Scholarship Report 2011.pdf

1 Early Intervention & Behaviour Change Programs For Police Officers.

Senior Sergeant Roger Knight Victoria Police –January 2011

The Tynan/Eyre Scholarship Report

Early Intervention & Behaviour Change Programs

For

Police Officers

By

Senior Sergeant Roger Knight



Contents Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3

Edmonton Police Department, Canada…………………………………………………………………………………………….5

Peel Regional Police, Canada………………………………………….………………………………………………………………13

Phoenix Police, Arizona, U.S……………………………………………………….…………………………………………………..23

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police, Nevada, U.S…………………..………………………………………………………………29

Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, [LASD]California, U.S….................................................................36

Los Angeles Police Department, California,[LAPD], U.S…....................................................................42

IAPro Conference, Austin, Texas, U.S…................................................................................................47

Merrick Bobb, Police Assessment Recource Centre & Monitor for LASD‐Los Angeles, California, U.S………..…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………49

Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..52

Abbreviations Used.

Uof ‐ Use of Force.

EIU/EI – Early Intervention/Unit.

EPS – Edmonton Police Service

LAPD – Los Angeles Police Department.

LASD –Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department.

PAS – Personnel Assessment System.

CALEA – The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies

FTO – Field Training Officer

TEAMS II ‐ Training Evaluation and Management System

PPI – Personnel Performance Index



Introduction I have been a member of Victoria Police since 1973. In that time I have seen our behaviour and culture change on many occasions. The behaviour that was around when I started would not be tolerated now and many of our members now have no idea just what the culture and behaviour has been like.

As I have travelled through this job, I have seen instances where we do not and still don’t, tackle the difficult issues in relation to police behaviour. It is often too difficult to do something about a poor performer, a member with behaviour issues, a poor manager and many other issues that we have all seen and identified with.

The behaviour doesn’t get treated; the member develops further poor behaviour or, even worse, infects other members with it. Those behaviours are passed on and the trainer is training a new type of behaviour in other members.

Other police forces have learnt the hard way. Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department have gone through Commissions of Enquiry as a result of corruption, along with many other police forces. The LAPD are still under the Consent Decree, a Federal Court order requiring the department to comply with conditions set to stop corrupt activity, as a result of the behaviour uncovered in the Rodney King beating and subsequent Christopher Commission in the early 90’s. The Christopher Commission found that much of the behaviour was obvious and it could and should have been dealt with at the time.

Early Intervention Programs are almost standard tools in most police forces throughout North America and Canada. They have identified that Police and their behaviour is risky business if not properly monitored.

In 2004, I began researching Early Intervention Programs from around the world. I have made many contacts and learnt an amazing amount about people and a profession that I have been in for over 38 years.



The tell‐tale signs that a member is having problems are in many cases not always obvious. A couple of years ago I was speaking to a Sgt who told me that he didn’t need any Early Intervention System to tell him when a member had problems. His problem solving skills were based on three questions, to properly diagnose the problem with the member; did he have a drinking problem, did he have a paperwork problem, or did he have marriage problems? We then had a vigorous discussion and the Sgt then admitted that his assessments were out‐dated.

The days of an easy ad‐hoc fix in correcting police behaviour are gone. Fortunately, drinking problems aren’t as common as they used to be, members can and do hide their paperwork and members, particularly males, aren’t that forthcoming with their relationship problems.

Members involved with drugs and other illicit substances, use of excessive force, pursuits, complaints, critical incident attendance, excessive use of discretionary arrests, financial/gambling issues and even part time employment, are often clear indicators of background issues that are not always obvious. Lack of confidence in their own performance can often be masked by other more obvious behaviour.

I have been extremely fortunate to have been given the opportunity to study Early Intervention and Behaviour Change Programs by being granted this scholarship.

I studied Early Intervention Programs with Police Forces at Edmonton and Peel Regional Police, Canada, Phoenix, Las Vegas, Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Mr Merrick Bobb‐ Monitor of the LASD and I attended at the IAPro Conference in Austin.

I have been given electronic copies of all Early Intervention presentations from the IAPro Conference, and every Police Force I visited gave me electronic copies of their programs and training packages.

The assistance that members from every police force and other organisations I visited was overwhelming.

Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to study what has been an ever increasing passion of mine for the past 6 years. Your investment has not been wasted.



Edmonton Police Department, Canada Sgt. Eric Johnson, Early Intervention Program

Shelley Cornfield, [Analyst] Early Intervention Unit.

Constable Curtis Hoople, Welfare Unit, Edmonton Police

Lawrence Peck, Police Chaplain Edmonton Police.

The Edmonton Police Service has 1490 sworn and 580 members.

The Mandate of the Edmonton Police Service and, for that matter, it would accurately describe the functions of all of the Early Intervention Units that I visited during this study tour is:‐

1“Early Identification and notification of potentially damaging patterns of behaviour; providing member’s and supervisor’s assistance throughout to ensure individual and organization success”

The Early Intervention Unit [EIU] is not attached to Internal Affairs as, even though they deal in similar issues, their objectives are different. The Early Intervention Unit analyses the excess of the thresholds of trigger points, assesses the behaviour and treats the behaviour before it becomes a problem for the member, and the department. These trigger points include, Critical incidents, Use of Force, Complaints, Discretionary Arrests, Departmental concerns, e.g. missed court dates, Traffic Concerns, Pursuits and a number of other concerns and indicators that would indicate when a member, group, or even a station or unit, is in danger of developing serious behaviour issues that could lead to corrupt activities.

The EIU stress that they are not a part of Professional Standards. They go out of their way to ensure that every member is aware of that. In fact the EI Unit have access to all Internal Investigation data, but the Professional Standards Officers do not have access to the EI data. The EIU members have a higher security clearance [Top Secret] than the Professional Standard [Secret] access. It is imperative that the credibility of the program is not compromised under any circumstance. Without this understanding members will not co‐operate willingly with the EIU when the behaviour is in its infancy. Instead, if there is a compromise of this understanding, the members will not have the confidence to readily admit behaviour that can be changed at an early stage. I was told that a

1Edmonton Police Service



couple of Professional Standards detectives accessed the EI computer of an analyst for better information on a member that they were investigating when she was absent from her computer for a short time. The EI program credibility had been severely compromised as a result and she was dismissed from her job.

Wellness Branch Human Resources

– Early Intervention Unit – CISM (Critical Incident Stress Management) – Member Support Services (Employee Assistance)

Chaplain

I was impressed with the spirit of co‐operation between the units and members within the Wellness Branch. They all are aware of the importance of this program, they make member referrals to the appropriate unit and nothing is left to chance. The chaplain is very pro‐active; he mixes freely with police members, doesn’t dress in religious clothing and has no religious identification on him. He conducts suicide prevention with members in most training courses and is often called upon by the EIU and the police members alike. It was apparent in my dealings with him and watching his interaction with the members, that they know and are confident with him and have a great deal of respect for their Chaplain.

Edmonton Police uses a commercially available off‐the‐shelf program. IAPro collects essential data and is used by Professional Standards as a case management system. It also incorporates Blue Team, an essential dashboard which shows all members their triggers and thresholds as they are activated and exceeded. IAPro/Blue Team also warns the EIU of impending problems with members and situations that should be further examined. This program sources all information from the data that members report on as a matter of course use during every contact, and it is live. There are no separate data bases that slow the system down, or do not talk to this essential program.

Other essential data such as personnel records and training is fed from other databases that the department uses and this is collated into IAPro giving a complete picture of members and their work practices, behaviour and management. There are a few minor changes to the system that will shortly be added with an upgrade to IAPro that will make the EI system complete, an almost one‐stop shop allowing all members and managers to view all trigger points shortly after they are entered onto the system. It will give the department an almost live picture of what is actually happening within their ranks at the time and, more importantly, allowing risks to be actioned as they are building.



Current Behaviour Indicator Types

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS EARLY INTERVENTION

Critical Incidents Citizen Concern

Discretionary Arrest Complaint of Conduct Use of Force Criminal Investigation

Traffic Concerns EPS Concern Vehicle Pursuit Information Only

Current Indicators & Thresholds

2

2Edmonton Police



Reports to the Early Intervention Unit

Any member may make a report about another member to the Wellness Office if he/she has concerns for a member for any reason. It is designed this way to encourage members to take some responsibility in dealing with issues that can affect the member, or other situations he/she works with.

5 ways to access program –

– Member initiated – Peer initiated – Supervisor initiated – EI Unit initiated – System initiated

Once a member has been identified as a risk, further detailed examination of the member is undertaken. This ensures that there is no knee jerk reaction. There is further examination of the behaviour, supervisors are spoken to and asked for an opinion. Often the supervisors are able to clear up the matter or confirm what has been detected. Another issue that has been identified is that when the EIU make contact with a supervisor in relation to a member, the supervisor will identify another member/s that has been of concern to him. This leads the EIU to treating the behaviour of other members at‐risk too. This cross checking also stops members’ malicious reports from being acted upon. To date there have been no malicious reports.

Critical/non‐critical incidents

I asked how they determine what the difference is between Critical/non‐critical incidents. There had been some conjecture within the department and it was decided that it was the individual’s determination, but what they have learned from the process is not what I may class as critical or non‐critical. Who are we to determine what the member is going through at that time in their life? For example, whilst we may class going to an elderly person’s natural death as non‐critical the member may have had an elderly relative die recently, which all of a sudden changes the member’s perception of the job that we and the member would normally take as non‐critical and may now become critical. This type of interpretation can also be applied to other non‐critical jobs, and that has been found to have a bearing on members’ behaviours.

Erik is a Sgt but, his rank or lack of it, does cause him some problems. In most instances he is dealing with Sgts and Staff Sgts [S/Sgt] who can stand him up and cause him some issues when he deals with them, such as when he is instructing the other managers to implement plans etc., some members don’t want to be told by a member of, or below their rank, what to do. He has often had his Staff Sgt conduct meetings when dealing with other Staff Sgts involving a member under their control, and



Erik has to feed his S/Sgt the information during the meeting, even though Erik has done the work leading up to the meeting. He also says that being an officer in the unit will not work, as it puts the officer too far away from the O/R’s and steps the meetings and actions up to levels which should remain in more delicate stages.

He found that many members who exceeded the thresholds on many aspects and needed to have some form of plan implemented had displayed an arrogant attitude and it was not until all of the data is put in front of them, that they then start to accept that they have a problem. In many instances the members did not realise that they were displaying concerning behaviour until this action was brought to their attention and a plan implemented.

