Safety in the former Soviet nuclear power industry

Despite significant growth within the Soviet nuclear industry in the 1970s, the underlying ethos legislated against an effective safety culture. In retrospect, it seems to have been almost inevitable that some incident would occur - events a t Chernobyl in 1986 merely served t o confirm this. This incident alerted Western nuclear experts, as well as the public worldwide, to the risks taken in the Soviet industry. While, in practical terms, Soviet and East European nuclear development slowed considerably, it was not until the collapse of communism that the official standpoint on nuclear power changed and Western operators gained the opportunity to co-operate in safety work. However, the associated political upheaval and economic depression introduce new concerns. This article examines the changes which have occurred in the civil nuclear industry in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

by D. H. Wilson and H. W. Whittington

Introduction An important result of the radical political changes which occurred in the USSR and Eastern Europe after 1989 was that the civil nuclear industry became open to inspection by international observers. Until then, the industry had the appearance of a successful and growing enterprise with almost 39 GW of installed capacity within the Soviet Union, and a growing sphere of influence in Eastern Europe (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). In terms of installed capacity and power generated, the Soviet Union's nuclear industry ran ked th Fd in the world, behind the USA and France.

The initial scientific advances of the 1950s and 1960s in the Soviet nuclear programme were part of a drive to create an advanced nuclear industry. The political authorities chose to concentrate efforts on nuclear expansion because of an imminent deficit in conventional energy

There have been three distinct periods leading to the present position of the nuclear industry:

0 From the inception of civil nuclear power in the 1950s until the Chernobyl incident in 1986. This period was characterised by substantial growth combined with official secrecy over the technology and risks.

0 From 1986 until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, covering the immediate results of Chernobyl and Gorbachev's implementation of 'glasnost'. During this time, it is likely that safety concerns were recognised internally by the ministries and some scientists, but limited information

was made public, either nafionally or internationally.

0 From 1991 until the present time. The industry has achieved a degree of openness, such that environmental concerns have higher priority than during the Communist regime, but the continuing financial depression introduces further barriers to achieving acceptable safety standards.

This article charts Soviet nuclear development and explains the underlying technical and political philosophy accompanying each stage. It is argued that the high environmental risk built into the nuclear industry cannot be easily reduced to an acceptable level, and will require continuing political and industrial commitment in order to make use of the new opportunities afforded to improve the situation.

Post-war period until 1986

developed in the cold-war period from the early 1950s was not open to scrutiny, either nationally or internati~nally.~ Considerable progress was made in developing commercial reactors, but the secrecy which surrounded the industry led to an approach in which genuine concerns over safety and environmental protection did not receive due attention. In hindsight, it appears almost certain that this approach would lead to a serious nuclear incident.

The first Soviet civil nuclear reactor to supply power to the grid was a t a research

The Soviet nuclear industry which

POWER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996 21 7

1 Map of nuclear in Eastern

Europe and the former Soviet Union (Seealso Table 1)

facility in Obninsk, near Moscow, in 1954 (Fig. 1 ) . This was a 5 MWe unit with carbon moderation and boiling water cooling, a combination which was later used in the commercial RBMK design. Several research facilities were developed in the 1950s, including a 70 MWe unit at Dimitrovgrad and a large development near Chelyabinsk (Fig. I ) , in the Ural Mountains.

Since the earliest developments, there has been a strong link between military and civil nuclear power. The same designers who led the development of the first atomic bomb also designed the Obninsk reactor. Another example of the link was that the location of the 600 MW plant a t Troitsk (Fig. 1 , '9') was unknown in the West for a long time, probably because it was being used to produce plutonium for the nuclear arsenal. Thus, from the inception of the civil programme, there was considerable secrecy because i t was linked with arms production and as such was a matter of national security.

