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Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Report DRDC-RDDC-2018-R239 December 2018

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Canada-US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment (CAUSE) V Public Safety Broadband Wireless Communications

Joe Fournier DRDC – Centre for Security Science Jacob Gurnick Steven Tomich Joe Wilson Charles Nadeau Sébastien Laflèche Charles Auger Vincent Picard Veronique Lafrenière Communications Research Centre Canada

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Template in use: EO Publishing App for SR-RD-EC Eng 2018-08-10_v2.dotm © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Department of National Defence), 2018 © Sa Majesté la Reine en droit du Canada (Ministère de la Défense nationale), 2018

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IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS

This document was reviewed for Controlled Goods by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) using the Schedule to the Defence Production Act.

Disclaimer: Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence ("Canada"), makes no representations or warranties, express or implied, of any kind whatsoever, and assumes no liability for the accuracy, reliability, completeness, currency or usefulness of any information, product, process or material included in this document. Nothing in this document should be interpreted as an endorsement for the specific use of any tool, technique or process examined in it. Any reliance on, or use of, any information, product, process or material included in this document is at the sole risk of the person so using it or relying on it. Canada does not assume any liability in respect of any damages or losses arising out of or in connection with the use of, or reliance on, any information, product, process or material included in this document.

Endorsement statement: This publication has been peer-reviewed and published by the Editorial Office of Defence Research and Development Canada, an agency of the Department of National Defence of Canada. Inquiries can be sent to: [email protected].

DRDC-RDDC-2018-R239 i

Abstract

On December 7, 2011, President Obama and Prime Minister Harper released the Beyond the Border (BTB) Action Plan, which set out joint priorities and specific initiatives for cross-border collaboration [1]. A common goal within this partnership focused on enhancing the coordination of responses during binational disasters. Specifically, the plan states that Canada and the United States will “focus on cross-border interoperability as a means of harmonizing cross-border emergency communications efforts.” The Canada–US Enhanced Resiliency (CAUSE) experiment series addresses this binational goal and hypothesizes that technologically enhanced multi-agency and cross-border Situational Awareness (SA) and communications interoperability [2] measurably improves regional resilience.

The fifth experiment in this series, CAUSE V was once again jointly sponsored by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) First Responders Group (FRG), the Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Centre for Security Science (CSS) and Public Safety Canada (PS Canada). This cross-border initiative consisted of a single experiment, performed in November 2017, based on a simulated eruption of Mount Baker in Washington State and the ensuing lahar flows to river valleys in Canada and the US.

This border region between British Columbia and Washington State is understandably important for both countries. There are three border crossings, of which one is the third busiest between the two countries, and another is the second busiest truck crossing point. The area is a major hub for regional energy transmission including a natural gas pipeline (3.8 billion ft³/day) and three hydroelectric facilities. It is also a very important area for agriculture, natural resources and tourism, where the potential economic impact of a Mount Baker eruption is very significant [3].

Emergency management agencies and jurisdictions in British Columbia and Washington State worked closely together to assess the effectiveness of a variety of technologies expected to improve communications interoperability and situational awareness by exchanging and sharing information in real-time. Such technologies included broadband mobile wireless communications, the use of digital volunteers and social media, and situational awareness tools that provided a common operating picture.

This Report describes the impact of the Canada-led component of CAUSE V, broadband mobile wireless. It describes the design, planning and execution of the wireless technologies used in the experiment. Recommendations provided at the end of the Report are derived from the key findings and propose actions to further push the envelope of communications interoperability between Canada and the US. Pertinent elements of this Report are also captured in a Canada–US After Action Report.

Significance to Defence and Security

The public safety and defence communities have traditionally relied on voice communications for mission critical and day-to-day operations. This Report describes how broadband mobile wireless communications can be of significant benefit to public safety and defence by greatly improving communications interoperability, information sharing and situational awareness among a variety of agencies and jurisdictions in Canada and the US. The Report examines the key benefits of CAUSE that

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help improve decision-making and coordination during an emergency response. This was accomplished by conducting a sophisticated two day experiment along the British Columbia–Washington State border where agencies made use of many feature-rich data applications beyond voice during the response to and recovery from a simulated volcanic eruption. CAUSE V was the fifth instance of the Canada–US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment series.

