hy Tumis Barge, Carlos Fnnseca,Daniel Ortega, Humherto Ortega,

aml Jaime Nhseloch

Pathfinder Press, New York

Ed ited by Bruce M ar cus

Copy r igh t c 1982 by Pat h f inder PressAl l r i ghts reserved

Libr ar y of Congress Catalog Card N umber H2-H2051ISB N cloth 0-87348-618-8; ISB N paper 0-87348-619-6

Manufact ured in the U n i ted States of A m er ica

Fi rst ed i t i on , 1982

Path f inder Press

410 West St reetNew York , N Y 10014

ContentsIntroduction 7The Historic Program of the FSLN 13Nicaragua: Zero Hour

By, Carlos Fonseca A mador 23Nothing %il l Hold Back Our Struggle for Liberation

B y Dani el Ortega 43Nicaragua — The Strategy of Victory

Ir..terview wi th H umberto OrtegaOn Human Rights in N icaragua

By Tomas Borge 85The Role of Religion in the New Nicaragua 105Nicaragua's Economy and the Fight Against Imperialism

By J ai me Wheelock 113

The Second Anniversary of the Sandinista RevolutionBy Tomas Borge 127

An Appeal for Justice and PeaceBy Daniel Ortega 141

Index 155

HON DU RAS

ELSAI VADOR

NI CARAGUA~ ~

Jinotegahinadega Matagalpa

y

Leon o

Managua® Masa a0 Cari bbean

GranadaLake Sea

Rjyas Ni c aragua

Pacifi c Ocean

COSTA RI CA

PANAM

In troduction

A revolution is unfolding in Nicaragua. Led by the fighters of theSandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the workers and peas­ants of that country carried out a victorious insurrection against thebrutal and corrupt U.S.-installed Somoza dictatorship and took intothei r own hands the power to shape thei r dest iny . The Jul y 19, 1979,downfal l of the dictator sh ip m arked the beginn ing of a new stage in

the history of Nicaragua, ono that has seen big changes and that holdsthe promise of even bigger changes in the future.

From the start, the U.S. I-,„'vernment resisted these changes. As itbecame appareni, that even in :reased m i l i t ary aid could not save thepersonal dictatorship of Ansstasio Somoza, Washington maneuveredto f ind a solut ion that would leave intact Somoza's mi l i t ary force, the

hated N at ional Guard. Wheii t hat fai led, f irst Carter and then Reaganu sed promises of aid and later m i l i t ary t hreats and par am i l i t ary at ­tacks in an effort to slow dove and overturn Nicaragua s revolution.

The U.S. has stationed wa:ships off Nicaragua's coast. It plans toconstruct new mil itary airfields in neighboring Honduras. In violationof U.S. laws, it has given the green light to mil itary training of rem­nants of Somoza's Nat ional G ,i ard and other counterrevolu t ionar ies atpr ivate camps i n Fl or ida and Cal i forn ia . And the CI A has t r ained,

armed, and supplied several tl.ousand Somozaist counterrevolution­ar ies and mercenar ies stat ioned along Nicaragua's border i n Hondu ­ras. In early 1982, it was reported that the National Security Councilhad budgeted at least $19 mi l l ion to pr om ote destab i l izing and cover tact ions — including ter ror ist at tacks — against the N icaraguan peo­ple and government.

Washington's propaganda campaign against the Nicaraguan revo­lution charges that the revolution is undemocratic, that it has meanteconomic disaster for N icaragua, that the N icaraguans seek to expor tthei r revolu t ion by force, and that the leaders of the revolut ion — the

cadres of the FSLN — are simply agents of Cuba, and that their revo­l u t ion was "made in H avana.*' As the speeches in th is collect ion show ,

these are outright lies.While the example of revolutionary Cuba is a tremendous inspira­

t ion to struggling people around the world, the insurrection that t r i ­umphed in July 1979, and the revolutionary changes that have oc­

8 Sa n d in is tas Speak

curred since, came out of the decades-long st ruggle of the N icaraguanpeople to free themselves from foreign domination and to determinetheir own destiny. Nicaraguans have a proud tradition of resisting at­t empts to make N icaragua the U n ited States backyar d .

For Central Americans, the Monroe Doctrine and its subsequent re­finements meant not freedom from fbreign intervention, but exactlythe opposite. As the speeches collected here explain, the U.S. rulersmaint a ined order and stabi l i t y in thei r Cent ral Amer ican neocoloniesth rough repeated landings of the M ar ines.

In t h is centu ry , t he N icaraguan most closely associated w i t h t hestruggle against U.S. domination was Gen. Augusto Cesar Sandino. In1 927 he organized an arm y of work ers ; i nd peasants to dr ive out t h eU.S. M ar ines, who had again occupien N icaragua i n 1926, Sandino'sArm y for the Defense of N at ional Sovereignt y fought them for seven

years and won tremendous popular su@port. When the Marines werefi nal l y w i th dr aw n i n 1933, they lef t b<ih ind them as a replacement

force the infamous National Guard bearded by Anastasio Somoza Gar­cia. This m i l i t ary force was to be the gu:.rantor of stab i l i t y for the U .S.i n N icaragua. One of i t s f i rst acts, oi l Februar y 21 , 1934, was t o

murder Sandino, who had agreed to a cease-f ire after the w i thdr awalof the Marines. From that t ime on, tl ,» National Guard, headed by asuccession of Somozas, became notorioi .s the wor ld over for i ts brut a l i ­t y and corr upt ion .

Using t h is power , the Somozas bui l t t hemselves a for t une est imat ­ed, in 1979, at $400-500 mil lion. They controlled the only two meat­pack ing plants w ith expor t l icenses, hi i l f the sugar m i l ls, two-th i rds of

the commercial f i sh ing, 40 percent of r ice product ion , and the largestmi l k -processing plant . They dom inated cement m anufact ure, owned

the national steamship and air l ine companies, a newspaper, two TVs tat ions, and a radio stat ion .

They did all of this with Washington's blessing. As President Frank­li n D . Roosevel t once said, "Somoza may be a son of a b i t ch, but he' sour son of a bitch." Nicaragua was repeatedly used by U.S. imperial­ism as a base for intervent ion throughout the area. CIA i nvasions both

of Guatemala i n 1954 and of Cuba in 1961 were based there.The great wealt h of the Somozas was amassed at the cost of great

suffering for the Nicaraguan people. Under Somoza half the popula­tion was ill iterate. Infant mortality was so high that in poor neighbor­hoods one-third of all children died before age one. Life expectancy wasonly fi fty years.

Eighty percent of the populat ion of M anagua, the capi t al , lacked

1ntroducti on 9

running water and only one house in ten had a decent roof. Half thes ick received no medical care at al l .

Inequitable distribution of the land meant that many went hungry.Half of all the farmland was owned by less than 2 percent of the land­owners, wh i le the poorest 50 percent of the farmers held less than 4

percent of the land. For these farmers, the average annual income in1972 was only $35.

These ter r i ble condi t ions led to w idespread opposi t ion to the dicta­

torship and a continual struggle against the regime and its NorthAmer ican backers.

Out of this tradition of struggle, the FSLN was born. Carlos FonsecaAmador , Tomas Borge, and Si l v io M ayorga, veterans of the studentstruggle of the 1950s, joined with others including a veteran of Sandi­no's army, Colonel Santos Ldpez, in July 1961, taking their inspirationboth from Sandino's struggle and from the successful Cuban revolu­tion of 1959.

The struggle the FSLN began then, with a gueri lla front along thenor t hern border, was to last un t i l the insurrect ion. I t took many d i f er ­ent forms. The Sandinistas worked clandestinely and, when possible,legally; they worked in the mountains and in the cities; in the villagesand in the factories. Many were arrested, tortured, and ki lled. Butthey persevered. They won the respect, confidence, and loyalty of al­m ost the ent i r e populat ion, so that when the insurrect ion f i n al ly t r i ­umphed they could t r u l y be descr ibed as the leg i t im at e representa­

tives of the Nicaraguan people.Immediately after the over throw of Somoza, the FSL N began to im ­

plement i t s program for Nicaragua's reconstruction, and this wont hem even broader suppor t f rom the worker s and peasants. For t h efi rst t i me, a government responsive to the needs of the oppressed wasin power.

The revolutionary government launched a l iteracy campaign toteach the people how to read and wr i te. I t confiscated the property ofSomoza and his closest collaborators, bringing about 25 percent of thecultivable land under government control. I t nationalized the banksand sought to use their resources to rebuild the devastation caused bySomoza's N at ional Guard. I t encouraged workers to form un ions and

enforced workers' rights, such as the eight-hour day, paid vacations,and social security protection. I t helped organize workers in manyplants into production committees and took additional steps to in­crease work ers' par t i cipat ion i n p lann ing product ion and managingfactor ies. I t i n t ervened t hr ough nat ional izat ions against capi ta l i st s

10 Sandinistas Speak

who sought to undermine the revolution by decapitalizing their enter­prises or otherwise restricting production.

All these actions have earned the FSLN and Nicaragua's revolu­tionary government i ncreased prestige and authority i n N icaraguaan d ar ound th e wor ld . These act ions have also earned the N icara­

guans the enmity of the United States government .W ashingt on's i n t erests ar e i r reconci lably opposed to those of t h e

workers and peasants of Nicaragua. It has an enormous political andeconomic stake in maintaining the low wages, substandard living con­ditions, and brutal dictatorships that are imposed on the working peo­ple of Central America. And it fears that the Nicaraguan revolutionwil l set a powerful example for the oppressed and exploited every­where.

The speeches, documents, and interviews collected here are by fivecent ral leaders of the FSLN. Car los Fonseca Amador, one of the found­ers of the FSLN, was its central leader unti l he was murdered by theSomoza dictatorship in 1976. Tomas Borge, Daniel Ortega, HumbertoOrtega, and Jaime Wheelock are all members of the FSLN's NationalDirectorate and play m ajor r oles in the Government of N at i onal Re­construction. Together their wr i t ings and speeches give a picture ofhow the Nicaraguan revolution developed and where it is headed. Inthis collection the leaders of the FSLN speak for themselves, and thatis the best answer to the slanders and lies circulated by Washington.

We can learn a great deal from the Nicaraguan workers and peas­ants and their leaders. At the very time that workers in the U.S. arebeing thrown out of their jobs, social services are being slashed, andnew restrictions are being imposed on our democratic rights, ourbrothers and sisters in Nicaragua are taking gigantic steps forward.

One clear example is in education. While the Democrats' and Repub­licans' cuts in aid for schooling are increasingly making education theprovince of the wealthy, the Nicaraguans have enrolled one-third oftheir population — almost 900,000 — in some kind of formal study.Similarly, while hospitals and clinics are being closed in major U.S.cities, the Nicaraguans are busy building new medical care facilitiesthroughout the country and have increased their expenditures forhealth care six t imes. Outlays for al l social services in Nicaraguadoubled from 1978 to 1981. While the U.S. rulers carry out bipartisanpolicies that foster unemployment and plant shutdowns, the FSLN

In t roduction 1 1

and the Government of National Reconstruction are putt ing Nicara­gua back to work .

These enormous di fferences resul t f rom the fact t hat t he work ersand peasants of Nicaragua now have a government that representsand f ights for the ir in te rests, not t hose of a ru l i ng r ic h. 'I'he t xample

they are providing for workers in North America and around the worldof the k inds of immediate social gains that are possible when pol i t ical

power is i n the hands of work ing people is what W ashington real l yfears.

The advances of the N icaraguan work ers and peasani,s deserve not

only our max imum effor ts to stop intervent ion by the U .S. and i ts al ­lies against the revolution, but also our careful study so that we canlearn from thei r exper iences.

Bruce MarcusApri l 1982

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The Historic Program of the FSLN

This document was fir st presented to the Nicaraguan people i n 1969.It was reprinted by the FSI.N Department of Propaganda and PoliticalE ducation i n J une 1981. Thi s translati on f rom that edi tion is by Wi l lReissner .

The Sandinista N at ional L iber at ion Fron t (F SL N ) arose out of t heNicaraguan people's need to have a "vanguard organization" capableof taking political power through direct struggle against its enemiesand establishing a social system that wipes out the exploitation andpoverty that our people have been subjected to in past history.

The FSL N is a pol i t ico-m i l i t ary organizat i on, whose str ategic objec­t ive is to take pol i t ical power by destroy ing the m i l i t ar y and bureau­

c rat i c appar atus of the dictatorship and to establish a revolu t i onar ygovernment based on the worker-peasant al liance and the conver­gence of al l the pat r i ot ic ant i - imper ia l ist and ant i -ol igarchic forces int he count r y .

The people of Nicaragua suffer under subjugation to a reactionaryand fascist clique imposed by Yankee imperialism in 1932, the yearAnastasio Somoza Garc ia was named commander i n c hief o f t he so­called N at ional Guard {GN ).

The Somozaist cl ique has reduced N icaragua to the status of a neo­

colony exploited by the Yankee monopolies and the country's oligar­chic groups.

The present regime is politically unpopular and juridically i llegal .The recogn i t ion and aid i t gets from the N or t h A m er icans is i r refu t ­able proof of foreign interference in the affairs of Nicaragua.

The FSLN has seriously and with great responsibil ity analyzed then at ional real i t y an d has resolved t o confron t t he di ct at orship w i t harms in hand. We have concluded that the tr iumph of the Sandinistapeople's revolu t ion and the over t hrow of the regime that is an enemy

of the people will take place through the development of a hard-foughtand prolonged people's war.

Whatever maneuvers and resources Yankee imperialism deploys,the Somozaist dictatorsh ip is condemned to total fai l ure in the face of

13

14 Sand in is tas Speak

the rapid advance and development of the people's forces, headed bythe Sandinista National Liberation Front .

Given this historic conjuncture the FSLN has worked out this polit i ­cal program with an eye to strengthening and developing our organi­zat ion , inspi r in g and st im u lat ing the people of N icaragua t o marchforward with the resolve to fight unti l the dictatorship is overthrownand to resist the intervent ion of Yankee imper ial i sm, in order to forgea free, prosperous, and revolut ionary homeland.

I . A revolutionar y gover nm ent

The Sandinist a people's revolut ion w i l l estab l ish a r evolut ionarygovernment that w i l l el im inate the react ionary st ructure that arose

f rom r i gged elect ions and m i l i t ar y coups, and the people's power w i l lcreate a N icaragua that is free of exploi t at ion, oppression, backwar d­

n ess; a free, progressive, and independent count r y .The revolutionary government will apply the following measures of

a pol i t i cal character :A . I t w i l l endow revolu t ionary power w i t h a st ructure that a l low s

the full participation of the entire people, on the national level as wellas the local level (depar tment al , mun icipal , neighborhood).

B. I t w i l l guarantee that al l ci t izens can fu l ly exercise al l ind iv idualf reedoms and i t w i l l respect human r ight s.

C . I t w i l l gu ar antee the free exchange of ideas, which above a l l

leads to vigorously broadening the people's rights and national rights.D. I t w i l l guarantee freedom for the work er -un ion movement to or­

g anize in the cit y and count ryside; and freedom to organize peasant ,

youth, student, women' s, cultural, sporting, and similar groups.E. I t w i l l guarantee the r i ght of em igrant and ex i led N icaraguans

t o ret ur n to thei r na t ive soi l .F. I t w i l l guarantee the r i gh t to asy lum for ci t izens of other coun­

tr ies who are persecuted for par t icipat ion in the revolut ionary st rug­gle.

G. It wil l severely punish the gangsters who are guilty of persecut­ing , inform ing on , abusing, t or t u r ing , or m u rder ing revolut ionar ies

and the people.H. Those individuals who occupy high political posts as a result of

rigged elections and mil itary coups wil l be stripped of their poli ticalrights.

The revolu t ionary government w i l l apply the fol low ing measures ofan economic character :

A. I t w i l l expropriate the landed estates, factories, companies,

The Historic Prognzm of the FSLN 1 5

b u i l d ings, means of t r anspor tat ion , and other wealt h usurped by th e

Somoza family and accumulated through the misappropriation andplunder of the nation's wealth .

B. I t w i l l expropriate the landed estates, factories, companies,means of transportation, and other wealth usurped by the politiciansand mil itary officers, and all other accomplices, who have taken ad­vantage of the present regime's adm ini st r at ive cor rup t i on .

C. I t w i l l nat ional ize the weal th of al l the foreign companies thatexploit the mineral, forest, marit ime, and other kinds of resources.

D. It wi l l establish workers' control over the administrative man­agement of the factories and other wealth that are expropriated andnationalized.

E. I t w i l l cent r a l ize the mass t ransi t ser vice.F. I t w i l l n at i onal ize the bank ing syst em , which w i l l be placed at

the exclusive service of the country's economic development.G. It wi l l establish an independent currency.H. I t wil l refuse to honor the loans imposed on the country by the

Yankee monopol ies or those of any other power .I . I t w i l l establ ish commercia l relat ions w i t h al l coun t r ies, what ­

ever their system, to benefit the country's economic development.J. I t wil l establish a suitable taxation policy, which wil l be applied

with strict justice.K. I t wil l prohibit usury. This prohibition will apply to Nicaraguan

nat ionals as wel l as foreigners.

L. I t wi l l protect the smal l and medium-size owners (producers,merchants) wh i le rest r i ct ing the excesses that lead to the exploi tat ionof the workers.

M. I t wi l l establish state control over foreign trade, with an eye todiversifying it and making it independent.

N. I t wil l rigorously restrict the importation of luxury items.O. I t w i l l plan the nat ional economy, put t ing an end to the anarchy

characteristic of the capitalist system of production. An importantpar t of th is plan ning w i l l focus on the indust r i a l izat ion and elect r i f ica­t ion of the country.

II . Th e agra ri an r evolut ion

The Sandinista people's revolution will work out an agrarian policythat achieves an authentic agrarian reform; a reform that wi l l, in theimmediate term, carry out massive dist r i bu t ion of the land, el im inat ­ing the land grabs by the large landlords in favor of the workers (smallproducers) who labor on the land.

16 Sa n d in is tas Speak

A. I t wi l l expropriate and el iminate the capitalist and feudal es­tates.

B. I t w i l l t urn over the land to the peasants, free of charge, in accor ­

dance with the principle that the land should belong to those who worki t .

C. I t wil l carry out a development plan for l ivestock raising aimeda t diversi fy ing and increasing the product i v i t y of that sector .

D. I t w i l l guarantee the peasants the fol low ing r ights:1 . T imely and adequate agr icu l t u ra l credi t .2. M ar ketabi l i t y (a guaranteed market for thei r product ion).

3. Technical assistance.E. It wil l protect the patriotic landowners who collaborate with the

guer r i l la st ruggle, by pay ing them for thei r landholdings that exceedt he l imi t establ ished by the revolut ionary government .

F. I t wil l st imulate and encourage the peasants to organize them­selves in cooperat ives, so they can t ake thei r dest iny i nto thei r ow nh ands and direct ly par t icipate in the development of the count r y .

G. I t w i l l abolish the debts the peasantry incurred to the landlordand any type of usurer .

H. It wi l l el iminate the forced idleness that exists for most of theyear in the count ryside, and i t w i l l be attent ive to creat ing sources of

j obs for the peasant populat ion .

II I . Revolution in culture and education

The Sandinista people's revolu t ion w i l l establ ish the bases for t hedevelopment of the nat ional cu l t ure, the people's educat ion, and un i ­

v ersi t y refor m .A. I t w i l l push forward a massive campaign to immediately w ipe

out " i l l i t eracy ."

B. I t w i l l develop the nat ional cu l t ure and w i l l root ou t t he neo­colon ial penetr at ion in our cu l t u re.

C. I t w i l l rescue the progressive intel lectuals, and thei r w or ks thathave ar isen t h roughout ou r h i story , from the neglect i n w h ich theyhave been main t ained by the an t i -people's regimes.

D. I t w i l l g ive at tent ion to the development and progress of educa­

t ion at the var ious levels (pr imary , intermediate, technical, un iversi ­ty , etc.), and educat ion w i l l be free at al l levels and obl igatory at some.

E. I t wil l grant scholarships at various levels of education to stu­dents who have l i m i ted economic resources. The scholarsh ips w i l l i n ­c lude housing, food, clot h ing, books, and t r ansport at ion .

F. I t w i l l t r ai n more and bet ter teachers who have the scien t i f ic

The Historic Program of the I"SL1V 1 7

knowledge that the present era requ ires, to satisfy the needs of our en­

tire student population.G. It wi l l n a t i ona l ize t he cente rs of p r i va te education t h at h a ve

been immorally turned into industries by merchants who hypocritical­ly invoke rel igious pr inciples.

H. I t wil l adapt the teaching programs to the needs of the country;it w i l l apply teach ing methods to the scient i f ic and research needs oft he count ry .

I . I t w i l l carry out a un iversi ty reform that w i l l include, among oth ­er t h ings, the fol low ing measures:

l . It w i l l rescue the univers ity f rom the domina ti on of the exploit ­ing classes, so it can serve the real creators and shapers of our cu l t ure:

t h e people. U n i versi t y i nst ruct ion must be or iented ar ound m an ,around the people. The un iversit y must stop being a breeding groundfor bureaucratic egotists.

2. E l im inat e t he discr im inat ion i n access t o un iversi t y classes

suffered by youth from the working class and peasantry.3 . Increase the state budget for the un iver si t y so there are the

e conomic resources to solve the var ious problems confront ing i t .4. Major ity student representation on the boards of the faculties,

keeping in m ind that the student body is the main segment of the un i ­versi ty populat ion .

5. E l i m in ate the neocolonial penet rat ion of the universi ty , espe­cially the penetration by the North American monopolies through thechar i t y donat ions of the pseudoph i lan thropic foundat ions.

6. Promot ion of free, exper iment al , scient i f ic invest igat ion th at

must cont r ibute to dealing w i t h nat ional and un iversal quest ions.7. St rengthen the un i t y of the students, facu l t y , and invest iga­

tors w ith the whole people, by perpetuat ing the sel fless example of the

students and intel lectuals who have offered thei r l i ves for the sake ofthe pat r i ot ic ideal .

IV . Labor legislation and social security

The Sandini st a people's revolu t ion w i l l el i m inate the i nj ust ices ofthe l i v ing and work ing condit ions suff ered by the work ing class underthe bru ta l exploi t at i on , and w i l l inst i t ute labor legislat ion and socialassist ance.

A. It wi ll enact a labor code that will regulate, among other things,the follow ing r ight s:

1. I t w i l l adopt t h e pr i nciple that '*those who don't w or k don' teat," of course mak ing except ions for those who are unable to part i ci ­

18 Sandinis tas Speak

pate in the process of production due to age (children, old people), med­ical condition, or other reasons beyond their control .

2. Strict enforcement of the eight-hour work day.3. The income of the workers (wages and other benefits) must be

suAicient to sat i sfy thei r dai l y needs.

4. Respect for the dignity of the worker, prohibit ing and punish­i ng unjust t reatment of workers in the course of thei r labor .

5. Abolition of unjustified fi rings.6. Obligation to pay wages in the period required by law.7. Right of all workers to periodic vacations.

B. I t wil l el iminate the scourge of unemployment.C. It wi l l extend the scope of the social security system to all the

work ers and publ ic employees in the count ry . The scope wi l l i ncludec overage for i l lness, physical incapaci ty , and ret i r emen t .

D. It will provide free medical assistance to the entire population. Itw il l set up clinics and hospitals throughout the national terr i tiory .

E. I t wi l l undertake massive campaigns to eradicate endemic i l l ­nesses and prevent epidemics.

F. I t w i l l carr y ou t u r ban reform , which w i l l prov ide each fam i lywith adequate shelter. It will put an end to profiteering speculation inurban land (subdivisions, urban const ruct ion, rental housing) that ex­p loi ts the need that work ing fam i l ies in the ci t ies have for an adequat eroof over thei r heads in order to l ive.

G. I t w i l l i n i t i ate and expand the const ruct ion of adequate housing

for the peasant population.H. I t w i l l reduce the charges for water , l ight , sewers, urban beaut i ­

fication; it wil l apply programs to extend all these services to the en­t i re urban and ru ral populat ion .

I. I t w i l l encourage par t icipat ion i n sports of al l types and catego­ries.

J. I t w i l l el i m inate the hum i l i at ion of begging by put t ing the above­ment ioned measures into pract ice.

V. Administrative honesty

The Sandinista people's revolution will root out administrat ive gov­ernmenta l cor rupt i on , and w i l l establ ish st r ict adm inist r at ive hones­t y .

A. I t wi l l abolish the cr iminal vice industry (prostitution, gam­b l i ng, drug use, etc.l which the pr i v i leged sector of the Nat ional Guardand the foreign parasites exploit .

B. I t wil l establish strict control over the collection of taxes to pre­

The Historic Program of the FSL1V 1 9

vent government funct ionar ies from pr of i t i ng , put t i ng an end to thenor mal pract ice of the present regime's official agencies.

C. I t w i l l end the arbi t r ar y act ions of the members of the GN, who

plunder the population through the subterfuge of local taxes.D. I t w i l l put an end to the si tuat ion wherein m i l i t ary commanders

appropriate the budget that is supposed to go to take care of commonpr isoners, and i t w i l l estab lish cent ers designed to rehabi l i t ate thesewr ongdoers.

E. It will abolish the smuggling that is practiced on a large scale bythe gang of pol i t i ci ans, of fi cers, and foreigners who are the regime'saccomplices.

F. It wil l severely punish persons who engage in crimes against ad­min ist r at ive honesty (embezzlement , smuggl i ng, t rafl i ck ing in vices,

etc.i , using greatest sever i t y when i t i nvolves elements acti ve in t h er evolu t ionary movement .

VI . R eincor por at ion of the A t lantic Coast

Th e Sandinist a people's revolu t ion w i l l pu t i n to pract ice a special

plan for the Atlantic Coast, which has been abandoned to total neglect,in order to incorporate th is area i nto the nat ion's l i fe.

A. I t wi l l end the unjust exploitation the Atlantic Coast has suf­fered throughout history by the foreign monopol ies, especial ly Yankeei mper i a l i sm .

B. I t wil l prepare suitable lands in the zone for the development ofagr icu l t u re and ranch ing .

C. I t w i l l establ ish condi t ions that encourage the development ofthe fishing and forest industries.

D. I t wi l l encourage the flourishing of this region's local culturalvalues, which flow from the specific aspects of its historic tradition.

E. I t w i l l w ipe ou t the odious discr im in at ion to which the indige­nous M isk i tos, Sumos, Zambos, and Blacks of t h is region are subject­ed.

VI I . Emancipation of women

The Sandinista people's revolution wil l abolish the odious discrimi­nation that women have been subjected to compared to men; it will es­tablish economic, political, and cultural equality between woman andm an .

A. I t wil l pay special attention to the mother and child.B. I t w i l l e l im inat e prost i t u t ion an d other socia l v ices, t h rough

20 Sa n din is tas Speak

which the dign i t y of women w i l l be raised.

C. It wil l put an end to the system of servitude that women suffer ,w hich is reflected in the t ragedy of the abandoned wor k ing mother .

D. I t wi l l establish for children born out of wedlock the right toequal protect ion by the revolut ionary inst i t u t ions.

E. It wil l establish daycare centers for the care and attention of thechi ldren of wor k ing women .

F. I t w i l l establish a two-month matern it y leave before and afterb i r th for women who work .

G. I t w i l l r aise women's pol i t ical , cu l t u r al , and vocat ional levelsthrough their participation in the revolutionary process.

VI I I . Respect for religious beliefs

The Sandinista people's revolution wil l guarantee the population ofbel ievers the freedom to profess any rel i gion .

A. I t w i l l respect the r ight of ci t izens to profess and pract ice any re­ligious belief.

B. I t w i l l suppor t the work of pr iests and other rel igious f igures who

defend the working people.

IX. Independent foreign policy

The Sandinista people's revolution will eliminate the foreign policyo f submission to Y ankee imper i a l i sm , and w i l l establ ish a pat r i ot i cforeign pol icy of absolute nat ional independence and one that is for au­thentic universal peace.

A. I t w i l l pu t an end t o the Y ankee in terference i n the i n t ernal

problems of Nicaragua and wil l practice a policy of mutual respectwi t h other count r ies and fr at ernal col laborat ion between peoples.

B. I t wi l l expel the Yankee mil itary mission, the so-called PeaceCorps (spies in the guise of technicians), and m i l i t ary and sim i lar po­l i t i cal elements who const i t ute a barefaced in terven t ion in the coun­

t r y .C. I t w i l l accept economic and technical aid from any count ry , but

always and only when th is does not involve pol i t ical compromises.D. Together w i t h other peoples of the wor ld i t w i l l pr omote a cam­

paign in favor of authentic universal peace.E. I t w i l l abrogate al l t reat ies, signed w it h any foreign power , that

damage national sovereignty.

The Historic Program of the FSL7V' 2 1

X. Central Amer ican people's unity

The Sandini st a people's revolu t ion is for the t rue un ion of the Cen­

t ral American peoples in a single country.A. I t w i l l suppor t authen t ic un i ty w i th the fr at ernal peoples of Cen­

tral America. This unity wil l lead the way to coordinating the effortst o achieve nat ional l iberat ion and establ ish a new system wi thout im ­p er ia l ist dominat ion or nat ional bet r ay al ,

B . I t w i l l e l i m inate the so-called i ntegrat ion , whose ai m is to i n ­crease Cent ra l A m er ica's submission to the Nor t h A mer ican monopo­lies and the local reactionary forces.

XI. Solidarity among peoples

The Sandini st a people's revol u t ion w i l l pu t an end to the use of the

nat ional ter r i t or y as a base for Y ankee aggression against other fr a­ternal peoples and w i l l pu t i nto pract ice mi l i t an t sol idar i t y w i t h f r a­

t ernal peoples figh t i ng for thei r l iberat ion .A. I t w i l l act ively support the st ruggle of the peoples of Asia, Af r ica,

and L at in Am e rica against t he new a nd o ld colonia l ism a nd againstt he common enemy: Y ankee i mper ial ism .

B. I t w i l l support the struggle of the Black people and all the people

of the U n ited States for an au thent ic democracy and equal r i gh ts.C. I t wi l l support the struggle of all peoples against the establish­

ment of Yankee mil itary bases in foreign countries.

XI I . People's patriotic army

Th e Sandinist a people's revol u t ion w i l l abolish t h e armed forcecal led the N at ional Guard, wh ich is an enemy of the people, and w i l lc reate a pat r iot ic, revolut ionary , and people's army .

A. I t w i l l abolish the N at ional Guard, a force that is an enemy of the

people, created by the Nort,h Am er ican occupat ion forces i n 1927 tupursue, tor t u re, and murder the Sandini sta pat r iots.

B. In the new people's ar my , professional soldiers who are membersof the old army w i l l be able to play a role prov id ing they have observedthe fol low ing conduct :

I. They have supported the guerri lla struggle.2. They have not par t icipated i n m urder , p lunder , tor t ure, and

persecut ion of the people and the revo! utionary act i v i sts.

22 Sa nd i n i stas Speak

3. They have rebel led against the despot ic and dynast ic regime ofthe Snmozas.

( ' . I t w i l l st rengthen t he ncw people's ar my , ra ising i t s f i gh t i nga bi l i t y and i ts tact ical and technical level .

D. I t w i l l inculcate in the consciousness of the members of the peo­ple's «i my the principle ofbasing themselves on their own forces in thefu l f i l lmen t of thei r dut ies and the development of al l thei r creat ive ac­t i v i t y .

E. I t v i l l deepen the revolut ionary ideals of the members of' the peo­ple's i i rmy w i th an eye toward st rengthen ing thei r pat r iot ic spir i t and

thei r f i r in convict ion to f igh t un t i l v i ctory is achieved, overcoming ob­stacles and correct ing er rors.

F. I t w i l l forge a conscious discip l ine i n the ranks of' the people'sa rmy and w i l l encourage the close t ies that must ex ist between t hecombatants and the people.

(». I t w i l l estab l ish obl igatory m i l i t ary service and w i l l arm the stu ­

d ents, workers, and farmers, who — organized in people's mi l i t i as ­wi l l defend the r ights won against the inev i table at tack by the reac­t i onary forces of the count ry and Yankee imper ia l ism .

X I I I . V ener at ion of our m ar tyr s

' I'he Sandini sta people's revolut ion w i l l m ai ntain eternal gr at i t ude

to and vener at ion of' our homeland's mar ty r s and w i l l cont inue t he

shining example of heroism and selfiessness they have bequeathed toUs.

A. I t w i l l educate the new generat ions in eternal gr at i t ude and ven­

erat ion toward those who have fal len in the st ruggle to make N icara­gua a free homeland.

B. I t w i l l establ ish a secondary school to educate the ch i ldren of ourpeople's mar t r ys.

C. I t w i l l inculcate in the ent i re people the imperishable example ofour m ary t rs, defending the revolut ionary ideal: Ever onward to victo­ry tf|

Nicaragua: Zero Hour

by Carlos Fonseca Amador

Car los Fonseca A mador was the central leader of the FSL N f rom ihe

ti me he helped found i t i n J u l y 1961 unt il h is m u rder by the Somozadictatorship on November 8, 1976. As a student, Fonseca had jo ined the

pro-Moscow N i caraguan Socia l ist Par ty, wi th which he later came into

poli ti ca l conf li ct. Fi rst arrested for hi s revoluti onary acti vi ti es i n 1 954,Fonseca was repeatedly detained. In 1969, after an escape from a Costa

Rican j ai /, h< u.'ent to Cuba, where he publi shed this ar ti cle he had wr i t ­ten ear li er in the year. I t f i rst appeared i n the Spanish- language edit io nof Tr i cont inenta l, no. 1 4, 1969. Th is t ranslat io n, by M i c hael T aberand Wi l l R ei ssner , cs based on a 1979 repr i n t ing o f t he art ic le by t he

Na tiona l Secretar ia t of Propaganda an d Po li ti ca l E ducation of theFSLN .

The e cono m i c s it u a t i o n

T h e people of N icaragua have been suffer ing under the yok e of a

react ionar y c l ique imposed by Y ankee imper ial ism v i r t ual l y since1932, the year in w hich Anastasio Somoza G. was named commanderin chief of the so-cal led Nat ional Guard (GN ), a post that had previous­ly been filled by Yankee officials. This clique has reduced Nicaraguato the status of a neocolony — exploi ted by the Yankee monopolies andthe local capi ta l ist class.

At t he present t.ime, the economic cr isis that t he countr y has beensuffer ing has gotten worse. In the years immediately preceding 1966 ,the nat ional economy grew at an annual rate of 8 percent. By cont rast ,

i n the years 1966 and 1967 the growth rate decl ined to 3.1 and 4.6 per ­c ent respect ively .

The production of cotton, which has been increasing since 1950, wil lincrease only slightly in the future. This is due, on the one hand, to asaturation of the foreign capitalist market supplied by national pro­duction, And in addition, i t is due to the growing competition fromsynthet ic f ibers. There has, in fact , been a major drop in the pr ices of­

23

24 Sandin istas Speak

fered by the foreign capi t a l ist m arket for the harvest from the 1968

planting. This last fact has persuaded the country's government to es­t ab l ish commercial rel at ions w it h some social ist count r ies. which w i l l

take part of the cotton harvest. This crop amounts to 26 percent of thecu l t ivated land in N icaragua.

Regarding coffee, which is the second largest export product, there isa l ready overproduct ion, which cannot be sold on the capi t a l ist mark et .

Regarding sugar product ion , oAicia l sources state that i t i s un l ikelythat the pace of growth can be maint ained in the immediate fu tu re.

The exploitation of minerals such as gold and copper, which is di­rect ly in the hands of foreign i nvestors, pays r idiculously smal l sums

to the national treasury through taxes. Parallel with this, the handingover of the nat ional r i ches to the Yankee monopolies has cont inued toincrease. I n 1967, for example, a law went i n to effect t hat gave Mag­

navox, a company special izing in the exploi t at ion of forests, absolu teownership of a m i l l ion hectares of' nat ional t er r i t ory .*

A t the same t ime, the ru l i ng cl ique handles the funds of the stat e

banks as if they were personal funds, wh i le fraud and smuggl ing reachstagger ing d i mensions. The Somoza fam i ly , wh ich had very l i m i t ed

economic resources when it took power, has obtained a vast fiefdom,w hose domains go beyond N icaragua's borders and extend i nto t he

other count r ies of Cent ra l A mer ica .In N icaragua, moreover, there is an unjust dist r ibu t ion of land. Sta­

ti st ical reports for the year 1952 show that a few propr ietors cont rol 55

percent of the total area of privately owned farms.Nicaragua off ers except ional condi t ions for the development of cat ­

tl e raising . N ever theless, the consumpt ion of products der ived fr omcat t le has decl ined and the increase in exports has largely been due toforeign sales of cows that would have contr i buted to an increase in the

quant i t y of an im als.Th e advantages pr ov ided t o producer s o f product s fo r foreign

markets — i n t h i s case for gr ow ing cot ton — has led t o a si tuat ionwhere food products are grown on the worst lands, which also means

t hat impor ts are needed to sat isfy t h is impor tan t sector .N icaragua is among the count r ies that have been hur t most by t he

so-called Cent ra l A m er ican economic i n tegr at ion . I t i s w el l -know n

that t h is integrat ion has been simply a plan to increase the economichold of the Yankee monopolies over Cent ral Amer ica. This scandalous

fact has reached such a magn i tude that even spokesmen of the N icara­guan regime i tsel f have been pu t i n the si tuat ion of publ icly stat i ng

~1 hectar e = 2 .47 acres

N i caragua: Zero H ou r 2 5

that the indust r ies establ ished as a resul t of th is integrat ion do not en­

hance national economic development.As w it h t he other count r ies of Cent ra l A mer ica, there is no oi l pro­

duction in Nicaragua. It has been stated, however, that if there werepossib i l i t ies for oi l exploi t at ion in Cent ral Am er ica, the Y ankee mo­

nopolies would have an interest in hiding it, in order to maintain it asa reserve in case revolu t ionar y governments were establi shed in t h ec ount r ies that cu r r en t ly produce oi l .

A l t hough the governmenta l capi ta l ist sector represents the domi ­nant segment of the country's capitalist class, it must be pointed outt hat the sector of capi t a l i sts who cal l themselves "opposi t ionists" ar ealso involved in exploit ing the Nicaraguan people. Many t imes, thegovern ing and "opposit ion" groups join t ly exploi t importan t sectors ofthe nat ional economy, as is the case regard ing sugar , m i lk , the press,

banking, liquor dist i lleries, etc.The economic system descr ibed above tu rns the other classes mak ­

ing up Nicaragua's population into victims of exploitation and oppres­sion. The poor diet of the working classes has caused numerous deathsthrough hunger. It's known that in 1964 hundreds of peasants died ofhunger in the Tempisque area, in the department of Matagalpa. Invar ious regions in the nor th , the incidence of goi ters is very h i gh. I nt he M alacaguas area, t here have been cases of collect ive dement i aprovoked by poor diet; night blindness resulting from Vitamin A andprotein deficiencies has occurred in areas around the town of Dar io .

A few years ago, some tests carried out in a school in Jinotepes, a re­gion located near the country's capital, indicated that every one of the200 students suffered tuberculosis.

Only 1.1 percent of the Nicaraguan population has completed pri­mar y school . F i ft y percent of th e populat ion has had no school ingwhatever . Th e propor t ion of students t hat leave school i n t h e f i r st

grade or repeat grades is ext r emely h igh (73 percent ). Only 21 percentof the student populat ion comes from the sector of society w i th income

levels at or below the count ry*s average. Out of 200,000 young peoplef'rom fourteen to nineteen years of age, barely 20,000 are enrolled inhigh school or commerc ia l, vocationa l, or agr icul tu ra l education.

Infant mortal ity reaches dreadful levels in Nicaragua. More than 50percent of the deaths in the count ry occur among persons under four ­teen years of age. Out of every thousand chi ldren born, 102 die. Six outof every ten deaths are caused by infectious — meaning curable — dis­

e ases. In recent i nvest igat ions 9.28 percent of the popul at ion had a

posi t ive react ion in tests for mal ar ia, wh i le in Costa Rica i t is 0.96 per ­c ent , and in Panama, 4.98 percent .

26 San d in is tas Speak

Nicar agua: A v ictim of Y ankee aggressionfor m ore than a centur y

To understand N icaragua's current pol i t ical si t uat ion i t 's necessary

to keep in m ind cert ain character ist ics that have been seen t hrough­out i t s nat ional hi story . N icaragua is a country that has suff ered for ­

eign aggression and oppression for more than four centuries. Togetherwith the other coun t r ies of Lat in Amer ica, N icaragua faced rule by theIber ian pen insu la. In a region of i t s ter r i t or y located on the A t l an t icCoast , i t also suffered Br i t ish dom inat ion, which lasted for 150 years

u nt i l 1893. A t t he same t ime, Nicaragua was among the f i rst vi ct im sof the aggressive policy of the U n i ted States.

Shor t ly af ter the so-cal led Monroe Doct r ine was proclaimed by t he

U.S. government in 1823, N icaragua v as chosen as the target of Yan­k ee rapaci ty .

In the decade of the 1830s, representat ives of the Wash ington gov­ernment t raveled through N icaragua in order to obtain informat ion to

p repare for in tervent ion i n the count r y .Below is a list of some of the Yankee acts of aggression that N icara­

gua has suffered:

1850. The governments of England and the U n i ted States sign t hes o-called Clayton-Bu lwer t reaty , by which these powers, w i t hout tak ­ing the N icaraguan government i nto account , arbi t r ar i ly decide to di­

vide among themselves the r ight to bui ld an in terocean route throughNicaragua.

1854. In J un« of that year, a IJ.S, warsh ip commanded by a seaman

named Hol l i ns, bombards the N icaraguan por t of San .Juan del N or teand reduces it to ashes.

1855. Several thousand Nort h Am er ican f i l i busters, headed by W i l ­l iam W alk er, intervene in Nicaragua. Walker proclaims h imself presi­

dent of N icaragua and is recognized as such by t he Yankee govern­ment of Fr an k l i n Pi erce. Among other savage measures, he decreesslavery. The N icaraguan people, w ith the hack ing of the other peoples

of Cent ral A mer ica, take up arms and succeed in t hrow ing out the in­terven t ioni sts.