There was, therefore, little information on nuclear incidents in the Soviet Union before 1986. Medvedev describes several major incidents, suggesting that there were many more potentially serious safety significant incidents which were ~ n r e p o r t e d . ~ In 1957, for example, there was a catastrophic

incident at Kyshtym, near Chelyabinsk (Fig. I ) , where radioactive waste was kept. Storage tanks containing radioactive chemicals ignited and exploded, and radioactive elements were released into the atmosphere. As a result of this incident, over 10 000 people were evacuated and 250 000 acres of agricultural land were abandoned. However, the security over the reporting of this event (and another two subsequently at Kyshtym) remained intact so that it was not public knowledge either within the Soviet Union or in the West.'

Nuclear debate During the early period, discussions over

the development of civil nuclear power were principally oriented towards cost and national eminence rather than safety. Two debates displayed the values that were held in the late 1 9 5 0 ~ . ~ In the design of the first commercial pressurised water reactor (PWR), the requirements for the pressure vessel proved difficult to meet with current Soviet technology, and the option to revert to conventional fossil-fuel generation was considered. The objection was on the basis of the economic cost involved in developing the nuclear and support industries to meet the standards to produce PWR units. The counter

21 8 POWER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996

arguments stated that nuclear energy was a long-term investment, whose true benefits would not be apparent until 30 years later. Furthermore, PWR technology had already been operating in the United States, and the Soviet nuclear industry was regarded as a national symbol of industrial excellence, capable of matching or exceeding Western achievements.

The second debate a t that time involved the siting of nuclear installations. The proposed sites in the 1960s were all in the densely populated European part of the USSR. A leading reactor designer, Nikolae Dollezhal, wrote that waste disposal was a major problem (a probable reference to the Kyshtym incidents), and suggested building large complexes remote from centres of population. The suggestion was rejected because it implied that nuclear technology was not completely safe, and because of the economic necessity to have generating capacity to meet demand in the European USSR and Eastern Europe.

While there were scientists who were concerned about safety in the nuclear industry, the political structure did not

promote openness about safety and environmental impact, so that development was flawed in several aspects related to these issues. Chernousenko, the nuclear scientist who directed the task force immediately following the Chernobyl incident, states this:7

'It was the secrecy and lack o f accountability of our nuclear science, and its refusal to open itself up to discussion and criticism which made it possible for dangerous design faults to lead finally to a nuclear accident o f this scale.. . The Soviet nuclear industry presents its projects as works o f near-genius so that they apparently feel that reactor design deficiencies and infringements o f safety regulations have to be hushed up to go unnoticed and uncorrected for years and even decades. Economic reactor operation is pursued at a definite cost in terms o f nuclear safety. '

Commercialism o f nuclear power

national grid was slow during the 1960s as the technology reached a stage where large units could be built to contribute a significant

The rate of addition of nuclear units to the

Table 1 Major sites of Soviet designed nuclear plant

number of units der construction

VVER 440

Bulgaria VVER 4401230 VVER 100

Czech Republic VVER4401213 VVER 1000

Finland VVER 44012 1 3

Hungary VVER 44012 1 3

Lithuania RBMK 1500

Russian RBMK 1000 Federation

VVER 1000

WER 4401230

VVER 44012 1 3 BN 600 (breeder) AGP (1 2 MW units) Prototype RBMK

VVER 4401230 VVER 440121 3 VVER 440121 3 RBMK VVER 1000

1 Khmelnitski 1 Rovno

(6) VVER 44012 1 3

Slovakia

Ukraine

POWER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996 219

2 Total installed share of Soviet electric Dower. The two basic nuclear generating capacity [Source: World Nuclear Industry Handbook 19931

families developed in the 1960s were the RBMK type with water cooling and graphite moderation and the light water PWRs, designated VVER.7 As shown in Fig. 2, the major additions of nuclear capacity to the Soviet grid did not start until the 1970s, when the large RBMK and VVER reactor designs were becoming viable.