Many of the members also had an inflated opinion of the value of their work performance, and likewise many of the supervisors also had the wrong impression of their members work output. Often they were lulled into a false perception of the member. Members who thought they were the best worker were in fact the worst. Bad news for the managers too! This indicates that the members were not able to adequately judge their own behaviour and the managers were not being effective managers. They believed the member’s hype, and took their eyes off the ball.

The Wellness Office has a higher security rating with the trigger data managed by IAPro than Professional Standards do. This is because if Professional Standards has access to the EI information it would compromise the EI process, corrupt the integrity of the program with the members and there would be little co‐operation from the members. Professional Standards would also use it to pre‐empt any EI initiatives.

They have found that the EI program is telling a different story to what personnel assessments are. This is because:‐

1. Managers do not like to be the bad guy and tell it like it really is. Managers inevitably give members a good rating even though they know that the member needs help, and

2. Managers don’t know what they should know about their members and give them a better or average rating because of that.

Either way, problem members are not officially identified and treated before they become a bigger problem or they infect other members creating an even bigger problem. The EI program is making managers accountable and responsible for both their own behaviour, their leadership and the way they manage their people.

Members have access to IAPro through a dashboard called Blue Team [see page 21] that they can all access through the Intranet. They can only see their own data. They do not see IAPro directly, just the dashboard. This is the back end of the data/case management program. Blue Team allows each member to see how their behaviour affects the trigger points and eventually triggers an excess of the pre‐determined threshold. The EI unit often receive calls from concerned members who have



identified patterns in their own behaviour. This has allowed them to take a pro‐active role in changing and modifying their own behaviour before it becomes a problem.

The EI unit have also identified that recruits trained from the start in the Police Academy about behaviour, police culture and the identification of trigger points, have had a noticeably better behaviour attitude than members who were not trained from the beginning. In the time that they have been on the street, they have had significantly less complaints and behaviour issues than that of other members of that vintage who have not been trained. We should start training members at recruit level in the first 2 week Ethics Program about these issues and eventually everyone will be able to identify with the reasons for EI. Every management course should undertake this training so that eventually everyone gets the same message. It will be a cultural change that will take time. The issues will not go away and neither should the necessity to train members in this essential behaviour change program. The EI unit are attending training courses and briefings across the department to train members in identifying at‐risk behaviour. Supervisors are given more detailed training as it is they who are expected to identify and deal with the issues as they are unfolding.

When a member has been identified as having a behaviour issue and the meetings with supervisors also confirm this, an offer is made to the member in a formal presentation of the issues identified. The EIU Sgt then deals with the member in the treatment of the behaviour. The treatment may take as long as it takes to get it changed, and it can involve anything to get the member back into being a confident effective police officer. Treatment can range from internal training, communication courses, confidence building, and anger management. It can also lead to other outside treatment because issues such as alcohol/drugs/relationships/gambling can all lead to poor behaviour on the job that, until the EIU intervened, was not known.

A Sergeant was found to have 25 Use of Force reports when other Sgts were having on average 2. A subsequent check on his shift also found that they too had high UoF. The shift had copied his style. The Sgt’s leadership style behaviour was corrected. As a part of the treatment program he was also given the opportunity to correct his subordinates’ behaviour too. This was achieved with great success, he changed, they changed ‐ everyone learnt new skills.

The EI program is entirely voluntary. Of course, when the member is aware that his behaviour has become known it is always quickly identified by the members that it is better to get it treated rather than run the possibility of being charged for the same behaviour that could have been treated at an earlier stage.

Triggers/Thresholds are measured over a 12 month period. After the 12 months a new cycle begins and the member starts the process over again.



Success is judged by:‐

• Increased knowledge and buy‐in by members • Member complaint reductions • Pro‐active instead of re‐active • Well received by Chief’s Committee and Executive Officers Team

One of the best quotes that I heard, and I heard a few whilst I was away, summarises police behaviour over time as:‐

"A normal reaction...by a normal person...to an abnormal event..." We then discussed how this effects our "circle of normal" and how it is now larger and skewed compared to normal everyday people...Police have a massive circle of normal that grows with experience...where they fall in that circle of normal is all about the coping mechanisms that they put in place to understand the change...In other words, we’re screwed….

3*

This also goes for members’ behaviour along the way. We shouldn’t take full responsibility for them but, their behaviour, along with Hoople’s assessment is correct. We expect them to do society’s dirty work, be responsible, be cool, not take the law into their own hands, have rules of engagement where some members of society don’t, society turns on us when it suits ‐ and we expect that we don’t have some responsibility for some of the behaviour that we have created.

EI results cannot be measured. You will never know how many complaints you have stopped. This can also be applied to reducing the road toll, or any other pro‐active operation. You will never know how many deaths or injuries you have stopped because the events have not occurred.

Another good point made by Erik was, “Retired members leave the department after giving a lifetime of service. They have worked alongside us and when they retire we take their life and soul away from them. We are responsible for them”.

I was fortunate enough to have a sandwich with the Police Chief, Mike Boyd. He was a huge supporter of the EIU and has ensured by his genuine support that the program has been successful. He is popular amongst the Edmonton Police members.

3Constable Curtis Hoople, Edmonton Police Early Intervention Office.



An issue I think we should seriously look at is the informal complaints made at stations where no record is ever made of these complaints. In Edmonton they cannot proceed with a complaint unless the complainant actually wants to make a formal complaint. Most of those people contact a supervisor and then never come back. But, they do record these informal complaints in IAPro and they stay recorded as Informal Complaints. What they have subsequently found is when they examine a member's history along with all of the other data, or when a member gets into serious trouble, it is obvious he has developed a course of behaviour over a period of time and those Informal Complaints have been the warning signal.



Peel Regional Police, Canada

Det. Sgt. Evan Cranna. Officer in Charge Early ‐ Intervention Unit, Risk Management Carmie McCormack ‐ Blue Team Administrator, Early Intervention, Risk Management. Bonnie Martens – Analyst Peel Regional Police

The Purpose

4“Early Intervention is a non‐disciplinary approach to providing Offers of Assistance to members at the earliest possible opportunity, in order to minimize risk to the member, the organization and the public we serve”.

Early Intervention Unit and Professional Standards are two separate units. EI has a higher security rating, because it needs to maintain independence and integrity with the system and the members of the department.

The department uses IAPro/Blue Team as the data management / EI package.

There are 2 analysts in the office, both carefully selected. All information is kept in house. Nothing is shared with Professional Standards.

When Professional Standards are made aware of anything the details of the incident are automatically forwarded to the EI unit, it automatically gets flagged and the EIU begin a background check on the member. An analyst then completes an assessment and gives Evan a package on the member.

Three levels of Intervention

(1) Carmie goes through the software and comes up with an initial assessment of the member along with a check of the member’s history. Evan then decides if they need to probe further and they will assess with other members in a similar work environment.

4 Peel Region Police EIU



(2) They access their “Neiche” System looking at all type of work performance history, traffic tickets, geographic plotting using histograms and charts.

(3) They look at the environment through the lens of the Patrol Supervisor or Det. Sgt, e.g., he may have been a coach officer, training younger members, given the green light to go outside his normal work area and find trouble spots to give younger members a higher exposure to those learning issues and he is now operating way ahead of the pack.

After the detailed analysis is completed, Evan contacts the supervisor and shows him the detailed charts and reports on the member. It may be that the member does not need any further work done on him, but the supervisor has had the issue brought to his attention. When they both decide that the member does not have any issues, they both decide that the file is completed. Evan then returns the file to his analyst and she also confers with the decision. She is the check and balance in the system. Once they have raised the issue, it is never assumed that the responsibility is going on to any other member to resolve.

If it is decided that they have issues with a member there will be made an offer of assistance made to him/her. The EI unit contact the Wellness Unit who has access to the health professionals. They then follow up with the member to ensure that he/she has made the follow up contact. This covers the Due Diligence and the Risk responsibilities of the department. This ensures that all avenues have been taken to get the member treated and back on the track, and also covers the department in case something does develop into a bigger problem e.g. the member commits suicide or other serious issue, when the department knew that there was something wrong and did nothing to stop it. If there was ever an inquest, there is evidence that the department and members did what was required to be done and show that it acted properly.

The first time a member has exposure to Use of Force, baton, OC sprays etc., an alert is triggered. This is done for three reasons ‐

(1) It’s probably the first time that this rookie has been exposed to something as traumatic as that,

(2) This will be the first time that member is exposed to Early Intervention, and that gives the member an EI contact. They will carry that EI with them for the rest of their career. The department is doing their Due Diligence. This intervention will be sent to the Sgt who does the contact. The reason for the Sgt doing this is to make sure that he is following through with his responsibilities, he takes ownership of that member, he understands the issues, and the member.



(3) Standards are set.

The Sgt is told to make contact with the EI office. They in turn will coach the Sgt in how he is to do the EI interview. They are aware that some Sgts will just do the basic follow up, but there is a built in accountability in this role. The EI team is not there when the Sgt does the interview. They do not want this to be a big deal, they do not want it to be too overbearing. They want to be seen to be pulling up next to the officer and saying, “We are riding beside you. Is everything Ok?,” He is the eyes and ears of the department, the radar, to look ahead on behalf of the department and to notify the appropriate people including the peer support group, if is there is a problem. It is visionary and leaves nothing to chance and makes sure that the problem is shut down.

Any member can come up and see the EI office. The office is set up so that any member can come into the office and not be seen by another member in the office. It is also common for a member to contact the EI and meet on the road.

Any member can send information to the EI office via the intranet. The only condition is that a member must identify himself about the information that he is disclosing about another member. But, in reality, if there is an anonymous notification they will, in fact, act on that information if a notification came through this system a file is generated and enquiries begin.

Blue Team is currently being trialled as a part IAPro with a small part of the Peel Police Dept. They are planning on going live to the rest of the department in early January 2011. They see this as another culture change to the rest of the department and awareness to the members of the trigger points that may lead to a change in their behaviour. This is turn should raise their understanding of not only their own behaviour, but the behaviour of their work colleagues, supervisors and the overall culture of the department.

It was acknowledged that by introducing an EI package it was effectively re‐training the members and supervisors in their behaviour. More importantly, it was making supervisors more accountable and making them take responsibility for their management style. If you are asking a Sgt to assume the role of accountability, then you have to give him the tools to do the job. Whilst it is acknowledged that this job can be done without IAPro, the department are doing their best to give the best tools and training, whilst discharging the responsibilities in Due Diligence.



Due Diligence

“Reasonable steps taken by a person to avoid committing a tort or offence, a comprehensive appraisal of a business undertaken by a retrospective buyer, especially to establish its assets and liabilities and evaluate its commercial potential”

1. The message that this sends to the employees of the department from the management says that we do care. We care that when your life is falling apart that someone does care and we have some help for you.

