Self-Enhancement Among Major League Soccer Players: The Role of Importance and Ambiguity on Social Comparison Behavior

Self-Enhancement Among Major League Soccer Players: The Role of Importance and Ambiguity on Social

Comparison Behavior'

NICO W. VANYPEREN~ University of Nijmegen

This study was conducted to examine psychological mechanisms underlying self- enhancing comparisons among 88 male major league professional soccer players. In line with other research, the results suggest that positive beliefs about oneself are more difficult to maintain with regard to unambiguous comparison dimensions. More interestingly, similar results were found by contrasting comparisons with a specific other to those with a vague other, a more ambiguous comparison target. Furthermore, it was confirmed that the more value subjects attach to a dimension of comparison, the more they consider themselves superior on that dimension. The practical implications of these results for competitive sport are discussed.

If objective standards are available to evaluate one's opinions, abilities, or performances, Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory proposes that people are less inclined to fall back on social criteria, because social standards provide them with less stable and accurate appraisals of themselves. However, objective criteria, for example, the number of points that are scored, the distance that has been jumped, or the weight that has been lifted, can only be meaningfully interpreted in a social context. A man's 100 meters performance in 11.0 seconds is a very poor result in the context of a qualifi- cation contest for the Olympic Games, but in the context of a local tourna- ment it might be a fabulous accomplishment. Similarly, a basketball player can be the star-player in team A, but an inconspicuous player in team B. Furthermore, in contrast to closed skill-games like golf and bowling, in games like soccer, basketball, and hockey, the environment is apt to vary and is unpredictable (e.g., position and velocity of players vary, as well as the flight of the ball, the bounce and roll of the ball, and the tactics; cf. Jones, 1980). Therefore, in these latter games the players will have a higher level of uncertainty about their abilities and performances, which will foster the need for social comparison information (cf. Festinger, 1954; VanYperen & Buunk, 199 I). Thus, social comparison behavior is inherently associated with competitive sport, particularly with opened-skill team games.

'The author is grateful to Willy Duiker for his help in data collection. 'Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. Nico W. VanYperen,

Department of Psychology, University of Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9104, NL-6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

1186

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1992, 22, 15, pp. 1186-1 198 Copyright @ 1992 by V. H. Winston 8, Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

SELF-ENHANCEMENT AMONG SOCCER PLAYERS 1187

Furthermore, in contrast to individual sport performers, team players have to deal with intergroup comparisons, that is, comparisons with opponents, as well as intragroup comparisons in assessing their performance level. This latter type of social comparison is a unique characteristic of team sports. Team players have both common goals (e.g., defeating other teams) and concurrent goals (e.g., to get a starting role in the team) at the same time. Several studies illuminate the role of both intergroup and intragroup social comparisons among (elite) performers in team sports (cf. Duchon & Jago, 1981; Lord & Hohenfield, 1979; Nosanchuk & Erickson, 1985; Rees & Segal, 1984; VanYperen & Dobbelsteen, 1991).

The present study is conducted to examine explanations for the self- enhancing social comparisons that professional soccer players make, that is, the phenomenon that competitive sporters (and people in general) are inclined to perceive themselves superior to others (cf. Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Felson, 1981; Taylor & Brown, 1988). It is plausible that this self-serving bias serves to protect or enhance one’s self-esteem and self- confidence (cf. Wood, 1989). For competitive sporters, high self-confidence seems to be necessary for an optimal performance; more self-confident sporters perform closer to their potential (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990). It has to be noted that a self-enhancing motive for social comparison activities runs counter to the assumption of Festingers’ (1954) social comparison theory, which states that individuals are primarily interested in a more or less objective evaluation of their performance. Indeed, there is growing evidence that people are not always unbiased self-evaluators, aiming at stable and precise judgments of themselves (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Wood, 1989). In the sixties, Hakmiller (1966) and Thorton and Arrowood (1966) found evidence that social comparisons can be inspired by the need to accomplish or to preserve a positive self-concept. People seem to be inclined to distort information in order to validate their own opinions and other personal characteristics, thus maintaining a positive image of their own attributes and performances in comparison with others (Goethals, 1986). For example, most individuals feel that they are more capable car drivers than others (Svensson, 1981), run fewer risks of catching diseases (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986), and have a higher chance of being confronted with positive life events (Weinstein, 1980). Especially individuals who are satisfied with themselves and/ or their situation tend to bias the cognitive processes of information acquisition, retention, and recall in a self-serving manner (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990; Taylor & Brown, 1988).