The growth of the nuclear industry coincided with the end of the periods of easy expansion of conventional energy exploitation. In the late 1970s, Soviet production targets for coal and oil were becoming increasingly hard to meet and, in the early 1980s, Soviet planners were faced with the prospect of sharply increasing production costs t o maintain current levels of production. At the same time, industrial demand for electricity continued to grow. A feature of communist industrial consumption was that energy intensity (energy input per unit GDP) was very high.8 There was therefore the prospect of an energy deficit, and the growth of nuclear generation was seen as the resource t o meet that requirement.

The Soviet Unions 1 1 th five-year plan for the 1981 -85 period anticipated a trebling of nuclear capacity. While this goal was not achieved, it showed tkat the Ministry of Energy and Electrification had chosen t o depend on expansion of the nuclear industry to meet the forecast energy deficit.This plan detailed a proposal to raise nuclear installed capacity from 12 500 M W to 33 800 M W to meet 98% of European USSRs demand increase. There were delays in the planned expansion, but a very substantial increase in nuclear capacity was achieved; by the end of 1985, over 25 000 M W was in operation in the 12th plan in which a target capacity of

PO

around 69 000 M W was set for 1990.

expansion there was an increase in the incidence of careless construction, poor maintenance, and a concentration on operation with minimum downtime. Centrally planned non-military industry in general produced in quantity a t the expense of quality, as the system of quotas demanded. P. P. Read, in a documentary novel on Chernobyl, describes the difficulties faced in constructing a huge nuclear complex in the Soviet central planning system. Inevitably, construction was not accomplished to the standards dictated by the design; materials were substandard and inadequately qualified. The political pressure and increasing shortfalls in planned conventional energy production, however, dictated that nuclear development should continue, regardless of the risks.

The large nuclear complexes of the 1970s and 1980s were built against a background devoid of any safety culture. Such concerns over safety which did exist could not be voiced openly for fear of reprisal by the hierarchy of authority set up to ensure secrecy. The catastrophic event at Chernobyl is viewed by some as an almost inevitable consequence of the inadequacies of nuclear power development under the Soviet regime.

Eastern Europe

Economic Assistance (CMEA, or Comecon) was that the energy economy depended on availability of cheap energy from the Soviet Union. The East European countries used this supply to fuel industry which was p red om i na n t I y en erg y-i n tensive heavy engineering. This dependency meant that the Soviet Union had considerable economic

WER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996

Under the pressure of this intense rapid

A feature of the Council for Mutual

220

leverage within CMEA, and thus could exert political control.

As Soviet conventional fuel reserves became more costly to exploit, such large quantities of cheap exports could not be sustained, and nuclear power was seen as the means to maintain the Soviet Unions economic control over Eastern Europe while still meeting local demand. This goal was approached in two ways: firstly, by creating interconnections between the electricity supply networks and trading power generated from nuclear stations in the Ukraine, and secondly by building nuclear plant in Easter Europe which required Soviet technology, resources and personnel.

The Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe continued because none of the states had the industrial capacity to build nuclear power stations without the participation of the other CMEA members. Each of the CMEA states contributed elements: Czechoslovakias contribution was the most significant, as it produced VVER pressure vessels. However, the plants were built to Soviet designs and required the presence of Soviet experts for construction and operation of the plants. Often, there were teams of Russian personnel on site with overall responsibility for the plants, a fact which complicated nuclear operations following the breakup of CMEA (discussed later).

Only two countries chose Western models instead of Soviet designs. In Yugoslavia, a US Westinghouse designed PWR was completed in 1981, and in Romania, a nuclear complex is under construction using a Canadian design, with assistance from the Canadian nuclear utility. It is interesting to note that these two countries were less closely linked to the Soviet Union than the other CMEA members. In contrast, Bulgaria had the strongest link to Moscow, and was first to operate a Soviet-designed reactor.

By 1986, there were ambitious plans to expand nuclear power in Eastern Europe (see Table 2). There was already around 5000 MW of installed capacity in the region based

on Soviet VVER technology, and the 1985-90 plans stated that this should be approximately doubled. Energy policy in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria was particularly oriented towards nuclear power and, in both countries, a nuclear share of over 50% of electricity generation was envisaged.

