memory—Recent. The data for the recollective memory responses issimilar to the account we provided in our earlier (somewhat data free) discussions ofthis form of memory (e.g., Brewer, 1986; Brewer & Pani, 1983). Asking recollectivememory questions for recent events gave rise to experienced imagery in every case.This is consistent with the imagery data for recollective memories of randomly se-lected events from the lives of undergraduates that was reported in Brewer (1988).The reported imagery was very vivid (80% of the responses had at least one imageryresponse of 4 or 5 on a 0–5 scale). There tended to be imagery in more than onemodality, usually directly related to the content of the episode recalled. The visualimages tended to be more dynamic and to be experienced with a context. About two-thirds of the specific visual images were experienced from the original point of view.

Recollective Memory—Old. The data for recollective memory for older events isremarkably similar to that for recent memories. In the larger context of the differentforms of memory studied in this experiment it appears that the important variable isthe different forms of memory examined, not the age of the recollective memories.In fact, the similarity of the data for the two forms of recollection across the variousvariables gives a fairly good indicator of the reliability of the procedures used in thisstudy. Clearly the data do not support Nigro and Neisser’s (1983) hypothesis thatolder recollective memories should show a higher percentage of observer point ofview. Within the overall similarity there does appear to be a consistent tendencyacross the data for the older recollective memories to be somewhat less vivid thanthe more recent recollective memories.

Motor Skill. Relatively few images were experienced when the participants werecarrying out a practiced motor skill (in 63% of the cases there were no imageryreports of any kind). We assume that this is an overestimate of the true rate becauseour motor tasks were relatively discrete and we think that a long series of repetitivemotor tasks would show even less imagery. The item analysis showed that the imagesthat did occur were various forms of associations, recollections, and restatements ofthe question.

Motor—Declarative. Requesting answers to questions for information that is typi-cally expressed as a motor skill gave dramatically different data from the simple

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operation of a motor skill. This form of question almost always gave rise to imagery(there was some form of imagery in 97% of the cases). The imagery that did occurtended to be very vivid, to be generic, and to occur in the motor and the visualmodalities. It seems to us that the data support the view that in order to obtain theinformation to answer this type of question the participants had to generate the motormovement in imaginal form. This analysis is supported by our examination of thetwo instances where participants used overt motor movements to answer the ques-tions—there was no reported imagery in either of these cases.

Rote Skill. In our earlier discussions of the phenomenal experience involved incarrying out various forms of memory tasks (Brewer & Pani, 1983) we were a littleuncertain about what to say about rote memory, though we tended to think of it asoccurring without much imagery. Our data for this form of memory appear to besomewhat mixed. Rote memory questions give rise to imagery in about half the cases.One could argue that some of the images were involved in answering the questions(e.g., visual images of their University identification card when asked their socialsecurity number). However, the item analysis suggested that many of these imageswere due to various forms of irrelevant associations and recollective memories.

Rote—Declarative. Answering declarative questions that require information thatis stored in rote form produces a much higher rate of imagery than does overtlycarrying out the rote task. The Rote—Declarative questions gave rise to experiencedimagery in 91% of the cases. In our 1983 chapter we were not explicit about theimagery modality expected for rote memory, but it seems likely that we thought thatmuch of the imagery would be auditory. In fact, the data for this category are consis-tently higher in auditory imagery than any of the other categories. However, evenfor this high auditory category, the auditory dominance is only 38% and visual imagesstill predominate. The images that do occur are almost all general and the visualimages are almost all without context.

Cognitive Skill. While carrying out a cognitive skill roughly half of the participantsreported some form of imagery, though only 31% showed vivid imagery. The itemanalysis of the vivid images showed that most of these were recollections and re-statements of the question.

Cognitive—Declarative. Asking questions that require declarative answers aboutcognitive procedural information elicits some form of imagery in 94% of the in-stances. Over half of the images that occurred contained at least one vivid image andthe events described tended to be general (87%). On most of the remaining measuresthese items tended to have intermediate scores.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results of this study have some clear implications for the role of phenomenaldata in psychology. Over the years many writers have either denied the existence ofimages (Watson, 1914) or argued that images are too variable or inconsistent for usein experimental psychology (e.g., Brown, 1958; see Pani, 1996, for a detailed discus-sion of these issues). We have shown that there are several long-term memory tasks(Generic Perceptual, Recollective, Motor—Declarative) that produce essentially uni-versal imagery reports with an undergraduate population. It seems unlikely that our


results are due to some bias in our procedures that lead to reports of imagery giventhat the data are the result of a manipulation of the types of memory retrieved andin other tasks (Motor Skill, Rote Skill) the same individuals who gave the extremelyrobust imagery data reported no images for the majority of their retrievals.

