Sem Vi Interpretation

8/2/2019 Sem Vi Interpretation

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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Qu:1; Define the statutory interpretation

Ans; When the court find difficult to apply the statute or Act because of

certain ambiguity, then courts interpret the statute and apply the law in the

case while making judgement, it called statutory interpretation.

There are different part of Statute i.e. (i) Short Title, (ii) Long Title, (iii)

Preamble, (iv) Marginal Notes,(v) Heading of a group of sections, (vi)

definition of interpretation clause, (vii) Proviso, (viii) illustration, (ix)

exception & saving clauses, (x) explanation schedules and (xi) punctu ation.

There are mainly three rules: Literal Rule, Golden Rule or Modification Rule

and Michief Rule /Heydons Rule / Purposive Rule.

Literal Rule: If in the statute there is no ambiguity, and meaning is clear, thenthe ordinary and natural meaning should be given, to statute. Means to take the

words as the legislature have given in statute, and to take the meaning as given

naturally, unless where the construction of these words is either by the

preambles or by the context of the words in question controlled or altered.

The Golden Rule: This rule has been defined that before making any

interpretation the court must read the statutory language, grammatically and

terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense, directly in its context,

without omission or addition of any word from statute, thereafter makejudgement discarding injustice, absurdity and contradiction.

CASE LAW: Bangalore Water Supply V/s A. Rajjappa

In this case the Bench of Supreme Court did not arrived at one conclusive

decision on the meaning of Industry and the meaning of industry construed

by judges are parallel to each other, therefore the matter was referred to

Constitutional Larger bench of Supreme Court.

Is the modification of literal Rule, the purpose and meaning of the Golden Rule

has been given by Justice Parke B in case of Black V Smith

Mischief Rule / Heyden Rules / Purposive Rule; When the language of statute

capable of two or more construction, in such case it becomes important to

consider the remedial and correct construction, which is in the interest of

public welfare and against the public evil and avoid the mischief.

Qu:2; Explain mensor sententia legis

Means Main Sentiments of legislature

Ans : The statute is an land mark legal work of legislature, the conventional

way of interpreting or construing a statute should not touch the humble true

intentions of the legislature, therefore the statute should be c onstrued

according to intention of legislature. If the statute have provision of

interpretation more than one in such case the court shall interpret the statue in

such way that it express the true intention of legislature. The elementary

principle of interpretation of statute to gather mens or sententia legis means

to gather the main sentiments of legislature b ehind the statute.

CASE LAW: Bhatiya Iernational V/s Bulk Trading S. A & Anr [AIR 2002SC 1432]


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CASE LAW: British India General Insurance V Captain Libar Singh, AIR

1959 SC 1331 pp 1334

The Supreme Court held that in holding the section 96(2) of the Moter Vehicle

Act 1939, is exhaustive of defence open to an insurer to add word also after

the word on any of the following grounds and observed This the rules of

interpretation do not permit us to do unless the section as it stand ismeaningless or of doubtful meaning

Qu;4; Explain Principle of Casus omissus:

Ans: In application of same rule the legislature had provided in one Statue but

omitted or forgotten to provide in another statue, and the court can not provide

what the legislature forgotten / omitted in statute. Of course the court can find

out harmonious solutions.

CASE LAW: Hiradevi & Ors (Kailash nath Kapoor-Died) V District BoardShahjahanpur AIR 1952 SC362; In this case In this case there are two ways

provision of dismissing the services of secretary of education society. [casus

omissus]

The section 71 of the U. P. Board Act 1922, as amended in 1933, provided that

a resolution the Board for dismissal of the secretary shall not take effect until

the period of one month has expired OR until the State Government has passed

orders on any appeal preferred by him/secretary.

A Dist Board passed a resolution for dismissal of its secretary and also for his

suspension till the matter of his dismissal was decided under Section 71 of the

Act on appeal if any preferred by the secretary.

But Court held that under section 90 of the Act the secretary could be

suspended only as a punishment or pending of the orders of any authority

where sanction is nec first way Section 71 of the UP District Board Act 1922

necessary for his dismissal.

The pending the orders of any authority where sanction is necessary for hisdismissal could not appropriately cover the case of suspension like the present

one and the resolution for suspension was therefore ultra vires

The U P Act 1 of 1933, Section 71 was amended and the amended section

provided that a resolution of dismissal was not to take effect till the expiry of

the period of appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was so presented. But the

consequent section 90 was not amended. [casus omissus]

CASE LAW: Nalinakhsya Basak V Shyamsunder AIR 1953 SC 148; Thesection 18(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provision)

Act, 1950, which gave power to court to rescind or vary any decree for

recovery of possession was held not to cover a power to rescind or vary an

order for possession passed under section 43 of the Presidency Small Cause

Court Act 1882 The Craford V Spooner, is said that whatever given bylegislatures, the court shall not add in it or remove some words, the act is

dangerous to judiciary.[casus omissus]

Qu: 5 ; Discuss the Literal Rule on interpretation with suitable cases. In

what way is the Golden Rule of interpretation a departure from the Literalrule?


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Ans: The meaning of literally means exact or similarly. In Literal Rule it is

essential to understand the meaning of words in statute, through their natural,

ordinary or popular sense. The phrases and sentences are construed according

to their grammatical meaning; up to certain extend, not beyond some absurdity

or contrary. To take the word as legislature given in Statute, and take the

meaning which the word given naturally. If the word h as given natural meaning

one should not depart from natural and original meaning, unless it leading toabsurdity. The Golden rule is that the word of a statute must prima facie be

given their meaning. The natural and ordinary meaning should not be departed

unless the meaning requires in legal context different meaning. Such meaning

can not be departed by Judges, the drafting of statute is so important to a

people who hope to live under rule of law. Therefore the court must see that

whenever possible to apply golden rule of construction. Means to read the

statute grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense,

which is in context, without omission or addition .

While construing departure of court from the rule of literal construction, goingbeyond outside the recognized limits, in the name or guise of liberal or strict

construction leads to unwarranted expansion or restriction of the meaning of

words and gives rise to serious error. The Golden rule departed from literal

rule in when it construing the natural meaning and ordinary meaning of words,

unless there is requirement in legal context.

