Russians I have Known

8/4/2019 Russians I have Known

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TEo BUCHHOLZ)1 M HARMONDEANNA l\1. JOHNSONKRYST\'N FREIOLII"CYNTHIA \'Ol!NGSCOTT BAKER

Cover Art: Bonnie Brengelman, Sirin, 1994To Russians I have known

ISBN: 0-15-501053-0Library of Congress Catalog Number: 94-73035Copyright 1995 by Harcourt Brace & CompanyCopyright 1974 by Holt, Rinehart and WinstonAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or byany means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any infonnation storage andretrieval system, without pem1ission in writing from the publisher.Requests for pennission to make copies of any part of the work should be mailed to: Penn iss ionsDepartment, Harcourt Brace & Company, 6277 Sea Harbor Drive , Orlando, Florida 32887-6777.(Copyright acknowledgments begin on page 389, which constitutes a continuation of this copyrightpage.)Address for Editorial Correspondence:

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272 SOCIOECONOMIC CHALLENGES

11. Craig ZumBrunnen, "A Review of Soviet Water Quality Management: Theoryand Practice," Chapter 13 in Geographical Studies on the Soviet Union: Essays inHonor of Chauncy D. Harris, Research Paper No. 211, edited by Roland Fuchs andGeorge Demko (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1984 ), pp. 257-294; and BorisKomarov, The Geography ofSurvival: Ecology in the Post-Soviet Era (Armonk, N. Y:M.E. Sharpe, 1994).12. Denis J. B. Shaw, Russia in the Modern World: A New Geography (Oxford:Blackwell, 1999), p. 133.13. Craig ZumBrunnen, "Institutional Reasons for Soviet Water Pollution Problems," Proceedings of he Associations of American Geographers, vol. 6 (1974), pp.105-1 08; and ZumBrunnen, "A Review of Soviet Water Quality Management: Theoryand Practice," pp. 270-273.14. See Judith Thornton and Andrea Hagan, "Russian Industry and Air Pollution,What Do the Official Data Show?" Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 34, no. 2(Summer 1992), p. 19.15. See Jonathan Oldfield, "Environmental Impact of Transition-A Case Studyof Moscow City," Geographical Journal, vol. 165, no. 2 (1999), pp. 222-231.16. Komarov, The Geography ofSurvival, p. 56.17. James H. Bater, Russia and the Post-Soviet Scene: A Geographical Perspective(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996), p. 316.18. Craig ZumBrunnen, "The Lake Baikal Controversy: A Serious Water Pollution Threat or a Turning Point in Soviet Environmental Consciousness?" in Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, edited by Ivan Volgyes(New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 90-114.19. Loren R. Graham, The Ghost of he Executed Engineer: Technology and theFall of he Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).20. For example, see Peter Rutland, "Sovietology: Who Got It Right and Who GotIt Wrong? And Why?" in Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death ofCommunism and the New Russia, edited by M . Cox (London and New York: Pinter,1998), pp. 32-50; and Oldfield, "Environmental Impact of Transition-A Case Studyof Moscow City," pp. 222-231 .21. N. A. Gladkov, "Bogatstva prirody: zabotlivo okhraniat', razurnno isp ol' zovat'.Vosstanavlivat' i umnnnnozhat' ," Priroda, no. 2 ( 1962), p. 6.

22. Igor Petryanov, "Quo Vadis," Soviet Life (November 1970), p. 53.23 . G. Khromushin, "Is Technology to Blame?-Who Benefits from Concepts ofan Irreversible Ecological Crisis?" Current Digest of he Soviet Press, vol. 31, no. 37(October 10, 1979), p. 15.24. ZumBrunnen, "Institutional Reasons for Soviet Water Pollution Problems,"pp. 105-108.25. For example, see Andrew R. Bond and Matthew J. Sagers, "Some Observations on the Russian Federation Environmental Protection Law," Post-Soviet Geography, vol. 33, no. 7 (September 1992), pp. 463-474; Komarov, The Geography of Survival, pp. 3-13; D. J. Peterson and EricK. Bielke, "The Reorganization of Russia'sEnvironmental Bureaucracy: Implications and Prospects," Post-Soviet Geography andEconomics, vol. 42, no. I (January-February 2001), pp. 65-76; Craig ZumBrunnenand Nathaniel Trumbull, "Obstacles and Opportunities to the Establishment of anEnvironmental Information Network in Northwest Russia," Journal of Urban andRegional Development Research, vol. 8, no. I (2000), pp . 38-58; and CraigZumBrunnen and Nathaniel Trumbull, "An Emerging Northwest Russia Environmental

ENVIRONMENT AL POLICY 273

Information Network: IT Capacity Building for Environmental Protection aml Su >-tainable Development," NETCOM, vol. 15, nos. 3-4 (2001 ).26. T. Saiko, "Environmental Crises: Geographical Case Studies in Post-SocialistEurasia" (Harlow, England: Prentice Hall, 200 I), p. 61.27. A. Knorre, "The Rise and Fall of Environmental Protection as a National Security Issue," Russia's Fate through Russian Eyes: Voices of he New Gerzeration (Boulder: Westview, 200 I), p. 291.28. For example, see Goskomekologiia, 0 sostoianii okmzhaiuslzchei pridronuisredy Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1999 g. (Moscow: Goskomekologiia, 2000).29. OECD, Environmental Performance Reviews. Russian Federation (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1999), p. 45; and Bond andSagers, "Some Observations on the Russian Federati on Environmental Protection Law,"pp. 463-473.

30. Peterson and Bielke, "The Reorganization of Russia's Environmental Bureau-cracy: Implications and Prospects," pp. 65-70.31. Feshbach and Friendly, Jr., Ecocide in the USSR.32. Craig ZumBrunnen, "Vliianie geografo-ekonomicheskikh faktorov na sistell\ )'upravleniia kachestvom vody," fspo/' zovanie matematichcsk ikh modefn d/iuoptimizatsii upravleniia kachestvom vody: Trudy Sovetsko-Amcrikanskugo s i m t ! o ~ i w r w , tom I (Leningrad: Gidprometeoizdat, 1979), pp. 1g6-216.33. Craig ZumBrunnen, "Mechanisms for Environmental Quality Management:Framework for Application in Ukraine." in Ekonomika ukraini: min1de, sucasne imayburnh-The Economy of Ukraine: Past , Present and Future, Proceedings ll f Fir>tCongress of the International Ukrainian Economic Association , edited by GeorgeChuchman and Mykola Herasymchuk (Kiev: Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, 1993 ), pp. 168-183.34. OECD, Environmental Performance Reviews. Russian Federation, p. 45.35. Knorre, "The Rise and Fall of Environmental Protection as a National SecurityIssue," p. 294.36. OECD, Environmental Performance Reviews. Russian Federation, p. 5 I.37. N. D. Sorokin, ed., Okhrana ukruzhaiushchei sredy, pnj)()dopul' zovanie 1obespechenie ekologicheskoi bezopasnosti v Sankt-Peterburge za ]980-2000 gorly(St. Petersburg: Adrninistratsiia Sankt-Peterburga upravlenie po okhrane okruzhaiushchei sredy, 2000), p. 30.38. OECD, Environmental Performance Reviews. Russian Federat ion, p. 142.39. OECD, Environmental Financing in the Russian Federation (Paris and Wa shington, DC: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998 ).40. OECD, Environmental Performance Reviews. Russian Federation, p. 147.41. Stig Kjeldsen, "Financing of Environmental Protection in Ru ssia: The Role orCharges," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, vol. 41, no. I (January-February2000), pp. 48-62.42. Ria Oreanda, "Taxes, Economic Press Review: Taxes," Delovoy Peterburg,June 28, 2002.43. Andrew R. Bond, "Environmental Disruption During Economic Downturn:White Book Report," Post-Soviet Geography, vol. 34, no. 1 (January I993), p. 75.44. Oldfield, "Environmental Impact of Transition-A Case Study of MoscovCity," pp. 222-231; and Victoria R. Bityukova and Robert Argenbright, "Environmental Pollution in Moscow : A Micro-Level Analysis," Eurasian Geography andEconomics, vol. 43, no . 3 (April-May 2002), pp. 197 -2 15.