Overall, the data provide strong support for the analysis of the structure of humanmemory outlined in Brewer and Pani (1983). In that chapter we argued that imagerywould occur during retrievals from long-term memory for Generic Perceptual Mem-ory, Recollective Memory, Motor Skill—Declarative, Rote Skill—Declarative, andCognitive Skill—Declarative. We also argued that little imagery would result duringretrievals from Semantic Memory, Motor Skill, Rote Skill, and Cognitive Skill. Thepattern of data provide clear support for these predictions. For the index of the occur-rence of any image or any vivid image all of the predicted high image conditionsshow higher imagery than do the conditions predicted to have low imagery. On theoverall image measure the mean for the conditions predicted to show high imageryis somewhat more than double the mean for the conditions predicted to show littleimagery (1.93 versus 0.80). Many of the individual predictions were also supported.The images reported for Generic Perceptual Memory tended to be nonspecific andto be restricted to the visual modality. The images reported for Recollective memorytended to be specific. There was a relatively high proportion of motor images forthe Motor Skill—Declarative condition and a relatively high proportion of auditoryimagery for the Rote Skill—Declarative condition.

On the other hand, there were also a number of unpredicted findings. In general,there was more imagery than we expected in the low imagery conditions (SemanticMemory, Motor Skill, Rote Skill, and Cognitive Skill). Our item analysis of the vividimage responses for these categories suggested that a large proportion of this imagerywas due to associations, recollective memories, and reinstatements of the question.Examination of the data for image modality also shows a stronger visual componentthan we expected. While there was a relatively high occurrence of motor imageryfor Motor Skill—Declarative and a relatively high occurrence of auditory imageryfor Rote Skill—Declarative, in both cases there was also considerable visual imag-ery. Thus, it appears that when the participants reported motor imagery they alsoexperienced a visual image of the motor task. Finally, our data on point of view forrecollective memories did not support Nigro and Neisser’s (1983) suggestion thatrecollective memories from older events show more observer images.

In our 1983 chapter we argued that data based on reports of phenomenal experiencemust be included in a complete psychology of the mind. It seems to us that the reliableand systematic data we have gathered for imagery during retrieval from long-termmemory is a good example of the type of data that must be incorporated in explana-tory accounts of human memory. This leads to the very difficult question of thepossible causal role of these imagery reports in the memory retrieval task. Given thatour data are descriptive, they cannot provide an answer to that question. However,it seems to us very likely that for Motor Skill—Declarative, Rote Skill—Declarative,and Cognitive Skill—Declarative the experienced image is serving as a link in thecausal path to producing the memory retrieval. We feel that the same may be truefor Generic Perceptual Memory and Recollective Memory. In order to make progresson the issue of the causal status of the imagery in these forms of memory retrieval

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it will be necessary to supplement descriptive data from phenomenal experience withadditional research using other techniques such as modality interference (e.g., Sims &Hegarty, in press) and investigating individuals with imagery deficits (e.g., Farah,1988; Kosslyn, 1994).

APPENDIX: ITEMS

Semantic Memory

1A. What is the opposite of falsehood?1B. What is the opposite of theory?1C. What part of speech is used to substitute for a noun in English?1D. Which is faster, the speed of light or the speed of sound?1E. What word means the same thing as concept?

Semantic Memory—Association

2A. What is the capital of France?2B. What is the opposite of clean?2C. What happens to water below 0 degrees centigrade?2D. Which recent president was almost impeached?2E. What planet is closest to the sun?

Generic Perceptual Memory

3A. Which is farther south, the tip of Florida or the tip of Texas?3B. Which hand does the Statue of Liberty hold the torch in?3C. How many places do lines meet in a capital M?3D. What object is shown on the back of a nickel?3E. What shape are a German Shepherd’s ears?

Recollective Memory—Recent

4A. What was the first thing you had to drink today?4B. What came to mind when you first noticed what the weather was today?4C. Where was the first person you saw when you came in the building today?4D. Who was the last person you talked to, before me?4E. Where were you the last time you spent cash for something?