Case Law-1: Suthendran V/s Immigration Appeal Tribunal Supra; [golden

rule]

In the case the question arises related to section 14(1) of the Immigration Act,

1971, which provide that a person who has a limited leave under this Act toenter or remain in the United Kingdom may appeal to an adjudicator against

any variation of the leave or against any refusal to vary it. In this case theword a person who has limited leave were construed not to include a person

who has had such limited and it was held that the section applied only to aperson who at the time he lodged his appeal was lawfully in the UK that is in

whose case leave had not expired at the time of submitting of appeal.

Case Law-2: S A Vekantraman V/s State AIR 1958 SC 107 p 109; [goldenrule] This is Criminal Appeal before Supreme Court, the Appellants was public

servant and removed from service for guilty found in departmental inquiry,

under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, therefore a criminal case was filed

against him. Supreme Court held that sanction is not necessary for taking

cognizance of the offence referred to in the section, if the accused has ceased

to be a public servant on the date when the Court is called upon to take

cognizance of the offence. The Court rejected the construction that the words

who is employed and in not removable as they occur in clause (a) and (b) of

section (1). Means that who was employed-and was not removable an also theconstruction that the words competent to remove him from office in clause(c) mean would have been competent to remove him from his office Justice

Imam pointed out that In construing the provision of statute it is essential fora court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those

words are clear enough The appeal was dismissed.

Case Law-3: Workmen of National and Grindlays Bank Ltd V/s Nationaland Grindlays bank Ltd. AIR 1976 SC 611 p. 618. [golden rule] The

Supreme Court observed that In construing section 6(a) of the Payment of

Bonus Act, 1965, that the words depreciation admissible in accordance withthe provision of sub section (1) of section 32 of the Income Tax Act have to

be given their natural meaning and these words could not be read as


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depreciation allowed by the Income Tax Officer in making assessment onemployer. It was therefore held that it was for the Industrial Tr ibunal todetermine what was the depreciation admissible in accordance with section 32

of the Income Tax Act and the Tribunal could not just accept the amount

allowed by the Income tax Officer as depreciation under that section, It was

further held that the finding of the Inco me Tax Officer was not even admissible

before the Tribunal for purpose of the Bonus Act.

Case Law-4:Haji S K Subhan V/s Madhavrao AIR 1962 SC 1230 p 1236:[golden rule] In this case the Supreme Court observed that in construing M P

Abolition of proprietary Rights Act 1950 which in clause (g) of section 2

defines Home farm as meaning land recorded as Sir and Khudkast in thename of a proprietor in the annual papers for the year 1948-49, the Nagpur

High Court held that this definition should be cons trued liberally and that land,

though not recorded as Khudkast of the proprietor in the annual papers of

1948-49 but which ought to have been recorded as such, was within this

definition. This decision was overruled by the Supreme Court by interpretingthe said definition section in its natural and ordinary meaning and consequently

holding that the basis for treating a particular land as home-farm under the Act

was the record and not fact of actual cultivation It was pointed out that

There is no ambiguity about the definition of Home-farm and so the questionof strict or liberal construction does not arise.

Qu:6; Define Regard to subject and object;

Ans: The Supreme Court said in case Dimkachi tea worker v ItsManagement, AIR 1958 SC 353 p 356 [subject / object] said that The word

of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning are to be understood in

the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and

the object which the legislature has i n view The Doctor who was appointed bymanagement as Asst. Medical Officer, was dismissed from service by paying

one month salary in lieu of one month notice, the industrial tribunal rejected

the plea of workmen that the doctor was worker and majority d ecision of

Supreme Court up held the judgement of Industrial tribunal. The word any

person is construed

The Supreme Court in case of U P Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v Braj Kishore,

AIR 1988, SC 2239, observed that Having regards to the object of the U PBhoodan Yagna Act 1953 to implement the Boodan movements, which aimed at

distribution of land to landless laboures who were versed in agriculture and

who had no other means of subsistence; it was held that the expression

Landless person in section 14, which made provision for grant of land to

landless person was limited to land less person laboures and did not include a

landless business residing in a city.

Qu;7; Discuss Presumption of Constitutionality;

and Discuss construction Ut Res Magis Valeat Quam Pereat

Ans ; Is an advance idea in jurisprudence and to fully understand if you should

refer to a legal dictionary, the basic idea of, better the things should function

than that it should perish is that if a piece of law seems unclear, one should try

to understand it in a way that makes sense of it. The underlying idea of all

legal system is that all laws make sense and are there for a purpose, if a law

seems incomprehensive or silly, one should try to understand it in some waythat.


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Means the things may rather have effect than to destroyed It is requires to

court that legislatures put every provision in Statute for a purpose and to

construed the Statute to give effect to each provision of the Statute. There is,

therefore, presumption of constitutionality that the legislatures does not

exceeds its jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing that the Act is not

within the competence of the Legislatures, or that it has transgresses (to cross

the limit) the limit laid down by the organic law of the Constitution it must beallowed to stand as the true expression of the national will .

Case Law: Khyerbari Tea Co V/s State of Assam AIR 1964 SC 925.

In this case the Petitioner said that they are transporting their tea from Assam

to Calcutta for final fishing and packing, it is 689 Miles from Golpaigudi via

by Railway to Dibrugad, and from Dibrugad to Ghat by Steamer and to

Calcutta, both booking station and destination are located in West Bengal. The

Contention of Petitioner is that in accordance with the Art 301 there is freedom

of trade and in accordance with Art 19(1)(G) the Act is infringement of rightsguaranteed under Art. The Supreme Court observed that If law is shown toinvade the freedom of trade under Art 301, a onus shift to the State to satisfy

that the restrictions imposed are reasonable and in the public interest within

the meaning of Art 304(b) The appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court.