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Safety and Natural Resource Use. Despite its new name, this agency appearsto have retained its environmental protection responsibilities in full. But suchpositive examples appear to be the exception rather than the rule. Furtherattempts to create the outward appearance of retaining the trappings of astate environmental protection agency seem to have been lost on the Putingovernment. State-sponsored environmentally sensitive/threatening initiatives,such as the recently completed Baltic Pipeline System or oil extraction development on Sakhalin Island and offshore in its coastal fishing grounds ,have instead not surprisingly met with no resistance or significant interference from within the Ministry of Natural Resources from the point of viewof environmental protection. As one Russian commentator has observed:"There simply is no environmental policy in Russia-the existing policy couldactually be construed as intending to destroy environmental policy."63

If any positive developments have occurred in terms of state environmental protection since April 2000, it may be in terms of the improvement ofaccessibility to some basic environmental information resources within theMinistry of Natural Resources. The annual reports on the "Status of the Environment" are readily available online at the Ministry's website. One of themajor drawbacks of the annual reports produced by the oblast-level officesof Goskomekologiia had been their very small press runs . Also, official environmental publications are with increasing frequency being made availableon oblast-level websites. The ministry also funds two newspapers with environmental coverage, Prirodno-resursnye Vedomosti and EkologicheskaiaGazeta Spasenie, though each has an admittedly government rather than activist perspective. Those public officials who did not regret the passing of theformer Goskomekologiia remain optimistic that a better-financed agency, theMinistry of Natural Resources, will provide more opportunities for investment in environmental infrastructure such as wastewater and purificationplants than Goskomekologiia had in the past. But such optimists are alsoadmittedly few.Human Rights and Environmental Whistle-Blowers in RussiaHuman rights issues remain critical for Russian environmental activists, asthe cases of Grigorii Pasko (a naval journalist accused of revealing navalsecrets concerning dumping in the Sea of Japan) and Igor Sutiagin (accusedof spying and transferring state secrets to Western government representatives, though he has demonstrated that his only sources were from the publicrecord) continue to demonstrate. The acquittal ofAlexandr Nikitin, after morethan five years of court proceedings and delays and a one-year jail term ,appears to be an exception that was made for a Russian whistle-blower under

ENVIRONMENTAL PO LI CY 26Y

the lobbying pressure and publicity campaign successfully aimed at the courtof world opinion. As has been noted, Russian courts do not have a goodrecord of independence.64 Incidents of employee firings at nuclear powerplants an d other environmentally sensitive sites continue to occur regularl yas whistle-blowers attempt to bring environmental risks to the light of thepublic. Russian environmental NGOs ' almost inevitable reliance on foreignfinancial assistance (especially under conditions of active opposition to somany of the Russian government's curr ent policies) continues to come underattack from the highest levels of the Russian government. From the point ofview of Western governments, however, this support is one of the best pos-sible peace dividend investments.Alexandr Nikitin, a former naval officer based in Murman sk, drew thewrath of the Russian military establishment for his co-writing of a report forthe Norwegian NGO Bellona on the topic of nuclear hazards from the Sovietand Russian navy in the Barents Sea region . Nikitin was arrested in February1996 and held in solitary confinement for fourteen week s. After more than ayear in prison for alleged spying and release of state secrets to a foreigngovernment, he was released and drew international attention to human rightsabuses on Russian whistle-blowers. Nikitin was later fully absolved of hisaccusations, but only after two years of highly public trial s that to manyviewers revealed to what extent some authorities would go in an effort toconceal environmental information if it was considered even remotel y re-lated to militarily sensitive information and activities. The Russian SupremeCourt eventually heard his case. Niktin 's conviction created an outrage bothinternationally and in Russian environmental NGO circles. Nikitin's lawyers, engaged by Bellona, were seen as having played a critical role in Nikitin 'sacquittal. The fate of another Russian whistle-blower, Grigory Pasko , ha sbeen less fortunate. Pasko worked as an investigative journalist for the newspaper of the Russian Pacific Fleet, "Boyevaya Vakhta," where he focused onnuclear safety issues. He was arrested by the Russian Securit y Service (FSB)in November 1997 and accused of committing treason through espionagewhen working with Japanese journalists. The Court of the Pacific Fleet ac-quitted Pasko of the treason charges in July 1999 and released him under ageneral amnesty. Yet the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Courtreversed the verdict in November 2000 and sent the case back to the PacificFleet Court for a retrial. Pasko was next sentenced to four years of prison inDecember 2001. Whether or not the Russian Supreme Court will hear hisappeal remains unresolved, and a decision was expected in June 2002. Bothcases came to be highly publicized in Russia and have been viewed as critical indicators of the tolerance of the Russian government toward environmental whistle-blowers in general.65


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Goskomekologiia and the Devolution of State EnvironmentalProtectionGovernment Decree Number 643 of May 26, 1997 replaced the Ministry ofEnvironmental Protection with the State Committee on Environmental Protection (Goskomekologiia). 45 This loss in status of a state environmentalprotection agency came soon after Yeltsin s second election victory in thesummer of 1996. The decision reflected a renewed interest in natural resource exploitation at the expense of a lowering of the stature of state envi ronmental protection. Goskomekologiia 's stated tasks were to: ( 1) implemen tand coordinate environmental policies; (2) develop environmental policyinstruments; (3) implement state ecological examinations and inspections;(4) manage nature conservation; (5) establish and supervise environmentalnorms and standards; (6) prepare reports on the state of the environmentand provide technical a ~ v i c e ; and (7) manage the Federal Ecological Fund.46A final sphere of responsibility of Goskomekologiia involved internationalenvironmental cooperation.47

Goskomekologiia held offices at the republic, oblast, and krai levels. Atthe republic and oblast levels, Goskomekologiia maintained a relatively largeamount of independence, often siding with local needs rather than federallevel preferences. In St. Pet ersburg, for example, the city-level administration for environmental protection was often at odds with Goskomekologiia,especially as concerned the distribution of resources of the regional Environmental Fund.48 A number of other federal bodies also had jurisdiction overenvironmental prot ection issues. Those bodies were: (I ) the Ministry of Public Health; (2) the Ministry of Emergency Situations; (3) the State Committee for Land Policy; (4) the State Committee for Fisheries; (5) the FederalForestry Service; and (6) the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology .49 Theappointment of visible scientific bureaucrats, such as Victor IvanovichDanilov-Danilian, the former minister of Goskompriroda (affectionately calledDan-Dan by some Russian environmentalists), as chairman of the newGoskomekologiia, provided some continuity from the former Goskompriroda.He continued to serve as chairman until the dissolution of Goskomekologiiain April 2000.