1 870. The N icaraguan government 's head of foreign relat ions, Dr .Tomas Ayon, sends pat r i ot ic notes to the I.J.S. government representa­t ive, in which he protests that government 's interference in the inter ­na l affa ir s of N icaragua an d demands repar at ion for t he mater ia l

damages caused by the bombardment of 1854 and fulfi l lment of finan­cal commi tments made by the m i l l ionai re investor Cornel ius Vander­b i l t .

1898. Lewis H anke, representat ive of t he U .S. government , is un­

Nicaragua: Zero H our 2 7

successful in his at tempt to intervene on behalf of a react ionary group,

against whom a resolute, popular rebel l ion occurs.1907. U .S. gover nment worsh ips occupy the waters of the Gul f ol'

Fonseca.1909. Th e nat ional ist N i caraguan gover nmen t shoots tw o N or th

Amei icans named Cannon and {Iroce, who were guilty of'participatingin armed act ions against the N icaraguan government . The U.S. gov­ernment., through the U.S. secretary of'state, sends a note to the Nica­raguan gover nment , know n as the " K nox note," i n w h ich i t open ly

states that i t has the r ight to intervene in N icaragua's internal aff a i rs.1910. U .S. warsh ips int er vene on the side of the (!onservat ives who

are i n revol t against th e N icaraguan government . I n t h is way , t he

U.S. imposes a sel l-out government on N icaragua.1912. The country is occupied by thousands of U .S. Mar ines. Armed

resistance to the occupat ion lasts for several months, at th e end of

wh ich the pat ri ot ic leader Benj am in Zalednn dies wi th arms in hand.1914. Emil iano Chamor ro, the Conservat ive government 's ambas­

sador to the U n i ted States, and U .S. Secretary of State Bryan sign thed isgraceful canal t reaty k nown as the Chamor ro-Bryan pact .

1927. Jose Maria Moncada, a representative of the Liberal bourgeoi­sie and m i l i t ar y head of the people's army that has been f ight,ing t he

government imposed by the North A mer ican i nt ervent ion, comm its abetraya l an d enter s i n t o agreemen t w i t h t he representat ive of t he

State Depar tment , Henry L . St imson, who years later would become

secretary of war in the Tr uman government . Wh i le St imson occupiedth i s post , the barbar i c atomic bombing of H i rosh im a an d Nagasak itook place.

Augusto ( 'esar Sandino, head of a column of the people's ar my , re­fuses to accept the Moncada agreement and r ises up i n arms against

the N or t h A mer ican occupat ion and the t ra it ors who suppor t i t , TheAr m y for t he Defense of N at ional Sovereign ty , headed by Sandino,

car r ies ou t more t han 500 clashes w i t h t he occupat ion forces. Th i smakes i t impossible for the Yankee occupiers to defeat the N icaraguan

pat r iots m i l i t ar i l y , but before leav ing the count ry at the beginn ing of1933, they leave behind them a react ionary force called the N at iona lGuard.

1 934. On February 21 of that year , A ugusto Cesar Sandino is mur ­

dered . A nastasio Somoza G., comm ander i n ch ief o f th e N at ionalGuard orders th is cr ime car r ied out af ter receiv ing inst ruct ions from

the Yankee Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane. The murder is carried outdur ing the days when A ugusto Cesar Sandino and his comrades wer eprepar ing to f ight against the ant ipopular di rect ion in which the coun­

28 Sandin istas Speak

try was being led. Having received guarantees that his life would berespected, Sandino decided to take par t in t a lks in order to dispel t heslanderous charge that he was not in terested in peace.

1 936. Somoza ousts the const i t u t ional president of the count ry, w i t h

t he approval of the U .S. governmen t .1947. Somoza ousts the constitutional president of the country ,

a gain w i t h the approval of the U .S. governmen t .1960. The U .S. fleet in the Car ibbean Sea is mobi l ized to protect the

governments of Guatemala and N icaragua, which are facing grow ingp opular discontent .

Nicaragua: A base for Yankee aggression

Together w i t h plunder ing i ts nat ional r i ches, U.S, imper ia l ism hasbeen using N icaragua's geographic posi t ion to make i t a base for ag­

gression against other Lat i n Am er ican peoples.The Chamorro-Bryan canal t reaty is st i l l in force, which pract ical ly

makes the U.S. N icaragua's master. This treaty au thor izes the Wash­ington governmen t t o bu i l d m i l i t ar y bases i n N icaragua, and also

g r ants i t the r i ght to bu i ld an i nterocean canal t hrough the count r y .Below is a list of var ious events show ing how N icaragua serves as a

base for imper ia l ist aggression against other Lat in Am er ican peoples,and especial ly against the count r ies around the Car ibbean Sea:

1948. W i t h i t s armed forces the Somoza government i n tervenes in

Costa Rican terr itory, where an armed conflict is developing that cul­m in ates in the persecut ion of that count ry 's work ers' movement .

1954. The Somoza government supports the Guatemalan mercenar ­ies that launch an at tack against the democrat ic government of JacoboArbenz.

1955. The Somoza government i n tervenes mi l i t a r i l y i n Costa Rica.1961. The mercenary invasion that is defeated by revolutionary Cu­

ba at the Bay of Pigs leaves from Puerto Cabezas in N icaragua.1965. Nat ional Guard t roops form par t of the foreign forces that , led

by U.S. Marines. occupy the terr itory of the Dominican Republic. Int he same year , 1965, counter revolut ionary mercenar ies captured inC uba state that f,hey left from t r a in ing camps in Nicaraguan ter r i t or y .

1966. Rene Schick , nom ina l president of N icaragua, states wh i letr avel ing in the U n i ted States that N icaraguan ter r i tory can be used

as a base for forces aimed against Cuba.1967. Anastasio Somoza Debayle makes known his decision to send

members of' the Nat ional Guard to take part in the aggression in V iet ­n am .

¹caragua: Zero Hour 2 9

1968. It has been asserted that Somoza's agents took par t in theoverthrow of the government of Arnulfo Arias,* who despite his sub­missiveness, apparently didn't fully satisfy all the demands of the U.S.g over nm en t .

A tr adi t ion of rebel l ion

A notable feature of Nicaraguan history, particularly during thestage that began with independence from Spanish rule in 1821, is theuse of violence by different poli tical forces within the exploiting class­es, fighting over control of the government. Peaceful changes betweendifferent factions of the rul ing classes, which have been rather fre­q uent in other L at i n Am er ican count r ies, have not t aken place in N i ­caragua. This t radi t ional exper ience predisposed the N icaraguan peo­ple against electoral farces and in favor of armed struggle. There is nodoubt, then, that the Nicaraguan people have a r ich t r adi t ion of rebel ­l i on .

I t is a fact t hat the N icaraguan people have t aken up arms to figh t

specific forms of oppression many t imes through movements headed

by individuals, movements that in no sense could lead to progressiver evolu t i onary ch ange. Th i s represents another character i st ic of t heNicaraguan people t h roughou t t hei r h i story . Th is character i st i c re­lates to the lack of a deepgoing revolu t ionary consciousness.

The ideological obscurant ism inher i ted from the colonial epoch hascontinued to weigh heavily in preventing the people from marchingwith full consciousness toward struggle for social change. It is indispu­table that throughout their history the Nicaraguan people have en­dured numerous battles in which they have demonstrated their cour­age. But they have marched to these st ruggles more by inst inct than

through consciousness. Perhaps it is useful to repeat in the case of Ni­caragua the words that M arx wrote in relat ion to Spain. M arx pointedout that the Spanish people had t rad i t ional ly been a rebel people, butnot a revolut ionary people.

The nat ional an d i n ternat iona l condi t ions t hat cu rr en t l y prevai lmak e i t possible for at least a sector of the N icaraguan people to in ­

i t i at e armed st ruggle, conscious that they ar e t r y ing not simply t oachieve a change of men in power, but a change of the system — theoverthrow of the exploiting classes and the victory of the exploitedclasses.

'A r n u l fo A r ias, president of Panama, was deposed by a mi l i t a ry coup elevendays after h is elect ion in October 1968.

30 Sandin istas Speak

Or igin and prolongation of the present regime

I t is not possible to analyze the condi t ions that have perm i t ted theru l ing cl ique to remain in power for more than t hree decades wi t hout

stopping to study the count ry 's si tuat ion at the t ime t his regime wasinsta l led, as wel l as the si t uat ion that has been developing for more

than thirty years.From 1926 to 1936 the N icaraguan people went t h rough one of the

most i n tense per iods i n t hei r h i story . The armed st ruggle, t hrough

which the people sough t change, produced more than 20,000 deaths.The st ruggle began as a f ight against a Conservat ive government i m­

posed by t h e N ort h A m er icans, wen t t h rough the Sandinist a resis­tance, and concluded w i t h A nastasio Somoza's m i l i t ar y coup againstJuan B. Sacasa.

The st ruggle was carr ied out w i t hout an indust r ial proletar iat exist ­

ing. The incipient bourgeoisie betrayed the Nicaraguan people andsold out to the Y ankee interven t ion. The bourgeoisie could not be i m ­mediately replaced as the vanguard of the people's struggle by a revo­lu t ionary pr oletar i at . The Sandinist a resistance, which became t heheroic vanguard of the people, had an almost tot a l ly peasant composi ­

tion, and therein lies the glory and the tragedy of that revolutionarym ovement .

It was a glory for the N icaraguan people that the most humble classresponded to the stains against the honor of the homeland, and at th e

same time a tragedy because it involved a peasantry lacking any polit­i cal level whatsoever. M oreover, there were leaders of impor tant guer ­

ri l la columns who were tota l ly i l l i t erate. As a resul t, once Sandino wasa ssassinated his movement could not m ain t ain i ts cont i nu i t y .

The prolonged armed struggle, which ended in betrayal and frustra­t i on, exhausted the people's strength. The sector headed by A nastasio

Somoza won hegemony over the t rad i t i onal L iberal Par ty , wh i le t heopposi t ion to Somoza's government came to be dominated by the t radi ­t iona l Conservat ive Par ty , a react ionar y pol i t ical force profoundlyweakened because in the 1930s th is par ty 's sell-out to the Y ankee in ­

t ervent ionists was fresh in the people's memory .An impor tan t factor that also seriously cont r ibuted to the int er rup­

tion of the anti-imperialist struggle was the situation arising from theoutbreak of the Second Wor ld War, which concentrated the focus of theworld's reactionaries on Europe and Asia, Yankee imperialism, thetraditional enemy of the Nicaraguan people, became an ally of theworld antifascist front. The lack of a revolutionary leadership in Nica­ragua pr evented t h i s real i t y f rom being i n terpreted correct ly , and

Nicaragua: Zero Hour 3 1

Somoza took advantage of the situation to consolidate the rule of hisclique.

The rise of the old Marxist sector

For many years, the influence of the Marxist sector in the oppositionw as almost completely under the cont rol of the Conservat ive sector ,

the political force representing the interests of one sector of the capi­ta l ist class. One of the factors that cont r i buted to the weakness of the

Marxist sector originated in the conditions in which the NicaraguanSocialist Par t y ( t he t r ad i t i onal Com m unist organizat ion i n N icara­

gua) was formed. That organizat ion was formed in June 1944, whenthe Second Wor ld War was st i l l not over , and i n a per iod when t he

views of Earl Browder were in ful l force. Browder, the general secre­tary of the Communist Party of the United States, proposed concilia­t ion w ith the capit a l ist class and wi th N orth A mer ican imper ial ism inLat in A mer ica.*

In those years, the N icaraguan w ork ers' movement was basical l ymade up of ar t i sans, and t h is prov ided a base for an t i -wor k ing-class

deviations, In addition, the leadership of the Socialist Party was alsoof ar t isan or ig in , and not of proletar ian roots as the N icaraguan So­

cialist Party demagogically asserts. It was a leadership that sufferedfrom an extremely low ideological level .

For many years, the revolutionary intellectual was a rare exceptionin Nicaragua. The radical and free-thinking intellectuals of the yearsof the U .S. armed interven t i on, who as a class represented a bourgeoi­s ie that ended up capi tu l at i ng, could not be replaced by intel lectuals

identified with the working class, for the reasons previously ex­plained. As a resu l t , the int el lectual movement in N icaragua came to

be the monopoly of a Catholic element, who for a period even began toopenly ident i f y w i t h fascism . I n t h i s w ay , th e door of though t r e­

m ained shut to the revolut ionary movement .The Nicaraguan Socialist Party was organized in a meeting whose

objective was to proclaim support to Somoza's government. This tookplace on July 3 , 1944, in the M anagua gymnasium . To be r igorously

*Earl Browder (1891-1973( headed the Communist Party USA 1930-45. Af­ter the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 his name became identifiedwith the policy (actually dictated by Stal in) of supporting capitalist govern­ments that were at war w i t h N azi Ger many. In Lat in A m er ica th is meant sup­

porting governments that had Washington's support, and subordinating thew ork ers' st r uggles to them .

32 San d in is tas Speak

object ive, i t 's necessary to expl ai n that th is very grave error was notthe result of simple bad faith by the leaders. We must look at the fac­t ors that brough t i t abou t .

The Marxist leadership did not possess the necessary clarity in theface of the Conservat ive sector's control over the ant i -Somozaist oppo­si t i on. I t could not dist i nguish between the just ice of the ant i -Somoza­

i st opposi t ion and the maneuvers of the Conservat ive sector .Once Somoza had used the pseudo-M ar xist sector for his own bene­

f i t , he un leashed repression against the workers' movement , whi ch ,

due to the comfortable condi t ions in which it was born, did not k now

how to defend it self w i t h the necessary revolu t ionary f i r m ness.Par al lel to th is, the capi ta l ist sector of the opposi t ion (Conservat i ve

Par ty , L iberal opposi t ion grouping ) car r ied ou t a l l k i nds of compro­mises w it h the Somoza regime.

Role of the Cuban people's struggleand revolutionary victories

The pr incipal character i st ic of the period from the assassinat ion of

Sandino i n 1934 un t i l t he t r i umph of the Cuban revolu t ion i n 1959was the int er rupt ion of the trad i t ional armed st ruggle as a systemat i c

tact ic to f ight the ru l ing regime. Another main character i st ic was thealmost total dom inat ion that the Conservat ive sector exerted over t heant i -Somozaist opposit ion. That was the si tuat ion, last ing for twenty ­

five years, that preceded the new stage, which began with the armeds t ruggle of the Cuban people and thei r vi ctor ious revolut ion .

There were a few except ions to that long paci fi st ic period. But thesewere a lmost a lwa ys ins igni f icant a ctions by t he Conservati ve sector,beh ind the backs of and against the people. In A pr i l 1954, an armedcoup was foi led, which a l t hough under Conservat ive hegemony , i n ­

volved elements that had revolut ionary incl inat ions. The at t i t ude ofthese revolut ionary elements, along w i t h the act ion of the pat r iot Ri ­

goberto Lopez Perez, who gave his life in bringing Anastasio SomozaG. to ju st ice on September 21, 1956, must be v iewed as precursory

e vents to the insurrect ional st age that developed several years lat er .The Cuban people's rebel l ion had an in fl uence even before its victor ­

ious outcome. Thus, in October 1958, there was the guer r i l l a act ion inwhich the leader, the veteran Sandini sta Ramon Raudales, was k i l l ed .

There were a whole series of armed actions against the reactionarygovernment of Nicaragua, including the following:

Ramdn Raudales, in the mountains of Julapa, in October 1958; ElChapar ra l i n J une 1959; M anue l D iaz Sotelo, i n Estel i , i n A ugust

¹ ca ragua: Zero H ou r 3 3

1959; Carlos Haslam, in the mountains of Matagalpa, in the secondhal f of 1959; H er ibert o Reyes, i n Y um ale, i n December 1959; L asTrojes and El Dorado, in early 1960; Orosi, on the southern border, int he second hal f of 1959; L u is Mor ales, on the San Juan River on t hesouther n border , i n J anuar y 1960; Poteca River on t h e nor ther nborder , Januar y 1961; B ij ao River , N ovember 1962; the Coco River

a nd Bocay Riv er , i n 1963; clash between peasants and local author i ­ties in 1965 i n the Uluse region of Matagalpa; economic actionsagainst banks i n 1966; act ions in M anagua, January 22, 1967; incur ­

sions in Pancasan i n 1966 and 1967; economic bank act ion in M ana­g ua and cert ain revolut ionary execut ions in some areas of the count r y ­

s ide i n 1963; bat t le w i t h the N at ional Guard i n Oaosca, M atagalpa ,February 1969.

In some encounters, especial l y i n the f irst months of the new stage,

e lements l i nked to the t radi t ional capi t a l ist par t ies were infl uent ial inthe leadership of these act ions. But i n general , these effor ts increas­ingly revealed the determ inat ion of the revolut ionary sector to take up

arms to win the count ry 's l iberat ion .The period of gestation of the current revolutionary armed struggle

has lasted almost ten years and th is length of t ime is clear ly a result of

the character i st ics of the revol ut ionary movement that have been ex­plained.

The rise of the revolutionary armed organization

Especial ly in the f irst years of the new stage, the revolu t ionary lead­ership was obl iged to take up arms w i t h leaders who often lacked the

political conviction needed to lead the struggle for national liberation.As the process has developed, these leaders have been replaced bycomrades who possess a profound convict ion and an unbreakable de­ter m inat ion to defend the people arms in hand.

Another very prominen t aspect of the f i rst per iod of t he new stagewas the lack of an adequate revolut ionary organizat ion l i nked to the

broad masses of the people, and especially to the peasants. It should benoted that the composi t ion of what could be cal led the revolut ionarygroups was primarily made up of artisans and workers with a very lowp ol i t ical and ideological level . A t t hat t ime, revolut ionary m i l i t an t swi th a un iversity student background were an except ion. Students fel l

in different actions, but each group as such lacked the numbers neededto enable i t to play a very impor tant par t in assim i l at ing the experien ­

ces that t h e i nd iv idual st udents were acqu i r i ng . The revolu t ionarygroups lacked cadres who had the abi l i t y t o solve the di ff i cul t prob­

34 Sandin istas Speak

lems that the si tuat ion posed.One aspect that is worth looking at regarding the work that has

been done over the last decade is that no one knew how to combine un­derground activity with work among the popular masses. In general ,iinportance has been given only to underground activity, although af­ter the defeat at the Bocay River in 1963 and the Coco River between1964 and 1966 the error was committed of interrupting insurrectionalwork i n order to pay at ten t ion to wor k among the masses.

It must be pointed out that for a period of time, more precisely up to1962, each individual armed action came from a different group. Thatis, they reflected the total anarchy that the insurrectional revolution­ary sector suffered from. The Sandinista National Liberation Front(FSLN ) marked the overcoming of that problem, prov id ing th is sectorw i t h i t s pol i t ical and m i l i t ar y inst r ument .

Between 1959 and 1962, some of the components of the FSLN re­tained the il lusion that i t was possible to accomplish a change in thepacifistic line of the leadership of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. Inthe year 1962 th is i l lusion was dissolved in pract ice w ith the establ ish­ment of the Sandinista Front as an independent grouping, althoughfor some time to come the idea was maintained that it was possible toarrive at specific unity with the Socialist Party, something which real­ity has refuted.

The movemen t t hat cu lm in ated at the Coco River and the BocayRiver was the f irst act ion prepared by a more or less homogeneous rev­

olutionary group. This first attempt was like a dry run for the revolu­tionary sector.

This f irst defeat led to a posi t ion marked w it h a refor m ist st reak . Itis t rue that armed st ruggle was not renounced and the convict ion re­

mained that this form of struggle would decide the unfolding of the Ni­caraguan revolut ion. But the real i ty was that for some t ime the pract i ­

cal work of continuing the preparations for armed struggle was inter­rupted. I t is also t rue that after the 1963 defeat our movement was se­ri ously sp l i n tered, but we did not know how to adequately overcomethe int ernal cr i sis that developed.

One factor that undoubtedly influenced the deviation was that ourarmed defeat coincided with a downturn in the anti-Somoza move­ment in Nicaragua. In 1963, the political ascent initiated by the strug­gle and victory of the Cuban people was interrupted. The basis for thedownturn was that in February 1963 the Somozaist clique successfullycarried out the maneuver of holding an electoral farce to impose thepuppet Rene Schick .

In any case, al though th is downtur n in the general si tuat ion took

N k aragua: Zero H ou r 35

place, the FSLN leadership did not fu l ly understand th is to be no more

than a par t ia l phenomenon, inasmuch as the direct ion of the revolu ­t i onar y movement was fundament al l y t ow ard progress and in t r ansi ­t ion toward maturi ty .

It was correct in that period to pass over to rebuilding the insurrec­t i onal or ganizat ion and accumu lat in g new forces w i t h w hich to re­

launch the armed st ruggle, but t h is goal natural ly demanded an un in ­

ter rupted maintenance of a series of insurrect ional -type tasks: accum­

u lat ing mater ial resources, t ra in ing combatants, car ry ing out cert ainarmed act ions appropr i ate to the strategic defensive stage, etc.

Th is deviat ion in tact ics was also expressed in the ideology that theSandinista Front adopted. A l though i t raised the banner of ant i - impe­

r i a l ism and the emancipat ion of the exploited classes, the Front vaci l ­lated in putt ing forward a clearly Marxist-Leninist ideology. The atti ­t ude that t he t radi t i onal M ar xi st -Len inist sector had mai nt a ined int he N icaraguan people's st r uggle cont r ibuted to th i s vaci l l at ion . A s

has been stated, this sector in practice has openly played the game ofthe Somozaist cl ique. This factor , together w i t h the ideological back ­wardness prevailing in the revolutionary sector of the country, led tovaci l l at ion in adopt ing an ideology that on the nat ional level was root­ed in compromise. I t can be said that at t hat t ime there was a lack ofc lear understanding t ha t i t was only a quest ion of t im e before the

youth and people of Nicaragua would begin to distinguish between thefalse Marxists and the true Marxists.

Consequent ly , i n the years 1964 and 1965, pract ica ll y al l the em­phasis was pu t on open work , which included legal wor k among t he

m asses. Clandest ine tasks were car r ied out , above al l i n the count r y ­side, but the main emphasis of the work during that t ime was legal.Real i t y showed that legal wor k car r ied ou t i n that m anner di d notserve to accumulate forces and that the progress achieved was min i ­

mal. Neither can it be overlooked that the legal work through the now­d isappeared Republ ican M obi l izat ion group, the studen t movement ,

and peasant movement suffered from lack of discipl i ne, audaci ty , andorganization.

One must also conclude that r evolu t ionary wor k (whether i t be pub­l ic, legal, or clandest ine), cannot be advanced in an accelerated way i fthe armed revolu t ionary force is lack ing. I t was the lack of such a force

that deter m ined the ext reme l im i t at ions of the legal work car r ied outin the years 1964-65.

Our exper ience shows that t he armed revolu t ionary force (urbanand rur al) is the motor force of the revolut ionary movement in N icara­gua. The armed struggle is the only thing that can inspire the revolu­

36 Sa n di ni stew Speak

t ionary combatant i n N icaragua to carry out the tasks decided on bythe revolutionary leadership, whether they be armed or of any otherrevolutionary character .

Parenthetical ly, during the years 1964 and 1965 important contactwith the peasant sector was developed. Comrades of urban extractionpermanently established themselves in areas situated on both ends ofthe northern region of the country, and made trips to learn the peas­ants' problems firsthand and organize the revolutionary struggle inthe countryside.

I t must be said, however , that fu l l advantage was not t aken of t hebroad contact that was established with the peasants. In the country­side, some mass peasant meetings were held, some peasant delega­ti ons were sent to the city to expose the problems of the count ryside,and the peasants occupied some lands, challenging the violence of thebig landlords. However, an accelerated pace of peasant mobi lizationwas not maintained. Contact was preserved at specific points and wasnot extended to other places where the peasants suffered terrible liv­ing and working conditions. In addition, if the few peasant marches tothe city had been organized with more audacious methods, a muchlarger n umber of peasants would have par t i cipated, and at t he samet ime a greater number of areas would have gone into act ion .

In various places, individual contact with certain peasants was pro­longed for too long a t ime w i thout proceeding to the mobi l i zat ion of the

peasant masses. Land invasions by the peasants who had been dispos­s essed were hardly ever car r ied ou t .

The lack of both adequately developed leading cadres and the neces­sary determ in at ion t o organize the st ruggle of t he popular massesplayed a decisive role in the fact that we did not fu l ly ut i l i zW he possi­

bi l i t ies that were presented. Lack ing guer r i l l a camps, it, was impossi­b le to t rain cadres to organize the st ruggle of the diverse sectors of theNicaraguan people.

The armed movement of Pancaskn

In the course of 1966, practical steps were taken to relaunch armedact ions. That year the Sandinista Front became conscious of the devia­

tion that had occurred as a result of the blows of 1963 and it proceededto prepar e th e Pancasan guer r i l l a base. A l though t h i s preparat ionshowed organizat iona l progress compared w i t h t h e F SL N 's armedmovement in 1963, it did not represent serious progress in politicaland mil itary tactics. It was a notable step forward organizationally be­cause it did not follow the usual practice of preparing the armed move­

N i caragua: Zero H ou r 3 7

ment in a neighbor ing count ry , which had provided distance from theenemy's observation; rather it was preparation of an armed movementi n m o u n t a i n s s i t u a t ed i n t h e v er y ce n t e r o f t h e cou n t r y .

An ex t remely impor tant factor that h indered the success of the Pan­

casan movement was the mist aken method used to get the peasants topar t icipate in the st ruggle. The form used was to recru i t a number ofpeasa n t s t o becom e p a r t o f t h e r eg u l a r co l u m n . T h i s m ea n s t h a t t h ese

peasants were completely m ixed i n w i t h th e work ing-class and st u ­

dent fi gh ters, i .e., combatants w it h an urban background .

Th e m i l i t ants who came from u rban areas general ly possessed ahigher revolut ionary consciousness than the peasants as a whole, who

became demoral ized when faced w it h the f i rst di ff icu l t ies that we ranup against : scarcit y of suppl ies, cer tai n slow marches, and the f i r st

rum ors of the presence of enemy soldiers on nearby road». This obl i ­gated th e leadership t o send back the m aj or i t y of the peasants, al ­though there were honorable except ions of peasants who fi rm l y re­fused to be. let go and who are an example of the combat ive possibi l i t y

o f th is sector .

In addi t ion, in the f i rst stage of the revolut ionary war t hat was be­ginn ing, we did not f ind a way t o incorporate the peasants in t hose

areas some days distant , w i t h whom contact had prev iously been es­tab l ished through organizing them in the st ruggle for land and for oth ­e r demands. Some of the peasants who temporar i ly j oined the guer r i l ­

las had been moved from thei r areas to the encampments.W hen the break-up of th e Pancasan guer r i l l a movement had a l ­

ready t aken place, i t became know n t hat once some of the peasant swho had deserted the guer r i l las ar r ived back in thei r own areas, they

took par t i n ar med assaults on local government posts or r u ra l com­mercia l establ ishments, as wel l as execut ions of know i i i n formers.Th is indicates that to a large extent, some of the peasants who had be­

come demoral ized went t h rough that cr isis because they were not or ­ganized in the most appropr iate manner . I t means that they probabl v

should have been i r regu lar r ather than regular guerr! l las. This expe­r ience leads us to th ink about the possib i l i t y of organizing i r regu la r

guer r i l las para l lel io the regulars. We should not fai l to point out thatwe can now evaluat e th e impor tance of wor k among the peasants

much bett er , thanks to our ow n exper ience. We don't on ly base ou r ­selves on th e exper iences of other L a t i n A m er ican guer r i l l a move­

ments.Another aspect t ha t m ust he h i gh l ighted wa s t h < i n .uffi cient

num ber of cadres to handle al l the tasks that the preparat ion of t he

work demanded, not only in the city and the count ryside, hut even oui.—

88 Sa n d in is tas Speak

side of the country. For too long the leadership of the Sandinista Frontt olerated sectar ian ism, which stood in the way of promot ing a suAi ­

cient quantity of new cadres coming from politically advanced work­i ng-class backgrounds and f rom t he un iversi t y sector . Fever ish at ­tempts were made to achieve excessively bi g goals instead of alway smak ing progress in car ry ing out su i table, everyday tasks.

The insu rrecf,ionary wor k was not r elated t o the general people' sst ruggle — especial ly the peasant, student, wor k i ng-class st ruggles. I twas good that the Front. put i ts pr i ncipal emphasis on insur rect ionary

work , bu t i t was an er ror t o abandon other r evol u t ionar y forms of

s t ruggle. Sectar ian tact ics weighed heav i ly and these deter m ined thecourse of' act iv i t y i n the preparat ion for the movement i n the moun­

t a i n s .

Th e inel iv idual ist ic bad hab its that leadership comrades often dis­

played was the factor that helped hold back the in i t i at i ves that couldhave resolved many problems; on di f ferent occasions ind iv idual prob­lems were m ixed w i t h pol i t i ca l probleins. This may have decisivelycont r i buted to depr iv ing cert ain in i t i at ives of the ser iousness that was

due them .In regard to placing cadres in charge of var ious tasks, i t was a mis­

take to be conf ident that comrades who had not exper ienced the pr iva­tions of' guerr i l la l if'e would be able to work among the masses — forexample, among the student masses. For some years now, our organ i ­

zat ion has been conscious ol' the bal last that the N icaraguan revolu­t i on;i ry movement car r ies as a result of the stance of the capi ta l ist par ­

ties, w hich for many years usurped the leadership of the ant i-Somoza­ist opposi t ion . I l owever, at the t ime when the guer r i l l a base was es­tabl ished in the mountains, there was insuAi cien t thought. given to

the fact that due to the prevai l ing condi t ions the tasks requi red by thewor k i n t he ci t ies could nof, be at tended to by m i l i t ants who did not

possess the necessary f i r mness and discip l ine. In view of t his, the com­rades in ih» forefront of urban resistance work could count on the prac­t ical col laborat ion of a very reduced number of m i l i t ants. The si tua­

t ion of the urban resist ance became morc acute due to the sectar ian al ­t i t ude of those charged w it h t h is responsibi l i t y .

Organized mass wor k i st udent , peasant, work er ) was paralyzed. On

the one hand, ihere were not enough cadres to handle t his work , andon the other , there was an underest im at ion of the importance th is ac­

t i v i t y could play in the development of the armed st r uggle. This weak ­n ess led t o the sit.uai ion w here when the death of comrades i n t h emount ains and in fhe ci t ies was recorded, there was not consistent sol­

Nicaragua: Zero Hour 3 9

idarity on the part of all the members of the Front .I n t h e ci t ies, on l y v i olen t act ions of an in di v idual n at ur e w er e

pl anned. And th ere was no at tempt t o develop a pol icy of using v io­

lence involving the participation of the popular masses in the cities—s ometh ing that is possible mainl y i n M anagua, the count ry 's capi t a l ,

which has a population of more than 300,000.U nder N icaraguan condi t ions, as wel l as in most coun t r ies of L at i n

Am er ica, the center of act ion of the revol ut ionary war has to be thec ount ryside. However, the ci t ies must also play a role of par t i cu lar im ­

port ance, given that in the f irst stage of the war the city has to supplythe countryside with the most developed cadres to lead the politicaland mi l i t ary detachment. In general, the revolu t ionary elements fromthe ci t ies have a greater ab i l i t y t o develop themselves i n t he f i rst

s tage. These elements ar e composed of t h e revolu t ionar y sector ofworkers, students, and a cert ai n layer of the pett y bourgeoisie.

One must take into account the habi ts that the capi t a l ist par t ies andthei r fa i t h fu l servants have imposed on the popular masses t h roughthei r electoral poli cy. These par t ies have condi t ioned broad sectors ofthe people to par t i cipate in the hust le and bust le of electoral r igama­

role. This circum st ance must be taken into account to fu l ly understandwhy many sectors of the populat ion , despite thei r sy mpathy w i t h t he

revolutionary armed struggle, cannot demonstrate that sympathyt h rough act ion . T h is forces us to consider the need t o fu l l y t r ai n a

broad number of persons from among the populat ion to have the mate­rial capacity to support the armed struggle. To seek out the people isnot suff icient ; they have to be tr ained to par t icipate in the revolut ion­

a ry w ar .

Some current tasks

Several months ago, work in the countryside was reestablished. TheFSLN is simultaneously developing political and mil itary work, withthe object ive of reorganizing the guer r i l l a st ruggle.

In the countryside a study of the peasants' problems is already un­der w ay , and t h is i nvest igat ion has requ i red m i l i t ants to stay i n t heru ra l zones for several weeks. M i l i t ant s w i t h an urban background(workers and students) are participating in this political work. It hasbeen said that the mountain (the guerri l la base) proletarianizes, andwe agree with this statement. But as our experience has shown, it canbe added that the countryside — political contact with the peasants—a lso proletar ianizes. The urban m i l i t an t , in contact w i t h the count r y ­

40 Sandin istas Speak

side, including the zones where a guerri l la base is not organized, livesthe abject poverty that the peasants suffer and feels their desire tost ruggle.

A phenomenon that has been seen in this country since the Panca­skn movemen t i s the growt h of th e Sandinist a N at ional L iberat ionFront's poli tical authorit y over the broad sectors of the popularmasses. Today the Sandin ist a Fron t can cla im , and has obtained, amuch greater degree of cooperation from the population than in thepast. It must also be said that if we do not get greater cooperation thanwe actual ly are receiv ing, i t is because we lack cadres who are compe­tent in asking for this type of help, and also because the cadres now ac­tive are not functioning systematically enough.

Simultaneously, new methods are being found so that we can gainthe practical collaboration of new sectors of the population in the clan­destine conditions under which we function (a smal l country wi thsmal l ci t ies). This has led us to not depend exclusively on the old m i l ­itants and collaborators (a large proportion of whom are "jaded").

Furthermore, we have reestablished squads that are prepared to actin the cities, and they have carried out some actions.

We now have plans to undertake actions in harmony with the periodo f reestabl ishment we are now going through .

The Sandinista National Liberation Front believes that at the pres­ent t ime and for a certain period to come, Nicaragua wil l be goingthrough a stage in which a radical poli tical force will be developing itsspecific character ist ics. Consequent ly , at the curren t t ime i t is neces­

sary for us to strongly emphasize that our major objective is the social­ist r evolu t ion , a revolu t ion t hat a ims to defeat Y ankee imper ia l i smand its local agents, false oppositionists, and false revolutionaries.T his propaganda, w i t h the f i rm back ing of armed act ion, w i l l perm i tt he Front to win the suppor t of a sector of the popular masses that i sconscious of the profound nature of the struggle we are carrying out .

In order to outline a strategy for the revolutionary movement, it isnecessary to take into account the strength that the capitalist partiesrepresent, due to the influence they st il l wield within the opposition.One must be aler t to the danger that the react ionary force in the oppo­

sition to the Somoza regime could climb on the back of the revolution­ary insurrection. The revolutionary movement has a dual goal. On theone hand, to overthrow the criminal and traitorous clique that hasusurped the power for so many years; and on the other, to prevent thecapit a l ist opposi t ion — of proven submission to Yankee imper ia l ism— from taking advantage of the situation which the guerri l la strugglehas unleashed, and grabbing power. In the task of barring the way to

Nicaragua: Zero Hour 4 1

the traitorous capitalist forces, a revolutionary political and mil itaryforce rooted in the broad sectors of the people has a unique role to play.S ink ing these roots is dependent on the organizat ion's abi l i t y to dr iv e

out the Liberal and Conservative influences from this broad sector.The pol icy we fol low l ater on regarding the old pa r t ies that now

have a capitalist leadership wil l be determined by the att i tude thatthe people as a whole have toward these par t ies.

Relating to the situation of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, it can bes tated that the changes that have taken place in that pol i t ical organ i ­zation's leadership are purely changes in form. The old leadershipbuilds il lusions regarding the Conservative sector, and calls for build­ing a pol i t ical front in which these stubborn agents of imper i a l ism par ­

t icipate. The so-called new leadership cu rren t ly just i f ies having par ­ticipated in the electoral farce of 1967, support ing the pseudo-opposi­tional candidacy of the Conservative politician Fernando Aguero. Likethe old leadersh ip, the so-called new leadership keeps tal k ing about

the armed st ruggle, wh i le i n pract ice i t concent rates i t s energies onpetty legal work .

The above statements do not contradict the possibility of developinga certain unity with the anti-Somozaist sector in general. But this isunity at the base, with the most honest sectors of the various anti­Somozaist tendencies. This is all the more possible due to the increasei n the prest ige of the Sandin i st a N at ional L iberat ion Fr on t and t hediscredi t ing and spl i nt er ing of the leadership of the capit a l ist par t ies

and the like.The Sandinista National Liberation Front understands how hard

the guerri l la road is. But it is not prepared to retreat. We know that weare confronting a bloody, reactionary armed force like the NationalGuard , t h e ferocious GN , w h ich m a in ta in s i n tact t h e pract ices ofcruelty that were inculcated in i t by its creator, the U.S. Marines.Bombardmen t of v i l l ages, cu t t ing of ch i l dren's t hroats, v iolat ion ofwomen, bu rn in g huts w i t h peasants inside of them , m ut i l at ion as a

tort ure — these were the study courses that the U .S. professors of civ­ilization taught the GN during the period of the guerri l la resistance(1927-1932) led by Augusto Cesar Sandino.

The frustration that followed the period of the Sandinista resistancedoes not have to be repeated today . Now the t imes are different . The

c urren t days are not l i k e those i n w h ich Sandino and h i s guer r i l l abrothers battled alone against the Yankee empire. Today revolution­ar ies of all the subj ugated count r ies are r ising up or prepar ing to go in­t o the bat t le against the empire of the dol lar. A t the apex of this bat t l eis indominatable V ietnam , w hich w i t h i t s example of heroism , is re­

42 Sandinistas Speak

pulsing the aggression of the blond beasts.The combative example of our fallen brothers carries us forward. It

is t h e exampl e of Casim i r o Sotelo, Dan i l o Rosales, Jorge N avar ro,Francisco Buitrago, Silvio Mayorga, Otto Casco, Modesto Duarte, Ro­bert Amaya, Edmundo Phrez, Hugo Medina, Rene Carrion, RigobertoCruz (Pablo Ubeda), Fermin Diaz, Selin Chible, Ernesto Fernandez,Oscar Fl orez, Fel ipe Gait an, Fausto Garcia, E l ias Moncada, FranciscoMoreno, Carlos Reyna, David Tejada, Carlos Tinoco, Francisco Cordo­ba, Faustino Ruiz, Boanerges Santamaria, Ivan Sanchez.

We will faithfully fulfi l l our oath:"Before the image of Augusto Cesar Sandino and Ernesto Che Gue­

vara; before the memory of the heroes and mar t y rs of N icaragua, Lat ­in Amer ica, and hum an it y as a whole; before history: I place my handon the black and red fl ag that sign i f ies 'Free Homeland or Death,' and

I swear to defend the nat ional honor w i th arms in hand and to f ight forthe redempt ion of the oppressed and exploited i n N icaragua and t heworld. If I fulfi l l this oath, the freedom of Nicaragua and all the peo­ples will be the reward; if I betray this oath, death in disgrace and dis­honor w i l l be my punishment ."

Nothing Will H old Back OurStruggle for Liberation

by Daniel Ortega

This speech by FSI .N leader Daniel Ortega u>as delivered tr> the ple­nary session>» of th» Sixth Summit Cvn/erence o/'Nonaligned Countri esheld i n H avana September 3- 9, /9 7 9. Ortega is coordinator of Nicara­gua 's . l untu i>fNatio»ul Re«onstruction. The translat ion is by In te rcon­

ti nental Press.

In January 1928 the Panamer ican Conference was held in Havana.

At t ha t t im e th e N icaraguan people wer e engaged i n an unequalst r uggle against Yankee int ervent ion. Cal v i n Cool idge, who was thenpresident of the U n i ted States, par t i cipated i n the H avana meet i ng ,

and the ty r ant M achado was president of Cuba.Sandino, hoping to gain the support of some delegations, sent the

fol low ing message on January 2, 1928:

Our voices must be heard in Havana. Men must not lack the moral courage tospeak the t r u t h abou t our misfor t une. They must tel l how the people of N icara­

gua, who a r« va l iant ly f igh t ing and suffer ing, are determ ined to make any sac­ri f ice. even i n c lud ing the ir own exte rm i na t i on, in order to defend the ir l iber ty .

The resu lts in Havana w i l l be nul l and void if the ideal of the Spanish-speak i ngp eoples is not crystal l iz«d; i f you let us be ;issassinatc d to the last man, w« wi l l

have the consolat ion of'know ing that we car r ied out our du ty. Our (:oun tr y andFreedom.

A. (; . Sandino

Not a single voice was raised at t hat H avana meet ing .' I'oday H avana is serv ing as the site for t h is Sixt h Sum m i t , and the

peoples and gover nments that ar e represented i n t h i s assembly aremot i vated by «or>i mon interests.

A free and hospitable people, filled with solidarity, is receiving thesedelegations. And the leader of the revolution carried out by this peopleis presiding over the Nonaligned for this period. The tyrant Machadono longer governs Cuba. It is the people of Cuba who determine theiro wn dest iny .

43

44 Sa n d in is tas Speak

The Governmen t of N at ional Reconst ru ct ion of N icaragua and the

Sandinista National Liberation Front salute the people of Cuba, theirgovernment , and th e president of the Counci l of State, Comandanteand Comrade Fidel Cast ro.

We also salute the peoples of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa,and A sia for the sol idar i t y they demonst rated in suppor t of our cause.

On Saturday, September 1, in a Mexican newspaper , we read a dis­patch datel ined H avana that made reference to N icaragua's posi t ion

regarding the "problem" of Kampuchea. And we say "problem" be­cause it is a problem for imperialism for a people to be free.

Th e dispatch i n quest ion noted that N icaragua's delegat ion hadal igned i tsel f w i t h the Soviet bloc by recognizing the gover nm ent ofpeople's Kampuchea. We all know what interests motivate the inter­national press agencies of the so-called free world, so the deed does notsurpr ise us.

We know that m any of these press agencies, and w i th them the mostr eact ionary sector s of t h e U n i ted St ates government an d of L at i nAm er ica, are wai t ing to pounce on our declarat ions at t h is meet ing .