2. The message that it also sends to the public is that we care about the type of police officers we chose to work for you and that your officers are well taken care of and this is why we are spending a large amount of money on this software process. It also sends out a message to the public that the police are more accountable and responsible than they have been in the past.

3. It also sends a message to the government and the police overseers that we are taking seriously what you are asking for ‐ we don’t get sued.

The EI office must be well staffed and resourced to make the change work.

EI becomes the driver of the culture shift; it tracks and parallels the behaviour. They have tried Professional Standards and tried to shape a culture, it doesn’t work, and they tried embarrassment, demotion and promotions ‐ that doesn’t work. Cultural shift is not driven by discipline; it is driven by the department working with the members. They must have their hearts and minds changed, they pull up along‐side the members when things are falling apart and get the problems solved.

This is a transparent program, a manipulation of the members with a soft edge.

When an alert comes in other data, is from downloaded from their “Niche” system, including personnel information, repetitive stress and discretionary arrests, etc.,

Discretionary Arrests

Discretionary Arrests are monitored heavily and is usually an indicator that a member is over using his powers. Discretionary arrests are self‐initiated, no other person is a victim and it is usually a matter between the police member and the offender. It can indicate that the member is the protagonist who is looking for trouble. One example of this, was a member who was frequently involved in pursuits. He would allow them to run for some lengthy period of time. The member often sat off people who he knew were a high chance of being involved in a pursuit. The member was an adrenalin junkie. He thrived on the thrill of the pursuit irrespective of the risks to all. This behaviour was picked up via the EI program. The result was that a Sgt was briefed by the EIU and the member managed at a local level. The pursuits, the involvements of other members in this member’s poor behaviour ceased, and risks to members of the public were heavily reduced.

Members who were a passenger in the pursuit car are not counted if they were just an assisting officer.



When Fourth Class officers, those within the first 3 years of their career, are involved in a pursuit or first UoF they get an offer of assistance from the supervisor. It is not a full blown offer, just a check to see how they were affected by the incident. This is irrespective of whether the rookie is a driver or corroborator. This offer is made because many people have never been in a fight in their lives prior to the incident. This is a crucial point in their career; it exposes them to EI and programs the members for the rest of their career. This also keeps the Sgts in check, so that it puts an obligation on them to follow up with their members. It also ensures that the department has discharged its responsibilities.

When the Sgt addresses the behaviour issues with the member his detailed reply is sent back to the EI unit for assessment and filing.

Pursuits are also a high risk that is a trigger. There may be cases where the same members are in a number of pursuits together and this has to be addressed.

If members exceed the thresholds of 4 Use of Force in 3 months and discretionary arrests or other trigger the analyst will do a preliminary offer package for the OIC/EIU. Checks on the affected member are carried out and assessed against all of the risks and printed through IAPro producing an overall summary of the triggers going off. The OIC is then made aware of the issues arising and there will be a further deep scan of the data to see if there is a problem that should be investigated.



5Table of current triggers and allowable thresholds

From there, a direct referral is made from the analyst and the package is presented to the officer and the issues worked through with the supervisor. It is possible that the member may disclose other issues that the EI did not know about. This is not common, but has happened. If something comes out of the woodwork, only a 1 line comment is made in IAPro.

The issue of the supervisor and the member then becomes a divisional issue through the Wellness Program. There is then an obligation on the division to run with the EI program. The EI office then leaves it with the division and they follow up with it.

5Peel Regional Police



If there was an issue raised in EI process and there were still thresholds being exceeded, or the issues were getting worse or a re‐occurring issue, the EI office would then take a deeper look at them and consider the member and/or the supervision. An instance that they looked at recently highlighted a substance abuse. In this circumstance, they then look at the member’s suitability to remain at work whilst the issues are of concern. The EIU do not fix the issue, they put that back at the division responsible for the member to fix it. This ensures that the management take responsibility for the member and the issues, which may also highlight matters that need to be addressed at a local level. Many people consider that EIU is a last stop, but the unit do not consider that it is. They are making the management take responsibility for their people; they provide the background information and raise the emerging problem for the management, making them more accountable for their people and increasing the managements’ people skills.

The EIU don’t fix people, they shape them. They are the tools to give the supervisors the skills to become better managers to deal with the issues. They don’t “whack” people, Professional Standards does that. The pressure is on members and the managers just being involved in normal daily operations of police work, and they don’t have the time to fully monitor their members. They can overlook the problems. The department has now provided the EI tool and this holds managers accountable.

Policing has changed these days; there are many varied ranges of duties and more responsibilities and accountabilities for police of all ranks. The organisation has skilled all members in behaviour management and also made it incumbent on managers to take the lead, identify issues and do something about it when and at the time it is required.

McNeil Disclosures

There is a requirement in Canada that members who have been charged with any offence have to disclose to the defence that they are a McNeil Disclosure. For example, if a member has been charged with any offence e.g. exceeding PCA or has been served with an intervention order at any time in his career, he has to declare that information to the defence. The IAPro/EI data base has been modified to capture all McNeil matters for future reference. There is also a law firm who specialises in targeting members, units or whole stations. If they pick up behaviour or training problems, they capitalise on the matter. Many cases have been lost and civil writs paid as a result of the issues raised by these lawyers. McNeil Disclosures have caused pain for the members and department, and the EIU have had to make further investigations as a result. One good thing to come out of this is that the members have had to smarten their attitudes and become more professional as a result. A major problem is that members with a McNeil classification cannot be used to the full 100% because of the credibility issues. This caused real chaos at Peel. Issues such as this including domestic violence histories can explain why members behave in the manner they do. The EI process has been used to deal with many issues raised because of this process.



The program is also being used to monitor “who is training who” in poor work practices. This process is essential when one member, including a supervisor, can directly influence the behaviour of one or more members. They also pay particular attention to A/Sgts, as they can change behaviour of a group of police who they are trying to impress.

There is no negative feedback from the Police Union. The Police Department ensured that there was a good start up and the union was included in process. The union’s view is that it keeps their members out of trouble from the start and reduces their costs in defending members. It is like an insurance policy to them.

Managements’ style is much better as they are more hands on, they are better skilled in communicating with their members, intuitive in picking up problems as they are developing and know more about their people. It also develops their members’ skills in a similar way.

Indicator Data Points

y Pursuit reports y Public complaints y Human rights complaint y Use of force reports y Select 911 calls for service y Departmental Motor Vehicle Collisions y Discipline reports y Discretionary arrests

y Cause disturbance y Assault police officer y Resist arrest y Civil litigation



6[Above] The Blue Team Dashboard. The red and yellow indicate a problem

Problem members represent 3‐5% of police officers. Every other member operates below the threshold level.

Thresholds are adjusted depending on what the EI Committee recommends, and takes into account the statistical and analytical information available to it. They meet once per year to re‐assess their thresholds.

6Peel Regional Police Blue Team Dashboard.



The EI Committee is made up of:‐

• Management of the Police Service • Union • Membership • Using Statistical and analytical process.

People who are lazy don’t come under notice because they are lazy. The EI process is not a work performance tool. It will inadvertently identify lazy people and there are other indicators to identify these members. Supervisors should use those tools and not this program so that EI retains credibility with the members. Allowing this to be used for work performance measures will quickly destroy all of the good work.

The EIU do not show members all of their info/data. EI needs to be transparent, but if everything is given to members they go to other members and tell them that they “Should see what they are keeping on us”. This is a very fine balance and should only be shown to the Sgts and above.

Treatment programs are often used to treat a variety of behaviour issues including:‐ UoF training, confidence building, referring to the Organisational Wellness Unit, member assistance program and a new treatment program is currently under way with other professionals, including professional coaching.

All treatment is done in consultation with the Organisational Wellness Unit.

When criminal issues are identified by members the department has compellability and leverage against the members. This is not held back by the EIU.

At the end of the process the unit and supervisors have ‐ Showed‐Met‐Talked and RESOLVED.

EARLY INTERVENTION PROCESS

y Prior to conducting the interview, the Supervisor will consult with the D/Sgt in the E.I.U. to develop an interview strategy.

y Once the interview has occurred, the Supervisor, in conjunction with the member, will develop an action plan which is forwarded to the D/Sgt in the E.I.U.

y Upon completion of the action plan the alert shall be closed and no further action taken.

y A member may opt out of an action plan at any time.

They want to appoint a psychologist next year.



Phoenix Police Department, U.S. Patti Moore, CPA – Administrator – Administrative Services Bureau.

Detective Lynne Paul ‐ PAS Administrator – Employee Assistance Unit.

Lieutenant Dan Olsen – Professional Standard Bureau.

Phoenix Police Department has 3200 sworn members and 1000 unsworn.

They paid a lot of money in about 2000 to develop their own purpose built EI program ‐ Personnel Assessment System (PAS). They also use IAPro to do station audits, track property, speed camera files, money and, in fact, everything, and it also links it to members and their behaviour. This department has used IAPro to manage all these tasks and more, something that it was never initially meant to be used for. 7http://phoenix.gov/police/pas1.html

The EIU members said that if they had their time over again, they would have just bought IAPro off the shelf. There was a lot of work and a huge amount of money spent to develop it by themselves.

Trigger points were set in 2004 and were set by trial and error. Triggers were refined through the first year and in consultation with other police departments. They meet on a regular basis to refine the thresholds. They now have the bench mark.

EI monitoring is automated and when thresholds are exceeded notification is automatic. Adjustments are made to the thresholds when a special operation is under way as this will naturally increase the thresholds. The EIU can tell when an operation is running because of the high thresholds. They have checks and balances built in so that members cannot exceed them in an operation. Adjustments to the program will be manually overridden. Results are sent to supervisors for them to check if the increase is legitimate as a part of an operation.

Professional Standards use IAPro and information from IAPro is fed into PAS.

EI was originally initially set up with Professional Standards, but taken away from them and is a separate unit. EI is not a disciplinary process. This policy is in line with Edmonton and Peel police to retain credibility and confidentiality with the members. It is in the EIU charter that their program is non‐disciplinary. It defeats the purpose to be anything other than non‐disciplinary.

7Phoenix Personnel Assessment System [PAS] Home Page.



The unit can pick if a station is out of control, but this has not happened yet. A precinct had started to exceed thresholds but this behaviour was noticed at an early stage and brought back into line before it became a bigger issue. Everyone is aware of the EI program,the reasons for its existence and the need for police officers to control and monitor their own behaviour as a consequence.

Members were initially suspicious of EI because they thought they were a part of Professional Standards, but strong education and positive results soon convinced members that it kept them out of, rather getting them into trouble.