The record of Goskomekologiia was decidedly mixed. An evaluation ofthe success or insufficiencies of Goskomekologiia's environmental protection record depends in large part on the local perspective. Reasonably welltrained and increasingly experienced ranks of thousands of inspectors hademerged by the end of the 1990s. Cases of bribery of those inspectors orother Goskomekologiia officials undoubtedly existed, but they appear to bethe exception rather than the rule. Larger environmental projects appeared to

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be going ahead in the late 1990s, especially once the August 17, 1998, fmancial crisis had subsided. Goskomekologiia 's offtces communicated relativelyopenly an d regularly with the environme ntal NGO cornmu ni ty. 50Goskomekologiia began to create World Wide Web-based environmental in formation resources .51 Devolution of power within Goskomekologiia fromthe federal to the regional and local levels appeared to be providing bothopportunities for creative environmental problem solving of environmentalissues on the local level, but also for abu se and violations. In Bashkiria , forexample, a dam was under construction in an area that was also consideredpart of a national park. 2 Elsewhere, de facto decentralization meant that de-cision-makers at the local level were "left to ftll in the gaps" as they saw flt.53On balance, Goskomekologiia's work found both supporters and critics. bu teven its most vocal NGO critics would soon be appalled by the prospect ofthe agency's subsequent dismantlement.Dissolution ofGoskompriroda and Transfer to the Ministry ofNatural ResourcesVladimir Putin s ascendancy to the presidency, first as acting president onDecember 31, 1999, and then by an overwhelming electoral victory threemonths later, resulted in a major retrogressive course-reversal for state c:nvi-ronmental protection in Russia. Putin's self-proclaimed ideology of "strengthening of vertical power" sought to rei n in the relative independe nce of theregions that had emerged in the 1990s.54 Within two months after havingassumed power as Russia's president by election, Putin issued Decree 867,which liquidated Goskomekologiia and transferred its responsibilities to theMinistry of Natural Resources. The May 17, 2000, decree also abolished theFederal Forestry Service and transferred its respon sibilities to the same Min istry of Natural Resources. The 200-year-old Forestry Service had numberedabout 100,000 employees .55Putin's decision appeared to be a reaction to a number of event s: ( l) thedevolution from centralized to decentralized management that had occurredwithin Goskomekologi ia; (2) the August 1998 devaluation of the ruble, fromwhich Russia's economy has begun only slowly to recover (though the devaluation is now widely viewed as a positive even t from the point of view ofeconomists) ; and, closely related, (3) renewed state support for an unencu mbered exploitation of Russia 's natural resources in order to revive Russia'seconomy as quickly as poss ible. The fallout from Decree 867 was almostimmediate amon g Russia 's nascent but increasingly cyber-networked env ironmental NGO community. Expressing disbelief, several NGO represent atives clung to the point of view that the decision must have been maJe withou


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USSR to Russian Federation: Environmental Policy in theTransition YearsLegal Framework and Policy Tools of State EnvironmentalProtection in RussiaThe development of state environmental protection in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union has closely paralleled the process of emergence,growth, and consolidation of Russian democratization . The period has beencharacterized by increasing attention to state environmental protection during the glasnost period in the mid- and late 1980s, the strengthening of thatprotection during the 1990s, a devolution toward regional environmental protection responsibility in the mid-1990s, and the eventual consolidation ofstate environmental protection into Putin s "strengthening of vertical power"(ukreplenie vlastnoi vertikali). State environmental protection during thisperiod has been marked by remarkable evolution and change, but also bycontinuity.25 After more than a decade of reform in Russia, state environmental protection resembles more the Soviet state's approach to exploitation ofthe natural environment than it has in any period since the collapse of theSoviet Union. The periodization that follows traces the institutional contextof the developments (and the subsequent near dismantling) of state environmental protection in Russia from the glasnost period to the present time.Emerging Focus on the EnvironmentPublic response to environmental degradation on the whole remained stifleduntil the last years of the Soviet Union as a result of the paucity of availableinformation on the subject. As one environmental specialist has written: "Theseventy-three-year history is a history of systematic misinformation on theenvironmental situation in Russia."26 Criticism of the Soviet government'slack of divulgence of public information turned out to be well founded whenthe floodgates of information on the actual state of the environment in Russia were opened. Heated debate and criticism in the Congresses of Peoples'Deputies in 1989 and 1999 came to focus to a large degree on environmen taldegradation and especially its health consequences. The Soviet regime's cavalier approach in its exploitation of the natural environment began to be fullyrevealed to the public. Public opinion polls of this period showed that theenvironment ranked second or third among the problems that most concernedthe nation 's citizens. 27

As a res ult of the growing attention on the degradation of the Sov iet Union'snatural environment, a January 1988 Soviet government decree established

ENYIRON tv!ENTAL POLICY 26 1

the USSR Committee on Environmental Protection and Natural ResourceUse (Goskompriroda ). It was to replace a much weaker USSR Council ofMinisters' Commission on Environmen tal Protection. Goskompriroda wouldbe responsible for the environmental protection of Soviet natura l resources.Beginning in 1989, a series of State annual reports on the sta te of the environment provided the first official account of environmenta l conditions andenvironmental protection efforts in the Soviet Union. The annual reports aimed"to promote the 'dissemination of verified environmental in formation, themobilization of society's efforts to improve the environmen t, and rationaluse of natural resources, as well as the adopting of effective managementdecisions in this sphere."28 The reports presented a compilation and synthesisof the work of a large number of environmentally related agencies and specialists and, indeed, became, as the 1999 report would state, a " unique" gov ernment document.