T hese are the same forces that gave r ise to the Somozaist dictator ­ship. They are the same forces that defamed and assassinated Lumum­ba,* t ha t defamed and assassinated Che. These are the same forcesthat slandered and assassinated Van Troi ,** the same forces that slan­

dered and assassinated Sandino.Imper i alism cannot conceive of a free people, a sovereign people, an

independent people. Because, simply and plainly, for them the peopleis noth ing more than an em pty ph rase. We just saw reconf i rmat ion ofth is when our f i nal offensive was launched.

They examined the war in mathematical terms. Somoza had a regu­lar ar my. Somoza had more soldiers than the Sandinistas. Somoza hadtanks, planes. a r t i l lery , w h i le the Sand i nistas d idn' t . Somoza had

more soldiers, more r i fl es, more commun icat ions than the Sandinis­tas. Therefore, Somoza had to w in the war against t he Sandinistas.Bu t what was left nu t was t hat Somoza did not have the people, andthat we Sandini st as were the people.

And when Somoza was losing the war, they were tal k ing about (. os­ta Rican intervent ion, Panam an ian in tervent i on, Cuban intervent ion ,

*Patri re Lumumba, a leader nf the struggle for Congolese liberation, was thef i rst pr em ier of the Republ ic of the Congo. H ia gover nment was over t h rown by

a m i l i t ary coup involv ing the (', IA , and he was murdered i n 19g l .

" 'sNguyen Van Trni was a Vietnamese freedon: fighter .

Nothing Wi ll Hold Back Our Struggle 45

Soviet intervention — simply because they have never been able tounderstand, and are never going to understand„ that people are capa­ble of achieving their l iberation, that people are able to solidarizethemselves with people, and that therefore the free and sovereign peo­ple of Nicaragua today recognizes the right of Kampuchea to occupyt h is seat .

I repeat, imperialism cannot understand it because for them the peo­ple is nothing more than an empty phrase.

The Nicaraguan people have won, with their blood, the right to behere today, in this way breaking with a historic past of servi l ity to­ward imperialist policy.

For the first time in their entire history the Nicaraguan people cano fficial ly express thei r sovereign w i l l , j oi n ing t h i s movement of t h eNonaligned barely forty-one days after their tr iumph.

We are entering the Nonaligned movement because in this move­

ment we see the broadest organization of the Third World states thatare playing an important role and exercising a growing influence inthe international sphere, in the struggle of peoples against imperial­

ism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including Zion­ism and every form of oppression. Because they are for active peacefulcoexistence, against the existence of m i l i t ar y blocs and al l i ances, forrestructuring international relations on an honorable basis, and arefor the establishment of a new international economic order.

In the Sandinista revolut ion there is no al ignment; there is an abso­

lute and consistent commitment to the aspirations of the peoples whohave achieved their independence and to those who are struggling towin i t . That is why we are among the N onal igned.

Th is t r anscendental step is par t of the process of l iberat ion that peo­ples are going through, peoples such as those in Grenada, Iran, Kam­

puchea, and Uganda, who won beautiful victories this year .In 1855 a certa in W i l l i am W a lker a rr i ved f rom t he southern s lave

states of the United States with a gang of mercenaries, to make him­self master of our country and of all of Central America.

The individual in question named himself president of Nicaragua

and h i s f i rst decree was the reestabl ishmen t of slavery ; the U n i t ed

States press and more than a few U.S. legislators made Wil l iamWalker into a hero.

In September 1856, after continual and bloody resistance, the peopleof Nicaragua and the peoples of Central America defeated the invader,who was obliged to flee to his country of origin, where he was received

as a hero.Some months later he again t r ied to invade our count ry. Dur ing h is

46 Sandinistas Speak

third attempt he was captured in Honduras, a country bordering onNicaragua, and was shot. In 1909 a Liberal president named Jose San­tos Zelaya, who tried to open new markets in Europe, was forced to re­sign by a note sent by the U .S. secretary of state of that t ime. But what

Senor Zelaya lacked, the Nicaraguan people had plenty of, and theyr ose up against Y ankee intervent ion .

Because we rej ect Y ankee intervent ion we are in the N onal igned.For that reason, and because we are Sandini st as, we demand the rein­

tegrat ion, the uncondi t ional r et ur n of the Guantanamo base to Cuba,and we recognize the heroic and unequal struggle waged by the Cubanpeople against the criminal blockade.

That is why we suppor t the st ruggle of the people of Puerto Rico forself-determination and independence, and why we are in solidarityw i t h Lol i ta Lebron and her companions in pr ison,* who are authen t i c

representat ives of t he st ruggle of the people of Puer to Rico.That is why we stand behind the people of Panama in thei r st ruggle

for sovereignty over the Canal Zone.That is why we are w i t h the people of Belize in their st ruggle for i n ­

d ependence, for self-determ in at i on, and for ter r i tor ia l i n tegr i t y .Regular t roops of the Yankee mar ines landed in our count ry in 1910

in an at tempt to suppress our people's desire for independence. Bloodys t ruggles wer e un leashed an d t h i s armed i n tervent ion was m ai n ­

tained unti l 1926, the year they withdrew, believing the situation tobe under control .

Because we are Sandinistas and because just causes are our causes,we have, from the beginn ing, ident i f ied w ith the st ruggle of the heroicpeople of V i et nam , and we condem n al l t he aggressions t ha t havetaken place and are tak ing place against the people and government of

Vietn am , which fought , and is f i gh t i ng, against aggression and for ­e ign occupat ion .

We also support the just struggle of the people of Western Sahara,and from t h i s moment N icaragua must be included among the coun­

tries that fully recognize the Democratic Arab Sahraoui Republic andthe Polisar io Front as the only and the legi t im ate representat ive of the

heroic people of Western Sahar a.That is why we recognize the legi t im ate r ights of the people of N a­

m ib ia, represented by SW A PO. We support the Pat r i ot ic Front of Zim ­babwe, the sole representat ive of t h is people, and we condemn the im ­

*L ol i t a Lebron was one of f ive Puerto Rican nat ional ists im pr isoned in t he

U.S. in the early 1960s for armed proindependence actions. She and the threeother surviving prisoners were released in 1979.

Nothing Will Hokt Back Our Struggle 4 7

per ia l ist maneuvers in Rhodesia, the puppet regime of Muzorewa, and

the so-called internal settlement.*We solidarize ourselves with the frontl ine countries and condemn

the aggression by South Africa and Rhodesia against them. And we so­l i dar ize w i t h the r i gh t of the people of East T imor to self-determ ina­t ion .

We support the reunification of Korea and we demand the with­dr awal of U .S. troops from South K orea .

Only a few month s wer e t o pass when i n 1927 Y ankee mar inesa gain landed on our soi l .

Then the f igure of Augusto Cesar Sandino vigorously rose up and, at

the head of an army of workers and peasants, sought to mil itar i ly de­f eat the interven t ionist forces in an unequal campaign .

Sandino embodied the desire for l ibert y of a people who were sys­tematically subjected to the attack of Yankee intervention and sub­jected to imper ia l ist exploi t at ion and dom inat ion. The same mar ineswho murdered the F i l i p ino people thousands of m i les from our coun­

tr y , ar r ived to soak N icaraguan ter r i t or y in blood in those days.This explains the existence of Sandinismo, which on May 4, 1927,

gave rise to what Sandino called the "war of l iberators to end the war

of the oppressors."T he Yankees, who were unable to defeat Sandino's army m i l i t ar i l y ,

who found themselves forced to withdraw in January 1932, again re­sorted to t reachery , using as thei r inst r umen t an army and an army

chief named Anastasio Somoza Garcia, founder of the dynasty. Thisarmy and this army chief were created by the White House strategiststo assassinate Sandino.

They though t t hat k i l l ing Sandino would solve the problem. Theyd id not take into account that Sandino had in i t i ated a process of l iber ­a t ion which, carr ied on by the Sandinista N at ional L iberat ion Fron t ,

was to wi n one of i t s most impor tan t v i ct or ies on Ju l y 19, 1979. Onthat day we both defeated the cr im inal Somozaist N at ional Guard and

expelled the last Yankee mar ine, Anastasio Somoza, from N icaragua.O ur countr y is a smal l count r y , a poor count r y .

*The in ternal set t lement was a plan imposed by the wh i te m inor i t y regi me

in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to inst i t u te nom inal B lack r u le wh i le mai n t ai n ing theeconomic and pol i t ical st ruct ure of wh i te dom inat ion. Abel M uzorewa, a B lack

clergyman, was installed as prime minister under this set-up in June 1979.Lacking Support from the Black major i ty, the plan collapsed, and, after elec­tions in March 1980, Robert Mugabe of the Patriotic Front became prime min­i ster .

48 San d in is tas Speak

A l i t t l e more than 2.5 m i l l ion N icaraguans l ive i n 128,000 squar ek i l om eters. I t is a count r y t hat is basical ly dependent on agr icu l t ur e,and i t s product ion was par alyzed by the war . A count ry that had fewfactories, which were destroyed by the Somoza air force.

A coun tr y w i t h a sm al l popu lat ion that has had to sacr i f ice thou­sands of its best children to repel three armed Yankee interventionsthat have left more than 200,000 vict ims. A count ry that in i ts f inal of­fensive against the Somozaist dictatorsh ip suffered more than 50,000

deaths, a high percentage of whom, 90 percent of the total, were youthfrom eight years of age to twenty.

A countr y w i t h i t s schools and hospi t als destroyed, w i t h i t s ci t iesleveled by 500-pound bombs given to Somoza by the Un i ted States and

Israel i Zioni sm. But we were not alone in the st r uggle. We know thatwe had the back ing of the peoples of the wor ld. We know that th is was

what made it impossible for the Y ankees to carry out a new armed in ­tervent ion in our countr y before the tyr an t was destroyed.

Am ong the f i les abandoned by Somozaism we have found proof ofthe loans for arms that the government of Israel had given to the dicta­torship. Israel was an accomplice to the crimes of Somoza. Israel wasthe inst rumen t that imper ia l ism used up to the last moment to armSomoza's genocida l di ct atorsh ip . Rockets, r i fl es, how itzers, planes,g unboats, and even helmets and un iform s were sent to the dictator .

But the strengt h of the people was greater than that of the aggression .As we said at that t i me, we w i l l not repay these loans, this debt that

adds up to millions of dollars. Nor will we pay any debt contracted withother count r ies for ar m aments for the Somozaist regime. On the con­

tr ary , i t is Israel that owes a debt to our people.We are Sandinistas; our people have been struggling against op­

p ression and intervent i ons for more than 150 years. That is why wehave historical ly identified with the struggle of the Palestinian peopleand we recognize the PLO as their leg i t im ate representat ive. And thatis why we condem n Israel i occupat ion of the A rab ter r i t or ies and de­m and thei r uncondi t ional r et u r n .

We support genu ine efforts in the search for a just and t rue peace inthe M iddle East . But such a peace must take into account the in terests

of al l the par t ies, and i n the f i rst place the r ights of the Palest in ianpeople.

On May 4, 1927, at t he moment Sandino was r i sing up, a N icara­guan t r a i tor signed away the sovereignty of the people of N icaragua to

the Yankee government , in exchange for a dol lar for each r i fl e t urnedin. We condemn the Camp David accords, which, l ike the shamefultreason of 1927 in Nicaragua, merit our energetic repudiation.

Rat i ng Wi l l Hold Bock Our Struggle 4 9

In June 1979, there were forces in the U.S. government that wantedto propose an invasion of our soil to the seventeenth meeting of repre­sentatives of the Organization of American States. But there were alsoseventeen L at i n A m er ican coun t r ies that said no to the imper ia l ist

proposal.Here we must make special mention and take recognition of the An­

dean Pact countries.We should mention the names of President Rodrigo Carazo of Costa

Rica; ex-President Car los Andres Perez of V enezuela; President JoseLopez Porti l lo of Mexico; General Omar Torri jos of Panama; and FidelCastro of Cuba — al l of whom were and cont i nue to be in sol idar i t y

with our struggle, despite the risks that such solidarity implies.We should make special ment ion of the m i l i t an t sol idar i ty that L at ­

in A m er ican f i gh ters gave ou r st ruggle. The blood of these f ight er swas shed along the road to victory . We can state that L a t i n A mer ica

helped to make this victory possible.We are a smal l coun tr y t hat has waged war i n order to win peace.

And we suppor t the establ ishment of a just and last ing peace that ex­

tends to al l coun t r ies and regions.We recognize the right of peoples to win their freedom through the

p ath that is best for them, whether armed or not .

We are a poor coun try that wants to t ake the effor ts and resourcesnow being i nvested in defense of the revolut i on and i nvest i t i n t r ac­

t ors and plows. And we suppor t general and complete disarm amen t ,under st r ict i n ternat ional cont rol . We are for an end to the arms race

and we salu te the SA LT I I accords as an import ant step in t h is direc­ti on. We demand respect for the ter r i t or ia l i n tegr i t y of states and re­nunciat ion of the use of force in intern at ional relat ions. We condem n

the existence of m i l i t ary bases.Sandini smo is the incarnat ion of the nat ion. The Sandinista N at ion­

al L iberat ion Front , as the genu ine vanguard of the great people's in­s ur rect ion that. defeated the dictatorsh ip, is now push ing forward aprocess of nat ional reconst ruct ion whose f irst measures have been themassive expropr iat ion of the property of Somoza and h is civ i l i an andmi l i t ar y accomplices. So far more th an 5 00,000 hecta res, close to 50

percent of the ent i r e arable area of the countr y , has been recovered bythe people.

More than 180 industrial and commercial enterprises have passedinto the hands of the people.

More than 400 mansions and homes have been expropr iated in t heint erests of the people.

The banks have been nat iona lized.

50 Sandin istas Speak

We have begun to put an Integral Agrarian Reform Plan into effect .Agricultural exports have been nationalized.The exploitation of natural resources has been nationalized.By eliminating the 500 and 1,000 cordoba bills* and retiring them

from circulation, we are hindering the maneuvers of the defeated So­mozaists to destabilize our country financially.

A real social thrust is being given to education, health, and housing.A foreign policy of relations with all countries of the world has been

established.We have become part of the movement of the Nonaligned.Sandinista Defense Committees have been organized as bodies of

people's participation.The Sandinista People's Army has been set up to fulfi l l the pressing

need to guarantee the defense and advance of the revolution.And this revolution has been expansive and generous toward i ts

enemies. Thousands of captured soldiers have had thei r l i ves protect ­

ed. Groups such as the Int er nat ional Red Cross were author ized to setup centers of refuge to give shelter to the Somozaist cr iminals whowere fleeing.

The revolution is marching forward. The difficulties are great. Thecounterrevolution is a potential threat .

There are some who assert that we are assassinating the prisoners.There are some who are trying to put conditions on international

aid. The conspiracy is power fu l and the most react ionary sectors of the

U.S. government have already succeeeded in stopping a small grant of$ 8 m i l l ion that the U .S. gover nment was going to give our count r y .

The most react ionary sectors of the Cent ral Amer ican region are ob­serving our process with trepidation. We have detected concentrationsof Somozaist soldiers in neighboring countries. But just as we havebeen generous in victory, we will be inflexible in defense of the revolu­tion.

To what has already been described, we must add the economic le­gacy of imperialist domination and the Somozaist war of aggression.

We f ind ourselves w ith a foreign debt of more than $1.53 bi l l i on. Ofth is amount , $596 mi l l ion fa l ls due this year, hav ing been incur red asshor t -ter m loans at very h igh in terest r ates. The foreign debt is equi ­v alent to t hree t imes the total annual expor ts of the count r y .

The loans obtained by Somozaism were misspent, squandered, andsent out of the country to personal accounts in the United States andEurope.

*1 cdrdoba = U 8 $.10

Nothi ng Wi l l H old Back Our S tr ugg le 5 1

A study published August 14 by the Economic Commission for LatinAmerica (CEPAL) maintained that Somozaist bombing resulted in$580 million in material damage to the physical and social infrastruc­tu re i n the agr icu l t u r al , indust r i al , and commercia l sectors. A t pres­ent $741 mi l l ion is needed to react ivate product ion .

To the losses cited above, we have to add the losses to the system of

p roduct ion that stem from the paralysis of economic act iv i t ies, In addi ­tion we must add the resources requ ired for restor ing the count ry' seconomic apparatus at a t ime when i t is also being t ransformed.

To give us a more graphic representation of the problem, CEPAL es­ti m ates that the si tuat ion we have descr ibed means that, the Gross Do­

mest ic Product has decl ined 25 percent t h is year , 1979. In per capi t at erms, th is puts the GDP back to the level that N icaragua was at i n1962, mean ing we have sl id back seventeen years.

And to top i t al l off, our revolution found only $3.5 mil lion in thes tate coffers. That is al l t hat Somozaism was unable to loot .

N icaragua's si tuat ion has provoked interest in the count r ies of Lat ­in Am er ica and the rest of the wor ld. Regional bodies have expressedthei r decision to aid us. Bi latera l ly we have close relat ions w i th many

count r ies.But we must be frank : The oppressive f i nancia l problem that con­

fronts our process, which is di rect ly related to rest ruct ur ing the for ­e ign debt and receiv ing f i nancing i n order t o al low ou r economy t ostar t up again, does not seem to ser iously int erest the developed coun­

tr ies.T he governmen t of M exico, which has aided us to the extent i t i s

able, has raised the idea of an in ternat ional sale of sol idar i t y bondstha t woul d come du e a t a defer red per iod an d w i t h low i n t erest .

Through this bond issue the debt that falls due this year, which as wesaid totals $596 mi l l ion, would be rest ruct ured on adequate terms. Wesupport the proposal of President Didier Rasiratekat of Madagascar,regarding the creat ion of a F i nancia l Fund of the Nonal igned coun­tr ies.

We believe i t is our duty to present before the movement of the Non­

al igned both the advances and the problems of the revolut ion in N ica­ragua.

We believe that by consol idat ing the Nicaraguan revolut ion we w i l lbe strengthen ing the st ruggle of the underdeveloped count r ies.

We know that imperialism is interested in seeing our process failand that i t is going to use al l the resources at i ts disposal to achieve

that .The liberation st ruggle in our country is continuing. And today

52 Sa nd i n i stas Speak

more than ever we need the disinterested suppor t of the Nonal igned.Nicaragua, which forty-one days after its tr iumph is showing you boththe open wounds and the consolidation of our revolution, is a challengef or t h is movement .

The people of Sandino are not going to step back from the ground al­ready gained. Our in tegra ti on w i th t he peoples of A f r i ca a nd A s iaraises our mor ale in t h is great bat t le. The fu ture belongs to the peo­

ples.The march toward uictory mill not be stoppedf

Nicaragua — The Strategy of Victory

In ter view w ith H u m berto Or tega

H u mberto Ortega i s a leader of the FSL1V and the commander i nchief of the Sandini sta People's A r my. This i nter vi etv, conducted by the

e xiled C hi lean j ou r na l ist M ar ta H arnecker , ori gi na l l y appeared i nEng l i sh i n the J anuar y 27, 1980, i ssue of Gra nma. Mi n or s tyl is tic

c hanges have been made for consi stency and readabi l i ty .

Mar ta H arnecker: The armed struggle of the Nicaraguan people for

liber at ion has been a long one. I have read your book 50 ahos de luchasandi ni sta (50 Years of Sandin is ta S tr uggle) in w h ich you describedthe h i gh l ights of the st ruggle up t o 1975. H owever , tw o years ago

there seemed to be l i t t le l i k el ihood that vi ct or y would be obtained soquickly. What made possible the big gains registered by the revolu­tionary process which led to the overthrow of Somoza and his regime?

Humberto Ortega: W e ll , before I a nswer y our q uestion d i rectl y , I

would l ike to briefly sum up the key points of the book you mentioned— though th is is very hard to do w i thout fa l l ing in to oversimpl i f ica­

ti ons and omissions.The revolu t ionary movement which took shape in our count ry in the

th i r t ies as a resul t of Sandino's s truggle ­Harnecker: Wh i ch took s hape or began?

Ortega: We l l , we say t hat i t t ook s hape because it s ummed up a l l

previous effor ts at revolu t ionary st ruggle in N icaragua, and becauseSandino assim i l ated the most revolu t ionary ideas of his t ime and wasable to integrate them i nto our hi st or ical process.

He undoubtedly began i t and in the course of its development he in­c luded a number of pol i t ical, ideological, ant i - imper ia l i st , internat ion­a l i st , and m i l i t ary facets. That is what we mean by the movement tak ­ing shape. That is, the st ruggle Sandino car r ied out against the Yan­

kees for seven years lef t us w it h a number of histor ical and program­mat i c elements and revolu t i onary v iews which we assim i l a ted.

We must bear i n m ind that , i f we include Sandino's movement , by

tha t t i m e there had a l ready been t h i r t y - t hree armed movement sagainst imper ia l ism and the oligarchy, headed by the Liberals who up­

54 Sa nd i ni stas Speak

held revolutionary positions in that period.The st ruggle Sandino led suffered a bi t ter setback as a result o f h is

death and that of other members of his general staff. However, in oneway or another, the people always reacted against the oppression. The

reaction was poor, limited, and fragmented, but i t increased lit t le byli t t le.

The most sign i f icant upsurge in these struggles took place in the fi f­

t ies, the decade when Anastasio Somoza Garcia, founder of the tyran ­ny , was executed by Rigobert o Lopez Perez.* I t was an indiv idual ac­tion but i t was not simply a case of tyrannicide. As Perez himself puti t , i t t u rned out to be " the beginn ing of the end of the ty ranny ."

Then , i n 1958, wh i le F idel was i n the Sier r a Maest ra , an armed

movement led by Ramon Raudales began, and the following year i twas the guerr i l la group led by Carlos Fonseca. From 1958 to 1961t her e wer e n ineteen ar med m ovement s t ha t sough t t o do bat t l eagainst t he dictatorsh ip .

The v ictory of the Cuban revolut ion caused a t r emendous pol i t icalupheaval. I t made a big impact on our people, who w i tnessed a pract i ­cal example of how it was possible to overthrow a tyrant .

Th e 1959-60 per iod was one in which condi t i ons were created to set

up a revolutionary vanguard that could lead the popular and revolu­t i onary war in the same way and w ith the same effect iveness as Sandi ­

no.In 1961 the Sandin ista Front emerged from several armed groups as

an al ternat ive to the forces that at that t ime led the st ruggle againstSomoza, tbe so-called hi stor ical paral lels or L iberal-Conservat ive for ­

ces.The Sandin ista Front was a new alternat i ve, but at the same t ime it

fol lowed up on th e legacy of th e r evolu t i onar y movement, Sandinostar ted .

Af ter i.t was founded there was a long per iod in which, in addi t ion tover y i mpor tan t organizat ional and m i l i t ar y exper ience w hich was ofgreat va.'ue for the fu ture of the movement, the FSL N acqu i red moral

standing, dedicat ion, tenaci ty , and set an example which made i t pos­s ible to reach out to the masses, organize them, and w in thei r conf i ­dence. Dur ing that per iod, the repression of the regime was focused onthe guer r i l las.

"'ln 1956, the poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez walked into a public affair for So­

moza i n t he cit y of Leon and shot the dictator four t i mes. Somoza l a ter d iedf rom his wounds, and Lopez Pi.rez was k i l led on the spot by the dictat or 's body ­guards.

N i caragua — Strategy of Vi ctory 5 5

T he most impor tant oper at ion car r ied out by the Fron t to make i t ­

self known to the world was undertaken on December 27, 1974, when ahouse fu l l of top off i cials of the regime was taken over .* We obtained

a mi l lion dollars, for the first t ime the Sandinistas' revolutionaryviews were broadcast on TV and radio, and political prisoners wererescued.

Th e m ai n object iv e o f t h i s r a ther i solated operat ion was not

achieved: to st rengthen the guer r i l las in the mount ains. Somoza un­l eashed a t r emendous repressive campaign in the ci t ies, the count r y ­

s ide, and the mou nt ains, where the movemen t was t r y ing t o set upguerri l la forces that were in the stage of making contacts and settingup thei r columns. From 1974 to 1977 thousands of people were k i l ledand thousands of others disappeared.

That repression combined w ith our weakness prevented the guer r i l ­

las from going on the offensive. We were unable to channel the polit i ­cal potential and capitalize on the agitation result ing from the Sandi­nista operat ion . That made i t possible for the enemy to depr ive us ofthe in i t i a t i ve, and press censorsh ip, a state of siege, mar t ia l l aw, and

courts-mart ia l were al l imposed.T h is per iod of rel at ive stagnat ion ended i n October 1977, when a

Sandinista offensive began with the capture of the National Guardg ar r ison at San Car los, near the border w i t h Costa Rica, on the th i r ­teenth, and it cont inued w ith the at tack and capture of the town of Mo­zonte, f ive k i l ometers from Ocotal , in the depar tment of Nueva Sego­

via, on the fi fteenth. The guerr i l las held a meeting in the publicsquare of Mozonte before withdrawing. Two days later there was anat tack on the main gar r ison in Masaya, less than twent y k i l ometersfrom the capital, and there was an important ambush of enemy forceson the move. For over four hours, four comrades managed to containa l l the enemy forces coming from M anagua to Masaya. On the twenty ­f i f th, three squads from an FSLN column took the town of San Fernan­do, and the soldiers stat ioned there surrendered.

These developments paved the way for a qualitat ive change in thepolitical and mil itary picture. That's when our flexible policy of allian­

*On December 27, 1974, eigh t FSL N guer r i l las seized the home of a formermi n ister of agr icu l t ure dur ing a part y and took hostage th i r ty top Somozaist of­

flicials. They succeeded in obtaining the release of more than a dozen of theirim pr isoned comrades and a r ansom of m ore t han a m i l l ion dol l ars. On D e­

cember 30, the guerri l las freed the last of their hostages and fled to Cuba alongwi t h the freed pr isoners .

56 Sandin istas Speak

ces began, and from it emerged the Group of Twelve.*Harnecker: But w hat m ade possible the events of October 1 977?

Ortega: October 1977 came about thanks to an offensive shift thatwas given to the armed struggle at a time when the crisis of Somoza'sregime was very acute.

Following the 1972 earthquake, the situation of Somoza's regimebecame more acute and bureaucratic and mi l itary corruption morewidespread. While this administrat ive corruption chiefly affected themasses, it also began to affect the petty and intermediate bourgeoisie,thus increasing the scope of opposi t ion to the regime.

On the other hand, groups of businessmen star ted to lose faith in thed ict atorship's abi l i t y t o gu ar antee th e necessary condi t ions for t h edevelopmen t of the count ry . There was grow ing i n t er na l resistance

from all segments of the population, in addition to the growing opposi­t ion in ternat i onal l y due to the regime's repressive policy .

While Somoza lost more and more political and moral authority, wegained it, in spite of the difficult conditions facing our tenacious guer­ri l las in the northern mountains, where the forces of the Pablo Ubedacolum n were st r i v ing to regain the in i t i a t i ve, which the dictatorsh ip

had for al l pract ical purposes depr ived us of by l at e 1975.Th is tenacious eff or t i n add i t ion to the dai l y an t l ik e tact ics of our

members al l over the count r y made i t possible for our m ovement , farfrom being wiped out, to remain in action even under those difficultconditions. If this had not been accomplished, it wouldn't have beenpossible later on to transform the political and moral potential intomi l i tary power, into a large force, as happened.

The acute economic crisis and the growing resistance of the peopleled to a poli tical crisis in the country. Business groups which unt i lthen had adj usted thei r i nt erests to the terms imposed by the dictator ­shipp shifted to a posi t ion of over t opposi t i on. A group of members of theConservative Party led by the editor of La Prensa, Pedro Joaquin Cha­morro, joined the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL), an ant i­Somoza opposition organization led by dissatisfied sectors of the bour­geoisie. UDEL demanded political and trade union freedoms; an end tothe press censorsh ip, the state of siege, and the repression ; and cal ledfor amnesty and a general pardon for pol i t ical pr isoners and ex i les.

In m id-1977 there was great pol i t ical act i v i t y among the bourgeois

*The "Group of Twe lve" was a b loc of i n te ll ectua ls, professionals, and bus i­

nessmen who came together in late 1977 to oppose the Somoza dictatorship andto call for FSLN participation in any post-Somoza government .

N i caragua — Strategy of Vi ctory 5 7

opposi t ion resu l t ing from the sh if t given to U .S. foreign pol icy by t he

C ar ter adm ini st r at ion .Imperialism and reaction were seeking ways of making changes in

the regime without touching the basic strings of power: the tremen­dous economic and repressive power of the N at ional Guar d .

The political situation forced Somoza to try to improve his image.On September 19 the state of siege and mar t ia l law were l i f ted, andthe dict ator convened mu nicipal elect ions.

We must keep in m ind that these efforts at democrat izat ion or over ­hau l ing took place in 1977, when imper i a l ism and react ion were con­

v inced that they had been able to w ipe out or pract ical l y w ipe out t heFSLN.

From 1975 to 1977, they had played all their cards to try to crush usmi l i t ar i ly . In order to do so they devastated vast por t ions of the coun­

tryside, repression was stepped up in the cities, and courts-martialwere instituted. Nearly all our leaders, Carlos Fonseca, Eduardo Con­tr eras, Car los Agiiero, Edgar M ungu ia, and F i lemon Rivero, had beenki l l ed .

It was very di ff cul t fnr the FSL N to mount a m i l i t ar y response andthat response was very l i m i t ed .

Somoza and the Yankees swore that they had eliminated us and,therefore, that we would be unable to serve as the catalyst for the cr i ­

sis. When they fel t that we were hard h i t , scattered and div ided, theyd ecided i t was t ime for a democrat izat ion plan .

I t was at that t ime and in order to prevent such maneuvers that wedecided to go on the offensive m i l i t ar i l y speak ing .

We regained the in i t i at i ve w h ich we had t aken on December 27 ,1974, but t h is t ime we aimed to avoid losing i t again. We didn't have abig mass organizat ion, but we did have our act i v i sts and the organiza­

tional potential which li t t le by l i t t le allowed us to organize and mobil­i ze the masses. We didn't have superior forms of organizat ion of t h evanguard, but we did realize that , given the si tuat ion, m i l i tary act ion

would al low us to make our presence fel t in the pol i t ical and organiza­t i onal f ields, paving the way for the establishment of an insur rect ionals tr ategy .

Harnecker: Ho w could you have decided on an offens ive if the Frontwas in such a precar ious si t uat ion'?

Ortega: I t ' s true that w e were in a precarious situa t ion and that i n

spite of our efforts we were unable to stay on the mil itary offensive. Inpract ice we were on the defensive, and we had to try to overcome that

s i t uat ion wh i le avoiding the tw in pi t fa l ls of advent u r ism and an over ­

58 San d in is tas Speak

ly conservative analysis of this difficult and precarious situation.In order to undertake offensive operations we had to overcome a cer­

tain conservative frame of mind which led our movement to passivelyaccumulate forces. When I say "passive," I mean in general, not in par­t i cul ar, because there were operat ions in which we regained the in i t i a­tive mil itar i ly speaking.

Harnecker: Could you expla in fur t her what you mean by passive ac­cumul at ion of forces?

Ortega: Wh at I mean by passive accumula t i on of forces is a policy of

not gett ing involved in the conjunctures, of gaining strength whi lestanding on th e sidel ines; a passive policy of a l l i ances. I t 's a passiveview wh ich holds that i t is possible to pi le up weapons and gain in or ­ganizat ion and number w i thout f i gh t ing the enemy, wh i le si t t ing on

the sidel ines, w i thout i nvolv ing the masses — not because we didn' twant to do so but because we felt that if we showed our claws too much ,

t hey would come down hard on us and shat ter the movement .We knew we would be going on the offensive under d if fi cul t c ircum­

stances, but we knew we had the necessary minimum of resources totackle this new stage.

By May 1977 we had drawn up a programmatic platform which out­l ined an insu r rect ional st r ategy t hat served to sum up the st r ategicviewpoint of insurrection which I, along with Carlos Fonseca, had pre­pared in 1975. This was in tu rn an outg rowth of the efforts made along

these l ines after t he death of Oscar T urcios and Ricardo M or ales inSeptember 1973, fol low ing the Chi lean coup. This marked the start ofthe debate wi t h in our ranks over the two st rategies: guer r i l la war farecentered in the mount ains, on the one hand, and armed st ruggle fo­

c used on the masses, on the other .

That was the f irst debate. I t was a bit imm ature and categor ical: it' s

e i ther the mounta ins or the ci t ies. Raising th is quest ion as one or theo ther was not correct .

Harnecker: I ' d l ike to know w hy you associate the masses wi th t he

ci t ies and not w i t h t he guer r i l l as.Ortega: T h e t r u th i s that w e a lways took t he masses in to account ,

but more in terms of thei r suppor t ing the guer r i l las, so that the guer ­ri l las as such could defeat the National Guard. This isn't what actu­ally happened. What happened was that it was the guerri l las who pro­vided support for the masses so that they could defeat the enemy bymeans of insurrection. We all held that view, and it was practice thatshowed tha t i n order t o w i n we had to mobi l ize the masses and get

them to actively participate in the armed struggle. The guerri l las

Nicaragua — Strategy of Victory 5 9

alone weren't enough, because the armed movement of the vanguardwould never have had the weapons needed to defeat the enemy. On ly

in theory could we obtain the weapons and resources needed to defeatthe National Guard. We realized that our chief source of strength layi n m aint ain in g a st ate of t ota l mobi l izat ion that would disperse thet echnical and m i l i t ar y resources of the enemy .

Since production, the highways, and the social order in general wereaffected, the enemy was unable to move h is forces and other meansabout at w i l l because he had to cope w it h mass mobi l izat ions, neigh­

b orhood demonst rat ions, ba r r icades, act s o f sabotage, et c . T h i senabled the vanguard, wh ich was reorganizing i t s army , to confron t

the more numerous enemy forces on a better foot ing .Getting back to what I was saying: the reactionaries were planning

to cope with the cr isis and come out on top. We real ized what was hap­pening, took note of the fact that the enemy had taken a step forwardby l i f t ing the state of siege and was consider ing an amnesty, and saw

that i f t h is happened we would be in a di ff i cul t posi t i on. So we decidedto speed up the offensive.

Parneeker: An o ffens ive wh ich, as far as you a re concerned, was li ­

mited.Ortega: We l l , s ince we had n ever e xperienced an i nsur rection, we

felt that t hat was the way to mobi l ize the masses to support those oper­at ions. But pract.ice showed us that we were st i l l unable to meet al l thecondi t ions requ ired for a response by th e masses so that th e dr ivewould t ake on an insurrect ional character . Two years had to pass be­

fore th is was accompl ished.Th is offensive took place as par t of an insurrect ional st r ategy, but i t

w as not an insu rrect ion al t hough we cal led for one. As i t t u rned ou t ,t hese operat ions served as propaganda for insurrect ion .

Harnecker: Did you consider w hat f a i lu re would have meant?Ortega: Yes, we did. If we fai led it would be a terr i b le blow for Sandi­

ni smo. We had to run the r i sk. We knew we wouldn't be wiped out be­cause we knew our enemy. Of course, there was always a r i sk , but be­

ing w iped ou t w i t hout going on the offensive was worse than beingwiped out on the offensive, because by f igh t ing we could begin a pro­

cess leading to victory . I f we didn't t ake the pol i t i cal and m i l i t ary of'­fensive, defeat was certa in . That was the problem we faced.

Harnecker. Then you don't feel the October opera tions were a fai lu re

even though the insurrect ion didn't come about?Ortega: We view October as a historic achievement, because, first of

al l , i t enabled us to defeat t he imper ia l ist scheme. When the enemy

60 Sa n d in is tas Speak

fel t t hat w e had been destroyed, we appeared on the scene stronger

than ever, we struck harder blows than ever before, They were sur­prised when we began operations in the cities, because they thoughtthe ci t ies were sacred.

On the other hand, al though there was a cr i sis, the masses did notreact to it . Al l they could see was that the vanguard was being hithard. These operat ions served to restore Sandin ismo's hegemony overthe masses and the confidence of the masses in thei r economic and po­

li t ical struggles. This led the regime to make serious mistakes, thebiggest one being m urder ing Pedro Joaquin Chamor ro on January 10 ,1978.

Th is assassinat ion led the masses to take to the st reets for the fi rs ttime, to express their long pent-up feelings of support for Sandinismo.So we can say that October served to deepen the crisis which imperial­ism and react ion were on the br ink of tu r n ing to thei r own advantage.

Ha rnecker: Wh en d id y ou s ta rt p re paring f or t he O ctober o pera ­

tions'?Ortega: Even before May 1977 we were acquiring weapons and lay­

i n g t h e pol i t ica l and st r ategic groundwork , l i k e the programm at icplat form I ment ioned, t r y ing to see how we could organize the people

who shared our views.We reacted to the si tuat ion w i t h what we had, given the si tuat ion .

We had been stockpil ing, stockpiling for something bigger, but youcan't stockpi le on the sidel ines because then you never real ly stock ­

pile.We pl unged i nto the offensive real izing that our effor t w ould bear

fr u i t because we took note of the prevai l ing cr isis, the enemy plots, thefact that we were on the defensive and had to respond then and there.

Had we been conservat ive and said "No, we' ll stockpi le in si lence," wewould have lost our chance to the enemy, and he would thus have beenable to el im inate us once and for a l l, or at least put us out of act ion fora long while, because the people would have been confused by the re­gime's gr an t ing a few concessions and i t would have been harder for

them to understand our v i ews.

The October operat ions made i t possible to shat ter the enemy ma­neuver and Sandin ismo appeared on the scene with renewed vigor. A l ­so, in mil itary terms it was not a complete failure. We weren't able tocapture the Masaya gar r ison bu t at least most of the at tackers sur ­

vivedd. In the north the guerr i l las remained active from October to May1978 on what was cal led the Car los Fonseca Nor ther n Front . A few

comrades were killed in the attack on San Carlos, but it was a militaryvi ctory for us. We weren't able to hold on to i t, but i t wasn't l i ke the at­

Ni caragua — Strategy of V i ctory 6 1

tack on the M oncada in Cuba, i n 1953;~ we were able to st r i ke, pu l l

back , accumulate forces, and st r i ke once agai n .

To prove the point, four months later we captured two cities and en­circled an antiguerr i l la camp in the Nueva Segovia area for the firstt im e.

Had October been a failure, we would not have been able to under­t ake new act ions in j ust a few months. From October on we grew inpolitical and mil itary strength all the t ime.

Harneckert %h at a bout t he masses in October?

Ortega: In October t here was no mass response as far as acti ve par­ticipation was concerned.

Harnecker: Then they were actions by a vanguard only?Ortega: Yes, by a vanguard, which not only contr ib uted to sharpen­

ing the crisis, frust r ated the schemes of react ion, and enabled the van­

guard to gather renewed strength, but also began to strengthen a se­ries of activities that the masses had been carrying out, in spite of therepression, an d w h ich consisted of st ruggles for socia l ga ins, t r adeunion and pol i t ical st ruggles. Therefore, these act ions st rengthenedt he mass movement , which later became openly insurrect i onal .

Harnecker: But d idn't the offensive lead to the adoption of even morerepressive measures by the dictator sh ip?

Ortega: Ye s. In i ts despera t ion, the regime adopted a series of indis­cr im inately r epressive measures. The revolu t ionar y movement w as

brutally repressed by the Somoza regime. The repression that hadbeen gradual ly increasing became even sharper in retal i at ion for t he

October operat ions.Harneckert I n t ha t c ase wouldn't y our o pera tions be considered a

sign o f adven t u r i sm , resu l t in g on l y i n even st ronger r epression

against the people?Ortega: Yes. Some sectors of the left that were engaged in setting up

t r ade unions, etc., claimed that those act ions had destroyed the organ i ­zat ion and the resurgence of the mass movement, but t h is wasn't so. I t

is t rue that the repression would affect the open, legal organizat ion ofthe masses, but it wouldn't affect their organization under really revo­l u t i onary condi t ions. To go along w ith such claims would mean fal l i ngprey to the big show the imper ia l i sts were mount ing w it h al l the tal kabout the bourgeois-democratic way out , in which the trade union

*On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro led a group of fewer than 200 in an unsuc­cessful attack on the Moncada garrison in Santiago de Cuba. Almost all wereki l led or captu re d; Castro was sentenced to fi f teen years in prison for h is part i n

the attack.

movement was to par t icipate. For us i t was preferable that such a cas­trated trade union movement not be formed.

Sum m ing up, the big j ump ahead occurred in October 1977 and th issharpened the crisis. Then came the assassination of Pedro JoaquinChamorro, which made the situation even worse, and with the massesin the cities, in the neighborhoods, everywhere, participating moreand more in the upr ising, the process became completely i r r eversib le.

After that came the capture of the city of Rivas along with the city ofGranada on February 2, 1978. Present in these actions were severalcomrades who were later k i lled in the struggle, such as CommanderCamilo Ortega Saavedra, who led the attack on Granada; the com­mander, guer r i l la pr iest , and Spanish int ernat ionalist Gaspar GarciaLav iana; and Panch i to Gut ier rez, among others.

Harnecker: Wh en d id t he m asses begin t o jo in t he i nsurrectionalprocess?

Ortega: The operat ions of October 1 977 gave a big boost to the massmovement , but i t wasn't u n t i l after the asassinat ion of Pedro JoaquinChamorro that they really came out in ful l force and made crystalclear their potential, their determination, and their Sandinista will tojoin in the armed struggle.

I would l ike to make clear that the uprising of the masses as an af­t ermat h to Chamorro's assassinat ion was not led exclusively by t heFSLN.

Harneeker : Was it a spontaneous action?Ortega: It w as a s pontaneous r eaction o n t he p art o f t he m asses

which, in the end, the Sandinista Front began to direct through its ac­ti v i sts and a number of mi l i t ary un i ts. I t was not a mass movement re­

sponding to a call by the Sandinistas; it was a response to a situationthat nobody had foreseen.

Now th en , ou r capacit y for i n t roducing ourselves i n t o tha t massmovement was st i l l l i m i ted at the t ime and was aimed at reaf fi r m i ngour political and mil itary presence among the masses, but not yet froma concrete organic standpoint because we didn't have the necessary ca­dres.

