Responding to Terrorism Victims · 2020-06-08 · terrorism victims. This report focuses primarily on how criminal justice agencies and victim assistance professionals can assist

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office for Victims of Crime


Advocating for the Fair Treatment of Crime Victims


Advocating for the Fair Treatment of Crime Victims

Responding to Terrorism Victims


Oklahoma City and BeyondOklahoma City and Beyond

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Preparation of this document was funded by the Office for Victims ofCrime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The doc-ument is based on interviews with those tasked with assisting the victimsof the Oklahoma City bombing in the investigative and prosecutorialphases of the criminal justice system. The opinions, findings, and con-clusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those ofthe authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of theU.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street NW.Washington, DC 20531

Janet RenoAttorney General

Daniel MarcusActing Associate Attorney General

Mary Lou LearyActing Assistant Attorney General

Kathryn M. TurmanDirector, Office for Victims of Crime

Office of Justice ProgramsWorld Wide Web Home Page

www.ojp.usdoj.gov

Office for Victims of Crime World Wide Web Home Page

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc

For grant and funding information contactU.S. Department of Justice Response Center

1–800–421–6770

OVC Resource Center1–800–627–6872

OVC Resource Center Home Pagewww.ncjrs.org

The Office for Victims of Crime is a component of the Office of Justice Programs,which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics,the National Institute of Justice, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and DelinquencyPrevention.

NCJ 183949


Oklahoma City and Beyond

U.S. Department of Justice • Office of Justice Programs • Office for Victims of Crime

October 2000NCJ 183949

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About the Cover

The missing presence of the 168 killed in the Alfred P. Murrah Building bombing is marked by 168 chairs in a me-morial park where the building once stood. Although the chairs are similar in overall appearance, each was individu-ally handcrafted so no two chairs are exactly alike, and each is etched with the name of a victim who was killed.Some chairs are small, representing the children who died. The seat backs were cast from molten bronze and sit onbases made of glass. The glass bases house lighting mechanisms so that the chairs glow at night.

Photo courtesy of the Oklahoma City National Memorial Foundation.

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Message From the Director

E very violent crime has a significant and long-lasting impact on surviving victims and families ofvictims. Acts of terrorism resulting in mass casualties have a wide and traumatic impact on com-munities and nations. Indeed, that impact is the primary goal of terrorists. In recent years, it has

become clear that United State citizens are not immune from these crimes, either at home or outsidethe borders of this country.

The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City literally brought homethe impact of terrorism for Americans. Individuals and agencies responded in extraordinary ways in theaftermath of the bombing and throughout the criminal trials. No model was in place, however, to guidethem in how to respond to and what to expect from victims of terrorism. Their response has since set astandard for others to follow in responding to victims of future terrorist events including the bombingof the military barracks at Khobar Towers in 1996 and the bombings of two United States embassies inKenya and Tanzania in 1998. In addition, the preparations for the Oklahoma City bombing trial phasehelped to anticipate the complex issues that developed with the 1999 trial preparations for the twoLibyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC)has marshaled resources and creatively used new technologies to ensure that families of the 270 victimshave information and assistance throughout the trial process.

The potential numbers of victims and the consequences of terrorist events present significant chal-lenges and require an extraordinary response from public safety and law enforcement agencies.Experience has taught us that the physical, emotional, and psychological impact on victims and com-munities persists long after the immediate crisis has been handled. Preparing for acts of mass violencehas become an important priority for federal, state, and local officials, and ongoing efforts to developcomprehensive response plans among agencies are occurring at all levels of government. The needs ofvictims and their families, beginning with the immediate crisis and continuing through the criminaljustice process and beyond, must be incorporated into the planning process.

Each act of terrorism presents unique challenges that are specific to the victims, the event itself, andthe progress of the criminal investigation and prosecution. Providing services to the victims of each ter-rorism event teaches additional and important lessons for responding to future events and expands ourbase of knowledge for serving victims more effectively. Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma Cityand Beyond attempts to summarize those lessons and to recommend plans for responding to the needs ofterrorism victims. This report focuses primarily on how criminal justice agencies and victim assistanceprofessionals can assist victims of terrorism and on how the roles and responsibilities of these agenciesand individuals fit into the overall response to victims.

A number of individuals involved in the provision of services to the Oklahoma City bombing victimscontributed their insights and experiences to this report in addition to OVC staff, who have been di-rectly involved in working with victims of other acts of terrorism. Underlying their insights and effortshave been the voices of the surviving victims and families of the victims of Oklahoma City, KhobarTowers, the embassy bombings, and Pan Am Flight 103. These victims have honored us by sharingtheir experiences of coping with the aftermath of the crimes that devastated their lives. In turn, we canhonor them by ensuring that our communities are adequately prepared to respond effectively to terrorismvictims in the future.

Kathryn M. TurmanDirector

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Acknowledgments

I mproving the response to terrorism victims is a work in progress. The foundation was laid by thededicated and resourceful individuals who responded to the victims of the bombing of the Alfred P.Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Their extraordinary work on behalf of victims and vic-

tims’ families in Oklahoma City and Denver set a standard for other cases that followed and for futureterrorist events. The Office for Victims of Crime is deeply grateful to them for sharing their experiencesthrough countless hours of interviews for the development of this report. We take this opportunity tohonor them for their remarkable service to the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing and to recognizethe impact their efforts will have on the response to victims in the future.

Gwen AllenExecutive Director, Project Heartland

K. Lynn AndersonAssistant United States Attorney, U.S.Attorney’s Office for the Western Districtof Oklahoma

Suzanne BreedloveDirector, Victim Services, Oklahoma DistrictAttorneys Council

Mary Anne CastellanoVictim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the District of Colorado

Robin FineganDirector, Colorado Oklahoma Resource Council

Krista R. FlanniganDirector, Colorado Oklahoma Resource Council

Joan GayVictim-Witness Assistance Unit, U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the District of Kansas

Candace GroszFormer Planning/Grants Specialist, Office forVictims Programs, Colorado Department ofPublic Safety

James M. HornDirector, Forensic Behavioral ScienceConsulting/Training

Jeannette KingAdministrator, Critical Incident WorkshopGroup, Inc.

Dahlia LehmanVictim-Witness Assistance SupervisoryCoordinator, U.S. Attorney’s Office for theWestern District of Oklahoma

Diane LeonardFormer Administrator, Critical IncidentWorkshop Group, Inc.

Carol MorrisVictim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the Southern District of Indiana

Jim NormanPsychologist, Project Heartland

Col. Jack PoeChief of Chaplains, Oklahoma City PoliceDepartment

Patrick RyanFormer United States Attorney, U.S.Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Oklahoma

Steve SiegelDirector of Program Development, DenverVictim Assistance and Law Enforcement Board

Mary Jo SpeakerVictim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the Eastern District of Oklahoma

Gayla StewartVictim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the Northern District of Oklahoma

Linda WagnerPsychologist, Project Heartland

Several individuals were instrumental in the development of this report. Janet Dinsmore, writer and ed-itor, conducted the interviews and organized the story of the Oklahoma City victim response. Her effortswere supported and guided by OVC Deputy Director Carolyn Hightower and OVC Program ManagerLaura Federline, who was responsible for overseeing OVC funding to the various agencies providingservices to the bombing victims.

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Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix

I. Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

II. The Immediate Crisis Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3The Initial Incident Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3Victim Support Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Compassion Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4Resource Coordination Committee (Unmet Needs Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5Crisis Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Death Notification and Recovery of Remains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6Donations of Services and Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

III. Postcrisis Victim Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Ongoing Victim Needs and Vicarious Victimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Employee Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8Project Heartland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Streamlining Procedures To File for Claim Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9U.S. Attorney’s Office Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Identification and Notification of Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10Victim-Witness Assistance Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11Attorney Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

IV. The Criminal Pretrial and Trial Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Challenges to Victims’ Rights and Services as a Result of Change of Venue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Travel Assistance to Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14Denver-Based Support Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Victims’ Rights and Services During the Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Closed-Circuit Television Broadcasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Explanation of Trial Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17The Victim-Witness Center, Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17Mental Health Support and the Safe Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

V. Long-term Victim Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Ongoing Mental Health Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Assistance to First Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20Restitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20Postconviction Notification of Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

VI. Legal Issues Pertaining to Victims of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23Funding Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23Victims’ Rights During the Criminal Justice Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23Privacy Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

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Respondingto TerrorismVictims:Oklahoma Cityand Beyond

VII. Recent International Terrorism Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27Bombing of Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, June 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27Bombings of United States Embassies, Kenya and Tanzania, August 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Lockerbie, Scotland, December 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

VIII. Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

IX. Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31State and Local Victim Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31Federal Victim Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

X. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

Bibliography/References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Interviewees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

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Executive Summary

T he April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P.Murrah Federal Building (Murrah Building)in Oklahoma City sent shock waves

throughout America. This event was the mostdevastating incident of domestic terrorism in ourNation’s history. The shock of this terrorist actwas magnified by its location—the very centerof our country. “This is the place, after all,where terrorists don’t venture. The Heartland.Wednesday [April 19] changed everything” (TheDaily Oklahoman, April 20, 1995). The effect ofthe bombing was far reaching—extending wellbeyond the borders of Oklahoma. It created mass casualties and injuries, affecting not only the im-mediate victims, survivors, and the OklahomaCity community but also the entire Nation.

In recent years, the Federal Government has beencalled upon to play a larger role in mitigating andresponding to all types of human-caused violentevents and disasters. The federal responsibilityranges from immediate disaster relief to long-termassistance that helps communities to recover fromthe event. Moreover, because terrorist acts arefederal crimes, investigated and prosecuted by fed-eral law enforcement officials, federal criminaljustice agencies have statutory responsibilities re-lated to victims’ rights and services in connectionwith terrorism criminal cases. This range of re-sponsibilities raises the issue of the FederalGovernment’s preparedness to respond to actsof terrorism and the resulting emotional and psy-chological impacts. Lessons learned from theOklahoma City bombing response provide a foun-dation for recommendations to improve planningfor services to victims of terrorism in the future,keeping in mind that planning must be flexible tomeet the unique circumstances involved in eachincident. For example, the demands to provideservices to victims overseas or to victims who arenot from the location of the criminal event posedifferent challenges from those raised by theOklahoma City bombing. Analysis of the

Oklahoma City bombing and other large terrorismevents the Federal Government has responded toover the years reveals a consistent progression ofvictim assistance challenges for federal agencieswith responsibilities in those situations:

1. The immediate crisis must be handled.

2. Postcrisis victim needs must be met.

3. Victims’ rights and services must be providedduring any criminal justice process.

4. Long-term victim needs must be recognizedand provided for as they emerge over time.

This report identifies the special measures neededto protect the rights and meet the needs of vic-tims of a large-scale terrorist attack involvingmass casualties. In particular, it demonstrates ef-forts required to ensure an effective response tovictims’ rights and their short- and long-termemotional and psychological needs as an integralpart of a comprehensive response to terrorismcases involving mass casualties. This report doesnot attempt to portray a complete picture ofeverything that was done for the victims, and therecommendations are not intended to present acomprehensive plan for addressing the needs ofvictims. It is a place to begin, based upon the ex-periences of OVC in working with victims andproviding resources for assistance.

The primary sources for the information and rec-ommendations presented in this report are inter-views and meetings with victims and staff of thefollowing organizations that were supported bygrants from the Office for Victims of Crime(OVC) Emergency Reserve Fund:

✦ United States Attorney’s Office for the WesternDistrict of Oklahoma: The Federal Govern-ment office responsible for prosecuting thecase and ensuring the provision of victims’

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incorporate OVC’s experience working with ter-rorism victims including those from the KhobarTowers bombing in 1996, the bombing of theUnited States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in1998, and the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing forthe trial that began in May 2000.

These recommendations are addressed to thosewho are responsible for victim assistance reforms,including criminal justice policymakers in the ex-ecutive and judicial branches of the FederalGovernment, state legislators, and city and coun-ty administrators. The report should also provevaluable to prosecutors, law enforcement officials,victim advocates, mental health providers, and allothers involved in victim-witness assistance efforts.Its attention to the importance of preplanningand coordination among responding agencies hasimplications for any agency committed to servingthe needs of crime victims.

The report begins with background informationaddressing the victims’ needs that emerged duringthe immediate crisis of the Oklahoma City bomb-ing, the postcrisis victim needs after the immedi-ate crisis was dealt with, victims’ needs during thecriminal justice process, and the long-term victimneeds that developed over time. These sectionsare followed by a discussion of the laws that re-quire victims’ rights and services to be a part ofany crisis response plan. The final sections identi-fy the lessons learned as a result of the OklahomaCity bombing and the other terrorism eventsthat followed it and present policy recommenda-tions that promote future preparedness. All ofthese criminal events have raised the followingquestions:

✦ What are the needs of the victims, the firstresponders, and others who come into con-tact with the victims and/or the first res-ponders (e.g., prosecutors, mental healthprofessionals, and family members of thefirst responders)?

✦ What are the legal requirements for respond-ing to victims of terrorism?

✦ What are the chief obstacles to meeting vic-tims’ needs (e.g., privacy issues versus the


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rights and services as outlined in federal lawand the 1995 Attorney General Guidelines forVictim and Witness Assistance. The efforts ofthe Western District were later supplement-ed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for theDistrict of Colorado. The Victim-WitnessAssistance Unit in the U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the Western District of Oklahomaworked with the prosecution team in bothlocations to establish policies and proceduresfor the trials.

✦ Project Heartland, Oklahoma City: An organi-zation established by the Oklahoma Depart-ment of Mental Health and SubstanceAbuse Services to coordinate and delivermental health services for bombing victims.

✦ Colorado Oklahoma Resource Council, Denver:A broad-based public-private coalition thatcoordinated services for victims throughoutthe trials in Denver.

✦ Critical Incident Workshop Group, Inc.,Oklahoma: An organization created to pro-vide therapeutic debriefing sessions for fami-lies of deceased bombing victims, survivors,and rescue-and-recovery workers.

✦ Oklahoma State Crime Victim CompensationProgram: A state agency that provided finan-cial assistance with funding support fromOVC to crime victims for crime-related ex-penses such as funeral costs, medical and

mental health expenses, and lost wages.

