1MI7/l012 Reasonable Self-Esteem RICHARDKESHEN MeGill-Queen's University Press Montreal &KingstonLondonBuffalo ICW4n. A.. Air a;IIMI &tlt-Eatm. Uom.el, QC, CAN:PIMIIMS. p .. eowtllN e1ees.dghto-. tueynot '- 1tl11out """''"""" -lhpubllther, NICIIIII._.ru-ponnlttad ,....u.S.orOIIIIIICIIIIOOII)'Iahtla... 1/17 1MI7/l012 (') McCiiJ-Queen's Univt.'fsi tyPress 19')6 1$BS(clot:h) ISDNo-77)5- 1)73..() (paper) Ltgd d('positflfSt quarter 1996 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec This book has ba-n publishedwith tlw help of a grant fromthe Canadlanfederation!otthe llumanities, usingfunds provided bythe Social SC'JCJ'lctSand RestMch Coundl of Canada, McCiii-Queffl'sUniversityPressis gratefoJtothe Canada Council for .support of its publishing program. Keshen,Richard,t 946--self-t$1-'m loc-ludes bjbliogr:tphkaJrefcren.c-esMd lndex. f$8NOo7])5LJ72-8 (bound)-IS ON Q-77}5'1)7}-6 (pbk.) 1. 1.litle. >79c:m Ill pUblloh.,, !Wr u- '*"'lbd ..-u.-. or....,rl- 1MI7/l012 Contents Prefacexi Acknowledgmentsxiii PARTONEREASONSFORSELF-ESTEEM 1Self-Esteem and theReasonable Person3 The concept of areason for se/j-.esteemis defined. Six guideline.C.O.Ilcept Js.iJ)lpliCitil\tJ\e.'V.a.Y.':':'! e.x.e.r: cise our capacity tomake self-ascriptions. To ascribe a characteristic to oneself i.sto refer to oneself (which in English we do mainly with the word "!"),and. to refer to oneself is ipso facto to distinguish onesel.f fromallotherentitiesintheworld.Manyofour self-ascriptions presuppose we have a history. This assumption i.s most evident when I ascribe tothe characteristic of having done or felt something inthe past.Itis also evident whenI ascribe to myself some person-alitytrait,suchasbeing quick-tempered,forsuch aself-ascription presupposes I have behavedinaquick-tempered way inthe past. 8>Reasonsfor Self-Esteem Nowitis one thing to apply the concept of person-distinctness to oneself andyet anothertogivemoral weightto the self-ascription. In ananalogous way.we canimag.inethattwopeopleeachknow thatthepropertyofbeingaCanadianappliesto himself,butthat only one of them attaches weighttothe fact. And just aswe can ask whatfactorscontributetoaperson's givingweighttohisbeinga Canadian, so we can ask whatfactorscontributetoaperson's sense of being a distinct person. Before discussing such fuctors, I must make the following clarification. Few philosophers would deny that '"e are distinct individuals with ahistory and an inner life- subjects-of-a-life, to use TomRegan's apt phrase,'> Difficulties arise,however,when we tryto saymore clearly inwhat our identities throughtime, quadistinct individuals, consist. Docsthe conceptof personalidentity presuppose,for example,that there is some one unchanging thing whkh we uniquely are and whkh remains the same throughout ou.rlives? Tnthis case, the unity of our livt'S from birth to death would be ascribable to this underlying entity which binds the temporal stages o1 our Jives together. If our ordinary concept of personal identity does tprcsupposc this,docs the ordinary concept, as some arsue, rest on a false belief? Wouldit in fact be truer to say that our identity through time consists simply in the continuity andronnectedness of our changing properties, withoutthere neces-sarilybeing some onething whichremains the same?Inthislatter view,wewouldultimately be akindof association of changinglife-stages.Now it isimportantto seethat neither of these metaphysical interpretations deniesthat we arc distinctindividuals with ahistory andaninner life.Tnparticula.r,mybeing an association of evolving propertiesdoesnotmeanIdonotexistasanumericallydistinct individual, justas atable's beingcomposed of evcr-