In October we began to t ake steps in that di rect ion: the act i v i sts, themechanisms — and new permanent forms of mass organizat ion beganto take shape quickly: the neighborhood committees, the work done ina number of factor ies and in the student movement. Fur thermore, theUnited People's Movement was already beginning to take shape evenbefore October. This was the result of the Sandinistas' efforts to re­group the revolutionary organizations around their program in orderto fight against Somoza's regime and gradually lead the people in our

Nicaragua — Stnztegy of Victory 6 3

process of national and social liberation.When the bourgeois opposition sectors began to retreat during the

strike, the FSLN made its presence felt with the armed actions of Feb­ruary 2, This is why we decided to capture Granada, Rivas, and theantiguerr i l la camp in Santa Clara, Nueva Segovia.

The capture of the antiguerr i l la camp was led by German Pomares,Victor Tirado, and Daniel Ortega. Camilo, our younger brother, ledthe attack on Granada, and the capture o'f Rivas was led by Eden Pas­t ora and the pr iest Gaspar Garcia Lav iana .

It was the first really serious blow dealt in the crisis. These large­scale act ions redoubled the masses' enthusiasm and thei r deter rn ina­

tion to fight Somoza. They now saw a strengthened vanguard capableof fighting, of dealing blows to the enemy, of capturing cities. In otherwords, the masses saw a considerable advance from the operations inOctober to these operations, in the same way they considered the oper­ations in October to be a considerable advance over the previously de­fensive position of the Sandinistas. Therefore, we were gaining mo­mentum, for the operations in February were superior to those in Oc­tober.

Harnecker: Wo uldn't the fact that you had to wi thd raw from the cap­tu red ci t ies be considered a fai l u r e?

Ortega: No, not at a l l , because we took the cit ies, seized the weapons

of the N at ional Guard, overpowered them , harassed the enemy, andkept on h i t t in g them every chance we got . Everybody stayed i n or

around the ci t ies.By then the Car los Fonseca Colum n was operat ing in the nor thern

p ar t of the count ry , w i thout hav ing sufTered a single tact ical defeat .

A t the same t ime, the guer r i l l a forces of the Pablo Ubeda Colum n ,

operating in the mountain areas, were able to get back together due toa respit e in th e i ntense pressure that t he N at ional Guard had beenput t ing on them. The guer r i l la movement in Nueva Segovia had muchmore effect on the v i tal economic, social , and pol i t ical centers because

i t was operat ing nearer to them . But i t was the t rad i t ional guer r i l l amovement and the movement in the mountains that made possible thegrowth and the moral and pol i t ical hegemony of the Sandin ista move­

ment un t i l October .In other words, October was the cont inuat ion of the armed st ruggle

main l y i n the mount ains because that was what the exist ing opera­

tional conditions called for, but the time came when the armed strug­gle had to be t r ansferred to zones of greater pol i t ical impor tance.

It wasn't a quest ion of stor ing away what we had accumulated, buto f reproducing i t . I f we rem ained there we'd be holding on to what w e

64 Sa n d in is tas Speak

had but i f we moved to other zones we'd be reproducing ourselves.The greatest expression of the impact of the February actions is the

insurrection of the Indians in Monimbo. It was the first of its kind, or­ganized and planned ahead of t ime by the Indians and Sandinistaswho were there. The battle lasted for almost a whole week, until Feb­ruary 26. The enemy crushed that upr ising, which was p art ia l ­

Harneckert You mean i t w as the only one in t he whole countr y?

Ortega: Ye s, but at the same time, that part i a l upri s ing was the soulo f the masses on a nat ionw ide scale and became the heart of the insur ­r ect ion t hat was to take place throughout the count r y .

Ha rneckert When you were plann ing the Monimbo upris ing weren' t

you aware of the l i m i t at ions of an isolated act ion?Ortega: But we didn't plan the uprising. We just took the lead in the

action that was decided upon by the Indian community .The Mon imbo upr ising began around February 20 and cont i nued for

about a week. The capture of several ci t ies (Rivas and Granada, for ex­ample) and the act ion car r ied out by the Nor thern Front had aroused afeel ing of great expectat i on, of agi tat ion among the masses, and the in­

surrectional propaganda spread by the FSI.N beginning in Octoberth rough pam phlets, etc. dist r ibuted th roughou t the countr y was be­g i nn in g t o bear f r u i t . The vanguard, however , hadn' t been able to

make contact in a more organic form w i t h t hose sectors of the masseswith the greatest political awareness. The actions of that sector, en­couraged by the tel l ing blows dealt the National Guard by the FSLN,in the m idst of t he Somoza regime's pol i t ica l cr i sis and the count ry' s

s ocial and economic problems, surpassed the vanguard*s capacity t ochannel al l that popular agi t a t i on .

The neighborhood of Monimbo, which is a district of Masaya withsome 20,000 inhab i tants and both u rban and r ural zones, began in aspontaneous fashion to prepare for the insurrect ion. They began to or ­ganize block by block, set up barricades around the whole district, andt ake over the key spots. They also began to execute henchmen of theregime, to apply people's just ice for the f irst t ime. They began to work

as a Sandinista uni t when they st i l l lacked the organized leadership oft he Sandinista movement .

And t his doesn't mean that there were no Sandin istas there. Therecertainly were and that's precisely why Camilo Ortega went to Mo­nimbo, with contacts we had there, to try to lead the uprising, and hewas k i l led in the f igh t i ng .

Harnecker; I unders tand now. Therefore, it was not an upris ing thatyou had planned. Now then, would you have stopped it if you had beenable to do so?

Ni caragua — Strategy of V i ctory 6 5

Ortega: It would have been very d iA ic ul t to do tha t, because the up­

rising responded to the objective development of the community. Ofcourse, in keeping w i th our plans, maybe we would have postponed i t

or planned it differently. Maybe we wouldn't have organized an armedin su r rect ion but rather some other k ind of mass act iv i t y, but that 's the

way things turned out. This was the way this Indian sector respondedimmediately to the incent ive provided by the capture of the ci t ies bythe FSLN several days before.

In l ate February the organizat ion of the vanguard was st i l l l im i teda nd we didn't have the cadres to channel the deter m inat ion and f ight ­

ing sp i r i t that existed among the masses.Harnecker: An isolated upris ing l i ke that one meant that the enemy

could concentrate all its forces against i t .Ortega: Exactl y , and tha t's someth ing we learned by experience.Ha rnecker: Then, it 's important to know about other his to ri cal expe­

riences in order to avoid m ak ing mist akes.Ortega: Of course. We, the vanguard , knew of those his to ri cal expe­

riences, but the masses didn' t .Harnecker: So it was actua ll y a lesson for t he people.Ortega: Ye s. We, the vanguard, knew i t f rom the classics. The prin ­

ciple of concent r at ion of forces has been one of the basic pr inciples inwar fare since ancient t imes.

What's important is that, in our case, we went through that expe­rience in spite of the vanguard. The vanguard was certain that the up­ri sing would be a setback , but a setback that would be transitory , be­cause the decision of Mon imbo cont r ibuted to raising the morale of the

rest of the people who joined the uprising.To what extent can the action be considered to have been a histor ical

mi st ake? To what extent was the act ion an er ror on the part of the peo­p le, or was i t simply thei r only opt ion at t hat t ime? The fact remains

that t hat example cont r i buted both nat ional ly and int ernat ional ly tothe developmen t and u l t i m ate t r i umph of the insurrect ion . Perhaps

wi thout t hat pa in fu l step which enta i led great sacr i f ice it would havebeen mor e di f f i cu l t t o achieve that m ora l au thor i ty , t ha t ar ousalamong the count ry 's masses, that spi r i t of support for one another thatcame from hav ing w i tnessed how they had sacr i f iced themselves tow i n the suppor t of the whole wor ld for a people that were waging a

st ruggle singlehanded. Perhaps w i t hout t hat example i t would have

been more difficult to speed up the conditions for the uprising.That was an exper ience we and the people learned f ro m.Wit h the exper ience we had acquired from October to Mon imbo we

were able to ver i fy that the masses were w i l l ing to stage an upr ising,

66 Sandinis tas Speak

but they needed more mil itary organization, more mass organization.Th ere was a need for r iper pol i t i cal condi t ions and there was a need for

more agitation, for better means of propaganda, such as a clandestineradio station.

It was necessary to mobilize the masses for war through the mostelementary forms of organization.

Ha rnecker: Yo u b egan t o consider t he ma tter o f t he radio s ta t i onthen?

Ortega: We'd been thinking about i t s ince October but we hadn' tbeen able to set i t up . We had a radio set t hat the f i rst. ant i -Somozaf ighters had used in 1960, but i t was old and we weren't able to put i t

i n wor k ing order at t hat t im e.H owever , we managed to f i x i t l ater and we pu t i t i n operat ion i n

those months of 1978. It was heard in Rivas, but very faint ly. By thenwe were fu l l y aw are of the need for a radio st at ion , of a way to com­mun icate w i t h the masses in order to prepare them for the insu rrec­

t ion .

But to get back to the idea I was developing. A gradual strengthen­ing of forces was achieved amidst an enormous amount of act i v i t y that

included the execut ion of Gen. Regualdo Perez Vega, chief of the Gen­eral Staff of the N at ional Guard, the capture of the palace in A ugust *and w i nding up the f i rst stage of t h is insu r rect ional movement t hathad begun in October 1977, with the nationwide uprising in Sep­tember 1978.

Harneeker: At t hat t i me, when you issued a call for the upris ing, did

you think i t would be successful?Ortega: We issued a call for the upris ing. A series of events, of objec­

tive conditions, came up all of a sudden that prevented us from beingbetter prepared. We could not stop the insur rect ion. The mass move­ment went beyond the vanguard's capacity to t ake the lead. We cer ­ta in l y could not oppose that mass movement, stop that avalanche. On

the contrary. we had to put ourselves at the forefront in order to lead ita nd channel i t to a cert ain exten t .

I n t h i s sense, the vanguard , aw ar e of i t s l i m i t at ions, decided t oadopt the general decision taken by the masses; a general decisionthat w as based on the example of the Indians of M on imbo, who, in

In A ugust 1978, twen ty -f ive FSLN guer ri l las took over the N at ional Palace,and held hostage more than sixty members of Somoza's puppet Chamber ofDeputies. They succeeded in winning the release of sixty political prisoners,having three Sandinista communiques read over the radio, and obtaining alarge ransom.

Nicaragua — Strategy of Victory 6 7

turn, had been inspired by the example of the vanguard.In other words, the vanguard set the example in October; the masses

foll owed su i t for the f i rst t ime i n an organized fashion i n M on imbo.

The vanguard created the conditions on the basis of that example andthe masses moved faster than the vanguard because a whole series of

objective conditions existed, such as the social crisis, the economic cri­sis, and the pol i t ical cr isis of the Somoza regime.

And since the regime was in such a state of decomposi t ion, every one

of our act ions far surpassed the impact we expected would resul t f romthem. But we had to keep on hit t ing. It was very difficult to hit thetarget . We hi t i t , but i t wasn't precisely a bu l ls-eye.

We were inspired by a spirit of victory, but we were aware of our lim­itations. We knew that it would be difficult to win, but we had to waget he st ruggle wit h that k ind of spi r i t , because it 's only w i th that spi r i tthat people are prepared to shed their blood.

Fu r therm ore, i f we didn' t organize that mass movemen t i t wou ldhave fal len into general anarchy. In other words, the vanguard's deci­

sion to call for the uprising in September made it possible to harnessthe avalanche, to organize the upr i sing for the victory that was to fol ­

low.Ha rnecker: Wh at condi t i ons were r ipe for i nsurrection7

Ortega: The objecti ve condit ions of social and poli t ical cris is existed.But the conditions of the vanguard, in terms of the organizational lev­e l to lead the masses, and especial ly in terms of weapons, did not exist .

We didn't have the necessary weapons but every t h ing else was r ipe.Harnecker: There was a very signi f icant economic cris is, but Somoza

st i l l held many elements of power, chiefl y the a rm y —

Ortega: Right, exactly, the army. And we didn't have the experienceof participating in a national uprising, the training such an experiencegives the masses and the knowledge of the enemy, who showed up al lh is weaknesses. We didn't have enough weapons, but we did know that

even i f the upr ising was not v ictor ious i t would be a blow from whichthe regime would never recover. We were absolutely conv inced of th i sand so great was our convict ion that a mont h later we were already

cal l ing for insurrect ion again .There were some comrades on the left who held the view that Sep­

tember practically negated all possibil ity of a short-term victory, thatt he oper at ions had been a st r ategic mi st ake, a defeat , and they t hu s

had delayed the day of victory.T hey wer e m istaken because September was not a v ictory bu t i t

wasn't a defeat i n st r ategic terms ei ther . I t was a histor ical achieve­

ment w i t h both posit ive and negat ive aspects.

68 Sandin istas Speak

Harnecker: So, what i s the f inal verd ic t, then?Ortega: That it was an accomplishment, because we grew as a van­

guard. One hundred and fi fty men participated in that uprising andour forces were multiplied several t imes over: three- or fourfold, plusthe potent ial for recru i t ing thousands of others. We grew in size and infirepower because we captured weapons from the enemy. The van­guard suA'ered very few casual t ies. There were people k i l led as a re­s ul t of Somoza's genocide, but very few cadres were k i l led in combat .

I n other words, we were able to preserve our st rengt h .

Harnecker: What is your verdict from the mil i tary standpoint?Ortega: We preserved our forces, acquired mi l i ta ry experience, cap­

tured weapons, learned about t he enemy, and destroyed some of t heenemy's means of mobilization, including armored vehicles. The ene­my suffered more casual t ies than we did; the people had a hand in th i sas did our own firepower, and we were able to retreat — this is a greatl esson — successfu l ly . For the f irst t ime we were able to engage in mi l ­i t ar y maneuvers, pul l ing back to other places in the city and count r y ­

side to accumulate forces for the new insurrect ional st ruggles of an of­

fensive nat ure which soon mater ia l ized.So, we can't say i t was a defeat . I t would have been a defeat i f they

had exterm inated us, if they had seized all our weapons, if we had been

broken up and dispersed.I t was not a m i l i t ar y v i ctor y since we were unable to capture t he

gar r isons in the f ive ci t ies where there was figh t ing, but i t was a sig­n i f icant pol i t ical accompl ishmen t .

I repeat, we called for insurrect ion because of the pol i t ical si tuat ion

which had developed and to prevent the people from being massacredalone, because the people, just l ike they did in Monimbo, were takingt o the streets on thei r ow n .

Ha rnecker: Wo uldn' t the people have been massacred just the same,wi t h or w i thout you?

Ortega: No, it would have been worse, because at least we channeledthe w i l l of the people, just as happened in M on imbo, bu t on a muchlarger scale. That is why I told you we went forward; we never wentaround in ci rcles.

In the final stages, the peasants came down to join the struggle int he ci t ies. In Ch inandega, the safe houses were f i l led w it h people tak ­

ing three-hour classes. The people were going to take to the street: Thepeople were the ones in the vanguard of that struggle. There was no al­ternat ive but to put oneself at the head of that upsurge and t ry to ob­tain the most posi t ive outcome.

We placed ourselves at the head of that movement and led i t i n f i ve

Nicaragua — Strategy of Victory 6 9

cit ies. I t was the f i rst nat ional upr ising led by the FSLN bu t that was

chiefl y due to pressure by the masses.Harnecker: You mean that on calling for insurrection you took into

account above all the mood of the masses.Ortega: That's r ight, because their morale was high and became

higher when the palace was captured in A ugust — that paved the way

for the September insurrect ion .Harnecker: When you planned the capture of the palace, did you con­

sider the impact t h is would have on the masses?Ortega: We knew the mass movement was coming to a head, but we

preferred that i t come to a head than that i t not come to a head.The impor tant t h ing was to foi l the imper ia l ist plot which consisted

of staging a coup in August to put a civ i l ian-m i l i t ar y regime in powerand t hus put a damper on the revolut ionary st ruggle.

The palace operat ion had to do w it h the plot . We fel t t hat since wedidn't have a large-scale par t y or ganizat ion , since the work ing class

and the wor k ing people in general were not wel l organized, the onlyway to make ourselves felt in political terms was with weapons, That' swhy we car r ied out many operat ions that were m i l i t ar y i n form , butp rofoundly pol i t ical in content . That was the case in A ugust .

It was a m i l i t ar y oper at ion w hich was an ou tgrowt h of a pol i t ical

rather t han a m i l i t ar y si t uat ion . That was also the case in October1977 when we had to regain the mil itary initiat ive and counteract ap ol i t i cal maneuver .

Harnecker: So, when some people ask w hy y ou c al led f or t he Sep­

tember uprising without having achieved the unity of the three ten­dencies, this is explained b y­

Ortega: C ondit i ons for u n i ty d id n ot e xist t he n. F i rs t w e h ad t o

strengthen the st ruggle, and al l the tendencies were wor k ing on th is.Li t t le by l i t t le we came to an understanding but around a l ine which

was called for in practice; it was not our line but the one the people de­manded.

After M on imbo we dissolved the Car los Fonseca Column and sent i t smembers to the nerve centers of economic, social, and pol i t ical act i v i ty

in the count ry . As far as we were concerned there was no choosing be­tween mountai n and ci ty ; i t was a case of being w i t h the masses.

We sent some of the forty men in the column to Estel i, others to Ma­

nagua, and others to Leon — The column served as a means to educatepeople. It made possible more all-around training because they weregathered there under the w ing of members of the leadership l ike Ger ­

man Pornares and other members of our nat ional leadersh ip. Th' it washow we t ra ined a smal l group of cadres whom we later sent to the cit ies

70 Sa n d in is tas Speak

to prepare the insur rect ion, using what we learned in 1Vlonimbo.Given all that had happened from October to Monimb6, we held the

view that i t was necessary to put ourselves at the head of the massmovement in order to prevent the repressive forces from wearing itd own, because i f t hat had happened, no mat ter how many guer r i l l acolumns we had, victory in the shor t t erm was out of the quest ion .

The crux of v ictor y was not m i l i t ary i n n atu re, i t was the masses'par t i cipat ion in the insurrect ional si tuat i on . We always st ruggled to

keep the activity of the masses going, and at the end it was showings igns of decl ine, given the fact that there had been two years of un i n ­ter rupted act iv i t y after October and repression was get t ing steadi lyworse. N at ional Guar d members would dress up as guer r i l las, and,

s ince n igh t t im e belonged t o t h e guer r i l l as, they w ou ld m ov e i n t oneighborhoods and kil l people.

The repression was so severe that some people were star t ing to fal lback .

As far as we were concerned, the ent i re st rategy, all the pol i t i cal andmil itary steps taken were focused on the masses, on preventing a de­cl ine in thei r morale. This is why we undert ook operat ions that did notf i t w i t h in a specific pol i t ical -m i l i t ary plan but they did serve the pur ­pose of cont i nu ing to mot ivate the masses, to keep the mass movementgoing in the ci t ies, which, in t u rn, al lowed us to gain in st rength. The

masses made i t possible for the armed movement to accum ul ate t heforces the masses themselves needed.

We strived to keep the masses in action. That's why at t imes its eemed as though operat ions were disconnected from a m i l i t ary plan .

But , in fact, they were in l ine w i th a pol i t i cal -m i l i t ary st r ategic sit ua­t ion aimed at keeping the mass movement going because that was theo nly way to obtain a m i l i t ary victory .

Our i nsur rectional s tra tegy was centered on the masses not on m i l ­i t ary considerat ions. I t 's impor tan t to understand that .

Harnecker: But d idn't t he fact t hat t he emphasis was on u rban i n ­

surrect ion as opposed to the guer r i l la colum n lead to an unduly greatloss of l i fe and destruct ion" .The fact that the st ruggle was centered onthe ci t ies makes i t easier to repress, for example the bombing of t hec lt ,l es ­

Ortega: That q uestion i s meaning less, because that w as t he onl yway to w in in N icaragua. I f i t had been otherw ise, there would neverhave been a victory. We simply paid the price of freedom. Had therebeen a less costly means, we would have used i t but real i ty showed usthat in order to win we had to base ourselves on situations that hadbeen tak ing shape, for better or for worse, in a disorder ly manner and

Nicaragua — Strategy of Victory 7 1

which impl ied a very h igh social pr ice.

Trying to tel l the masses that the cost was very high and that theyshould seek another way would have meant the defeat of the revolu­

tionary movement and more than that: fall ing into utopianism, pater­n al i sm, and ideal i sm .

Liberation movements must realize that their struggle will be evenmore cost ly than ours. I personal l y can't imagine a vi ctor y i n L at i nAm erica or anywhere else w i thout the large-scale par t icipat ion of the

masses and w i thout a total economic, pol i t ical, and social cr isis sim i larto the one in N icaragua.

I myself feel i t is very di I I i cul t to take power w i thout a creat ive com- ,

binat ion of al l forms of st ruggle wherever they can t ake place: coun­tryside, city, town, neighborhood, mountain, etc., but always based onthe idea that the mass movement is the focal point of the st ruggle andn ot the vanguard w i t h the masses l im i ted to merely suppor t ing i t .

Our experience showed that i t is possible to combine the st ruggle in

the city and in the count ryside. We had st ruggle in the ci t ies, st rugglefor the control of means of communication, and struggle in the guerri l ­la columns in the rural and mounta inous areas. But the columns were

not the determ i n ing factor in br ing ing about victory; they were simplypar t of a greater determ i n ing factor wh ich was the armed st ruggle of

the masses. That was the main cont r ibut ion .

In May, after the September developments, the movement gained inmi l i t ary and pol i t ical strength, the act iv i ty of the masses became moref ar -reach ing, the bar r icades were erected, the dai l y st ruggle i n t h eneighborhoods cont inued. None of th is would have been possible had

there been a st r ategic defeat .From September un t i l we launched the offensive in M ay, the brun t

o f m i l i t ary act i v i t y was borne by the guer r i l l a columns of the Nor t h ­er n Fr on t and the ones in Nueva Gu inea, in r u ra l and mountainousareas. The final offensive began with the capture of El Jicaro, in Nu­eva Segovia. In M arch Commander German Pomares was act ive in thearea and was able to overpower the enemy gar r ison and set severalambushes for N at ional Guard cont ingents coming to aid the forces de­

feated at El J icaro. These operat ions cont inued w i th the capture of Es­teli in April by the Carlos Fonseca Northern Front column. Esteli wastaken by a guerri l la column, not an uprising. The masses joined in af­terwards.

Harnecker: But why did you capture a single city again? Isn't that arepet i t ion of the Mon imbo exper ience?

Ortega: No, because we weren't defeated in Esteli; the NationalGuard was unable to rou t the guer r i l l a f ighters there. Our comrades

72 Sandinistas Speak

wi t hdrew by break in g t hr ough th e encirclemen t an d demonst rated

that thousands of soldiers had been unable to defeat a column Of lessthan 200 men . I t 's t rue that the forces used in the capture of Estel i

should have been larger. What happened was that orders had beengiven to carry out a series of operations in the area of Estel i and ourcomrades launched a direct at tack on the ci ty. These were act ions that

were w i t h in the per imeter of the N or th er n Fr ont ; they were mutualsuppor t operat ions between the forces of the Nor thern Front . But thes i tuat ion i n the countr y had deter iorated to such an exten t that t h e

capture of the city created a nat ionw ide feel ing of expectat ion that ac­celerated the insu rrect ional offensive.

After September the brunt of the war was borne by the guerri l la col­um ns of the Nort hern Front. A t the same t ime, all over the count ry themil i t ia and the combat units of the Sandinista forces continued to ha­rass the enemy. H undreds of the regime's henchmen and inform erswere executed. A fter the insu rrect ion the people realized that they hadwon and were incensed by the repression .

Harnecker: In o ther words, the blows that were being dealt t he ene­

my had a greater effect than the repression'?Ortega: A much greater e ffect. By th is time the people were already

exper ienced in bat t le and thei r t h i rst for v ictory was so great that theSeptember cr imes, rather than dampening thei r sp i r i t , strengthened

i t even more. Everybody had had a relative or friend ki lled in thest ruggle and there was a great t h i rst for revenge. The people wantedrevenge and we weren't going to go against thei r w ishes.

The final offensive began in M arch 1979 w ith the capt ure of El J ica­

ro. The di ff erent tendencies were beginn ing to un i te by then. Ever y ­

body was in favor of beginning an offensive in the north, and there wasa general consensus regarding the upr isi ng. The capture of E l J icarowas fol lowed by that of Estel i. A fter Estel i there was Nueva Guinea, ami l i t ar y setback for us, but i t served to bog the enemy down, to wearh i m down . I t cost us 128 men — The plan was correct , but our com ­

rades were unable to cope with a number of tactical problems and theenemy hi t them hard .

Harnecker: Wh at was the plan for N u eva Guinea?Ortega: To in f i l t r a te a column there, to bog the enemy down, to car­

ry out guerri l la operations. This would create the conditions in therest of the countr y for car r y ing out pol i t i cal -mi l i t ary work in the ci t i esonce the Nat ional Guard was dispersed. The repression would be lessbecause the N at ional Guard would be bogged down in Nueva Guinea .

Bu t instead of st i ck ing to guer r i l la warfare, our comrades operated onflat terrain and became an easy target for the enemy.

N icaragua — Strategy of Victory 73

Harnecker: In other words, by then the center of the struggle hadshifted to the guerrilla units.

Ortega: The mass movement d id not al low the enemy to concentra te

al l its mil itary force against the columns and, at the same time, thecolumns* operations forced the enemy to go out in search of them. This,

in turn, made the mass struggle in the cities a lit t le easier.The enemy found himself in a dead end. If he left the cities, the mass

movement would get the upper hand, and if he remained, this wouldhelp the guer r i l la columns' operat ions.

Harnecker: Th is w ay o f o rganizing t he a rmed s truggle, w as i tplanned beforehand or was i t someth ing that you learned as you went

along?Ortega: We ll, these are things that you learn in the course of the

st ruggle and use to your advantage. We knew t hat i t would be thatway. W e planned an operation in the north to force the N ational

Guard to go there, giv ing us a chance to better organize the rest of thec ount r y .

Harnecker: Ho wever, t hat s tatement y ou m ade a bout t he m ass

st ruggle in the ci t ies mak ing i t possible for the guer r i l las to gain mil­itary s trength i s a conclusion you a rr i ved at l a te r. You d idn' t p lan i tthat way, did you?

Ortega: Yo u' re r i ght . I t w as a conclus ion b ased on p ractical expe­

rience. Getting back to the series of operations, after Nueva Guinea wecaptured Jinotega in May and this was followed by the battle in El Na­

ranjo, on the Southern Fr ont . I t was then that we cal led for the f inaluprising.

Harnecker: What made you issue the call for the insurrection inMay?

Ortega: Because by then a whole series of objective conditions werecoming to a head: the economic cr isis, the devaluat ion of the cordoba,

the political crisis. And also because, after September, we realized thatit was necessary to strategically combine, in both time and space, the

uprising of the masses throughout the country, the offensive by theFront's mil itary forces, and the nationwide str ike in which the em­ployers, as well, were involved or in agreement .

There would be no victory unless we succeeded in combining thesethree strategic factors in the same time and space. There had alreadybeen several nat ionw ide st r i kes, but not combined wi th the masses' of­fensive. There had been mass uprisings, but not combined wi th the

str ike or with the vanguard's capacity to hit the enemy hard. And thevanguard had already dealt blows, but the other two factors had beenabsent .

74 Sandin istas Speak

These three factors were combined to a certain extent in September ,but not completely, because the process still wasn't being led entirelyby us. We made it clear aAer September, in an internal circular, thatthere would be no victor y un less these three factors were combined.

It would have been very difficult, without the Sandinistas' unity, togather and synthesize into a single pract ical l ine al l the achievementsthat the var ious tendencies had accumulated. This is why we can saywi th cer ta inty that un i t y played and w i l l cont i nue to play a major role

in the revolut i on .Harnecker: Bu t shouldn't t here have been st i l l another factor? I 'm

saying this because — at least from the outside — there seemed to be ab alance of forces that was very di ff icu l t to break .

Ortega: We ll , tha t' s the mi l i t a ry aspect. I' ll expla in t hat l a te r. Noww e' re deal ing w i t h the st rategic factors. From a st r ategic standpoin t ,

as of M ay , Somoza had already lost the war . I t was only a question oft im e.

Harnecker: But i f you hadn't received the weapons you received inthose last few weeks would you have been able to w in?

Ortega: I' ll g o i n to th at p resent l y, but f i rs t I w a nt t o say t hat i t ' s

v ery impor tan t t o combine these t hree factors. A fter September w ecaptured E l J icaro and we t r ied to t ak e Est el i , too, bu t we couldn' t

coordinate the operat ion wel l . Lat er, Estel i was captured, and this waspractically an action by the vanguard, a hard blow, but st il l anotherisolated action. The Nueva Guinea operation was aimed at supportingEstel i bu t the forces in Estel i were al ready w i t hdraw ing. The opera­t ion in N ueva Guinea aroused nat ionw ide interest, and when the for ­ces were being mobi l ized to cont i nue the advance, to combine al l those

factors, Nueva Guinea fell and then came Jinotega, which arose in anat tempt to coordinate i t w i t h Nueva Guinea and then gradual ly coor ­

d inate every t h i ng .The taking of Jinotega coincided with the activity on the Southern

Front and the capture of El Naranjo — on the Costa Rican border,where the National Guard had stationed a large force — which theS outhern Front's general staff decided to capture in coordinat ion w i t han at tack on the city of Rivas, thus beginn ing the f inal offensive on theSouthern Fron t of N icaragua .

The Souther n Front wanted to take advantage of the dispersion of

the enemy forces result ing from the capture of Jinotega, but when itwent into action the forces in Jinotega had already withdrawn. Thatwas the action in which Germann Pomares was killed.

We came to the conclusion that if we continued this way the enemywould cut us to pieces, because they would be weakening us bit by bit .

Nicaragua — Strategy of Victory 75

I f we lost E l N aranjo we would lose the chance of scor ing a short -t er m

mi l i t ar y v i ctory . We j ust cou ldn' t affor d t o lose at E l N aranjo. W eworked ou t a plan th at , at that t i me, concerned chiefl y th e inter nal

front , that is, the fronts hav ing to do mainl y w i t h the ci t ies, since at

that t ime the guerri l la columns were dispersed and recovering fromthe bat t les they had fought and, therefore, wouldn't be able to go into

act ion immediately. Thus, the insur rect ion was launched wi th the fu l lawareness that the columns of the Nor th er n Front , in the mount ain ­

ous areas, would not be able to take par t in the act ion immediately butw ould do so later .

The way we saw i t , the insur rect ion had to last, at a nat ionw ide lev­

el , for at least two weeks in order to give the columns a chance to re­g roup and go into act ion at the r ight moment, mak ing the enemy's sit ­

uat ion completely u ntenable and subject ing the enemy to a constantstr ategic siege, w it h vi ctory only a quest ion of t ime, of wear ing downthe enemy before launch ing the final at tack. We planned to wear down

the enemy by cu t t i ng of f h is means of comm un icat ion , isolat ing h i smi l i t ary un i ts, cut t ing off supp l ies and so for th, thus form ing a nat ion­

w ide bat t lefront that the Somoza regime wou ldn't be able to cope wi t h .And that 's just what happened. We worked out. the insur rect ional

p lan . What was planned, basical ly for t he ci t ies, was that when t he

B enj am in Zeledon Colum n nf the Southern F ront went i nto act ion i nEl N aranjo, the upr ising was to be launched a few days later in the Ri ­g oberto I.opez Perez Western Front , which would create a very d i f f i ­

cul t si t uat ion for the Nat ional Guard: major blows in the Nor th, blowsin the West , and more blows in the South. Several days after the bat.­

tles in El N aranjo, our forces in Masaya, Granada, and Carazo were togo into act ion, cut t ing off' the means of communicat ion to Somoza's for ­ces on the Southern Front . The upr ising in M anagua was to star t as

soon as fi ght ing had begun on al l those fronts.Harnecker: E xcuse me for i n te rrup t i ng, but w asn't i t i n E l Na ran jo

that t he Sandini sta forces were defeated and had to re treat?Ortega: No. We didn't suffer a defeat at El Na ran jo . What, happened

there was a m i l i t ary m aneuver ; that. is, we left. the E1 N aranjo h i l l s,and several days later we captured Penas Blancas and Sapoa, the Na­

ti onal Guard's ma jo r mi l i t a ry b ases on t he Southern F ront. We suc­c eeded in get t ing Commander Br avo ou t of Sapoa and after t hat w e

w aged a posi t ional war in the ent i re area un t i l the war was over .Harnecker: Going back to my question about the mili tary balance of

forces and the mat ter of weapons, what was your or i g ina1 plan?Ortega: W e planned to seize our weapons from t he enemy.Harnecker: B ut i t d idn't t u rn out t hat w ay.

76 Sa nd in istas Speak

Ortega: Well, it did, in part. This is what actually happened: begin­ning with the actions in El Naranjo, we succeeded in launching the of­f ensive by the vanguard and coordinat ing w i t h the other fr onts. W e

succeeded in calling a strike, which turned out to be a general str ikeand in which Radio Sandino played a decisive role. W i thout the radiostat ion i t would have been di f f icul t to keep the st r i ke going. The mass

i nsur rection also took place. Therefore, the three factors we were ta l k ­in g abou t w er e combined . A f ter t h at . when Somoza began t o getbogged down and was unable to destroy our forces, his defeat was onlya mat ter of t ime, in fact , a mat ter of days. The strategic si tuat ion wasalready defined. From a st rategic standpoint , the enemy had lost; they

were only defending themselves, but we couldn't w in ei ther , due to aquest ion of f i repower. Solv ing th is problem made i t possible to hasten

the end of a war that the enemy had already lost. They could st i l l win afew bat t les, but never the war . Somoza would never have been able toget ou t of the hole he was in . Now then, i f we hadn't had that arm a­

ment , maybe the war would have lasted longer , had a h igher socialcost, caused more bloodshed and greater dest ruct ion. W it h less arma­

ment we would have won anyway , but at the cost of greater dest ruc­t i on .

We got the weapons but they didn't reach al l the places they wer eneeded; and i n t hose places i t was possible t o defeat t he N at ional

Guard by resor t in g t o dest ruct ion , by bu r n ing ent i r e ci t y b locks inorder to surround the army gar r ison by f i re. Wherever there was anarmy garrison and we didn't have enough weapons, we got the peopleout of thei r houses — which were already pract ical ly destroyed by theenemy's bombs and mortar shells — and we proceeded to occupy thehouses nearest the garrison in order to bring our forces up close andkeep ii, under control. The houses that were already destroyed were seta f i re to force the enemy to abandon the surrounded gar r ison .

What few weapons we had we deployed near the exi t and other key

spots, and we fough t the enemy w i t h contact bombs. In ot her words,thousands of people fough t w i t h machetes, pick s an d shovels, an dhomemade bombs. That was the armament and i t showed that i t was

c apable of destroy ing and was destroy ing the enemy , except that i tmeant a longer w ar . Only a solut ion to the problem of f i repower cou ld' hasten the end of a war t hat the enemy had al ready lost .

By then Somoza had no foodstu ffs, no gasol ine, couldn't use any ofthe highways. could no longer control the count ry; the economv was al ­r eady in r u ins, every t h ing was paralyzed. Somoza could no longer r u l e

and his posi t ion was untenable, To this we should add the int ernat ion­

n i caragua — Strategy of V i ctory 7 7

a l pressure. I t was only a quest ion of t ime before Somoza was over ­

thrown.Harneckert But couldn't that t i me factor a lso be harmf ul to the mass

movement by dr aw ing al l the st rength out of i t ?

Ortega: No. At that stage of the game there was no danger of its be­ing exhausted, because even though th ere weren*t enough weapons,they were being captured from the enemy and the enemy was being

defeated. Needless to say , the ar m ament t hat was received playedqu i te a decisive role in hasten ing the victory and, in some cases, in de­

ciding a few bat t les which otherwise would have been lost . We don' tknow i f losing those bat t les would have had any effect on the spi r i t of

the masses and on the m i l i t ary si tuat ion in the rest of the count ry andwe would have lost the war . I n t h is sense, we can say that the arma­ment played a st rategic role and that i t is necessary to have a m in i ­mum reserve of war m at er iel — bazookas, explosives, and arm ament

wi t h h igh f i repower — r a ther t han l a rge quant i t ies because theywould never be enough to meet the needs of the people. What counts isthe people's wil l to go out in to the streets and fight w i th whatever theyhave at hand .

To sum up, i t was possible to combine those three factors — st r ik e,insurrect ion , and m i l i t ar y offensive — and, before t hat , the un i t y of

Sandinismo was achieved, w i t hout which i t would have been di ff i cu l tto keep those factors combined and coordinated. Fu r thermore, ther ewas an excel lent rearguard networ k that made i t possible to have thetechnical back ing necessary to end the war quick ly. The means of com­

municat ion were also of v i t a l impor t ance: w i r eless for coordinat ionamong the var ious fronts, and the radio. Wi thout them i t would have

been impossible to win the war, because it would have been impossibleto coordinate i t ei ther from a pol i t ical or m i l i t ar y standpoint . We suc­

ceeded in organizing Radio Sandino, which was the main means of pro­paganda for the upr ising and for the st r i ke. A nother factor was ourabi l i ty to main tain broad al l i ances, a policy that succeeded in isolat ing

th e Somoza regime, achiev in g nat ionw ide an t i -Somoza un i t y , an dneut ra l i zing the react ionary cu rrents in favor of i ntervent i on .

W i thout the monol i t h ic un i t y of the Sandini stas; w i thout an insur ­

rect ional st r ategy supported by t he masses; w i thou t t he necessarycoordinat ion between the guer r i l l a fr onts and the m i l i t ary fr onts inthe ci t ies; w i thou t effect ive w i reless commu nicat ion to coordinate al l

the fronts; without a radio broadcasting system to guide the massmovement ; w i thou t ha rd-h i t t i ng technica l an d m i l i t ar y resources;

without a solid rear guard for introducing these resources and prepar­

7B Sa n d in is tas Speak

ing the men, training them; without prior training; without previousvictories and setbacks as happened in Nicaragua beginning in October1977, when the masses were subjected to the most savage repressionwhich was, at the same time, a great source of learning; without a flex­ib le, int el l igent , and m at ur e pol icy of a l l i ances on both the nat ionaland int ernat ional levels there would have been no revolut ionary victo­

ry . The victory was the cu lm inat ion of al l those factors.It al l sounds very simple, but you can't imagine what i t cost us to do

it — lt cost us an October, a February, a palace, an insurrection in Sep­tember , al l t he bat t les after September i n E l J icaro, Estel i , N uevaGuinea. I t cost us al l the effor ts made in the zone of the Pablo Ubeda

Colum n in the mountains, in the A t l an t ic Coast zone. That 's what weh ad to pay for ou r v ictory .

Harnecker: Ab out t he rear g ua rd — s ometh i ng that w as absent i n

m any L at in A mer ican guer r i l l a movements — when did you st ar t or ­g anizing i t ?

Ortega: We always had a rear guard . The movement h ad di rect ex­per ience w ith a rear guard dat ing back many years. Our count ry is not

an island l ike Cuba, we have to rely on neighbor ing count r ies, and the

revolut ionar y m ovemen t r el ied on suppor t f r om t h e neighbor i ngmovements from the very beginn ing. Sandino himsel f went to Mexico,to Honduras — many Hondurans and Costa Ricans joined Sandino's

struggle — so we counted on support from Honduras and Costa Rica tomeet some needs of the rear guard that were dif fi cul t to meet in N ica­

ragua .W e operated clandest inely i n Cost a Rica an d H onduras. A nd i n

o rder to set up the rear guard at h igher levels i t became necessary —

along with finding resources and setting up clandestine schools — tobegin arousing — to begin arousing a feel ing of sol idar i t y w i t h ou r

c ause among the m ai n progressive pol i t ical sectors in each count r y ,wi t hout being sectar i an, and not w i t h the left -w ing sectors alone, be­cause tha t would have meant isolat ing ourselves. Nobody gave us a

rear guard; we won the r ight to have one.The al l iances we achieved th rough ou r effor ts were of v i ta l impor ­

t ance in ou r obta in ing heavy weapons and sophist icated equipment .Harnecker: Consideri ng t ha t y ours was an a rmed movement, how

did you manage to put into practice a broad policy of al l iances'? Itwould seem easier for an elect ion-oriented movement to put i nto prac­tice a policy of that kind.

Ortega: We succeeded because we earned respect for ourselves, and

th is is someth ing that other movements have not achieved; they ar enot taken ser iously, they are not respected. We won the r ight to estab­

¹ca ragua — Strategy of V ic tory 7 9

lish alliances, we imposed our right. If they hadn't seen us as a force tobe reckoned with they wouldn't have approached us, but they realizedwe constituted a force and thus had to become our allies. And they didso due to our pol i t ical program, even though ours was an armed move­ment with a revolutionary leadership.

The progressives realized that ours was a revolutionary movementand that we weren't t otal l y in accord w i th thei r ideology, but they alsor eal ized that we had a pol i t ical program that was, to a cer tain exten t ,

of interest to them and that we had mi l i t ary power. Those three factorsmade i t possible for us to establish t rue al l i ances, not paper ones. Wemade no agreement of any k i nd. We just set down the rules of the gameand acted accordingly, and as a result we went on gaining politicalground .

Harnecker: Can you te ll us what effect the in te rna t i onal balance of

forces had on your vi ctory?Ortega: The in te rna ti onal balance of forces, the in te rna t ional situa­

ti on , the state of the var ious forces in the area, the cont radict ions ofWestern developed count r ies, etc., must def in i t el y be t aken i n to ac­c ount .

It would have been very difficult for us to win by depending only onin terna l development . We real ized tha t the internal gains had to ber einforced by th e forces tha t exi sted abroad. An d th e onl y way t o

achieve this was to practice a mature, flexible policy by disclosing ourrevolut ionary , democrat ic, and pat r iot ic program for nat ional recon­

st ruct ion. That was what made i t possible for us to count on the sup­por t of al l the m at ure forces the wor ld over , the revolu t ionary forces,the progressive forces.