Case Law: Gita Hariharan V/s RBI, AIR 1999 SC 1149 p.1152

The Supreme Court observed that In section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and

Guardianship Act, 1956, which provides that the natural guardian of a minorsperson or property will be the father and after him, the mother . The word

after him were construed not to mean only after the life time of the father

but to mean in the absence of father . As the father and after him, mother

this construction would have made the section unconstitutional for violating

constitutional provision against sex discrimination;

Qu:8; Explain Hardship, incontinence, injustice, absurdity, and anomaly to

be avoided

Ans: The court shall keep in mind that while selecting the interpretation thecourt should adopt such interpretation , which is reasonable and sensible, and

avoid to select which is none of those things as it may be presumed that the

legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which least offend

our sense of justice, if the grammatical construction leads to some absurdity or

some repugnance or inconsistency with the test of the instrument it may be

departed from so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency.

CASE LAW: Rakesh Wadhwan V Jagdamba Industrial Corporation, AIR

2002, SC 2004;

Section 13(2) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, provides

for eviction of a tenant, who has not paid or tendered the rent due. There is

provision to that section which reads Provided that if the tenant on the first

hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the

arrears of rent and interest at 6% per annum on such arrears together with cost

of application assessed by the controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have

duly paid or tendered the rent The provision does not in terms provided th at if

there be a genuine dispute regarding the arrears due the controller will

provisionally determine the arrears and give time to the tenant to deposit thesame to save the eviction. But such a provision was read by implication to

avoid hardship and injustice to the tenant in case of a genuine dispute of


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arrears of rent. The court reached this conclusion by holding that the qualifying

expression assessed by the controller in the provision qualified also thearrears of rent and not merely cost of application .

CASE LAW: Central India Spinning weaving and manufacturing co. Ltd V

Empress Mills, Nagpur AIR 1958 SC 341 p 346

In construing section 66(1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities

Act 1922, which authorized imposition of a terminal tax on goods or animal

imported or exported from the limits of a municipality the question before the

Supreme Court was whether the said clause empowered the municipality to

levy a tax on goods in transit. The High Court adopted derivatives meaning of

words import and export i.e. to bring in and to carry away and has therefore

held that the municipality had the power to levy terminal tax on goods in

transit. The Supreme Court in reversing the decision of High Court pointed out

that the words import and export in their ordinary commercial sense of the

words in preference to derivative sense. The Justice Kapur observed that Theeffect of the construction of import and export in the manner insisted upon by

the respondent [municipality] would make rail born goods passing through a

railway station within the limit of a m unicipality liable to the imposition of the

tax on their arrival at the railway station or departure there from or both which

would not only lead to inconvenience but confusion, and would also result in

inordinate delays and unbearable burden on trade both inter state and intra-

state. It is hardly likely that was the intention of the legislature. Such

interpretation would lead to absurdity which was according to rules of

interpretation to be avoided.

Qu:9; Discuss the following: i] Long Title: It is now settled law that the long

title of an Act is part of the Act and therefore is admissible as an aid to its

construction.

Case Law: Ashwinikuamr Ghosh V/s Arabindo Bose AIR 1952 SC 369 p

388.[ long title]

The Supreme Court observed that while dealing with Supreme Court Advocates(Practice in High Court) Act 1951, which bears a full title thus An Act to

authorized Advocate of the Supreme Court to practice as of right in anyHigh Court. Justice S R Das observed that One cannot but be impressed at

once with the wording of the full title of Act. Although there are observations

in earlier English cases that the title of the Act is not part of the Statute and is

therefore to be excluded from the consideration in construing the statute, it is

now settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and

may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of

throwing light on its construction, although it can not override the clearmeaning of the enactment.

Case Law: Poppatlal Shah v/s State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274 [long

title]

Under the Madras Sales Tax Act 1939, as it stood before it was amended by the

Madras Act XXV of 1947, the mere fact that the Contract of sales was entered

into within the province of Madras did not make a transaction which was

completed in another province, where the property or goods passed, a sale

with the province of Madras and no tax could be legally levied upon such atransaction under provision of Act.


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Though the provisional legislation could not pass a taxation statute or Act,

which be binding on any other part of India, it was quite competent for

province to enact a legislation imposing taxes on transaction concluding

outside the province provided there was a sufficient and real territorial nexus

between such transaction and the taxing p rovince.

The title of preamble whatsoever their value might be as aids to construction ofa statute, undoubtedly throw light on the intention and design of the

legislatures and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislatures itself. It is

settle rule of construction that to ascertain the legislation intent all the

constitute part of statute also to be taken together and each word phrase or

sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of

the statute. The Judgement of Madras High Cou rt Reversed.

The Supreme Court observed that the title of the Madras General Sales tax Act

1939, was utilized to indicate that the object of the Act is to imposed taxes on

sales that take place within province.

Qu;10; Discuss Headings

The view now is settled that the Headings or Title prefixed to sections or group

of sections can be referred to in construing an Act of Legislatures. But

conflicting opinion has been expressed by the various courts on what weight to

be attached to heading. According to some opinion it is key to the

interpretation of the clauses of sections of Act, and thus the heading is equally

crucial as preambles. But there is opposite opinion stating that when the wordis ambiguous then the role of heading shall be considered in construction.

Case Law: Frick India Ltd V/s Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 689 p. 693.

[heading]

The appellant before Supreme Court is manufacturer of spares and equipments

required for cold storage and deep cooling plants, in dairy and food industries.

Since the unit was registered with Central Excise department they paid the

excise duty and taken out t he goods for sending to Gujarat and after submitting

return the unit filed refund order to get back the duty which they have paidunder the order of notification. But it was dismissed, by Asst. Commissioner

CE, thereafter they filed appeal against the order of Asst. Comm. before the

Commissioner of Central Excise, that was also dismissed.

Thereafter the unit filed writ petition before High Court, that was also

dismissed, and present civil appeal came before Supreme Court. It was

observed by Supreme Court that whole arguments arose because of compositesentence used in this paragraph of notification. It is only means complete

plants which are covered by items (1) and (2) cannot be considered as parts onmachinery and such complete plant would not be classification under sub-item

(3) of Item 29 A. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant

on this notification does not in any way adverse the case of the appellants, the

appeal dimissed.