Policy recommendations from the abovegroups, in some cases, were broadened to

“Crime is a shattering experience. . . . It can destroy aperson’s sense of safety and security. Of paramount im-portance to crime victims and witnesses is their treat-ment by criminal justice personnel, who should careabout their suffering, enforce their rights and protec-tions, offer support to help them heal, and hold thecriminal accountable for the harm caused.”

—Attorney General Janet Reno

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Based on the recommendations thatform these last sections, OVC hopes thatpublic officials will be better informed andable to develop more effective procedures forresponding to future acts of terrorism.

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Executive Summary

need for victim contact information regard-ing the criminal justice process, change ofvenue, and victim services)?

✦ What are the unique needs of terrorism vic-tims abroad as identified in the KhobarTowers and East Africa bombings and trial as-sistance for the Pan Am Flight 103 families?

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T he bombing of the Murrah Building took itstoll in human life and property damage andchanged the community’s and the Nation’s

general sense of safety and security. The blastkilled 167 men, women, and children and injured853 others (Oklahoma Department of MentalHealth and Substance Abuse Services, May 31,1998). A volunteer nurse became the 168th fatal-ity when falling debris struck her as she respondedto the emergency. The explosion rocked down-town Oklahoma City, reduced the north face ofthe Murrah Building to rubble, and dealt exten-sive damage to each of the nine floors as they col-lapsed into the center, pancaking one on top ofthe other. When the dust cleared, one-third ofthe building lay in ruins. The force of the blastdamaged 324 surrounding buildings, overturnedautomobiles, touched off car fires, and blew outwindows and doors in a 50-block area. News re-ports indicated the explosion was felt 55 milesfrom the site and registered 6.0 on the Richterscale.

Nineteen children, many in a second floor day-care center, died in the Murrah Building’s col-lapse. Thirty children were orphaned. A total of219 children lost a parent. More than 400 indi-viduals were left homeless in the area. Seventhousand people lost their workplace and some16,000 people were downtown at the time of theexplosion (Oklahoma Department of MentalHealth and Substance Abuse Services, May 31,1998). It is estimated 360,000 Oklahomans knewsomeone personally who worked in the MurrahBuilding (Oklahoma Department of Mental

Chapter 1

Bombing of the Alfred P.Murrah Federal Building

“The bombing in Oklahoma City was an attack on inno-cent children and defenseless citizens. It was an act ofcowardice, and it was evil.”

—President Bill Clinton

Health and Substance Abuse Services, May 31,1998). To compound the devastation the bombinghad on the primary victims, unimaginable psycho-logical and emotional impacts from the 16-dayrescue-and-recovery effort took its toll on second-ary victims including law enforcement and fire department personnel and Urban Search andRescue (US&R) team members.

At the time the bomb was detonated, numerousfederal agencies had offices in the Murrah Building:Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF);Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Armyand Marine recruiting offices; Department ofVeterans Affairs; General Accounting Office;U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;U.S. Department of Defense; U.S. CustomsService; U.S. Department of Agriculture; U.S.Department of Transportation; and GeneralServices Administration. The Federal EmployeesCredit Union and “America’s Kids” Child CareDevelopment Center were also housed in thebuilding. When the catastrophe occurred, about600 federal and contract workers and about250 visitors were in the building (OklahomaDepartment of Civil Emergency Management,1996).

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Chapter II

The Immediate Crisis Response

The Initial Incident Response

W ithin minutes of the blast, a massivesearch-and-rescue effort commenced thatincluded fire, emergency, medical, and law

enforcement personnel, as well as a large numberof citizens. Citizens and emergency personneljoined together and entered the bombed structure,forming human chains to locate and remove

trapped survivors and victims. In fact, throughoutthis rescue effort, the large outpouring of citizensand agency volunteers astonished veteran rescueworkers.

The strong State and Federal Government pres-ence in Oklahoma City helped the response-and-rescue effort. For example, immediately following

A Summary of Victims’ Needs During the ImmediateCrisis

The immediate response to the bombing en-compassed the search-and-recovery effortthat lasted through May 4 and centered uponthe need for information about the identity and status of victims and emergency support.The following victims’ needs quickly becameevident:

✧ A crisis response plan for identifying andassisting victims of criminal incidents caus-ing mass casualties that is linked to anoverall system for responding to acts ofterrorism.

✧ A mechanism for providing informationto families about their loved ones and toprovide comfort and protection from themedia.

✧ A system for gathering pertinent informa-tion from families necessary to facilitatethe identification of remains, for relayinginformation about the remains of a lovedone, and for providing counseling services

during the process of recovering and iden-tifying remains.

✧ A system of death notification that en-sures that victims receive informationabout their loved ones before the mediabroadcast this information and that takesinto consideration the wishes of the familyand the safety and care of family membersonce they receive notification.

✧ Mental health care service providers withexperience and training in working withvictims, their families, and others impactedby mass-casualty crimes.

✧ Awareness of financial, technical assis-tance, and training resources for meetingthe needs of terrorism victims.

✧ A system for providing for first respon-ders’ physical and emotional needs,including regular communication with family members.

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the explosion, the Oklahoma City Fire Depart-ment set up an Incident Command System (ICS)to manage the intensive search-and-rescue missionand massive influx of federal, state, local, and vol-untary agency resources (Oklahoma Departmentof Civil Emergency Management, 1996). Also,working together, the local police department, thecounty sheriff, and state and federal agencies han-dled traffic and security. By 9:25 a.m., 23 minutesafter the blast, the State Emergency OperationsCenter was operational and included representa-tives from the state departments of public safety,human services, military, health, and education.Soon joining these agencies were the NationalWeather Service, the Civil Air Patrol, and theAmerican Red Cross (ARC).

Within an hour and a half of the bombing,President Clinton announced the signing ofEmergency Declaration FEMA–3113–EM–OKunder title V provisions of the Robert T. StaffordDisaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act[PL 93–288]. This signing and declaration ofemergency gave the Federal Government primaryresponsibility to respond to the disaster and au-thorized full reimbursement for all eligible responsemissions performed by state and local government.

President Clinton’s declaration that OklahomaCity was a federal disaster area automatically trig-gered ARC to act as the lead agency in providingfood, shelter, first aid, relief supplies, and welfareinformation. Approximately 665 rescue teammembers were sent immediately by the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) toOklahoma City.

The swift response in Oklahoma City of publicand private agencies at all levels of governmentdemonstrated how critical it is for those agenciesto work collaboratively in responding to the crisiscreated by a mass-casualty incident. This type ofplanning and coordination is just as critical toidentifying and meeting the needs of victims.

Victim Support ServicesThe needs of victims and family members im-

mediately following the bombing wereacute and urgent. Some of the support

services that were mobilized to assist victimscame in the form of the Compassion Center(later becoming Project Heartland), the ResourceCoordination Committee (Unmet NeedsCommittee), and crisis intervention.

Compassion Center

The Compassion Center (the Center), a familyassistance center, was operational by 3:30 p.m. onthe afternoon of the bombing. The Center, ini-tially set up by the Office of the Chief MedicalExaminer and the Oklahoma Funeral DirectorsAssociation, provided approximately 20 funeraldirectors to greet families and gather predeathand antemortem information (American Psycho-logical Association, July 1997). By the next day,April 20, the American Red Cross was operatingthe Center serving victims and families. TheCenter also was supported by the hundreds of localclergy, police and military chaplains, and mentalhealth professionals from across the Nation. Otheragencies sharing support responsibilities for theCenter included the county sheriff’s office, theOklahoma National Guard, the Salvation Army,Tinker Air Force Base, and the U.S. Departmentof Veterans Affairs. The Center was located in theFirst Christian Church in downtown OklahomaCity because of its proximity to the bombing site,the size and floor plan of the building, and ade-quate parking for about 1,200 vehicles.1

Immediately, the Compassion Center put policiesin place to limit media intrusion upon those whowanted privacy, while allowing access to the sur-vivors and family members who wanted to speakwith the press. Mental health care and ARC public affairs specialists briefed individuals beforeinterviews, escorted them to interviews, and de-briefed them afterward to reduce the possibilityof retraumatization.

The Center was a place to exchange information.First, the families themselves provided detailed in-formation, photographs, and medical/dentalrecords to identify loved ones who were still miss-ing. Second, as a humanitarian effort, the Centerprovided information about emergency services,mental health counseling, security, and comfortfor victims and surviving family members. TheOffice of the Chief Medical Examiner and a liaison

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Resource CoordinationCommittee (Unmet NeedsCommittee)

Recognizing the need for an umbrella groupthat would pool information and help coordinatefunding for victim services, approximately 20agencies convened in May 1995. Known both asthe Resource Coordination Committee and theUnmet Needs Committee, the group quickly grewto encompass 80 agencies. Representatives metweekly to determine and help fill unmet victimneeds stemming from the bombing. This groupcontinues to meet 5 years later to review requestsfrom victims, survivors, family members, and dis-aster workers and allocates a decreasing supply of funds.

From its beginning, the Committee focused onfilling service gaps—many services concerned fi-nancial and leave benefits and the many needscreated by the bombing that insurance did notcover including shattered windshields, car repairs,babysitter costs for children whose center was de-stroyed, and eyeglasses. In response to a floodof inquiries about access to benefits and legal entitlements, the Attorney Liaison from theU.S. Attorney’s Office worked closely with theCommittee and numerous victims throughout thefirst year to find attorneys who could provide probono legal counseling and troubleshoot benefitproblems with agency bureaucracies.

Crisis Intervention

Federal authorities immediately recognized thebombing’s traumatic impact on surviving victims,family members, rescue workers, allied profession-als, and the community-at-large. By the end ofthe first day, April 19, 1995, OVC placed a nine-member crisis intervention team on the groundin Oklahoma to work with both the victims andthe people responding to the disaster. The team,composed of professionals from across the country,met with victims and trained law enforcementofficials, emergency services personnel, clergy,medical professionals, and school officials.2 OtherFederal and State agencies sent personnel to pro-vide assistance.

5

The Immediate Crisis Response

from the Governor of Oklahoma provided twicedaily updates to the victims’ families on the rescue-and-recovery efforts. The “family room” set up inthe Center protected relatives from the additionaltrauma of media intrusions. The family roomalso offered special areas where people could re-ceive messages, eat meals, and use donated long-distance phone services.

During its 16 days of operation, the Center servedthousands of victims, survivors, family members,and rescue workers seeking news, information,and solace. Daily, some 400 mental health profes-sionals participated in support, death notification,and staffing mental health services at the Center(Oklahoma Department of Civil EmergencyManagement, 1996). Within 48 hours, a need fora child mental health specialist on the death noti-fication teams was recognized. Following the deathnotification, parents and other family membersoften had questions about what to tell their chil-dren, how children at various ages might react,and how to manage their own grief in front oftheir children (American PsychologicalAssociation, July 1997).

As stress and work took their toll on rescue per-sonnel, crisis intervention on their behalf becamenecessary. When rescue workers switched fromsaving lives to retrieving bodies and body parts,separate staff were provided to offer stress man-agement services. More than 12,000 volunteerand professional rescue personnel were involvedin the rescue operation. Compassion Center staffalso recognized that many media representativeswere becoming secondary victims experiencinglong work hours, competing intensely for stories,and undergoing prolonged exposure to the bombsite, shattered survivors, and stressed rescuers.

When the Center closed, Governor FrankKeating named the Oklahoma Department ofMental Health and Substance Abuse Services(ODMHSAS) as the lead agency to coordinateand conduct mental health crisis response ser-vices. The Center became Project Heartland onMay 15, 1995, and was supported by grants fromFEMA and the Office for Victims of Crime(OVC). Project Heartland continued to providean extensive array of victim services.

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or “common” body tissue results. In the case ofOklahoma City, families waited until December1999 for a memorial service and interment of thecommon tissue due to a judicial order delayingburial until attorneys settled legal evidence ques-tions and until the victims had the opportunityto voice their intentions about how and wherethe remains were to be buried.3

Donations of Services andSuppliesIn the aftermath of the bombing, the donationsfor victims and rescue workers from organizationsand individuals were overwhelming. Donationspoured in from fellow Oklahomans and from citi-zens across the Nation. Citizens donated approxi-mately $14 million to the Oklahoma CityDisaster Relief Fund. Storage and inventory con-trol of the massive amounts of contributions leftat drop-off locations became a major logisticalproblem. Nearby streets were crowded with pri-vate cars, commercial tractor-trailers, pickuptrucks, and other vehicles loaded with goods rang-ing from wheelbarrows to football helmets. ARCreceived $15 million for its relief work with thebombing victims (Kriner, April 20, 2000). Later,special purpose funds—such as the fund for vic-tims’ travel to Denver—also attracted generouscontributions from private citizens, corporations,and a huge range of organizations, large and small.

The creation of the Murrah Fund by the state leg-islature was necessary to allow the OklahomaCrime Victim Compensation Program to acceptpublic and private donations that would assist thevictims and provide additional flexibility to theprogram to pay lost wages and cover grief counsel-ing for family members of the victims. In additionto using $129,363 in state funds to assist victimswith medical and mental health expenses, funeraland burial costs, and lost wages, the compensationprogram received $100,000 in donated funds fromthe Iowa crime victim compensation programand supplemental federal grants totaling roughly$70,000 from OVC. In total, the special MurrahFund received more than $300,000 in funding tohelp compensate the bombing victims.

Death Notification andRecovery of RemainsThe difficulty in recovering and positively identi-fying the bodies of the bombing victims delayedofficial death notifications to the families. In addi-tion, the need to collect evidence from the bodiesand conduct autopsies meant that families experi-enced further delays in the release of the remainsand the ability to proceed with funerals. Thesedelays were unavoidable and not unique to theOklahoma City bombing case, but it was criticalthat victims’ families received adequate explana-tions for delays in notification and the release ofbodies, including information about the legal re-quirement to conduct autopsies in all homicidecases. When some families objected to the autop-sy process, counselors explained the importance ofthe autopsy in collecting important evidence andin answering any questions families may have inthe future about the cause of death. In addition,as many surviving family members looked backlater, they regretted taking the advice of severalofficials who recommended that they not viewthe bodies of their loved ones.