Harnecker: Ma tu re forces, you say? What do you mean by t,his?Ortega: I ' m speaking of the bourgeois forces that go th rough a pro ­

c ess of mat u r i t y and don't rush i n to adventurous under tak ings l i k e

those of the CIA and the reactionary sectors. There are mature forcesin the wor ld that , realizing the qual i ty and strength of a revolut ionary

movement , even i f they have contradictory i n terests, end up respect ­ing i t . I t is even possible. in fact , to form certain al l i ances, to agree oncertain pol i t ical issues, that have a bear ing on the balance of forces

necessary for the f inal at tack. In order to achieve this it is impor tant t ohave a program w hich responds to the count,ry's real problems, thatproposes solut ions that everybody w i l l consider correct.

We defined the objective problems: that Nicaragua must undergo re­construct ion for such and such reasons, that nat ional un ity was neces­

s ary for such and such a reason and so for t h —Moreover, it was necessary to win everybody's support, not the sup­

80 Sa n d in is tas Speak

p ort of the left-wing sectors alone. The Sandinista Front made i t apoint to set up an infrastructure of solidarity in each country, seeking,fi r st ly , the suppor t of al l ; and secondly , the suppor t of those who bestunderstood our problems.

Now then, there's a big difference between sympathizing with ourcause and providing material aid. And who's going to provide such ma­terial support? Whoever wants to do so, without poli tical commit­ments of any kind attached, without jeopardizing principles.

Getting that support was a great accomplishment on the part of theSandinistas. We wanted to get as much support as we could abroad inorder to frust rate any scheme of foreign int ervent ion. And in doing sowe even won the support of sectors in the United States itself.

Harnecker: As far a s the Sandin is ta movement i s concerned, whatbearing did the existence of the three tendencies and their later reuni­fication have on the process' ?

Ortega: As I said, Sandinista unity was a decisive factor in the victo­ry. However, in order to understand the process of reintegration wemust go back a bit into history.

What happened in Nicaragua was not a profound division in theFSL N but rather a sort of spl i t -up of the vanguard into three parts as aresul t of our lack of mat u r i t y at the t im e ­

Ha rnecker: When d id that happen?

Ortega: It s tarted between 1976 and 1977.Harnecker: And what was the reason for it?Ortega: I was coming to that. More than a question of ideology, of

program, it was a question of the leaders' concern over finding a solu­tion to the problems of the revolutionary movement and channelingthe revolutionary activi ties in that direction.

Harnecker; I don't q ui te unders tand what you m ean—Ortega: Well , the leadership's way of dealing wi th the problems was

primit ive. In actual practice, there was virtually no coordinated lead­ersh ip . A s a resul t of the repression and due to the fact t hat we re­

mained out of contact with one another for long periods of time, plusthe lack of a common line, of a political commitment set down in writ­ing, everyone worked as they pleased. And this led to clashes. The splitwas not caused by profound ideological and political differences, al­though this type of problem did exist. If we had been better organized,perhaps we could have set t led the contradict ions — which are alway spresent i n the in i t ia l stages of every movement — in a posi t ive man­ner, encouraging crit icism while maintaining unity. The lack of thisnecessary framework for discussion along with our immaturity as in­dividuals, as revolutionaries, coupled with the repressive atmosphere

Ni caragua — Strategy of Vi ctory 8 1

led to our gradual spl it , breaking up into the three tendencies thateverybody knows about.

The split coincided with the death in combat of Oscar Turcios andRicardo Mor ales, both members of the nat ional leadersh ip. It arose outof the growth of the Sandinista movement itself, and came at a timewhen the very development of the movement called for a radical im­provement in our organization and leadership, a more organized van­guard capable of effectively leading the mass struggle, of charting asure path for the armed struggle in Nicaragua. We were aware of thisneed, but we were not able to accomplish this, to assimilate the expe­rience of our older comrades — more experienced in party work, inworking with the masses, with more military experience and more ex­perience in dealing with polit ical forces at home and abroad — and tocombine this with the dynamism of the young people who were already

beginning to join the movement in significant numbers.It was necessary to combine the old with the new and, in practice,

thi s created clashes. The older comrades began t o mistrust they ounger ones, who were beginning to assume responsibi l ity for anumber of tasks, and the young ones, who had no idea how hard thestruggles of the preceding years had been, underrated the older com­rades because the veterans stil l resorted to primit ive methods of workwhich the young ones thought should be eliminated.

Harnecker: Yo u consider yourself among the vete rans?Ortega: Wo uldn't you say so? I w as among those who started years

ago.Harnecker: How do you explain the implicit d iv ision of labor be­

tween the three tendencies by virtue of which the Proletarian Tenden­cy worked chiefly with the urban masses and the Prolonged People' sWar Tendency with the guerri llas in the mountains?

Ortega: I w a nt t o exp la in t h a t t he d iv is ion o f l abor o f w h ich y ouspeak was not the result of the division into tendencies; it existed be­f ore the divi sion of the fron t .

L et me explain ­

The leaders of the three tendencies were concerned with the overallproblems of the revolution. What I'm trying to say is that when, at thetime of the split, the comrades working on the different tasks assignedto them by the FSLN realized that they were unable to come up withsolut ions for the problems they faced — because of the drawbacks and

weaknesses I' ve already mentioned — they started to organize them­selves and the work they had mastered on the spot and seek solutionsto the problems they faced according to the structures within theirreach. You must remember that we were wor k in g am idst br u ta l re­

82 Sandin istas Speak

pression; it was impossible to do nationwide work, everybody workedaccording to what the situation dictated. The comrades who worked inthe mountains continued doing so in l ine with the prevai l ing situa­t i on ; those who worked more closely w i t h sectors in product ion, w i t hstudents, and in making known scienti fic revolutionary theory con­tinued to do so; and those who had been doing chiefly mil itary work,seeking insu rrect ion, pursued that l i ne.

A ct ual ly the efforts made by the three separate st ruct ures were fur ­thering a single struggle, were giving rise to a single policy, and wereevolving a single strategy for victory.

That explains why none of the tendencies thought of sett ing up anew FSLN.

Harnecker: So you didn't have three general secretaries—Ortega: Of course not. And that explains why, when the unity of the

movement was reestablished, the work the three tendencies had donew as complementar y .

Harnecker: So t his sort o f d iv is ion o f l abor e xisted before t hes plit —

Ortega: Yes, the different areas of work had been decided upon bythe movement. The fact that we all came from a common root was veryhelpful. It led us to respect the work of the other tendencies. For exam­ple, the insurrectional tendency did not try to set up another revolu­tionary student front. I t let that organization, which played such animportant role in Nicaragua, remain under the control of the othertendencies. Nor was there any int er ference with the work the "Prole­tar i an " comrades did in several factories, and t hey d id n' t i n te rfereeither. They didn't try to set up another Northern or Southern Front ,which was the most important mi l itary work done by the "insurrec­tionals." The efforts were coordinated and they complemented eachother .

Harnecker: Besides, no one of the three could have tr i u mphed wi th ­

out the help of the others.Ortega: Tha t's right . The problem was that each one wanted to lead

the process, wanted to be the one that stood out the most, but that wasovercome in the course of the st ruggle i tsel f and everybody real izedthe importance of everybody else's work. Thus we came to the unityagreements which we started to work on in late 1978 and which wereconcluded in March 1979, based on a single policy, without anyonehaving to give ground to the other. The whole Sandinista movementagreed on a single policy which upheld the insurrectional nature of thestruggle, called for a f lexible policy on a ll iances and the need for abroad-based program, etc. This programmatic, political, and ideologi­

Ni caragua — St rategy of V i ctory 8 3

cal foundation made it possible for us to coordinate our efforts with in­creasing effectiveness and pave the way for our regrouping. I think itwould be more correct to say that we regrouped together rather thanreunited. The three tendencies all had a great desire to become a sin­gle FSLN once again, as shown by the enthusiasm, love, and zeal withwhich this unity is preserved now, and w'e're sure it is irreversible.Just as Sandinista unity was vital for victory, the unity of all the leftaround Sandinismo and of the entire population around the left andSandinismo is vital to consolidate the process and achieve our goals.

Ha rnecker: We u nders tand t h at w o men p layed a v ery i mportant

role in the armed st ruggle in N icaragua, that in the ci t ies they foughtshoulder to shoulder w i th men and in the columns they came to const i ­

tute 25 percent of the force; that there were several women command­ers. What are your views on this? Was i t someth ing new or was there a

tradition of women participating in such activi ties?Ortega: The Sandin is ta F ront w as heir t o the t radi t i on of women' s

participation in the struggle, not only in Sandino's time but also in thepast centur y and even fu r ther back . You al ready know about the roleof women dur ing Sandino's struggle, of his comrade, of in ternat ional ­ist comrades l ike the L ia Toro sist ers. Or th e case of the women who

were m urdered by the Yankees in 1912. There was a woman from E lSalvador involved; her name was Lucia Matamoros. She was drawnand quartered for having fought against the intervention of that time.Th ere was also Comrade Concepcion A lday, the w ife of the f irst L iber ­

a l guer r i l l a to f i gh t the Y ankees in Ch inandega, who was k i l led i n1926.

The FSL N i nher i ted and fol lowed up on t h is par t icipat ion . But i t' simpor tant to point out that Sandin ismo not only developed the par t i ci ­pat ion of women i n the vanguard organizat ion bu t i n al l sectors, andnot j ust in suppor t work for key tasks but in key strategic tasks. Such

is the case of guerri l la Commander Dora Tellez, better known as Com­mander 2; guer r i l la Commander Monica Baltodano; and other guer r i l ­

la commanders such as Leticia Herrera. These three comrades playeda very impor tan t role, not j ust i n suppor t wor k for the revolut ionaryst ruggle but as pol i t ical and m i l i t ary leaders. In the course of the in­

sur rect ion, they were leaders on the bat t lefield, as in the case of DoraTel lez {Claudia I, who headed what was called the Rigoberto Lopez Pe­r ez Wester n Fr ont , one of the most impor tan t f ronts of the war .

Sandinismo did not close the doors to women's participation; thatw ould have been a backward , sexist way of underest im at ing th em .

Women played a very important role in the insurrection. There werecolumn s i n w h ich al l t h e of f icer s w er e women , women wh o com­

84 San d in is tas Speak

manded hundreds of men without any problem.Harnecker: Before we end this interview, would you like to say any­

thing else?Ortega: W e l l , f i rs t o f a l l , I would l i ke to thank you for t h is opport u ­

ni t y to discuss these issues, which are vi tal to an understanding of ourrevolutionary process. I would have liked to give more thought to theanswers but the daily tasks we face have made this impossible. What Isaid here should not be viewed as the last word, as the defin i t ive anal ­

ysis. I' ve just expressed my particular views, which I hope will contrib­u te to a better understanding of our process, of our brave and inspi r i ng

revolu t ionary st ruggle.

On Human Rights in Nicaragua

by Tomtls Borge

The fol lou i ng presentation ivas made by FSL1V leader Tomas Borge,Ni caraguan mi ni ster uf the i nterior , to the I nter -A meri can H umanRights Commission on October 10, 1980. The commission spent a weekin 1Vi caragua , meeti ng w i t h representa ti ves of the government , the

armed forces, the j udi cia l system, and the Cathol ic church, as wel l aswi th ex-N ational Guard p ri soners and thei r fami li es. On i ts depar ture,the commissi on announced i t would recommend i nternati onal human­

i ta ri an ai d to N i caragua .Thi s presentation was or i g i nal ly p ubli shed as a pa mp hlet by the

Mi ni stry of the I nteri or . The translati on is by In te rcont i nenta l P ress.

We have l i stened w ith great respect and at tent ion to your opin ions.

Perhaps I should start by saying that in every country there are onlytwo possibi l i t ies. Ei ther you are in favor of human dign i t y and respectfor human r i gh ts, or you are against human r i gh ts. There is no otherp ossibi l i t y .

Leaving aside the nuances that may exist, and without being me­chanical about it — either you' re for human rights or you' re againstthem.

The pol i t ical t h rust of t h i s revolu t ion and t h i s government i s un­shakably and i r reversibly in favor of human dign i ty , of human r ights.

Obviously , in pract ice we have fal len shor t of perfect ion, but the mostimpor tant t h ing is our st rategic, histor ic decision to be in favor of hu­man r i ght s.

Our i nv i t ing you here was one resul t of t his decision .

In order to tal k about human r ights, you have to tal k about the So­moza dictator sh ip, and about al l the governments N icaragua has had.

But especial ly about the Somoza dictator sh ip.Over the last hal f century our people have been pu t i n fr on t of t he

f i r in g squad w i t hou t any lega l nicet ies being observed. They have

been pu t in to tor t ure chambers.

T he Somoza government 's special t y was v iolat ing al l th e law s —even those laws that existed in the count ry at the t ime, which are not

85

86 Sandin istas Speak

the same as the laws that exist today. Now we see the contradict ionsbetween the laws of the past and the revolu t ion that is under way. We

haven't yet had t ime to change the ent i re j udicial system, but we knowthat much of i t is obsolete and not in l ine w i th our revolu t ionary pr i n ­ciples. There was a legal framework under the dictatorship, but Somo­za just did not pay much attention to it .

T he abuses comm i t ted under Somoza are fami l ia r to al l of yo u ­even though a cr im inal l i ke Somoza does every th ing possible to hidehis cr imes. When he was i n power , he was able to cover up a lot ofthings.

As a mat ter of pr inciple we have not t r ied to hide any t h i ng, not evenour m i st akes. not even the abuses that have been commi t ted. Bu t i n

the days of the dictatorship, obviously, everything possible was done tocover up the worst aspects of the repression .

You never had a chance t o t a l k t o th e peasants who had greasespread on their gen i tals so that the dogs would eat them. You could not,

talk to the men who were scalped al ive wi th razors and had salt and v i ­negar rubbed into thei r wounds so they would suffer un t i l t hey died.You cert a inl y never had a chance to tal k t o the peasant w omen whowere raped, as almost 100 percent of them were in some nor thern pro­

vinces.

Probably you don't even know about the peasants who were bur iedalive in the mountains. You don't know the incredibly horrible statis­tics on the number of vict ims. You have spoken of the large number of

vi ct ims — we know that they numbered in the tens of thousands. Morethan 100,000 N icaraguans were k i l l ed .

Th in k about the fact that there wasn't a single fam i ly i n N icaragua

that escaped the repression, not even the fam i l y of Somoza h imsel f .Because Edgar Lang, a Sandini sta mar ty r and hero, was a rel at ive of

Somoza's; many members of Somoza's fam i l y were vict ims of repres­sion .

Repression under Somoza went so far beyond the nor mal l im i ts thatit t ouched h is ow n fam i l y and the fam i l ies of f r iends. There wasn' teven a single Somozaist fam ily that escaped the repression. That givesyou some idea of the magn i t ude of repression under Somoza.

Of course al l t h is repression led to an enormous bu i ldup of resent ­ment and hatred in the Nicaraguan population. Everything that hasto do with the National Guard is despised in this country. We made abig effort to save some members of the National Guard. We foundthem jobs, and in some cases the workers accepted them out of'a senseof discip l i ne. But they wouldn't t al k to the Guardsmen — they t u rned

On Human Rights in Nicaragua 8 7

their backs on them and made their l ives miserable.People wil l not put up with the guardias for the reasons I have al­

ready explained. Because besides being murderers, they were th ieves.Besides being robbers, they were bru t al . They k i l led a lot of N icar a­

guans, and they stole the property of others.They were murderers, thieves, torturers, and rapists. That's what

they were. That's what they st il l are in the places they have fled to.Perhaps the worst cr ime Somoza and his son commi t ted was not that

o f k i l l ing N icaraguans, not t hat of t u r n ing the N at ional Guard in to

cr im inals, but that of t u r n ing chil d ren in to cri m i na ls .You r efer to the youngster s who are i n pr ison — the specialt y of

those ch i l dren was gouging out pr isoners' eyes wit h a spoon. This was

one of the techn iques of these chi ldren who were hor r ibly deformed bySomozaism .

Bu t th e revolu t ion has made a pol i t i ca l decision not t o pu t these

y oungsters on t r ia l bu t to t ry to rehabi l i t ate them .

Unfortunately some of them were taken to the facil i ties where thea du l ts are. The revolut ion is set t ing up separate faci l i t ies for them ,but in the meant ime they have a separate section of the Modelo faci l i ­ty ; they are not w i t h the others. We want to get them out of there, and

we w i l l do so as soon as we have another place for them .Righ t now we cannot afford the luxury of j ust t u r n ing them loose,

because they would become del inquents. These youngsters — w i thoutwor k and w i t h al l the deform at ions they have suff ered — wou ld be­

come murderers and thieves and would end up back in jai l for newcr imes. I"or t h is reason we wouldn't be doing them any favor . We ar e

g oing to take them someplace and rehabi l i t ate them .Our revolut ion has histor ical ly had a policy of not execut ing anyone.

Those were the inst ruct ions we gave du r ing the w ar . I t i s not j usts ometh ing we decided after ou r vi ctory , but a pol icy we followed dur ­

ing the war itself .I don't know if the tape recording st i l l exists of a speech I made to the

National Guard when we had them surrounded in the barracks at Ma­tagalpa. It went out over the radio, over our own radio. In i t I told themto tur n themselves in , that not h ing would happen to t hem. The N a­

t ional Guard never bel ieved us when we told them t h is.I remember when I was taken pr isoner . I was brut al ly tor t u red, kept

wi t h a hood over m y head for n ine months, and kept handcuffed forseven months.

I remember when we captured those who had tortured me. I toldthem: "I am going to get back at you; now comes the hour of my re­

88 San din istas Speak

venge, and my revenge is that we are not going to harm a single hairon your heads. You didn't believe us before, but now we are going tomake you believe us."

That was our philosophy; that was the way we were. But take a min­ute to think about what it meant, what it means to have been in Nica­

ragua in those days.You, Mr. President* — just imagine that they murdered your wife,

the way they murdered mine. Imagine if they had brutally murderedyour son or your brother, if they had raped your wife or sister ordaughter — and then you came to power .

This wil l give you some idea of the moral stature of the leaders of

this revolution, that we have not taken revenge against those who didus so much harm.

But we cannot demand the same consciousness from the great mass

of fighters who saw their brothers and sons shot down, whose wiveswere raped, whose daughters were raped, whose loved ones were tor ­

tured, who were themselves victims of torture, who lived through thefrightening destruction of the botnbs that fell in their cities and of therockets that fell on their houses and killed children and old people.

They came to power w i t h t he sound of shots st i l l ringing in their

e ars, st i l l feel ing the blood recent ly spi l led and the cr imes just comm i t ­ted.

The logical, natural thing to do was to turn the guns against thosewho had lived by the gun. But the immense majority of the NationalGuard were not shot; only a t iny minority of these murderers wereshot . Even we ourselves don't know who they were. I t was l ike Ft ten­teovej una — everyone was in i t t ogether. **

When the revolu t ion won, they gave me a m i l l ion cordobas to star tsett ing up the M inist ry of the Inter i or . And I started spending th is mo­ney to set up a pol ice force and State Secur i t y , w i thout bother ing toask for receipts. I don't know exact ly what happened to th is money. If I

had to give an exact accounting, they would have to send me to jai l .You cannot have the faintest idea of the situation that existed in Ni­

caragua at that moment . I don't even know who was in charge of t heLa Polvora barracks r ight t hen — a nd I d on't t h i nk a nyone k nows.

*Com mission President Thomas Farer , a U .S. ci t izen .

"og uenteovej una is the ti t l e of a 1618 drama hy the Spanish wr i t er Lope de Ve­

ga about the m urder of an oppressive tax collector in the v i l l age of Fuenteovej ­una. When questioned by the king's prosecutor, the vil lagers take collective re­sponsibil ity for the act.

On H u man Ri g hts i n N i caragua 8 9

People spent one week here and the next week someplace else.A l l r i ght , i t is possible that i f we were to make an invest igat ion w e

might be able to find out who was in charge of La Polvora.Bu t do we real l y have the moral r i gh t t o punish those who fough t

alongside the people against the tyranny, who risked their l ives, whoperhaps were wounded, who saw thei r fathers and brothers and sons

ki lled?What r ight do we have to ask now that they be punished for th ings

that happened at a t ime when there were no mechanisms of control int he whole country — when there existed nei ther judicial order nor m i l ­i t ary order .

These companeros did not have a very clear idea of what they weresupposed to be doing, and some may even have thought they were fol ­low ing the policy of the revolut ionary government. The means of com ­municat ion we had at ou r disposal to let people know what the policyw as were not very good, and th is was also t rue dur ing the war .

I t would be very d i f f icul t for us to t rack down who was responsiblefor the th ings that happened in the f i rst mon ths after the victory , ex­

t r emely di f f i cu l t .We would be demagogues and liars if we told you we were going to

punish these companeros, if we told you that we were going to have athorough invest igat ion to f ind out who was responsible for the execu­

t ions that took place in the days after the victor y .On the other hand, we have punished a lot of people. When we found

out about somet h i ng, we penalized those responsible. Bu t we did notpublicize what we were doing, and I don't even remember the names ofthose penalized.

We depor ted one f i ghter , whose nam e I don't r emember , a Sout h

Am er ican, who I found commi t t ing abuses. We immediately expel ledh im from the count r y .

We also put in jai l some cornpaneros whom we found committ inga buses. I don't k now i f they are out now .

But you don't have any idea of what those first months after the rev­olution were l ike: there wasn't the slightest bit of control over any­thing.

When we founded the Ministry of the Interior, there were six of us;and in the whole country there was no police force, no State Security,no judges, no courts„no Supreme Court, no nothing.

All we had were titles: "You' re the minister of the interior." "You' rethe president of the Supreme Court." There was no infrastructure. Wedidn't even have offices. We didn't have files. We had nothing, abso­l u tely not h in g.

90 Sandin istas Speak

About the only thing we could do then was go around here and theretrying to stop bad things from being done.

When they tried to lynch the prisoners who were in the Red Crossbuilding, I personally went to see the relatives of our martyrs whowere there ready to take their revenge.

I needed all the powers of persuasion I possessed. I didn't tape recordwhat I said, but I think it was one of the most eloquent of the few elo­quent speeches I have made in my life.

In any case, I managed to persuade them not to kill the NationalGuard. Mr. Ismael Reyes, who is a member of the Red Cross, wasthere; he was the one who called me.

There was a large crowd trying to break down the doors to get in andkill the murderers who were inside. We were able to convince them notto do it. We were able to convince them by saying that we could not killthem because we had made this revolution in order to put a stop to kill­ings.

This was perhaps the most persuasive argument. I asked them: "Sowhy did we make this revolution, if we are going to do the same thingthey used to do? If that's the way it is going to be, we would be betteroff not having made the revolution."

We said the same thing to the police, to members of the State Securi­ty, to the companeros in the army: "Don't commit abuses; don't be dis­

respectful to anyone; don't hit prisoners." Because often they did hitprisoners or kill prisoners. We said to them: "If you do such things, thenwhat did we make this reooLution for t"

It was a battle, a tremendous battle. We asked the Church to helpus. For example, we asked the Church to help us improve prison condi­tions. One time a German clergyman came to this very office and ex­pressed his admiration for the revolution and asked me: "'How can wehelp you?"

We told him: We' re going to tell you a secret; we want you to help usto improve conditions for the prisoners.

We didn't want to say it publicly, because several times when we didsomething to improve conditions, word got out. And people didn't likei t .

If you were Nicaraguan and you had suffered all that Nicaraguanshave suffered, you wouldn't be very sympathetic with the idea of doingsomething for the prisoners either. When we ask people what weshould do with the prisoners, they say, "Shoot them." If we had gonealong with the will of the people on this, we would have shot them all.

That is why we told this clergyman to help us improve the condi­tions of the prisoners. We told him: "Don't send us aid for our children,

On Human Rights in Nicaragua 9 1

w hom we love more than anyth in g i n the wor ld. Send us aid for t h eprisoners, for the criminals we are holding in jail, for the murderers."

Some Christian businessmen came, some North American mil lion­aires, including an astronaut who had been to the moon, and theyasked us what they could do to help. We told them also: "Build us thebest prison in Latin America, the most humane, because we want toset an example for the world in our treatment of prisoners."

They promised; we' ll see if they keep their word. I hope they do, be­cause they gave me the impression of being serious and responsiblepeople. So far they have sent us 7,000 Bibles, which we have dividedup among the prisoners.

We have some serious problems with our prisons. There aren't verymany of them, and they are in poor condition. There is overcrowding;there are shortages of foodstuffs. The staff suffers from these problemsas well as the prisoners.

One time I almost started to cry — not for the prisoners, to tel l thetruth, but for the companeros who were guarding the prisoners. Itseemed like the companeros were the prisoners and the prisoners werethe ones s ta nd ing g uard. T he p r i soners w e re b etter o ff t h an t h e

guards, who were sleeping on the floor, half-naked, with no shoes,half-dead with hunger. It was a pitiful picture.

This is a country that was left in ruins. It is important not to forgetthis fact. This is a country reduced to rubble. We have extraordinaryproblems, yet efforts are being made to improve the prisoners' condi­tions.

We are battl ing not only to improve their material conditions but al­so to counter the hat red that the companeros watch ing them feel to­ward them.

We are the ones car ry ing out t h is bat t le, because we have the moralauthority to do it. But if I had been a National Guardsman or a Somo­zaist, or one who was indifferent, I wouldn't have much moral authori­ty to ask the companeros to treat prisoners well .

But we ourselves were the vict ims of the National Guard, we weretortured, we and our families were victims. For that reason we do havethe moral authority to ask that they be treated well .

No one can accuse us of having a selfish interest in having themtreated well, because if we had any selfish interest it would be in hav­i ng them t reated badly .

We can expect some improvements. The problem of overcrowdingcan be reduced by building more prisons. That's the only way.

We built one new prison. We invested a million and a half c6rdobas,and when it was finished it turned out the engineer — who was ob­

92 Sandin is lax Speak

v iously incompetent — hadn't designed in sewers. And other exper tswe consulted came to the conclusion that i t was impossible to put insewers because of the condi t ion of the ground.

So months of work came to nothing, along with our expectations ofmoving the prisoners into better quarters where we had planned forthem to have conjugal visits and other basic rights we want to intro­duce into our penal system .

Now we have to begin looking for other possible locations for a placewe can put them for at least a few months. The engineer inspector saysthat we can't take anyone over to the Granada facil i ty. In the mean­t i me, we have given inst ruct ions that the pr isoners be perm i t ted morefrequent v i si t s.

Yesterday I was in J inotepe prison, and I found out that we need bet ­ter communications. We still haven't perfected our means of communi­cat ion. They hadn't yet got ten the order we issued some time ago to al­

low more frequent v isi ts, or the order to permi t the pr isoners to receivemagazines and books and other things. We also found some prisonerswho were being held unjustly and released them.

We agree completely w i t h the idea of increasing the number of visi t sthe prisoners are allowed. But you should be aware that there are ad­mi n ist r at ive problems re la ted to such v is it s .

The Tipitapa prison, for example, has a capacity of 700. That is, itshould have 700 but it actually has more than 2,000.

It is difficult to control visits under such conditions. It can only bedone by increasing the staff. This means spending more money, but weare going to f ind ways to al low more visi t s.

We have al ready au thorized more fr equen t v i si ts, as wel l as t heright to walk freely through the halls, and to receive books, news­papers, magazines, cigaret tes, radios, television, and other t h ings thatwere proh ib ited before, such as br inging i n lemons and or anges andother f r u i ts. A l l t h is has now been author ized.

lt is true that the companeros in charge of the penal system have es­tablished some rules that are somewhat mechanical and sometimeseven childish. One t ime I visited the prison in Granada, where Ilearned of a rule that every t ime an off icial came by, the pr isoners hadto stand at at ten t ion .

O ne of f icial named Leana went by 300 t imes a day . So every t i me

she went by the women were supposed to stand at at tent i on. I t was r i ­diculous.

We still haven't straightened out things like that, much less perfect­ed al l the admini st r a t ive and inst i t u t ional norms of the count r y . But

we are making a lot of progress.

On Hu m an H ig h ts in N u a ragua 9 3

We are going to release more pr isoners. We have al ready released alot. What happens is that we make the mistake of not lett ing peopleknow about the discipl inary measures taken against many compane­ros for abusing prisoners, and we also have not made public thenumber of prisoners we have released. We have freed thousands of pri­soners.

We only made it public in the first few days, when I freed more thana hundred cr iminals, ex-Guardsmen, from Jinotega. Today, by theway , they are l i sted among the "disappeared" ; actual ly , they fl ed toHonduras. We also have not publicized a lot of the disciplinary stepstaken. Commander Cuadra has given you just a few examples of peo­ple disciplined under the law.

We ar e going to free al l t hose pr isoners whose physical condi t i onprevents them from posing any danger , regardless of what they havedone, unless the charges against them are very serious indeed.

I have been thinking that even though we had decided not to free al ot of the women pr isoners un t i l the H uman Rights Com mission lef t ,that, given the productive discussions we have had, and the positiveat t i t udes you have shown, we should free them immediately. And I amg oing to propose this to the governmen t .

We are going to make a study. We wil l send lawyers to all the pri­sons to look into the possibil ity of freeing a lot more prisoners.

It wasn't possible in the very beginning to tel l who was telling thet r u t h an d wh o wasn' t . M any of th e pr isoners even changed thei rnames. Thei r r elat i ves come to the pr isons and look for them under

their real names, and they "can't find them."These prisoners are death ly afraid of the revolut ion. They are afraid

because of the crimes they committed. They have guilt complexes, andthat 's why they won't g ive thei r real names.

You wil l also find if you study the answers they gave to the SpecialTribunals, that they were all cooks, typists, bartenders, barbers, andmechanics. Nobody ever f i red a shot. You would th ink that we had justbeen shoot ing at ourselves.

Some would say, "they only recruited me three days before." Othersclaimed to have been in the army only a mon th ; others said they had

deserted; others that they were really in the FSLN. Ferreting out thet r u t h in al l these cases is very di f f i cu l t .

We are, however , t r a i n in g gr oups of companeros. We have given

them instruction in judicial norms, in respect for human rights, inquestioning prisoners, so that we can speed up the trials. Now moreare being held than before.

In the beginn ing i t was a big problem, but now we are get t ing more

94 Sandin istas Speak

experienced in such procedures. Every day we do them a li tt le better ,and now we are preparing thir ty-five new people.

As I told you, it's a hard job. We started out with no experience.%howere the judges in this country? Who had any judicial experience inNicaragua'? The Somozaists, and their experience was all in the frame­work of corruption.

The only thing we knew how to do was fight. We are still half guer­ri l las. We weren't judges, we had no legal experience. We weren't in­vestigators, we weren't police, we weren't anything. We have learnedall this under the gun.

It is a lit t le more than a year since the victory, and from a historicalpoint of view this is only an instant, only a historical second. We our­selves have said that we are only beginning to normalize things, tocreate a state apparatus.

We have special i nt erests of our own. For example, we are interestedin building the FSLN. But the FSLN is waiting on the sidelines whilewe take care of our immediate task of organizing the state apparatus.We can't do anything without a state structure.

July 19 came this year and we were just getting around to paying at­tention to the FSLN as a political organization. Why? Because wedidn't have a st ate. We are just now beginn ing to have a real state,

And the first prior ities of the state were not in the judicial system —they were in health care, the literacy crusade, and defense of the revo­lution.

Now that we' ve achieved some normalcy in defense and in healtha nd educat ion, we can st ar t . We can start to give the legal system i t sproper importance. Up to this point it hasn't had a single vehicle, or itsown building; now we' re providing vehicles and giving them a build­ing. We' re starting to give some encouragement to those in charge ofthe judicial system; we are meeting with them more frequently. Beforewe couldn' t, because we had other t h ings to do.

With the end of Somoza's dictatorship came the end of the legalstructure and coercive forces that supported Somoza. We were facednot only with the job of reconstructing buildings destroyed by the warbut also of building a state apparatus, and the latter is sometimes asd i ff icul t as the former .

There are some people who feel nervous about what is happening,but perhaps the first thing we have to say is that there has been a revo­lution here. And a revolution makes some people very happy and oth­ers not so happy. There are some who feel very secure about it and oth­ers very insecure.

There is a new sense of security among the immense majority of the

On H uman Ri g hts i n N i caragua 9 5

populat ion, who used to l ive in fear. They were always afraid of beingki l l ed , of being t hr ow n i n j a i l , of being tor t ured, afr aid thei r l ands

would be stolen, afr aid they would lose thei r j obs or be k icked out ofs chool. They l ived in a st ate of ext r eme insecur i t y .

Bu t who was responsible for t h is insecur i ty? The social groups thatru led the count ry. Now those who were insecure before have recovered

a sense of security; they feel safe for the first t ime.Bu t t hose who before caused insecur i t y t o the bi g maj or i t y of t he

populat ion now feel insecure themselves — even though th is revolu­

t ion has been ext r emely fl ex ible and has given everyone an opport u ­n i t y . They feel insecure even though we have ser iously proposed ­

and th is is not just a tact ical or shor t -t erm th ing — that we main t ain am ixed economy and pol i t ical pl u r a l i sm .

We mean i t when we talk about pol i t ical plur a l ism and a mixed eco­

n omy . Bu t what happens is that a t h ief t h i nks everyone else is l i k ehim. And these people th ink we are t r i ck ing them, when in fact we are

going to great pains to show them that we are not l y i ng, that i n factthey are the ones who hist or ical ly have been the l i ars. They can't con­

cede the possibi l i t y t hat there m igh t be people who aren't l i ars, andtherefore they feel nervous.

Obviously t h i s is a v icious ci rcle, because th is insecur i t y they feel

c auses them to decapi t a l ize thei r businesses. But when they begin t odo that , thei r work ers become aware of what they are doing. And then

the revolut ionary government becomes concerned.We are not prepared to al low them to decapi t a l ize thei r businesses.

S uch a lack of confidence is a blow to th is count r y. They are al l in debt ,w h ich is the best proof. There is not a single pr ivate enterpr ise in th i sc ountry wh ich is not in debt to the f inancial syst em .

And i t would not even be a radical step, but a simple business proce­d ure, for us to say to them: "Gent lemen, ei ther you pay us or you tu r nover your operat ions." But they aren't i n a posi t ion to pay .

So what has the revolut ionary government done? Has it t aken awaythei r businesses? No. In fact i t has extended them more loans in orderfor them to develop thei r businesses.

Unfor t unately , we have a backw ard capi ta l ist class. I w an t t o befr ank w i th you. I th ink that in the long run a cert ain segment of the so­

called pr i vate sector is going to come to its senses. There are some peo­p le who don't show good sense now bu t may some day come to thei rsenses. There are some who are half-sensible who may become sensi ­

ble; just l i ke there are some who already show some common sense inwhich this characterist ic may become stronger.

W e could have w iped these people out . We had the power to do i t .

96 Sandin istas Speak

Th is would only have shown that we had as l i t t le sense as they do. But

we have learned something from history. People learn from expe­rience. We have learned that in order to be revolutionaries and ad­vance a revolutionary process, it is necessary to have one's feet on thegl'ountl .

We could have taken away al l their businesses and we would nothave been over thr own; I 'm sure of that. But what is most conducive tothe economic development of the country is what is best for the Nicara­guan people. So when we talk about a mixed economy, we mean it; andw hen we t al k about pol i t i cal pl ur a l i sm, we mean i t .

Th is is not a shor t -ter m maneuver bu t our st r ategic approach. Thepolitical approach of the FSLN is to maintain a mixed economy andpolitical pluralism.

We are not going to violate these principles. But we are not going tolet them decapitalize their businesses, because that means taking re­sources out of the count ry and destroy ing those enterpr ises.

We want to see the development of pr ivate enter pr ise, pr iv ate com­merce, and pr ivate cu l t i vat ion of the land. Fur thermore, we have noin terest in nat ional izing the land. On the cont r ary , we are interested

in expanding private ownership of the land. We think this should bebasical l y in the form of cooperat ives, but i f there are also pr ivate en­terprises involved in agricultural production, we want them to developtoo.

We wil l give them whatever help they need, just l ike we did to theSan Antonio sugar mi ll, for example, which is a mil lion-dollar opera­tion i n pr ivate hands.

We are going to multiply the number of cooperatives, which is aform of pr iv ate ownership of the land, and one that people only j oin ona volunt ary basis.

C ooperat i ves ar e not h ing u nusual ; they ar en' t com muni sm , l i k esome back ward elements here th ink who don't have the faintest ideawhat a cooperative is. You only have to read half a page of a book onthe subject to be aware that a cooperat ive involves pr ivate ownership .

Ther e is a pol i t ica l uncer ta int y am ong cer tai n sectors. The t rad i ­

t iona l part ies in t h is countr y — and I 'm not t a l k ing about the trad i ­t i onal part ies just t o at tack them — have r uled N icaragua for mor ethan a hundred years and they have never been able to solve the coun­try's problems. But they want to go on living. They stubbornly refuseto retire to a museum.

We are not going to prevent them from cont i n u ing to l ive. They ar egoing to die a natural death, and new, modern, different parties needto come into being.

On H uman R ig hts i n N i caragua 9 7

The L iberals* don't dare to ident i fy themselves, but there are thosewho are bold enough to suggest that the Liberals should be a politicaloption in this country. This doesn't worry us.

What kind of influence can these parties have, either historically oramong the masses'? They are doing us a big favor by presenting them­selves as our opposition. We'd rather have them for an opposition thansome modern party with relevant ideas and a possibil ity of a future.

Better them than new sectors that aren't t a i nted w i th hav ing been

Somoza's yes-men, having made deals with Somoza, having been partof the react ionary hyster ia that prevai led in t h is count ry . Tainted bycomplicity with the imperialist interventions in Nicaragua (with al ldue respect to ou r honored f r iend, the president of the commission).Th is is the k ind of opposit ion we don't have to worry about . They are

the ones who are wor r ied.At a cer tai n t ime, they were demanding immediate elect ions. We

said no, and one of the reasons was precisely because we favor politicalp l ur al i sm .

If we had held elect ions six months after the victory , or i f we held

them r ight now, those people wouldn't even get hal f a deputy. Pol i t icalplu r al ism would disappear . I f t here were 100 representat ives in con­

gress, it would be 100 Sandinistas. And since we do favor political plu­r a l i sm, we want them to have pol i t ical representat ion ; we would l i k ethem to be able to organize themselves into some type of par t y t hat

would at least have the possibi l i t y of present ing i tsel f as an opt ion .Besides that, we really didn't have time to spend holding elections

r i gh t then. I t would have meant an expendi t ure of energy and resour ­ces when our main job right then was to get our economy going again,

But elect ions wi l l be held. We have already set the date. That w i l l be

the t ime to have a contest in the electoral arena. What won't be up fordebate is whether or not there is a revolu t ion in N icaragua.

We have publ icly cr i t i cized people i n the pr i vate sector , bu t t heyhave cr i t i cized us as wel l. They demand the r ight to at tack us, but theyd on't t h ink we have a r igh t to at tack them .

I f they can at tack us, why can't we do the same to them? If they cal l

us communists, why can*t we call them reactionaries? If they say we' ves old ourselves for gold from Moscow, why can't we say they are prost i ­

tu tes who have sold themselves to imper ia l ism' ?If they have the same r ight to express themselves as we do, and they

at tack us in La Prensa and over Radio Corporacion and other sta t ions,

then we can attack them in our media.

* Somoza's part y .

98 Sa n di n istas Speak

W e can defend ourselves and we can cr i t i cize them. But we do it w i t h

the truth, and they do it with lies.Bu t al l r i gh t , everyone has thei r ow n idea of what t r ut h is. Some

people think lies are the truth .It is true that certain means of communication, such as Radio Sandi­

no, belong to the FSLN, just l ike Radio Corporacion belongs to ther eact ionar ies. I t is also t rue that other means of mass communicat ion ,such as television, are in the hands of the state.

I wish you would ask the French why they control certain communi­cations media. Television, for example, is in the hands of the state inFrance — and not only in France but in Spain too, just l ike in Nicara­gua. The reason is that the television stat i ons belonged to Somoza, andwhat was Somoza's passed into the hands of the new state. If there hadb een a television channel in pr iv ate hands, i t would st i l l be in pr i v at ehands.

Bu t at t h is poin t we are not in favor of l icensing a new commercialtelevi sion st at ion , because w e ar e t r y in g t o t r ansfor m N i caraguantelevision. Traditionally, television has been very alienating. Alienat­ing because i t encourages pornography, because it glor i f ies cr ime and

violence. We are making a big effort to transform television into some­th in g educat ional , because televi sion i s a very effect ive medium ofcommunicat ion ,

What we can consider is opening up television to other political for­ces, such as the Church. We have nothing against the idea of theChurch having access to television. The Human Rights Commissionheaded by Dr. Leonte Herdocia has already suggested it .

There has been some discussion about the scope of our laws on statesecur i t y. The problem is that we don't have al l the state structures wen eed in t h is count r y , and the laws that do exist aren't a lw ays usefu l .

Ther e i s a cont radict ion between th e new revolu t ionar y st ructuresthat have arisen and the judicial system. For example, in the old days,criminals were arrested and then freed because they bribed the judges.The lawyers and legal experts al l went along with this. The policewent along with it. Because of all this, prisoners were set free.

In December we are going to issue some pardons. We are going to as­sign some people to make as careful a study as possible of each prison­er's case. We want to free those who are physically incapacitated andthose who clearly are not guilty. We also want to study the cases of alot of those who were tried in the first months, because some of themmigh t have been given excessive sentences. I t may be tha t i n somecases we will reduce the sentences.

On Hunuxn Rights in Nicuruguo 9 9

We don*t have a new system of laws wri tten since the revolution.This is a very big problem. We stil l have judges who aren't very hon­est. This is because in order to have honest judges you have to havehonest lawyers. One day we went out with a lamp looking for an hon­est lawyer in N icaragua. We found just one — we found Leonte Herdo­

cia.Maybe I am exaggerat ing. Maybe there are a number of honest law­

yers, but the number is not very big. They were t ra ined in a hor r ib lycorrupt school. The problem w i t h N icaragua is that cor rupt ion was sopervasive that being corrupt was not considered st range. In fact, it wasbeing honest that was considered weird. Anybody who didn't steal wasconsidered a fool .

I remember people talking about a man who worked in a bank anddidn't steal , and they cal led hi m a b l i t her ing idiot . In other words, i t

was sort of a cr ime not to be a cr im in al. People acqui red very negat i ve

h abi ts. We need new generat ions to overcome th is, to forge new at t i ­tudes.