The Supreme Court observed in this case that It is well settled that the

heading preferred to section or entries ( of a tariff Scheduled) can not control

the plain words of the provision, they cannot also be referred to for the purpose

of construing the provision, they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of

construing the provision when the words used in the provision are clear andunambiguous nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the

words in the provision. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or


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sub heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even

in such case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of clear

words used in the provision.

Case Law: Bhinka V/s Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960 [heading]

The Supreme Court observed that under section 180 of U P Tenancy Act, 1939a remedy was provided for ejectment of a person who was illegally retaining

possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the lawfor time being in force The question before Supreme Court was whether a

person without having title but retaining possession by virtue of an order

passed under section 145 Cr. P. C, could be ejected under aforesaid provision.

In searching the conclusion that such a person could be ejected the Supreme

Court construed the words possession in accordance with the law for the timebeing in force as meaning possession with title. Support for arriving at this

conclusion was taken from the heading of the section which read Ejectment of

person occupying land without title Justice Subbarao quoted with approvalthe following passage from max well The heading prefixed to sections or

sets of sections in some modern statute are regarded as preambles to those

sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute but they may

explain ambiguous words.

Qu;11; Discuss Punctuation in a statute

In England before 1850 there was no punctuation in the manuscript copy of any

Act which received the Royal assent, therefore, the Courts cannot have anyregards to punctuation for construing the older Acts. Even as regards more

modern Acts, it is very doubtful if punctuation can be looked at for purpose of

construction. The opinion on Indian statute is not very much different

Case Law: Ashwinikumar V/s Arbindo Ghosh, AIR 1952 SC 369

[punctuation]

In this case before Supreme Court Justice B. K. Mukherjee expressed himself

as follows; Punctuation is after all a minor element in the construction of a

statute and very little attention is paid to it by English Courts, It seemshowever that in the vellum copies printed since 1850, there are some cases of

punctuation and when they occur they can be booked upon as a sort of

contemporaneous expositio. When the statute is carefully punctuated and there

is doubt about its meaning, a weight should be given to punctuation. I need not

deny that punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly

be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain

meaning of text.

Qu:12; Explain Parliamentary history and statutes in pari materia areadmissible aids in the interpretation of statue- Elucidate

Ans: According to the traditional English view, the intent of Parliament which

passed the Act, is not to be gathered from Parliamentary history of the statute,

means the bill which Parliament passed was not copied from the Parliamentary

history of the statute. The Bill in its original form or the amendments

considered during its progress in the Legislatures are not admissible aids to

construction. Since the Court are entitled to consider such external or historical

facts as may be necessary to understand the subject matter to which the statute

relates or to have regards to the mischief which the statute is intended toremedy the exclusionary rule was relaxed to admit the reports of the


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commission preceding a statutory measure as evidence of surroundingcircumstances with reference to which the word in the statute are used.

Case Law : State of Mysore V/s R V Bidop, AIR 1973 SC 2555. [pari

materia]

The Supreme Court speaking generally, to begin with, enunciated the rule ofexclusion of Parliamentary history in the way traditionally enunciated by the

English Courts, but on many an occasion, the court used this aid in revolving

question of construction. The Court has now cleared to the view that legislative

history within circumspect limits may be consulted by court in resolving

ambiguity. But the court still sometimes like the English courts, make a

distinction between use of a material for finding the mischief dealt with the

Act and its use for finding th e meaning of the Act

Case Law: Indira Sawhney V/s Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 1061 p 1071

[pari materia]

The Supreme Court while interpreting Art 16(4) of the Constitution the Court

referred to Dr. Ambedkars speech in the Constituent Assembly and observed

That the debate in t he Constituent Assembly can be relied upon as an aid to

interpretation of a constitution provision is borne out by series of decision of

this court. Since the expression backward class of citizens of India is not

defined in the Constitution, reference to such debates is permissible to

ascertain at any rate of context, background and objective behind them.

Particularly where the court wants to ascertain the original intent suchreference may be unavoidable. The Court however, earlier clarified that the

debates or even the speech of Dr. Ambedkar could not be taken as conclusive

or binding on the court. More recently while interpreting Art 28(1) of the

Constitution which prohibits religious instruction in educational institutionmaintained wholly out of state funds, reference was made to the debates in the

constituent assembly which said to be illuminating and helpful in giving arestricted meaning of the expression.

Qu:13: Explain pari materia

Ans: The meaning of the maxim is statute are in pari materia which relates to

the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things. When two

pieces of legislations are of different scope, it can not be said that they are in

pari materia

Therefore the Bombay Rent Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947

and the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, were not in pari materia as they

do not relates to the same person or things or to same class of persons or

things.

CASE LAW: State of Madras V/s A Vaidyanath Ayer AIR 1958 SC 61 p 65

[pari materia]

The Supreme Court observed that the section 4 of Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1947, which directs that on proof that the accused has accepted any

gratification other than legal remuneration, it shall be presumed unless the

contrary is established by the accused that the gratification was accepted as a

bribe, has been held to be in pari materia with subject matter dealt with by the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the definition of the expression shall presume

in the Evidence Act has been utilized to construe the words it shall bepresumed in section 4 of the P C Act, 1947.


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Case Law: Swarva Shramik Sangh V/s Indian Smelting and Refining Co.

Ltd. AIR 2004 SC 269 p 277 [pari materia]

The meaning and intention of the legislatures which must govern the

interpretation of a provision in a statute, have to be ascertain not only the

language in which it is clothed but also by considering its nature, its design

and the consequences which would follow in cons truing it either way.

Reports of commission or inquiry committee preceding the introduction of a

bill for the enactment have been always viewed as providing evidence of the

historical facts or of surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil interest

to be remedied and any time even for interpretation the Act as external aids to

construction of the Act.

In this case it has been held that the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union

and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practice Act, 1971 has to be read and

construed along with other labour Laws then in force such as the IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947, Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970. [pari

materia] It was held in this case that workmen claiming to be employed by a

company ostensibly through a contractor alleging this to be a camouflage to

conceal the real relationship cannot directly complain against the company

under the Maharashtra Act and they have first to raised industrial disputes to

have their status as directly employed by the company determined under the

Industrial Disputes Act. The Appeal was dismissed.