New legislation was promulgated under Mikhail Gorbac hev and becamethe 1991 Law on Env iro nmental Protection . The law speci ti ed: (I ) a citizen'sright to a healthy and safe environmen t; (2) a citizen's right to fo rm environmental associations, to obtain information, and to seek legal redress for em ironmental change; (3) environmental responsibilities of the fede ral and othergovernmental levels; (4) environmen tal obligations of enterpri ses; (5) a stateecological examination system; (6) environmental liabi lity ; and (7) creationof an environmental funds system .29 Other earlier laws, such as the IL)82 Law.on Air Protection , remained in force . Contradictions be twee n new laws andexisting laws would remain a hallmark of the reform period. Gorbachev alsoappointed a special presidential advisor to work on env iro nmental issues.Aleksei Yablokov, a highly respected bio log ist and me mber of the Academyof Sciences, served as a highly visible presidential advisor into the beginning of the Yeltsin presidency.30

Press reports during thi s period carried more and more revealing detailsabo ut environmental degradation that had taken place during the Soviet period. A Russian trans lation of Ecocide in the USSR by the Western specialistsMurray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly reached a wide audience in Russia _llMany specialists in the Soviet Union crit icized the book's conc lusions as apocalyptic, but tho se same conclusions appeared to many others to be accurate. Theactivity of environmental NGOs grew signi ficantly during this period. Suchinfluential NGOs as the umbrella Socio-Ecological Union came into existenceduring this period. The Institute for Soviet-American Relations (JSAR, laterrenamed Initiative for Social Action and Re newal in Eurasia) opened an officein Moscow. Civil society grew from a small number of dissidents to a tledglingNGO community, as witnessed by the active presence of the Socio-EcologicalUnion throughout all of the republics of the Soviet Union by the end of 1992.


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The Historical LegacySoviet Legacy and InheritanceAcademic discussions of environmental issues had already emerged in Soviet scientific circles in thel960s. 11 During the late Soviet periou, a numberof precursors to Russia's state environmental protection in the 1990s hademerged. An elaborate set of environmental laws and several agencies requireu a detailed reporting of environmental conditions and violations . 12 Butthose laws existed largely on paper rather than in practice. Legislation suchas the 1960 Law on Air Protection and the 1972 Water Colle establishedseem ingly strict norms, in some cases stricter than in the West, but in practice those norms were not widely enforced. 13 Soviet factory managers oftenmisreported water effluent and air pollution data. A number of Western specialists have demonstrated that even officially published environmental statistics could be largely inaccurate. 14 The late Soviet period was also a time ofrelative detente and unprecedented numbers of exchanges between Sovietand Western scientists. Yet knowledge about environmental issues was consiuered specialized knowledge and not for public consumption or analysis.To an unfortunate degree, the Soviet public at large remained without accessto scientific knowledge of environmental issues, their health effects, and theextent of environmental degradation in their own country. 15 Soviet officialsjustified their silence on the topic under the pretense of not wishing to alarmthe public with information that the public was seen as unprepared to interpret scientifically.

A number of highly visible cases of environmental disruption nevertheless came to be discussed in the press in the second half of the 1980s as presscensorship was lifted. The old environmental cause celebre from the 1960s,Lake Baikal, once again took center stage. 16 Even the Soviet planners' greatest ambitions for industrialization of the region could not entirely outweighth

E N V t K O N ~ t E J \ T A L POLICY 257

came part of public discussion. 19 Th e 1n6 Chernobyl inciuent tragicall yreinforced the conclusion among the Soviet public that the Soviet guvemment had not placed public health ftrst. Indeed, it has been argued that environmental degradation and its accompanying health consequences playeu aimportant role in discrediting the legitimacy of the Soviet state in the eyes oits own citizens.20Placing the Blame on Capitalism's InstitutionsPrior to Gorbachev, a common Soviet refrain was that environmental prolems were the natural outcomes of capitalism's in stitutional triau of privaproperty, the profit motive , and "free market" competition, all of whicreate powerful incentives for individuals and tirms to generate env iromental externalities or social costs by discarding their unwanted industrimining, forestry, anu agricultural by-products into the air, water, and laof the surrounding environment, thereby lowering their production coand increasing their entrepreneurial competitiveness in the marketplalnueed, Western economic theorists since the time of Pigou's writingsthe nineteenth century developed and honed suc h arguments. S o v i ~ t leers pointed to the work of Pigou to affirm this perspective to \\'estern servers and their own citizens as environmental problems began to surfin the former Soviet Union. They attributed these problems to vestigescapitalism rather than to shortcomings of the Soviet command economyrapid economic growth in general. Accordingly, while the environmemovement in the West was burgeoning rapidly even before the tirst LDa y in 1970, Soviet and Marxist theoreticians and policy makers wereguing that Western environmental problems provided convincing empcal evidence that capitalism and its profit motive breed environmedisruption and destruction.The Soviet Theoretical Ability to Prevent EnvironmentalProblemsTh e Soviet Union's leadership's counterargument was that lack oftalism with its private property rights, private profit motive, anumarkets protected it from serious environmental problems. For examsome four decades ago, the Soviet academician, Professor N. A. Glaasserted that:

In the Soviet Union it is not as if there were need of specia l measurthe protection of nature as the very structure of Soviet socie ty found


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problems, skipping over their main causes, trends, impacts, severity, and spatial patterns. However, due to the rather well-established scientific link between levels of ai r pollution and the incidence of human health problems,slightly more detail about Russian air pollution problems will be included(see Map 13.1 ).Water Quality and Water AvailabilityVery few of the medium-size to large-size rivers and lakes of Russia remainfree from pollution, even in the Far North, Siberia, and the Far East. Themost severely polluted waterways are located in the Volga-Caspian Basinand the Ob ' -Irtysh Basin, and the latter basin's waterways suffer especiallyfrom petroleu m contamination. Freshwater availability is problematic in manyregions, and a significant ly larger fraction of Russia's best agricultural landsare susceptible to drought than was the relative case for the former SovietUnion as a whole. A very large fraction of the entire Russian coastline and itsestuaries have polluted waters, especially along the Barents Sea coastlineand the coastal waters of the Russian Far East. 1Soil, Habitat, and WildlifeBoth soil contamination and soil erosion are serious. Extensive areas of thecountry are negatively impacted by the pollution of the soil by heavy metals.Pesticide contamination extends throughout the entire range of Russian agricultural lands, but is especially severe in the North Caucasus, Central Chernozem (Black Earth), and lower Volga River basin. Habitat destruction isespecially significant in the logging areas of northwest Russia, southern Siberia, and the Far East. Lucrative poaching has increased the number andgeographical extend of endangered species. 2Radioactive Contamination and HazardsRadioactive contamination and the risks of nuclear submarines and power plantaccidents are very real. For example, there are reported to currently be sometwo thousand organizations in Moscow that used radioactive materials in theirwork, including eleven nuclear reactors. The largest nuclear-wastes deposit islocated on the territory of the Kurchatovsky Institute nuclear research facility,and the Ministry for Nuclear Power acknowledges this fact. There was no radiation control system at all in Mosco w until 1960. As a result, dangerous lyradioactive wastes were buried throughout the city. Some 70 percent of theradioactively contaminated sites are often found during the excavations for