Although these plans were extremely ambitious, there was widespread public unease about the issue of nuclear power, particularly in Yugoslavia and Poland. Environmental issues were becoming an outlet for public dissent against the communist systems, and this led to extensive delays over the construction of the Zarnowiec plant in Poland and a heated public debate over the issue in Yugoslavia. In general, however, the governments in Eastern Europe prior to the Chernobyl incident were determined to develop energy systems dependent on a large nuclear sector.

Chernobyl nuclear incident a n d i ts implications

The Chernobyl incident in 1986 was considered by some engineers within the Soviet Union and outside as the inevitable result of flawed development. Inadequacies in virtually al l aspects of the nuclear industry were revealed once the myth of the competence and safety of Soviet nuclear power industry was dispelled. There were many publications following the incident, and it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the causes in detail.13 It is clear that a combination of errors in the design and operation of the plant could be traced, and that the belief in the inherent safety of the plants had led to complacency and serious errors in judgment.

The incident happened as operators were conducting a test on the generators to prove that enough electrical energy could be generated from the inertia of the turbogenerator equipment to facilitate a complete shutdown. It was necessary to reduce the power output of the unit before this test was conducted. However, by a fault

Table 2 Nuclear power operating and proposed in Eastern Europe, 198620

Around 50% of the countrys electricity to be supplied from nuclear power by 2000, and 73% by 2020

Four new 1 OOOMW VVER units were under construction, to increase share to over 50%

880 MW nearing completion and 2 x 100 MW units planned

Bulgaria 1760 MW in operation

Hungary 880 MW in operation

Romania none

Poland none

Five CANDU-6 units under construction and another site had been chosen for plant using CMEA technology - civil work started in March 1986

four units under construction and further 4000 MW planned

Yugoslavia 660 MW in operation using Westinghouse technology supplier undecided

site decided for new nuclear power station, but

POWER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996 22 1

which should have been prevented not only by the design of the equipment but also by strict operational safety codes, the automatic power regulation was deactivated and the power fell to levels a t which the reaction was extremely unstable, a property of the particular core design using carbon moderation and water cooling. At this point, the incident could have been prevented by a complete shutdown and restart, but instead the operators attempted to restore the power to a more stable level to continue the test. In doing so, the reaction rate increased uncontrollably, leading to the explosion which lifted the reactor top cover, expelling graphite moderator blocks from the reactor core and sending tonnes of radioactive material into the atmosphere.

The official Soviet report on the incident blamed operator crror as the main cause. This was consistent with the current party line, which held that the reactors were safe. The blame was apportioned to individual mismanagement, rather than faults in the State-provided equipment. Even if operator error had been the primary cause, this should have led t o intensive retraining and development of an operating safety culture. Instead, the investigation did not tackle the basic issues which involved those responsible for nuclear power in the ministries and scientific research establishments. A number of design modifications were made, but the root problems were not addressed at that time.

Despite the public position stated by the government and nuclear authorities, there was clear concern over safety at RBMK units throughout the Soviet Union. Of the eight RBMK reactors under construction a t the time of the incident, only three units were completed at lgnalina (Lithuania) and Smolensk (Russia). Further long-term plans were to be based on VVER technology rather than RBMK designs. The existing RBMKs were all subject to immediate safety work, which caused severe power shortages during 1987. These actions amounted to a recognition of faults in the design, even though official statements persisted with the claim that operator error had led t o the incident.

In Eastern Europe, the Chernobyl incident had a very significant political and social effect as i t prompted several public protests which were an important step towards the revolutions in 1989. The communist governments were determined to continue their nuclear programmes a t the same rate as before, and attempted to follow the Soviet line of underplaying the extent of the incident and giving reassurances regarding the safety of national programmes. However, environmental and human rights pressure groups acted to stop the progress of nuclear power, particularly in Poland, East Germany, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The protests centred on the lack of information made public about the incidents and on the growing danger of further incidents if more Soviet nuclear power stations were built

within the region. While the official response of each of the East European governments (except Yugoslavia) was to continue as before, progress was inevitably slowed. Fig. 2 shows that there was very little new capacity added in Eastern Europe following 1986, in comparison with the Soviet programme which tailed off around 1989.