Recollective Memory—Old

5A. Who were you with the first time you drove a car?5B. Where did you take the A.C.T.’s?5C. What was the first rock concert you went to?5D. What was the last sporting event you went to in high school?5E. Where were you the first time you rode a bike?


Motor Skill

6A. Type this sentence. (Handwritten prop: ‘‘The basic entity is truth.’’) (Aftertyping) As you typed this letter (point to the ‘‘r’’ in ‘‘truth’’) . . . .

6B. Type this sentence for me. (Handwritten prop: ‘‘The predominant aspect isquality.’’) (After typing) As you typed this letter (point to the ‘‘a’’ in‘‘quality’’) . . . .

6C. Copy this in your own handwriting. (Typed prop: ‘‘There is an unreality.’’)(After writing) As you wrote this letter (point to the ‘‘i’’ in ‘‘unreality’’) . . . .

6D. Copy this in your own handwriting. (Typed prop: ‘‘There is an hypothesis.’’)(After writing) As you wrote this letter (point to the ‘‘t’’ in ‘‘hypothesis’’) . . . .

6E. Tie this shoelace for me. (Prop: An untied shoe) As you made the secondloop . . . .

Motor Skill—Declarative

7A. (Use same prop as 6A) If you were to type this out, what finger would youtype this letter with (point to the ‘‘r’’ in ‘‘truth’’)?

7B. (Use same prop as 6B) If you were to type this out, what finger would youtype this letter with (point to the ‘‘a’’ in ‘‘quality’’)?

7C. (Use same prop as 6C) If you were to write this sentence in your own handwrit-ing, would you dot this ‘‘i’’ (point to the ‘‘i’’ in ‘‘unreality’’) before or afteryou finished writing the rest of the word?

7D. (Use same prop as 6D) If you were to write this sentence in your own handwrit-ing, would you cross this ‘‘t’’ (point to the ‘‘t’’ in ‘‘hypothesis’’) before orafter you finished writing the rest of the word?

7E. When you tie a shoe, does the second loop you make end up on the right orthe left?

Rote Skill

8A. What do we call the familiarity, awareness, understanding, acquaintance withfacts?

8B. What is seven times three?8C. What is your social security number?8D. Say the alphabet until I tell you to stop. (Stop at H) As you said the ‘‘G’’ . . . .8E. Finish this phrase for me. Where there’s a will, there’s a .

Rote Skill—Declarative

9A. I’m going to give you the definition of something. I want you to give me thefourth letter of the word that stands for what I define. So, what is the fourthletter of the word that stands for familiarity, awareness, understanding, acquain-tance with facts?

9B. What is the last numeral in the product of seven times three?9C. How many numbers are there in your social security number?9D. What is the seventh letter in the alphabet?

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9E. Tell me the last letter in the word that finishes this phrase: Where there’s awill, there’s a .

Cognitive Skill

10A. Add up these numbers for me. (Prop: vertically written 41 1 52 and a pencil)10B. Add up these numbers for me. (Prop: vertically written 62 1 23 and a pencil)10C. Let’s do some algebra. Write down what ‘‘x’’ would be. (Prop: ax 5 b written

over x 5 and a pencil)10D. Finish this sentence: An academic year is made up of two .10E. I’m going to start a statement, and you give me the word that finishes it: A

while ago I saw a new thing and somebody said it was a Niz. Recently I sawa lot of that thing and somebody said, ‘‘Those are called .’’

Cognitive Skill—Declarative

11A. What is the sum of forty-one and fifty-two?11B. What is the sum of sixty-two and twenty-three?11C. Let’s do some algebra. If ax 5 b, what does x 5?11D. What are the last three letters of the word that finishes this sentence: An aca-

demic year is made up of two .11E. I’m going to start a statement, and I want you to give me the last three letters

of the word that finishes the statement: A while ago I saw a new thing andsomebody said it was a Niz. Recently I saw a lot of that thing and somebodysaid ‘‘Those are called .’’

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Carolyn Mervis for much help with earlier data analyses and Ellen Brewer for her invaluable helpin later cross-Atlantic data analyses.

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Received March 26, 1996

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Reports of Mental Imagery in Retrieval from Long-Term Memory