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This article was downloaded by: [University of South Carolina ] On: 04 October 2013, At: 02:57 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rfia19 RITUAL, RELATIONSHIP, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN LAOS Stephen K. Bailey a a Nyack College, USA Published online: 27 Apr 2010. To cite this article: Stephen K. Bailey (2004) RITUAL, RELATIONSHIP, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN LAOS, The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs, 2:1, 3-10, DOI: 10.1080/15435725.2004.9523167 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15435725.2004.9523167 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions

RITUAL, RELATIONSHIP, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN LAOS

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This article was downloaded by: [University of South Carolina ]On: 04 October 2013, At: 02:57Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The Brandywine Review of Faith &International AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rfia19

RITUAL, RELATIONSHIP, AND RELIGIOUSLIBERTY IN LAOSStephen K. Bailey aa Nyack College, USAPublished online: 27 Apr 2010.

To cite this article: Stephen K. Bailey (2004) RITUAL, RELATIONSHIP, AND RELIGIOUSLIBERTY IN LAOS, The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs, 2:1, 3-10, DOI:10.1080/15435725.2004.9523167

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15435725.2004.9523167

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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2 | spring 2004 | 3 the brandywine review of faith & international affairs

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR or Laos) has often been listed by the U.S. Commission on International

Religious Freedom as a nation that should be designated a “country of particular concern” regarding religious freedom. “A ‘country of particular concern’ (CPC) is defined by law as a country the government of which has either engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, defined as violations that are ‘systematic, ongoing, and egregious’.”1 In many ways, the religious persecution endured by the small population of Christians in Laos easily meets this defini-tion of “particularly severe.” Between 1994 and 2002 the Lao government quietly called on provincial authorities to get rid of the Christian communities or to at least contain them within their areas of jurisdiction. Local authorities have confiscated church buildings, Christians have been arrested, and many have been forced to sign affidavits renouncing their faith. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, designation as a CPC is a foreign policy tool that aims to prevent abuses like these through a combination of denunciation (being named to the list of CPCs is meant to help shame countries into reform) and punishment (CPC designation triggers the imposition or continuance of economic sanctions).

Thankfully there has recently been a marked improvement in the area of religious freedom in the Lao PDR. In fact, in the State Department report on international religious freedom, Laos was one of only two countries this past year that was acknowledged as having shown significant improvement. But the change may have little to do with the threat of CPC designation (which is ironic since contro-versies over CPC designation tend to preoccupy activists and the media). Instead these improvements in religious freedom are due to the timely convergence of two things: the political adjustments made by the Lao govern-ment to the realities of being part of the global community, and the Christian community’s discernment that it is better to help Lao society negotiate these adjustments than to punish its government for being reluctant to make them. The former process is a story whose details often elude even the most informed observer of Laos. The Lao political process has been an extremely opaque one due to legendary secrecy

RITUAL, RELATIONSHIP, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN LAOS

By Stephen K. Bailey

Stephen K. Bailey is Assistant Professor of Missiology at Alliance Theological Seminary, where he teaches cross-cultural com-munication, anthropology, and sociology. He also serves as director of the Alliance Graduate School of Mission. He worked in Laos and with Lao refugees in Thailand for 16 years. He holds a M.Div. in Intercultural Studies from Alliance Theological Seminary and a M.Th. and a Ph.D. degree from Fuller Theological Seminary.

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of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party and the Lao government.2 The latter process has been a collaborative one between Lao and foreign Christians who desire to contribute positively to the future of the Lao PDR.

The Christian effort in the arena of religious freedom has been guided by an appre-ciation for the cultural and social history of Laos. More particularly, this has meant account-ing for the rich roles that ritual and relationships play in Lao society. Lao Christian leaders are making a deliberate effort to ritually recognize the authority of the Lao gov-ernment, to resist their own tendency as a religious minority to with-draw, and to signal a willingness to participate in national development. This strategy seems to be paying off.