ENVIRON1\1ENTAL POLICY c:\.l

construction projects. Over the past twenty-tive years the Moscow City government has liquidated over I ,350 such co ntaminated sites and has removedover 930 tons of radioactive wastes. 3 And in terms of severity, Mosco\v is farless radioactively contamina ted than othe r regions in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk ,Cheliabinsk, Lake Karachai, Miass in the Urals, and elsewhere. A descriptionand map of the radioactive contamination "hot spots" in Russia paints a trulychilling portrait for current and future Russian citizens 4

Natural HazardsRussian environmental policies also will need to address numerous natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, droughts ,floods, and forest fires. The link between human health problems andenvironmental pollution seems tragically well established in Russia5 Evensimply as a list of environmental problems crying out for sound policyresponses, this listing is very far from complete, and readers are referredto nearly all of the references cited at the end of this chapter for morespecific details. However, before proceeding with a historical retrospective of Soviet/Russian environmental policy, we have decided to includeat least a bit more detail about one of Russia's more serious environmen-tal problems, air pollution.Air Pollution LevelsAir quality has long been and remains a major problem thwughuut the urbanized realms. One of the major changes in the post-Soviet era is that theair quality in the cities of European Russia that had experienced a quan tumimprovement in the late seventies and eighties when natural gas replacedcoal and oil for many industrial and domestic uses (especially fueling boilersfor space heating) has again deteriorated due to exhaust gases of the autonJLJbiles whose number has been swelled by millions of used and poorly tunedimports from elsewhere in Europe and Japan. During the Soviet era, gaseousand aerosol releases from the thousands of industrial smokestacks Jottingthe landscape of the "fertile triangle" (the territory enclosed by an imaginarytriangle with vertices at then Leningrad, Irkutsk, and Odessa in Ukraine)belched millions of tons of contaminants into the atmosphere annually, withone of the worst places and most deleteriously ecologically impacted regions being the metallurgical center of Noril' sk in northem East Siberia." ANoriJ' sk, stationary sources annually emitted more tonnage of air pollutantthan the combined tonnage from the smokestacks of the four next worsurban industrial complexes, Novokuznetsk, Magnitorgorsk , Cherpovets, and


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Copyright 2003 by M. E. Sharpe, Inc.All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataRussia's policy challenges: security, stability, and development I(edited) by Stephen K. Wegren.

p. em.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-7656-1079-5 (alk. paper)-ISBN 0-7656-1080-9 (pbk.: alk. paper)

I. Russia (Federation)-Politics and government-1991-2. National securityRussia (Federation) 3. Russia (Federation)-Social policy. 4. Russia (Federation)Economic policy-1991- I. Title: Title on CIP data: Russia's policy changes. II. Wegren,Stephen K., 1956-

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TRANSLATION PAGE 16: SOVIEr TRANSCRIPTOFMALTA SUMMITFor me it is important that the tendency toward renewal that has taken shape in Eastern and Western Europegoes in the direction of rapprochement. The result will not be a copyof the Swedish, English, or Soviet model.No. Something will turn out that will meet the demands of the cmrent stage of development of human andEuropean civilization.

I have just discovered that people have no fear of choosing between one system and another Theyare searching for their own unique possibility, one that will provide them with the best standard of living.When this search flows freely; then there is only one thing left to say: good luck.Bush. I do not think that we differ on this. We approve of sell-determination and the debates that do alongwith it. I want you to interpret our approach in a positive light: V\kstem values by no means signify theintrusion of our system on Romania, Czechoslovakia, or even the GDR.Gorbachev. That isvery important for us. fundamental changes are happening, people are corning togetherAnd that is the most important thing. I see that on Eastern European soiL ways of resolving problems thatinvolve a different system- in the field of economics, technology; etc. - are becoming established. That isnatural.

Ifwe share a common understanding, then allour practical actions taken in the changing conditionswillbe appropriate andwill come to acquire a positive characterBaker. I would like to clarify our approach to self-determination: We agree that each country must have theright to free elections. But all this makes sense onlywhen the people in the countryare really in the positionto choose freely This also falls into the concept of 'Western values", and by no means is it the right to thrustone's ways on others.Gorbachev. If someone is making a claim to the ultimate truth - they can expect disasterBush. Absolutely right.Baker. That is not exactly what I meant. Take, for example, the question of reunification of Germany; whichis making both you and us nervous, as well as many Europeans. What are we advocating here? For thereunification to happen on the principles of openness , pluralism, and a free market. By no means do we wantthe reunification of Germany to reproduce themodel of 1937-1945,which, evidently; is something that worriesyou. Germany of that time had nothing in commonwith Western values.Gorbachev. A. H. Yakovlev is inquiring: why are democracy; openness, the market- 'Western values?'Bush. Itwas not always that way You personallycreated a start for these changes directed toward democracyand openness. Today it is really much clearer than it was, say; 20 years ago, that we share these values withyou.Gorbacbev. There is no point in entering into propagandisticbattles.Yakovfev. When you insist on 'Western values," then "Eastern values" unavoidably appear, and ''Southernvalues" ..Gorbacbev. Exactly, and when that happens, ideological confrontations flare up again.

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TRANSLATION PAGE 14:SOVIETTRANSCRIPfOFMALTA SUMMITGorbachev. I am convinced: we can work togethe r successfully even he re. If the USSR an d the US begin toreduce their chemical arsenals gradually, this will give us the moral right to persuade others even morestrongly of the need for nonproliferationof chemical weapons ..Bush I fully agree with these views.Gorbachev. When I meet with political leaders from Eastern as well as from Vkstem Europe, I te ll them allthat this is an objective process, which brings together countries across the continent. They are no w lookingfor optimal variants for combiningeconomics, technology; an d various standards ..

What is the essence of this essentially consensus-based approach? We are convinced that we mustwork toward continuing an d developing the Helsinki process, an d by no means toward destroying what wascreated on the basis of it. After this, Helsinki IIwill be needed so that we can interpret the ne w situation an dwork out joint criteria an d frameworks. It is understood that all countries that signed the Helsinki Act,including of course, the US an d Canada, must take part in this meeting.

Another important question- what to do with institutions created in another age? 'This also demandsa balanced an d responsible approach. Otherwise the curren t positive direction of the process of changemight tum into its opposite, lead to an undermining of stability. Exist ing instruments for supporting thebalance must not be shattered, but modified in accordance with the demands of the age. They must beutilized to strengthen security an d stability an d improve relations between states. Let Nffi'O an d the WarsawTreaty Orga.rrization become even to a greater degree political, bu t not only as military orga.rrizations, and letthere be a change in their confrontational nature. It is good that our generals have aheady begun to graspthe spirit of the time, to visit each other; an d to discuss the most complex questions.