For some families, the fact that the official deathnotifications took place at the Compassion Centercreated an additional hardship. Some families in-dicated they would have preferred to be notifiedin their homes. Other families objected to thepractice of designating funeral home directors tonotify families rather than using clergy to handlethis responsibility. The presence of funeral homedirectors at the Compassion Center and priests arriving to give last rites was disconcerting to many

family members who were still waiting for newsof their loved ones. As in other mass-casualty

events where significant destruction to thebodies of victims happens, unidentified

“One of the difficulties for death notification teammembers was the long hours spent waiting to do notifi-cations because of the delays in body recovery and pos-itive identifications.”

—American Psychological Association

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Chapter III

Postcrisis Victim Assistance

Ongoing Victim Needs andVicarious Victimization

V ictim services needed to be adjusted and ex-panded to help victims and families after theimmediate crisis as they began to stabilize

their lives and cope with the impact of the event.Victims and survivors had to deal with a widerange of emotional, psychological, physical, legal,and financial consequences. For example, custodydecisions and legal processes were necessary for

children who were left without a parent or bothparents as a result of the bombing. As time passed,victims and families experienced new issues andchallenges. In addition, it became evident thatvictims were not limited to the injured and thefamilies of and others close to those killed in thebombing. Playing a role in responding to thebombing had a traumatic impact upon the menand women who were involved in the emergencyresponse, such as rescue workers who participatedin the recovery of victims and bodies, and those

As Oklahoma City responded to victims dur-ing this postcrisis phase following the immedi-ate crisis, the following victims’ needs wereidentified:

✧ Mental health services to ease the transi-tion for those involved with the criminalevent when the immediate crisis endedand they returned to “normal” work andfamily conditions.

✧ Recognition by employers and serviceproviders of the traumatic impact on firstresponders and others working with vic-tims and efforts to provide opportunitiesfor debriefing, counseling, and other assis-tance to help them cope.

✧ Streamlining service requests and benefitclaims so that the process of and docu-mentation for accessing services and bene-fits are simpler for victims and enableagencies to cope with the increased de-mands of responding to a terrorist crime.

✧ The ability to increase or supplementthe number of victim assistance staff inagencies faced with responding to masscasualties.

✧ Experienced staff aware of the uniqueneeds of terrorism victims.

✧ Access to an experienced prosecutor whois sensitive to victim-witness issues andprovides victims with information aboutthe status of the case and the legal issues.

✧ A resource plan developed by OVC andother U.S. Department of Justice compo-nents that provides guidance in managingpersonnel resources for future disasters.

✧ Information sharing and identification ofvictims to enable prompt extension oflegal rights and services to victims and notification about the status of the investigation.

A Summary of Victims’ Needs After the Immediate Crisis Is Met

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8

who provided care to the victims in the immedi-ate aftermath and in the months and years follow-ing the bombing. Significant levels of secondarytraumatic stress were experienced by a wide rangeof professionals and were exacerbated in manycases by the cumulative effect of exposure to othertraumatic events.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office and other agencies in-volved with the victims faced the emotional hard-ship of working with anguished family members,ensuring orphaned children were appropriatelyplaced, and accompanying the Medical Examinerto report often gruesome findings to families. Thissituation was compounded by personal losseswithin the offices themselves. Within the U.S.Attorney’s Office, a husband and a grandchildwere killed in the bombing. Staff members inmany offices continued to put in a full day’swork when friends remained among the missing.Throughout Oklahoma City, wrenching decisionsfaced survivors, family members, friends, and fel-low employees as multiple funerals took place simultaneously. Difficult decisions about whichservice to attend added guilt to grief. One employ-ee who lost most of the agents in his office at-tended 30 funerals. Caregiving professionals andvictim advocates, while skilled in dealing withvictims’ severe emotional distress, were not pre-pared for the scope and intensity of the traumatic

reactions experienced in the weeks, months, andyears after the bombing. Mental health sup-

port services were provided through theEmployee Assistance Program (EAP) and

Project Heartland.

Employee Assistance Program

Counseling and debriefing opportunities wereavailable to federal employees through their re-spective Employee Assistance Programs.4 ManyEAP staff returned to Oklahoma City severaltimes. They conducted a training session for officemanagement, to include the U.S. Attorney, onHow To Recognize and Refer the TroubledEmployee. EAP also conducted several generaltraining sessions for the office on grief, loss, andtrauma. Finally, EAP contracted with an eminenttrauma psychologist who went to Oklahoma onseveral occasions to meet with interested employ-ees. Initially, many employees did not use theseresources at the time they were offered.5 In addi-tion, no consistent link was established withlocal mental health professionals, such as ProjectHeartland staff, who were also working with fed-eral workers. Many new federal managers were assigned to Oklahoma City as a result of thebombing. These managers were not always sensi-tive to the needs of their fragile and traumatizedwork force. Employee needs were not addressed aseffectively as they could have been. An ongoingliaison between the various federal personnel of-fices, EAPs, and Project Heartland might havebeen helpful in meeting employee needs in the aftermath of the bombing.6 Within the U.S.Attorney’s Office, some staff members later re-quested debriefings, noting that other “traumaveterans” such as rescue workers, police, firefight-ers, and treatment providers were offered or re-quired to participate in debriefing sessions on aweekly basis.

Project Heartland

Created by the Oklahoma Department of MentalHealth and Substance Abuse Services, ProjectHeartland was the immediate mental health re-sponse to the bombing. FEMA provided initialfunding for “crisis counseling, crisis intervention,support groups, outreach, consultation, and educa-tion to individuals who were affected by emotion-al or physical proximity to the bombing,” andon May 15, 1995, Project Heartland opened.7

Because Project Heartland was the first communi-ty mental health response to a large-scale terroristevent in the United States, there was no previousexperience to guide and establish the appropriate

“Emotional triggers are everywhere. Some employeeshave had to spend most of their time since the bomb-ing re-creating documents, procedures, and records thatwere destroyed. Sometimes, simply finding a report bya colleague who was killed or seeing a picture in anewsletter produces a flood of tears. Many managers—some who weren’t even around at the time of thebombing—can’t understand why people are still so affected.”

—Linda Wagner, Project Heartland

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a broad spectrum of minority and eth-nic populations (Oklahoma Departmentof Mental Health and Substance AbuseServices, May 31, 1998). Outreach efforts in-cluded educational materials and informationabout services, debriefing sessions for workplacegroups, and educational seminars on such topics asgrief or traumatic stress. Services were providedfree of charge at the Project Heartland Center,which housed a core group of clinicians and wasopen from 8:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m., with eveningand weekend appointments available on request.After hours, calls to the Center were transferredto the ODMHSAS crisis hotline, enabling clientsto have 24-hour access to services.

Streamlining Procedures ToFile for Claim BenefitsFederal and state agencies made special efforts tostreamline procedures for obtaining benefits andother assistance for victims. Agencies such as thestate’s crime victim compensation program, ad-ministered by the Oklahoma District Attorney’sCouncil, assisted victims with crime-related ex-penses. This program made special efforts to sim-plify the compensation application and awardprocess by waiving the usual law enforcement ver-ification requirements and by dedicating one staffmember to exclusively process all claims. Specialattention was given to compensating lost wagesfor the victim and loss of support for the victim’sfamily. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) ad-ministers the Public Safety Officers’ Benefit pro-gram, which provides aid to survivors of slain andinjured federal and state safety officers. In re-sponse to the Oklahoma City bombing, BJA notonly streamlined its application procedure but alsosent staff to Oklahoma to meet with survivingfamily members and assist them in applying forbenefits. These are only two examples of specialefforts taken to provide easy access to public bene-fits for victims of this terrorist act. Recognizingthe horrific trauma experienced by the bombingvictims, other special efforts were also undertakenby agencies such as the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency and the Social SecurityAdministration.

9

Postcrisis VictimAssistance

services for terrorist-caused psychological trauma.Project Heartland found that traditional crisiscounseling techniques were not sufficient, andnew approaches were developed to reach disastersurvivors. From 5 original staff members, ProjectHeartland grew to 65 employees providing a comprehensive array of clinical, educational,and outreach services. FEMA supported ProjectHeartland as the longest Regular Services projectit ever funded—funding was extended three timesand ended on February 28, 1998 (Center forMental Health Services, ND). FEMA awarded$4,092,909 to Oklahoma Regular Services.

On March 11, 1997, Project Heartland receivednotification from OVC that $234,930 had beenawarded to fund crisis-counseling activities atthe Safe Havens during the trials in OklahomaCity and at the trials in Denver, Colorado.Since FEMA guidelines do not allow fundingof long-term mental health services outside ofthe federally declared disaster area, OVC fundedthe necessary mental health services during thetrials. The Safe Havens served as places of respitefor the victims’ family members and survivors attending the trial proceedings in Denver or theclosed-circuit television (CCTV) broadcasts ofthe trials in Oklahoma City. On February 28,1998, OVC extended the grant and awarded anadditional $264,000. OVC’s grants to ProjectHeartland allowed services to continue for themany survivors, family members, other individualsaffected, and an increasing number of rescueworkers and rescue worker family members seek-ing help with problems stemming from the bomb-ing.8 Among the most innovative servicesprovided by Project Heartland were the OVC-funded activities related to the trials—availabilityof crisis counseling at Safe Havens during the tri-als in Denver and CCTV broadcasts in OklahomaCity (American Psychological Association, July1997). (See further description of mental healthservices under chapter IV, “The Criminal Pretrialand Trial Phases.”)

Between June 1, 1995, and February 28, 1998,Project Heartland reported providing 8,869clients with counseling, support group, or crisis in-tervention services. Approximately 186,000 con-tacts were made, which included reaching out to

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are in need of service, and more limited assistancecould be made available to them.

Responding to the magnitude of the OklahomaCity bombing case and the complex difficultiesfaced by its victims, the U.S. Attorney’s Officemet victims’ needs by exceeding the requirementsof federal law and the 1995 U.S. Attorney GeneralGuidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance (AGGuidelines). Operating under the AG Guidelines,the U.S. Attorney’s Office identified victims andcreated a database of victim contact information.Some agencies refused to supply contact informa-tion for clients (victims), citing organizationalpolicies of nondisclosure. Underlying most agen-cies’ unwillingness to share client (victim) informa-tion was the fear that the identifying informationmight be used by criminal justice agencies for purposes beyond victim notification. The U.S.Attorney’s Office had to rely on obituaries in thelocal newspapers and information from FEMAand other sources to identify victims and sur-vivors, a process that the staff found to be a frus-trating and unnecessary obstacle in implementingvictim services. (See Privacy Act discussion underchapter VI, “Legal Issues Pertaining to Victimsof Terrorism.”) The U.S. Attorney’s Office provid-ed victims’ rights and services through its Victim-Witness Assistance Unit and through theappointment of an Attorney Liaison.

Identification and Notification ofVictims

Beyond the need to identify who the deceasedvictims were for the sake of their families, therealso was the need to identify surviving victimsand family members of the deceased to providethem with information and services. This needmade it essential for agencies to exchange information about their clients, otherwise somevictims would receive duplicated services and oth-ers would received none at all. The InternationalBusiness Machine (IBM) Corporation donatedelectronic equipment, software, and training tocreate and manage a database of services providedto individual victims. The victim database even-tually included approximately 3,000 family mem-bers and survivors that victim-witness coordinatorsand others involved with distributing victim

U.S.Attorney’s OfficeResponse This phase of the Oklahoma City bombing re-sponse focused on identifying and locating vic-tims, assessing their needs, and providing theservices needed to help them cope after the im-mediate crisis. Based on the federal definition of“victim,”9 victims encompassed a wide range of

ages and situations.10 A critical task for the U.S.Attorney’s Office involved identifying the victimpopulation and developing a plan for providingappropriate assistance. While the definition of afederal crime victim includes anyone who suffersdirect physical, emotional, or financial harm,there is a potentially wider range of individualswho suffered psychological harm. The OklahomaCity bombing victims directly affected by theevent included the injured and killed and theirfamilies as well as employees of agencies in theMurrah Building. Beyond this core group of vic-tims are other victims who suffered: rescue work-ers, police officers, and other responders to thescene; coworkers; people who worked in nearbyoffice buildings; taxi and bus drivers who were inthe area when the bombing occurred; and manyothers who were exposed to the event and to thetraumatic aftereffects. Over time, investigators,prosecutors, victim services personnel, and otherswho worked closely with the details of the crimi-nal case or with the surviving victims and victimfamilies also became significantly affected. While

core services should be provided to the federallydefined victims, the Oklahoma City experi-

ence has shown that many other victims

“The circle of care should encompass caregivers, out-of-state responders, jurors, attorneys on both sides,Salvation Army volunteers, clerks who typed up the victims’ statements, hospital personnel, janitors, U.S.Marshals, FBI personnel who accompanied witnessesand families—all those whom we now know were oftenvicariously victimized by this catastrophe.”

—Linda Wagner, Project Heartland

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Postcrisis VictimAssistance

services could use and update. When this newcomputer system was installed, agencies belongingto the Resource Coordination Committee enteredinformation into the system regarding types andamount of services provided to individual victims.Unfortunately, due to confidentiality concerns,many victim-serving agencies did not enter intothe system information about the names of theirclients (victims), the amount of assistance, or thespecific services delivered.

The Victim-Witness Assistance Unit also estab-lished a toll-free telephone information line forvictims to obtain assistance and initiate regulargroup meetings with survivors and family members.This toll-free telephone line alleviated the needfor staff to make hundreds of calls to victims toprovide trial-related and other information and gavevictims the freedom to obtain information at timesthat were appropriate and convenient for them.

Victim-Witness Assistance Unit

Going beyond the requirements of federal laws,the Victim-Witness Assistance Unit addressedimmediate needs for food and shelter, organizedlarge-scale resource coalitions, and engaged inpersonal troubleshooting for individual victims.It also gathered federal job vacancy announce-ments for federal employees, helped create a “jobfair” for nonfederal employees, and worked withsmall federal agencies to arrange extra administra-tive leave and waive administrative barriers for adonated leave program. In compliance with feder-al law and U.S. Department of Justice policy, theU.S. Attorney’s Office kept victims informedabout the progress of the criminal case and avail-able services with frequent case status letters.(See chapter VI, “Legal Issues Pertaining toVictims of Terrorists.”)