This system is for the members to monitor themselves and control their own behaviour. If they start to cross the threshold, a supervisor will talk to the member for a check‐up. This sends the right message to the members and reassures them that the process works. It is essential to be separate from Professional Standards; it stops suspicion, increases confidence in the process and promotes full co‐operation with the members.

Members have accepted that EI is here to help them. If Professional Standards approached the EIU for information on a member, it would be refused. Professional Standards have other means of getting the information if they need to, and compromising the EI process is not considered. Professional Standards have more access to data than the EIU are comfortable with and they are currently in the process of pulling back the ability of Professional Standards to have that much access.

If criminal behaviour picked up in the EI process it is not sent to Professional Standards, but to the Special Investigations Unit. SIU deals with behaviour that the department and the EIU are obliged to report.

A Sgt is the first point of contact with the member and if he can’t deal with it, it then goes further up the chain; advice is readily available from the EIU.

From the onset, when the behaviour is highlighted, the two considerations are:‐

• a performance, or • emotional issue,

What direction do they go? Consideration is also given to medical and psychological issues impacting on the member to do his/her job.

If the member has a pattern of behaviour that doesn’t respond to treatment, a recommendation may be made for a work fitness assessment, dismissal.

More training issues were detected than cultural issues and once identified, the behaviour has been resolved.



Some members have to be convinced that this was, “Your warning that you will be in the discipline system if you don’t change your behaviour”. This was a similar theme that I had been hearing from the other police forces I had visited up to this time. Members were displaying an arrogant attitude and were of an opinion that they were better than they really were, and their behaviour had to be addressed before it got worse, or involved other members too.

Phoenix had some members who gave no early warning that they were a problem and had done something stupidout of the blue, usually involving alcohol, where they found themselves going straight into the discipline process. This was unavoidable as the signals weren’t there at the time.

The media have asked what happened to the EI process where the member has offended out of the blue. The EI process can do a lot of things; it can’t predict what was unpredictable.

EIU involves 10 people on site and 70 people off site, the Supervisors on stations.

The human factor is the most important factor in the program

The Early Intervention process is a tool to help managers manage their people; it is also an important tool to help every member be self‐aware of their own behaviours.

This system stops “halo” personal ratings because it makes managers deal with the problem. A common theme in all organisations is that managers don’t want to be the bad guy and address poor behaviour or performance. The behaviour remains a problem because of their inability to address it. The issues usually follow the member from one station to the next station and they just start fresh if the behaviours don’t get treated. It compromises managers who are aligned to problem members and who they fail to take action on. It makes the managers respond to the problem and makes them accountable for what they did or didn’t do

The EIU will on occasions call the station management to tell them of an emerging problem and they have to deal with it before it becomes bigger. This will start a process in advising the management on how to deal with it and strengthening the process. The treatment plan will often involve anger management, training in driving, tactics training, counselling, confidence building, 30/60 or 90 day monitoring on an improvement plan. Dealing with members on a treatment plan this way,is very successful in addressing the behaviour.

The behaviour is addressed through a Performance Management Guide [PMG] and is written and evaluated for the member with the goals and achievements set. The plan goes back through the EIU for assessment at the completion of the plan. The Sgt and other direct line management are accountable for the plan and its outcomes. It is the responsibility for the Sgt to have appropriate/reasonable goals. It is not up to the EIU to determine what is happening on the station‐ that is a station/management issue.

If the plan works and the triggers stop going off then the problem is solved, but if they continue to go off, then the supervision is the problem.



The local media often asks what is happening with the EI program and they will sometimes do their own investigations into police members. No one wants to get caught short, the department needs to have as much up their sleeve as possible about what they were doing and they need to show that they are on to the problem, they picked it up and they are treating the problem before the media claims the issue.

We covered many issues but, a couple of really important issues they are dealing with at present, is a member who has been charged with 2nd degree murder, which is work related. This has not occurred before. The issue happened in a Hispanic area, which is a hot spot at present and there is a lot of pressure on the department to take action on the police in the area who are "anti‐Hispanic". There are allegations of racial profiling by the police. There is a racial uprising as a result. The EIU did a check on the local police, their attitudes and their behaviour in the area. They were able to prove that the police did not have behaviour problems as painted by “leaders “of the local community, who had nothing other than anecdotal evidence to support their arguments. The EIU used PAS to assess all of the trigger points and found that the police had not been exceeding the thresholds, which was essential to show that they did not have behavioural or cultural issues. This is a great tool for the department to put things into perspective. It is an effective tool to put armchair critics, who have no real evidence, in their place and to tell the truth as it really stands. Victoria Police are going through something similar to this at Flemington, where the local community are making similar allegations. We have no substantive data which would prove one way or the other if this was the case. Even if it was the case, if we had an EI system in place, we would be able to address the issues before they got out of control.

Phoenix is also dealing with a Sgt. who was recently found shot dead. They do not know if it was a suicide or execution. There is a major problem with many members claiming that the Sgt would never have committed suicide. It is raw because at this stage it can’t be proven to be either murder or suicide. The EI program has been used to back track on the Sgt's behaviour and found nothing to indicate a problem. They expect the behaviour of the members at the stations close to the member to change and are now heavily monitoring many of the police who are affected by this issue, using the EI system. They have gone back over the PAS info to check to see if they have missed anything that may have led to his death.

None of the EIU staff are professional counsellors, but they are picking up the warning signs and stepping in before they have bigger issues. EI/PAS is just another tool.

Trigger points affect people at different times in their lives depending on what is happening to them at that time.



I spoke to an Atlanta member at the IAPro Conference in Austin and she told me that a big behavioural issue with many police forces is the members returning from Afghanistan on military service. They don't have any tolerance and this is causing big problems. When I was at Phoenix, they gave me a research paper concerning this very issue. LA County Sheriff's Dept. has launched a very successful major program to deal with this behaviour. They are the leaders in this police/military program

Information taken into account by PAS/IAPro includes: ‐ Leave balances, and off duty work/second jobs/pursuits/military leave (valid concern but not an excuse). Off‐duty work can affect their work as a police officer. Some officers never have a day off work because of the lifestyle that they build, they can’t afford it on a normal wage; they don’t know how to relax. These issues impact heavily on their job. It causes problems with members being tired, lazy, short tempered displaying poor judgement. A typical example of this would show up in complaints, high UoF and short fuse problems.

They wish they had more oversight of off duty work, but they don’t. Off duty work is a bigger problem than officially recognised, because it never gives the members an adequate break. The union resists any control over part time employment because they say that the member has a right to work any other job.

I would have also considered that if members were in a life style that they can’t afford and have to work extra jobs just to support that lifestyle, they would be more susceptible to more corrupt activities.

Other issues that can cause problems for members and won’t show up in the EI system will include

• Single v married, • Kids v non kids, • Male’s v females. [Males have a different way of dealing with problems and Females usually

deal with problems better]

Referrals to the EIU by members

The EIU occasionally get referrals of members by other members. The EIU check this information with their data on PAS and then with the supervisor to confirm the information. Only after the information indicates a problem an approach to the member will be made. They have never had a malicious referral. It is generally found that these reports are accurate and usually means that if other members are aware of the problems, there are usually bigger issues.

Recruit classes are trained in Early Intervention principals at the earliest stage to stop other members unduly influencing them.



It is essential that EI does not get compromised. The Integrity of the program is essential. The EIU regularly attends at stations to show the flag and to retain confidence with the members. The program needs to be genuine and be staffed by genuine members. Police will see through this otherwise.

IAPro and Auditing

I spoke to Lieutenant Dan Olsen of the Professional Standards Bureau. I originally met with him at the IAPro conference in Phoenix in 2008 and again after that conference at his office. I was impressed then with his advances and was also shown the PAS at that time. This is why I wanted to go back to Phoenix again.

Dan had given a talk to members of the IAPro Conference in Austin the week before I visited Phoenix on this occasion. He had used IAPro for auditing, something that it was never intended to do, and which no other police force had used the program for. Everyone was impressed, even the company who owns IAPro.

The program is used by the department to manage data including Freedom of Information Requests, Traffic Camera Operations, including the storage of photos and correspondence to motorists and the department, Property Management, Station Management, including station audits. In fact, the department uses IAPro as a data/case management program for most of its operations.

– IAPro is used to store all audit documents & track each audit recommendation with due date. (Tasks with Due Dates – IAPro Today screen).

– IAPro is used in Property Management Bureau Inspections for the following:

• Destruction Random: Freezer • Random: Gun Room • Random: Missing Property • Random: Officer Release • Random: Secure Property Destruction • Random: Shredding Services

• Random: Temporary Lockers • Random: Vault Random: • Vehicle Lots Random: • Warehouse Gun Destruction • Money Escheat Random: • Bicycles Random: • Breakdown Random: • Cameras Random: • Drug Reanalysis Random: • Drug Room Random:



Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, U.S. Melissa Pugh – Early Intervention Coordinator – Office of Internal Affairs

Las Vegas Metro has a total staff of 5,500 including 2800 sworn members. They are the 7th largest police department in the United States.

Their original system was PAS and was punitive in nature.

In June 2008 the new system commenced operations. IAPro is used as a Case Management/EI system with Blue Team being used by members to directly input data and monitor their own behaviour and trigger points. The system is 100% paperless.

IAPro was launched and took 9 weeks to get up and running. Blue Team was launched first as they wanted the members to be comfortable with its use. Members then understood the EI principles and got used to it. Every member was trained in its use.

How is Early Intervention different?*8

� Represents a problem‐solving approach to employee performance. � Non‐Disciplinary‐designed to improve performance:

Counseling Training Coaching

� No record of participation is placed in an employee’s personnel file.

The keys to success *

� At every level of management, the key to the success of the program is the supervisor, whose effectiveness is twofold.

8 * Quotes from the EI Training program



First, that you recognize an employee’s decreasing job performance. This may be the earliest significant evidence of a developing problem. Second, that as supervisor you intervene to get the employee the help they need. The supervisor is the one who can most effectively provide the motivation for the employee

to seek help

What do you stand to lose? *

� To cover‐up for someone is to allow that person to get deeper and deeper in trouble.

It may even cost the person his or her job or life.

� Covering up for one employee’s failing performance reduces your credibility.

Employees

Administration

Oversight committee for EI consists of Supervision/non‐supervision, civilian and commission (oversight).