Post-communist developments

which the new governments inherited following the collapse of communism remained a matter of grave concern. It was by no means certain that the risks which had led to the Chernobyl incident were under control. As long as the communist structure remained in place, there was a duality between the official position of the Party and its actions. After the overthrow of the Communist Party in 1991, Western engineers gained freedom to make objective observations. Since then, there have been both positive developments related to greater openness, and new dangers introduced by the economic crisis and fragmentation of the Soviet and East European Bloc.

The condition of the nuclear industry

Breakup of CMEA

led to profound changes in the energy systems in Russia, the newly independent republics and in Eastern Europe. Previously, the economies depended on cheap energy available in large quantities. More recently, however, the true cost of energy became apparent as hard currency was required at costs approaching the going international rate. This has led to an increased dependence on nuclear power as a source of energy with relatively cheap running costs.

In Russia, the use of nuclear power allows the authorities to export supplies of oil and gas in exchange for much-needed currency. In the Ukraine, the energy debt to Russia is alreadyvery large, and the response to the financial collapse in that country has been to continue operating even the highly dangerous Chernobyl units to avoid power shortages.

were provided with a political agenda of ensuring continuing dependence of CMEA on Moscow. However, in the economic crisis following the breakup of CMEA, Russia began to demand hard currency for the services of Russian operators. Many of the staff operating and maintaining the reactors in Eastern Europe, and in the newly independent republics, returned to Russia or the Ukraine, and new teams of local operators had to be trained to run the plants.

Afurther difficulty lies in the distribution of the units. The aim of the electrification planners was to develop an extensive interconnected system, so that large units could be used to generate electricity into a pool used by al l of the Soviet and East European republics. As a result, many of the

The breakup of the economic bloc CMEA

Under the Soviet regime, technical services

222 POWER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996

republics have units which are too large for the domestic system (see Table 3). for example, in Lithuania, 80% of the country's electricity comes from two 1500 M W RBMK units. It becomes very costly for such units to be powered down for maintenance and repair, and so operation can become a higher priority than safety.

Spent fuel and waste handling Dealing with spent fuel and high-level

radioactive waste has become a major problem in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Prior to the breakup of CMEA, spent fuel was sent from Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union for reprocessing. Final disposal of waste products was agreed under contract between the USSR and the individual countries. In the case of Bulgaria, the waste products were to be returned to Bulgaria for burial. However, this has not yet started and no provision has been made for the long- term containment of waste products.

The reprocessing service was paid for in the soft currency of tradable roubles until the breakup of CMEA. Russia changed i ts policy and has begun to demand hard currency in return for accepting the spent fuel. This leaves the countries of Eastern Europe with the dilemma of whether to pay the high price demanded by the Russians or to attempt their own local spent fuel storage facility.

In Bulgaria, for example, the authorities were faced with a bill of $40-50 million to send spent fuel to Russia a t around $1 000 per kilogramme. In response, the Bulgarians have proposed a domestic storage facility for spent fuel a t the country's nuclear station a t Kozlod uy.

Russia itself does not have adequate facilities to cope with its own waste products as well as those of i ts neighbours. Boris Semenov, the Deputy Director General of the IAEA, identified improvements in waste management and disposal as a key issue for social acceptance and further development of the nuclear industry.14 However, officials have admitted that there is not the capacity for processing waste, and not sufficient finances for a programme to deal with the pr0b1em.l~

Large quantities of radioactive material were dumped illegally during the Soviet regime, and recent reports are exposing the extent of the releases, both from civil and military sources." It is claimed that radioactivity equivalent to half of the fallout from Chernobyl was dumped, mostly in the 1960s and 1970s. The main sources of the radioactivity are seven reactors from submarines and an icebreaker vessel, as well as the 'accidental' loss a t sea of three nuclear powered submarines.