Within the first few weeks, the Victim-WitnessAssistance Unit held group or individual meetingsto explain victims’ rights and determine the avail-ability of resources with the following: SocialSecurity Administration staff, the Western DistrictCourt Clerk’s Office, U.S. Department of Housingand Urban Development staff, displaced residentsof a nearby apartment building damaged by the

bombing, the FBI chaplain, OklahomaCommunity Foundation, State Victims’Compensation Program, American RedCross, and Project Heartland.

As the number of victims and the volume ofwork increased, an immediate need developed foradditional victim-witness assistance staff skilled inmanaging victim data; handling the emotional,resource, and support needs of victims and families;training other professionals to serve victims; andorganizing community resources while still han-dling other existing case responsibilities of that office. The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys(EOUSA) immediately moved to supplement theresources of the Victim-Witness Assistance Unitby obtaining permission from the U.S. Attorneys’Offices in Kansas and in the Northern andEastern Districts of Oklahoma to detail their victim-witness coordinators temporarily to theWestern District office.11 EOUSA then providedfinancial assistance to pay for the travel and lodgingof additional staff members detailed to OklahomaCity. Initially, all victim-witness coordinators

worked together to contact victims and assessneeds. Later, those from other offices were able torotate their assistance to the Western District ofOklahoma office—working in shifts to keep upwith their own caseloads. For each coordinator,the Oklahoma City bombing was an additionalresponsibility rather than a replacement of existingresponsibilities.

“The Attorney General Guidelines were very important—they were the basic structure for tasks tobe accomplished. But there was so much more to do in the beginning and no staff to carry it out, so we didwhat the crisis demanded—go out and meet the needs.We interpreted ‘best efforts’ as the vehicle to go way beyond the Guidelines. And by intervening to meetpractical, absolutely critical needs like food and shelter,victims were aware of our concern and compassion from the beginning.”

—K. Lynn Anderson,Assistant U.S. Attorney

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of practical assistance included assisting victimswith obtaining official forms and enlisting the aidof the Oklahoma Bar Association to locate Texasattorneys who would provide pro bono services forvictims and their families. Once the trials began,the Attorney Liaison also became a credible andinformative link between those working withinthe criminal justice process and the victims, fami-lies, and survivors.

Attorney Liaison

On May 30, 1995, the U.S. Attorney’s Office ap-pointed a special Attorney Liaison for victims.12

This Attorney Liaison would also serve as a mem-ber of the prosecution team for the bombing trials.

The Attorney Liaison assisted the Victim-WitnessAssistance Unit in removing bureaucratic road-blocks to help victims receive benefits. Examples

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Chapter IV

The Criminal Pretrial andTrial Phases

Challenges to Victims’ Rightsand Services as a Result ofChange of Venue

T he focus of victim services shifted to trial-related activities when the change of venuehearing was held in January 1996. Long be-

fore the judicial decision to change the venue inthe cases of United States v. Timothy McVeigh andUnited States v. Terry Nichols, however, specula-tion over a possible new venue aggravated victimtensions and apprehension regarding the upcomingtrials. The pretrial and trial phases raised con-cerns about ensuring victims’ observation and/or

The criminal pretrial and trial phases present-ed significant challenges to safeguarding crimevictims’ rights especially with the change ofvenue decision in February 1996.As Okla-homa City and Denver responded to thebombing victims, the following victims’ needswere clear:

✧ Ability to observe trial proceedings.

✧ Accommodations for travel and housing.

✧ Accommodations for CCTV broadcasts.

✧ Legal explanation of trial events.

✧ Emotional support for trial decisions,evidence, and testimony.

✧ A notification process that informs victimsof the ongoing criminal justice process.

✧ A process for determining which victimscan attend the trial each day.

✧ A waiting area separate from defendantsand their families.

✧ Seating in the court separate from defen-dants’ families.

✧ A process to identify and coordinate re-sources and volunteers to assist victimstraveling to the trial.

✧ An intermediary who coordinates mediainterviews with victims and families anddebriefs the victims and families after theinterview to reduce the possibility of retraumatization.

A Summary of Victims’ Needs During the Pretrial andTrial Phases

participation at the trials, informing victims of thecriminal justice process, and continuing to providemental health services.

A new set of challenges emerged as a result ofmoving the trials of Terry Nichols and TimothyMcVeigh to Denver. Attorney General JanetReno announced to the victims Judge Matsch’sdecision that the criminal trials of defendantsTimothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols would nottake place in Oklahoma but in Denver, Colorado.Attorney General Reno pledged, however, thatthe U.S. Department of Justice would work tosupport the victims.

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Responding toTerrorismVictims:Oklahoma Cityand Beyond

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financial sacrifice, recognizing that the venuechange imposed by the court demanded long-distance travel and added to the disruption of victims’ lives. Without such support, many wouldhave been denied the opportunity to attend thetrial, and others would have been forced to incurcosts on top of grievous losses.

Soon after the venue change announcement,Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating asked theUnited Way of Metro Oklahoma City to adminis-ter a fund to help victims travel to the Denver tri-als. In a coordinated effort on February 27, 1996,Attorney General Janet Reno augmentedGovernor Keating’s announcement by announc-ing an OVC grant for $200,000 to the U.S.Attorney’s Office for victims’ travel expenses re-lated to attendance or observation of the trials.To help coordinate travel and other activities,OVC provided funding for two temporary staffmembers for the Victim-Witness Assistance Unitand funded additional victim-witness personnelin the Colorado District U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Denver-Based Support Services

The change of venue to Denver unleashed astorm of activity in that city among public andprivate groups wishing to be of assistance to thevictims. Social service, mental health and publicsafety agencies, churches, businesses, victim advo-cates, and private citizens offered a wealth of per-sonal goods and services to the Oklahomans.Some 600 people volunteered rooms in theirhomes for relatives and survivors of the bombing.13

Fueled by local media, which clamored for amajor demonstration of civic hospitality, victims’groups in Denver and the U.S. Attorney forColorado concluded that a single, local coalitionwas necessary to coordinate services and dona-tions. Simultaneously, the U.S. Attorneys’ Officesin Oklahoma City and Denver and the U.S.Department of Justice recognized the need for asingle coalition given the fervor of media requests,the outpouring of contributions, and the risk foranother venue change if the response was not organized. On March 14, 1996, the ColoradoOklahoma Resource Council (CORC) was born.CORC brought together 18 agencies includingrepresentatives of the city of Denver, federal

Apart from the basic statutory requirement tokeep victims informed throughout the criminaljustice process, the change of venue required spe-cial accommodations to help victims access theproceedings and receive support in the new triallocation. One of the primary concerns of victimswas the difficulty the distance to Denver posed forwatching the trials. The victims initiated twopieces of legislation that were passed by Congressto secure victims’ rights to participate in judicialproceedings:

✦ A new federal statute established that, wherea Federal Court changes the trial venue outof the state in which the case was initiallybrought by more than 350 miles from the location in which the proceedings originallywould have taken place, the court mustorder closed-circuit televising of the pro-ceedings to be broadcast at the original loca-tion to permit victims who qualify under thestatute to watch the trial proceedings [42U.S.C. § 10608].

✦ Congress passed legislation prohibiting theU.S. district judge from ordering victims ex-cluded from the trials of the defendants be-cause the victim may testify or make astatement during the sentencing about theeffect of the offense on the victim and thevictim’s family [18 U.S.C. § 3593].

Travel Assistance to Denver

Plans to facilitate victim attendance at the trialsin Denver began at the U.S. Attorney’s Office

for the Western District of Oklahoma. TheOffice was committed to enabling as many

victims and support persons as possibleto travel to Denver without personal

“We want to be sure that victims can exercise theirright to attend court proceedings. In doing that, wecarry out the Justice Department’s responsibilities underthe Victims of Crime Act and the Victims’ Rights andRestitution Act.”

—Attorney General Janet Reno

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The CriminalPretrial and Trial Phasesagencies, relief organizations, and victim advocacy

groups.14 Among other victim assistance functions,CORC ensured that a Safe Haven was providedfor victims in Denver.

Although businesses, churches, and other privategroups donated generously to CORC, ongoingsupport was necessary to meet the needs of bomb-ing victims attending the trials. To provide sup-port for victims’ services during the trials, OVCapproved a grant under an amendment to theVictims of Crime Act (VOCA) contained in theAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Actof 1996 [42 U.S.C. § 10603b]. Under the grantagreement, OVC extended federal antiterrorismfunding to the Denver Victim Assistance and LawEnforcement (VALE) Board because of VALE’scommitment to the victim assistance effort al-ready under way and its capacity to overseeCORC activities.

OVC coordinated meetings in Denver andOklahoma City that included EOUSA, theVictim-Witness Assistance Unit, VALE, andCORC. OVC identified responsibilities forCORC that reflect concern about providing com-prehensive service delivery to victims withoutcompromising the legal case or hindering legiti-mate media demands:

✦ Identify, coordinate, collect, and inventorylocal resources, including funds, staff, andservices, for the survivors and victim familymembers.

✦ Maintain records regarding donations andresources and compile a resource directorycontaining food, lodging, transportation, andlocal victim service information.

✦ Coordinate medical and mental health assis-tance to the victims, including recruitingand training qualified mental health profes-sionals to work as volunteers at the SafeHaven.

✦ Supervise a volunteer coordinator and sup-port staff at the Safe Haven.

✦ Help coordinate the response of Denverbusinesses, agencies, and community groups

through attendance at communi-ty meetings, prompt referrals, andprovision of information on victimneeds.

✦ Prepare a written security plan includingscreening and credentialing volunteers.

✦ Develop procedures for transportation, hotel,and food vouchers.

According to many members of CORC, having ayear between the organization’s founding and thebeginning of the first trial to prepare proved ex-tremely helpful. Among the materials developedwere procedures and rules governing the volun-teers’ schedules, transportation, security, safety,debriefing, media contact, insurance, liability, andconfidentiality. A statement defining the SafeHaven’s position on mandatory disclosure andrecordkeeping by mental health professionals wasalso developed. Other handouts addressed ways of responding to victims or included maps, restau-rant and entertainment guides, and other resources.

The change of venue required a great deal of co-operation and understanding on the part of theagencies and organizations working with the vic-tims in both cities. Time and effort were requiredto develop trust and to address differences in rolesand perspectives among these agencies and organ-izations. With OVC’s active intervention and thevictims’ arrival for the first trial, tensions easedamong the key agencies working with the victims.

The need to clarify roles illustrated the uniquecircumstances that emerge from a change invenue, particularly when the new venue is so farfrom the jurisdiction trying the case. In addition,it was critical to carefully balance the needs andrights of victims and the need to maintain the in-tegrity of the criminal justice process. The U.S.

“The change of venue required a nontraditional ap-proach to mental health services, victim advocacy, andspiritual support.”

—Krista Flannigan, Director, CORC

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definitions from the Victim’s Rights andRestitution Act as criteria for CCTV admissioneligibility; the second proposing an applicationprocess for approving individuals who would viewCCTV broadcasts. Judge Matsch granted bothmotions, issuing an Admission Order on February26, 1997. He also assigned Judge Gasper Perricone,a retired Colorado State judge, to preside over theCCTV broadcasts of the trials.15

In the 4 weeks between the issuance of JudgeMatsch’s Admission Order and commencement ofthe CCTV reservation system, the Unit notifiedthe entire victim database (2,100 persons) of theireligibility to attend the CCTV broadcasts and ac-complished the following:

✦ Certified more than 1,100 persons to viewthe CCTV broadcasts.

✦ Transmitted forms of ineligible applicants toJudge Matsch.

✦ Notified certified persons of “badging” dates.

✦ Staffed badging operations on 7 days when850 victims received their badges.

✦ Learned to operate the reservation system.

✦ Mailed instructions on how to use the sys-tem to all certified victims.

Attendance fluctuated, but some victims attendedevery day of the court proceedings. During thesentencing phase of the McVeigh trial, as many as300 victims attended the CCTV broadcast ses-sions. During the Nichols trial, CCTV broadcastattendance totaled 1,062 (Oklahoma Departmentof Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services,May 31, 1998).

Victims appreciated the presence of JudgePerricone and his assistance in explaining legalproceedings. Many expressed disappointment,however, in the quality of the CCTV picture. Not only was the picture somewhat fuzzy but also afixed camera built into the back wall of the court-room eliminated variety in focus and prohibitedviewers from observing the defendants’ faces.16

Department of Justice’s letter to CORC concluded:“In most everyday situations, private citizens whodesire to help others in time of tragedy can do sowithout interference or restriction. However,here, the situation involves a federal criminalprosecution, with all its attendant restrictions.The cost of any missteps could be great” (Solanoet al., August 15, 1996).

Victims’ Rights and ServicesDuring the TrialsOnce the trials began, the victims needed supportservices in both Oklahoma City and Denver. Thisassistance included CCTV broadcasts of the trialin Oklahoma City, an explanation of the trialevents, and information and emotional support tohelp victims cope with testimony, evidence, andcourt decisions.

Closed-Circuit Television Broadcasts

In deference to victim wishes, the Victim-WitnessAssistance Unit began searching for a secure facil-ity in Oklahoma City that could accommodatelarge numbers of victims who might want towatch CCTV broadcasts of the trial. The FederalAviation Administration (FAA) offered its audi-torium and additional space in the FAA buildingfor a “Safe Haven” for the bombing victims.Prosecutors then requested the court to transferthe CCTV broadcasts to the FAA site. Judge

Matsch granted the motion. The AttorneyLiaison assisted the trial team in preparing

two motions: one urging adoption of victim

“CORC demonstrated the importance of communica-tion and relationships between government and non-government agencies, between for-profit and nonprofitgroups, with each piece playing a valued part.Theseprinciples go beyond lessons to deal with acts of terror-ism.They apply to many cases when there’s a change invenue.”