A lot of lawyers bribe judges. They try to get money from the familyof someone who is arrested. The police don't have very good investiga­t ive techniques, they don't produce evidence in t ime, so, as a result ,someone walks off scot-free who is obviously a very dangerous indiv id­

ual. So someone who has raped a three-year-old girl goes free for lackof adequate evidence, especial ly since there is a tendency to considercr imes l i ke t h is a pr ivate business.

Eden Pastora caught a man with a gun in his hand attacking some­one. He took away his gun and ar rested h im, but the man was set freefor lack of proof. There are people who sell narcotics, a crime for whichwe have a special hat red, and they go free for lack of evidence.

Sometimes there are protests because the people don't want to letsuch people go, because they know for a fact the criminals will go outi n the streets and commi t new cr imes. So somet imes they t r y to tak emat ters into thei r own hands. We find the same type of resistance onthe par t of the chiefs of pol ice in the prov inces.

We have had cer tain problems w i t h the j udicial st ruct ure, t r y ing tocome up w i t h l aws that ar e st r ict enough so that cr i m in als w i l l be

locked up and not left to hurt people. But writ ing laws is a difFicult un­dertaking. Changing the judicial structure of a country takes time.

In the case of the Special Tribunals, you shouldn't think we aren' tconcerned about speeding things up. And the way we go about writ ingnew laws (which are already better than they used to be) is more care­ful every day, in terms of the types of legal solutions to the various

100 Sa n d in is tas Speak

orders and cases that come up. Remember that the Special T r i bun al s

deal only with crimes committed before the revolution.Regardless of what they say about us, we are operat ing w i t h in a cer ­

tain legal framework. It is possible to behave in an intelligent mannerand st i l l be t rue to one's pr inciples. It is also possible to be t rue to one' sprinciples and behave stupidly. Our incl ination is always to tell thet r u th . We have demonst r ated that i t is much better to tel l the t r u t h ,because you get in less trouble tel l ing the t ru th than you do ly ing. It i s

almost always smarter to tell the truth.There is a tendency, however, to try to cover up mistakes, and to ex­

aggerate. I remember when we were in pr ison and the Red Cross came

to inter view us. Even though we were honest — some companeros didexaggerate, a few did make up experiences.

I want to tell you something that wil l show how far we are preparedto go in being honest : I ment ioned to some of you that the prisoners atTip i t apa now have it worse than we did when we were prisoners there.

We were bet ter off than they are. We were al lowed weekly visi ts — I 'mtalking about Tipitapa.

Crazy things would happen. I remember one day they wouldn't letme have a book on psychic energy because they thought I would use itto escape. Another t ime they brought me a copy of Capital and said,"This one we' ll let through because it's about capitalism."

We' ve already said that we are lett ing them have any kind of booksexcept for comics and pornography. But we st i l l were bet ter off. Not meperhaps, since I was kept isolated, in a cell by myself, but the vast ma­jor i ty of us were better oft' than the prisoners are now. The main reason

is that now there are so many people in jail. There weren't so many be­fore and obviously it is easier to provide for a small number than a bigcrowd. When we were impr isoned at the place you vi si ted, El Chipote,we were kept with hoods over our heads, in handcuffs, and they beat usevery day. We all wanted to be sent to Tip i t apa, because for us being at

Tipitapa was almost l ike being free. There was such an enormous dif­ference that being t r ansferred to T ip i t apa was almost l i k e being letout on the street .

Now the opposite is true. Those who are in El Chipote don't want togo to T ip i tapa; and those at T ip i t apa wan t t o go back to E l Ch ipote.That is the difference.

They would rather go back to the State Security facil i ty, which ismore comfortable because there aren't so many prisoners. At El Chi­pote they can make thei r ow n meals and get what they want , but notat T ip i t apa. There condi t ions are much worse.

I am tel l ing you this because I imagine a number of prisoners and

On Human Rights in Nicaragua 101

their relatives have told you about abuses they have suffered. They ex­aggerate of course, although in some cases abuses have been commit­ted, which have been inflated by the prisoners.

Someone was asking about the abuses we have committed. I have tosay there isn't a pattern of abuse. One day I went to a jail and a womanprisoner told me she had been undressed and forced to do situps in herunderwear . I asked her to tel l me who did i t . The person she accused

denied it, but she insisted.I must say that the person accused was not a Nicaraguan; I th ink he

was a Colombian . He was one of the remnants of the "Simon Bol ivar

Br igade."* We immediately deported h im ; th is happened i n the f i rstfew months.

It was very dif fi cu l t to arrest people and put them in j a i l. We already

had plenty of pr isoners to wor ry about w i t hout going around arrest i ngour own people. Besides, if we had put everyone who commi t ted abuses

in prison, I think we would have had to jail half a million Nicaraguans.People not only committed abuses. They also stole cars, and looted

abandoned houses. There wasn't a house that wasn't looted. Who didi t? The people did i t, our companeros, the police, members of the arm y .

I ncredible th ings went on i n t h is count r y .I t seemed l i ke the most nat u ral t h ing i n the wor ld to grab every ­

thing you could in these houses and make off with it. It was like com­m unal proper t y .

We lost a lot economically through the looting and destruction ofbuildings. This very building was stripped down to the walls. Every­th ing was taken — ai r condi t ioners, toi lets.

The house of the mi l l i onai re Montealegre, out on the highway to the

*The Simon Bol ivar B r igade was an armed internat ional cont i ngent that en ­

t ered N icaragua in the closing days of the civ i l w ar ; ostensibly to support t h eFSL N . W h i le i t u t i l ized the FSL N's name and banners, the Br igade refused tos ubmi t t o the discip l ine of the FSL N and car r ied out w or k i n con fl ict w i t h t h eFSL N 's effor ts. A pr ovocat ion involv ing a demonst r at ion organized by the Br i ­

gade and the B r igade's refusal to submi t i t s armed u n i t s to the cent ra l com ­

mand of the FSLN led to the expulsion from the country of its non-Nicaraguanmembers in A ugust 1979.

The Simon Bol i var B r igade was organized from Colombia by fol lowers of N a­huel Moreno, leader uf t he Bolshevik F action o f t he Fourth I nternational.Moreno's maneuver was launched w i thout cansul ta t iun w i th t he elected lead­

ership bodies of the International, which condemned the Brigade as a "criminaladventure." The Bolshevik I'action split from the Fourth International in No­vember 1979.

102 Sa n d in is tas Speak

south, was t om apar t. We sent people to try to save the house, a housewhere there was a mil lion-dollars worth of housewares alone. It wasthe house of a guy who spent t hree mi l l ion cordobas on his daughter' swedding. I t was a t reasure.

Such houses should be taken care of. They belong to the people. Thish ouse became state property and we sent some people to guard i t .

I w en t th ere a mont h l ater t o see what there was, and everyt h i ngw as gone. They told me: "Someone came from the M in i st ry of Cu l t u r e

and said you had given them permission to take things out."I don't know i f they r eall y were from the M ini st ry of Cu l t u re. The

most nat ural t h ing in the wor ld was to gather up th ings and take themaw ay . This is cal led loot ing; i t is called theft ; and i t is against the lawin every countr y i n the wor ld .

Total ly by accident, I found a broken pain t ing thrown on the ground .

It was a Picasso. I have since ver i fied that i t was a genu ine Picasso.They didn' t. take the Picasso. This makes me t h ink they weren't real ly

f rom the M i ni st ry of Cu l t ure, they were stup id .Th is happened. The t ru t h is that there was no control over anyt h i ng .

We set up a body cal led Cocoabe, but some of i ts members commi t tedabuses. In those first days people would steal a car, and when it ran outo f gas abandon i t and steal another .

They wrecked a lot of M ercedes-Benzes, luxur y cars. They t ot aled

them, ran them into t h ings. They would get out of a car after crash ingi t in to someth ing, and stop another car coming down the street, mak ethe dr iver get out , and dr ive off in i t . They wou ld see a car parked andtake i t . Besides t hat , they would dr ive at i ncredible speeds. People

were k i l led, there were accidents.Th ere is a psychological explanat ion for al l th is. People fel t for t he

fi rst t ime as if they were the bosses in thei r own count ry. It, was a coun­tr y that had always before been someone else's — i t wasn't ou r coun­

try , i t was almost l i ke a foreign count ry. We were l i ke foreigners here:it was l i ke we were v isi tor s in N icaragua. And besides, we were dis­cr i m inated against by the real ru lers of the count ry , who weren't even

Nicaraguan . Then , al l a t once, ou r people fel t l i k e the countr y be­l onged to them — the streets, the h ighways. They began to k i l l them ­selves dr i v ing around l ike lunat ics. They began to lake the t hings theyhad a lways been denied. These were people who had never had any ­

thing, and they suddenly felt l ike they ruled the world. They did a lotof damage to the count r y 's economy, but t h is si tuat ion could not have

been avoided.There was only one thing we could prevent — the kil l ing of the Na­

On Human Rights in Nicaragua 103

t ional Gu ard . Some wer e k i l l ed , bu t noth in g l i k e th e number t h at

would have been ki lled.I f we had given the sl ightest si gn , not one Guardsmen would have

been left alive. If we had gone along with it in the slightest way, everysingle one would be dead. But we were inflexible and took great painsnot only to prevent them from being ki lled but even to see that theyweren't mistreated. And we succeeded as much as possible.

Th i s was a m ajor h i stor ica l accompl ishment . W e di d i t becauseth at 's the way we were taught . Car los Fonseca taught us. The revolu­

tion teaches respect for other people. And we also did i t th i n k ing aboutLatin America.

I f we had made a revolution here that was bloody and vengeful, withfir ing squads and beatings, we would hurt the chances of revolution­

ary movements in other places. We would make it harder for them tofind allies, we would frighten people in other countries.

Whenever there is revolu t ionar y act i v i t y in L at i n Am er ica, peoplewi l l say — not simply that we wish the revolu t i onar ies wel l — but thatwe are sending t roops, that we are sending arms.

We have promised in al l ser iousness not to send arms or t roops to

help the Salvadorans, and we have kept ou r pr omise. Mr . Carter canrest assured that we are keeping our promise not to send arms to theSalvadorans.

Th ere is not the sl ightest danger that someday i t w i l l be revealed

that we sent arms, because we haven't sent arms. It would be i rrespon­sible, compl etel y i r responsible. Even i f we don't have a t r emendous

amount of affection for Carter, we don't think the Salvadorans needthem.

Just l i ke we couldn't prevent loot ing, and couldn't t h row the people

responsible i n j a i l , i n t h e same way w e couldn't pr even t a cer t ai nnumber of prisoners from being ki lled or mistreated. Who did it? Wedon't know. The people did it ; the people themselves did the looting;the people themselves did the k i l l i ng. People who had suffered ter r ib lyover a long per iod of t ime. There was a vi r t ual explosion in N icaragua,and the only reason i t wasn't worse was because of the good sense, ma­tu r i t y , and respect for hum ani ty that mot ivate the leaders of the revo­

lu t ion .For the same reason that we decided to respect human r i ghts, we al­

so decided to offer you the greatest possible freedom of movement .Even though we had some reservat ions, even though we were not too

sure that the commission would act with the necessary objectivity andunderstanding.

104 San din is tas Speak

You probably also came into the situation with some prejudicesagainst us. But we see that your at t i t ude is posit ive, that you are nottrying to put us on trial but rather to encourage us in our respect forhuman rights.

Just respect ing h uman r i ghts isn't enough for us. We want t o be­

come a shining example for the whole continent in the area of humanr i gh ts, and w e ar e going t o do i t . W hen people t al k abou t h umanrights, when people talk about respect for human rights, we wantthem to say — " l i ke in N icaragua." You can help us w i t h t h i s.

The Role of Religion in the New Nicaragua

The fol lowing statement by the National D irectorate of the FSL N was

publ ished i n the October 7, 19BO, issue of Ba rr i cada. The translat ion isby In te rcont i nenta l P ress.

For some t ime the enemies of our people — dr iven from power onceand for al l — have been car r y ing on an obst inate campaign of distor ­ti ons and l ies about var ious aspects of the revolu t ion, w it h the aim of

confusing the people. This campaign of ideological confusion seeks topromote anti-Sandinista fears and att i tudes among the people, whilea t the same t ime pol i t ical ly wear ing down the FSLN thr ough int er m i ­

nable polemics that never seek honest conclusions, but in fact seekprecisely the opposite.

The question of religion has a special place in these campaigns ofconfusion since a large percentage of the Nicaraguan people have verydeep-rooted rel igious sent iments. In th is regard, the react ionar ies' ef­for ts have been aimed at spreading the idea that the FSL N i s usingrel igion now in order to later suppress it . Clear ly, the purpose of such

propaganda is to manipulate our people's honest faith in order to pro­voke a polit ical reaction against the FSLN and the revolution.

This campaign is particularly vicious because it takes up mattersthat touch very deep feelings of many Nicaraguans. Given the impor­tance of the quest ion, and in order to or ient ou r membersh ip, clar i fythings for our people, and prevent further manipulation of this subject,the N at i onal D i rectorate of the FSL N has decided to issue th is docu­

ment expressing its oAicial position on religion.Chr i st ian pat r i ot s and revolu t ionar ies are an i ntegra l par t of t he

Sandinista people's revolution, and they have been for many years.The participation of Christians — both lay people and clergy — in theFSL N and the Government of N at ional Reconst ruct ion is a logical out ­

growth of thei r outstanding par t i cipat ion at the people's side through­out the st ruggle against the dictatorsh ip .

Through their interpretation of their faith, many FSLN membersand f i ghters were mot iv ated t o j oi n t h e revolu t ionar y st r uggle andtherefore the FSLN. Many gave not only their valiant support to ourcause, but were also examples of dedicat ion, even to the point of shed­

105

106 San dinistas Speak

d ing thei r blood to water the seed of l iberat ion .

How could we forget our beloved martyrs Oscar Phrez Cassar, OscarRobelo, Sergio Guerrero, Arlen Siu, Guadalupe Moreno, and LeonardoMatute, or the dozens of Messengers of the Word* murdered by the So­mozaist N at ional Guard in the mount a ins of our count ry , or so many

other brothers and sisters.We should give special mention to the revolutionary work and hero­

ic sacrifice of Catholic priest and Sandinista member Gaspar GarciaLaviana. He represented the highest synthesis of Christ ian vocationand revolut ionary consciousness.

A l l these were hum bl e men and women w ho knew how to fu l f i l lthei r du t y as pat r i ot s an d revolu t ionar ies w i thou t get t in g bogged

down in long philosophical discussions, They now live eternally in thememory of the people, who w i l l never forget thei r sacr i f ice.

But the participation of Christians was not l imited to serving asf ight er s i n th e Sandinist a Fr ont . M any Ch r i st ians, lay people and

clergy, who never participated in the ranks of the FSLN althoughsome were linked to it, professed and practiced their faith in accordwi t h ou r people's need for l iberat ion. The Cathol ic church and some

evangelical churches even participated as institutions in the people' sv ictory over the Somoza regime of ter r or .

On various occasions the Catholic bishops bravely denounced thecrimes and abuses of the dictatorship. Monsignor Obando y Bravo andMonsignor Salazar y Espinoza, among others, were abused by Somoza­

ist gangs. It wa s a g roup o f p r iests and m onks t hat e xposed t o t hew orld the disappearance of 3,000 peasants in t h e mount ains i n t h en or th of our count r y .

Man y Ch r i st i ans of di f feren t denominat ions car r ied a l iber at ingmessage to the people. Some even gave refuge and food to the Sandi ­

nistas who were mercilessly persecuted by Somozaism.People gathered in the religious houses to hear underground news

bulletins when the Somozaist repression prevented independent radios tat ions from broadcast i ng .

Because of thei r br ave par t i cipat ion i n the st ruggle, the Cathol i cc hurch an d Chr ist ians i n genera l su ff ered persecut ion an d deat h .Many religious figures also were mistreated, were expelled from ourcount r y , faced a thousand obstacles to the exercise of thei r Chr i st ianfaith. Many religious buildings were broken into, pillaged, bombed,

*The "messengers of the word" were lay Christians who proselytized among

peasants in the early 1970s. They often played a role in organizing oppositionto the Somoza dictatorship in the countryside.

The Role of Religion 107

and assaulted i n at tempt s to murder companeros inside, as was th e

case with El Calvario Church in Leon and the chapels in the moun­ta i ns.

To a degree unprecedented in any other revolut ionary movement i nLatin America and perhaps the world, Christians have been an inte­gral part of our revolutionary history. This fact opens up new and in­terest ing possib i l i t ies for the par t i cipat ion of Chr i st ians in revolu t ions

in other places, not only du r ing the st ruggle f' or power, but also later i nt he stage of bu i ld ing the new societ y .

In the new rondit,ions that are posed by the revolu t ionary process,we Ch r ist ian and non-Chr ist ian revolut ionaries must come together

around the task of prov id ing cont i nu i t y to this extremely valuable ex­per ience, extending i t i n t o the fu t ure. We must perfect the forms of

conscious par t icipat ion among al l t he revolu t ionar ies in N icaragua,whatever their philosophical positions and religious beliefs.

FSL N 's positions on religion

1. The FSL N sees freedom to profess a rel igious faith as an inal ien­able right which is fully guaranteed bv the revolutionary government .Th is pr inciple was included i n ou r revolut ionary program long ago,and we w i l l main tai n i t in pract ice in the fu t u re."' Fu rt hermore, in the

new N icaragua no one can be discr im inated against f' or publ icly pro­fessing or spreading thei r rel igious beliefs. Those who profess no rel i ­

g ious faith have the very same r igh t .2. Some au thors have asserted t ha t r el igion i s a mechanism for

spreading false consciousness among people, which serves to just i fythe exploit at ion of one class by another . This asser t ion undoubtedly

has histor ic val id i t y t o the exten t t ha t i n d i fferen t h i stor ical epochsrel igion has served as a theoret ical basis for pol i t ical dom inat i on. Suf ­

fice i t fo recal l the role that the m issionar ies played in the process of'd ominat ion and colonizat ion of the Indians of our count r y .

However, we Sandinistas state that our exper ience shows that whenChr i st ians, basing themselves on thei r fa i t h , are capable of respond­ing to the needs of the people and of hi story , those very bel iet's leadthem to revolut ionary act iv i sm. Our exper ience shows us that on~ can

be a bel iever and a consistent revolutionary at. the same time. s ad thatthere is no insoluble cont radict ion between the two.

3. The FSL N i s the or ganizat ion of N icaraguan revolu t ionar ies,

who have volunt ar i ly come together to t ransform the social, economic,

108 Sa n d in is tas Speak

and pol i t ical si t u at ion i n our countr y i n l ine w i t h a known program

and strategy.Al l those who agree w ith our object ives and proposals, and have the

personal qualities demanded by our organization, have every right topar t i cipate act ively in our ranks, whatever thei r rel ig ious beliefs. Ev i ­dence of this is provided by the fact that there are three Catholicp r iests in the Sandinista Assembly .

Many Christians are members of the FSLN, and there will be Chris­t i ans w i t h i n the Sandini st a Front as long as there are revolu t ionaryChr i st i ans in N icaragua.

4. As a vanguard t hat is conscious of the immense responsibi l i t ies

that have fal len upon i ts shoulders, the FSLN zealously seeks to main ­tain the strength and unity of its organization around the explicit ob­j ect ives for w hich i t was formed. W i th in the fr amewor k of the FSL N ,

there is no place for rel igious proselyt i sm. This would underm ine thes peci fi c character of our vanguard and i n t roduce factors of disun i t y ,

s ince the Sand ini st a Fr on t includes companeros of var ious rel igionsand none.

Outside the framework of the FSLN, Chr i st ian act i vi sts — whethert hey be pr iests, pastors, members of rel igious orders, or lay people ­al l have the r ight to express thei r convi ct ions publ icly. Th is cannot beused to det ract from thei r wor k i n the FSL N or from th e confidence

t hat they have gained as a resul t of thei r r evolu t ionary act iv i t y .5. The FSL N has a profound respect for al l the rel igious celebra­

t i ons and t r adi t ions of ou r people. I t i s st r i v in g t o restore the t r uemeaning of these occasions by at tack ing var ious ev i ls and forms of cor ­

rupt ion that were in t roduced into them in the past .We feel that th is respect must be expressed not only by insur ing con­

d i t ions for t he free expression of these t radi t ions, but also by seeingthat they are not used for pol i t ical or commer cial ends. I f in the fu tu r eany Sandinista act i v ist depar ts from th is pr inciple, we state now thatthis in no way represents the FSLN's position.

Of course, if other pol i t i cal par t ies or indiv iduals try to turn the peo­ple's rel i gious fest ivals or act i v i t ies into pol i t ical acts against the revo­

lu t ion (as has happened in some instances in the past ), the FSLN de­c lares i t also has a r i gh t t o defend the people and the revolut ion i n

these same condi t ions.6. No Sandinist a member shou ld, in any of f icial capaci ty , offer an

opinion on the interpr et at ion of rel igious quest.ions that are solely theconcern of the var ious churches. These questions must be decided by

the Christians among themselves. If a Sandiriista who is also a Chris­t ian i n t ervenes in the polemics of t hat k ind, he does so in a personal

The Role of Reli gi on 109

capaci ty , in h is capacity as a Chr i st ian .7, Some reactionary ideologists have accused the FSLN of trying to

divide the Church. Nothing could be further from the truth or more ill ­i n tent ioned than th is accusat ion. If there are divisions wi t h in the rel i ­

gions, they exist completely independently of the wil l and activity ofthe FSLN.

A study of history shows that around big pol i t ical events members ofthe Catholic church have always taken di ff erent and even cont radic­

tor y posi t ions. M issionar ies came w i t h th e Spanish colonizers, andthey used the cross to consecrate the slave labor that had been in i t i at ­

ed by the sword. But against them arose the f i r m ness of Bar tolome delas Casas, the defender of the Indians.*

In the beginn ing of the last centur y many pr iests fought for the in ­dependence of Cent ra l A mer ica, some w it h weapons in hand. And on

the other ex t r eme there were pr iests who defended the pr i v i leges ofthe crown i n L at in Am er ica w it h equal vehemence.

After liberation from the colonial yoke, we find the anti-interven­ti onist posi t ions of Monsignor Pereira y Castel l6n, who cal led for de­

fense of the nat ion's in terests against the N or th A m er ican invasion .Du r ing the Somoza epoch the f igure of Monsignor Calderon y Padi l l a

stands out, at tack ing the Somozas' vice, cor rupt ion, and abuse of pow­e r against the poor .

And today there is the massive revolu t ionary comm i t ment amongrevolut ionary Ch r i st ians.

Earlier we mentioned the participation of many Christians in thepeople's revolu t ionary st ruggle. But we must also point out that some,

l i ke Le6n Pal l ais and others, rem ained at Somoza's side to the end.We should not forget t ha t i n t hat per iod ther e were pr iests who

proudly paraded thei r m i l i t ary ranks and off icial posi t ions — of courseno one demanded that they give up their posts. But we should also notforget that in cont rast to these sad examples we have the immense fig­ur e of Gaspar Garci a L . and so many ot her Sandin i st a m ar t yr s ofC hr i st ian or ig i n .

Th is si tuat ion cont i nues in the present stage. An imm ense maj or i t yof the Christ ians actively support and participate in the revolution.But th ere is also a minor i t y that main tai n pol i t ical posi t ions opposed

to the revolu t i on .Nat u r al l y w e Sandinistas ar e good f r iends of t h e revolu t ionary

*Bartolome de las Casas (1474-1566h a Spanish Dominican, was known as the" protector of the Indi ans" for h is defense of the r ights of the Indians against th e

Spanish settlers.

110 Sondi nistas Speak

Chr i st i ans bu t not of th e counter revolu t ionar ies, even though theycall themselves Christians.

The FSL N , however , main ta ins communicat ions on al l levels w i t hdifferent Churches, with the ranks and the hierarchy, without regardto their political positions.

We do not foster or provoke activi ties to divide the Churches, Thatq uest ion i s the exclusive concern of t he Chr i st i ans and does not i n ­

volve pol i t i cal organizat ions. I f d iv isions do exist , the Ch urches mustlook for the causes wi t h i n th emselves and not at t r i bute them to sup­

posed mal icious outside in fl uences. Speak ing f rank ly , we wou ld lookkindly upon a Church that took part , in an unprej udiced, mat ure, andr esponsible manner , in the common effor t t o cont inual ly expand th edialogue and par t icipat ion that our revolu t ionary process has opened.

8. Another matter that has recently been the subject of discussion isthe par t icipat ion of pr iests and members of rel igious orders in the Gov­ernment of Nat ional Reconst ruct ion. In regard to th is, we declare thatevery N icaraguan ci t izen has a r ight to par t i cipate in car ry ing out po­l i t ical affai r s in our count ry , whatever t hei r ci v i l st ate, and the Gov­

e rnm en t of N at ional Reconst ruct ion gu ar antees th i s r i ght , wh ich i sbacked up by the law.

The pr iest companeros who have t aken posts in the government , inresponse to the FSL N 's cal l and their obl igat ions as cit izens, have thus

far carried out extraordinary work. Facing great and difficul t prob­lems, our count r y needs the par t icipat ion of al l pat r i ots to move for ­ward . I t especial ly needs those who had the chance to receive highereducat ion, w hich was denied to the maj or i t y of our people.

Therefore, the FSL N w i l l cont inue to ask al l t hose lay and cler ical

citizens whose experience or qual ifications might be needed for ourprocess to par t i cipate.

If any of the religious companeros decide to give up their govern­mental responsibi l i t ies for thei r own special reasons, that too is thei rr i gh t . Exercising the r ight to par t icipate in and fu l f i l l one's pat r iot i c

obligation is a matter of personal conscience.9. The revolut ion and the st ate have or ig ins, goals, and spheres of

act ion that are di ff eren t t han those of rel igi on. For the revolut ionar ystate, r el i gion i s a personal m at t er . I t is the concern of i nd iv iduals,churches, and special associations organized around religous aims.

Like every modern state, the revolutionary state is secular and can­not adopt any religion because it is the representative of all the people,believers as wel l as nonbel ievers.

By issuing this official communique, the National Directorate of theSandinista National Liberation Front hopes not only to clarify the

The Role of Religion 111

question under discussion, but also and especially to remind the revo­lutionary mil itants of the FSLN and the Churches of their duties andresponsibi l i t ies in the const ruct ion of our count r y, which has been held

down by 159 years of pillage, repression, and dependence.Bu i ld ing N icaragua's fu t ure is a histor ic chal lenge that t r anscends

our borders and inspires other peoples in their struggle for liberationand to create the new man, and it is a right and a duty of all Nicara­guans, regardless of thei r rel igious bel iefs.

Sandino Yesterday, Sandino Today, Sandino Always!F ree Homeland or Death !

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Nicaragua's Economy and theFight Against Imper ialism

by Jaime Wheelock

FSL N leader J ai me Wheelock is Nicarag ua's mini ster of agri cu l tural

development. Thi s speech was given to the Fi rst I nternational Confer ­ence i n Sol i da ri ty wi th N icarag ua, held i n M anagua J anuary 26-31,1981. It ua s published in the February 1, 1981, issue of Barr i cada, the

FSL N dai ly . The transla ti on i s by In te rcont inental P ress.

Companeros of the presiding committee of this extraordinary gath­ering in solidarity with our people and our struggle;

Companeros Julio Lopez and Raul Guerra;Brothers and sisters from all those countries and peoples that for a

long time have been supporting the formidable efforts of the Nicara­guan people to conquer thei r freedom, nat ional independence, and so­cial progress:

Today we would l ike to give you some general information on theachievements and the prospects of the Sandinista economy. We do soa t a t ime when the react ionary forces of imper i a l i sm , along w i t h t h e

Somozaists and the reactionaries here at home, are bent on setting upobstacles to the Sandinista people's revolut i on .

That is why we think your presence here has a deep revolutionarysign i f icance — both of intern at ional ism and of sol idar i t y — because itamounts to a show of support f rom the whole wor ld, from democrat i cpeoples, from progressive and humanistic consciences, from those whohave faith in the people's future. At the same time, it is an incentivefor us Nicaraguans and revolutionaries to know that in the battlesthat await us in defense of our national sovereignty and independence,w e can count, on the tremendous strengt h of in ternat ional sol idar i t y .

We wil l not mention figures because we wil l be distribut ing docu­ments and stat i st ics that show the successes and obstacles of the N ica­

raguan revolution in its economic and social development. We knowthat as you carry out your tasks of sol idar i t y and suppor t to the N ica­raguan cause you need to understand as we do the basic condi t ions, thefavorable and unfavorable aspects of our economic and social develop­

113

114 Sa nd in is tas Speak

ment, and our current achievements and problems.In looking at the basic conditions of the Sandinista economy, we

must first take up the objective situation we found ourselves in whenthe revolution tr iumphed. First, a sparsely populated country with ali t t le more than 2 mil lion inhabitants concentrated in the area alongthe Pacific Coast. Fifty percent of the population lives in the country­side, and 50 percent in urban areas. With the exception of Managuaand five or six cities with 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants, the latter arepractically all small peasant vi llages. So, much of the 50 percent of thepopulation called urban is actually a rural population as well .

There are some 800,000 workers incorporated into the economic ac­tivity of the country; of these, more than 60 percent were il l iterate. Sothe labor force was a poorly skilled one, mainly engaged in handicraftsand peddling in the towns. In the countryside, tenant farmers cult i ­vate basic grains on tiny plots, while the bulk of the agricultural laborforce works picki ng cotton and coffee and cut t i ng sugarcane.

We have had an economy in which development has been slight ,where alongside a relat ively smal l industrial sector we find a verybroad range of handicrafts. In the countryside, export-oriented lat i­fundia are complemented by a very extensive sector of small peasantproduction.

The main features of the Nicaraguan economy are economic back­wardness, dependence on imperialism, and a predominantly capitalistsocioeconomic st ructure, in which we nonetheless find many who sub­sist on precapitalist forms of production, both in the urban handicraftsand peasant sectors .

We have a highly developed infrastructure in the Pacific zone, whilein the central and Atlantic zones the conditions for production, trans­portation, and communications are almost totally lacking. The Atlan­tic Coast has more than 60,000 square kilometers but only 200,000 in­habitants. That is, an area three times as large as El Salvador butwith a population thirty t imes smaller .

So the objective economic conditions the Nicaraguan revolution wasfaced with were a backward structure, cultural oppression of theworkers (the majority of the population), underdevelopment, and eco­nomic dependence.

As is well known, Nicaragua is a country that produces enough foodfor its own people and has a quite efficient peasant economy. But i tmust also be taken into account that the economic power of capitalismwas mainly brought to bear on agricultural exports, with the aim ofmeeting the requirements of the international capitalist market. Thisforced a weak and stagnant natural economy to serve as the basis of

Ni car agua's Economy and I mperi a l ism 115

imported technology so as to meet the needs of a dynamic agriculturalexport sector .

We are dependent not only because of what we export to the interna­t ional capitalist market but also because of what we must impor t —machinery, materials, technology, and capital — in order to produce.

Owing to the rapid development of certain sectors of our economy,such as agriculture, without a corresponding development of industry ,we are forced to buy al l our machinery and technology abroad. Thisprevented our traditional handicrafts from being transformed into an at ional indust r y .

Th e w ar r i or s of t he past centur y w er e unable to bu i l d the cot ton

g ins, coffee processing plants, or sugar m i l ls that l ater would prol i fer ­ate in the country. Those artisans who manufactured twine, domesticgoods, bowls, or carts were unable to become manufacturers of oftenhighly sophisticated pesticides and fert i lizers overnight .

Therefore, when the Sandinista revolution tr iumphed on July 19,o ur underdevelopmen t an d dependence wer e of wha t w e t er m t h e"qual i t at ive" type, meaning the enormous di ff i cu l ty of achiev ing inde­

pendence in culture, technology, and industry, in order to become in­dependent in agriculture.

This may sound somewhat dramatic but it is a reality which existsnot only in Nicaragua but also in many countries of the so-called ThirdWorld.

Therefore, making a revolution i n disadvantageous conditionsmeant in itself drawing up a long-term strategic program aimed atst r i k ing at aspects of N icaragua's economic and social problems that

could be described as crucial — a program to strike at backwardness,to strike at underdevelopment, to strike at economic dependence.

Thus, our revolution put forth a program that might be called theprogram of a poor country, of a small, backward country which has towork for its national independence, which has to work for its economicindependence, which has to work for the cultural betterment of i t sil l iterate work force, which has to develop vast areas in the countrywhere our backwardness is total, which has to redress the demograph­ic and economic imbalances existing in our terr itory, where the con­t r adict ions of neocolonial i sm, capi ta l i sm, and imper i a l i sm's ol igarch icenterprises have coincided to create chaos and economic anarchy. Thatis what we found on July 19.

We are aware that the more backward a country is, the more diffi­cult it is to achieve social progress. Precisely for that reason, we havenot worked in a spectacular manner. We know that this is a very diff i ­cult task , because the country needs substantial investments for

l l 6 S a n d i n istas Speak

development . Much t ime is needed to master technology, much t ime isneeded to lay the foundations of a sound, independent economy.

That is the strategic aim we are working toward with spirit and wil l .But that is the long-term challenge. On July 19 our immediate taskwas to provide the basic necessities of our people.

Economic doctrines and romantic ideas are no good if the people arehungry. And on July 19, in addition to terrible material destruction,we found a quite onerous foreign debt. At the same time, there werethe aftereffects of a capital drain of more than $800 million.

Th ere was, of course, the basic economic and social condi t ions wefound: backwardness, underdevelopment, poverty. We found a countrythat was total l y bank r upt , w i t h no foreign cur rency, no foreign sav­

ings; with a debt of $1.6 bil lion, and destruction amounting to morethan $800 mil lion, which affected more than 35 percent of the indus­tr ial production and more than 25 percent of agriculture.

The war coincided with the harvest of basic crops and, some time lat­er , the cotton harvest . So in 1979 and par t of 1980, those basic crops

were lacking. The basic diet of Nicaraguans consists of corn, rice, andbeans, and i t so happened that in that year there were no beans, rice,

o r corn .And, worst of a l l . we would not be able to expor t cot t on, the pr ime

crop for N icaragua's surv ival . Of the 320,000 manzanas* t r adi t ional l y

sown, it was only possible to sow 50,000.We had to devote a large amount of resources to the rehabi l i t a t ion of

the infrastructure. You know that Somoza's regime vented its rage onthe factor ies, on st r ategic indust r ies and product ion un i t s.

Much was destroyed in the countryside also, where agricultural ma­chiner y was p i l l aged. Tobacco was v i r t ual l y looted, and they tookaway more than $3 m i l l ion wort h of machinery. Dest ruct ion was gen­e ral .

Our foremost job at the t ime was the rehabi l i t at ion of the inf rast ruc­ture, and to this end we had to spend large sums of foreign currency.Our debts increased because we had to buy spare parts and equipmenti n order to ret urn to relat ive norm alcy .

In N i caragua, norm alcy has depended to a great extent on foreigncredit . If there is t ransportat ion, i t is because we have used credi t l inesabroad. If the factories are running, it is because we have brought in aconsiderable number of spare par ts, which has meant great expendi ­tures in foreign currency or external loans. If we have worked success­

*1 manzana = 1.726 acres

Ni carag ua's Economy and I mper ia l i sm 117

fu l l y i n economic react ivat i on, i t has been at the expense of grow ing

foreign indebtedness.The f irst six months of the revolu t ion were dedicated to admi ni st r a­

tive organization, to extirpating the whole corrupt cancer of Somoza­ism. Th is meant incorpor at ing into state and economic management a

politically , administrat ively, and technically inexperienced intel l i ­gentsia. I t meant organ izing the r evolu t ion's r anks, creat ing l arge

mass organizat ions and an army t r u ly capable of facing any at tack bySomozaism and react ionary forces abroad.

So the 1980 program was called the Plan for Economic Reactivation.Th is program cal led for using the count ry 's product ive forces to the ut ­

most wh ile mak ing substant ia l i nvestments in mat er ial , human, andf inancial resources. The lat ter made i t possible to put the product ive

machinery back i nto mot ion, under the di f f icult condi t ions our count ryf ound itsel f i n .

We have been ta lk ing about object ive socioeconomic condi t ions; that

is, the legacy of the past , the legacy of backw ardness, underdevelop­

ment , and pover ty . That is the most di ff icul t t h ing we face. We havebeen talking about the legacy of destruction caused by the war, the col­lapse that occurred with the revolut ion and its aftermath, and the costto our country al l t h is sign i f ied .

But there is a th i rd aspect we want to emphasize so that the logic ofthe Sandini sta economy can be fu l ly understood. This aspect is the po­

l i t ical one — the quest ion of nat ional un i t y .We seek to emerge from poverty and underdevelopment, to counter

dependency , and t o r ehabi l i t at e and react ivate ou r economy w h i lemai nt ai n ing nat ional un i ty. I t is a very di f f icul t and complex task, one

that m ight even seem to cal l for w izards or magicians. Somet imes thecontradict ions involved are so deep and i r reconci lable that i t is di f f i ­

c ul t for us to harmonize them .How can we del iver our people from pover ty, whi le at, the same t im e

react ivat ing our economy and ut i l i zing al l our product ive forces? Andhow can we do this while large sectors of our economy are still subjectto forms of exploi tat ion that are character ist ic of capi t a l ism in under ­developed count r ies'?

In fact — and th i» is perhaps one of the deepest concerns of our revo­lu t ion — the economic considerat ions of the N icaraguan revolut ion

are not as impor tant to u» as its pol i t ical aspects.In a way, the N icaraguan revolut ion is not just a N icaraguan ono. It

is a revolution made by a people who share the problem» of many otherpeoples l ike our own — peoples who st i l l l ive under the iron ru le of m i l ­

118 Sa n d in is tas Speak

it ar y di ctatorsh ips, which as we al l k now are the typical and classicforms used by the imperialists to dominate our peoples.

The imperialists install such mil itary dictatorships where they can­n ot i n ter vene d irect ly or where there are no local ol igarchic or bou r ­geois classes w ith enough economic power and pol i t ical ta lent to guar ­

antee the subjugat ion «f the people. So they t u r n those classes in tothe~r i ntermediari es , into representatives of their interests in suchcount r ies.

Th is i» v hii t they d« v' hen they cannot i nt «rvene directly — ei t herbecause the people st ruggle as our people did in Sandino's t ime, or b«­

< iiii»« i >i t«mari «n ;i l d ipli>m;i t ic c«nsid«r;i t ion» pr«vi nt t hem f'rom do­ing so. <I t hi i i k i t would be dif f i cu lt for the imper ia l i sts to intervene i n

;i direct , m i l i t ary way in C<>lomhia or Venezuela, for exampl«. >H«rc in N icaragua nei ther the Liberals nor the Conservat ives could

guarantee imper ia l ist dom !nat i«n . So when i t became impossible t ocheck th<. v igor.ous advance <>f Sandino they had to intervene — fi rstdi rect ly and then by means of a mi l i t ary dictatorship that, placed it selfabove al l the classes and par t ies and represented imper ia li»t i nt erests

excl usi v«ly .Imper ia l i sm's m i l i t ar y di ct at orship — w hich also protected a ser ­

vi le, subsidiary , and i r r«levant. loc;i l f«rrn of' exploi t at ion — was de­s t roved by t h«S<ind in ista r«volu t ion. The typical and classic form the

imperial i st s have introduced in Cuatemafa, Kf Salvador, Chile, and«th«r L . it>n Amer i can count r ies suffered an im por tant defeat, here inNict>l'iigu<i .

Th is is why nat ional un ity is of'such great impor tance to thc N icara­

gtlall i'«voluti on .Some months ago. a L' .S. State Depar tment oAicial said that the pi l ­

lars of'what hc ci i l l«d th« " t r ad i t iona l regim«s" were being l orn downin C«n ! ra l A m«>ic,>. Those pi l l ar s were i n cr isis, he said , expl ici t l y

poin t ing to the reiict i«niir.v Church h ierarchy , the ol igarchy , rind thef 'a»cist, arniy T h«. « w«r« the th> <.e pi l lars on which the so-called t radi ­

t loi ia l dom inat ion rested.A ccording t« t h is «fi i c ial . rh ;i t i s w h it. had ma in t t ined t h « un i t y ,

t i b i l i t i . .i >id c«h< si<>n <>I'so«i< ty . Ht>t w h a t, i» now i r i v o lv ed i s t h a t on ce

th is pat ter n wa» hri>ken in N icar iigua, a new type of nat i«nal un i ty ap­p<.;ired. H«r< th«r« i» , l ;ih i l i t y , p<;ice. ;ind product.ion .

9'e are n.->t. going t« siiy that. w« are l iv ing in paradise, because there

ar« c«nt r;>dict ion. an d ,i n i r i t«ns« ideological st r uggf«. The react i<>n­

ar ie» keenly d< sire to wi n over t h « m iddle st rata of the populat ion .They are mak ing a stubborn effor t to t ake advantage of the backward­

Nicaragua's Economy and Imperialism 119

ness of the peasantry and the humble people to turn them against ther evolu t i on .

But one thing is certain: here, neither the reactionary hierarchy, theoligarchy, nor the mil itary dictatorship can guarantee national unitya ny longer . There is un i ty , but under revolu t ionary r u le. I t is a un i t y

rooted in the mass organizations, the organizations of the workers,p easants, students, and democrat ic wom en .

In other words, a people's un i t y w i t h people*s armed power , and a

government program al low ing for and st im ul at ing the par t i cipat ion ofall strata in the national reconstruction of Nicaragua. And all thosefactors are uni ted under the f i rm gu idance of our vanguard, the Sandi ­n i sta N at ional L iberat ion Fron t .

Five years ago that was a dream, an i l lusion. But now th is State De­

par t ment ofl i cial real izes that wh i le the old t radi t ional pat t erns havebeen replaced by revolutionary patterns, peace, stabil i ty , and thesmooth funct ion ing of the economy are mainta ined. This is a victory ofthe revolu t ion, th is is a victory of al l the revolu t ionar ies in the wor ld .

An d that i s even mor e impor tan t t han the speci fical l y economic as­pects.

Our main concern, therefore, is to fully use the nation's productiveforces. And we th ink that under a revolu t ionary power i t is also possi ­ble to induce the forces of the middle class and even the bourgeois sec­

t or t o j oi n us, i n t h e same way an agr icu l t ura l w orker offer s h i s

energy, his sweat, his blood in the task of building the new homeland,which is what the peasants and workers are doing .