Plutonium and non-proliferation As plutonium is required for atomic

weapons, it is necessary to keep a strict inventory of where the element is produced and stored. With the security and central planning of the Soviet military, this was

~

POWER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996

Table 3 generation (1 992)2'

Nuclear share of total electricity

Lithuania 80% Slovak Republic 55% Hungary 47% Ukraine 40% SI oven ia 35% Bulgaria 33% Czech Republic 21% Russian Federation 12%

possible. However, with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the destruction of nuclear weapons and the waste disposal problem, it is possible that there is an illicit world trade in plutonium originating from Russia. This issue has caused concern a t international levels, as i l l ic i t weapons-grade plutonium has already been confiscated in Germany.17

Continuing development

research, despite the challenges, as future developments of the nuclear industry are seen as an important source of income for the country. Considering the current economic depression, it is unclear how Russia could resource further research into new reactor types, and the lack of publicity suggests that research and development is not a high priority on the Russian agenda. The proposed new designs are:18

Russia aims to continue its programme of

0 VVER 500: A smaller version of the VVER 1000 with steel reactor housing designed for a larger model. This design was proposed for increasing capacity a t Sosnovy Bor and a t Kola.

0 VPBER 600: This was adapted from the design for a ship propulsion unit. MKER 800: Based on RBMK, but with extra cooling.

0 BN 800: A fast breeder reactor succeeding the BN 600 design which has operated successfully a t Beloyarsk.

Safety has become much more important in the new designs than it ever was with the previous ones. It is claimed that the safety features of the VVER 500 model protect it from operator error and can withstand a severe earthquake or a jet aircraft crashing into the building. The policy of safety in conservative design continues, as the example of the VVER 500's overdesigned steel housing demonstrates, but is supplemented by several new safety features.

It should be noted that, while 20 GW of units under construction was cancelled in the last ten years, there is still a total of 17 GW actively under construction, and 12 GW suspended with the intention of continuing construction given the financial resources

223

Table 4 Nuclear capacity under construction

iiumber of un t \ capaciry MWe

Bulgaria suspended

Czech Republic 2 Romania 5 Russian Federation 9

suspended 7 Slovakia 4 U kra I ne 3

suspended 3

2000 2028 3500 6930 7000 1760 3000 3000 -

total 35 29718

(see Table 4). While demand has decreased because of the economic depression, it is argued that flew riucledr cdpdcity is needed to displace conventional fuel burning to allow energy exports for hard currency, and to replace older and less safe nuclear capacity.

Discussion There is little doubt that, although the

future energy mix will depend heavily on coal, nuclear power will remain an important element in electricity supply. It is therefore imperative that the safety issue is handled wisely, with the goal of achieving a worldwide standard of nuclear safety. A safety culture must be developed throughout the design, construction and operational phases of the industry, as was built up in the Western counterparts. The lack of awareness of safety by the majority of workers has been a serious source of risk. In practice, this situation is being modified as Western nuclear operators consult on management and operations a t the sites.

It is clear that overall safety at the plants has improved since the Chernobyl incident, and it is unlikely that the same incident could occur at another plant. However, the significant step towards improving safety was to recognise that there are real risks involved which must be minimised; a fact which was not apparent during the communist regime. A necessary part of the process of improving safety is opening up the industry t o scrutiny and identifqing significant risks. Both Western and Eastern nuclear operators must continue to co- operate in working towards a fair appraisal of safety aspects of the nuclear industry, even although public attention has, to some extent, shifted away from the safety of nuclear power stations.

The governmental handling of nuclear issues in the current political climate is critical, and must provide the opportunities for international involvement and co- operation. Safety and environmental concerns in the former Soviet nuclear industry have become global issues because of the scale of radiation pollution and risk. There are high financial costs involved in reducing risk in the industry, and a seemingly

unidentifiable social and economic cost to rectify pollution damage. As these issues represent an immense financial burden, they must be dealt with by the international community, requiring a high degree of international co-operation.

nuclear operators depends on political decisions t o provide the framework and necessary finance. The main barriers in this area are to do with legal responsibility of the Western operators in the case of an incident, and sourcing the high cost of safety improvements and environmental cleanup which is measured in billions of US dollars. It is the responsibility of political leaders to facilitate this work, but progress may be slowed by the difficulty of reaching a consensus on a course of action.