I am certain that there are good prospects for cooperation in the Council for Mutual EconomicAssistance [SEV]. In the CrviEC we are planning complex measures to ease entry into th e structure of theworld economy

Our members of parliament are aheady cooperating- an d are not doing a bad job-, a "people'sdiplomacy" is developing. Such a comprehensive, positive atmosphere will secure all of us from unexpectedan d unpleasant surprises in the future.I am under the impression that US leaders are now quite actively advancing the idea of havingconquered the division of Europe on the basis of 'Western values." If this premise is not solely for propagandapurposes, an d they are intending to make it a basis for a practical policy; then Iwill say bluntly that they arecommitting many follies. At one time in th e West there was anxiety that the Soviet Union wa s planning toexport revolution. But the aim of exporting 'Weste rn values"sounds similat

I would put it this way: the times are no w very complex an d therefore particularly crucial. The factthat Eastern Europe is changing in the direction of greater openness, democracy; an d rapprochement togeneral human values, creating mechanisms for compatibility an d world economic progress, all this opensunprecedented possibilities for stepping into a ne w level of relations. A step using peaceful, cahn means.Here it is very dangerous to force artificially or to push the processes taking place, all the more so for thepurpose of satisfying some one-sided interests.

Possibilities for European integration in cultural an d political spheres can be most varied, includingthose never before experienced. And this will not place painlessly In some locations the situation will eventake on a critical character. An d this is natural, for there are immense an d varied social forces being drawninto the events.

Ica n make this judgmentat least about the Soviet Union. Ourcountry is a genuine conglomerate ofpeoples. They have various traditions an d historical features of development. We are no w fiercely

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TRANSlATION PAGE 12: SOVIEfTRANSaWTOFMALTA SUMMITBush That is an excellent idea. But allow me to ad d a few words. I am very pleased with the cooperationbetween our diplomatic departments, in the military as well as in other areas. I believe that the channels fordiscussion of military-political problems now integrally supplement the contacts laid by Akhromeev an dCrowe. Meetings between military specialists help the matter greatly; and I hope that we will continue todevelop this practice.Gorixlchev. That is exactlywhat we intend to do.Bush. Iwill say frankly: our military has immense influence in NATO. I have just asked them to do an analysisof military expenditures of US an d the West combined. And to present their recommendations. I think thatin this crucial period, contacts between our military leaders are particularlysignificant.Gorbachev. Sowewill have them meet more often. Would you like to go first in discussing European issues?Bush. You are closer to Europe, but I would like to preface our conversation with a few comments.

Frrst of all, I admit that we were shocked by the swiftness of the changes that unfolded. We highlyregarded your personal reactionan d the reaction of th e Soviet Union as a whole to these dynamic an d at thesame time hmdarnental changes.Although we did not go into details, during yesterday's conversation we discussed eye-to-eye theproblem of reunification of Germany. I hope that you understand that you cannot expect us not to approveof German reunification. At the same time, we realize the extent to which this is a delicate, sensitive issue.We are trying to act with a certain reserve. I will phrase this thought a little dilierently: There is no desire onmy part, nor among representatives of my administration, to be in a position that would appear soprovocational. I emphas ize that point.

Another example of our policy with respect to Eastern Europe. We sent a high-level delegation toPoland. It included my senior economic advisers, other representatives of the administration, businesspeople, union leaders, etc. They went there not to create difficulties but to explain to the Fbles whichmechanisms in our opinion, are effeCtive in the economic sphere.

Iwill not elaborate on each Eastern European country but will stress the thought that we understandvery well the meaning of the section of the Helsinki Act on national boundaries in Europe.

It stands to reason that I am ready to answer any of your questions. Fersonally I am most interestedin how you view the possibility of moving beyond the limits of the status quo.Gorbachev. I do not agree that we are "closer to Europe." The USSR an d the U.S. are equally integrated intoEuropean problems. We understand very well your involvement in Europe. To look at the role of the US in theOld World any differently is unrealistic, erroneous, an d ultimately unconstructive. You must lmow this, it isour basic position.Bush. That is not exactly what I meant: I just meant that historically we were not as close to Eastern Europe.Of course we are close- an d will be close - to Europe, we are vitally interested and involved in NATO. TheUS is, properly speaking, the leader of NATO.I want to emphasize apart from this that you are catalyzing changes in Europe in a constructive way.

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TRANSLATION PAGE 10: SOVIET TRANSCRIPT OF MALTA SUMMITThe next question of principle. To some degree we have touched on this already; when we looked

at the dynamic of the negotiation process. Howeve1; I want to return to this problem and single out one veryimportant point.

You an d I have admitted that as a result of the arms race there arose truly unimaginable militarypower on both sides. We came to the same decision that such a situation is fraught with catastrophe. Anextremely important negotiation process was initiated, at the forefront of which arose questions about thereduction of nuclear weapons.Bush Excuse me for interrupting you, bu t I would like in this context to thank you for th e deeply symbolicgift which you sent to me through Ambassador Dobrynin- a memento made out of disassembled missiles.Gorixlchev. Yes. The treaty on shorter-range an d intermediate-range missiles [RMSD] became a historicwatershed.

Generally speaking, the prospects openingup are not bad, an d your comments yesterdayconvincedme that a hopeful basis for further progress has been established.

But what worries us? Up to now; the negotiations have left out one of the three fundamentalcomponents of military power- navy forces. Both the previous an d the current administration react veryemotionally whenever this question is raised. Meanwhile, there has been no infringement on Americansecurity. I want with full responsibility to announce that we are taking into account the interests of the USYour country is a sea power, with vitally important communications conveyed along seas an d oceans.Building up the navy [VMS]- for us this is both a historical tradition, and a whole system in science an dindustry, deeply built in to economic interests. For that reason changingthe approach here is not so easy; Weunderstand this well, since we ourselves are experiencing similar difficulties in other areas of military buildup.

But what comes of this? As early as the beginning of the 1950s we literally encircled a network ofmilitary bases. On them were more than 500,CXXJ people, hundreds of fighter planes, powerful navy forces.The US has 15 carrier forces, approximately 1.500 fighter planes. And what immense forces are alreadydeployed on our shores, or could be deployed at an y moment. I am not even speaking about strategicsubmarines- even if they fall under the negotiations on [Russian acronym: IaVK]. As a result of the VIennatalks the level of military confrontation on land will be substantially lowered.As I have already said, there are good prospects for concluding a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensiveweapons [SNV]. Under these circumstances we have a right to expect that the threat to the Soviet Union fromthe sea will also be diminished.

Our ministers have already talked about this. I am taking the initiative upon myself an d am officiallyraising the issue of starting negotiations on th e problem of the navy (VMS]. How to begin them- here we areprepared to be flexible. Let it be in the beginning measures of trust, then a general reduction in the scale ofnavy activity. Then, when the situation becomes clear at the same time in Geneva an d in Vienna, the timewill come to deal in earnest with the question of reducing naval forces [VMS].

I will say in advance that we are adopting a realistic position In particulai;we are aware that the UShas other problems aside from Soviet military forces. But I would still like to stress once again with totalcertainty: just as European security is important to the US an d its allies, we are interested in security of theseas an d oceans.

Now; after delineating some of our fundamental approaches I would like to comment on specificnegotiation points. S ince we agreed in advance not to ge t carried away in details, Iwill, as you did yesterday.limit myself to the main issues.