In order to st rengthen the count ry 's un it y we can benefi t f rom t heb ourgeoisie's exper ience in agr icu l t ure, from thei r m anagement sk i l l s

in industry. The contradictions arising from their participation arel ess signi f i cant than the solu t ions they prov ide for car r y ing on t hes truggle against the commmon enemy .

The contradict ions inherent to social classes are less impor tant thanour m at er ia l achievements i n reconst ruct ing the foundat ions of na­

tional economy, i n the struggle for development , in the struggleagainst backwardness, and indeed in the struggle against economicd ependence, because the ra t ionale of the economy is cent ra l ized in aplan, in an economic program that assigns a role to each social force.

We are not refer r ing t o t hat old , backwar d economy where a b i gmanufacturer could do as he pleased. In the first place, a big manufac­turer has to cont r ibute to the f inancial system and has to pay a f ixed

interest rate reimbursing the money that was lent to him by the state,by the people.

120 Sa n din is tas Speak

Secondly , when he produces, he has to pay product ion taxes, expor t

duties, capital gains taxes, and real estate taxes, as wel l as incometaxes, because our economy operates on this basis. And of course, thereis our political capacity, the capacity to regulate what some call the re­p roduct ion of capi t a l .

We nationalized foreign trade and the banks. This means that thestate receives al l the foreign cur rency. No big cotton producer here canobtain dollars, only cordobas. With those cordobas he has to pay banki n terest , product ion taxes, expor t du t ies, capi ta l l ev ies, and incom etaxes.

Somewhere, usual l y i n a bank , he w i l l keep a r ather sign i f icantamount. And that money is also avai lable to be used by our economy as

a whole.Th us, we are also able to use these resources, these indiv iduals, as

workers in national reconstruction. Their contribution is significant .There has been no need to expropr iate the means of product ion. I n

real i t y , what we are expropr iat ing are the surp luses.W e should seriously consider whether i t i s convenient or not for a

poor, dependent, and backward count ry lack ing a sk i l led work force touse these resources and exploi t t he land by i n t roducing st ate and na­ti onal cont rol over the surp lus rather than over the means of produc­tion themselves.

Of course, this is a very special circumstance in Nicaragua. It proba­bly does not apply to other countries. But we do have control over prop­erty, profit, and surpluses.

The middle and upper st r ata feel that we respect thei r proper ty, and

that they can l i ve somewhat af fl uent ly . They feel somewhat at ease,because we al low them the possibi l i t y of ow n ing some of the means ofproduct ion .

We bel ieve that rather than being a problem for the revolu t i on, t h i sis v i ta l for the revolu t i on. U n i t y to confront imper ia l ism is v i t a l. Thatis why our economic program has included such elements of un it y bot h

in the 1980 plan and in the 1981 plan as well .What have we achieved in recent months? At the beginn ing we had

set ourselves a real ly h igh growth r a te. We were going to grow by 2 3p ercent . Of course, this f igure has to be seen in terms of the very di ff i ­cul t year the N icaraguan economy had suffered. I n 1979, N icaragua'sgross nat ional product equal led that of 1962.

We had gone back seventeen years, so from a cer tain poin t of v iewth is 23 percent growt h was not so diff i cu lt to achieve when resor t ing to

all our forces and using all our financial resources.It was dif fi cult in the organizational condi t i ons, because of the mate­

Ni carag ua's Economy and I mperi a l ism 1 21

r ia l damage we had suffered and also because of the shock and turm oi lour people suffered, the geographical di st r i bu t ion of th e populat ion ,

and other social factors.But we can say that we have pract ical ly at t a ined that f igure, and in

some aspects we have surpassed it, especially in agriculture. The em­ployment goal of 95,000 workers was 92 percent fulf i lled; in 1980 wewere able t o create 82,000 new j obs. W e succeeded i n t he economic

react ivat ion of our main l ines of product ion .As for coffee, the harvest wi l l surpass by 7 percent the figure

planned for 1980. The lowest f igure for cot ton product ion in the 1980program was surpassed, the h ighest being 170,000 manzanas planted,

t he lowest , 120,000 manzanas. We planted 140,000 manzanas, but i nterms of yield we w i l l pract ical ly equal the fi gure that could have beenexpected from the 170,000 manzana goal .

We planted more than 45 percent over the f igure planned for r i ceand 20 percent more in tobacco. As for sugarcane, we surpassed theplan's goal by 25 percent.

We can say that we recorded the most impor tant and biggest gr ai nharvest in our country's history. We had rain, transportation and com­mun icat ions pr oblem s t ha t considerabl y r educed th e h arvest , an d

s torage problems that considerably cu t product ion .Never theless, i n agr icu l t ura l pr oduct ion , bot h for domest i c con­

sumpt ion and expor ts, we can say that our people made a great effor t

to react ivate the economy. The agr icu l t u ral workers, the students whoharvested cot ton and coffee, the whole people, al l t he sectors of ou rpeople in a j oin t effor t were able to achieve the goals set for nat ional

reconst ruct ion in order to give N icaragua and the N icaraguan revolu­tion our f i rst m ajor economic success.

Indust r ia l react ivat ion faced problems, not so much because of lackof resources, energy, vital i ty, abil i ty, and administrat ive capacity, butm ainly because the Cent ra l Amer ican Common M arket underwent acr isis. V i r t ua l ly al l ou r indust r ia l product ion for expor ts, that is, ourmost impor t an t domest ic product ion, is or iented toward the CommonMark et . E l Salvador had market problems, as did Costa Rica, Hondu­

ras, and Guatem ala. And we have not been able to market some of ourp roducts yet .

We think that when the situation in El Salvador is resolved in favorof the revolutionaries we wil l occupy a more favorable position eco­nomical ly because El Salvador is one of our m ajor markets.

We want to underscore one interest ing aspect — economic react iva­tion got a l i t t le out of control i n the sphere of services.

I t was natura l t hat because of the physical dest ruct ion i n agr i cu l ­

122 San d in is tas Speak

tur e and indust ry , i t was going to be di ff i cu l t t o reconst ruct . So the

work force, especially small farmers and workers, were reoriented to­w ard the commercial sector . Trade grew excessively , by 140 percent .This is a distortion, a trend toward creating too large a tertiary sectorthat wil l have negative effects if we do not check it .

But in gener al , we can say that the 1980 program was a success. We

do not face the same si tuat ion we had at the beginn ing, that of 1962.We ar e al ready at t h e level of 1978. That i s real l y a r emarkabl e

achievement, which gives us hope and encouragement for the comingyear.

Generally speaking, 1981 will l ikewise be a year of reactivation. Wew i l l pu t st ress on sav ings and economic eff i ciency. But economic eff i ­ciency in what sense?

You can see clear l y t hat t h ere ar e new adm ini st r at or s an d newwork ers who lack experience. Where there is destruct ion — let us say ,in a factory — if you grant the administ rator 1 m i l l ion cordobas to pro­duce 100 un i ts, real i t y w i l l pr ove under present physical, adm inist r a­

tive, and organizational conditions that 1 mi l lion cordobas in thatproduct ion center w i l l probably produce only seventy un i ts. That is theproblem we have faced throughout agriculture and industry, althoughit seems to have hit us harder in agriculture.

We have dumped lots of money — again and again — into smallproduction units that never before had had access to it. They were notable to manage thei r resources eff icient ly , so instead of producing for ­

ty un i ts, they produced twen ty . That is why we are now facing f inan­c ial problems, and perhaps some in fl at ion , since there are large sumsof money w i t h no counterpar t i n products.

The 1981 program is aimed at solving this problem by using diff'er­ent var i ables — assign ing credits more rat ional ly , gran t ing credits tothose who can produce efficiently.

Somewhat roman t i cal ly, at one point we were even t ravel ing in hel i ­copters and gi v in g ou t cr ed i ts to peasants who l ived i n ver y remot e

areas. The credits vir tually fel l into their hands from the helicopter .But who was going to gather that production? By which roads, bywhich means of t r ansporat ion?

The fact is that the produce, if there was any, remained there be­cause that money was spent on salt , shoes, and clothing and not onp roduct ion .

Such romantic errors are made in every revolution. They are justthe counter product ive side of the generosity of revolu t ion ists.

In agriculture the problem was more or less the same. Imagine allSomoza's agricultural enterprises and production centers — some

>>Iicaragua's Economy and I mper ia l i sm 123

2,000 of t h em . When we took of fice at th e N icaraguan In st i t ut e ofAgrarian Reform we did not even know where they all were. We sentnine or ten companeros out to locate them. Al l we knew was that therewere ten in one place, twenty in another ; we did not know what they

produced.In early 1980 we were stil l counting cattle. There were no records;

product ion indices were unknow n, but people had to be fed. We had toproduce m i l k and coffee, we had to raise cat t le. Then the N at ional

Hank connected a pipel ine to siphon money to the N icaraguan Inst i ­

tute of Agr ar ian Reform . Otherw ise i t wi>uld have been impossihl».O ne compan»ro w e sent t o M atagalpa reported 149 estates w i t h

10,000 worke rs — w» had to pay wages and back wages, and the landhad to b» t i l led . A t t hat, t ime w» had no ;iccountants: we had to buyth i ngs and wr i te invoices on scrap paper .

In those early days ineff iciency was unavoidable. The 1981 programt r ies to solve th is problem as wel l .

We must t ry to make the system eff icient by implement ing invent.>­

ries and account ing systems, control l ing costs, programm ing f inanc­ing and product ion, mak ing inventor ies from the smal lest. item to the

biggest indust r ia l enterpr ise, keeping a record of al l the costs, reduc­ing unnecessary »xpens»s, curt a i l ing waste, and f ight ing against un­p roduct ive employment .

Eff i ci»ncy is one of the pr incipals of the 1981 program. It means thatif we invest 100 cordobas. we must get 100 un i ts; and not only 100, but,

even 120. Efficiency must be the guarantee of a healthy economy ando f auster i t y in t h is count r y .

You know that i n many economic aspects N icaragua depends on re­sources from abroad. In order to produce cotton, we have to import fer ­t i l izers. pest icides, agr icu l t u ra l a i rp lanes. plows, and cc>tton harvest ­

e rs. In fact , we possess only the work force and the land for cu l t i vat ingcotton in N icaragua, but the rest — that is, the technoh>gy — must heimport ed .

Wi t h i n the fr amewor k of such aust er i t y , we have tc> plan our sav­i ngs. We must conserve fer t i l izer and pest icides and plant pest -resist ­

ant var iet ies,You also know that we depend completely on oi l im por ts. Last y»ar

we spent some $200 mi l l i on on oil , wh i le our exports accounted for lessthan $500 m i l l ion. This year we w i l l have to spend $280 m i l l ion dol ­

lars on pet roleum alone.Should t h is si tuat ion cont inue, by 1985 our exports w i l l go only to

buy oil. This situation is rea11y unbearable, not only for Nicaragua butfor al l the poor economies that lack th is resource.

124 Sa nd tni stas Speak

We know that the oil-producing countries have a legitimate right tomake those who have always exploited them pay. But the countries ofthe Th i r d W or ld account for scarcely 3 t o 8 percent of wor ld oi l con­sumption, while current oil prices represent for Third World countriesthe cost of survival itself .

We could even say that oi l prices are one of the most destabilizingfactors, one of the most threatening and destructive factors for oureconomies.

The world has to do something about it . We have to do somethingabout i t . I f a decision should be made to make the developed count r ies

pay the oi l b i l l s of the underdeveloped count r ies, that would be com­pletely just .

Oil prices for the developed countries should be increased accordingto consumption in the Third World. Third World countries should re­ceive their oi l free of charge or even be subsidized by the developedcount r ies.

What we are suggest ing is not out of the reach of those nat ions for avery simple reason. Some Th i rd Wor ld count r ies l ike Brazi l consume a

large percentage of that oi l , so excluding Brazi l and other r elat i velylarge count r ies, we, the smal ler count r ies, account for only 2 or 3 per ­

cent of wo rld o il consumpt ion.So, if we charge to and demand from the developed countries this 3

percent, we could quite easily solve the problem of our economy. Wethink that this struggle — our struggle, the struggle of all the under­developed nations, and your own struggle as well — must be waged,b ecause we have to make people aware of t h is problem .

This problem alone could destabilize us economically. The time wil lcome when we will have to say "Energy or death!" at the same time wesay "Free homeland or death !"

This is a problem we are facing now because we also have to pay ourforeign debt. If we pay for oil and for our foreign debt, we wil l be pro­ducing only in order to import. This is a vicious circle.

We could say that this is the most acute and burning aspect of eco­nomic dependence. A count ry that expor ts at increasingly lower pr icesand imports at increasingly higher prices will always be indebted, in­creasingly indebted.

What has been the response of the international capitalist economy?To lend at high interest rates. They buy at low prices, they sell at highprices, and they lend us the deficit. So we face mounting indebtedness,a spi ral that w i l l f i nal ly force us to declare: "From now on we w i l l notpay a single cent."

We only owe $1.6 billion. Some countries owe as much as f 65 billion,

¹caragaa's Economy and imperialism 125

and there are others that owe $20 bi l l ion, or ten, or t hree, or four. Thetime wil l come when an economy like Nicaragua's wil l be suffocatedand there w i l l be a collapse. A t some poin t there w i l l be a col lapse.

We must all be aware of that. This applies both to the cornpaneroswho are in a posi t ion to launch campaigns to fam i l i ar ize publ ic opinion

with the situation, and to those representatives of friendly countrieswhere perhaps there are st i l l great shor tcomings in terms of fu l ly un ­derstanding the complex problems our revolu t ion faces.

There are t remendous economic resources that could be mobi l izedfor the strengthen ing of a revolu t ionary process l ike ours, if everyone

were conv inced that t h is revolut ion has a bear ing, not only locally orregional ly , but on the whole wor ld .

Thi s i s an ongoing revolu t ion i n a Th i r d W or ld countr y that has

been able to over throw imper i a l ist power , that i s bu i ld ing nat ionalun i t y w i t h a democrat ic and plur a l i st ic or ientat ion , tha t is wor k i ng

m iracles i n t h e m idst of a ser ies of cont r adict ions, that i s t r y ing t omake a contribution to our peoples so as to open to them the road to lib­erat ion . A l l t h i s can m ak e the vaci l l at ors i n many places pu t conf i ­dence in the revolu t ionar ies who are able to lead their nat ions towards

real independence, social progress, and stabil i ty .And each and every brother or sister in each and every count ry must

work t irelessly so that solidarity and material support, economic andfi nancial cooperat i on , might cont r ibute to break ing t hrough the eco­nomic and f inancial bar r i ers that i nt ernat ional react ion is set t ing up .

A few days ago they warned us that should the Nicaraguan govern­ment persist in al leged m i l i t ary aid to the revolut ionary movement ofEl Salvador, the $75 mil lion loan from the U.S. government would beimmediately suspended, and that its payment would be immediatelydemanded.

They have now paused to review the granting of the remaining $15mi l lion. We are morally and politically ready to resist these aggres­sions.

In any case, we w i l l set a fresh example, an example for everyone.Perhaps it wil l be an example differing from Chile's simply because ofd isprov ing the not ion that t h er e cannot be a second revolut ion i nAm er ica or that the revolut ion can be reversed. We th ink t hat when arevolu t ion is a real one, i t is i r reversible.

So our example might well be that wherever imperialism seeks toreverse a revolution in Latin America, it wi l l find a people ready tofigh t to the last drop of blood for thei r i ndependence.

We consider these aspects to be real ly impor tant . We know that ouressent ial responsib i l i t y is to wor k for the bu i l d ing of the N icaraguan

126 San d in is tas Speak

economy, but it is stil l more essential to defend ourselves, to mobilizeour people, to prepare an army capable of dealing blows to any otherar my . I t i s mor e essent ia l t o see t hat ou r m ass organizat ions area rmed to the teeth .

I t m i ght seem to be a cont radi ct ion that the defense of our economy ,of economic independence, of the actual const ruct ion of a progressive

economy seek ing social just ice should be based not only on an econom­ic program, but also on the armed st ruggle against foreign aggressors.

Our ecoiiomy m ight drop to 1940 levels. The circulat ion of vehiclesm ight cease in t h is count ry . We migh t have immense dif f i cu l t ies w i t h

suppl ies. Bu t we would be secur ing the fu tu re, wh i le reaff i r m ing theri gh t of our countr y to act according to i t s i nt erests.

T hat i s why f i gu res are not as impor tan t as the way i n w h ich wecombine cer tai n effor ts. Th e impor tan t t h in g i s revolut ionar y con­

s truct ion , the abi l i t y t o m ak e t he revolu t ion prevai l , the ab i l i t y t omai n t ain nat ional sovereignty and the r ights of the N icaraguan peo­

ple, to rebuff imper ia l ist f i nancial , pol i t ical , or m i l i t ar y t h reats andnot to yield to their pressures.

We ar e ready even t o di e i n order t o prove i t once more — as

we proved i t du r ing our st ruggle against t he f i l i busters in 1856, as weproved i t du r ing the 1926-33 war , as we proved i t on Ju l y 19 — andth is t ime w it h more capaci ty , abi l i ty , exper ience, self-assurance, and

weapons. Nicaragua can be swept away, its land destroyed and turnedin to sal t and ashes, but i t w i l l never be conquered.

Great effor t s have been made in t he cotton h arvest , w hich lackedmanpower this year, as we had foreseen. We would like to invite you,once you have completed your progr am , to pick cot ton for N icaragua.

I intended to give you a brief report, but it turned out to be a speech.In concluding, I would l ike to thank you on behal f of our people andg overnmen t for you r encouraging presence. We ar e also pleased tonote the presence of dear ly beloved brothers and si sters who al l formany years have been suppor t ing the wor ldw ide st ruggle for N icara­

gua.W e would l i k e your stay t o be very f r u i t f u l , and we ar e going t o

m ake al l possible efforts for you to draw the highest benef its from t h i shi stor ic and excel lent meet ing of sol idar i t y w i t h the N icaraguan peo­ple.

Thank you, companeros.

The Second Anniversary of theSandinista Revolution

by Tomas Berge

This speech was given before a crowd of half a mi llion, gathered i nManagua July 19, 1981, t o celebrate the second anniversary of the Ni ­caraguan revolution. I t appeared in the July 20, 1981, issue of Barrica­

da. The translation is by Intercontinental Press.

Companeros of the National Directorate of the Sandinista NationalLiberation Front;

Companeros of the Government of National Reconstruction;

Special guests;Heroic people of Nicaragua:There is an immense multitude gathered here today — not to speak

of the hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans who couldn't make it tothis plaza for lack of transportation.

We should pay warm and heartfelt tribute to the discipline andheroism of our people. Since two o' clock this morning, endless streamsof men and women have been pouring towards the July 19 Plaza alongall the highways.

We should also take note of the sacrifice and heroism of the 30,000Nicaraguans, members of the mass organizations and the armed for­

ces, who are standing watch on the four sides of the city .They can't be here for this rally. They can't even watch it on televi­

sion. But they undoubtedly share the excitement and happiness all ofyou feel at seeing the hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans who havecome here to support the revolution and the measures it has taken.

And this immense crowd has also come to pay tribute, not to those of

us who survived the struggle and have the good fortune to be able tosee the glorious victory, but to those who died, those who shed theirblood to make this wonderful anniversary possible,

And what do these two anniversaries mean? In both cases it means

the beginning of a new stage. The people who began this struggle nev­er thought about the honors they might receive on a day like today.

They only thought about the urgency of their revolutionary duty.

127

128 Sa n din is tas Speck

But they would not have been astonished at the idea of this huge rally,because they always had faith in the future, an unshakable confidencei n victory .

I n Ju l y 1961, fel low N icaraguans, a course was begun t hat brok eli ke a storm in J uly 1979. July 1961 is the f irst g l im mer of a new idea

that was justified and realized in July 1979.Both dates fu l f i l l the promise Sandino made when he said " I swear

before our homeland and before history that iny sword w i l l defend thenat ional honor and that i t w i l l mean victor y for the oppressed."

In J u l y 1961, the sword of Sandino was unsheathed, and i n J u ly

1 979 the promise about victory for the oppressed was kept .Th is sword is st i l l unsheathed for cut t i ng off the heads of the revolu­

tion's enemies.

Twenty years ago, when a group of people returned to Sandino'sroad of st ruggle, they di d not foresee th e magn i t ude the revolut ionw ould assume. Now the presen t generat ions understand w hat t h i sp rocess means, but i t w i l l t ake fu t ure generat ions to comprehend fu l l y

the heroism of the founders. Fut ure generat ions w i l l be the ones to un­derstand the sacr i f ice, the courage, and the st rength of past genera­

tions, and of the current generation of Nicaraguans.When the Sandin ista N at ional L iber at ion Fron t was founded, the

exploit ing classes represented by the Somoza dynasty had closed off allpossibi l i t y of a peacefu l st r uggle. The t ime had come to take up onceagain the rifles of Sandino. Some peop! e had already done it: the proudold w h i te-bearded Raudales, D iaz, t he j ournal ist Sotelo , a fa rmernamed Car los Haslam, and many others.

The FSLN was, in the last analysis, the coming together of indi vidu­

al guer r i l l a f ighters of that era. I t was a union of di fferent ideologicala nd pol i t i ca l ideas. I t was a sy nthesis, as we have said before, of a

whole hi story of heroic st ruggles, which began in the colon ial per iodand broke like l ightning bolts in the new epoch that opened up in 1821,which lying historians falsely call independence.

Don't wor ry , we are not going to tel l the history of N icaragua here,

not even in broad out l i ne. The history of our people, wh ich is often dis­t or ted or unknown, is a heroic one. We just want to point out that Ju l y

1961 was the beginn ing of a def i n i t ive effor t to take on not only t hebloody dictatorship but also to break in a mi l lion pieces the heavychains that t ied us to Yankee imper i al i sm .

The condit,ions under which t.he FSLN was founded were incrediblyd i ff icul t and painfu l . They never stopped being di ff i cu l t and pain fu l .

These were hardships an d pai n t ha t ou r w hole people was goingthrough. What was special about those founders, who were considered

The Second Anniversary 129

mistaken and even crazy at the time, was that they had a sense of his­t ory . That they never gave up i n the face of hardsh ips and danger .That they started with nothing, with no money, no arms, no expe­r ience, no reput at ion .

What set them apart was that they had boundless faith in the peo­ple, that they were aggressive, brave, endlessly patient, and absolute­ly sure they would wi n i n the end. They were in the f i rst crop, whenthere were very few people doing the plant i ng. They accepted the r isk

of death, when there was no possibi l i t y of actual ly seeing the new day

in the immediate future.T hey made the b i r th of the vanguard possible, they made the bi r t h

of the Sandinista N at ional L iberat ion Fron t possible.

And obviousl y when w e t al k about th e FSL N , we are not t a l k i ngabout something that is just a political party. We' re not talking simplyabout an armed organization. We are talking about a historic re­sponse. We are ta l k ing about the indiv isible real i t y of the FSL N and

the Nicaraguan people.As long as th is people is m i l i t an t and proud, as long as th is people is

made up of heroic workers, as long as the workers and peasants and allrevolu t ionar ies are ready to defend the nat ional sovereignt y arms i nhand, as long as there are N icaraguans who love the land where theywere born, as long as th is people exists, the FSL N w i l l cont inue to ex­

ist .For this reason, all the efforts of those who were born in Nicaragua

but now want to go back to the past, of the bootlickers of the Yankees,wil l fail. They will never be able to separate the people from their van­guard .

For the same reason, when the masses express thei r desires — and

also thei r dissat isfact ions — the FSLN , which is thei r h ighest form oforganizat ion, makes these desires and dissatisfact ions i ts own, makesthem par t of i t s revolut ionary act ion .

That 's why we say that the measures Daniel f Ortega] announced to­

day were not pulled out of a magician's hat, but instead were the resultof your st ruggle, the st ruggle of the great popu lar masses.*

The masses pu t forwar d t hei r demands. The FSL N processes andsynthesizes these demands and ret urns them in the form of concrete

sThese measures strengthened the laws against decapitalization, authorizedthe confiscat ion of proper t ies of N icaraguans out of the coun try for six months,

author ized t h e conf iscat ion of l arge estates lef t i d l e or un der u t i l ized, an dstrengthened government controls on foreign trade. They were adopted by pop­u lar acclam at ion .

130 Sa n din is tas Speak

tasks that the masses, using thei r inexhaust ible creat ive capaci ty, putinto practice.

And when we tal k about the masses, we are not ta l k ing about somevague accumul at ion of ind iv iduals, but rather of a consciously organ­ized population. It is impossible to build up your revolutionary powerwi thout both the quant i t a t ive and qual i t at ive development of the pop­ula r organizat ions. U n less the wor k in g class gener ates and car r iesthrough these changes, the revolut ion w i l l stagnate and rot . In other

words, it wil l stop being a revolution.T he masses themselves must a lways — now and i n the fu t u r e —

speak up in a loud, clear voice on their own behalf. They must developways of par t i cipat ing and tak ing in i t i at ives. The FSLN k nows that theNicaraguan people for t unately are not the m indless herd that the ene­mies of the revolu t ion have t r ied to por t ray t hem as.

The sons and daughters of th is countr y are not robots, not manne­qu ins. This is a populat ion every day more conscious, more audacious,

and more creat ive. With t h is heroic populat ion, we wi l l m ake i t to ourgoal, we wil l go all the way. With this heroic population that under­stands the world around it more clearly every day, it wil l be easier tocome up w it h the r igh t answers to the quest ions the revolut ion poses.

If the leaders of t h is revolu t ion want to resolve the enormous andcompl icated economic problems that Dan ie l t a lked about , the prob­lems of defense, of health, of education, then we will have to turn to themasses, to make ourselves one w it h the masses. There are no mathe­

matical formulas or bri l l iant theories we can use to solve the problemsthat present themselves as the revolu t ion unfolds. There is only one

answ er , only one response — the impressive power of the masses, freefrom bureaucrat ic shack les, devot ing themselves to the daily tasks ofr ebui ld ing the count r y .

And the whole world, both our friends and our enemies, knows whatth is heroic people is capable of. Sandino was the one who showed theway in defending our national honor. And who were Sandino's follow­ers? The same people who made this revolution, who are now makingc oncessions to the classes that were f ina l ly t hrown out of power in N i ­caragua, after r u l ing for centur ies.

And these are real concessions besides. For example, the business­

m en have been given incent ives to produce, and i t was correct for t h i sto be done. They were given al l k i nds of help and access to f i nancial

credit , and they wil l continue to get help in order to produce. Buteverybody should know that as of July 19, the day of our victory, theiraccess to political credit is closed off. That road is closed to them, be­cause power is now in the hands of all the descendants of Sandino's

The Second Anniuersary 131

rag-tag ar my , of the barefoot soldiers, of the revolut ionar ies, of thosewho hunger and thirst for a justice that has been denied them since theb eginn ing of our hi story .

And we are going to defend t h is power w i t h the sl ingshot of Dav id ,

except that in this slingshot we have, not a pebble, but ri fle and can­non rounds.

A nd the brand of these r i fl es and cannons is not impor t ant . What ­ever label they have on them, wherever they come from, we don't have

to explain to anybody where we got these weapons, these rifles, thesecannons. They are to defend our revolu t ion and our people.

And where is this slingshot of David? In other words, who is in con­t rol of t hese r i fl es, these cannons? The m i l i t i a members in thei r n u­

rnerous bat ta l ions, which are suff icient to defend our homeland. Theyhave the same boldness and determination that Sandino did, but theirarms are bet ter t han those of our legendary guer r i l la, our General ofFree Men. Now i t is the people who have the cannons, i t is the peoplewho have the tanks, i t is the people now who have the r i fl es. And any ­body who wants to f i gh t against N icaragua has to f igh t against t h is

historic people, against this heroic and brave people.We hate war , and our N at ional D i rectorate has repeated th is many

t imes. We haven't organized the defense of our revolu t ion for the pur ­

pose of conquer ing neighbor ing ter r i t or ies — or di stan t ones for thatmatter. We have done it in order to win peace. Our friends and neigh­bors can rest assured that t h is revolut ion was made in order to defend

the land of our bir th .You al l saw how ou r soldiers, our pol ice, our m i l i t i a members, the

f i ghters of the M i ni st r y of the I nt er ior , the students, al l wen t ou t t opick cotton. And Jaime tWheelock] tells us that they were the most ef­f i cien t work er s i n the cotton harvest . These f ight er s wen t ou t andsweated in the fields. And that's natural, because we are in the sweatbusiness, not the blood business. We would r ather spi l l ou r sweat inthe fields and factor ies than spi l l our blood in the trenches. But there

should not be the slightest doubt that these same men and women whowent out to clean up the cotton f ields are equal ly prepared to clean out

the counter revolu t ionary r at s wherever they show t hei r faces in ourc ount r y .

Our people have an aptitude for peace, but we also have an aptitudef or defense. I t i s very impor tan t for the enemies of our revolu t ion t o

understand this, and if they have forgotten, we'd be glad to remindthem about our history. And if any of them th ink they are up against aweak and di v ided government , we wan t t o make clear t o them that

this is the strongest and most united government Nicaragua has ever

132 Sandin istas Speak

had. The leadership of this revolution is a strong and united leader­ship, strong because it is a government of the people, strong becausethe government has the arms, and st rong because of the r ightness ofit s power and the power of i t s r i gh tness.

The whole world has its eyes on Nicaragua. Our friends and our ene­mies alike are watching us and respect us besides. Nicaragua has al­ready ceased to be an unknown place on the world map. Yesterday,Modesto jH enr y Ru iz l told us that when he was in E urope someonew as t r y ing to check ou t where N icaragua was, and by chance a fl y

landed on the map, and they said, "that's Nicaragua." But Nicaraguais no longer u nknown. Now i t is par t of the wave of revolu t ions in our

era. I t i s a count r y w i t h great m ora l au thor i t y , not onl y i n Cent r alAm er ica, not only in L at i n A m er ica, but i n the whole wor ld. We are

proud to be Nicaraguans. This revolution transcends national boun­daries.

Our revolut ion has always been internat i onal i st, ever since Sandino

fought i n the Segovias. There were internat i onal ists from al l over t hewor ld who fough t alongside Sandino, men from V enezuela, M exico,Peru. Another who fought alongside Sandino was the great hero of theS alvadoran people named Farabundo M ar t i .

It is not st range that we are int ernat ional ists, because this is some­th ing we got from Sandino. Al l t he revolu t ionar ies and al l the peoplesof Latin America especially know that our people's heart is with them,beats alongside thei rs. Our heart goes out to Lat in Amer ica, and we al ­so know that L at in A mer ica's heart goes out to the Nicaraguan revolu ­

t i on. This does not mean that we export our revolut ion. I t is enough ­and we couldn't do otherw ise — for us to expor t our example, the ex­ample of the courage, sensitivi ty, and determination of our people.

How could we not be upset about the inj ust ices that are commi t tedin di fferent parts of the wor ld? But we know that i t is the people them ­

s elves of t hese count r ies who must m ak e thei r r evolut i ons, and weknow that by advancing our revolu t ion we are also helping our broth ­ers and sisters in the rest of Latin America. We know what is restingon our revolut ion — not only the aspi rat ions of our people, but also the

hopes of al l the dispossessed of Latin America. This carries with itenormous responsibi l i t y, because as we have said before and repeat to­

day, our internationalism is primarily expressed in consolidating ourown revolution, working selflessly day in and day out and trainingourselves mil itarily to defend our homeland.

And t h is is a big responsib i l i t y , a very big responsibi l i t y , because itis ext remely hard to t ransform a society . I 'm not going to go over t he

destruction, the looting of Nicaragua. Our country wil l demand from

The Second A n n iversary 1 33

us more effor t , harder work , more sacr i f ice in the fut ure. Carr y ing for ­

ward the revolutionary process is harder, much harder, than the waritsel f . Because i t i nvolves a war against t he misery of the exploitedclasses, a war against the misery that the exploi t ing classes have con­

verted i nto a fact of l i fe.So we see that w h i le we' re in the process of deal ing w i t h one prob­

lem, ten new ones come up. Somet imes we lose bat t les and somet imeswe win bat t les in rebu i ld ing the count ry . But of course what is impor ­

tant is the direct ion we are moving in, the meaning of what we are do­ing , and the th ings we accompl ish . Ou r er rors can be corrected, but

what is last,ing are the revolut,ionary t r ansformat ions.We are creat ing a new society in which an indiv idual is not a piece of

nierchandise, a society in w hich there are no wolves and lambs, wheremen do not l ive off the exploi t at ion of other men. We are st ruggl ing to

create a society in w hich the workers are the fundamental power dri v­

ing th ings forward, bu t i n w h ich other social sectors also play a role.a lways insofar as they ident i fy w i t h the interests of the count ry, v: i th

t he interests of the great m aj or i t y .The measures the Government of N at ional Reconst ruct ion has an­

nounced today are a step forw ard in the process of t r ansform at ion de­manded by the wor k ing class. But i t i s not possible to move forwardwi thou t cu t t i ng i n t o the i n terests of t he sel fish classes. So nobodyshould be surprised that these sectors are attacking the revolution.Even i f i t is t r ue that not everyone in these classes is t rapped in t he

web of selfishness or completely possessed by the demon of prejudice,n evertheless i t is a fact t hat a big part of them have no interest wh at ­

soever i n changing the rot ten st ruct ures of the past . For t h is reason ,the revolut ionary measures that are being taken provoke fury and in ­

secur i ty in some sect ions of the m inor i t y class. They say the m ixed eco­nomy i s dead, t ha t t here i s no more pol i t ica l p l u r a l i sm . W e repeatwhat our br other Daniel said here today: the revolut ionary process isgoing to cont i nue moving forward. Honest and pat r i ot ic employers and

businessmen not only have the right to join in the tasks of production,b u t they w i l l h ave the support of the revolut ion i n doing so. In t h e

same sense, we can speak of pol i t ical plur al i sm, a mixed economy, andnat ional un i ty — but alw ays w i t h in the framework establ ished by therevolu t i on , not against the revolut ion .

A m ixed economy, plur a l i sm , un i t y , not to w ipe out or weaken t herevolution, but to strengthen it. Not to destabilize, but to stabilize. Nott o bad mouth the revolu t ion and stab i t i n t he back w i t h disgust ingl ies, as is happening every day , bu t t o cr i t i cize w i t h respect for t h et r u t h .

134 Sandin istas Speak

This is the sense in which the revolution has put forward the strat­egy of a mixed economy, so that the gent lemen of the business commu­

n i ty can produce, for thei r own benefi t but also to cont r i bute to raisingproduct ion in the count ry. But what has happened? We have to repeat

what our br other D aniel has said .There are a few patriotic businessmen who have understood what

t he new r ules of the game are, learned the new laws of pol i t ical ar i t h ­met ic, and have adopted an honest an d const ruct iv e at t i t ude. Bu t

there are many others, the unpat r iot ic businessmen, who have refusedto pi tch in w i t h the tasks of w ip ing out backw ar dness and poverty and

t ak ing up the chal lenge our economic di f f i cu l t ies present .They have had a hundred years of chances, histor ical l y speak ing .

And we have to adm i t t hat they have accompl ished some th ings, but

a lw ay s t o en r ich t hemselves at t h e expense of the w or kers' sweat .Every drop of proletarian sweat, and sometimes every drop of blood,w as t r ansformed t h r ough the businessmen's famous eff iciency i n t olux u r ious weal t h , al l of i t dest ined for thei r st rong boxes.

What have t hese unpat r i ot ic elements done for N icaragua'? Theymade i t i nto a rubbish heap, into a lake of blood, into a valley of tears.Because they didn' t teach the people to read and wr i te. Because they

did noth ing for the healt h of the people. Because they took th is coun­try, which because of its nat u ral resources should by r ight have been aparadise, and kept it backward and miserably poor.

Now the top representatives of this unpatriotic bourgeoisie demandthat we rebuild immediately what it took them a hundred years to de­s troy .

Who decapit a l ized the count ry? Who assassinated Sandino and cele­

brated in an orgy of champagne and blood? Who made fabulous dealswi t h the t y ranny? Who made cont r i bu t ions under the table to Somo­za's elect ion campaigns? l "The bourgeoisie," the crowd responds]

Who grabbed up the peasants' land and has kept the work ers under

the yoke of oppression?! "The bourgeoisie" IWho cal led our wonder fu l l i t eracy campaign indoct r i nat ion?

Who ch imed i n and st i l l ch imes i n w i t h the crude ant icommu nistcampaigns of Somoza, Pinochet , St roessner , and al l the rest of the go­r i l l a an ima l l i fe of L a t i n A m er ica and t he CIA ? Who slandered t herevolu t ion and who abuses the mass organizat ions w i t h disgust ing

epithets? I "The bourgeoisie" lWho asks for advice and takes orders from the representat ives of the

empi re, of the same empire that t r ied to enslave our count r y , sowingdeath, destruction, and humiliation'? [ "The bourgeoisie"1

It was not you work ers and peasants. You weren't the ones who de­

The Second Annioersary 135

capi t a l ized the count ry . You weren't the ones who went and stood at

the door of the American embassy to ask permission for what you weregoing to do. And if it wasn't you, then who is it, who was it, who has italway s been? W h o ar e t h e t r a i tors , t h e capi tu lators, t h e f alseprophets? [ "The bourgeoisie" I

Sure there are good adm inist r ators w i t h in the bourgeoisie, there' s

no doubt about that. Unfortunately — and this happens in every revo­lu t ion — the big m aj or i t y of the guer r i l las who won the war were ofwor ker an d peasant background. They ar en' t adm i ni st rators. Theydon't have masters degrees in economics. Many of them, like GermanPomares, learned to read in the course of the struggle.

We should note that fortunately a certain number of intellectualshave thr own thei r lot in w i t h the revolu t i on, and now they are tak ing

on some of the most di f f i cu l t and complex areas of state admin ist r a­ti on. But i t is st i l l t rue that our revolut ion, l ike other revolu t ions, has

a ver y bi g shor tage of scient i f ical l y t r a ined personnel . W i t h i n t h ebourgeoisie there are people who were t r a ined in famous universi t ies.But the contradiction is that the people who were in the trenches andin the mounta ins were not the gent lemen w i th the Harvard educat ions

but the i l l i t er ate workers and peasants.

Could w e pu t a competen t businessman i n charge of a st rategicarea? Sure we could, why not? Bu t could we ever pu t i n charge of a

strategic area a businessman who literally hates the revolution? We' drather give the job to — as Modesto would say — a country bumpkin,because at least he could learn the job over t ime and would be incl ined

to give his energy and his l i fe to the revolu t i on .In the same sense in wh ich we acknowledge that there are pat r iot i c

businessmen, we also recognize the support t hat technicians have giv­

en . Because a lot of them — at least w i t h i n the contex t of the smal l

number that exist in Nicaragua — have assumed a patriot ic and ex­emplary stance.

Professionals and technicians can play a leading role in the wonder ­fu l task of const ruct in g a beaut i fu l fu t u re. Technicians should re­

member that thei r scient i f ic t r ai n ing isn't worth any th ing i f they losethei r hum an it y and put t hei r sk i l l s at the disposal of the enemies of

our people.As we' ve already said this morning, Nicaragua faces a diAicult eco­

nomic situation. I'm not going to go over again the destruction, the lowlevel of planting in 1979, the brutal decapitalization — al l of whichhas a lot of responsibi l i t y for t h is crisis. Another factor which must beconsidered is our object ive dependency on our t rad i t ional markets. Butthere's another th ing, and we should say i t again, and that 's the errors

136 Sa nd in is tas Speak

we have comm i t t ed, especial l y as a resul t of our inexper ience.It has been said that politics is a distil lation of economics. So it is not

surpr ising that a lot of the pol i t i cal and ideological problems we facetur n up in the area of product ion, dist r i bu t ion , and consumpt ion .

In other words, economic policy is basically the problem of power,and in order to t ake on the enemies of our people in the area of powerwe have to learn to consciously cont rol the economy. This appl ies to al l

o f us, the leaders of the revolu t ion and the government„ bu t not j ust t ous. More than any t h ing else i t appl ies to the workers.

We have to grow up. We have to get over the adolescent phase of ourrevolu t ion, in order tr> establ ish control over the anarchic tendencies of

the market economy to which we are st i l l t ied by a thousand inv isiblethreads.

The mass organizat ions have to take on the duty of keeping watch

over the economy and let t ing the governm ent know about inst ances ofdecapi t al izat ion, i n accord w i t h the new law against decapit a l izat iont hat was announced just now .

The inform at ion that is gathered must be ser ious and object ive, toavoid any possibi l i t y of i nj ust ice or subject i v i sm . But — and I want to

emphasize this in the name of the N at ional Di rectorate — the work i ngclass especial ly must respond w ith responsib i l i t y and with un ity to the

chal lenges histor y has given us. W i thou t responsibi l i t y and w i t houtwork ing-class un i ty , every t h ing is much more diAi cul t and, we could

say, impossible.Absenteeism on the job and other forms of indiscip l ine object ively

are an t i revolut ionary at t i t udes and in pract ice are decapi ta l izat ion .The A gr ar ian Refor m Law must be seen i n al l i t s pol i t ica l d imen­

s ions. I t was a measure of simple just ice to t ur n the land over to the

peasants. I t i s an agrar ian refor m law t hat benef i t s al l the workers,not just t he peasants, but immediately puts the peasants to wor k pro­ducing on idle lands, and rat ional izes agr i cu l t ural product ion .

We w i l l el im inate the big landlords w i t h t h is law, we w i l l g ive theland to the peasants, we w i l l im prove the condi t ions of the sm al l pro­

ducer and also give guar antees to the medium producer because theyalso know how to be pat r i ot ic.

T hey also know they can help cont r i bute to just ice in the count ry ­side. The happiness we get from th is tu rn ing over of the land must be

conver ted into organizat ion, work , product i on .Our revolu t ion is car r y ing out a hi st or ic demand of the peasants, as

Daniel said, and mak ing a real i ty the happy dream of Pablo Ubeda, ofRigoberto Cruz, and German Pomares, who gave their blood exact ly onthe earth wh ich today the revolu t ion is giv ing to the dispossessed.