Case Law: Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association V/sAdministrative Officer, AIR 2004 SC 1426 p 1431 [ pari materia]

This is appeal before Supreme Court of India, from appellant for declaring

them as employee under Employees Provident Fund Act 1952. The Supreme

Court observed that the legislatures was alive to various kinds of definitions

of word employee contained in various previous labour enactment when theAct was passed in 1972. If it intended to cover in the definition of employee

all kinds of employee it could have as well used. Such wide language as is

contained in Section 2(1) of the Employees provident Funds Act 1952, which

defines employee mean any person who is employed for wages in any kind ofwork, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an

establishment. Non use of such wide language in destination of employee insection 2(e) of the Act of 1912 reinforce our conclusion that teachers are

clearly not covered in the definition

The same principle the definition of employee in sect ion 2(e) of the payment of

Gratuity Act, 1972 was construed in the l ight of definition of employee in them

and it was held that teachers cannot be said to be employed in any skilled,

semi-skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory technical or clerical work andtherefore they do not fall under the definition of employee. The appeal

dismissed.

Qu.:14; Distinguish between mandatory and directory statute with case:

Examine the various factors guiding a Judge in holding a provision mandatory

or directory

Ans: The question arises whether the statute is mandatory or directory depends

upon the intent and wishes of the legislatures and language of in which intent

is cloth. Means the question of statute is mandatory is wholly depends on theintent of the legislatures and not on the language of statute. The intentions and

meaning of legislatures shall be calculated or taken granted from and


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ascertained from the language and also from its nature, its design, and the

consequences, which will in construing statute by either way. The determining

the question whether statute is mandatory or directory, is depends on the

subject matter, the important of the provision to the general object intended to

secure by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory.

The study of many cases on this topic does not yield any universal rule and any

result to decide whether the statute is directory of mandatory. The use of wordshall a mandatory requirement and use of word may directory requirement.

Case Law: Drigraj Kuer ( Rani) V Amar Krishna Narayan Singh (Raja)

AIR 1960 SC 444 [mandatory provision]

In this appeal before Supreme Court was disputes of property of two estate, the

Petitioner became unsound mind and the Court appointed ward. The respondent

owner of Ramnagar Estate filed a suit against the Appellant owner of

Ganeshpur estate for the recovery of certain properties. The appellant filed

cross suit against the respondent during the pending of suit the appellantbecame unsound and declared by court and court of ward was appointed by

court to appear before the court, who was Dy. Commissioner of Barabanki.

Thereafter in High Court both the parties arrived at mutual agreement and the

basis of this mutual agreement the High Court passed a decree of consent.

Meanwhile the unsound Appellant Rani recovered from illness and court

declared her she is sound mind person. Thereafter she filed two Application

before the High Court contending that the compromise decree is nullity, on the

following grounds;

a] As the court of wards had not complied with the Manadatory Provision of

sec 6 of the Act

b] As there could not in law be a compromise unless there were two parties but

in the present case there was only one party the Deputy Commissioner, of

Barabanki

c] The High Court failed to appoint a dis interested person as a guardian of the

appellant who was of unsound mind under order XXXII of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

In this case the Supreme Court observed that a mandatory provision had not

been complied with and the suit proceeded with the Collector as both the

plaintiff and defendants. The ward for unsound mind was not appointed which

is mandatory provision.

If the provision is mandatory as act done in breach thereof will be invalid, but

if it is directory the act will be valid although the non-compliance may give

rise to some other penalty if provided by the statu te.

Case Law: State of Punjab V/s Balbir Singh, AIR 1977 SC 629

When substantial compliance is held to be a sufficient observance of a

statutory requirement it is because the statutory provision containing the

requirement is regarded as directory rather than mandatory.

Case Law: Sashikant Sigh V Tarkeshwar Singh [ (2002) 5 Supreme Court

Cases 138 [directory/mandatory]

Their lordship while considering the requirement under section (1) of the Sec319 of Cr. P. C. [ read where in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of an

offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused had


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committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the

accused the court may proceed against such person for the offence which he

appears to have committed] that the person summoned could be tried together

with the accused is directory provision.

Whereas requirement in sub section (4) of section 319 of Cr. P. C. [where the

court proceeds against any person under sub section (1) then (a) theproceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh and the

witness re-heard (b) subject to provision of clause (a) the case may proceed as

if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of

the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. It is mandatory

provision.

It is very difficult to distinguish the directory provision and mandatory

provision.

Case Law: Rai Vimal Krishna V State of Bihar (2003) 6 SCC 401 pp. 412-414 [mandatory/directory]

It is case of Bihar, Section 149(1) of the Patana Municipal Corporation Act

1951, requires that the Executive Officer shall sign the assessment list and

shall give public notice by beat of drum and by displaying placards posted in

main public places. Interpreting section it was held that requirement of public

notice was mandatory but the requirement of manner of publication was

directory, therefore, public notice in the news papers was substantial

compliance though there was no publication by beat of drum or by posting playcards.

Qu:15; Discuss the rule ofEjusdem Generis with the help of cases

Ans: The meaning of maxim that a particular section of statute should not

divorced or removed from rest of Act. When a particular words pertaining to

class or category are followed by general words, the general world construed as

limited to things of the same kind as those specified. This rule is known as the

rule ofejusdem generis this rule applies when ;

1.Statute contains an enumeration of specific words2.The subject of enumeration constitute a class or category3.That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration4.The general terms follows the enumeration5.There is no indication of a different legis lative intent

Case Law: Sidheshwar Cotton Mills P Ltd V Union of India

The rule was applied in construing the word any other process In section 2(i)v of the Central Excise and Salt Act 1944 which defines manufacturer in

relation to goods in item 19.1 of the schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act

1985 to include bleaching mercerizing, dying, printing, water proofing,

rubberizing, shrink printing, organic processing or any other processing. The

Supreme Court held that the process which import change of a lus ting character

to the fabric by either the addition of some chemicals into the fabric or

otherwise and any other process in the section must necessary sha re one or

other of these incidents which constitute manufacturing in the exten ded sense.