In line with the assumption that self-enhancing comparisons serve to maintain a positive self-concept, Allison, Messick, and Goethals (1989) have suggested that individuals are especially inclined to feel better than others on dimensions that are not objectively verifiable. They called this “The Mu-

1188 NlCO W. VANYPEREN

hammad Ali effect” (“I only said I was the greatest, not the smartest”). The results of Allison et al. indicate that subjects perceived themselves superior with regard to moral behaviors, but not with regard to intellectual behaviors. Thus, like Muhammad Ali, they considered themselves better than others, but not necessarily smarter. The authors explained their findings primarily by the greater publicity, specificity, and objectivity of intelligent behaviors. Dunning et al. (1989) and Felson (1981) also pointed out that the occurrence of self-serving assessments can be explained by the ambiguity of the dimension under evaluation. They claim that positive beliefs about oneself are relatively easy to maintain with regard to ambiguous dimensions, such as morality and commitment. For example, Felson (1981) showed that college football players are more likely to rate themselves more favorably on ambiguous abilities, including mental toughness, quick reactions, coordination, and football sense. People are less likely to exaggerate their positions on unambiguous and objectively verifiable dimensions, because they want to take themselves seriously with regard to their self-evaluations and wish others do to so as well (Allison et al., 1989).

In the same vein, it can be argued that comparisons with vague or nonspecific others are more ambiguous than comparisons with specific others. Per- loff and Fetzer (1986) found that the self-enhancement motive is salient in comparisons with vague others, that is, subjects felt generally less vulnerable to negative life events in comparison with vague comparison others. On the other hand, subjects made more realistic comparisons with specific others (closest friend, sibling, parent), in other words, they did not perceive a difference between their own invulnerability and the invulnerability of specific others. Perloff and Fetzer (1986) suggested, among others things, that people are motivated to see themselves as better off than others, and that this is much easier to realize with regard to comparisons with nonspecific others. Information about nonspecific others is easy to distort or to construe. Furthermore, comparisons with vague others enable individuals to select a comparison target that puts them in a favorable light.

Besides the ambiguity of social comparisons, various authors have suggested that individuals are especially eager to perceive themselves superior to others on dimensions that are desirable and important to them (cf. Allison et al., 1989; Goethals, 1986; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Wood, 1989). For example, Campbell (1986) as well as Marks (1984) showed that the more students were inclined to feel superior to other students on abilities such as being well organized, creative writing, the capacity to be a leader, being a good friend, and making other people feel comfortable, the more they rated the ability as important and relevant for themselves. Buunk and VanYperen (1991) argued that individuals are motivated to perceive their marriage as being better than that of others, since having a good


marriage is for most individuals an important aim in life. Also the research of Tesser (see for a review, Tesser, 1988) provides evidence on the impact of the importance of the dimension under evaluation on social comparison processes. If individuals perceive themselves inferior to close others on important dimensions, their self-esteem is likely to be threatened. Tesser (1988) suggests that people are inclined to cope with this situation by making the dimension under evaluation less relevant for their own self-definition.

In the present study, the relationship was examined between the ambiguity of the dimension of comparison as well as the comparison target on the one hand, and the perception of being a better player than one’s colleagues on the other hand. The study was conducted among major league professional soccer players who were asked to compare themselves with the average professional soccer player (a vague comarison target), and the average teammate (a specific comparison target) on two dimensions. First, they had to compare themselves with respect to their soccer ability (an ambiguous dimension of comparison), and secondly, with respect to heading the ball (that is, playing the ball by head), a very concrete, specific, and unambiguous ability.