—Steve Siegel, Denver Victim Assistance andLaw Enforcement Board

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The CriminalPretrial and Trial PhasesExplanation of Trial Events

Part of the Attorney Liaison’s role was to debriefvictims about the day’s legal proceedings aftercourt had recessed. She explained the relevanceof what had been heard and seen that day incourt and what could be anticipated for the nextday of trial. Her discussions with the victims atthe Safe Haven made sense of attorney decisions,judicial rulings, strictures on witness testimony,and the sequence of trial events. In addition toanswering the victims’ questions, the debriefingswarned survivors and family members observingthe trial about upcoming potentially painful testi-mony or exhibits. These debriefings allowed indi-viduals to prepare psychologically or to choosenot to attend the session. These meetings general-ly concluded with a brief discussion of ways inwhich the victims could take care of themselvesemotionally. Project Heartland counselors werepresent to assist, if needed, in this phase of the debriefings.

Through the Attorney Liaison, the victims had adirect link with the prosecution team. As a mem-ber of the team, she not only advocated for thevictims’ interests, but also explained the prosecu-tion’s issues and procedures to the victims. One ofthe issues the Attorney Liaison was not able to re-solve, however, was the lack of sufficient seatingfor victims in the courtroom. The fact that themedia were assigned more seats than family mem-bers caused considerable irritation. Even worse,seating arrangements sometimes placed victimsnext to the defendant’s family—a source of stressand pain.

The Victim-Witness Center, Denver

The Victim-Witness Center was created throughthe joint efforts of the victim-witness coordinatorsfrom the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for the WesternDistrict of Oklahoma and the District of Colorado.Located next to the courthouse, the Center wascomfortably furnished and provided free local andlong-distance telephone service. Here, prosecutorsmet with witnesses prior to testifying. The victim-witness coordinators were responsible for makingtravel and lodging arrangements for witnesses, coordinated duties with the FBI witness coordina-tor 7 days a week, and fielded calls from witnessestraveling to Denver. In addition, the victim-witness

coordinators addressed other witnessneeds such as arranging witnesses’ travelto and from court, answering their ques-tions pertaining to the trials, and keepingthem informed of the judicial process.

Mental Health Support and the Safe Havens

Over the 11 weeks of the McVeigh trial and duringthe Nichols trial, the Safe Havens in OklahomaCity and Denver provided mental health services,food, free telephone service, and privacy to vic-tims and family members. Project Heartlandcounselors addressed victims’ apprehensions be-fore appearing in court and provided counselingand debriefings to victims after upsetting testimo-ny, exhibits, rulings, or other aspects of the trial.In the case of the Denver Safe Haven, ProjectHeartland counselors were able to communicateto the Victim-Witness Assistance Unit possibleconcerns the witnesses may have had based onwhat family members were communicating in theSafe Haven facility. Project Heartland activitiesalso included training and sensitizing staff andvolunteers who would be involved with victims,family members, and support people at CORC,the Victim-Witness Center in Denver, and theCCTV trial broadcast facility in Oklahoma City.Again, OVC support enabled Project Heartlandstaff to travel to Denver to meet these criticalneeds.

The Safe Havens were also designed to be securehavens for the victims and families of victims.Security procedures were carefully planned.Volunteers and member groups were barred fromspeaking with the media, and the press agreed tomaintain its distance from the Safe Havens. Withfew exceptions, the media respected victims’ pri-vacy. Some victims, however, initiated their owncontacts with reporters.

“People must realize that crime victims have a hugeneed to understand what’s going on, to view the process,to humanize events.”

—Diane Leonard, widow of a bombing victim

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Chapter V

Long-term Victim Needs

Ongoing Mental HealthSupport

F or many individuals associated with theevents of April 19, 1995, the bombing was alife-altering event (Kight, 1998). Long after

the last piece of rubble was hauled away, the disas-ter continues to propel many primary, secondary,and tertiary victims17 into grief, bouts of severe de-pression, substance abuse, rage, domestic violence,and stress-related physical disorders. Nightmares,loss of short-term memory, hallucinations, and arecurrent sense of “going insane” are among thesymptoms reported by individuals whose liveswere relatively untroubled and productive beforethe bombing.

An often overlooked population affected by theOklahoma City bombing includes those who re-sponded to the crime and offered some measureof assistance with the rescue-and-recovery efforts.Along with working under very difficult and dangerous conditions, some rescue workers were

The years following the Oklahoma Citybombing have revealed the often ravagingemotional effects of exposure to traumatizedvictims and the importance of providing ongo-ing intervention and emotional support to disaster victims, including secondary and ter-tiary victims.The following victim needs havebeen recognized during this phase of thebombing recovery:

✧ Long-term mental health services forposttraumatic responses to the criminalevent.*

✧ Education of managers and employees tounderstand posttraumatic stress disorderand to support victims who are returningto the workplace.

✧ Recognition of restitution for victims.

✧ Participation in decisionmaking processeswhen possible.

✧ Ongoing information about posttrialevents.

*Long-term posttraumatic responses can be triggered byanniversaries, memorial events, reminders of slain col-leagues in the workplace, birthdays, or birth of a secondchild.

A Summary of Victims’ Long-term Needs

injured and many handled bodies or body parts.As a direct result of their experiences in Okla-homa City, experts predict as much as 20 percentof the 12,984 rescue workers and volunteers mayneed help in dealing with the psychological im-pact (Oklahoma Department of Mental Healthand Substance Abuse Services, May 31, 1998).

New emotional pressures arose when the pace ofwork with bombing victims slowed and employ-ees returned to “normal” work and family condi-tions. The difficulty of this transition is widelyacknowledged by mental health experts (Okla-homa Department of Mental Health andSubstance Abuse Services, May 31, 1998) butconsiderably less recognized by employers and supervisors.

With research confirming the intense psychologi-cal impact of intentional disasters on communitiesand individuals (Oklahoma Department ofMental Health and Substance Abuse Services,May 31, 1998), Oklahoma City faced a long-term

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Participants in the Critical Incident Workshopscome from fire, police, and sheriff departments;the Highway Patrol; federal and state law enforce-ment; and FEMA search-and-rescue teams.Workshop participants have also included chap-lains, mental health professionals, survivors, andfamily members of victims. For 3 days, workshopparticipants work through “the ravages of trauma”in small group settings. Sessions are offered insafe, supportive environments in which everybodypresent has an opportunity to share their similarexperiences. The ability to talk about traumaticexperiences with colleagues appears to be veryhelpful to rescue and other public safety personnelwho are traditionally reluctant to acknowledgethe profound effects of what they have seen anddone.19 Sometimes this reluctance to acknowledgeand address symptoms of stress is reinforced byagency policies that penalize employees who seekpsychological help, labeling them “unfit for duty.”Twenty-eight workshops have been held since theVOCA grant in 1998 began with a total of 255 par-ticipants: 168 rescue workers, 27 survivors, 28 fam-ily members, 26 volunteers, and 6 others (King,January–March 2000).

Many of the rescue personnel, for whom theworkshops were primarily designed, reported over-whelming relief at the opportunity to unburdenthemselves and to voice the guilt they felt for“not doing enough” to save those who died in thebombing. Often the response of rescuers is to keepsilent, believing their families should be protectedfrom the horrible images imprinted in their mem-ories. It was reported that after sharing at theworkshop, many returned home with new hopefor healing and recovery.20 A surprising benefitfrom the workshops, which was reported by par-ticipants from different agencies, was that, asthey expressed similar fears and hardships, theydiscovered a kinship and a bond not shared be-fore. OVC funding is making it possible to offerfree workshops in Oklahoma, Maryland, and Cali-fornia, allowing all the rescue team members whocame from distant states to attend.

RestitutionRestitution for victims presented complicationsfor both victims and the prosecution team, given

need for mental health services. Mental healthspecialists identify four phases of recovery froma disaster. The experiences of many OklahomaCity bombing victims seemed to mirror thesephases. The first phase is the “Heroic” phase. Itoccurs at the time of impact and is marked bycourageous efforts. The second phase is the“Honeymoon” period. During this time individualsreceive attention and assistance and feel somewhatoptimistic. The third phase is the “Disillusion-ment” phase, and it is marked by the realizationthat things will never be the same and loved onesare not coming back. Experts say that every effortshould be made to ensure victims arrive at thefourth phase, the “Reconstruction” phase, within5 years. After 5 years, it is far more difficult for in-dividuals to overcome the psychological impactof a criminal disaster (Faberow and Frederick,1978).18

Efforts to help with these long-term symptoms in-cluded special services for first responders, consid-eration of some form of restitution for the victims,and postconviction notification of victims.

Assistance to FirstRespondersThe Critical Incident Workshops began in 1996,and OVC awarded $356,000 through a Victims

of Crime Act grant in June 1998. These work-shops are designed to help first responder vic-

tims address the difficulty they may feel inacknowledging their emotional needs.

“Federal, state, and local authorities, Red Cross chap-ters, and mental health professionals need to under-stand that mass casualty incidents are different fromother disasters.The psychological impact of these inci-dents appears to be more extreme than from other disasters.This severity also seems to lead to more im-mediate and long-term traumatic stress reactions. Broadcommunity reaction is also common and will be particu-larly likely in the aftermath of a terrorist incident”

—American Psychological Association

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Long-termVictim Needs

the number of victims, the lack of defendant assets,and disparate criminal sentences. No monetaryrestitution was sought in either the McVeigh casein which Timothy McVeigh received a death sen-tence or the Nichols case. Defendant Terry Nicholshad some assets in property, but the total valuewas too small to permit valuable distributionamong eligible victims. Nichols’ sentence of lifeimprisonment, however, presented the possibilityof financial earnings in the future through publi-cation of a book. In addition to 18 U.S.C. § 3681,which does not allow criminals to profit fromtheir crimes, prosecutors proposed a restitutionplan calling for the donation of any funds earnedby Nichols to the U.S. Department of Justice’sCrime Victims Fund. The sum, $14 million, allo-cated for Nichols’ restitution obligation represent-ed the cost of rebuilding the Murrah Building.21

To determine an equitable solution to the ques-tion of restitution in this particular case, prosecu-tors polled the victims for answers. The victimsagreed to waive their statutory rights to individualrestitution payments, acknowledging no amountof money could conceivably restore them.22

Postconviction Notificationof VictimsThe end of a trial and sentencing are not the endof the criminal justice process. Federal law requiresfederal officials to notify victims of a defendant’sposttrial status including parole hearings, any typeof release of the defendant (including escape),and the death of the defendant while in custody.The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operates anotification program to meet this responsibility.The BOP notification program is strictly voluntary,and victims can enroll through the U.S. Attorney’sOffice. In addition, the 2000 edition of theAttorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness

Assistance states that prosecuting of-fices should make reasonable effortsto inform victims about postsentencinglegal proceedings including appeals and habeascorpus petitions. In the Oklahoma City bomb-ing case, the Attorney Liaison continued to no-tify victims about the status of the appeals andhabeas petitions filed by Timothy McVeigh andTerry Nichols.

Newly drafted U.S. Department of Justice regula-tions also include victims in the pardon andclemency processes followed by DOJ’s Office ofthe Pardon Attorney. The regulations provide forvictim notification of the filing of a petition forpardon or clemency, the opportunity to submit awritten statement or make an oral statement tothe Office of the Pardon Attorney, and notice ofthe final decision. At the time of this report, thoseregulations had not been finalized. In cases involv-ing the death penalty, such as that of convictedOklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, victimsmay request the opportunity to be present andobserve the defendant’s execution. In a terrorismcase with hundreds or thousands of victims, devel-oping a fair procedure for victims to view the exe-cution presents another challenge to ensuringvictims’ rights.

“The Federal trials of those who masterminded thebombing are over.The national spotlight has long sinceshifted from Oklahoma City. But it is now, more thanthree years after the worst case of domestic terrorism inAmerican history, that many survivors are entering thebleakest period of grief.”

—“The Blast Fallout,” USA Today,August 4, 1998

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T here are several key areas of federal law thatare important to consider in responding toterrorism victims.

Funding AuthorizationAs a result of the need for federal monetary assis-tance to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing,Congress, in 1996, gave OVC the authority to ac-cess the Victims of Crime Act emergency reservefund of $50 million to assist victims of terrorismand mass violence. The Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amendedVOCA by adding 42 U.S.C. § 19693(b) to allowOVC access to the emergency reserve fund inboth domestic and international terrorist inci-dents. In domestic terrorism incidents, the OVCDirector is authorized to use the reserve funds tosupplement existing grants to state crime victimcompensation and assistance programs, to providefunds to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for use in coordi-nation with the state programs, and to provideemergency relief to terrorism and mass-violencevictims. In international terrorism incidents, theOVC Director can supplement grants to statecrime victim compensation and assistance pro-grams to provide compensation and assistance tostate residents who are victims of terrorism whileoutside the United States. OVC has used emer-gency reserve funds to provide supplementalgrants in support of victims of the Oklahoma Citybombing, the Khobar Towers bombing, the bomb-ing of Pan Am Flight 103, the bombing of theUnited States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,and the Columbine High School shooting inci-dent. The Antiterrorism and Effective DeathPenalty Act of 1996 also contained a provisionrequiring state crime victim compensation pro-grams to include in their compensation programsstate residents who are victims of terrorism whileoutside of the United States.

Chapter VI

Legal Issues Pertaining toVictims of Terrorism

Although the 1996 amendment adding 42 U.S.C.§ 10603b to VOCA created a new capability forOVC to provide funding to assist victims in bothdomestic and international terrorism and mass-violence cases, in practice, the limits of section10603b’s language have caused difficulties in pro-viding funding effectively. The statute’s limita-tions on the recipients of grants, the types of reliefthat could be funded, the timeframe covered, andproblems inherent in sending victims from thesame event to a multitude of different state com-pensation programs have seriously affected OVC’sability to provide effective funding support for ter-rorism victims. To overcome these restrictions inspecific cases, Congress passed special legislationbroadening OVC’s authorization to provide addi-tional assistance to victims of both the OklahomaCity bombing and the bombing of Pan Am Flight103. Currently, Congress is considering legislationthat would expand OVC’s authority to providefunding from the emergency reserve fund in thefuture. The proposed legislation would also au-thorize OVC to develop and administer a com-pensation program for victims of internationalterrorism.