Case Law: Jivajirao Cotton mills V/s. M P E B


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Section 49(3) of the Electricity Supply Act 1948, empowers to board to fix

different tariff for the supply of power to any person having regards to the

geographical position of any area and nature of supply and purpose for which

the supply is required and any relevant factors. In construing this section the

Supreme Court decided to the rule of ejusdem generis for limiting factors on

the ground that there was no genus of the relevant factors.

Qu.:16; Explain the rule of Harmonious Construction with the help of

decided cases

Case Law: M V Jarali V Mahajan Borwell 1997 (8) SC 386

The rule of harmonious construction was applied while revolving conflicting in

between sections 276B and 278B of the Income tax Act 1961.

Sec 276B: If a person fails to pay or credit to Central Government treasury the

amount of TDS, he shall be liable to imprisonment of 3 months.

Sec 278B: If a company fails to pay or credit to Central Govt. treasury the

amount of TDS he is liable to p ay fine or penalty and not imprisonment.

In such case the Supreme Court apply the harmonious construction by applying

fine to directors if they prosecuted as company and its directors

When Reconciliation not possible

In the disputes of Acts, when the reconciliation is not possible in such stage

the last Act shall play role in cons truction, but that will be last resort.

Case Law: Wood V Rilley OR K M Nanavati V State of Bombay

The appeal was before Supreme Court, in the case the court held that if there is

conflict of two sections of Act and can not be reconciled which may be

absolute contradiction, in such situation the court may allow to play last

section or Act, to play role in construction

In case of Nanavati the latter was prevailed

Lord Evershed M R Said It is no doubt that if two sections of an Act ofParliament are in irreconcilable then from latter will be preferred.

Case Law: Sirsilk Ltd V/s Govt. of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 160 pp 162

There was interesting question before Supreme Court relating conflict between

two equally mandatory provision viz section 17(1) and 18(1) of the Industrial

Dispute Act, 1947, is a good illustration of the importance of the principle thatevery effort should be made to give effect to all the provision of an Act by

harmonizing any apparent conflict between two or more of its provisions

Section 17(1) of the Act requires the Government to publish every award of a

tribunal within thirty days of its receipt and by sub section (2) of Section 17

the award on its publication becomes final. But section 18(1) of the Act

provides that a settlement between employer and workmen shall be binding on

the parties to the agreement. In a case where settlement was arrived at after

receipt of the award of a Labour. The tribunal by the Government but before

publication, the question was whether the Government was still required by

section 17(1) to publish the award. In construing these two equally mandatoryprovisions, the Supreme Court held that the only way to resolve the conflict

was to hold that by the settlements which become effective firm the date of


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signing, the industrial dispute comes to an end and the award become in

fructuous and the Government cannot publish it.

Qu:17; Explain any five of the following with reference to the General

Clauses Act

i] Coming into operation of enactment: When any Central Act is notexpressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into

operation on the day on which it receives the assent;

In the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of Constitution,

the assent of Governor General and

In case of an Act of Parliament, the assent of President

ii] Gender and number : In all Central Acts and regulations unless there is

anything repugnant in the subject or context, words importing the masculine

gender shall be taken to include females and words in the singular shall includethe plural and vise versa

iii]Duty to be taken pro rata: Where by any enactment now in force or

hereafter to be in force, any duty of customs or excise, or in th e nature thereof,

is charged on any given quantity, by weight or measurement or value of any

goods or merchandize, then a like duty is charged according to the same rate on

any greater or less quantity.

iv] Measurement of distance : In the measurement of any distance for thepurpose of any Central Act or Regulation made after the commence of this Act

that distance shall, unless a different intention appears be measured in a

straight line on a horizontal plane.

v] Effect of repeal: Where this Act or any Central Act or Regulation made

after the commencement of this Act, repeal any enactment hereto made or

hereafter to be made then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall

not

vi] Imprisonment: Shall means imprisonment of either description as definedin the Indian Penal Code.

Qu:18; Explain IMPLIED REPEAL;

Ans; This a presumption against a repeal of act or statute by implication,

and the reason of this rule is based on the theory that when legislature while

enacting a law has complete knowledge of the existing law on the same subject

matter and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision in new

Act, it gives out an intention not to repeal the existing Act or legislation. Butwhen the new Act contain a repealing section mentioning the Act which it

expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other Act is

further strengthened on the principle of ;

Expression unis est exclusion alterus; Means expression of one subject, object

and idea is the expulsion of other subject object and idea.

CASE LAW; Municipal Council of Palai V/s T J Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 1561

p 1565

In this case the Municip al Council had constructed the bus stand and prohibited

buses to stand on road or any other places in its limits, and those are using the


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bus stand council was charging 50 np per bus. This resolution under 286 and

287 of Travancore Municipal Acts, was challenged in Kerala High Court, by

writ petition which was allowed. The Provision of Municipal Act, which

provide to Municipal Council to provide bus stand, were held to be repealed

by a subsequent Motor Vehicle Act, which empowered the Government or

delegate to do the same. The reason for this conclusion were mainly two fold;

(1) that the Municipality Act was a special law applying to Municipality areas,and the Motor Vehicle Act was a general law applying to all area in general;

and (2) that both the provision were enabling ones and then could be no

question of conflict till the authority in the later Act also provided for bus

stand for the same areas for which bus stand had already been provided under

the Municipal Act.