Soccer players will be motivated to view their own soccer ability as a soccer player to be better than that of their colleagues since their goal is in the first place getting a starting position in the team, and secondly, defeating the opponent. On the other hand, it is not per se necssary to be a better header than other players. It is possible to be a worthy player without being a good header. Players may be valued, for example, on the basis of their heading qualities, but alternatively, on the basis of their passing ability, their speed, their mental toughness, their talent to score goals, their quality as a defender, etc. In this study, it was expected that subjects would consider themselves more as better players in comparison to others than as better headers in comparison to others. Similarly, they were expected to consider themselves more superior in comparison to the vague other than in comparison to the specific comparison target. Finally, it was expected that the more importance subjects attach to heading the ball, the more likely they would be to feel superior to others on that specific dimension.

Method

Sample

The sample consisted of 88 male major league professional soccer players from the Netherlands, including several players of the Dutch national team. The players were recruited by contacting the coaches of 10 teams of the Dutch major league. Six coaches were willing to take part. The six teams


that participated in the study represented all levels of the major league, that is, from relegation candidates (teams that were ranked lowest in the league) to nominees for the championship. After a training session, players were asked to complete an anonymous questionnaire. The data were collected as part of a study on stress and coping in competitive sport. With the exception of a few players who had commitments elsewhere, all players volunteered to participate.

The mean age was 23.4 years (range: 18.0 to 34.0). Level of education varied from vocational school (a training school for a specific trade), such as metal-worker, carpenter, or electrician ( 1 7%), to college education at the Masters level (6%). Some 55% were married or cohabiting, and 20% had one or more children.

Measures

Value attached to heading the ball. Subjects were asked to indicate how much value they attached to the ability of heading the ball. This question was followed by a 5-point scale which ranged from “not important at all” to “very important” with the mid-point labelled “neither unimportant, nor important.”

Self-other differences on the dimensions. Subjects had to indicate on a 5-point scale the difference between the “average professional soccer player” and “their average teammate” on two dimensions: (a) their soccer ability, and (b) their ability of heading the ball. The scale ranged from much better than l a m (-2) to much worse than l a m (+2), with the mid-point labelled about equally good (0).

Results

Descriptive data are summarized in Table 1. To present the results more conveniently, the five categories of the self-other differences have been reduced to three: self worse, equal, and self better. In general, a majority of the players considered themselves equally good with regard to their soccer ability, and more players felt superior than inferior in that respect. The feeling of superiority is more pronounced in comparisons with the vague comparison target (the average professional soccer player). Perceptions of inferiority most frequently occur with respect to heading the ball, especially when players compare themselves with the specific comparison target (the average teammate).

An Analysis of Variance was conducted with the team as a between- subjects factor, and two within-subjects factors: specificity of the dimension (soccer ability vs. heading the ball), and specificity of the comparison target


Table I

Self-other Differences on Soccer Ability and Heading the Ball - ~ ~~ ~

Self worse Equal Self better

Average professional soccer player as comparison target

Soccer ability 9.4% 60.0% 30.6%

Heading the ball 32.1 % 43.2% 24.7%

Average team-mate as comparison target

Soccer ability 17.4% 61.6% 20.9%

Heading the ball 38.1% 39.3% 22.6%

(average professional soccer player vs. average teammate). The results show no differences between the teams,3 which means that the results are indepen- dent of team membership, that is, the observed differences are not related to the performance level of the team. As can be seen in Figure 1, the expected main effects were found for both the dimension of comparison (F( 1,74) = 5.11 , p 4 .05), and comparison target (F( 1,74) = 10.72, p 5 .001). The soccer players generally viewed themselves as better soccer players than as better headers. Additional (one-tailed) t-tests revealed that, in comparison to the average soccer player, subjects perceived themselves as better players, but not as better headers (respectively, M = .28, SD = .73 and M = -. 1 1 , S D = 1.04; t (79) = 2 . 7 6 , ~ 5 .001), and in comparison with the average teammate equally good players, and worse headers (respectively, M = .01, S D = .67 and M = -.20, S D = 1.06; t(82) = 1.62, p I .05). The main effect of comparison target can be ascribed to the perception of being a better player than the average soccer player, but about equally good as their average teammate (respectively,M = .25, S D = .72 and M = .02, SD = .71; t(84) = 2.60, p I .01). The difference between the two comparison targets on the “heading” dimension was not significant (respectively, M = -. 12, SD = 1.04 and M = -.21, SD = 1.07; t(80) = 1.09, n.s.).