A patient methodology of relationship-building is vital in the Lao context. Westerners unfamiliar with the cultural assumptions of Southeast Asian cultures often disastrously underestimate the importance of relationship. Not long ago I asked a Thai diplomat work-ing in the U.S. what was the most difficult challenge he faced in working with American diplomats. Without hesitating he said, “In my culture we play together before we work to overcome difficulties. Americans always want to achieve their goals before playing.” In the context of religious freedom, a properly cultivated relationship creates the possibility of speaking with those in authority as a friend about the realpolitik consequences of violations of religious freedom, and the positive benefits that flow from respecting religious freedom.3

I want to suggest that the recent decline in religious persecution—while certainly helped along by the Lao government’s drive for eco-nomic prosperity—has actually been enabled by the attention to ritual and relationship. In this essay I hope to show how ritual and rela-tionship can be keys to addressing religious freedom in the Lao PDR and in other coun-tries with similar social experiences.

Landlocked Borders In More Ways Than One

If ever a country had reason to be suspi-cious of foreigners it is Laos. Geographically landlocked, Laos is vulnerable at multiple levels to the ebb and flow of the larger politi-cal concerns of its neighbors—those near and far. With a population of just over 6 mil-

lion, Laos is surrounded by populations of more than a billion (China), 77 million (Vietnam), 63 million (Thailand), 51 million (Myanmar), and 12 million (Cambodia). Ever since the collapse of the ancient Kingdom of a Million Elephants (Lan

Xang) in 1695, the history of Laos has been one of foreign interference.4 In more recent times it has been colonized by France (1893-1945), and subsequently dominated by the U.S. (1950s and 1960s), the U.S.S.R. (1975-1989), and Vietnam (1975-1990).5

But Laos is landlocked in a more signifi-cant way at the social level. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is one of the most stable and secretive in history. During the 1980s foreign aid workers would often sneak Time and Newsweek magazines into the offi-cials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that they would have information from outside the country. Today the foreign investment laws, tourism, and the Internet have enabled the free flow of information. Nevertheless, politically Laos remains painfully concerned about its borders, the integration of minority groups that make up at least one third of the population,6 and political dissent.7

More than Materialism

Violations of religious freedom in Laos have created the usual debate over how the international community should best respond. Some nations have opted to ignore the vio-lations and continue to pump monetary assistance into the Lao economy, with the hope that this will help bring prosperity. The assumption underlying this response is that

ritual, relationship, and religious liberty in laos

westerners unfamiliar with the cultural assumptions

of southeast asian cultures often disastrously underestimate the

importance of relationship

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when prosperity comes, the Lao government will be forced to deal with a greater level of diversity on both social and political fronts. This has basically been the approach of Japan and some European nations.8

On the other hand, the approach of the U.S. government and numerous Christian organizations has been to publicly criticize the Lao and rally international opinion against the persecution of Christians. This public outcry has the potential of creating a mood in which economic exchanges—both in terms of public aid and private business investments—could be used to leverage Lao religious policy. The linchpin of this approach for the U.S. govern-ment has been to withhold Normal Trade Relations (NTR) from Laos. This has served to create a kind of undeclared economic embargo. Without NTR, Lao goods and services become subject to unusually high tariffs in U.S. mar-kets. For instance, during the 1990s I was involved in an income-generation project that sought to help market Lao and Hmong handi-crafts. U.S. tariffs on products from Laos made this all but impossible as many of our appliqué and woven crafts were taxed 100% or more.

Both kinds of responses reflect a funda-mental belief that “money makes the world go round.” In the first case, the assumption is that only after a certain level of prosper-ity is achieved can a society tolerate a context of religious diversity. In the second case the assumption is that governments “of particular concern” will give in to social, religious, and political diversity only when their national prosperity is at stake. The reliance on these perspectives—which can be seen as two sides of the same coin—is not surprising given the fundamentally materialist worldview propa-gated by both Marxism and capitalism during the 20th century. That human societies are essentially driven by the pursuit of prosper-ity has been a fundamental assumption in the Western world for some time. The debate has only turned on the question of how material prosperity should be pursued.

But just when the West won the Cold War and it appeared that the free market propo-nents had won the debate, a new controversy

emerged over the validity of the global pursuit of a purely capitalist vision. An increasing number of people have become skeptical if not resistant to the assumption that societies should be built with economic concerns at the center. True, few people if any will forego the chance to prosper, but there is no consensus about the number of cultural and religious sacrifices a society should make in pursuit of prosperity. Clearly, the high-speed global pursuit of prosperity is causing a great deal of stress on many local cultures and religious communities. Of course, prosperous countries do tend to have a better record on religious freedom than do impoverished nations. But why is this so? What do we need to understand about impoverished nations that can help us understand why they often engage in or turn a blind eye to the persecution of religious minorities?

