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School accountability and school choice Cassandra Hart, University of California-Davis David Figlio, Northwestern University & National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Competition and Subnational Governments April 26, 2014

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School accountability and school choice. Cassandra Hart, University of California-Davis David Figlio, Northwestern University & National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Competition and Subnational Governments April 26, 2014. Motivation: Sorting between schools. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: School accountability and school choice

School accountability and school choice

Cassandra Hart, University of California-DavisDavid Figlio, Northwestern University & National Bureau of Economic

Research

Conference on Competition and Subnational GovernmentsApril 26, 2014

Page 2: School accountability and school choice

Cream-skimming in school choice literature: concern that children of most-informed parents will use programs and leave public schools

School report cards under accountability programs meant to help parents make more informed choices

Relevant literatures on ◦ parental use of information (Hastings, van Weelden, &

Weinstein, 2007; Billings, Brunner, & Ross, 2014)◦ information on capitalization of information in housing

markets (Figlio & Lucas, 2004) But little work on how increased information (non-

targeted) affects distribution of children across schools

Motivation: Sorting between schools

Page 3: School accountability and school choice

Potential for provision of new information to either polarize or equalize composition of schools◦ Salience of grades—clear evaluation of quality from

an authoritative source—may be especially high here Might have greater effect on low-SES families,

if they had less access to reliable gauges of quality previously

Might have greater effect on high-SES families, if they are better situated to act on new information

Motivation: sorting between schools

Page 4: School accountability and school choice

Look at how kindergarten class composition changes based on the provision of new information based on introduction of/changes to accountability regimes◦ A+ Accountability Plan roll-out (1999)

Differences in effects based on available alternatives

Effects on segregation indices

This paper

Page 5: School accountability and school choice

Introduced in Spring 1999◦ Graded schools A-F◦ Replaced system in which parents primarily had

access to information on raw test scores-provided “lumpy” evaluation of schools

Florida A+ Accountability Plan

Grade

Number of schools

Percent

A 116 8.3%B 191 13.6%C 643 45.7%D 402 28.6%F 54 3.8%

Page 6: School accountability and school choice

Newspapers FLDOE website

Publicity around 1999 grades

Page 7: School accountability and school choice

Front-page news in high-performing districts…

Page 8: School accountability and school choice

…and low-performing districts

Page 9: School accountability and school choice

Real estate agents School spaces DOE website

Publicity around 1999 grades

Page 10: School accountability and school choice

1999 school average scores by 1999 grades

Page 11: School accountability and school choice

Florida Education Data Warehouse individual student records (school enrollments, data on lunch status, etc.)

Birth records for birth cohorts from 1992 to 1999◦ Detail on parental and family characteristics

Maternal education Maternal age Maternal marital status at birth Birth conditions, (e.g. birth weight, multiple births,

etc.)

Data

Page 12: School accountability and school choice

School-level information on changes in composition of incoming kindergarten classes ◦ Maternal characteristics recorded during birth of

child Years of education Age Marital status (binary indicator for married)

◦ Family income in kindergarten year (share FRL)◦ Index of all of these◦ Size of incoming kindergarten class

Analytic plan

Page 13: School accountability and school choice

1999: new grade shock (for all grade levels separately). Equation for A grade:

Kst=school average characteristics of incoming kindergarten class (or log number students in some specifications)

Key IV: series of year indicators*1999Grade τs: school fixed effect. SchoolVars includes excess

absenteeism rate (share of students absent 21+ days), stability/mobility rate, suspension rates, and average FCAT test scores

Years 1997/98-2001/02 Identify grade effect by controlling for underlying

elements of school grade (Figlio & Lucas, 2004)

stsstsst choolVarsSearYAearYK

1999*

Analytic plan-1999 shock

Page 14: School accountability and school choice

Composition: Mean maternal education

*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

  A [compar:

B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 0.005 -0.028 0.050* -0.045  (0.040) (0.032) (0.026) (0.051)Grade X 1999 0.064** 0.004 -0.023 -0.090*  (0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.048)Grade X 2000 0.104*** 0.027 -0.064** -0.084  (0.033) (0.033) (0.026) (0.080)Grade X 2001 0.122*** 0.017 -0.018 -0.101  (0.040) (0.032) (0.029) (0.083)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,033 1,087School-Years 4,693 4,123 5,145 5,415Group Outcome Mean