Furthermore, an interaction effect was found (F( 1,74) = 4.56, p 5 .05), indicating that the subjects considered their soccer ability better than that of the average professional soccer player (M = .27, SD = .72), and their heading ability worse than that of their average teammate ( M = -.20, SD = 1.06).

’Main effect for team: (F(5,74) = .69, n.s.); interaction with dimension of comparison: (F(5,74) = .39, n.s.); interaction with comparison target: (F(5,74) = 1.06, n.s.); three-way interaction: (F(5,74) = .88, n.s.).


-I- soccer ability _e_ heading the ball

Figure 1. Relationship between the specificity of the comparison other and the perceived position on each dimension in comparison with a same-sex other.

The additional (one-tailed) t-test revealed that the difference between these two means is significant ( t (81) = 3.39, p 5 .OOl).

Following this, it was examined whether a difference exists between subjects who differ in the value they attached to the ability of heading the ball. Therefore, three groups were created: subjects who considered heading the ball as very important (18% of the sample), those who considered this some- what less important (46%), and those who found this more o r less unimportant (36%). A Multivariate Analysis of Variance was conducted with the value attached to the dimension as a between-subjects factor, and the comparison target as a within-subjects factor. No effects were found with regard to the within-subjects f a ~ t o r . ~ However, as pictured in Figure 2, the evalua- tive meaning of the dimension appeared to be strongly related to the perceived position on that dimension (F(2,78) = 1 1 . 3 2 , ~ 5.001). Independently of the specificity of the comparison other, subjects who attached relatively little value to the ability of heading the ball considered themselves worse

'Main effect for comparison target: (F( 1,78) = 1.09, n.s.); interaction with importance: (F(2 ,78) = .33, ns.).

SELF-ENHANCEMENT AMONG SOCCER PLAYERS 11 93

headers than the comparison targets (mean of the summed score: M = -.76, SD = .94). Players who considered heading a very important ability saw themselves as better headers than the comparison targets (M = .47, SD = .94), while the players who saw the dimension as not very important, but neither unimportant, found themselves about equally good as the comparison targets ( M = .04, SD = .82). Additional (one-tailed) t-tests revealed that all differences between the three subgroups were significant: inferior versus equal: t(64) = 3 . 6 8 , ~ I .001; inferior versus superior: t(42) = 4 . 1 0 , ~ I . O O l ) , and equal versus superior: (t(50) = 1.63, p 5 .05).

Discussion

The present study was conducted to improve our understanding of the self-enhancing social comparisons that individuals make. This was done by exploring the tenability of two different interpretations of this phenomenon. A great number of studies on social comparison suggests that the importance

I I I

u n im port ant im port ant very import ant

(n = 29) (n = 37) (n = 15)

-=- vague other - specificother Figure 2. Relationship between the rated importance of the two dimensions

under evaluation and the perceived position on each dimension in comparison with same-sex others.


of the dimensions under evaluation facilitates self-serving comparisons (e.g., Wood, 1989). On the other hand, the studies of, among others, Allison et al. (1989) and Dunning et al. (1989) suggest that the feeling of superiority on particular dimensions can be attributed to the ambiguity and non-objective verifiability of these dimensions.

Evidence was found for both explanations. First, the more value subjects attached to a dimension, the more they considered themselves superior to others on that particular dimension. It can be concluded that the results support the explanation that the rated importance of the dimension under evaluation serves the self-enhancement motive. In this context, however, a limitation of the present study must be noted. The present data d o not allow a distinction between cause and effect. It is possible that the value subjects attach to dimensions of comparison leads to feelings of superiority by making primarily downward comparison on these dimensions (Wood, 1989). On the other hand, in accordance with Tesser (1988), it might be that feelings of inferiority lead to a devaluation of the dimension in question. Second, although a majority made lateral comparisons, the results support earlier findings that subjects considered themselves better off with respect to the ambiguous dimension (their soccer ability) than with respect to a more specific, unambiguous, objectively verifiable dimension (the ability of heading the ball), independently of the performance level of the team. This leads us to another limitation of the present study, namely that only two dimensions were assessed. However, the validity of our findings is quite obvious, since others obtained similar results with respect to alternative dimensions of comparison, with regard to both importance (cf. Alicke, 1985; Campbell, 1986; Marks, 1984) and ambiguity (cf. Dunning et al., 1989; Felson, 1981). Third, perhaps the most interesting result is that the self-enhancing motives also appear to emerge the more ambiguous the comparison target is. Appar- ently, positive beliefs about oneself appear to be more difficult to maintain in comparisons with specific others than with vague others. Similarly to unambiguous dimensions, specific comparison targets provide individuals with less opportunity for favorable self-appraisals. Social comparison information is particularly difficult to distort or to construe when subjects have to compare themselves with a specific other on a concrete, unambiguous dimension, as suggested by the interaction effect between these two factors found in this study. Dunning et al. (1989) already noted that people appear to be able to make realistic comparisons in cases where the criteria of judg- ment are clearly established (p, 1089). Indeed, team players interact frequently with their teammates and probably share rating criteria for good performance (cf. Felson, 1981; Felson & Reed, 1986).