What is usually overlooked in respond-ing to societies that violate religious freedom is that they are often socially structured in fundamentally different ways from the coun-tries—like the U.S.—that criticize them. In order to understand what is most important about how and why they differ, it is necessary to draw on insights from social anthropology. While it is hard for social scientists to agree on any final list of social laws that are relevant in every society, I will suggest with social anthropologist Mary Douglas that there are at least two things people “always” do. First, they organize themselves in groups by establishing boundaries to clarify who is in and who is out of the group. Second, they establish rules for relationships within the group in order to com-municate meaningfully. All societies invariably seem to do these two things. What is variable, according to Douglas, is the degree of confor-mity demanded of individuals by the group and the number of rules established for relationships within the group. A high degree of conformity is accompanied by a deep concern for the social boundaries that define the social group. A large number of rules for social interaction is accom-panied by a preference for formality and ritual in communication. Mary Douglas has called

stephen k. bailey

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ritual, relationship, and religious liberty in laos

these two social dynamics “group” and “grid,” respectively.9

Group and GridDespite their many differences, the cul-

tures of nations like Laos, Vietnam, Iran, and Sudan—and all the nations listed as CPCs in 2003—share in common a deep need to care-fully define and protect their social boundaries, and also a preference for numerous rules for structuring relationships within society. People in high “group” societies, like Laos, do not easily distinguish between personal identity and the group in the way that people in low group societies do. At least three tendencies flow out of this social reality. First, the welfare of the group is more important than that of the individual. Second, religion and national iden-tity are highly interdependent. And third, the people of these societies do not make as large a distinction between form and meaning as do Western people.

Lao society functions very much like a tight family in which each member of the family has clearly scripted roles and responsibilities. For instance, Lao authorities look for the participa-tion of each household, village, and province in every important national gathering and event. A representative from each household-village-province is required to satisfy the demands of the hierarchy. These representatives are assumed to be responsible for communicat-ing about the event to the other members of their communities. If a representative does not participate, it is seen as offensive and threaten-ing to the social order. In short, persons and groups that are not integrated into the national hierarchy cause the group to feel unsafe.

In a similar vein, to be Lao is to be Buddhist. One of the biggest mistakes made by the LPRP was the attempt to establish the legitimacy of their authority without Buddhism playing a role. This was corrected starting in the early 1990s and today all the key leaders in the nation are seen publicly participating in the important Buddhist rituals throughout the year. Tradition, religion, and political authority feed off each other in high group and high grid societies.

This second tendency leads us into the third one. When Lao government officials see Lao giving their allegiance to Christian reli-gious forms it is assumed that they have also given their allegiance to the West. To their way of thinking, all good Lao are Buddhists. In a high group society, the ability to distinguish between Christian forms that have Western meaning and those that have Lao meaning is not a given. Unfortunately, Western-looking churches in Laos often serve as symbols that suggest allegiance to Western Christianity and by extension to “the enemy” (i.e. the West, or, more specifically, the U.S.).

In high “grid” societies (societies in which there are numerous rules for relationships within the group) religion must be externalized in symbols, rituals, and relationships. While the focus of religion in Western societies is on internalized values and ideals, high grid societies demonstrate their deepest concerns (religious or otherwise) in ritualized actions that reinforce key patron-client relationships, such as parent to child, teacher to student, and government to citizen. Hierarchies demand at least ritual acknowledgement from all legiti-mate persons and groups within their domain of governance. Yet, once this acknowledgement is made there is often more freedom granted to nonconformists than one might think.

Another characteristic of high grid societ-ies is the building of identity within clearly defined social roles. These roles are not only well defined and clear to everyone but they are also protected. Only men can perform some religious duties such as the merit-making ritu-als done by male monks in Buddhist temples, or khwan spirit rituals done for an ill person. In the same way, only women should serve as Nang Tiam spirit mediums, or cook and clean clothes. (Of course necessity can force the swapping of roles.) With many rules come many social categories; everything has a place and every person a role.