The nuclear issue has become a political lever. The position in the Ukraine is a prime example, where the remaining Chernobyl units are still in use despite intense international pressure to close them. For the authorities in the Ukraine, the energy crisis and instability which could result from widespread power shortages is a more pressing problem than the perceived risk of running the complex. They have stated that the plant cannot be shutdown unless the finance is provided for decommissioning and replacing the lost installed capacity.lg The Ukraine, therefore, uses the threat of Chernobyl as a lever to receive financial aid, while the West attempts to use the promise of financial aid as a lever to encourage reform. In this way, the issue of meeting the specific needs of the nuclear industry with finance from the West is clouded by wider political issues.

In the depressed economies of Eastern Europe, a supply of energy with low immediate running cost is very important. It is hoped that longer-term costs will be able to be absorbed once economic stabilisation and growth have been achieved. In the meantime, the costs of improving nuclear safety are mainly borne by international funding bodies, from a pragmatic understanding that the plants will operate anyway, with or without safety improvements, because of economic necessity. For example, the IAEAs recommendation in 1991 that Bulgarias nuclear installation should shut down was not acceptable because the plant provides the countrys only large domestic supply of electricity which does not cause harmful gaseous pollution.

The opportunity for co-operation between

Conclusions

installed capacity as a measure, the Soviet nuclear industry represents a successful engineering undertaking, averaging annual additions of over 3000 M W in the early 1980s.

This installation programme has delivered large quantities of relatively cheap energy which have fed not only the industries of the

It is undoubtedly true that, using

224 POWER ENGINEERING JOURNAL OCTOBER 1996

Soviet Union, but also the satellite countries of the Eastern Bloc. These countries were dependent on the Soviet nuclear industries, not only for energy transfers, but also for support of their own developing domestic nuclear programmes.

Unfortunately, this success has been bought a t a high price. Eastern Europe and Russia must now cope with the legacy of nuclear development which includes failing plant, difficulties with waste disposal and the prospect of a high-cost programme of retrofitting safety systems and of training operational staff. This will not be achieved by the efforts of these countries alone. The continuing provision of Western assistance and finance will be imperative - not only f o r the sake of those in Eastern Europe but also to ensure that another serious incident does not occur.

References 1 'World Nuclear Handbook 1993', Nuclear

Engineering International Supplement, Reed Business Publishing 1993, pp.26-49 MARPLES, E. D. R.: 'Chernobyl and nuclear power in the USSR' (Macmillan Press, 1986,

3 MEDVEDEV, Z.: 'The legacy o f Chernobyl' (Blackwell, 1990, pp.260-262)

4 MEDVEDEV, Z.: 'The legacy of Chernobyl' (Blackwell, 1990, pp.263-268)

5 EDWARDS, M.: 'The USSR's lethal legacy', National Geographic, 1994, 186 (2), pp.93-96

6 READ, P. P.: 'Ablaze: the story of Chernobyl' (Secker and Warburg, 1993, p.25)

7 CHERNOUSENKO, V. M.: 'Chernobyl- insight from the inside'(Springer-Verlag, 1991, P.10) DARMSTADTER, J., and FIR, R. W.: 'Interconnections between energy and the environment: qlobal challenqes', Ann Review

2

p p .3 7 - 50)

8

9 MARPLES, D. R.: 'Chernobyl and nuclear power in the USSR' (Macmillan Press, 1986,

10 READ, P. P.: 'Ablaze: the story of Chernobyl' (Secker and Warburg, 1993, pp.35-36)

1 1 NOVE, A.: 'The Soviet economic system' (Allen and Unwin, 1988,3rd Edn., pp.288-294)