Some police members treated EIU staff with suspicion because of the previous PAS system that was punitive in nature. The EIU had to work hard to overcome the previous and probably well founded suspicions of the previous program. EIU are very honest with the members

Patterns Identifying the Impaired Employee*

Complaints, UoF, pursuits, discharge of firearms, rifle deployment, and‐

¡ Increased Absenteeism ¡ “On the Job Absenteeism” ¡ High Accident Rate ¡ Repeated Complaints ¡ Repeated failure to respond to radio dispatches ¡ Sporadic work patterns ¡ Lowered Job Efficiency ¡ Coming to/returning to work in an obviously abnormal condition ¡ Relationships on the job ¡ Unusual behaviors



Usually the first to notice*

` What should you be looking for?

◦ An outgoing employee who is suddenly quiet or withdrawn ◦ The usual joking among employees suddenly has an edge ◦ Quality of an employee’s paperwork has declined ◦ An employee begins avoiding responsibilities ◦ An employee is going through a divorce, or other family crisis. ◦ Can you add more??????????

Las Vegas Metro operates within the accountabilities of CALEA. [The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., (CALEA®) was created in 1979 as a credentialing authority through the joint efforts of law enforcement's major executive associations.] The reporting by members in relation to UoF and other documents used in Early Intervention is also strictly enforced to comply with CALEA standards.

9The Law Enforcement Accreditation Program was the first credentialing program established by CALEA after its founding. It was originally developed to address what was seen as a need to enhance law enforcement as a profession and to improve law enforcement. That mission continues today. The program is open to all types of law enforcement agencies, on an international basis. It provides a process to systematically conduct an internal review and assessment of the agencies’ policies and procedures, and make adjustments wherever necessary to meet a body of internationally accepted standards.

Since the first CALEA Accreditation Award was granted in 1984, the program has become the primary method for an agency to voluntarily demonstrate their commitment to excellence in law enforcement. The standards upon which the Law Enforcement Accreditation Program is based reflect the current thinking and experience of law enforcement practitioners and researchers. Major law enforcement associations, leading educational and training institutions, governmental agencies, as well as law enforcement executives internationally, acknowledge CALEA’s Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies© and its Accreditation Program as benchmarks for today’s law enforcement agency.

All members see their own Blue Team dashboard.

9http://www.calea.org/

*Notes:‐Las Vegas– Early Intervention – Supervisor’s Training &Management Development Program



1. Every officer should be aware of his own triggers, and 2. Supervisors are aware of each member under his control and EI issues.

What’s your Role as the Supervisor? *

3. As the supervisor of a poorly performing worker there is no way you can dodge the bullet. a. You either remain part of the problem if you ignore the situation, or cover it up, b. Or, you become part of the solution when you take positive action.

Everyone who complains including informal complaints goes onto the EI system. Members get to see all of these complaints. Complaints from mentally impaired people or mischievous complaints are not shown to the members. If the Sgt gets an informal complaint and resolves it, the complaint doesn’t stay on the system. If the Sgt can’t resolve it, or the person insists it goes further, then it goes on the system.

Incivility is a problem and alerts are generated. 2010 has seen a reduction in incivility but they have been extremely high in previous years.

Melissa mentioned a member who was short in stature and had major problems in communicating. He generated many complaints about his demeanour; he even tape recorded himself with every contact. He was authoritarian, no bad language. This was a difficult case. This member was placed into the EIU and it was his job to take complaints for 1 month. The member now rarely attracts a complaint. As a result of having to deal with people complaining about police behaviour, he learnt to understand that police don’t always get it right. He saw first‐hand what happens and modified his behaviour. This member was also involved in 2 police shootings and the EIU think that as time went on, he became more and more defensive, he was becoming over authoritarian and up front because he was also trying to get himself into a situation where he was immediately in control and people didn’t challenge him. This was a confidence issue and he was trying to get in first and become too dominant to try and head off any further confrontation with the person he was dealing with.

I will guarantee that very few supervisors would have considered the flow on effect from a person of his stature and the 2 shooting incidents.

Members access Blue Team from the Intranet. There are 7 indicators that they can see.

Things that impact police in their after‐hours life include alcohol, drugs, moral problems, money/ ambling and domestic issues.

If an employee gets arrested they then go onto the alert system, a supervisor is made responsible for him and an offer of assistance is made to the member. Stress levels also increase because Professional Standards is investigating too.



Every trigger is measured over 1 year. The year starts from the first alert generated. Everyone is subsequently on a different 12 month period.

The top 5% of the members in the system is where the problem personnel are and these are the people who cause the biggest problems.

All UoF reports need to be accurate to maintain credibility.

All accidents including minor ones are recorded on Blue Team as a trigger. A report on the accidents is sent to a Sgt for intervention if there is a problem. This history in the report is generated over the 12 months, but if the Sgt was to ask, then other details would be provided. Members who have problems with driving can be recommended by a Sgt for treatment programs, including courses etc. Many issues can be found in relation to police accidents, including highlighting a lack of confidence by the member.

Members will often discuss other issues when EIU gets involved. They may disclose other problems within their area involving not only themselves, but other members and issues that may need to be treated.

The EIU have built up a totally confidential relationship with the members.

EIU does not allow the Professional Standards to see any of the alerts because they do not want them to have pre‐conceived ideas about the member. Credibility of the EI program is an essential tool in maintaining an excellent working relationship with police members.

If Professional Standards was handling a major corruption issue the EIU would lock that case down and no‐one, with the exception of the administrator and the investigation team, would be able to see the case.

The success of the EI has been so strong that this year they will drop the UoF triggers from 5 to 4. A year ago the average was 10. Somehow the members have developed new skills in handling confrontation. Las Vegas are about to do some research to find out what has happened, why and what have the members done to so drastically reduce the UoF. They would probably have to go back to the supervisors to find out what has so rapidly changed the attitudes and skills of the members.

This has happened even though there is an average of 25 police shootings per year in Las Vegas. There is a big gang problem in Las Vegas. They were at 22 shootings at the time I visited. Not all of the shootings were fatal. The EIU were of the opinion that the officers are not gun‐happy, that is the environment that they live in, but with a huge reduction in the UoF triggers I consider that this is a magnificent effort. With every shooting, Professional Standards will go back to the EIU to check the history of each member.



Behaviour Problems

The biggest issues are:‐Public Interaction complaints, Excessive UoF, Neglect of Duty involving a very wide range of topics.

The Early Intervention/Case Management program can pull all essential information together on racial profiling. They believe that IAPro is a really good tool to support the department against these allegations.

The worst police behaviour stories become the best EI success stories and that creates even more confidence in the system.

EIU monitor and advise supervisors on how to detect, manage and treat at‐risk behaviour. It increases supervisors’ awareness of police behaviour.

10“We tend to forget that they are all human and treat them as a uniform. And we forget that they have problems with wives, alcohol, money etc.”

A part of the training program for supervisors involves a Sgt from the Wellness Program discussing on how to talk to people, a skill we all need to perfect. This program will take people out of their comfort zone when supervisors are taught how to develop new skills in talking to their people.

If a station does not address the problem behaviour, the problem is sent back for them to address it, this time asking for an explanation. This makes management look at the pattern too.

They had a supervisor who didn’t adjust. He was suspended. This program makes supervisors responsive and manages their people and their problems. They teach their supervisors that the police officer is not a statistic, he is a human.

There are checks and balances for officers who hang on to the UoF reports to avoid the triggers going off. The system does not allow for this and will trigger another alarm. CALEA requirements cover this problem.

A major issue that I see we have to deal with is that supervisors who attend the job must do the follow up paper work and reports. They know what has happened and they know what the responsibilities are. The supervisor knows what went on and how it should be followed up. Our supervisors, the 251’s, often do not come from the station that they are supervising. Too often the last the supervisor will see of the job is when he/she leaves the incident and returns to his own

10*Melissa Pugh – Las Vegas Police EIU.



station. The supervisor on the attending member’s station is left to deal with an incident of which he knows only what is written on the running sheet or brief. The Sgt may not know there was UoF used. This is a serious issue and should be given serious consideration.

I recommend that a system should be implemented whereby the supervisor who attends the incident in the first instance has the responsibility of following it through in its entirety, irrespective of what station he belongs to.

The Chief of Police did a 10 minute video on the Intranet supporting the Early Intervention Program, setting the pace and adding credibility to the program.

Captains use the EI program to check on the behaviour patterns of possible new members transferring into their area and if they don’t like what they see they do not take them. They feel if they were to inherit a problem from another area, they then need to ask why that area hasn’t dealt with the problem. That area may have encouraged the problem, but why haven’t they taken responsibility for the behaviour too. This keeps everyone in check and makes all responsible for that behaviour.

Every member involved in the Professional Standards and the EIU have all signed confidentiality agreements. This includes Sgts and above, who are not to share their information including to the officer himself unless it is a part of the treatment plan.



Los Angeles Sheriff ’s Department, U.S. Shaun Mathers ‐ Captain – Risk Management Bureau

Patrick Hunter – Lieutenant – Risk Management Bureau

Robert Taliento – Sergeant – Risk Management Bureau.

The LASD has 9,000 police members. The department is a police force for hire. This means they can move in and take over the policing duties in an area that has changed from one police force to another. They can lose policing contracts it they don’t measure up. They have a budget of $2.5 billion per year. They are also responsible for the prison system and the EI system is applicable to the prison system too. Police officers from the LASD have to spend the first 3 years as a prison officer before becoming a general duties officer.

They use the PPI ‐ Personnel Performance Index. This is purpose built for the department and is like IAPro only more sophisticated. LASD invest $144 million per year in risk management, and Early Intervention is a big part of Risk Management. PPI is an early intervention, mentoring program designed to provide structured, highly supervised guidance to an employee when, for whatever reason, it is determined necessary to enhance his/her performance. The program is not disciplinary nor was it ever designed to be disciplinary in nature, they have other avenues available, if/when needed, including discipline for administrative or criminal misconduct and "improvement needed" performance evaluations for underperforming employees. Consecutive "improvement needed" performance evaluations can lead to separation from the department.

11“The program is classic risk management. As a result, the program is administered not by their Internal Affairs Bureau, but their Risk Management Bureau. After all, there is nothing to investigate and the employee is not suspected of engaging in administrative or criminal misconduct. While the Risk Management Bureau may work with Internal Affairs Bureau personnel, there is no "coordination" between offices. Further, Performance Mentoring Program documents are confidential and there is no documentation that the employee is or was ever a participant in the program. Consequently, participation in the program cannot be used to deny an employee a transfer or promotion.

11Patrick Hunter – Lieutenant – Risk Management Bureau



Our Performance Mentoring Program and Internal Affairs Bureau are entirely separate and distinct offices and, have entirely different functions and objectives. The Performance Mentoring Program is administered by Risk Management Bureau because it is a non‐disciplinary, non‐punitive, early intervention program designed to enhance an employee’s performance and reduce the likelihood of their becoming involved in risk‐related behaviours (it is clearly a risk management exercise). On the other hand, Internal Affairs Bureau is responsible for investigating allegations of (administrative) misconduct. The decision to impose discipline in cases of employee misconduct is the employee’s unit commander.