Perhaps the most important thing to notice about the high grid nature of hierarchies is that ritual is important in these environments due to the preference for indirect communication. In the United States ritual is “only ritual.” In

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stephen k. bailey

other words, rituals in American society—in keeping with the American social experi-ence—often lack power to really change social realities. The opposite is true in a traditional hierarchy. There ritual is the primary means of empowering the social system’s status quo and of changing it. Ritual itself is a potent kind of indirect media for communication. Indirect communication serves the role of allowing the authorities the space to adjust to new realities without undercutting the honor and legitimacy of the hierarchy itself.

Religious Minorities in a Hierarchical Social Order

Let me now describe how these tendencies in hierarchical societies have played a part in the Lao government’s viola-tions of religious freedom of the Christian com-munity. Frequently when I have informally asked government officials about the local Christian commu-nity they have responded by accusing Christians of being “hard headed.” When asked for clarification, the frequent answer is that Christians do not come to village or district meetings. In other words, they fail to participate, and by not participating they miss the opportunity to ritually show their allegiance to the government. The simple act of respectfully greeting an official at a meet-ing, the presentation of a gift at the dawn of the New Year, and speaking ritual blessings all communicate that you and your household are part of the larger social whole. To be part of the social whole is to acknowledge the legiti-macy of those in authority—at home, in the village, and in the government.

The perceived lack of participation is made more acute when local Christians refrain from participating in village-wide spirit rituals considered keys to the success of the rice har-vest. While the whole village turns out for the important Buddhist temple festivals Christians are off in an isolated corner refusing to partici-pate in the community’s celebration.10 There

is also widespread confusion and consterna-tion about why Christians would refuse to allow their sons and daughters to marry non-Christians. The behavior of Lao Christians is perfectly understandable in terms of their desire to protect the sincerity and integrity of their faith, but it is seldom successfully explained to the wider community. In short, the wor-ship and social interaction of the Christian community is consistently perceived as being un-integrated into the Lao national family.

This is made worse by the association of this un-integrated group with the West. Any un-integrated minority group is bound to make the larger social group feel uncomfort-able, but when you add to this the fact that this group seems directly linked to the nation’s

former war enemy, the feeling of discomfort is easily translated into acts of persecution. When we remember that to the Lao the well-being of the group is unquestionably more important than that of any one individual (or in this case, one minor-

ity group) then we should only be surprised if the Lao government did not work to suppress the Christian church. All this is compounded by the fact that Protestants in Laos have been exceptionally vigilant in evangelizing their neighbors since the early 1990s.

But we are not at the end of this list of opposite vantage points in the perception of the Lao Christian community. The un-inte-grated nature of the Christian community and its use of Western forms and communication styles cause the government to suppose its col-laboration with the West. The involvement of Westerners in the Lao Church removes all doubt. There are two obvious instances of such involvement. First, the Lao Christian Church is obviously dependent upon outside finances for its many programs. Although at least half of this aid is coming from Asian Christian orga-nizations, the perception that most of it comes from the West is crucially important in the sensitive Lao milieu.

the worship and social interaction of the

christian community is consistently perceived as being un-integrated into the lao national family

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ritual, relationship, and religious liberty in laos

Second, when Christians are persecuted the loudest voices of complaint are from Western governments and Christian organizations. From the Lao perspective the question then becomes: why would a nation as large as the U.S. allow such a small minority of people be the reason for discord in bilateral relations with the Lao PDR? Add the recent history of the war with the U.S. and it is easy to see how the Lao hierarchy has come to the conclusion that the U.S. has an important relationship—political and religious—with the Lao Christian community. All these elements converge on the Lao Christian community and seem to strangely fulfill the national prophecy about the “evils” of the Christian church.

It is difficult to imagine a more complex environment in which to try to formulate an appropriate response to the persecution of Lao Christians. As I mentioned above, however, notwithstanding all these complexities and challenges the tide does seem to be changing in a positive direction. In what follows I will make some suggestions as to why this has come about.

Religious Freedom, One Relationship at a Time

In the Lao context, acceptable commu-nication with the government is going to be characterized by its indirect character (includ-ing ritual) and attention to sensitive details of status and roles. Moreover, effective communi-cation is couched in terms of allegiance to the well-being of the Lao nation. The well-being of the nation is assumed to be the desire of every integrated member of the Lao nation. To be integrated is to know your place within the structure of Lao relationships and to perform your role with the good of the hierarchy in view.