CASE LAW; Syndicate Bank V Prabha D Naik, AIR 2001 SC 1968, p, 1968

If the prior law provides both for right and remedy and a later general law

undoubtedly replace the right, the remedy of the prior law must also be takento have been impliedly repealed. The British left India in 15.08.1947, but

Portugese were remained in Goa till 1962, because some unknown political

reasons, the Provision of Portugese Civil Code applicable in the Goa State

regulating contracts and remedies as also providing for limitation were taken to

be impliedly repealed by extension of the Indian Contact Act, the Negotiable

Instrument Act and the Indian Limitation Act to Goa

Qu;19; Explain Beneficial Construction

Qu;20; Explain Status to be read as a whole in its context :

Qu:21; Discuss Reddendo Singula Singulis: This rule applied where general

words of description follows the list of particular things;

The rule is developed from Irish case, in the following words;

Where there are general words of description, following on enumeration, of

particular things such general words are to be construed distributive

reddendo singula singgulis and if the general word is apply to some things and

not to others , the general words are applied to those things to which they willand not to which they will not apply; that rule is beyond of all controversy.

Thus I device and bequeath all my real and personal property to A, will beconstrued redendo singula singgulis by applying device to real property and

bequeath to personal property. and in the sentence ;

Illustration; Wharton; Law Lexicon 14 the edition p 650 : If any one shall draw

any sword or gun the word draw is applied to sword and only and the word load

to gun only because it is i mpossible to load a sword or draw a gun ;

I can not say I load a sword, I can s ay I draw the sword, similarly I can not say

I draw the Gun, I can say I load the gun.

An example of the application of the rule is furnished in the construction of

section 59(1) of the local Government Act 1933, which read A person shall bedisqualified for being elected or being member of a local authority if he has

within five years before the day of election or since his election been convicted

of any offence and ordered to be imprisoned for a period of not less than three

months, without the option of fine

Justice Clauson construing the section said The section provides for twomatters;


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first what is to be disq ualification for election? and

secondly what is to be disqu alification for being a member after election?

Provide for disqualification ; first conviction within five years before the day

of election and secondly conviction since election. It is obvious that the second

disqualification mentioned does not fit the first case mentioned namely that ofelection, but does not fit the second case, and the second case only. It also

obvious that the first disqualification mentioned fits the first case and it does

not seem at all apt to fit the second case.

CASE LAW: Koteshwar Vithal Kamath V K Rangappa Baliga & Co, AIR

1969 SC 504 p 511

In this case the Rangappa Baliga & Co, booked the Coconut oil on the forward

marketing principles, but letter he failed to lift the material and subsequent

payment, the Kamath, filed a suit of recovery in trial court, the said suit wasdecreed by trial court and the decree was upheld by Kerala High Court.

Aggrieved by judgement of High Court the Kamat went to Supreme Court.

Another case law the application of the rule ofRedendo Singula singulis is

found in the construction of the Proviso to Art 304 of the Const itution which

read Provided that Bill and Amendment for the purpose of clause (b) shallbe introduced or moved in the legislature of a State without the previous

sanction of the President It was held by the Supreme Court that the wordintroduced referred to bill and the word moved for Amendment.

Qu;22; Explain Heyden Case / Mischief Rule/ Purposive Construction/

Heyden Rule :

When the material words in statute are capable of bearing two or more

construction or interpretations, the most firmly established rule for

construction of such words of all statutes in general, they may be penal or

beneficiary, restrictive or enlarging of the common law the rule laid down in

Heydon Case.

Means the court must select the construction which is most firmly establishedrule, under rule of law and such rule must be far from any mischief, from the

material of statute.

Before construction in accordance to Heydon Rule the court must have

allowed:

a] What was the law before making of Act

b] What was the misch ief or defect for which law did not provide

c] What is the remedyd] what is the reason of giving re medy or relief

Thereafter the court must adopt the construction which shall suppress the

mischief and give relief or remedy.

Case Law: Bengal Immunity Co V/s State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661

Ans India is a old ancient country in world and having ancient history of

Kingdoms and Princess States, most of these Kings and Princess are now

Ministers and Governors, of course there are exception for instance Governorof Kerala R S Gawai. After getting freedom the most difficult work before

Indian leaders to draft and accept the constitutions, which have taken three


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years, of course that time no computer and internet available. The old

Kingdoms and Princess states were having their own Acts and Rules and

Regulations and separate taxation on goods, and in such laws there was

restriction on interstates flow of goods. After adoption of the Constitution, in

accordance to Art 286, there is no restriction for free flow of goods from one

state to other state. The instance appeal came before Supreme Court in 1955,

for hearing, the Supreme Court reject the taxation and restriction on interstatemovement of goods.

The Supreme Court applied the Hyden Rule in th is case

i] There was separate law for interstate flow of goods and

multiple taxation.

ii] There was mischief and defect in old state laws and old states

law was not providing any remedy or relief

iii] The Art 286 of the Constitution provide free flow of goods

from one state to other state, with single taxation

iv] The people of country are benefited, because there is no

multiple taxation and hurdles on movement of goods.

Case Law: CIT V/s Sodra Devi AIR 1957 SC 832;

The Heyden Rule was again applied in this case, in the construction of sec16(3) of the Income tax Act, 1923, the sub section read;

In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment,

there shall be include (a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of

such individualas arises indirectly or directly .

The question before Supreme Court was whether individual word stated in theaforesaid section meant only a male or also included female or wife. The

Justice Bhagwati said In order to resolve this ambiguity , therefore, we mustof necessity have resort to the state of the law before the enactment of the

provision, the mischief and the defect for which the law did not provide ; theremedy which the Legislature resolved and appointed to cure the defect and the

true reason of the remedy.

After referring to these factors Justice Bhagwati proceeded to point out It isclear that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the one resulting from

the wide spread practice of husband entering into nominal partnership with

their wives and father, admitting their minor children to the benefit of the

partnership of which they were member. This evil was sought to be remedied

by the enactment of section 16(3) in the Act. If this background of theenactment of section 16(3) is borne in mind there is no room for any doubt that

howsoever that mischief was sought to be remedied by amending the Act, the

only intention of the Legislature in doing so was to include the income derived

by the wife or minor child, in computation of the total income of the male

assesses, the husband or the father, as the case may be, for the purpose of

assessment. The word any individual were therefore construed as restricted

to male.

Qu;23; Explain Codifying Statutes:

Ans The purpose of codifying statute is to present an orderly and authoritative

statement of the leading rules of law on a given subject, whether those rule are


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to be found in statute law or common law. The codified Act could be found

from its preamble and title. The codifying statute is presumed that not be alter

unless contrary intention appeared.

