Robust Positioning, Navigation & Timing · Suggest a proactive strategy for Robust Positioning, Navigation & Timing Good system design can make things much harder for the hacker Initial

Robust Positioning, Navigation& Timing

John Pottle

3 February 2016 / CIO Forum / Cyprus

2Spirent Communications PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL

Improving Performance & RobustnessPositioning, Navigation & Timing

GLONASSGalileo GPS BeiDou

MilitaryApplications

Mobile Devices

CommercialAir Travel Automotive

Maritime

Space SurveyRailCritical

Infrastructure

Spirent Communications


The Need for Precise Positioning & TimingAutomotive: Low Position Integrity Requirement


The Need for Precise Positioning & TimingAutomotive: Medium Position Integrity Requirement


The Need for Precise Positioning & TimingAutomotive: High Position & Time Integrity Requirement

Connected Vehicles (C2C or V2X)

Autonomous Vehicles


Position and Time in the connected or autonomous car

Key parameters Integrity Accuracy Availability

Sensor fusion Figure of merit for each sensor Algorithm parameters

Standards for co-operative systems


Overview of GNSS Vulnerabilities


How are GNSS threats evolving?

Information Security categories apply to GNSS situation(Source: SANS Institute)

Unstructured Hacker

Structured Hacker

Organised crime/industrial espionage

Insider

Unfunded terrorist group

Funded terrorist group

Nation State

GNSS threat evolution has strong parallels with evolution of Information Security threats (Theunissen, 2014)

Currently no “responsible disclosure” for GNSS threats and vulnerabilities

Like

ly S

ever

ity

of

impa

ct

Low

Very High




GPS Timing Event: 26 January 2016

“On 26 January … the [GPS] Wing … verified users were experiencing GPS timing issues.

… Further investigation revealed an issue in the Global Positioning System ground software which only affected the time on legacy L-band signals.

… This change occurred when the oldest vehicle, SVN 23, was removed from the constellation. While the core navigation systems were working normally, the coordinated universal time timing signal was off by 13 microseconds …

Earlier event: April 2014: GLONASS system outage: 12 hours

Source: CGSIC e-mail 28 January 2016




“This past summer, multiple outbound vessels from a non-U.S. port suddenly lost GPS signal reception. The net effect was various alarms and a loss of GPS input to the ship’s surface search radar, gyro units and Electronic Chart Display & Information System (ECDIS), resulting in no GPS data for position fixing, radar over ground speed inputs, gyro speed input and loss of collision avoidance capabilities on the radar display.”

These types of events highlight the potential detrimental impact to navigation caused by GPS interference or jamming and the importance in understanding how your vessel’s or facility’s equipment could be impacted by a loss of GPS signal.”

Source: http://www.gps.gov/news/ &http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/alerts/0116.pdf

http://www.gps.gov/news/

http://www.gps.gov/news/

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/alerts/0116.pdf

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/alerts/0116.pdf


Source: Stavog trial, GLA, UK


Availability of hacking tools

“If you are sales personnel and delivery drivers, this GPS tracking jammer is a very popular item for you to take lunch or make a personal stop outside of your territory or route off the radar We are a GPS jammer factory! We will check the quality before shipped! Best service! .”


Google Images “GPS L1”, October 2015


Google Images “GPS L1 L5”, October 2015


How likely is it that GNSS systems could be disrupted?

The Spirent offices in Paignton, UK – Industrial estate in rural location – An ideal location for GPS testing in an unpolluted RF environment……


Real PPD & Jamming Events




GPS / GNSS spoofing

• Intentional Spoofing: The objective of a spoofing attack is to cheat the receiver position and time..

X

Authentic satellite signals

Spoofing Signals

Spoofer position

X

Truth PVT False PVT


GPS / GNSS spoofing

• Fake Navigation Data

X

Authentic satellite signals

Spoofing Signal – A fake GPS message is transmitted

Spoofer position

X

Truth PVTFalse PVT or denial of service

Faked Navigation Message


Spoofing

From report by Windward:

Google global fishing watch uses Satellite AIS and interactive mapping technology to monitor the AIS transmissions of all vessels (IMO mandate – all ships ovr 300GT on international voyages)

Windward analysis of AIS data shows that navigational data is being manipulated (or spoofed)

59% increase in GPS manipulations from mid-2013 to mid-2014

Many reasons for a vessel to manipulate its navigational data…..

Image source: Windward


AIS vulnerabilities

From AIS Exposed: Understanding Vulnerabilities and attacks 2.0, Balduzzi et al, Blackhat Asia 2014

Presentation contains details of how AIS could be hacked...

Includes examples of attacks

Fake Man overboard generation

False weather data generation

False Collision warning

Spoofing position

Impersonate Port Authority

Book TDMA slots


GPS Spoofing demonstrated at Hackers’ convention August 2015

Huang and Yang also spoofed a car’s position…. The car

is positioned in a car park but it’s sat-nav shows that it is

in the centre of a lake….

First time (known) that non-GPS specialists have spoofed navigation signals successfully


Equipment needed is becoming more accessible

Also need Open Source Code available readily available including for– • GPS transmitter• GPS Receiver

USRP

bladeRF

HackRF


Action Plan

Multi-FrequencyMulti-Frequency Multi-ConstellationMulti-Constellation Multi-ReceiverMulti-Receiver

Improved Antenna Technology

Improved Antenna Technology

Complementary: Dead Reckoning

Complementary: Dead Reckoning

Complementary:Alternative Positioning

Complementary:Alternative Positioning

Improved basic logicImproved basic logic Improved DSP detection

Improved DSP detection

Improved receiver technology

Improved receiver technology


Final thoughts…

GPS / GNSS has unique advantages and will remain as a key component for position, navigation and timing for the foreseeable future

GNSS threats are evolving as internet threats did (only faster) Data-driven risk assessments

Operation strategy in the presence of threats

Suggest a proactive strategy for Robust Positioning, Navigation & Timing Good system design can make things much harder for the hacker

Initial mitigation steps are quite achievable and straightforward.

Full protection is requires a rigorous system level approach and thinking.


© Spirent Communications, Inc. All of the company names and/or brand names and/or product names and/or logos referred to in this document, in particular the name “Spirent” and its logo device, are either registered trademarks or trademarks pending registration in accordance with relevant national laws. All rights reserved. Specifications subject to change without notice.

spirent.com

Thank you

• Join the GNSS Vulnerabilities group on LinkedIn to find out more about GNSS jamming and spoofing and join the discussion

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Robust Positioning, Navigation & Timing · Suggest a proactive strategy for Robust Positioning, Navigation & Timing Good system design can make things much harder for the hacker Initial