Victims’ Rights During theCriminal Justice ProcessUnder federal law, U.S. Government agencies in-volved in investigating and prosecuting crimehave certain responsibilities to crime victims. Inaddition, since 1983, the U.S. Department ofJustice has maintained policy guidelines called theAttorney General Guidelines for Victim and WitnessAssistance, which establish how the Departmentexpects its employees to treat crime victims andwitnesses. During the investigation and prosecu-tion of the Oklahoma City bombing case, the FBIand the United States Attorney’s Office operated

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changed from Oklahoma City to Denver, the vic-tims lobbied Congress to allow closed-circuit tele-vising of the trial to an auditorium in OklahomaCity so that victims did not have to travel toDenver to exercise their right to observe the trial(see 42 U.S.C. § 10608). These new provisionsare also included in the revised AG Guidelines andwill improve victim rights and services in futureterrorism cases.

Privacy ActConfusion about the coverage of the Privacy Actresulted in several agencies’ refusal to forward listsof victims to federal law enforcement agencies,and that significantly impeded Federal Governmentagencies’ ability to provide victims with legallyrequired rights and services. In the immediateaftermath of the bombing, the American RedCross had the lead role in assisting the victims andgathering information about the identities ofthe victims. When the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation and the U.S. Attorney’s Officeasked ARC for a list of victims, to comply withfederal law that requires law enforcement to iden-tify the victims of the crime, ARC declined toprovide the information, citing its belief that thePrivacy Act, which generally prohibits govern-ment agencies from disclosing records about anindividual without that individual’s consent,prevented ARC from turning the informationover to federal law enforcement officials (see 5U.S.C. § 552(a)). It is unclear whether ARC isa government agency covered by the Act.23 More-over, the Privacy Act contains a clear exceptionallowing agencies to transfer personal records forinvestigative purposes

to another agency or to an instrumentalityof any governmental jurisdiction within orunder the control of the United States for acivil or criminal law enforcement activity ifthe activity is authorized by law, and if thehead of the agency or instrumentality hasmade a written request to the agency whichmaintains the record specifying the particularportion desired and the law enforcementactivity for which the record is sought. [5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(7)]

under the guidance of the 1995 edition of the AGGuidelines, which contains a “best efforts” standard.Under that standard, the government agencieswere required to use their best efforts to see thatvictims were accorded statutory rights and services.The rights and services included identifying thevictims; providing them with referral informationfor medical, psychological counseling, compensa-tion, and restitution matters; providing themwith information about the status of the criminalinvestigation and later the prosecution of thecriminal case against the suspects; facilitatingvictim participation in the criminal case throughtrial attendance; and presenting impact informa-tion during the sentencing.

In January 2000, the Attorney General issued anew, revised edition of the AG Guidelines thatmakes it clear that some of the statutory victimservices are mandatory. Thus, federal law enforce-ment personnel must (1) identify the victims of acrime; (2) provide the victims with referral infor-mation and information about the status of theinvestigation and the major case events in theprosecution; and (3) arrange for reasonable protec-tion for the victims from intimidation and harass-ment. The revised AG Guidelines also containseveral new sections with guidance about how toprovide victim services in large cases, new guid-ance on attorney consultation with victims aboutmajor case events including plea bargains, anda new notification provision for posttrial caseevents. Moreover, the Oklahoma City bombingcase led to two new laws establishing enhancedvictim rights in federal criminal cases, which havebeen incorporated into the 2000 AG Guidelines.

First, the Oklahoma City bombing victims lobbiedCongress for the right to attend the trial if thevictim would be a witness only during the sentenc-ing phase of the trial. Judge Matsch had ruled thatvictims who were providing impact information atthe sentencing hearing were barred from watchingthe trial. In response, Congress passed 18 U.S.C.§ 3510(a), which gives federal crime victims theright to attend the trial regardless of whether the

victim intends to make a statement or provideany information in relation to the sentence.

Second, because the venue of theOklahoma City bombing trial was

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Legal IssuesPertaining toVictims ofTerrorism

The delay in providing the list was a major setbackto both FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office efforts toidentify victims and provide them with legallymandated rights and services. To address this prob-lem in the future, ARC, National TransportationSafety Board (NTSB), FEMA, and U.S. JusticeDepartment components (FBI, EOUSA, and

OVC) have entered into memorandaof understanding (MOUs) to enable co-ordination and the immediate transfer ofvictim information. Those MOUs are cur-rently under review to ensure that the PrivacyAct issues are addressed and completely resolvedin advance of any future terrorist event.

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S ince the bombing of the Murrah Building,OVC has been directly involved in provid-ing assistance to victims in several interna-

tional terrorism events affecting American citizens.OVC became involved in these cases at differentstages, and each case presented unique issues andchallenges. In one case, special legislation waspassed to enable OVC to provide the assistanceneeded by victim families. The following are ex-amples of the types of assistance OVC has pro-vided in recent major terrorist cases.

Bombing of Khobar Towers,Saudi Arabia, June 1996✦ OVC worked with the FBI to fund and orga-

nize a 2-day briefing for victim families inDecember 1998. The briefing provided fami-lies with information about the status of theinvestigation and about victim assistanceresources. In addition, U.S. Department ofDefense representatives were on hand to an-swer questions about military benefits andautopsy issues.

✦ OVC provided funds to the U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the District of Columbia to operatea toll-free telephone line for surviving fami-lies and injured victims and to provide a part-time victim specialist to maintain contactwith victims.

✦ OVC developed a special resource handbookand mailed it to victims.

Bombings of United StatesEmbassies, Kenya andTanzania,August 1998✦ OVC provided onsite assistance to the U.S.

Department of State when the families of

victims traveled to Washington, D.C., forthe arrival of the bodies of their loved ones.

✦ OVC transferred Emergency Reserve Fundsto the U.S. Department of State to assistvictims with emergency needs, such as un-compensated medical expenses and funeraland transportation costs, and to pay thesalary of a temporary person to serve as liai-son with victims.

✦ OVC provided funding and staff assistanceto sponsor a 2-day informational briefing inWashington, D.C., in May 1999, for injuredvictims and families of deceased victims.

✦ OVC provided staff assistance to help identi-fy resources and coordinate requests for crimevictim compensation and other services forindividual victims with available programs intheir states.

✦ OVC provided technical assistance and fund-ing to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for theSouthern District of New York for victim as-sistance during the upcoming trial.

Bombing of Pan Am Flight103, Lockerbie, Scotland,December 1988When Pan Am Flight 103 was bombed in 1988,few traditional victim assistance resources wereavailable to Americans who were victimized out-side the borders of the United States. Almost 12years after the crime occurred, the trial of two menaccused of the bombing began in a special ScottishCourt in the Netherlands under unique circum-stances. In April 1999, the Attorney Generalasked OVC to provide assistance to the victimfamilies during the trial, and Congress passed

Chapter VII

Recent InternationalTerrorism Cases

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were held in Washington, D.C.; Dumfries,Scotland; and London, England.

✦ OVC set up a secure information Web site,from which victim families can access up-dated information about the case, includingsummaries of daily proceedings and full courttranscripts; an “electronic scrapbook” ofarchival information on the bombing andthe victims; information about victims ser-vices; and a discussion forum for families tocommunicate with one another.

✦ OVC developed a trial briefing book for vic-tim families.

✦ OVC provided funding for onsite supportservices at the Scottish Court in theNetherlands, including a Crown Office pros-ecutor to serve as the legal liaison to the fam-ilies to explain Scottish law and procedure.

✦ OVC provided funding to create a securewaiting area for victim families at theScottish Court in the Netherlands.

✦ OVC provided funding and coordination tothe Scottish Court Service to establish fourremote sites in the United States and theUnited Kingdom for closed-circuit viewingof trial proceedings by victim families.

✦ OVC provided travel assistance for two fam-ily members per victim to attend the trialfor 1 week in the Netherlands or travel toone of the remote closed-circuit viewingsites.

✦ OVC established a fund to pay for uncom-pensated mental health counseling for im-mediate family members throughout the trialprocess.

special legislation, in May 1999, to enable OVCto use Emergency Reserve Funds for this purpose.

Although the case was to be prosecuted in aScottish Court under Scottish law, the U.S.Department of Justice and other federal agenciesprovided a great deal of assistance. OVC’s

assistance was viewed as a significant contributionto the trial. By establishing a unique partnershipwith the Scottish police, prosecutors, and courtpersonnel, OVC ensured that the information andassistance provided to the families was appropriate.OVC coordinated with Scottish authorities to as-sist Pan Am Flight 103 victims and families inmany ways.

✦ OVC created a comprehensive database con-taining updated contact information for al-most 700 family members of the 270 victims.

✦ OVC established an international, toll-freetelephone assistance and information lineaccessible from the 16 countries where vic-tim families are located.

✦ OVC provided funding assistance and coor-dination for case briefing meetings held forvictim families prior to the trial. Meetings

“Even with passage of time, the loss of my brother still isfelt deeply by all of us. Your efforts in keeping us in-formed about the Pan Am103 prosecution and arrange-ments are greatly appreciated. Your efforts have been areminder that there are people in Washington who alsohave not forgotten and who are working hard to seethat some measure of justice is obtained and that thefamilies of the victims are included in the process.”

—Brother of Pan Am Flight103 victim

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V ictims of violent crime experience a range ofneeds—physical, financial, emotional, andlegal. Victims are entitled by law in this

country to certain types of information and sup-port. Although victims of terrorism have much incommon with other violent crime victims andwith disaster victims, they appear to experiencehigher levels of distress that are in part due to theunique issues related to the traumatic elements,and often the magnitude, of these politically mo-tivated events. Witnessing the murder of peopleas they go about the everyday tasks of daily lifecreates a sense of horror and vulnerability thatmay last a lifetime. It may also put people at riskfor significant and long-term psychological diffi-culties. A number of factors increase the level oftraumatic stress for terrorism victims and presentspecial challenges to victims and to the profes-sionals charged with responding to them:

✦ The realization that the act and the resultingemotional and physical devastation was anintentional act directed not at individualsbut at the government.

✦ The scope and extent of the physical andemotional damage to victims, the age ofthe victims, and the defenselessness of thevictims.

✦ The often extraordinary financial cost of thedamage and losses associated with the crime.

✦ The duration of the event, including thelength of time it took to rescue the injured,to identify victims, and to recover and re-lease victim remains, and the inability to recover the remains of some victims.

✦ The extent of the intrusiveness of news cov-erage, especially the repetitive publication orbroadcast of disturbing visual images.

✦ Speculation about the perpetrators, motiva-tions, and the capacity of official agencies tohave prevented the act.

✦ The involvement of the criminal justice sys-tem, especially when the process is signifi-cantly delayed, or is lengthy and convoluted,or when a trial is held in another region orcountry.

✦ The difficulty in obtaining informationabout compensation, services, and the inves-tigation in cases where the event occurredoutside the boundaries of the United Statesand/or involve many victims from many dif-ferent geographical locations.

✦ The difficulty in identifying and taking intocustody perpetrators, particularly in crimesthat occur outside the United States.

✦ The difficulty in finding victim services andmental health professionals with experienceand expertise in dealing with the issues andneeds related to terrorism victimization.

Like other victims of violent crime, victims of ter-rorism need help in handling the crisis created bythe terrorist event, in stabilizing their lives, and indealing with the criminal justice process, whetherthere are an arrest and a trial or an arrest and atrial are delayed for years. Because each victim’scoping abilities and support systems are differentand his or her loss is individual, the needs of indi-vidual victims may vary. A process should be inplace to help victims assess their specific needsand find appropriate sources of help and support.Most victims will be able to function and stabilizeafter a period of time with moderate assistance,but a percentage of victims will continue to needassistance for years after the event.

Chapter VIII

Lessons Learned

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5. Victims of terrorism are considered victimsof a federal crime, but there may be manydifferent agencies at different levels of gov-ernment involved in the response. Coord-ination among federal, state, and localagencies is critical to effectively addressingthe needs of victims of terrorism.

6. Victims must be identified quickly and givenaccess to information and services.

7. Services and support must be victim sensi-tive and easily accessible.

8. Cases involving large numbers of victims re-quire special measures to ensure that ade-quate information and support to all victimsis provided in a timely and effective manner.Creative application of existing technology,such as Web sites, may help overcome chal-lenges presented by large numbers of victimswho are scattered geographically.

9. The impact of terrorism is not limited tophysical injury and property damage.Consideration and resources must be givento the emotional and psychological impactof terrorism, and decisions must be madeearly in the process regarding the delivery ofappropriate mental health services to victimsand responders, e.g., who is responsible forfunding, for how long, and what should bethe qualifications of those providing theservices.

10. Victim notification about and participationin the criminal justice process is an impor-tant aspect of how many victims come toterms with the criminal event.

The above lessons form the basis for the followingpolicy recommendations made to help improvefuture responses to acts of terrorism. A more pre-pared response to terrorism will provide for theneeds of victims not only in the immediate after-math of the crime but also during the judicialprocess and following the final case disposition.

Many people were involved in identifying the les-sons learned in the wake of the Oklahoma Citybombing: the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for theWestern District of Oklahoma and the District ofColorado, Project Heartland, Colorado OklahomaResource Council, Critical Incident WorkshopGroup, Inc., and the Oklahoma State CrimeVictim Compensation Program. The experiencesand lessons learned from the Oklahoma Citybombing were echoed in the responses to the ter-rorism cases that have occurred since 1995. Thelessons learned along the way were taught by vic-tims, victim advocates, criminal justice profession-als, mental health professionals, clergy, the media,and outside observers and include the following:

1. An effective response to victims of terrorismis dependent upon prior planning and coor-dination. Understanding the needs of vic-tims, clarifying the roles of responders, andbuilding trust among responding agencies areessential to developing and implementingworkable and effective interventions withvictims.

2. The victim population must be broadly de-fined to include not only the primary victimsand their families, but also first respondersand rescue workers, law enforcement, clergy,victim assistance personnel, and others whoare exposed to traumatized victims.

3. Identifying, setting aside, and effectivelymanaging resources are key to providing acomprehensive response. Encouraging coop-erative efforts between the public and pri-vate sector can maximize resources, leverageexpertise, and build a stronger sense of com-munity support.

4. State and federal laws mandate that certainrights and services be afforded to victims.Agencies and individuals charged with re-sponding to terrorism must be familiar withwhat the law requires.