Because the Performance Mentoring Program is non‐disciplinary in nature, no reference to an employee’s participation is recorded in his/her annual performance evaluation, appraisal of promotibility, or any other official Department document. Their participation is confidential. Further, current or past participation in the program cannot affect an employee’s ability to transfer to a different assignment or promotion within the organization

In evaluating an employee’s performance and possible candidacy for the program, one criterion (among many!) is the imposition of significant discipline (usually in excess of 16 days). Risk Management Bureau staff works closely with Internal Affairs Bureau staff in that regard. We are not so much interested in the facts of the investigation, just the resolution. One note of caution…Using Internal Affairs Bureau records and the imposition of discipline to evaluation candidacy is very, very subjective. Just because an employee has been subjected to significant discipline does not necessarily mean they are a good candidate for an early intervention (mentoring) program. The two (discipline and mentoring) can (but not always) be thought of as mutually exclusive.

Formal participation in the program is two years. Once an employee is removed from the program, Performance Mentoring Program staff informally monitor (yet document) their performance for an additional three years in the dimension that placed them in the program (e.g., use of force, complaints, etc.)”

The biggest problems at present are sickies on Mondays as a result of baby‐sitting, etc., and alcohol abuse.

Thresholds are on a 1 year cycle and are checked monthly. All information is sent to the Captains to provide a snapshot on UoF. They then have 20 days to get back to the unit with their assessment of the situation.

The Performance Management Committee is made up of 3 Commanders. The committee has 1 meeting per quarter to discuss the members at risk. The member is not present. There are 2 steps in the process.

(1) Looks fine no issues,

(2) Explore more on the member to the Risk Management Unit for an exhaustive investigation.



All risks are considered. They have about 63 members in the EI program at present. All are on different plans and there is no standard plan.

They want to change behaviour and that has to be right across the department. They look at all members twice per year to make sure that each member is travelling within range and they limit the damage as best they can.

The EI is driven to the local level and local issues.

At a local level, supervisors are required to meet with the member and update the status weekly. A progress report is required to be given to the committee every quarter. Progress reports are required more often in severe cases.

No member is forced to participate. If the member doesn’t want to do this he can’t be compelled to but most members are grateful for the opportunity to change and welcome the assistance.

Special attention is given to management because they may be a part of the problem, and this has to be considered.

EI issues are addressed at Compstat. Management are responsible and asked to explain what they are doing about their issues. Accountability is very high. This snaps everyone into line.

An example of a basic Early Intervention was a supervisor who had too many accidents in his area. He replaced the reversing globes with audible reversing lights for 6 months. All reversing accidents stopped. Although this is a very basic intervention, it displays that thinking outside the square can resolve even the most basic problem. They encourage all of their managers to take on all problems.

One member told me that it was better to have tried to resolve 10 problems and have failed 8 times, but at least you tried 10 times. You may not have resolved the other 8 problems fully, but you learnt a lot about people, yourself and new ideas for the future where they may work in a different circumstance. But it is unforgivable to not do anything. I agree!

Early Intervention was explained to me as:‐

Know the problem, understand the problem, do something!

If there is a problem with this ‐ it may really be the supervisor dealing with the problem doesn’t “understand the problem” and this will be the most crucial part that must be understood.

There is feedback from litigation & training when issues go against the department. A corrective action plan is instituted so that similar issues don’t happen again. If $20,000 or more is awarded against the department they have to show the board what corrective action has been put in place, how they have trained members and changed the process.



Another EI program that the department has in place is where members are involved in “Preventable” traffic collisions; these are where the investigation reveals that the collision was caused by the member. Previous methods of treating this problem was by using the discipline process, but nothing was done to retrain the member, or address the problem driver or address the lack of driving skills. The discipline process had little value when it didn’t address the root cause of the problem. The point system is similar to our demerit point system in the civilian driving licence system in Victoria emphasis training over discipline.

If the accident was preventable it will be classified into three categories,

Level One:‐

• Manoeuvring speed of 10 miles per hour or less prior to braking; • No disregard for safety; and, • No visible injuries

Level Two:‐

• Operating at a speed above 10 miles per hour prior to any braking and essential compliance with the road laws;

• No disregard for safety; • No life threatening injury; and, • The departmental vehicle is repairable

Level Three:‐

• All preventable collisions not classifiable as Level 1 or 2.

The Point System

The points will be retained against the driver’s history. The points will be accumulated for each individual traffic collision and maintained against the driver for 36 months from the date of the collision. When the 36 month anniversary of the first collision expires the points for that collision will be deleted against the driver’s record.

Level One = 1 point

Level Two =2 points

Level Three = 3 points or 4 points if there is notable disregard for safety and life threatening injury.

There are stages when a member will be removed from driving duties and re‐assigned to non‐driving duties reaches a pre‐determined number of points.



Members can redeem one point at the completion of the designated voluntary, off duty one day “Traffic Collision Reduction Class”. This class will be at the driver’s cost and in his/her own time.

Departmental Safe Driver Awards are made by the Captains of the LASD to acknowledge members who maintain a driving history free of preventable traffic collisions.

This is another example of an Early Intervention Program that strikes to the heart of each and every member. It’s not disciplinary; members will keep track of their points just like we do in Victoria to reduce costs and injuries.

This program has made significant reductions and improvements within the LASD.

There has been a drop in lawsuits and injuries as a result of this process in the 5 years after the Early Intervention process began.

The Sheriff’s Department has doubled in size, but costs have declined rapidly. They have saved 10’s of millions of dollars as a result of investing in Early Intervention. ‐ A powerful tool!

Members who are suspended do so under a new program and are now suspended 25 to 50 % of the time and training has replaced the full time suspension time. This has been found to have a more positive attitude with the members when they come back with a better attitude upon return.

Early Intervention is managed by the Risk Management Unit. It also involves the members and their supervisors. Management take a strong role in refining the member. The department has a vested interest in ensuring that they are a marketable product. They can lose policing contracts if they don’t measure up.

This program is also just as active within the prison system. The LASD manages the gaols, and this also presents the department with a huge issue. Whilst the trigger and thresholds are also measured, they have increased allowances where members may be involved in critical incident teams to specifically deal with unco‐operative prisoners in the system. But much of this training is carried into the general police duties system when the members are transferred to police duties at the end of their first three years.

The following paragraph is a sad fact of the culture of the LASD at the time of the KOLTS commission into their behaviour. Fortunately the department has learnt from these lessons and now has a substantial investment in Early Intervention, ultimately repaying that investment with better behaviour, supervision, self‐awareness, lower costs, stronger community respect and trust.



12“A year after the Christopher Commission report, the Kolts Commission investigated the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), and using a similar methodology identified agroup of 62 deputies with significant performance problems in the department. These 62 deputies were responsible for almost 500 use‐of‐force/harassment complaint investigations. Seventeen of these deputies were responsible for 22 civil lawsuits that resulted in damage awards or settlements of about $3.2 million against the County. The Kolts Commission concluded that the LASD had "failed to deal with officers who have readily identifiable patterns of excessive force incidents on their records." Not only were nearly all of the 62 deputies still on patrol duty at the time of the Kolts report, but–even more alarmingly many served as field training officers (FTOs). The Kolts Commission warned that in that capacity they were "imparting their 'street wisdom' to patrol deputies."

12*Early Intervention Systems for Law Enforcement Agencies – US Department of Justice Background: Origins and Development of Early Intervention Systems Page 47.www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e07032003.pdf



Los Angeles Police Department, U.S. Gerald Chalef – Police Administrator – Special Assistant for Constitutional Policing

Stuart Maislin – Commander – Assistant Commanding Officer – Personnel & Training Bureau

Ignacio Verduzco –Officer in Charge, Risk Analysis Unit

Officer Armand Lemoy ‐ TEAMS II Training Officer

Eva Macera – Management Analyst TEAMS II

Leona Reed Golden Police Service Representative TEAMS II.

There are 10,000 sworn and 3,000 unsworn members of the LAPD.

Their Early Intervention System, TEAMS II(Training Evaluation and Management System) was brought in as a result of the Rodney King, Kolts and Christopher Commissions of enquiry into corruption in LAPD and LASD in the early 90’s.

13“The aftermath of the 1991 Rodney King beating heightened national awareness of the phenomenon of the problem officer. The Christopher Commission, appointed to investigate the Los Angeles Police Department following the King incident, identified 44 problem officers in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) with extremely high rates of complaints. In a particularly notable observation, the Christopher Commission pointed out that these 44 officers were "readily identifiable" on the basis of existing departmental records. Yet, the LAPD appeared to have made no effective use of these records to identify the officers and take any corrective action. The Commission found, for example, that citizen complaint data were not used in making routine performance appraisals”. 14They have developed their own EI program as a result of the Consent Decree, the Federal Court Order put in place as a result of the Christopher Commission to ensure that the LAPD implement

13*Early Intervention Systems for Law Enforcement Agencies – US Department of Justice Background: Origins and Development of Early Intervention Systems Page 47.www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e07032003.pdf

14http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf



measures to protect members of the public from corrupt police officers. This Court Order is 281 pages. The order is still in place today, and it could be in place for at least another 5 years. TEAMS II deals with trigger points and under the Consent Decree there are 17 triggers/thresholds that are required by law, under the Decree, to be monitored.

The Office of the Inspector General reviews the program, including complaints and UoF. This office also conducts audits and reviews to ensure that the Decree is being adhered to.

The Risk Analysis Unit determines the members who are at risk based upon the reports generated by TEAM II. They then provide a brief, outlining the grounds with Risk Classifications at an informal meeting with the supervisor to discuss issues. The supervisor then addresses the concerns with the member and a plan is developed to deal with the behaviour.

Mobile Data Sheets, similar to our Mobile Data Sheets, provide much of the information needed to keep track of the member’s activities, such as traffic stops and ethnicity. This would be an indicator of Racial Profiling by a member. This information is recorded into TEAMS II. Racial profiling was raised by members of the community in Phoenix earlier in my report. The data collected by Phoenix was an accurate indicator that was in part used to tell the truth about police behaviour in those stations to balance what was being reported by members of the community, with no formal qualified basis to their allegations.