13.450 13.189 11.308 11.110

Group Outcome SD 0.778 0.814 0.903 0.770

Page 15: School accountability and school choice

Composition: Mean maternal age

  A [compar:

B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 -0.017 0.031 0.053 0.180  (0.093) (0.081) (0.067) (0.120)Grade X 1999 0.107 0.065 -0.065 0.039  (0.083) (0.074) (0.056) (0.128)Grade X 2000 0.147 0.042 -0.094 0.210  (0.091) (0.087) (0.065) (0.146)Grade X 2001 0.184* 0.154* -0.068 -0.075  (0.103) (0.084) (0.069) (0.167)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,033 1,087School-Years 4,693 4,123 5,145 5,415Group Outcome Mean

28.459 27.973 25.209 24.655

Group Outcome SD 1.587 1.615 1.511 1.335*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 16: School accountability and school choice

Composition: Fraction with married parents

  A [compar:

B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)Grade X 1999 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.009  (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011)Grade X 2000 0.015** 0.005 -0.002 0.016  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013)Grade X 2001 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.021*  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,033 1,087School-Years 4,693 4,123 5,145 5,415Group Outcome Mean

0.819 0.788 0.459 0.326

Group Outcome SD 0.098 0.104 0.157 0.148*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 17: School accountability and school choice

Composition: Fraction on subsidized lunch

  A [compar:

B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 0.002 0.010 -0.019** -0.028*  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014)Grade X 1999 -0.009 -0.012** -0.002 -0.017  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013)Grade X 2000 -0.038*** -0.011 0.012 -0.016  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018)Grade X 2001 -0.019** -0.012 0.023** 0.011  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,033 1,087School-Years 4,693 4,123 5,145 5,415Group Outcome Mean

0.219 0.261 0.732 0.853

Group Outcome SD 0.142 0.158 0.168 0.132*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 18: School accountability and school choice

Empirically driven Regressed grade-year standardized FCAT score

(average of math and reading) on:◦ Maternal education◦ Maternal age◦ Maternal marital status◦ Lunch status as of kindergarten◦ Race dummies (Black, White, Latino, Asian)◦ Maternal immigrant status

“Index” is the predicted third grade (standardized) test score based on these characteristics, fixed at birth or (for lunch status) K entry

Index creation

Page 19: School accountability and school choice

Composition: Advantage index  A

[compar: B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 -0.000 -0.005 0.012*** 0.008  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)Grade X 1999 0.014*** 0.003 -0.004 -0.003  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)Grade X 2000 0.025*** 0.005 -0.006 0.003  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012)Grade X 2001 0.022*** 0.006 -0.009* 0.007  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,034 1,088School-Years 4,693 4,123 5,145 5,415Group Outcome Mean

0.280 0.239 -0.251 -0.398

Group Outcome SD 0.134 0.128 0.202 0.157*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 20: School accountability and school choice

Advantage index: First-borns only

  A [compar:

B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 0.000 0.002 0.019*** -0.000  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014)Grade X 1999 0.018** 0.014** -0.001 0.010  (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)Grade X 2000 0.027*** 0.020** -0.007 0.012  (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019)Grade X 2001 0.031*** 0.020** -0.006 0.011  (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,034 1,088School-Years 4,688 4,118 5,142 5,412Group Outcome Mean

0.290 0.246 -0.236 -0.403

Group Outcome SD 0.143 0.139 0.219 0.192*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 21: School accountability and school choice

Ln(enrollment)  A

[compar: B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 -0.034 -0.007 0.032** 0.087***  (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026)Grade X 1999 0.057*** 0.049*** 0.022* 0.025  (0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.030)Grade X 2000 0.052** 0.057*** -0.045*** -0.058  (0.025) (0.019) (0.015) (0.037)Grade X 2001 0.033 0.073*** -0.094*** -0.046  (0.024) (0.020) (0.017) (0.037)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,034 1,088School-Years 4,693 4,123 5,145 5,415

*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 22: School accountability and school choice

Ln(enrollment): First-borns  A

[compar: B,C]

B [compar: C]

D [compar: C]

F [compar:

C,D]Grade X 1997 -0.016 -0.036 0.013 0.053  (0.034) (0.027) (0.023) (0.052)Grade X 1999 0.068** 0.031 0.030 0.010  (0.028) (0.024) (0.019) (0.041)Grade X 2000 0.098*** 0.022 -0.023 -0.085  (0.032) (0.029) (0.021) (0.053)Grade X 2001 0.072** 0.050* -0.081*** 0.003  (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.051)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 943 829 1,034 1,088School-Years 4,688 4,118 5,142 5,412

*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 23: School accountability and school choice

Ln(enrollment): Effect of 1999 A  Mother:

CollegeMother: No

CollegeNot FRL FRL

Grade X 1997 -0.045 -0.066* -0.038 -0.074  (0.035) (0.037) (0.029) (0.056)Grade X 1999 0.077*** 0.021 0.070*** 0.016  (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.038)Grade X 2000 0.067** -0.019 0.110*** -0.187***  (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.060)Grade X 2001 0.057* -0.047 0.064** -0.062  (0.030) (0.036) (0.030) (0.058)School Controls Y Y Y YSchool FE Y Y Y YUnique Schools 945 945 945 944School-Years 4,704 4,704 4,704 4,669

*** p<.01, **, p<.05, *, p<.10,.

Page 24: School accountability and school choice

Does the effect of school grades depend on the performance/availability of neighboring schools◦ Availability=>can’t easily sort if nothing else

easily available◦ Performance=>benchmarking/signaling story

School grades and signaling

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Lee

Page 30: School accountability and school choice
Page 31: School accountability and school choice

Measures of availability/quality of alternatives:◦ Any other public elementary within 3 miles (with

1999 grade)◦ Any other public elementary within 3 miles with

1999 grade C or lower◦ Had Public Choice grant (to support open

enrollment plans) in 1999

Effects: by available alternatives

Page 32: School accountability and school choice

Available alternatives: by grade

Weighted by 1998 student populations

  A B C  mean/sd mean/sd mean/sdAny Other Schools in 3 mi (%) 70.435 70.106 72.745  (45.854) (45.908) (44.563)Any Schools C or lower in 3 mi (%) 48.968 49.840 66.478  (50.231) (50.140) (47.245)District Had Public Choice Grant: 1999 (%)

57.851 54.430 49.589

  (49.598) (49.934) (50.037)

Page 33: School accountability and school choice

Index outcome: by alternatives  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Interactions None w/i 3 Any w/i 3 None C or lower w/i

3

Any C or lower w/i

3

No Open Enroll 1999

Open Enroll Grant 1999

A X 1997 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.008 0.006  (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)A X 1999 0.011 0.019*** 0.013* 0.018** 0.011 0.016**  (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)A X 2000 0.023** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.012 0.033***  (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)A X 2001 0.002 0.032*** 0.004 0.037*** 0.015 0.026***  (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007)Unique Schools 261 636 357 540 474 471School-Years 1,299 3,167 1,776 2,690 2,358 2,346

1997 diff p 0.964 0.871 0.2431999-01 joint p 0.116 0.040 0.255

Page 34: School accountability and school choice

IV: Within-city std dev of 1999 grades (standardized)

Outcome measures: Multigroup segregation index (Theil’s Information Index)◦ By race (White, Black, Latino, other)◦ By parental education (HS dropout, HS grad, some

college, college grad)◦ By lunch status (not FRL/FRL)

Segregation

Page 35: School accountability and school choice

  Racial Seg H Education H Not FRL Hstd_sd99GPA_cX1997 0.000 0.000 -0.001  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)std_sd99GPA_cX1999 -0.000 0.001** 0.002  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)std_sd99GPA_cX2000 0.000 0.001** 0.002  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)std_sd99GPA_cX2001 -0.002 0.001* 0.000  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)Year FE Y Y YControls Y Y YNumber of Cities 180 180 180City-Years 896 897 896Seg Measure Mean 0.076 0.038 0.075Seg Measure SD 0.071 0.031 0.074Seg Measure Min 0.001 0.000 0.000Seg Measure Max 0.426 0.146 0.467p-value ‘99, ‘00, ‘01 F test

0.329 0.067 0.462

Page 36: School accountability and school choice

Evidence of parental response to new provision of information (response to high-quality), especially among more educated parents◦ Modest evidence of benchmarking—response

somewhat greater when alternatives judged poor quality (or too far to be easy alternatives)

◦ Robust to district-by-district exclusion, exclusion of red-shirters and repeaters

◦ Some evidence of segregative effects (by parental education levels only)

Conclusion