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U nfortunately, the Oklahoma City bombingin 1995 was not the last act of terrorism in-volving Americans. It was followed by the

1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers UnitedStates military barracks in Saudi Arabia, the 1998bombing of the United States embassies in Kenyaand Tanzania, and the murders of two Americansas part of a terrorist attack in Uganda. Lessonswere learned in response to these acts of terrorismalong with those drawn from the trial of twoLibyans charged with the 1988 bombing of PanAm Flight 103. Lessons from these later experi-ences in addition to those from the OklahomaCity bombing combine to frame a more completeand informed set of policy recommendationsabout responding to victims of terrorism.

State and Local VictimAssistanceRecommendation 1

State and local authorities developing domesticemergency response plans should consider appli-cable legal requirements regarding the rights ofcrime victims and should include victim servicesrepresentatives in planning and testing responseprotocols.

DiscussionA number of efforts are ongoing involving federal,state, and local authorities to ensure that commu-nities are in position to respond to terrorism. Stateand local agencies should identify victim compen-sation and assistance resources available at thelocal, state, and federal levels to assist in respondingto acts of terrorism. OVC is working with the Officefor State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support(OSLDPS) to coordinate the development of train-ing and other tools focused on assisting victims. Inaddition, OVC and the U.S. Department of Statehave been working with an interagency task forceto develop protocols for responding to victims of

Chapter IX

Policy Recommendations

terrorism that occurs outside the borders of theUnited States.

Recommendation 2

Whenever possible, responding agencies shouldtake steps to avoid unnecessary delays in deathnotification and the release of victim remains tofamilies and to handle notification in a sensitivemanner.

DiscussionThe processes of recovery and identification ofremains may be extremely difficult and prolongedin terrorism crimes with mass casualties. Evidencehas to be gathered for the investigation and mayfurther delay the process, causing frustration andanger on the part of grieving families. The guidingprinciple should be to provide as much informa-tion as possible without jeopardizing either the accuracy of the identification or the evidence-gathering process. Death notification should behandled by professionals with training and expe-rience. Whenever possible, surviving familiesshould be consulted and their wishes honoredconcerning issues including whether to view theremains of their loved ones, how to inter humantissue that cannot be identified, and the timingof official ceremonies and memorial services.

Recommendation 3

In the immediate aftermath of a terrorism disaster,local officials should consider establishing a cen-tralized “compassion center” where victims can gofor information, crisis counseling, and privacy.

DiscussionIn addition to addressing comfort and privacyneeds of victim families, officials need to be ableto quickly reach families to obtain critical infor-mation necessary for identification and handlingof remains and for the investigation. The creationof a victim information center may have benefitsfor both victims and responding agencies.

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Recommendation 5

Application requirements and processing of crimevictim compensation and other types of servicesshould be streamlined and simplified for victimsto reduce the burden on victims and to ensurethat the process is victim friendly, that assistanceis timely, that paperwork is minimal, and thatagencies work together and share information.

DiscussionAgencies and organizations that make public andprivate benefits available to crime victims shoulddevelop necessary protocols and procedures tosimplify application processes without compromis-ing necessary checks and balances. In addition,they should offer assistance in completing formsand coordinate benefits to victims and survivors.Within the Guide to Responding to Mass-CasualtyIncidents, members of the National Association ofCrime Victims Compensation Boards (NACVCB)have included a special protocol for handlingcompensation claims for victims of terrorism cases.Agencies and organizations should consider estab-lishing contractual relationships with service pro-viding entities such as hospitals, funeral homes,and mental health providers to facilitate directbilling whenever possible, thereby relieving thevictim of additional and often confusing paperwork.

Recommendation 6

Local, state, and federal agencies responding to vic-tims of a terrorist act should consider establishingan “unmet needs” committee or task force thatincludes private organizations to ensure that theneeds of victims are identified and addressed andthat all of the available resources are coordinatedand used on behalf of victims.

DiscussionIn addition to creating a special task force to re-view unmet needs and coordinate resources in theaftermath of a terrorist incident, the NACVCB’sGuide to Responding to Mass-Casualty Incidentsrecommends that state compensation programsconsider establishing an advisory group to createa directory of resources with local, state, and national information about benefits and servicesavailable to victims of crime and mass disasters.

Recommendation 4

Mental health services should be made availablein the immediate aftermath of a terrorist act, andplans should be made for assessment and long-termprovision of services for victims and responders.

Discussion The response of mental health providers to ter-rorism victims and responders incorporates thefollowing points:

✦ Service providers should be screened, trained,and certified in the provision of mentalhealth services to victims of human-causeddisasters.

✦ Mental health services should be culturallysensitive and address diverse needs, beliefs,and lifestyles of all affected victims.

✦ Mental health services should provide forimmediate needs and long-term needs.Immediate needs may include services pro-vided by a trained counselor or chaplainduring death notification at a hospital or ata compassion center whereas long-termneeds may be served at a special, nontradi-tional counseling center for victims.

✦ Crime victims compensation programsshould have guidelines for funding mentalhealth services and should make the processas simple and accessible as possible.

The Office for Victims of Crime and the Center forMental Health Services (CMHS) at the SubstanceAbuse and Mental Health Services Administration(SAMHSA) are working together to develop ma-terials and training for community mental healthproviders about the impact of victimization andeffective models for treating victims and responders.Experience with violent victimization and terroristincidents have shown that mental health servicesneed to be in place for years, especially if thecriminal justice process is ongoing. States shouldallocate funding for these services and maximize

public and private resources for providingmental health services.

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Recommendation 7

States should consider establishing an emergencyfund or a process by which emergency funds canbe quickly allocated to respond to cases of terror-ism. This fund would pay for expenses that arenot reimbursable by the state crime victim com-pensation program and federal assistance funds.

DiscussionThe Oklahoma state legislature enabled theOklahoma Crime Victim Compensation programto accept public and private donations to create aspecial fund to provide compensation and assis-tance to the bombing victims and surviving familymembers. The program was also given the flexibil-ity to pay lost wages and cover grief counseling forfamily members of the victims. The creation ofthis special fund enabled the Oklahoma CrimeVictim Compensation program to help victimswith expenses not traditionally covered by theprogram. Policymakers should determine in ad-vance if legislation is required to establish a specialfund, what kinds of additional expenses will becovered by the fund, how much funding should beheld in reserve, and what financial resources areavailable to support special fund efforts.

Recommendation 8

Agencies serving victims should work together todevelop protocols for recruiting, screening, training,and supporting volunteers who work with terror-ism victims and their families.

DiscussionTo avoid confusion and conflict in the aftermathof a large-scale terrorism incident, guidelinesshould be developed ahead of time that determinewhich volunteers will be utilized, minimal qualifi-cations and training of volunteers, and volunteerdocumentation. Qualified mental health profes-sionals should be teamed with victim advocatesand present at all sites serving terrorism victims.Because a terrorism event may include the elementsof a large-scale disaster and criminal victimization,greater efforts should be made to link ARC staffand volunteers with victim assistance profession-als and volunteers. Each brings critical areas ofknowledge and expertise to the victim response.OVC should host a series of regional training

events that bring together victim assis-tance professionals and other professionalsand volunteers working in disaster relief.

Recommendation 9

States should ensure that their citizens who becomevictims of terrorism while traveling outside theborders of the United States are eligible for crimevictim compensation and services, and the uniqueneeds of these victims should be considered indeciding what crime-related expenses are allowable.

DiscussionA crime that occurs in a foreign country oftenpresents unique challenges to victims and victims’families or can exacerbate situations typicallyfaced by most victims. These factors may includethe cost of emergency overseas travel for familiesto go to the victim or for the victim to returnhome, emergency medical costs in countries wherepayment is expected instead of insurance, the costof transporting bodies, legal assistance in a foreigncountry, and the cost of traveling to criminal jus-tice proceedings.

Federal Victim AssistanceThe Federal agencies charged with responding toacts of terrorism, both domestically and abroad,should develop detailed protocols or a coordinatedcrisis response plan with the Office for Victims ofCrime to ensure that the rights and needs of ter-rorism victims are adequately supported.

Recommendation 1

Investigators, prosecutors, victim-witness coordi-nators, and court personnel should receive trainingon basic victims’ rights laws and services.

DiscussionThe Attorney General Guidelines on Victim andWitness Assistance provides a basis for training onlegal requirements. Supplemental training shouldinclude basic information on the mental healthconsequences of victimization and available re-sources and services for victims.

PolicyRecommendations

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protect victim information from public disclosureor inappropriate uses should not be used to with-hold victims’ names and contact information fromthe criminal justice agencies charged by federallaw with providing rights and services to crimevictims. Privacy Act issues should be addressedprior to an act of terrorism through MOUs or aspart of a coordinated crisis response plan. Providingvictim contact information to a law enforcementagency is a crucial exception to the Privacy Act.

Recommendation 4

Federal agencies should maintain a “fly-away”team of victim assistance experts, including anOVC representative, to provide onsite supportand technical assistance in developing the re-sponse to terrorism victims.

DiscussionOVC has identified individuals in federal andstate agencies and nonprofit programs with know-ledge and expertise in working with mass-casualtyand violent crime victims. Also, OVC has identi-fied people with the capacity to activate or locatefunding and other resources to assist communitiesin coping with a criminal disaster. OVC may beable to use VOCA funds to help support the costof support teams for immediate assistance and on-going technical assistance.

Recommendation 5

Prosecuting offices should establish mechanismsto ensure that victims are kept informed of caseevents, ongoing services, and support throughoutthe trial process.

A. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices should appoint anAttorney Liaison as an advisor for victimsand the trial team. Prior to the trial and dur-ing the trial, the Attorney Liaison shouldmaintain regular contact with victims to en-sure that they understand the prosecutionprocess.

B. Victims should have the opportunity to meetwith the trial team on a periodic basis toensure that prosecutors fulfill the require-ment to use their best efforts to consult withvictims about major case events and make

Recommendation 2

The FBI should ensure that plans and resourcesare in place to keep victims informed of the statusof the investigation and case events and thatagents can provide information and referrals tovictims for compensation and services.

DiscussionInvestigative agencies such as the FBI have responsibility for responding to victims of terror-ism until charges are filed, at which time the responsibility transfers to the relevant U.S.Attorney’s Office. Whenever possible, victimsshould be informed of critical case events by theinvestigative agency before that information is released to the media. The FBI should work closelywith the Office for Victims of Crime to coordinatesupplemental funding and assistance in dealingwith large numbers of victims. In cases of airlinedisasters, the FBI will need to coordinate with theFamily Assistance Program in the NationalTransportation Safety Board. Cases that occuroverseas require coordination with the U.S.Department of State, because that department ischarged with taking the lead in the emergencyresponse to terrorism against Americans abroad.Not all terrorism cases will result in an arrest andtrial as quickly as these events occurred after thebombing of the Murrah Building.24 It is not alwaysimmediately clear if a mass-casualty event is theresult of a criminal act as illustrated by the crashof TWA Flight 800. In addition, cases involvingchemical and biological agents may affect thou-sands of people and create huge challenges fordisseminating critical information about the med-ical impact of exposure, safety, and availability ofservices.25

Recommendation 3

Federal agencies need to ensure that identificationof victims and access to victim contact informationare established and maintained.

DiscussionThe FBI, EOUSA, and OVC should work with

ARC, NTSB, and others to ensure that victimcontact information is available to responding

investigative and prosecuting agencies in atimely fashion. Privacy laws intended to

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reasonable efforts to consult about proposedplea bargains.

C. Prosecutors and victim-witness coordinatorsshould ensure that plans are in place to enableas many victims as possible to participate incourt proceedings. In addition, a mechanismshould be in place for providing victim im-pact information at sentencing in the eventof a guilty plea or verdict.

DiscussionProsecutors and victim-witness coordinators arerequired to follow the AG Guidelines to ensurethat they are in compliance with federal laws andU.S. Department of Justice policy regarding vic-tims. Cases involving large numbers of victimsand victims living in many parts of the countryor the world may require special funding and thedevelopment of creative measures. Offices mayconsider tools such as toll-free information lines,special Web sites for victims, and the develop-ment of specific information guides for keepingvictims informed of case events and for providinginformation about services.26 Prosecutors shouldwork with the court to facilitate victim participa-tion. Large numbers of victims may pose chal-lenges for enabling victims to present victim impactinformation at sentencing. Prosecutors shouldwork with the victims to develop a plan that willallow as many victims as possible to present theirinformation orally or in writing.

D. In cases where there is a change of venue,prosecutors should work with the court toensure that reasonable efforts are made tomake a closed-circuit telecast of the trialavailable to as many victims as possible, toidentify resources for travel assistance, andto identify and put into place support forvictims in the community in which the trialis being held.

DiscussionFacilities for closed-circuit viewing by victimsshould be designed or selected with sensitivity tothe needs of victims for privacy, reasonable com-fort, and safety. Resources for victims’ travel maycome from private or public funds. In the

Oklahoma City bombing trials, a sitewas established in Oklahoma City forvictims to view the trial, whereas four siteswere established for victim families in the PanAm Flight 103/Lockerbie trial, since victim fam-ilies resided in 21 countries and 48 states.Assistance with victims traveling to theOklahoma City bombing trials and the Pan AmFlight 103 trial received funding support fromOVC because Congress passed special legislationenabling OVC to use VOCA funds to supportthese activities. The Denver community estab-lished an effective and extensive network of sup-port for the Oklahoma City bombing victimstraveling to the trial. In the case of the Pan AmFlight 103/Lockerbie trial, which is being held inthe Netherlands, OVC has been able to providefunding for victim support staff and station themat the special court and to create a secure familywaiting area in the court building.

E. When a terrorism act results in multiple tri-als, prosecutors and victim assistance profes-sionals should coordinate their activities toreduce the demands and stresses on victims,surviving families, and witnesses.

DiscussionMaintaining consistent communication betweenprosecutors and victim assistance professionals willhelp reduce confusion and duplication of efforts andensure that the needs of both victims and the trialprosecutors are met in a timely manner.

Recommendation 6

The U.S. Department of Justice should assist vic-tims with media requests by providing a media li-aison with expertise in working with victims toreduce unnecessary trauma to victims and to en-sure that journalists have access to the informa-tion they need to cover the story withoutnegatively affecting victims.