12 WHITTINGTON, H. W.: 'Power and politics, electricity trade in Eastern Europe', / E Review, July 1993, p.151

13 'The Chernobyl accident reviewed', Atom, 1991,413, p.12

14 SEMENOV, B. A.: 'A comparativeassessment of different energy sources...', Conference notes - fuel for Power Generation in Eastern Europe and the CIS, Modern Power Systems, May 1992

pp.71-79)

15 financial Times, 19th April 1994, p.2 16 The Independent, 'Soviets sank nuclear

reactors...', 10th November 1993 17 The Guardian, 'The next wave of nuclear

fallout', 20th april 1994, p.19 18 Financial Times Business Information: 'New

Russian reactors to emphasise safety features', East European Energy Report 1993, No. 23, P.3

19 MACKENZIE, D.: 'West funds reactors to replace Chernobyl', New Scientist, 16th July 1994, p.4

20 MARPLES, D. R.: 'Chernobyl and nuclear power in the USSR' (Macmillan Press, 1986,

2 1 SEMENOV, B. A.: 'A comparative assessment of different energy sources...', Conference notes -fuel for Power Generation in Eastern Europe and the CIS, Modern PowerSystems, May 1992

pp.51-70

0 IEE: 1996

Douglas Wilson and Bert Whittington are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Edinburgh, King's Buildings, Mayfield Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JL, UK. Prof. Whittington is an IEE

Energy Environ, 1992, 17, p.71 Fellow.

July 1996 issues

Investigation into optimising high switching frequency regular sampled PWM control for drives and static power converters. S . R. Bowes and Y. S . Lai Simulation of three-phase loaded matrix converter. A. Zuckerberyer, D. Weinstock and A. Alexandrovitz Practical evaluation of different modulation techniques for current-controlled voltage source inverters. J. Dixon, S . Tepper and L. Mor6n Online rescheduling of mass rapid transit systems: fuzzy expert system approach. C. S. Chang and B. S. Thia Operation control of paralleled three-phase battery energy storage system. C. M. Liaw, L. C. Jan, W. C. Wu and S . J. Chiang Novel topologies of AC choppers. B.-H. Kwon, B.-D. Min and J.-H. Kim Representation of hysteresis in three-phase transformer models for electromagnetic transients. J. M. Prousalidis, N. D. Hatziargyriou, and B. C. Papadias Predicting performance of three-phase induction motors connected to single-phase supplies. J. H. H. Alwash

Applications of customer outage costs in system planning, design and operation. K. K. Kariuki and R. N. Allan Tracing the flow of electricity. J. Bialek Three-phase optimal harmonic power flow. Y.-Y. Hong and Y.-T. Chen Continuous harmonic state estimation of power systems. Z.-P.Du, J. Arrillaga and N. Watson Spinning reserve allocation using response health analysis. M. Fotuhi-Firuzabad, R. Billinton and S . Aboreshaid Combined active and reactive dispatch with multiple objectives using an analytic heirarchical process. J. Z. Zhu and M. R. Irving Capability of the static VAr compensator in damping power system oscillations. H.F. Wang and F.J. Swift Application of the controllable series compensator in damping power system oscillations. F.J. Swift and H.F. Wany Evolutionary programming approach to reactive power planning. J.T. Ma and L.L. Lai Scheduling short-term hydrothermal generation using evolutionary programming techniques. P.-C. Yany, H.-T. Yang and C:L. Huang

The above issues of /E Proceedings are available from the IEE's Publications Sales Department at a single copy price of f63. Photocopies of any of the individual papers listed can be obtained from the IEE Library for a small charge (contact Mrs. Helen Crawford, Tel 0171.344 5449) Readers can obtain a random sample copy of /E Proceedings by contacting the Marketing Officer, IEE, Michael Faraday House, Six Hills Way, Stevenage SGI 2AY, UK, Tel: 01438 31331 1 , Fax: 01438 742849, E-mail: inspec@iee,org.uk.

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