I was told of an example of a member who was dismissed from the LAPD, but re‐instated upon appeal. The dilemma the department had was that the member had no credibility and had to be kept away from operational police work because of those credibility issues. They didn’t want him in the department. He was placed in non‐operational duties for an extended period of time and given no policing responsibilities. He was then brought back as an operational member, but not before he was re‐trained, and his credibility issues addressed. The Risk Analysis Unit monitored and managed his performance. The member is now one of the highest performers and he readily speaks to other members as an example of what not do, and the benefits of the Early Intervention Program.

The department have found themselves in a similar situation with other members, due to appeals being won by the members. The department has to address the issues and there is a long road rehabilitating members with credibility issues.

Analysis of members through TEAMS II allows them to assess individual members and their suitability to train new members. Officers who have been assessed as being at‐risk are not permitted to be training officers. This was one of the lessons learnt as a result of the Christopher Commission into the Rodney King beating. New members are allocated to training officers who have a strong ethical and leadership value and is not a follower.

Members are sometimes referred to the Behavioural Sciences Unit for counselling/psych assessment and treatment and are treated for a variety of issues because some members have to be protected from themselves, or the public should be protected from the member.



Commanding Officers can issue instructions that members tape record themselves so that they can monitor their own behaviour. Audits of recordings are also conducted on the recordings.

There are currently 40 members directly involved the EI program and approximately 150 members under review at this time. In 2003 there were 150 members directly involved in the program with others under review.

There have only been a few members who have re‐offended or placed back into the program. The skills most members have learnt from their initial placement, have given them the skills to change their behaviours and they have “graduated” from the program. Members come back before the Risk Management Committee, 3, 6, 12 months or longer, until it is considered that their behaviour is under control. If the committee think the members are not at‐risk, they release the member from the plan.

Captains use the TEAMSII/EI program to check on behaviour history of members transferring into their area. It is mandatory for them to use TEAMSII to check on new members. This makes them aware of what problems they are inheriting. This is also done in Las Vegas.

TEAMS II may also warn a supervisor to take a look at this employee – he may not necessarily be a problem, but the supervisor should be aware of a possible problem.

15Internal Affairs is not shielded from any of this information. The Commanding Officer of the Professional Standards Bureau sits as a member of the Risk Management Executive Committee and can often provide helpful information to the committee on the employee's disciplinary history. TEAMS II is not shielded from Internal Affairs, the initiation of Action Items (and the disposition of the Action Items) rarely results in complaints, and Internal Affairs can be a useful resource to prevent misconduct and the complaints that can result there from. TEAMS II can be used by Internal Affairs as just one factor in determining whether to target a "sting" against a specific officer, or perhaps to a specific unit, watch, or division, as TEAMS II can provide information on organizational entities as well as individuals. There are only five areas that may potentially generate an Action Item:

1. Uses of Force, 2. Complaints, 3. Claims/Lawsuits, 4. Pursuits, and 5. Traffic Collisions.

15** Officer Armand Lemoyne TEAMS II



There are, however, sub‐categories for the first three areas (i.e. Complaints/Stops, Complaints/Arrests). You can see the categories for each Peer Group (groups of officers with a similar rank, duty assignment, and function) and the Thresholds for each category on the attached document. These numbers are calculated every DP (Deployment Period, 28 days) and will change each DP based on the activity of all the sworn officers up through that DP (Note: This information is posted on our TEAMS II website and is always available for viewing by any department employee). For example, when police activity is low as a whole throughout the department, the Thresholds will be lower and higher when police activity increases. The Thresholds are based on Standard Deviation (reference 'Standard Deviation' in Wikipedia for more info) and the Bell Curve (aka Normal Distribution or the Error Curve). Our system calculates all of the police activity in each monitored area (i.e. Pursuits, Complaints, Uses of Force, etc.) and finds the mean (or average). It then adds three (3) standard deviations to the mean and that number becomes the Threshold which will trigger an Action Item for an employee in that Peer Group. If, for example, the Threshold for Claims/Lawsuits is 2.0789, then an Officer will need 3 Claims or Lawsuits to trigger an Action Item during that DP. Again, these Thresholds will fluctuate every DP. You will note that the higher Thresholds tend to be in the Peer Groups for our Patrol Officers and Gang and Narcotics Units and very low for Administrative and Supervisor groups. All Thresholds are calculated and set by the TEAMS II system for ALL five monitored areas (Uses of Force, Pursuits, Collisions, Claims/Lawsuits and Complaints).

Every 28 days the system will compare all peer groups (all members who are at the coal face) Data analysed – UoF, pursuits, complaints, law suits, collisions. Arrests are also factored in but the previous 5 measures are the most important.

Every member has access to their own threshold data. This keeps their behaviour at the front of their minds and keeps them in tune with the program.

Action items are continually updated every time a member is involved in an incident and the data is updated against their peer group. If the member exceeds the data the system sends this information to a supervisor for closer investigation.

All data can be adjusted according to what is happening with the peer group. That means that the thresholds go up and down depending on the seasons, day shift etc. An extensive maths formula is built into the system that modifies this pattern.

The peer group top 10% are the members who the department are really concerned about. They are the problem officers who need to be continually monitored and stand a high risk of developing corrupt behaviour.

Officers are served with Brady Letters where the member has to divulge that he has had disciplinary issues. For example, a member may have been proven to be a liar, and that means his credibility is a major problem. Members, who do have issues where they are the subject of a Brady Letter, are then restricted in what duties they can perform. The numbers of Brady Letters are now reducing, due to the EI program put in place to deal with issues identified before they become problems, and necessitate the letters being served on the member. There is now a different culture due to this program. This situation is a similar to the McNeil Disclosures in Peel mentioned earlier in this report.



Early Intervention plays a major role in addressing these issues with members so that they do not become a problem in the future.

The Rampart Scandal in the late 90’s highlights members in the Anti‐Gang Unit who were working for the gangs that they were employed to police. The police:‐

16“were involved in unprovoked shootings, unprovoked beatings, planting of evidence, framing of suspects, stealing and dealing narcotics, bank robbery, perjury, and covering up evidence of these activities. One of the corrupt police, Rafael Pérez gave evidence against over 70 other police officers who were convicted of these corrupt activities. Three officers, including Pérez were convicted of a drive by murder of a notorious LA gang member. The Rampart Scandal resulted in more than 140 civil lawsuits against the city of Los Angeles, costing the city an estimated $125 million in settlements”.

You will by now see why it is so important for police behaviour to be monitored and controlled before it becomes a problem. Pérez was considered to be a top worker by many in the LAPD. Unfortunately he was working for the wrong organisation.

11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rampart_Scandal



IAPro Conference‐ Austin, U.S. IAPro is the Case Management/Early Intervention program used by over 350 Police Forces throughout the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and some states in Australia, but not Victoria. I had attended the conference in Phoenix in 2008 and been exposed for the first time with formal Police Early Intervention practices and analysis. I was, on both occasions, the only operational police officer who was not directly involved with Professional Standards or official Early Intervention Program.

On both occasions, IAPro was loaded onto my laptop and I took part in the various presentations using the program. The conference was further broken down into different workshops during the 3 days of the conference, and we could all choose what we wanted to learn.

The second day of the conference this year was dedicated to Early Intervention Programs and the day was taken up with the practical hands‐on approach of dealing with at‐risk police behaviour.

I was a guest speaker for this part of the conference. Again, I was the only non EI/Professional Standards Police Officer who presented and I gave the presentation from a manager of a police station’s perspective. I have been developing my own program over the past 6 years using trigger points, but doing it is more difficult using my own resources, documenting and graphing data, and changing behaviour, all without the use of any case management program. I was surprised to have feedback from many of the participants at the conference that I was actually raising issues that they had not thought of, including why some members had behaved in the manner they did, and how I implemented practices that changed behaviours.

The speakers for the Early Intervention Day were as follows:‐

Edmonton Police EIU – Sgt Erik Johnson & Shelley Cornfield [Analyst]

Dallas Police EIU – Sgt. Nancy Felix

Peel Regional Police –Carmie McCormack ‐Blue Team Administrator, Early Intervention, Risk Management.

Staffordshire Police U.K. – Detective Chief Inspector Carl Brookes.

Victoria Police – S/Sgt Roger Knight.

IAPro – Michael Blumberg – CI Technologies.



Whilst there was general discussion, Mr Blumberg announced that as a result of speaking to D.C.I Brookes from the U.K., he was considering changing the way his program operates and include in the analysis of who the highest risk employees of the department were. The program was going to score each member and rank him/her in order of who was highest to lowest at risk. This received overwhelming support from the participants of the conference.

This conference also gave me the opportunity to network with many other interested EI members, police and analysts whom I would never have had the privilege to meet, because we do not have an EI program in Australia, and the geographical distance between us is enormous.



Merrick Bobb I was fortunate enough to have been recommended to Mr Merrick Bobb, the current Monitor [Oversight] of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Merrick had a wealth of knowledge on police behaviour and has been involved in commissions of enquiry and oversight into police forces for many years. He is Executive Director and President of the Police Assessment Resource Centre (PARC)

17“In 1996, the Police Commission hired Merrick Bobb (then also the Special Counsel to the LASD) to conduct a five‐year update on implementation of Christopher Commission recommendations. Bobb reported that the LASD did not have an operational EI system as intended by the Christopher Commission and that TEAMS was at that point weak and inadequate”.

Merrick was also Special Counsel assisting in the Christopher Commission into corruption involving the LASD in the 90’s.

Merrick looked after me for most of the time whilst I was in Los Angeles. He introduced me to people at the highest levels of the Internal Affairs/Early Intervention at the Sheriff’s Department and the LAPD. He also sat in on the TEAMS II lecture at the LAPD for the afternoon. We had some excellent discussions, and I learnt more than I could have ever imagined from his experiences. I was very fortunate.

Merrick’s organisation, PARC, reviews and monitors a number of police organisations. I have provided some extracts of his reports.

Whilst the following paragraphs are not my words but extracts from Merrick Bobb’s reports into the LASD, I feel that I must relay the powerful message, and the indelible impression the importance of having an effective Early Intervention System in place, particularly in a police force the size of Victoria Police, and the motivation I have further gained as a result of having been fortunate enough to undertake this study.

18“We assess whether the Department is minimizing liability to County taxpayers for the acts and omissions of LASD personnel. We assess policies, practices, training, and performance to test whether legitimate law enforcement ends can be accomplished with less risk to all concerned—the deputy, the suspect, third parties, and bystanders. Our examination considers the systems the LASD has in

17Background: Origins and Development of Early Intervention Systems Page 57.

18Extract from LASD 25thSemiannual Report pages 1‐2



place to identify and correct the persons and situations that have already lead to injury and subsequent liability or which may lead to liability in the future.