For example, Lao hospitality as integration becomes concrete in the baci ritual used to wel-come most all foreign guests. In a baci a person is expected to become phi nong or fictive kin. More literally, though, the phrase refers to the “senior to junior” structure of all Lao relation-ships. When you are phi nong you are cared for and you are also obligated. It is assumed that

you will take care of the family and the family will take care of you. This of course does not always play itself out in reality, but it is clearly the goal of Lao hospitality. An integrated person communicates from within the social network of Lao fictive and biological kinship.

At the diplomatic level this translates into prioritizing relationships before business objec-tives. To the Lao, shared meals, ritual gifts, and greetings enable relationships and come before work. Of course this assumes that diplomats will be around long enough to build strong phi nong relationships. Unfortunately, the U.S. government and Western organizations in general are well known for the quick rate of turnover in personnel. Relationships of mutual trust must be established before engaging issues of conflict. While many Western conflicts are resolved by appealing to universal principles (e.g., the Ten Commandments, international law, etc.) conflicts in hierarchical societies are resolved through ritual recognition of status and compromise toward shared objectives.

A good example of a Christian in Laos who has engaged the religious freedom issue in a culturally congruent way—that is, in ways that respects the importance of ritual and relation-ship—is Rev. Khamphone, General Secretary of the Lao Evangelical Church. Along with other likeminded Christian leaders inside and outside Laos, he has developed long relation-ships with Lao officials that have been crucial to his ability to address the topic of religious freedom constructively. For instance, he has spent significant time establishing himself as phi nong through receiving and extending hos-pitality. He and those who behave similarly are perceived as having the best interests of Laos at heart because they are now established within the (fictive) kinship network. His formal posi-tion of authority within the Lao Evangelical Church is also helpful because it appeals to the Lao preoccupation with social classification in hierarchies. Not everyone can speak to any official about any topic at any old time. The right person needs to speak to the right official at the right time.

Finally, enough cannot be said about using indirect communication and thereby protect-

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ing the honor of the hierarchy. For example, Rev. Khamphone has consistently refused to publicly criticize the Lao government. Any concern he has had regarding religious freedom has been addressed to the Lao government through the proper direct (official letters and meetings) and indirect channels (informal conversations over meals with key officials). To Westerners, these modes of communica-tions are difficult to understand, and may even appear to be irresponsibly deferential. But there are difficult social reali-ties in environments like those of Laos, and they cannot simply be wished away. These realities are ignored at the Lao minori-ties’ peril; the potential for harsh reprisals and reac-tionary backlash is never far from the surface.

The dynamics of religious freedom for minorities in a place like Laos are complex, involving escalating cycles of distrust on all sides. Violations of religious freedom can almost always be attributed to the fears that high group/grid societies have of those who are geographically but not socially integrated into the nation. But that is only one side of the issue. Minority religious groups are frequently guilty of failing to pay ritual respect to the social hierarchy, and of removing themselves from parts of the social network where they might otherwise build common ground. The disconnect between the social instincts of traditional Lao hierarchies and those of small minority groups results in inevitable misun-derstanding and conflict. And this in turn exacerbates problems of religious discrimina-tion and persecution. The upshot is this: the issue of religious freedom is at its root a social problem; methodologies for addressing the issue that operate only at the political level will not succeed.

ConclusionWhen outside observers—be they other

governments or nongovernmental organiza-tions—address the internal relationships

between different religious groups in a country like Laos they are on tenuous ground. In fact, voices of criticism of violations of religious freedom from outside the group are generally falling on deaf or—even worse—offended ears. Only trusted and well-positioned insiders may speak to these issues, and then only in indirect ways that avoid undermining the legitimacy of the structures of authority. The path into these groups is one that passes through ritual acknowledgement of the authorities and a dem-

onstration of competence in the rules for establish-ing good relationships.

To be sure, in some situations there is value in pressuring governments politically and eco-nomically. The role of the international community

in pressuring nations who violate the principle of religious freedom is a legitimate one if it is coupled with negotiations that address the social realities of hierarchies. Nevertheless, real change will only come when these societies are able themselves to negotiate the relationship between religious minorities and the religious majority. And this can only happen when courageous individuals on both sides act contrary to their social instincts. In some cases this will require a trusted arbitrator.