The Second A nni oersury 1 37

With the agrarian reform we feel in our hearts a joy similar to thatwr i t ten about in the B ible where i t says "Let the sea and al l the inhab­itants contained in the world roar. Let the rivers applaud and be joinedby the mount ains in cr ies of j oy ," because the love of just ice is not on lya revol u t ionary sent iment , but also a sent iment deeply shared by th eChr i st ian people of N icaragua.

And so we see that in our free Nicaragua there are hundreds of thou­sands of Ch r i st ian revolut ionar ies, men and women who today rej oice

over the news of the solut ion the Cathol ics have ar r ived at w it h the bi ­

shops. A solution based on dialogue and respect, that recognizes thepr inciple of the r igh t of revol u t ionary Cathol ics to work shou lder to

shoulder w i t h t hei r people, i n t he const ruct ion of a new society . I tgives us pleasure to see the mat u r i t y of the Church's leaders.

We were say ing bef'ore that the er rors w i l l be rect i fi ed but that t he

revolut ionary methods w i l l remain. So let us talk a bi t more of our er ­

rors, but not l ike in the confessional, where you receive absolu t ion andthen go on sinn ing .

Let us speak frankly before the people, as a healthy self-criticism, tocorrect er rors, to rect ify our course.

Someth ing w e must cr i t i cize, and Dan ie l has a l ready men t ioned

th is, but we want to tal k about i t a bi t more: bureaucrat i sm. We inher ­ited more than dest ruct ion. We also inher i ted the destroyer, bureauc­

rat i sm . Publ ic funct ionar ies in the past were educated w i t h the con­ception that their special jobs were only marginal to political deci­sions.

But the publ ic funct ionary is not only a speciali st, but today must al ­so make pol i t i cal decisions.

U nfor t unately, there are a great many funct ionaries that don't t ak et he approach of d irect l y resolv ing problems by wor k ing d i rect ly w i t hyou, w i t h the masses. The state apparatus must be simple, dynam ic,e ff icient .

When we created the nat ional ized sector of the economy, when webegan to make healt h care, education, and cul t ure avai lable to every ­

one, that was when the number of public employees began to increase,logical ly. However, I th ink that we have gone too far. We have not on ly

increased the funct ions of publ ic wor kers, but we have also increasedthe number , and now the bureaucracy is giv ing bi r th to more bureau­cracy. A nd w it h more and more employees and funct ionar ies the solu­tion gets harder and harder . So begins the red tape. Everyone in a sea

of red tape, memor anda, forms. I t h ink t hat t he bureaucracy grew somuch that i t would have done wel l to compete in the basebal l leagues,

because it was throw ing us al l so many curves, and I th ink that the bu­

138 San d in is tas Speak

reaucr ats would have won the championship besides.

Sure, many of ou r problems can't be resolved because of object i veproblems, for instance the lack of material resources; but there areproblems that don' t get solved because of a lack of im aginat ion . Wehave seen some incredible things in this regard.

L ik e the doctors, who have to register at t he un iversi ty , w i t h t heMinistry of the Interior, the Ministry of Health, and I think also withthe Publ ic Registr y of Persons.

Somet imes i t t akes t h ree days and even t h i r t y days t o get your

hands on a public document, thus wasting all that time. I even know ofthe case of a companera, who went to ask for a leave of absence when

she was seven months pregnant, and they told her to come back w ith as worn statement that she was pregnant. The fut ure mother said, look ,

corn panero, I am completely certain that I am not just swollen up, thatI don't have dropsy.

I th ink i t is an unpostponable obl igat ion to confront bureaucrat i sm .

Bu t how do we do it? By l in k ing ourselves to the masses. The adm in is­tr at ive leaders in the government at al l levels must go to the heart ofthe problems, where the confl i ct s are, must get t o know the proce­

dures, get out of thei r off ices, and simpl i fy th ings. And if the leaders doth is, so must the work ers.

We must also combat another vice we have inher i ted from the past— convert ing the easy i nto the di ff icu l t . Of course, we are not against

administrat ive controls. We are against uselessness, as we are againstinsolence and the bad manners w it h which our ci t izens are somet imes

greeted in publ ic off ices when they go for inform at ion or service. Yes,in Somoza's t ime the haughty dom inated, the arrogant, but now whatwe must have is simp l i ci ty , courtesy, and Sandin i sta respect .

On the other hand, I t h in k we have been soft on the funct ionar ies

who have abused their t rust. We are already plann ing, as CommanderOrtega said here, a law to deal har sh ly w i t h those who rob the publ i c

t reasury , above al l w i t h those who are cor rupt , who have stolen thepeople's resources.

It is certain that we st i l l don't have suff icient cont rols, and the con­

trol ler general has under taken m ajor effor ts to detect cr imes againstt he publ ic treasury, but i t is now t ime to deal sharply w ith those cr im i ­nals, who are the worst cr i m in als, because they are not j ust robbingtheir neighbor, they are robbing the entire people.

For sure, the law that Daniel mentioned will have to be a draconianlaw, that can send criminals to prison for a long time, including up tot he max im um. Jai l those who rob even i f i t 's only a p in .

We st i l l have companeros in the armed forces and in ot her sectors

The Second An n iv ersary 139

and other organisms, although fortunately very few, who think thatthe uniform or the responsibil ity the revolution has given them putsthem in the category of special citizen who can ignore traffic laws, nots tand i n l i ne at, the movies, give or receive recommendat ions, mak escenes in clubs and amusement spots.

These companeros ei ther w i l l correct thei r behavior or w i l l for fei tthe right to be known as Sandinistas.

We have spoken of auster i ty, but in many inst i t u t ions so far i t 's justrhetor ic . Ther e ar e i nn umerable abuses, squander ing of gasol ine,

which means squandering our foreign exchange earnings. Of course,for instance, we have the r ight to have a good t ime, to have our par t ies.If we want to have a part y we have i t , there's no problem; but i t must

be put on w i t h the simpl ici t y and the prudence our pover ty demands,the prudence demanded by our current problems and above al l our rev­

olu t ionary qual i t ies.In our of fices we must economize on the use of paper, elect r ic i ty, eco­

nomize in every way possible. In every way possible, except work , ef­f or t , and sacr i f ice. Auster i t y must be for everybody , not j ust for th ework ers in the f ields and in the ci t ies, upon whom the weight of our

economic di f f icu l t ies has fal len up to now .

War to the death , then, against bureaucracy, free spending, pi l fer ­age, corrupt ion, and abuses. Let us put an end to these evi ls, in order to

give land to the peasants, to make the revolution, honor the memory ofthose who died, to end thef t , cr ime, and corrupt ion. That 's what those

generous, brave, and humble men we recal l w i t h such profound re­spect today gave thei r l ives for . And how could we fai l to recal l our he­roes'? How could we fai l to recal l them on t h is glor ious occasion? How

can we not sense the eternal presence of Santos L6pez, veteran f ighter

of Sandino's army, who, carrying with him the weight of the years,st i l l had in his eyes the old gleam from the j ungles of Segovia?

How could we fai l to recal l the indefat igable Faust ino Ruiz, of whomi t was once said that he never said a word that wasn't on the mark l i k e

an ar row in the heart '? How could we fai l to recal l Jorge Navar ro, whocar r ied a k napsack fu l l of j oy , and a handfu l of grenades'? How couldwe fai l to recal l Rigoberto Cruz, Pablo Ubeda, f i rst in the bean s of thepeasants? Francisco Bu i t r ago, a student who knew many t h ings, but

never knew fat i gue or dismay? How could we fai l to recal l , how could

we fail to have a deeply felt remembrance of Germann Pomares, that in­trepid forger of the dawn'? Or Jose Benito Escobar, that worker whoset r ades were gunpowder and the people? How could we fai l to recal l Si l ­vio M ayorga, who created a gent leness that was always at the side ofevery Sandinista? How could we fai l to recal l , w i t h ou r hearts ful l of

I40 Sandin istas Speak

Nicaragua, Carlos Fonseca, the firebrand lighting up the night?I t is r ight t hat we remember them. I t is r ight that our people repeat ,

in the mountains and in the valleys, the names of these heroes. Let thean imals i n t he j ungle, the fi shes in the r ivers, hear t hem . Let thei rbombs burst like flowers on the faces of the children, so that their sac­ri fices may find an echo in the consciousness of the humble, of the ex­ploited, whom they held so dear i n thei r hear ts. They and those who

fol lowed in thei r footsteps made possible the ret urn of the fl ags and thereturn of hope. They made possible this revolution of ri fles and gui­tars, of audacious poems, of free peasants, of free workers, of a free peo­p le who took into their own hands for al l t ime the reins of their histor i c

destiny.Honor and glor y to these simple sons of our people, covered today

w i th the respected and heroic black and red flag of the FSL N. W ith t he

same flag that rescued the blue and wh i te flag of our homeland, whicho nce was sold ou t by the t r a i tors to thei r people. The blue and wh i t e

flag, defended by the black and red, today wave sure of themselves,and with legit imate pride in the middle of this violent rebir th, of an­thems shouted in combat, of a generous and heroic people that at lastis master of the sun, the rain, and the ear th, where the bones of its he­roes and dear mar t y r s are bur ied .

For those two fl ags: the fl ag of our homeland and the black and redflag of the FSLN, let us shout, Nicaraguans: Long live the FSLN! Longlive the immortal pioneers of our revolution! Long live the second an­niversary of our v ictory ! Long l ive the agrar ian reform! Long l ive free

Nicaragua!Pat ria L i bre![ "0 Mori r!" the crowd responds.]

An Appeal for Justice and Peace

by Daniel Ortega

This speech was delivered to the General Assembly of the United ¹tions on October 7, 1981. It was printed in En glish in the UN' s Provi­sional Ve rbatim Record of the Twenty- Ni n th Meeting. Mi n or styl is tic

changes have been made for consistency and readabi li ty .

The death of the president of Egypt , Anwar el-Sadat, is anothertr agic event t hat once again br ings to the forefront the urgent need to

contribute to the quest for a real solution to the Middle East questionwhich once and for al l wil l put an end to the violence that besets thefraternal peoples of the Arab world.

Humanity is living through a crucial moment in its history as a re­

sult of t he great t ens ions that t oday m ore than e ver t h reaten peace.Nicaragua has deemed it t imely and necessary to bring to this assem­

bly, among other things, a number of specific proposals capable of con­tributing to the cause of peace in the world.

We are today the bearers of a specific proposal in our search for a ra­tional way out of the profound crisis affecting the Central American

area, the most cr i t ical poin t of which is El Salvador. This is the mainreason for our presence in this assembly, where we are certain weshal l meet with the favorable reception warranted by the serious cir­cumstances of the moment .

We are the bearers of a specific proposal aimed at assisting CentralAmerica in its struggle for peace, at the very moment when that peaceis disrupted by the escalation of the arms race in the world, with bil­lions of dollars being invested in the production and emplacement of

medium -range missi les, rockets, neut ron bombs, and so on; at the verymoment when the progress achieved on strategic arms l imitationagreements (SALT II) is being seriously jeopardized by the hegemonis­tic p olicy of the present U n i ted Sta tes government .

We are the bearers of a specific proposal aimed at assisting CentralAmerica in its struggle for peace, at a time when the racist regime inSouth Africa is invading Angola, promoting destabilizing actions inZambia, invading the southern part of Mozambique, and training mer­

141

142 Sandin is tas Speak

cenaries to invade Zimbabwe, all of this with the support of the pres­ent United States government; at a time when Libya is the victim ofacts of aggression deriving from United States policy which have evenled to two aircraft of the Libyan Air Force being shot down over its ownterr itorial space in the Gulf of Sidra.

We are the bearers of a specific proposal aimed at contributing to thecause of peace in Cent ral Am er ica at a t ime when the government ofIsrael, w i th the fu l l support of the Un i ted States, is car ry ing out acts ofterrorism against the Palestinian people, and against the Lebanesepeople, murdering hundreds of people, as well as bombing the Tam­muz nuclear research center i n I r aq .

We are the bearers of a specific proposal aimed at contributing to thecause of peace in Cent ral Am er ica, at a t ime when there is an increasein spying fl ights by United States aircraft in the air space of Demo­c rat i c K orea and th e economic blockade and pol i t ica l an d m i l i t ar ythreats against Cuba, and the occupat ion of Guantanamo, cont i nue; ata time when the people of Grenada are harassed and attacked; at at ime when the implementat ion of the t reat ies concern ing the Panam aCanal Zone, for which Gen. Omar Torrijos fought and died, is placed injeopardy; at a time when resolutions of the United Nations concerningthe independence of Namibia are flouted.

We bring a specific proposal aimed at assisting Central America inits struggle for peace, at a time when the enemies of peace brandishphilosophical concepts to justify thei r war l ike nature, while at thesame t ime perpetr at ing acts of aggression .

That is why today we also wish to cont r i bute to the cause of peace by

condemning the South African regime, expressing our solidarity withthe peoples attacked by that regime, expressing our solidarity with thepatriots of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) asthe sole legitimate representatives of Namibia; supporting the front­l ine states; expressing our suppor t and sol idar i ty w i th L ibya and w i t hthe Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the sole representativeof the Palestinian people; with the people and government of Demo­c rat ic K orea; w i t h the people and government of Grenada„. w i t h t h e

courageous, un i t ed, and st rong people and government of revolu t ion ­ary Cuba; with the struggle of the Polisario Front; with the resolutionsadopted on August 20, 1981, on the implementation of the Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,wherein the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-deter­mination and independence is reaffirmed; with the people and govern­ment of Panama; with the people and government of heroic Vietnam,while repudiating the policy of punishment, and the threat and use of

Appeal for Justice and Peace 143

force against that people; with the coastal states of the Indian Oceanwhich are continuing their struggle to have that area declared a zoneof peace and to obtain the consequential withdrawal of the differentmi l itary fleets moving in the area. We also appeal to the fraternal peo­ples and governments of Iran and Iraq to seek a solution in the spirit ofthe Nonal igned movement, to the di ff erences or claims that may exist

between those two states.Fi nal ly , may we once again express our sol idar i t y w i t h the people

and government of Cyprus, with the people of Chile, with the people ofUr uguay, and w i t h t he heroic people of Guatemala. May we also hai las a victory for peace the independence of the people of Belize and itsmembership i n t h is organizat ion .

We bring a specific proposal aimed at strengthening the worldwideefforts to ensure peace which Central America is today obliged tomake at a t ime when that peace is also threatened by rest r i ct ive eco­nomic measures which make thei r fu l l weight fel t i n the Th i rd W or ldcount r ies, hist or ical ly exploi ted by the developed count r ies.

The latest decisions on the subject made public by the government ofthe U n i ted States are clear proof of what we have just st ated. The se­

cretary of the treasury of the present United States government hassaid that the gover nment in tends to l im i t loans and credits to develop­ing count r ies through the Internat ional M onetary Fund and the Inter ­

national Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and PresidentReagan h imsel f, at the annual meet ing of the Int ernat ional M onetaryFun d and the I n t ernat ional Ban k for Reconst ruct ion and Develop­ment, conf i rmed that decision, say ing that for the poor count r ies there

the only magic formula is that of the free market, a "magic formula"which has served only to make our countries poorer.

D espite the efforts made by the Th ird Wor ld count r ies to rest ruct ur ethei r foreign debt and, by means of great sacr i f ices, to pay the servic­ing costs, the economic horizon is now so bleak that i t compels us to se­

rious reflection. Unless formulas in keeping with the economic reali­t ies of our count r ies are devised, there wi l l be no way out except to can­cel the ent i re foreign debt and its serv icing costs, or the t ime w i l l come

when by common agreement we, the poor count r ies of the wor ld, w i l lhave to say that we are not going to pay, because we cannot pay, be­

cause we have nothing to pay with.We must not forget that in foreign debt servicing alone the develop­

ing countries must pay with blood and sweat more than $40 bil lion ayear , w i thout the least possibi l i t y of f i nd ing a solut ion to thei r eco­

nomic problems. On the contrary, the situation is becoming more andmore serious.

144 Sa n d in is tas Speak

Who can over look the fact t hat the pr ice of products that we expor tdeclines all the time while the costs of production of those products in­crease because the spare parts, machinery, equipment, and so on be­come more expensive each day?

In 1977 our count r ies had to produce 338 bushels of cotton, 1,394 bu­shels of sugar, or 98 bushels of coffee to buy one tractor. Four years lat­er, in 1981, we must produce 476 bushels of cotton — an increase of 41percent — to buy one tractor; or 2,143 bushels of sugar — an increaseof 54 percent or more; or 248 bushels of coffee — an increase of 145 per­cent . Th is is because the weal th y count r ies lend us money on har d

items, sel l more expensively each day , bu t buy each day a t a lowerpr ice.

As a resul t of these unfai r i n ternat ional t erms of t r ade and of t heprofound injustices engendered by exploitation, a dramatic social, eco­nomic, and political crisis shakes Central America today. That crisisstems from the depths of the pover ty of 20 m i l l ion Cent ra l Am er ican

men and women. In 1979 one in two 15-year-old Central Americanswas i l l iterate. One out of eight children dies before the age of one.Three out of every ten Central Americans looking for employment donot find it. Twelve mil lion men live without proper housing. For everydol lar obtained by a poor Cent ra l Am er ican a r ich man receives $48.According to recent studies by the Economic Commission for Lat inAmerica (ECLA), 8.5 mil lion Central Americans live in conditions ofe xt r eme pover t y .

It is there, in the old reality of the exploitation of the Central Amer­i can count r ies and i n t h e i nj ust ice w i t h w h ich the developed wor ld

treats our peoples, that we must seek the causes of the political and so­cial unrest that is today shaking Central America — not in the Nica­raguan revolu t i on, which is the f i rst great hi stor ic attempt in Cent r alAmer ica to el im inate the roots of the cri si s.

The accusat ion leveled at the Sandinista people's revolu t ion t hat i tis the cause of rebellion in Central America lays bare the hypocrisy ofthose who are truly responsible for the dramatic Central American sit­uation. The main solution to the crisis in the region lies in recognizingthat the crisis is the product of the exploitation to which the CentralAmer ican count r ies have been subjected and i n developing a set of

m easures in keeping w i th t hat real i t y .Between 1973 and 1980 Cent ral Am er ica's foreign debt increased by

five times, and by the end of 1981 it wil l reach the unprecedented fig­ure of $7 bi l l i on. That debt today represents 140 percent of our expor ts,when barely three years ago it amounted to 80 percent. I t is an in­creasing burden placed on the shoulders of Central American workers,

Appeal for Justice and Peace 145

because the payment of interest to creditors means that each year al arger proportion of the region's exports must be earmarked for i t .

The h igh rates of interest, which obey the fiscal and monet ary policy

of the United States, punish those who have less and reward those whohave more. So long as this si tuat ion is not corrected there can be no so­lu t ion to the Cent ral Am er ican cr i sis.

To solve its own cr i sis the Un i ted States is apply ing a policy consist ­ing of raising to unbelievable heights the cost of financial resourcesobtained by our countries. This logically leads to the export of theUn i ted States cr i sis to the poor count r ies. This year alone $1.2 bi l l ion

has been dr ained ou t of Cent ra l A m er ica and has found h ighl y re­warded refuge in the developed count r ies.

In the past three years alone the Central American countries havelost $1.23 b i l l i on , which was t r ansfer red to the developed count r ies,

the United States in particular, because of the deterioration in thepurchasing power of thei r expor ts. As long as this si tu at ion is not rev­

ersed how can our countries develop, how can that crisis be solved7That deterioration in the terms of trade is a veritable tax on our ex­

ports levied by the developed count r ies. Those count r ies must there­fore prov ide f in ance to compensate for that deter ior at ion .

In two years — 1979 and 1980 — the Cent ra l A mer ican count r ieslost international reserves amounting to $1.18 bil lion. Where, then,are ou r coun t r ies to f ind th e necessary resources to f inance invest ­ments to promote thei r development? What is requ ired is a massive

flow of concessional resources to finance our strategic energy, trans­por t , in frast ruct ure, and indust r ia l and agr icu l t ura l product ion pro­

jects.We demand just ice as count r ies that have been impover i shed by cen­

tu r ies of exploi t at ion and by those unjust in ternat ional economic rela­t i ons, but t he U n i ted States closes i t s ears. The for thcom ing confer ­ence in Cancun has already begun to be affected by the refusal of the

United States to deal with items that would truly make it possible todeal w i t h the explosive si tuat ion in the economic order of the world to­

day, and by its denying Cuba — which at present occupies the presi­dency of the N onal igned movement — in a manner that we can on lydescribe as infanti le, the right to participate in that conference.

But Nicaragua is convinced that countries like Mexico, France, Aus­tr ia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Algeria, India, and others wil lb e the standard-bearers and spokesmen in our demands for a new in ­ternat ional economic order .

We said that we were bringing from our region specific proposalsaimed at cont r ibut ing to the cause of peace. We have explained that

146 San d in is tas Speak

the fundamental causes of the cr isis affect ing ou r area are economicand that they have been brought about by the unjust relations existingin the present economic order and by the overexploitation to which ourpeoples have been and are subjected by exploiting minorities whichserve like eunuchs the interests of international exploitation. If we un­derstand th is, we shal l also understand why there was a revolu t ion in

Nicaragua and why there is a revolut ionary war i n E l Salvador andanother in Guatem ala .

If we want to find a serious answer to the situation in Central Amer­ica we shall have to stop invoking the specter of the East-West conflict ,which is used by those who try to reject any change in the region. Andwe cannot disregard or i gnore the fact that al l t h is pict ure of bru taleconomic exploitation has been defended throughout our history byaggressive United States policy.

After the United States War of Independence, the model of a federaldemocracy based on ideals of freedom which inspired the st ruggles ofWash ington and Jefferson was also the model for the leaders of the in ­dependence struggles of Latin America; and in Central America theliberal federal state headed by Gen. Francisco Morazan was the off­spring of those principles of the American revolution.

But that dream was to die very soon. The emergence of the MonroeDoct r ine, Amer ica for the Amer icans, was to represent the aggressive

will of Yankee expansionism on the continent and from 1840 onwardsour peoples were no longer to benefi t from the in fl uence of those idealsof democracy and freedom bu t r ather t o su ffer i n t erference, threats,the imposi t ion of t reat ies contradictory to the sovereignty of our coun­

t r ies, provocations and acts of war among neighbor ing states, black ­mail with the presence of the United States fleet in our territorial wa­ters, m i l i t ar y i nt ervent ions, the landing of m ar ines, and the imposi­tion of cor r upt governm ents and one-sided economic treat ies.

More than 784 acts host i le to the r ight of our count r ies to sovereign­ty have occurred on our cont inent since that t ime, and more than 100of them since 1960.

W hy were our count r ies insu l t ed, invaded, and hum i l i ated on m or e

than 200 occasions from 1840 to 1917? Under what pretexts, since atthe t ime there was not a single socialist state in the wor ld and the tsarruled over all the Russias? Treaties and loans were imposed on us, wewere invaded, we were given the status of protectorates under thatsame thesis of American national security, which was first called theMonroe Doctr ine and later the man ifest dest iny and later st i l l the big­

s tick or dol lar diplomacy .The expansion of front iers, secure mar i t im e routes, m i l i t ar y bases

Appeal for Justice and Peace 147

in the Caribbean, bought governments, and docile governments—these were manifestations of a liberal ideal which had become bare­faced expansionism.

How can we explain the numerous acts of aggression and interfer­ence and the landings that occurred between 1917 and 1954 in Latin

America, when there was stil l no Cuban revolution and Cuba couldnot be accused of interference — accusations that were to be reservedfor the future?

The United States did not take over Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898and impose the Platt Amendment to save Caribbean territories from

t he in fl uence of the Soviet Un ion, since the lat ter was not yet in exist ­ence.

The United States did not land marines in Vera Cruz, Hait i, and Ni­caragua, nor did it from 1903 onwards arm the most formidable navalforce ever seen i n Car ibbean wat ers to resolve the East -West confl ictto i ts own benefi t . It was simply defending the in te rests of i ts te rr i t o r­ial expansionism, the interests of its financiers and its bankers, ofthose business tycoons who were beginn ing to beset I .at i n Amer ica .

Today, October 7, 1981, the United States is beginning near the sov­ereign territory of Nicaragua mil itary maneuvers called "Halcon Vis­ta," w i th the par t i cipat ion of i ts own naval, land, and air forces togeth­

er with mi l itary contingents from Honduras. At this time, as in 1895when the filibuster Will iam W alker landed on our shores at the head

of a t roop of southern mercenar ies, our countr y i s threatened by ag­g ression on a scale higher t han that wh ich we have known so far . A tth is t ime, as in 1912 when our homeland was invaded by mar ines and

defended by the patriots led by Gen. Benjamin Zeled6n, the nationalhero, there are greater dangers of further invasions of Nicaragua,whether di rect or indi rect . At t h is t ime, as happened in 1927 when wewere invaded by the mar ines, against which the army, headed by Gen­era l Sandino, defended ou r n a t iona l sovereignt y and fought for si x

long years, there are new t h reats from the present U n i ted States ad­ministration. At this time it is necessary to remember the history ofaggression against Central American countries throughout more than

a centur y :

1855. The William Walker filibusters landed in Nicaragua with thepurpose of annexing the whole of Central America to the southern

states of the United States. Walker proclaimed himself president andrestored slavery in Nicaragua. That same year, the colonels in activeservice, K inneys and Fabens, proclaimed the independence of SanJuan del Norte, a sovereign terr itory of Nicaragua.

1856. Through the Dellas-Claredin Treaty, the United States ceded

148 Sa n d in is tas Speak

t o England the ter r i t or y of Bel ize, which did not belong to i t .1860. The United States intervened for the first t ime in Panama,

under the pretext of restoring order.1867. The United States aff irmed i t s ownership of Nicaragua

through the Dickinson-Ayon Treaty, which gave it the right to buildt he interoceanic canal .

1896. United States mi l itary forces landed in Nicaragua, at theport of Corinto.

1899. More United States military forces landed on our territory, inSan Juan del Norte and Bluefields.

1900. The U n i ted States imposed on N icaragua and Costa Rica theHay-Corea and H ay-Calvo t reat ies to acqu ire control over the canalroute t hr ough the Cent ral A m er ican i st hmus.

1901. The marines landed in the Panama isthmus.1903. The marines landed in Puerto Cortes, Honduras.1904. The marines landed in Ancon and other points in Panama.

That was the year when Theodore Roosevelt elabor ated the "Roosevel t

corollary" — or, rather, the big-stick policy.1905. A further landing of marines in Puerto Cortes, Honduras.1909 . The Un ited States intervened in N icaragua to over t h row the

government of Gen. Jose Santos Zelaya through the in famous "K noxnote."

1910. The marines landed in Corinto, Nicaragua, and attacked ours hores unt i l they imposed thei r own ol igarchic government .

1911. The United States again landed its marines in Corinto, Nica­ragua; imposed presidents in Honduras and Nicaragua; and compelledCosta Rica and N icaragua to accept onerous debt consol idat ions andnew loans.

1912 . The mar ines landed yet again i n H onduras and the U n i tedStates began i t s m i l i t ary occupat ion of N icaragua which was to lastunti l 1925.

1914. The United States imposed on Nicaragua the shameful Cha­morro-Bryan Treaty, which divided our sovereign terr itory.

1918. The marines landed in Colon and Chiriqui, Panama.1 919 . Th e mar i nes occupied H onduran por t s t o i n tervene i n t h e

electoral process.1920. The marines landed in Guatemala on the pretext of safe­

guarding the lives of North American citizens and protecting the lega­t i on .

1921. The marines occupied the region of Chorrera, Panama.1924. The marines landed in Honduras and occupied Tegucigalpa,

and other cities of the country .

AppeaL for Justice and Peace 149

1925. The marines landed in Honduras and Panama, in both casesto break workers' st r i kes.

1926. After leaving the country for many months, the marines re­t u rned to occupy N icaragua. That m i l i t ary occupat ion was to last unt i l1933, when the Yankee troops were compelled to w i t hdraw in the face

of the heroic resistance of the army, headed by Sandino, defending ournational sovereignty .

1930. The North A me rican f ru i t companies promoted front ier wa rs

and m i l i t ary up r i sings, imposed presidents, and underm ined the na­t i onal sovereignty of Guatemala, Honduras, and Panam a.

1954 . The U n i ted States, t hrough the Cent ral I n tel l igence Agency

i CIA), over t hrew the government of Gen. Jacobo Arbenz in Guatema­la .

1961. The United States mili tary mission directed a coup against aciv i l i an-m i l i t ary j unta of a nat ional i st ic character in El S alvador.

1964 . U n i ted St ates troops in the Panam a Canal Zone at tacked a

nat ionalist demonst r at ion and murdered th i r t y Panamanians.

1960s. Ear l y i n th e decade the U n i ted States also launched t heabor t ive invasion of Cuba.

1972 . The U n i ted States signed w i t h Colombia the Saccio V tisquez

Car r izosa Treaty , wh ich was har m fu l to the int erests of N icaragua'ssovereignty . I n that same year U n ited States forces were taken from

the Panama Canal Zone to M anagua to safeguard the stabi l i t y of t heS omoza regime after the ear thquake that destroyed that ci t y .

1978 . The U n i ted States attempted to impose a mediat ion policy in

Nicaragua to preserve the system and prevent the triumph of the San­dinista people's movement .

1979. The United States secretary of state, at the SeventeenthMeet ing of Consu l t at ion of the Organizat ion of Amer ican States, re­quested m i l i t ar y in terven t ion in N icaragua to frust r ate the Sandinis­

ta people's success. American helicopters landed in Costa Rica, in ac­cordance w i t h a plan to inter fere in our war of l iber at ion .

1981. The United States sent mi l itary advisers, mil itary helicop­ters, and war mater iel to El Salvador and Honduras. It cut loans to ourcountry for development and for the purchase of food by $81.1 million.It allowed the training of former Somoza guards in mil itary camps inthe state of Flor ida. I t r at i f ied the Saccio Vasquez Car r izosa Treaty as

an act of provocation against Nicaragua. And it began with Hondurasthe "H alcon V i sta" m i l i t ar y maneuvers.

T w o day s ago Col . Samuel D i ck ens, an A m er ican off icer an d amember of the Council of the Inter-American Defense Board, stated onarrival in Tegucigalpa that the "Halcon Vista" mi l itary maneuvers

150 Sa n d in is tas Speak

were but a sample and that the United States was ready to give itssupport to Honduras in a war against N icaragua and to at tack the peo­

ple and the revolutionary government of Nicaragua.His lack of respect did not stop there. He also attacked the govern­

ment of Honduras because i t proclaimed that i t was neut ral v is-a-v isneighbors like Nicaragua and a guerri l la war such as that in El Salva­d or. He also at tacked the governments of Mexico and France. A l l t h i saccompanied t he ar r i va l i n Puer t o Cortes on t h e A t l an t i c Coast ofHonduras of the U n i ted States amphibious vessel Fo rt Snell in g w i t h

500 marines, three patrol boats, a tugboat, and mil itary materiel .There also ar r ived at the same t ime at San Pedro de Su la, Honduras,two observat ion a ir craf t of the U n i ted States A i r Force coming from

the Panama Canal Zone.What can we cal l al l t h is'?The U n i ted States also t r ies to use Cent ral Am er ican ter r i t ory — as

i t di d in the 1960s to at tack Cuba — to at tack N icaragua now .Act s of aggression , i n ter ference, pressure, an d blackmai l never

cease. Respect for the sovereignty of our coun t r ies has never been ob­ta ined from the U n i ted States. The expansionist t h i nk ing of t he last

century, the gunboat treaties, the big-stick policy, have emergedagain.

In the face of these facts and threats we cannot remain si lent or inac­

t i ve, because history j ust i f ies our bel ief that we can be at tacked againand that the sovereignty we won once and for al l by force of arms onJu l y 19 , 1979, i s i n ser ious danger . Peace and stabi l i t y i n Cent ral

A mer ica are seriously endangered. Is this the k ind of history that w i l lrepeat i tsel f in Cent ral A mer ica?

Our peoples are ready to respond as Sandino did to any attempt atd irect or i nd irect aggression, ei ther i n N icaragua or i n E l Salvador .We al l know that the t hreat of invasion is directed f i rst and foremost

against those two peoples.Wi l l that intervent ionist policy cont i nue to be imposed on the wi l l of

the people of the Un ited States? W i l l the pol icy of sustai n ing, arm ing ,

and defending i n Cent ral Am er ica such cr im inal regimes as those ofUbico, Hernandez, Mar t inez, and Somoza cont i nue to he imposed? I twould appear so, according to the nostalgic words of'a represent at i veof the U n i ted States who, on her passage t hrough Peru, aff i rmed that

she would prefer Somoza in power in Nicaragua rather than the Sandi­nistas.

How far wil l economic aggression, hand in hand with mi l i tary ag­gression, against N icaragua go? W i l l t he policy of in terven t ionism inCentral America again be imposed with impunity? Wil l the United

Appeal for J u st ice and Peace 1 51

States cont inue to promote a wrong-headed policy in Cent ral Amer icaleading to an explosive regional crisis that will make worse an alreadydifficult international situation?

We wish to st ate yet again ou r f i r m posi t ion on t h i s quest ion . We

want peace, but not at the cost of freedom. We do not want war, but ifwar is waged against us we shal l resist w ith a people's war. We bel ieve

that although the picture is somber, the outlook threatening, there isstil l t ime to stop the warmongers.

Central America demands changes; the revolutionaries, the CentralAm er ican pa t r iots, ar e pr om ot in g those changes, an d th e Cent r alAmer ican peoples are ready to br ing them about . The just war being

waged by the heroic people of El Salvador demands a t rue solu t i on, onethat cannot be obtained through elect ions based on bloodshed, one that

cannot be obtained t hrough par am i l i t ar y gr oups, one that cannot beobtained through ever greater i nt erven t ion by the Un i ted States, onethat cannot be obtained through genocide.

It is for those reasons that, in our quest above al l for a stab i l izing so­lution in the area, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua applaudst he declarat ion made recent ly by M exico and Fr ance concern ing thesearch for a pol i t ical solu t ion in E l Salvador as a resul t of a dialoguebetween the bel l igerents.

We also welcome the resolu t ion on the si t uat ion regarding hum an

rights in El Salvador; and the possible ways and means of achieving apol i t ical solu t ion adopted at the Six ty -Eighth Conference of the Par l i ­

amentar y U n ion , w h ich met i n H avana September 15-24, 1981; theproposed resolut ion on Cent ra l A m er ica and the Car ibbean put fo r­

ward by t he Socia l ist I n te rna t ional, meeti ng i n P ar is in S eptember

1981; and the f inal declarat ion of the meet ing of Intel lectuals for t heSovereignty of the Peoples of Our Am er ica, held in H avana September4-8, which also relates to the st ruggle of the Salvadoran people.

We said that we were the bearers of a speci f ic proposal aimed at as­s ist ing Cent ral Am er ica in i ts st ruggle for peace in the wor ld. That is

why today we fulfill the duty demanded of us by historic circumstancesand inform you, M r . President , and the representat ives of th is assem­

b ly of the nat ions of the eart h of the proposals conveyed to us by t heS alvadoran pa t r i ots. Bu t f i rs t w e should l i k e t o say t ha t th er e i samong us, accompany ing the delegat ion of N icaragua, the president of

the Revolut ionary Democrat ic Front of El Salvador and member of theJoin t Pol i t ical Commission of the Farabundo M ar t i N ti t i onal I , ibera­t ion Front and the Revolut ionary Democrat ic Front, Comrade Gui l ler ­

mo Ungo.Th e proposals ar e dated October 4 , 1981, and addressed t o Com­

152 S a n d i n i s t as S p e ak

mander of the Revolu t ion Dan iel Ortega Saavedra, coordinator of th eJu nt a of the Government of N at ional Reconst ruct ion of N icaragua.

They are as follows:

The Farabundo Mart i National Liberation Front and the Revolutionary De­mocrat ic Fron t au thor ize you to convey to the U n i ted N at ions General Assem ­

bly, at its Thirty-Sixth Session and to the peoples of the world, our proposalsconcerned w i t h possible peace ta lk s a imed at solv ing the cr isis at present af ­

fl i ct ing our coun t ry . The fol low ing is the tex t of our proposals:The Farabundo M ar t i N at i ona l L iberat ion F ront and the Revol ut ionary De­

m ocrat i c Fron t address the in ternat ional com m u n i t y and peoples of the wor l dbecause they consider the U n i ted N at ions to be the expression of the pr inciplesof' peace, Just ice, and equal i t y am ong states and peoples and therefore the ap­

propr i ate forum in w hich to express the aspi rat ions of the people of El Salvador

and i t s representat ive organizat ions, I"M L N and I'"DR.May we f irst of al l express our gr at i t ude for the many expressions of sol idar ­

ity with the struggle of our people we have received from governments, as wellas from organizat ions and pol i t ical, social, and rel ig ious personal i t ies, through­

out ou r st r uggle. We wish most especial ly to express our gr a t i t ude to the gov­ernments and peoples of Mexico and Fr ance for t hei r sol idar i t y , for they haverecognized our organizat ions as represent at ive pol i t ical forces. May we also ex­

press our thanks for the comments and proposals of most of the coun t r ies of thein t ernat ional com m u n i t y in suppor t of a pol i t i ca l solu t ion .

If today ou r people, d irected by the Farabundo M ar t i N at i onal L iberat ion

Fron t and the Revolu t i onary Democrat ic Front , are involved in armed st rugg leit is because regimes of oppression and repression have closed the peacefulchannels for change, leaving recourse to armed st ruggle as the sole legi t im atea l t ernat ive to the people in i t s quest for l iber at i on; that is, the exer cise of th e

un iversal and const i t u t ional r i gh t t o resor t to rebel l ion against un law fu l andb loodt h i r st y au t hor i t y .

Our war is therefore a just and necessary war to build peace and bring aboutequa l i t y among al l Salvadorans.

However, what we want is peace and to achieve it we are proposing a pol i t icalsolut i on, the object ive of wh ich would be the end of war and the establ ishm en t

of a new economic and political order that wil l ensure for all Salvadorans theenjoyment of their national r ights as citizens and a life worthy of human be­ings.

Al l t h is suppor ts ou r ex press w i l l t o open a dialogue w i t h the ci v i l ian andmi l i t ar y representat i ves to be designated by t he j un t a t h rough a process ofpeace tal k s.

We in tend to base those peace ta l ks, wh ich reaAi r m our com m i t ment to seekarid implement a pol i t ical sol u t ion, on the basis of the fol low ing general pr inci ­

ples:Fi r st, they w i l l be car r ied out between delegates appointed by the Farabundo

Marti National Liberation Front and the Revolutionary Democratic Front and

Appeal for Ju stice and Peace 1 M

r epresentat ives of the gover nm ent j unt a in E l Salvador .Secondly, they wil l be conducted in the presence of governments which, as

wi t nesses, w i l l cont r i bute to the solu t ion of t he dispute.Thirdly, they wil l be global in nature, encompassing the fundamental as­

pects of the conflict on the basis of an agenda to be drawn up by both sides.F our t h ly , the people of E l Sa lvador must be informed of every developmen t .Fifthly, they wil l be opened without either of the two parties establishing

prior conditions.In an effor t t o ensure a basis that w i l l br ing about a pol i t ica l solut ion , the

F ar abundo M ar t i N at ional L iberat ion Front and the Revolu t ionary Democrat ­ic Fron t express the w i l l to discuss the fol low ing poin t s:

( a ) The def in i t ion of a new pol i t ical, economic, and j ur idical order wh ich w i l lmake possible and promote the fu l l democrat ic par t i cipat ion of the var ious po­li tical, social, and economic sectors, especially the poorer ones. Elections will bean im por tant element of the mechanism of par t i cipat ion and representat ion oft he populat ion .

(b ) The rest ruct u r ing of the armed forces on the basis of the off icers and menof the present arm y who are not responsible for cr imes of genocide against t he

people and the integration of the officers and men of the Farabundo Marti Na­t i onal L iber at ion Fron t .

Ou r f ront s regard elections as a va l id and necessary i ns tr u ment f or t he ex­pression of the w i l l of the people, prov id ing there are the necessary condi t i on sand a cl im ate that w i l l enable our ci t izens to freely express their w i l l . In El Sal ­

vador at present the electoral process does not f i l l t hose requ i r ements since therepressive apparatus of the regime which murders trade union and politicalleaders and act iv i sts, persecutes the progressive elements of the Chur ch, and is

responsible for the physical el im in at ion every day of dozens of ci t izens remainsin tact . Sim i l ar ly , m ar t ia l law and press censorship are st i l l in force and therehas been an escalat ion in the war against the people w i t h t he aid of weapons

and advisers sent by the government of the United States.A political solution is necessary for our people, for the stabili ty of the region,

for peace and secur i t y amon g nat i ons. Th i s means t hat gover nment s must

scrupu lously respect the pr inciple of non inter ference in the i n t er nal aff a irs ofo ther peoples. That i s why w e are d i rect l y addressing the gover nmen t of t h e

U n i ted States and ask ing i t t o cease its m i l i t ar y i n t ervent ion i n E l Salvador ,s ince t ha t i n terven t ion r uns counter t o the in t erests of th e Sa lvadoran an d

American peoples and endangers peace and security in Central America.Our proposal meets the claims for j ust,ice in accordance w i th the purest pr i n ­

c iples of i n t er nat iona l l aw , the i n t erests of nat ions and peoples of the wor ld ,

and the quest for a peaceful settlement of the causes of hotbeds of tension. Inthei r effor ts the Salvadoran people express thei r conf idence in the underst and­

ing, par t ic ipat ion , and suppor t of the in t ernat ional comm u m t y in the achieve­ment of their right to peace, freedom, and independence.

The document is signed by the U ni f ied Revolu t ionary Di rector ate of

154 Sa n di nis tas Speak

th e Farabundo M ar t i N at ional L iberat ion Fron t and the Execut i ve

Committee of the Revolutionary Democratic Front .We are convinced that this appeal for justice, this appeal for peace,

wi l l be recognized by al l those governments that are t r u ly concernedwith the, fundamental rights of mankind.

In the name of the dead, in the name of the tortured, in the name ofthe il l iterate, in the name of the hungry, in the name of the exploited,let t h is in i t i at ive not be in vain; let the forces of reason and love, theforces of peace, t r i umph once again over the i r r at ional forces.