The Section 265 of Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter XXI, Plea Bargaining

was amended in 2006

Qu;24;Explain Casus omissus :

Means while amending one Act omitted to amend corresponding Act. This is

best example of Legislatures office errors or law making body. Of course they

amended certain section of Act but they omitted to relating Act. omission by

the Legislature to amend a related provision present great difficulties of

construction, but on the same time the court can not remove the deficiency of

Legislatures.

Case Law: Hiradevi V/s Dist Board Shahajahanpur, AIR 1952 SC 362

This is civil appeal before the Supreme Court, Section 71 of the U P District

Board, Act 1972, provide that a Board may dismissed its secretary by special

resolution which in certain cases required sanction local Government and

section 90 conferred a power to suspend the secretary pending inquiry into hisconduct or pending the order of any authority whose sanction is necessary for

his dismissal. By U P Act 1 of 1933 Section 71 was amended and the amended

section provided that a resolution of dismissal was not to take effect till the

expiry of the period of appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was sopresented. No corresponding amendment was, however made in Section 90 and

it was held by Supreme Court that the suspension resolved in section 90 to be

operative till the appeal against dismissal was decided was ultra virus the

power of Board.

Qu;24; Explain DICTIONARIES

When any word is not defined in Act itself, then it is permissible to refer to

dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in

common parlance. However while selecting one meaning out of many meaningsin dictionaries, the regard must be given to context, because it is fundamental

rule that the colour must be taken from the context.

CASE LAW: State Bank of India V/s. N Sundara Mani AIR 1976 SC 1111 p

1114

Justice Krishna Ayyar observed that Dictionaries are not dictation of statutoryconstruction which the benignant (pleasant and beneficiary in nature) mood of

law and more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation.

CASE LAW: Commissioner of Income Tax V/s. N C Budhraja & Co. AIR

1993 SC 2529

Justice Jeevan Reddy observed that A statute cannot always be construed with

the dictionaries in one hand and the statute in the other hand, but regards must

also to be the scheme, context and to the legislative history

Qu;25; Explain Noscitur a sociis;

(Means a doubtful words can be derived from its association with other words)


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The meaning of word is to be judged by the company it keeps; It is a rule of

legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an act of Parliament with

reference to words found in immediate connection with them. The associated

words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine ofNoscitur a

sociis the philosophy of which is that the meaning of doubtful word may be

ascertained by reference to the meaning associated with it; such doctrine is

broder than maxim ejusdem generis ( Particular section of the statute shall notbe divorced from rest of the Act)

CASE LAW: G Radhakrishana Murthy V Commercial Tax Officer, JT 1998

(4) SC 426.

The Supreme Court held that in entry 16 of schedule A to the Punjab General

Sales Tax Act 1948 which reads cosmetics, perfumery and toilet goods,excluding tooth paste, tooth powder, kumkum, and soap, the perfumery was

construed to mean such articles as are used as cosmetics and toilet goods and

are upon the person, and it was held that the word had no application to dhoopand agarbatti.

CASE LAW: Pradip Agarbatii, Ludhiana V State of Punjab AIR 1988, SC

171

When some article are grouped together in an entry to the schedule of sales tax

and excise statute, each word is the entry draws colour from the other words

therein on the principle of noscitur a sociis

CASE LAW: Sidheshwar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd V Union of India, AIR 1989

SC 1019 p1023l

Qu; 26; Explain Generalia sphaecialibus non derogant

Means of a special provision is made on a certain matter that matter is

excluded from the general provision. This principle may apply in between Act

and rules, if a provision has been made into Act therefore the provision shall

be excluded from the rule

The principle can be apply to resolve the conflict in between two Acts. The

above said maxim meaning that where a special provision made in a special

statute that special provision excludes the operation of general provision in the

general law

CASE LAW: K M Nanavati V State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112 p123

In this land mark case Supreme Court held t hat the absolute power of Governor

under Art 161 of the Constitution to grant pardon or to suspend a sentencepassed on accused person is not available during the period the matter become

sub-judice before Supreme Court as otherwise it will conflict with judicial

power of that court provided under Art 142 of the Con stitution

CASE LAW: Venkatraman Devora V State of Mysore AIR 1958 SC 255

The Supreme Court held that said revolving conflict between Art 25(2)(b) and

26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of every religious

denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairs in matter of

religious Art 26(b) is subject to a law made by a state providing for socialwelfare and reforms or throwing open of Hindu religious institution of public

character to all classes and section of Hindu Art 25(2)(b)


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terms of such International treaty. But in case of criminal jurisprudence the

important factor is place of offence.

CASE LAW: Peoples Union for Civil Liberties V/s. Union of India, AIR

2005, SC 2417 p 2416

The language of the Indian Act is clear, its meaning cannot be affected byInternational declarations or United Nations, resolution to which India is party

and has given affect to. It was so held that in deciding that a retired police

officer having knowledge of practical experience in the matter relating to

human right, can be appointed a member of the National Human Rights

Commission being qualified to be so appointed under section 3(2)(d) of the

Protection of Human Rights Act, 1994, and his appointment can not be

challenged on the basis of Paris principle regarding the protection of human

rights, which is subsequently endorsed by UN

CASE LAW: Naim Malvan V/s. Director of Public Prosecution, AIR 1948,PC, 186

The Court held that the principles have given rise to a rule of construction

which as explained by Lord Si monds, means, A statute an offence and imposing

a penalty for it, should be so construed as to appl y only to those person who by

virtue of residence or in some case citizenship or nationality are regarded as

subject to the jurisdiction of the state which has enacted the statute

Qu: 33; Explain Presumption against the ouster of jurisdiction of Court;

Ans: Means legislature at the time of making statute or any law thought that

whatever they are making statute shall not ouster the jurisdiction of the courts,

Qu;34; Explain Presumption against violation of international law:

Ans: Means legislatures at the time of making statute or any law thought that

whatever acts, statute, law, and rules they are making shall not violate the

International Law.

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