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TRANSlATION PAGE 8:SOVIEITRANSCRIPTOFMALTA SUMMITBush The issue of nonproWeration of chemical weapons is also highly critical. I hope that our experts willtouch on this subject.Goroochev. I agree.

Now on the Vienna negotiations an d the reduction of conventional arms in Europe. You came out infavor of concluding an agreement on this most important issue in l99J and on its signing at the highest level.Our approaches here coincided. We are ready for active and constructive cooperation to attain this goal. Thereare difficulties, of course. But Iwill not elaborate on details.About the negotiations for limiting strategic weapons. Here political will is needed give impetus towork beingdone. I listened to you attentively; and you emphasizedsome of the elements. But, unfortunately;I did not hear mention of the problem of sea-based cruise missiles.

Now the climate is favorable for preparing thedraft treaty on reduction of strategic offensive weaponsfor signature by our meeting next year. And if by this time a solution to the problem of sea-based cruisemissiles has not been found, then a serious difficulty will arise. Here you are at a great advantage. TheAmerican side must consider this question again in the context I mentioned.Bush That is a problem.Goroochev. We are not trying to achieve mirror-like symmetry. Each side has a choioe, there is the situationof the country to consider, the different structures of the armed forCes.

But in working toward reduction of strategicoffensive weapons, it is impossible to ignore sea-basedcruise missiles [KRMB]. The US has a serious advantage in this area. Put yourselves in our position. OurSupremeSovietwill not agree to the ratification of a treaty if it avoids the problemof sea-based cruise missiles[KRMB].

I highly welcome your proposals on ecology You can expect our experts to take an active part in theconferenoe on ecological issues planned by the White House.I am glad that you touched on the question of increasing student exchanges. We began this gcxx:l

work during Reagan's presidency. For young people it is easier to find a common language. And I am surethat theywill make a contribution toward the positive development of Soviet-American relations.In summary, I would like onoe again to emphasize that I am happy with the steps that you outlinedhere. Soviet-American dialo:::I is gaining a certain momentum. And to give it new breath, new efforts andnew steps will be necessary. .['Ibe discussion continued on December 3, 1989.]Gorbacbev. ... Iwill start off by saying: we are pleased with the work done yesterday; but I believe that thereis a possibility for advancing even further If you do not object, Iwould like to start first. Nevertheless, today- I am your guest...Bush. I like "my ship" very much.

Seriously, we would like to express deep gratitude for the exoellent opportunity extended to ourdelegation to work on the Soviet liner Although the press is putting pressure on me right now; bombardingme with questions about our shortening the talks yesterday; I believe the changes in the programsubstantially affected the content of our discussion. FOrmy part, I consider our discussion to have beenverynice and productive. Actually; we essentially continued the talks at breakfast.Gorbacbev. Yes , we made a calculation and it turns out that the discussions lasted over five hours.

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TRANSlATION PAGE 6: SOVIET TRANSCRIPTOFMALTA SUMMITAll these, I repeat. are major factors in the regrouping of forces in the world. I am watching political

developments in India- these politics are dynamic. I have spoken at length with Rajiv Gandhi. India has abalanced approach aimed at establishing good relations both with us an d with you.What role do we play in this regrou ping? Very serious things follow from this. I began discussingthis question with Schultz. After one of the discussions he showed us some diagrams reflectingchanges thatwill occur at the en d of the oenhuy in economic relations between the leading countries of the world. Andnow it is simply essential to understand the role of the USSR an d the US in these major changes. They cannotalways follow with a peaceful flow of events.

Take Eastern Europe. Its specific share in the world economy is not very large. And look at ho wnervous we are. What form of action should we take, collective action?

And what lies ahead in terms of economics, ecology, an d other problems? We must think about thistogether, too.

For a long time Soviet leadership has pondered this. And we are coming to the conclusion that theU.S. an d the USSR are simply "doomed" to dialogue, joint action, and cooperation. It cannot be otherwise.

But for this to happen we must stopviewing each other as enemies. There is a lot of this in our heads.And we must take care not to look at our relations solely from a military standpoint.

All this means that we are suggesting a Soviet-American cooperative. This is about realities. Andthis in no way puts into question allied relations, or cooperation that has built up with other countries. Weneed to understandall this. I do not think that this wa s there before. Wehave just nowentered into the prooessof mutual understanding.

We asked the question: what kind of Soviet Union is in the US interest- the dynamic, stable, solidone or the on e struggling with all kinds of problems? I am informed about the advioe you have beenreceiving.

A far as we are concerned, we are interested in a US that feels confident in the decisions it makeson national security an d progress. This thought is present in all discussions with my Vkstem partners. Andthere have been hundreds of such meetings . I believe that any other approach is dangerous. Ignoringdomestic political prooesses, unwillingness to take into account the practical interests of the US in the world- that is a dangerous policy.And the US must take into account the interests of other countries. Meanwhile there is still a des ireto teach. oppress, an d step on throats. It is still there. We all know this. Therefore I would like to hear youropinion on this. For the question is how to build a bridge between our countries: across a river ordown a riveL

Since there is much time remaining in the President's leadership of a country such as the US, thispoint must be made clear. I think that we will not achieve this in just on e meeting. But the main issues mustbe sorted out. I repeat: we need clarity. All the rest- is concrete detaiL specifics that in the final analysis areintegrally linked to mutual understandingon these basic problems . .Bush. I hope you noticed that while the changes in Eastern Europe have been going on, the United Stateshas not engaged in condescending statementsaimed at damaging the Soviet Union. At the same time, thereare people in the United States who accuse me of being too cautious. It is true, I am a cautious man, but I amnot a coward, and my administration will seek to avoid doing anything that would damage your position inthe world. But I wa s insistently advised to somethingof that sort- to climb the Berlin Wall an d to make broaddeclarations. My administration, however, is avoiding these steps, we are in favor of reserved behavior.Gorbachev. ... I want to reply to the views you expressed in the beginningof the discussion. I welcome yourwords. I regard them as a manifestation of politicalwill. This is important to me.

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TRANSLATION PAGE4: SOVIET TRANSCRIPTOFMALTA SUM1vflTBush. We would like to raise the question of whether it would be possible for the Soviet Union to publishroughly the same amount of data on the Soviet military budget as we do in the United States. I think thatour publications give quite a comprehensive idea of the kind of military activityundertaken in our countryam sure that your intelligence services ca n confirm this authoritatively.GJrbachev. They report to me, on the contrary, that you do not publish everything.Bush. I am certain that the publication of more detailed data on military budgets , on a mutual basis, wouldencourage trust in this sphere.

I would like to touch on a few questions which are important for the future ..Particularly critical at the present time are problems of environmental protection We are no w forced

to take into account even the economic consequences of global climate changes. Some Western countriesare going so far as to drastically curtail even essentialeconomic activity for the sake of averting these changes.