As in all societies those who hold power are often unwilling to do what is just and right until their own interests are at stake. If the Lao are concerned with entering into the inter-national community as a respected participant in the global economy and international law they may need trusted third parties to help broker the path. The United Nations has so far failed to play a meaningful role in Laos in this regard. It has chosen instead to focus on economic development.11 It is time for a trusted third party friend of the Lao to help them negotiate the balance between safeguard-ing the legitimacy of the government and the unity of the nation and preserving the human rights of the minority groups that make up part of the nation.

stephen k. bailey

the dynamics of religious freedom for minorities in a place like laos are complex, involving escalating cycles

of distrust on all sides

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Representatives of hierarchies must con-sider the possibility that there are benefits to the whole group when religious minorities are effectively integrated. Representatives of the religious minorities must be willing to ritually acknowledge authority and to demonstrate their participation in national development. In the end, the roles of insiders and outsiders in the negotiation of religious freedom are facili-tated when all sides acknowledge each other through the social rituals that the cultural environment demands. Put simply, in CPC nations, sharing meals with the right people and communicating in the right ways can be far more effective than economic enticements imposed from the outside.

Recommended:• Check out IGE resources on Laos at

www.globalengagement.org/issues/laos.• Before taking an initiative for religious

freedom in someone else’s country, listen and observe. Look for the preferred style and pace of communication among the people you are working with.

• Third party brokers should make an effort to get to know everyone involved in the issue on a personal level. If you don’t speak the local language, make sure you build a good relationship with your interpreter. Interpreters have a great deal of influence in cross-cultural negotiations.

• Stay focused on the country you are attempting to impact for the long haul. Change towards religious freedom is almost always a negotiated process that takes time.

1. Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, May, 2003. According to the USCIRF’s website, “The Commission is a government entity. It is funded entirely by the federal government on an annual basis and its staff are government employees” (http://www.uscirf.gov/cirfPages/faqs.php3#q3, accessed June 4, 2004).

2. See Grant Evans, “Laos Is Getting a Bad Rap from the World’s Media,” Bangkok Post, July 7, 2003, p. 10.3. For example, the Institute for Global Engagement brings a relational approach to its work in Laos and other countries. Former U.S. Ambassador Robert Seiple,

founder of IGE, has engaged the Lao government on the issue of religious freedom for a number of years by building personal relationships with key leaders.4. See Martin Stuart-Fox’s discussion of the factionalism within the Lao royal family that initially opened the way for this kind of interference in The Lao Kingdom of

Lan Xang: Rise and Decline (Bangkok: White Lotus Books, 1998), p. 100. 5. While Vietnam’s influence has declined somewhat in recent years it maintains a special relationship with the Lao PDR. See Joseph Zasloff’s article, “The Foreign

Policy of Laos in the 1900s” in Jacqueline Butler-Diaz, ed., New Laos, New Challenges (Arizona: Arizona State University, 1998), pp. 127-145). My own observation is that the Lao government is free to do anything it wants except contradict the policies of Vietnam and enter into treaties that would threaten Vietnam. I saw no evidence that the Vietnamese ran the day-to-day operations of the Lao government while living there in the 1990s. On the other hand, the Lao have never hid their tight relationship of “solidarity” with Vietnam.

6. See Grant Evans, The Politics of Ritual and Remembrance: Laos Since 1975 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1998), pp. 141-152 for a discussion of the ways in which the Lao government is seeking to address the role of the minorities in the national life and historical narrative.

7. Bertil Lintner points out that to some extent political dissent is not a large problem in Laos because “Dissidents tend to leave for abroad rather than oppose the government at home.” See “Laos: Mired In Economic Stagnation?” in Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 137.

8. See the World Bank’s report on bilateral aid to the Lao PDR for the years 2001-2002 at http://www1.oecd.org/dac/images/AidRecipient/lao.gif.9. Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (New York: Random House, 1970), p. viii.10. During my years in Laos I often traveled with Lao co-workers for a couple weeks at a time. Whenever I attempted to slip off by myself for a short time “alone” some-

one was usually sent to ask me why I was angry. Removing yourself from the group never seemed to be completely acceptable. 11. This is not really surprising given the fact that the United Nations Development Project is the lead UN organization in the Lao PDR.

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