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Résumé

Le 7 décembre 2011, le président Obama et le premier ministre Harper ont rendu public le Plan d'action Par-delà la frontière (PDLF), qui énonce les priorités communes et les initiatives particulières de collaboration transfrontalière [1]. L'un des objectifs communs qui sous-tendent ce partenariat est d'améliorer la coordination des interventions lors de catastrophes binationales. Plus précisément, le plan indique que le Canada et les États-Unis doivent « mettre l’accent sur l'interopérabilité transfrontalière comme moyen d'harmoniser les efforts de communications en situation d'urgence ». La série d'expériences Canada-États-Unis de renforcement de la résilience (CAUSE) vise cet objectif binational et pose l’hypothèse selon laquelle une meilleure connaissance de la situation (CS) et l'interopérabilité des communications [2] interorganisationnelles et transfrontalières à l’aide d’outils technologiques accroîtrait sensiblement la résilience régionale.

La cinquième expérience de cette série, CAUSE V, a elle aussi été parrainée conjointement par le Groupe des premiers intervenants (FRG) de la Direction de la science et technologie (S&T) du département de la Sécurité intérieure (DHS) des États-Unis, le Centre des sciences pour la sécurité de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC CSS) et Sécurité publique Canada (SP Canada). Cette initiative transfrontalière comportait une seule expérience, effectuée en novembre 2017, fondée sur une éruption simulée du mont Baker dans l'État de Washington et les lahars qui s’ensuivraient dans les vallées fluviales au Canada et aux États-Unis.

Naturellement, cette région frontalière entre la Colombie-Britannique et l'État de Washington est capitale pour les deux pays. Il y a trois postes frontaliers, dont l'un se situe au troisième rang parmi les plus achalandés entre les deux pays, et un autre est deuxième parmi les points de passage les plus empruntés par les camions. La région constitue une plaque tournante majeure pour le transport de l'énergie et comprend un gazoduc (3,8 milliards de pi³/jour) et trois installations hydroélectriques. C'est également une zone très importante pour l'agriculture, les ressources naturelles et le tourisme où les répercussions économiques potentielles d'une éruption du mont Baker sont considérables [3].

Les organismes de gestion des situations d'urgence et les autorités de la Colombie-Britannique et de l'État de Washington ont travaillé en étroite collaboration pour évaluer l'efficacité de diverses technologies susceptibles d'améliorer l'interopérabilité des communications et la connaissance de la situation en échangeant et partageant de l'information en temps réel. Ces technologies comprenaient les communications mobiles sans fil à large bande, l'utilisation de bénévoles numériques et des médias sociaux, ainsi que des outils de connaissance de la situation qui fournissaient une image commune de la situation opérationnelle.

Le présent rapport décrit l'incidence de la composante canadienne de CAUSE V, les communications mobiles sans fil à large bande. Il décrit la conception, la planification et la mise en application des technologies sans fil utilisées au cours de l'expérience. Les recommandations formulées à la fin du rapport découlent des constatations clés et comportent des mesures visant à repousser encore plus loin les limites de l'interopérabilité des communications entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Les éléments pertinents du présent rapport sont également consignés dans un compte rendu après action canado-américain.

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Importance pour la défense et la sécurité

Les communautés de la sécurité publique et de la défense ont toujours compté sur les communications vocales pour les opérations quotidiennes et essentielles à la mission. Le présent rapport décrit comment les communications mobiles sans fil à large bande peuvent être très avantageuses pour la sécurité publique et la défense en améliorant grandement l'interopérabilité des communications, le partage d’information et la connaissance de la situation entre divers organismes et autorités au Canada et aux États-Unis. Le rapport examine les avantages clés de CAUSE qui aident à améliorer la prise de décision et la coordination lors d’une intervention d'urgence. Pour ce faire, on a procédé à une expérience complexe de deux jours le long de la frontière entre la Colombie-Britannique et l'État de Washington et durant laquelle les organismes ont utilisé de nombreuses applications de données riches en fonctionnalités, au-delà de la voix, pour intervenir lors d’une éruption volcanique simulée et assurer la reprise des activités par la suite. CAUSE V était la cinquième de la série d'expériences Canada-États-Unis de renforcement de la résilience.

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Table of Contents

Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Significance to Defence and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Résumé . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Importance pour la défense et la sécurité . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x 1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3.1 CAUSE III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.2 CAUSE IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

4 CAUSE V Broadband Wireless Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1 Experiment Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

4.1.1 Participating Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.2 Experiment Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.3 Experiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

4.1.3.1 Experiment Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1.3.2 Site Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1.3.3 Wireless Network Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1.3.4 Wireless Network Coverage Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.1.3.5 Overall Experiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

4.1.4 Wireless Users and Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.1.5 Wireless Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