DiscussionHigh-profile cases, such as terrorism cases, elicitintense media attention. The following issuesmust be considered when giving media what theyneed without overwhelming victims or violatingtheir privacy and freedom of movement:

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that enable personnel to access assistance with-out fear of adverse impact on employment.Supervisors should work with affected employeesto develop appropriate plans to help employees“reenter” their regular job once their responsi-bilities for the terrorism case are completed.Employee Assistance Programs should work close-ly with federal supervisors and managers to identi-fy appropriate steps for employee reintegrationinto the workplace, with special attention givento the types of assignments, the work environ-ment, and timing.

Recommendation 9

Federal agencies whose employees may be targetedby acts of terrorism, including those with embassiesand installations abroad, should have informationand procedures for responding to employee victimsand their families. Information about various ben-efits and the processes for obtaining those benefitsshould be streamlined.

DiscussionOVC and the U.S. Department of State arecochairing an interagency task force to addressthe complex needs of victims of terrorism abroad.One of the tasks identified by this group isto improve access to information and coordina-tion among agencies related to employee benefits.

Recommendation 10

Federal agencies with funding for victim supportand mental health services should determinewhich types of services and for what length oftime they will provide funding support for theseservices to state and local agencies.

DiscussionFederal agencies need to develop an appropriateplan for supporting assistance to victims of terror-ism that takes into account the long-term needsof these victims and the need for significant in-vestment in services by the affected state andlocal jurisdictions. Federal agencies should coordinate funding and services and ensure thatthe effectiveness of the services is evaluated. TheFEMA–CMHS approach to providing mentalhealth services in the aftermath of presidentially

✦ Coordination of large numbers of requestsfor information from the media.

✦ Protection of victims who do not wish to in-teract with the media.

✦ Assurance of accuracy of reports.

✦ Assurance of sensitive and fair treatment ofvictims.

Recommendation 7

Federal court personnel should have policies andprocedures that reflect current law and relevantcourt decisions affecting victim participation injudicial proceedings.

DiscussionNew statutes were passed in the wake of theOklahoma City bombing, and there have beenchanges related to restitution and other victim-related issues. OVC is supporting a project by theNational Center for State Courts to develop abench book for state and local judges and courtpersonnel on victim participation in court proceed-ings. The federal courts should consider developinga similar bench book or include victim issues inthe standard bench book already in use.

Recommendation 8

The U.S. Department of Justice should developand implement a plan for support and assistanceto minimize the vicarious trauma impact on inves-tigators, prosecutors, and victim assistance person-nel who are directly involved with primary victims.

DiscussionBeing involved in a mass-casualty terrorism case isan intense experience at physical, emotional, andpsychological levels. The closer an individualworks with traumatized victims, the more likelyhe or she will experience secondary trauma.Agencies ask a great deal of employees who handlethese cases, and they should ensure that assis-tance and support is available to their employees.Efforts should be made to provide information

about vicarious trauma to personnel and super-visors, and mechanisms should be enacted

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declared natural disasters is a good model to followand adapt to the specific needs of victims ofhuman-caused disasters. CMHS and OVC areworking together to assist state mental healthagencies and other providers in training andmaintaining a staff of experienced individualswho are trained in trauma resulting from terrorism.27

Recommendation 11

The Office for Victims of Crime should ensurethat responding criminal justice and emergencyresponse agencies are aware of the existence ofOVC’s Emergency Reserve Fund and the abilityof OVC to assist in coordinating services and in-formation for victims of crime.

DiscussionIn the immediate aftermath of an act ofterrorism, OVC staff should contact the re-sponding agency as soon as possible to estab-lish a point of contact, to provide technicalassistance, and to provide special or supplementalfunding if required. Congress should consideramending the statute authorizing the use of thereserve fund for terrorism cases to enable thefunds to be provided to a wider range of agencies,including the FBI, NTSB, and the U.S. Agencyfor International Development, and to use thefunds to cover a broader range of services, includ-ing emergency travel expenses, mental healthservices, and trial support.

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Chapter X

Conclusion

T he Oklahoma City bombing experience pro-vided a closeup view of the devastation ofterrorism. It severely tested the effectiveness

of victims’ rights laws and policies, the adequacyof resources for victims of terrorism, and the ca-pacity of victim services networks. The OklahomaCity experience was a step in developing a moreeffective crisis response plan for victims and theirfamilies. The bombing has been the impetus forcongressional hearings; passage of special fundinglegislation for victim relief; the confluence of ex-perts in emergency preparedness, medical andmental health, victim assistance, and other fieldsto examine their crisis response capacity andplans; training development; and identificationand coordination of resources.

Many of the lessons learned from the OklahomaCity bombing response have helped shape the re-sponse of federal, state, and local officials in othercases of terrorism including the school shootingsat Columbine High School and the terrorist at-tacks on Khobar Towers and the United Statesembassies in Kenya and Tanzania; these lessonshave also been wed during the preparations forthe trial concerning the bombing of Pan AmFlight 103. Involvement in these subsequent caseshas significantly added to a knowledge of whatneeds to be done to assist the victims of terrorism.

This knowledge has come not only from those in-volved in responding to victims but also from thevictims themselves who have shared their painfulexperiences so that lessons could be learned andtheir losses would not be in vain.

Now that terrorism has crossed the borders of theUnited States, it poses a very real threat withinthe United States while continuing to be a threatto Americans abroad. The goal of terrorism is notjust to kill people but to send a message to thepublic and to the government. The devastatingimpact of a single act of terrorism can last for gen-erations. Federal, state, and local governmentsmust be prepared to respond to all aspects of ter-rorist acts, including finding ways to mitigate thephysical, emotional, and psychological impact onvictims and those professionals who are chargedwith responding to these terrible crimes.

The recommendations presented in this report arenot comprehensive, but they are intended to bepractical and useful steps that will help refine andimprove the crisis response to terrorism. Public of-ficials at all levels of government can implementthese recommendations to ensure that thisNation’s communities and agencies are betterequipped to respond to the victims of future actsof terrorism.

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1. Interview with Ray Blakeney, Director ofOperations for the Office of the Chief MedicalExaminer, State of Oklahoma, April 19, 2000.

2. Some officials observed that the arrival ofOVC-sponsored crisis intervenors came too soonafter the explosion and recommended agenciesdelay this kind of assistance until the immediaterescue effort is completed.

3. The defense argued that an unidentified legcould have belonged to the perpetrator. The legwas later identified as belonging to one of the victims.

4. The Employee Assistance Program at the U.S.Department of Justice has now developed PeerSupport Team Training including a section onCritical Incident Trauma.

5. After the suicide of a colleague, some employ-ees took advantage of Project Heartland’s counsel-ing and debriefing resources.

6. Christy Prietsch, Administrator, U.S. AttorneysEmployee Assistance Program.

7. Under its own guidelines, FEMA could onlyprovide funding for crisis response services in thepresidentially declared disaster area and for a lim-ited period of time. FEMA funds could not beused for trial support.

8. OVC’s grant, awarded on March 11, 1997,funded crisis counseling during the trials at theSafe Haven in Oklahoma City and the SafeHaven in Denver, operated by the ColoradoOklahoma Resource Council, including volunteertraining. Project Heartland staff also assisted U.S.Attorney’s Office staff in debriefing prosecutionwitnesses when they completed testimony.

Notes

9. According to 42 U.S.C.10607(e)(2): “the term‘victim’ means a person that has suffered directphysical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a resultof the commission of a crime, including (A) inthe case of a victim that is an institutional entity,an authorized representative of the entity; and (B)in the case of a victim who is under 18 years ofage, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, oneof the following (in order of preference): (i) aspouse; (ii) a legal guardian; (iii) a parent; (iv) achild; (v) a sibling; (vi) another family member;or (vii) another person designated by the court.”

10. Because the bomb blast made the 26-storyapartment building unstable, all residents wereforced to move to hotels for 6 months. Many wereelderly and disabled, and most knew parents orgrandparents of children killed in the explosion.Following several other attempts, ProjectHeartland initiated a support group for residents.On completion of renovations, all ProjectHeartland staff helped tenants move back totheir apartments.

11. Under a later Interagency Agreement (March4, 1997) between EOUSA, OVC, and the FBI,EOUSA agreed to “assign its personnel and/orVictim-Witness Coordinators from other USAs’[U.S. Attorneys’] offices to assist with victim ser-vices on location at the discretion of the USA” inthe case of a catastrophic event. OVC agreed toprovide financial and technical support for emer-gency victim services and to “commit staff timeand funds necessary to enable the staff of the U.S.Attorney’s Office and the FBI to receive onsitetechnical assistance.”

12. Assistant United States Attorney K. LynnAnderson.

13. To protect victim privacy and avoid any possi-bility of tainting the jury pool, the U.S. Attorney’sOffice in consultation with Project Heartland recommended against private-housing offers.


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witnesses and sifted evidence; medical personnel;victim advocates; clergy who consoled victimsand officiated at many funerals; schoolteachers;and children whose belief in a safe future wasshattered. The circle of those affected also in-cludes jurors, dentists with identification responsi-bilities, bomb technicians, morgue workers,technical investigators, National Guard mem-bers, reporters, photographers, construction work-ers, and the larger community of Oklahoma City.From June 1, 1995, to February 29, 1998, anunduplicated count of 8,869 persons receivedcounseling, support group, or crisis interventionservices.

18. According to the National Institute of MentalHealth (Faberow and Frederick, 1978), there isalso a fifth and final stage, the “recovery” stage,where life has returned to a state of normalcy andvictims draw strength from the fact that they havesurvived and were able to mend their lives.

19. Interview with James Horn, Critical IncidentWorkshop Groups, Inc.

20. Interviews with James Horn, Diane Leonard,and Col. Jack Poe, Critical Incident WorkshopGroups, Inc.

21. Interview with K. Lynn Anderson, AssistantU.S. Attorney.

22. In 1996, Congress passed the MandatoryVictim Restitution Act, which requires FederalCourts to award restitution for most crimes de-fined in title 18 U.S.C.

23. The Privacy Act only covers Federal Govern-ment agencies defined as “any Executive depart-ment, military department, Governmentcorporation, Government controlled corporation,or other establishment in the executive branchof the [Federal] Government (including theExecutive Office of the President), or any inde-pendent regulatory agency” (5 U.S.C. § 552a(1)).Private organizations that have many “links” tothe Federal Government are not covered by thePrivacy Act (see Dong v. Smithsonian Institution,125 F.3d 877, 879–80 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 922 (1998) (SmithsonianInstitution)).

The Travel Committee supported the recommen-dation by issuing a press release on the victims’need for privacy while attending the trial.

14. Agencies making up CORC were CatholicCharities, Church of the Holy Ghost, City ofDenver, Colorado Council of Churches, ColoradoDivision of Criminal Justice, Colorado Organi-zation for Victims’ Assistance, Denver DistrictAttorney’s Office, Denver Victims Service Center,Downtown Denver Partnership, Denver FederalExecutive Board, Governor Roy Romer’s Office,Lutheran Family Services/Lutheran DisasterResponse, Mayor Wellington Webb’s Office,Mile High United Way, American Red Cross,District Attorney’s Victim/Witness Programs,and Volunteers of America. The U.S. Attorney’sOffice for the Western District of Oklahoma par-ticipated in an advisory capacity.

15. With judicial approval established, theAttorney Liaison and Colorado District CourtClerk convened FAA representatives, judicial ad-ministrators, U.S. Marshals Service representatives,media representatives, Judge Perricone, and othersto plan logistics including security, meals, privacy,and mental health needs during the broadcasts.Later meetings on mental health support tookplace with FAA staff, Safe Haven and ProjectHeartland counselors, and victim-witness coordi-nators. Planning involved both facilities—theCCTV site in the auditorium and the Safe Haven.The Attorney Liaison also participated in trainingprograms for the mental health and communityvolunteers who would staff the FAA Safe Haven.

16. In establishing the four remote court sites inthe Pan Am Flight 103/Lockerbie trial, the issueabout the quality of the transmission of the trialbroadcasts was addressed by using a high bandwidth, positioning six movable cameras in thecourtroom, and using an audio-visual director tochoreograph the detailed images appearing on thescreen.

17. “Secondary” and “tertiary” victims include social service and mental health professionals;

volunteers; fire, police, and other emergency response-and-rescue personnel; colleagues

and friends; attorneys who worked with


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Notes

24. The hijacking of an Egypt Air jet and thebombing of the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia in themid-1980s each took more than 10 years to cometo trial. The trial of two men accused of the PanAm Flight 103 bombing in 1988 finally began inMay 2000. To date, there has not been an arrestin the bombing of Khobar Towers.

25. It is probably unrealistic to expect that theFBI or OVC maintain staffing resources to copewith either short-term or extended efforts to pro-vide information to large numbers of victims. NTSBcontracts with a private company that specializesin crisis response, has the ability to quickly establishand maintain a toll-free victim assistance hotline,and provides ongoing notification. The FBI andOVC should consider utilizing the same type ofresources in terrorism cases, particularly when thevictims are not from one geographic region.

26. The case of Pan Am Flight 103 isan example of how to keep informedlarge numbers of victims who are scatteredgeographically. A secure, informational Website was established for the families of Pan AmFlight 103/Lockerbie victims to provide themwith daily trial summaries and other related infor-mation.

27. CMHS, SAMHSA, U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services, developed a report,Human-Caused Disasters: Recommendations for theCrisis Counseling and Assistance Program (Centerfor Mental Health Services, ND). This report con-tains important and detailed recommendations forimproving the mental health response to victimsof terrorism and other human-caused disasters. OVCstaff participated in the development of the report.


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Center for Mental Health Services. (No Date).Human-Caused Disasters: Recommendations for theCrisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program.Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health andHuman Services.

The Daily Oklahoman. April 20, 1995.

Faberow, N.L., and C.J. Frederick. (1978).Training Manual for Human Service Workers inMajor Disasters. Rockville, MD: National Instituteof Mental Health.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (July 3,1996). Report on Outstanding Issues in OklahomaCity, Oklahoma as Related to the Bombing of theA.P. Murrah Federal Building. Washington, DC:Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Flynn, Brian. (1995). “Thoughts and ReflectionsFollowing the Bombing.” Journal of AmericanPsychiatric Nurses Association, 1: 166–170.

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