We are trying to approach these issues rationally; to avoid extremes. At the present time, the USSRand the US are working actively on a committee preparing an international conference on climate under theaegis of the UN This is bringing satisfactory results. Looking ahead, we are planning two more importantsteps in this direction. Hrst. after the committee work is finished by autumn of next y e a ~ ; we intend to host aconference to draw up a limited treaty on climate change.

Environmental protection demands the attention of leadingscientists. I have asked the White HouseAssistant for Science [and Technology] Director [B]romley to organize a conference for next springon ecology;to bring together the finest scientific minds as well as leaders of appropriate departments from manycountries. I hope that Soviet representatives will also attend this forum.

Th e development of cooperation between our countries depends largely on the participation ofyoung people in this process. Here student exchanges are intended to play a great role. We suggest makingarrangements s o that in the 1 ~ 9 1 school year this type of exchange could be increased to approximatelylCXX) persons from each side. The expanded programwould involve young people up to 25 years of age. Inaddition, special attention should be paid to student exchanges in the humanities an d sociology. Thepractical experience would be very productive with respect to agricultural studies programs.God:Jachev. Thank you for sharing these interesting ideas. This is possibly the best proof of the fact thatPresident Bush's administrationhas se t its political focus on Soviet-American lines. I intend to touch on somespecific issues a little latet

Now I would like to express my observations of a general philosophical nature. It seems veryimportant to me that we talk about the conclusions we can reach from our past experience, from the 'ColdWar." What took place, what will linger in history. Such. if you wish, is the advantage of the historical process.But trying to analyze the course of past events is our primary obligation. Why is this necessary? Probably weca n assert that we all lived through a historic turning point. Entirely ne w problems, of which people in thepast could not even conceive, arose before mankind. And so- are we going to resolve them using oldapproaches? Absolutely nothing would come of that.By no means is everything that has happened to be considered in a negative light. FOr45 years wehave succeeded in preventing a major war. This fact alone shows that in the past allwas not bad. But all thesame, the conclusion is obvious- the emphasis on force, on military superiority; an d along with it the armsrace, has not justified itse lf. Both our countries apparently understand this better than any others.

The em phasis on ideological confrontation did not justify itself either. and resulted only in ourcontinual criticism of each other. We reached a dangerous line. And it is good that we knew enough to stop.It is good that a mutual understanding ha s arisen between our countries.

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TRANSLA110N PAGE2: SOVIETTRANSCRIPTOFMALTA SUlv1MlTBush Yes, that's right. We have already ha d productive discussions. I would like, if you will permit me, tooutline some of the thoughts of the American side.I fully agree with what you have stated regarding the importance of our meeting on Malta. I was prepared tomake similar points. Therefore I will no t repeat them.Concerningour attitude towardperestroika. I would like to sa y in no uncertain terms that I agree completelywith what you said in New York: the world will be better if perestroika ends in success. Not long ag o therewere many people in the US who doubted this. At. that time you said in New York that there were elementsthat did not wish for the success of perestroika I cannot sa y that there are no such elements in the US But Ican say with full certainty that serious, thinking people in the United States do not share these opinions.

These shifts in the public mood in the United States are affected by the changes in Eastern Europe,by the whole processofperestroika. Ofcourse, among analysts and experts there are differing points of view.But you ca n be certain that you are dealing with an administration in the US, an d with a Congress, that wishfor the crowning success of your reforms.

I would like now to offer a number of positive steps which, in our opinion, migh t provide a generaldirection for our joint task of preparing an official summit in the United States.A few oomments ooncerning economic issues. I want to inform you that my administration intends

to take measures toward suspending the Jackson-Vanik amendment which prevents the granting of mostfavored nation status to the Soviet Union ..

I also want to inform you that the administration has taken th e policy to repeal the Stevenson an dBaird amendments which restrict the possibility of extendingcredit to the Soviet side ..

These measures, which the administration is no w proposing in the realm of Soviet-Americanrelations, are guided by a certain spirit: they are not at all directed toward the demonstration of Americansuperiority. And in this sense, as we understand it, theyare in line with your approach. As it stands to reason,we in the US are deeply oonvinced of the advantagesof our type of economy. But that is not the issue rightnow. We have attempted to oonstruct our proposals in a way that does not give the impression that Americais "saving" the Soviet Union. We are no t talking about a plan of assistance, but about a plan for oooperation.

After the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is repealed, oonditions will be favorable for eliminatingrestrictions on granting credit. The American administration considers this a question no t of grantingassistance, bu t of creating the oonditions for the development of effective oooperation on economic issues.We plan to convey our oonsiderations on this issue to the Soviet side in the form of a document. It involves anumber of serious plans in the areas of finance, statistics, market function, etc ...

I would like to say a few words to clarifyour position with respect to the wishes of the Soviet side togain observer status in GATI. There used to be a division of opinion among us on this issue- the US wasagainst admitting the USSR into this 01ganization. Now the position has been reexamined. We are forgranting the Soviet side observer status in GATI. This is based on the view that participation of the USSR inGATI will be oonducive toward its becoming familiar with oonditions, operation, an d development of theworld market...

There is one other area in which ne w approaches ca n be used to develop economic oooperation. Ihave in mind the establishment of contact with the Organization for Economic Cooperation an dDevelopment. This would provide a good framework for oooperation on economic issues between East andWest. The administration is in favor of active progress in this direction ..[Bush moved on to discuss regional issues, an d stated the US position with regard to the situation in CentralAmerica. Then he proposed that they discuss the issue of disarman1ent.]

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The President then said tha.t eitherMr. Khrushchev did not believe tha.t the US was serious or the situationin tha.t area was so unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union tha.t it had to take this drastic action The Presidentreferred to his forthcoming meet ing with Macmillanand said the latter would ask what ha d happened. ThePresident said tha.t he would have to say tha.t he had gained the impression tha.t the USSR was presentinghim with the alternative of accepting the Soviet act on Berlin or having a face to face confrontation. He hadcome here to prevent a confrontation between our two countries and he regretted to leave Vienna with theimpression

Mr. Khrushchev replied tha.t in order to save prestige we could agree tha.t token contingents of troops,including Soviet troops, could be maintained in East Berlin. However; this would be not on the basis of someoccupa.tion rights, but on the basis of an agreement registered with the UN. Of course, access would besubject to GDR's control because this is its prerogative. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying tha.t he wantedpeace and that if the US wanted war, tha.t wa s its problem It is not the USSR that threatens war; it is the US.

The President stressed tha.t it was the Chainnan, not he, who wanted to force a change.Mr. Khrushchev replied tha.t a peace treaty would not involve any change in boundaries. In any event the

USSR will have no choice other than to accept the challenge; it must respond an d it will respond. Thecalamities of a warwill be shared equally. War will take place only if the US imposes it on the USSR. It is upto the US to decide whether there will be wa r or peace. This, he said, can be told Macmillan, DeGaulle andAdenauei: The decision to sign a peace treaty is finn and irrevocable an d the Soviet Union will sign it inDecember if the US refuses an interim agreement.

The President concluded the conversation by observing tha.t it would be a cold wintei:

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