4.1.5.1 Hangouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.1.5.2 Chrome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.1.5.3 Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.1.5.4 VLC and MX Player . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.1.5.5 Wowza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.1.5.6 Drakontas DragonForce (DForce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.1.5.7 Drones and Robots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4.1.5.8 IoT Sensor Gateways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.1.5.9 IP Cameras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.1.5.10 Virtual Private Networking (VPN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.1.5.11 ArcGIS Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4.2 Technical Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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4.2.1 Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4.2.2 Pre-emption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.2.3 Session Persistence (Service Continuity) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.2.4 Congestion-based Session Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.2.5 Access Class Barring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

5 Key Findings, Observations and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.1 Operational Findings, Observations and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

5.1.1 Wireless Network Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.1.2 Expectations of Network Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.1.3 Use of Wireless Applications Outside of Injects . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.1.4 Enhanced Ability to Communicate and Share Information . . . . . . . . . 40

5.2 Technical Findings, Observations and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.2.1 Canada–US Wireless Collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.2.2 Canada–US Applications Interworking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.2.3 Network Performance in Co-channel Environments . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.2.4 Session Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.2.5 Prioritization and Pre-emption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5.2.6 Congestion-based Session Persistence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 List of Symbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

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List of Figures

Figure 1: CAUSE III broadband wireless deployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Figure 2: CAUSE III wireless system level diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Figure 3: CAUSE IV emergency medical services scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Figure 4: CAUSE IV wireless system level diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Figure 5: Impact of Mount Baker eruption and Sherman Crater collapse. . . . . . . . . . 10

Figure 6: CAUSE V wireless deployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Figure 7: Abbotsford–Sumas border region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Figure 8: White Rock–Blaine border region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Figure 9: Eagle Mountain wireless LTE eNodeB site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Figure 10: Sumas Elementary School wireless LTE eNodeB site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Figure 11: Blaine Middle School wireless LTE eNodeB site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Figure 12: US Emergency Operations Centre—Bellingham. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Figure 13: Canada Emergency Operations Centre—Abbotsford. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Figure 14: Experiment vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Figure 15: Eagle Mountain—predicted wireless coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Figure 16: Sumas Elementary School—predicted wireless coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Figure 17: Blain Middle School—predicted wireless coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Figure 18: Eagle Mountain—TEMS drive test results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Figure 19: Sumas Elementary School—TEMS drive test results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Figure 20: Blaine Middle School—TEMS drive test results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Figure 21: Composite—TEMS drive test results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Figure 22: CAUSE V—system level diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Figure 23: CAUSE V—modems and handheld devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Figure 24: CAUSE V—modem/network configurations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Figure 25: Drakontas DForce mobile collaboration application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Figure 26: Texas A&M drones and robots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Figure 27: Sensor platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Figure 28: Applications—network configurations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Figure 29: Traffic prioritization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Figure 30: Pre-emption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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Figure 31: Session persistence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Figure 32: Congestion-based session persistence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Figure 33: Access class barring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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List of Tables

Table 1: Wireless coverage parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Table 2: Wireless users. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Table 3: Wireless applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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Acknowledgements

An experiment of the magnitude of CAUSE V is carried out with the help, dedication and enthusiasm of a great number of people and organizations. The authors wish to thank all of the following participating organizations who have helped to advance Canada and US interoperability:

• Abbotsford Fire Rescue Services

• Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)

• CANARIE network

• Cascadia Virtual Operation Support Team (VOST)

• City of Blaine School District

• Communications Research Centre (CRC) Canada – Innovation, Science and Economic Development

• Defence Research and Development Canada's Centre for Security Science (DRDC CSS)

• Emergency Management British Columbia

• E-Comm 911

• FirstNet

• Internet2 network

• Langley Emergency Program

• New Westminster Fire Rescue Services

• National Information Sharing Consortium (NISC)

• Nooksack School District

• Public Safety (PS) Canada

• Semiahmoo First Nation Emergency Preparedness Team

• Texas A&M University Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue (CRASAR)

• Texas A&M University Internet 2 Technology Evaluation Center (ITEC)

• US Geological Survey’s (USGS) Cascade Volcano Observatory

• US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)

• US DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) First Responder Group (FRG)

• US DHS, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

• Victoria Fire Department

• Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD)

• Washington State K-20 network

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• Whatcom County Division of Emergency Management

• Williams

• All suppliers of applications and technologies

DRDC-RDDC-2018-R239 1

1 Purpose

A key objective of the CAUSE series of experiments is to evaluate the effectiveness of emerging communications and information sharing technologies to provide enhanced situational awareness and resilience to public safety users during emergencies and large planned events that involve both Canada and the US. The purpose of this technical report is to provide a description of the public safety broadband wireless technologies tested, evaluated and put into operation during the CAUSE V experiment, to assess their effectiveness and to present key findings and recommendations.