A practical implication of the present study may be that-in order to aid the morale and to maintain self-confidence among their players-coaches


should not undermine or correct the distortions of reality of their players. Self-enhancing comparisons may produce higher motivation, greater per- sistence, better performance, more self-confidence, and greater success (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Cognitive illusions seem to be necessary for performing at the highest possible level, the aim of any competitive athlete. If failure is inevitable, players and coach can avoid or manage these situa- tions, for example, by putting negative events in the best light (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988) or by upgrading the importance and significance of the dimensions on which one is successful and downgrading the importance and significance of the dimensions on which one fails (e.g. Tesser, 1988). Thus, coaches can nurture and promote perceptions of superiority among their players to a certain extent, especially on ambiguous dimensions, and/ or by making favorable comparisons with vague others. Intrateam competition can be managed by granting each player his own favorable comparisons, whether or not illusory. In other words, coaches must take care to provide each player with positive appraisals, which produce feelings of uniqueness and merit.

However, some caution should be exercised. High self-confidence is abso- lutely impossible to maintain when it is exclusively based on cognitive illusions. As mentioned earlier (competitive) athletes are frequently provided with objective performance criteria. Also in unpredictable team sports, where a high degree of uncertainty exists, social reality can only to a certain extent be both fabricated and ignored. Therefore, coaches should primarily reinforce actual, unambiguous, and good performances on the part of their players. Indeed, although self-confidence is crucial in competitive sport, performing better than opponents is what counts the most, a n aim that inherently requires continuous pursuit of self-improvement. Self-improvement is a motive for social comparison activities that was already recognized by Festinger (1954) in the original formulation of his social comparison theory (i.e., the unidirectional drive upward). Self-enhancing comparisons may serve emotional needs, but do not necessarily lead to a better performance. For example, Marsh and Parker (1984) demonstrated that sixth-grade pupils surrounded by fellow pupils of lower ability tend to be higher in self-esteem than when they are surrounded by others of higher ability. Inter- estingly, the intragroup comparisons of the latter group are associated with a higher performance level (cf. Felson & Reed, 1986, but see Bachman & O’Malley, 1986). Thus, self-enhancing comparisons may produce positive feelings, but it may counteract a better performance and a performance improvement. Even more so, cognitive illusions may lead to an overestima- tion of one’s ability and talent, and thereby lead to unrealistic expectations, pressure, frustration, and finally, to burnout (Dale & Weinberg, 1990). Per- ceptions of superiority may result in exerting less practice and efforts to


improve, which is a fatal attitude for any competitor. Therefore, coaches should protect their players from maladaptive cognitive illusions.

In conclusion, the present study suggests that importance and ambiguity play a crucial role in explaining the self-enhancing motive in social comparisons as has often been established by previous studies. More research is needed to examine the relative explanatory power of each of these factors, as well as the impact of the controllability of the dimensions under evaluation (cf. Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1990). Practical implications of the present results are that coaches should pay attention to possible maladaptive effects of high levels of engagement in self-enhancing comparisons among their players. At the same time however, it may be important for the players’ self-confidence and performance level to perceive themselves as generally better on certain dimensions, a perception that should be promoted to a certain extent by the coach.

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Self-Enhancement Among Major League Soccer Players: The Role of Importance and Ambiguity on Social Comparison Behavior