We look for patterns. We look at practices and systems. We focus on the areas that were the subject of the Kolts Report—LASD practices on the streets and in the jails that may give rise to complaints or allegations of misconduct about LASD personnel from the persons who come in contact with the LASD. Use of force by the LASD has been a constant subject of our inquiry, as has medical care in the jails, the quality of supervision of deputies, deputy involved shootings and their investigation and review, the fairness and objectivity of internal investigations of alleged misconduct, and the proper use of systems such as the LASD’s early intervention software, the Personnel Performance Index or PPI.

The LASD is one of a small group of law enforcement agencies that have a nationwide influence and is looked to for leadership and innovation. It is a large urban agency serving millions of people in a richly diverse environment. The challenges facing the LASD in Southern California are often presented before the balance of the nation will experience them. In policing, as in other fields of endeavor, it happens first in California, and what California does will have a disproportionate impact everywhere else. California was certainly the first place in recent times where use of force by law enforcement came under intense scrutiny. For the LAPD, it began with Rodney King and the subsequent Christopher Commission Report in 1991. For the LASD, it was a series of officer‐involved shootings and the alleged predations of a tattooed gang of LASD officers in Lynwood that led to the subsequent Kolts Report in 1992. Out of each report came recommendations for ongoing independent outside monitoring and review of law enforcement. In the case of the LAPD, the Police Commission was given wider powers and the office of Inspector General within the Police Commission was created. In the case of the LASD, the Office of Special Counsel and later an Ombudsman and the Office of Independent Review (OIR) came into being. Los Angeles County’s tripartite structure—Special Counsel, OIR, and the Ombudsman—has become the gold standard by which monitoring and civilian oversight have come to be measured. There is an Ombudsman to focus on the satisfaction of complainants with the investigation and resolution of their public complaints against LASD personnel. There is the OIR to monitor individual internal investigations and help make sure the disciplinary outcomes in individual cases fairly reflect the Department’s policies and aspirations. There is Special Counsel to examine whether the LASD is doing its best to avoid unnecessary injury or death. The methods and approaches of Special Counsel and OIR have been emulated throughout the country and have been encapsulated in proposed national guidelines for police monitors commissioned by the US Department of Justice.



19“ This Semiannual Report, the 27th, examines broadly whether a computerized early identification system fulfills its promise to accurately identify possible problem officers. This Report also explores whether targeted intervention with problem officers leads to significant reductions in their risk‐related activity in the future. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic study of these questions. We examine them in the context of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). Following statistical analysis and research, we conclude that the LASD’s early identification system, called the Personnel Performance Index (PPI), and its targeted intervention program, called Performance Mentoring, perform well, thereby validating the LASD’s efforts and early identification systems in general. It is reassuring to conclude that the PPI works. It captures patterns and reveals trends in officer performance. Substandard behaviour indeed does not usually exist in isolation or occur randomly; it is related to other behaviour in a way that the PPI captures systematically. The strength and number of relationships in the PPI between key areas of officer performance are notable. The implication of these findings is significant: Use of early identification systems and subsequent targeted intervention in fact reduces police misconduct. Moreover, use of the early identification system and targeted intervention has not led to a corresponding decrease in police activity. In the 11 years since the PPI first became operational in 1997, the total annual number of arrests by the LASD has risen steadily from approximately 99,000 in 1997 to approximately 138,000 in 2008, despite significant drops in serious crime in recent years. At the recommendation of Judge Kolts in 1992 and by action of the Board of Supervisors, Sheriff Sherman Block agreed that the LASD would become the first law enforcement agency in the United States to develop a computerized, highly sophisticated relational database to serve as an early identification or tracking system to discover problem officers and those who might potentially become problem officers. Since that time, these tracking systems have proliferated widely and are now commonplace in most major urban police departments. Development of tracking systems has been a requirement in federal consent decrees since the late 1990s. The assumption behind any early identification and tracking system is that actual and incipient substandard performance will reveal itself in patterns in the data collected. Those patterns identify par‐ 1 Introduction and Executive Summary particular officers for whom further inquiry is warranted. For those officers ultimately found to have performed in a substandard manner, appropriate interventions can be devised. Since the creation of the PPI, the assumption has been that harmful officer behavior—or the kind of substandard performance that costs the Department and County of Los Angeles money in lawsuits and claims, harms the Department’s reputation in the community, or otherwise compromises the Department’s ability to fulfill its mission—does not exist in isolation. An outstanding officer suddenly “going bad” is rare. Far more often, the thinking goes, officers involved in an incident especially harmful to the Department or the community will have a history of substandard or worrisome performance. Substandard performance in one area at one moment can be related to, influenced by, or predictive of substandard performance in other areas, such that the Department can spot relationships and trends and intervene in a given officer’s career before a serious event occurs.”

19Extract of the 27thSemiannual Report into the LASD.



Conclusion The opportunity given to me with this study has opened my eyes and substantially furthered of my understanding of police behaviour and increased my awareness and the need for all of us to understand it too. More importantly, it is an essential ingredient that managers at every level do what they are morally and duty bound to do ‐ understand and manage our people. After all, we have a “Protecting Our People” policy in place and this program is truly Protecting Our People. Having seen what other police forces have in place throughout North America and Canada, I can safely say that Early Intervention Programs are an industry standard.

I have developed my own EI program over the past 6 years based, as much as I can, with my own limited resources that Victoria Police can provide to me. I have used as many of the Trigger points as I can manage. It is clearly evident that we cannot have an effective Early Intervention Program without the case management/data collection program in place. Likewise, we cannot have a case management/data collection program without having an Early Intervention program; it will take us nowhere.

The data collected by Victoria Police with the various independent databases all collecting information, and seemingly doing little or nothing practical with it, is a terrible waste of resources and missed opportunities. We could have a much more effective police force, management team, and truly understanding police force of people who know what is happening to them, why it is happening, and we or others seek treatment or behaviour change before it is too late.

As I travelled through each police force and mixed with the professionals both there and at the IAPro conference, I did not feel as if I was an outsider. I understood the programs because of my previous research. There was not one person or organisation not willing to provide me with what I wanted to know, or obtain in terms of manuals, handouts etc. I brought so much information back that I know I have a huge basis to commence an Early Intervention Program – when it happens. I was introduced to people who were at the top of organisations right down, and I won’t say they were at the bottom, because these members are stopping the organisations and their members from getting to the bottom.

We have created lifetime experiences for police officers that not many others in the community would have experienced. We give it to our members on a regular basis. We expect police to do the jobs the rest of the community wouldn’t do, we have rules of engagement, we have high standards and we are also held to account, just like the rest of the community. We need to go that extra distance to check them and their behaviour as a result.



You will have seen by now that EI places everyone in a situation where they have to think outside the square. It is obvious that we are dealing with humans, and our behaviour, although we think it is clear and explainable, is often masked by other behaviour that will go unchecked and untreated unless we become smarter.

Victoria Police do not have an EI program in place. We do not have a program that comes anywhere near addressing the root causes of much of the police behaviour that I have mentioned in this report. Our members will have no idea what trigger points and thresholds are about, if we mention them in the context of police behaviour or Early Intervention Programs. I refer back to the comments about the conversation I had with the Sgt and the way he diagnosed if a member was having problems, and what he looked for. Unfortunately those days of the simplistic ready reckoner are gone. We are a much more sophisticated society with more behaviour issues as a community, not to mention the police behaviour. Unfortunate too is the fact that we as an organisation have not kept pace with the changing patterns of behaviour, the recognition and the treatment of that behaviour ‐ which we have created.

Most police wouldn’t know what we were talking about if EI was mentioned to them. WE have a long way to go.

There are different treatments for different people. We must know our people; we must do something to look after them. You will also be aware by now that an EI program can be anything from placing audio sounding reversing lights into police vehicles to stop accidents, to recognising a member is actually suffering a lack of confidence by becoming over‐bearing, by implementing an EI program to tell the truth and have the facts about police behaving correctly when some members in the community make allegations of racial profiling and actually have the facts wrong. No one has ever tried to explain to police why we behave in the manner that we do. Worse, no‐one has ever tried to educate members in our own unique police behaviour and culture. Why do we see humour in things that are not humorous to others, why do we seem to be unaffected by things that others are shocked or upset about, why do we not see that our behaviour can slip, damaging ourselves, the organisation and the community and why do we get upset when our members are held to account when the community we serve, seemingly doesn’t seem to understand why we did or behaved in the manner that we did? We can talk about all sorts of pro‐active people initiatives such as the “Protecting our People” and everything that goes with this policy, and trying to make police have more Emotional Intelligence, but when they are required to practice it in reality on a daily basis, we will find that we will have a better trained, better skilled and more understanding police force for the community and ourselves.



The very strong message I felt whilst studying Early Intervention programs was that there is a healthy awareness by all members of how their behaviour affects themselves and others, and there is an even stronger message from the police forces pro‐actively monitoring, identifying and treating at ‐risk behaviour. Police officers in the US and Canada are conditioned into this style of behaviour change. It is a manipulation of the member’s behaviour, and like it or not, they have to participate in the program. This type of cultural behaviour awareness does not occur in Victoria Police. I was fortunate to have very candid and honest conversations with everyone I spoke to. I have again highlighted some of the most self‐explanatory quotes which I think wrap up Early Intervention. Again, the quote from Constable Curtis Hoople [Edmonton Police] to me, I think accurately sums up a police officer’s often different view of the world without being self‐aware of what is actually happening to him/her:‐ "A normal reaction...by a normal person...to an abnormal event..." We then discussed how this effects our "circle of normal" and how it is now larger and skewed compared to normal everyday people...Police have a massive circle of normal that grows with experience...where they fall in that circle of normal is all about the coping mechanisms that they put in place to understand the change...In other words, we’re screwed…. Lieutenant Patrick Hunter ‐ Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department “Know the problem, understand the problem, Do something!” Det. Sgt Evan Cranna Peel Regional Police– Peel Regional Police “Showed‐Met‐Talked and RESOLVED”. Detective Lynne Paul ‐ PAS Administrator – Employee Assistance Unit‐ Phoenix “The human factor is the most important factor in the program”. Melissa Pugh – Early Intervention Coordinator – Office of Internal Affairs – Las Vegas “We tend to forget that they are all human and treat them as a uniform. And we forget that they have problems with wives, alcohol, money etc.”

Thank you.

Roger Knight | Senior Sergeant 19020 Preston Police Station| Darebin PSA |North West Metro - Division 5

__________________________________________________________ email: [email protected] address:www.police.vic.gov.au

phone: (03) 9479 6113 | fax: (03) 9479 6169| mob: 0407 134 603 address: 55 Roseberry Ave, Preston, 3072| DX: 212420

Documents

Scholarship Report 2011.pdf