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2 Introduction

The objective of the CAUSE Resiliency series is to measure the impact of interoperable technology during a multi-agency cross-border emergency response and recovery operation. This on-going series is a collaborative effort between Defence Research and Development Canada – Centre for Security Science (DRDC CSS), Public Safety Canada (PS Canada) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, First Responders Group.

It is hypothesized that improving shared situational awareness and interoperable communications during multi-agency emergency events leads to enhanced community resilience. Incremental improvements in response and recovery operations within the affected regions from a time or efficiency perspective can be used to demonstrate resilience. Mutual aid, based on binational agreements, is necessary to provide operational support between Canada and the US during these cross-border emergencies.

To date, five scenario-based experiments have been conducted in Canadian and American cross-border communities. CAUSE I (Pacific region) [4], CAUSE II (Eastern region) [5], CAUSE III (Western and Eastern regions) [6] [7], and CAUSE IV (Central region) [8] were conducted pseudo-annually over the past several years. A public safety broadband wireless component was added to the experiment in CAUSE III and continued in CAUSE IV. The latest experiment, CAUSE V, which also included a broadband wireless component, was conducted in the Pacific Northwest and involved border communities of the Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) and the US state of Washington (WA).

A high level of collaboration between Canada and the US was required to design and implement the public safety broadband wireless technologies required for the experiment. The key partners in the wireless component of CAUSE V included Canada’s Centre for Security Sciences and the Communications Research Centre, and Texas A&M in the United States.

This Report describes the broadband wireless component of CAUSE V from a technical perspective. The experiment After Action Report (AAR) [9] provides a more comprehensive understanding of the overall experiment conduct. Section 3 of the Report briefly describes CAUSE III and CAUSE IV in order to understand how broadband wireless has evolved over the experiments. Section 4 describes the wireless network design methodology, the resulting infrastructure and the applications that were used in the experiment. Section 5 describes the sophisticated, and in some cases unique, wireless technology achievements in the experiment, while Section 6 lists the key findings of the experiment and their associated recommendations.


3 Background

DRDC CSS has been a key contributor and leader on the Canada–US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment (CAUSE) series since 2011. There have been five experiments in all, with the last three featuring a significant broadband wireless communications and information sharing component. As the experiments progressed, the intention was to build on the outcomes and key findings of the previous iterations in the series. As such, a brief description of the broadband wireless components of CAUSE III and CAUSE IV is provided as background information.

3.1 CAUSE III

CAUSE III was comprised of two scenarios. One was located along the border in the Eastern part of Canada and the US, with the other scenario located along the border in the Western part of Canada and the US. It was the latter of the two scenarios that focused on broadband wireless technology. The experiment was carried out over a two day period in the end of November 2014 and was located along the borders of Saskatchewan, Alberta and Montana where a fictitious, large wildland fire was spreading very rapidly. The area was very remote and sparsely populated with virtually no wireless communications available. The intent of the experiment was therefore to provide broadband wireless communications to first responders tending the fire. In doing so, responders would have a higher level of situational awareness that would lead to better control of the fire, save valuable time, and possibly lives. This was done by deploying a Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) deployable system to serve the responders addressing the wildland fire. LTE is the broadband wireless technology upon which 4G cellular mobile services are based. Many feature-rich applications were then made available to first responders including voice and video conferencing, a map-based real-time situational awareness tool, email and a variety of real-time video feeds, many of which were hosted on the Internet. In order to connect to the Internet, the deployable system needed to be installed approximately 70 kilometers (43 miles) north of the Canada–US border since this was the closest point at which backhaul to the Internet was available (Figure 1).


Figure 1: CAUSE III broadband wireless deployment.

Because of this significant distance from the border, the LTE deployable system was raised to approximately 180 meters (600 feet) above ground level using a tethered aerostat in order to provide the necessary wireless coverage at the border region. In order to further complement the LTE wireless coverage off of the aerostat deployable system, two other LTE deployable systems were set up in proximity to the border region. One was located in Canada at the Wild Horse border crossing between Alberta and Montana, with a second located in the US at the Willow Creek border crossing between Saskatchewan and Canada. Depending on their location, wireless users were able to connect to the three systems.

The main objectives of the broadband wireless experiment in CAUSE III were to enhance first responders’ situational awareness, demonstrate the extensive wireless coverage range offered by deployable LTE systems, and highlight the benefits that broadband wireless applications could offer to public safety users. Figure 2 provides a high level system view of the experiment.


Figure 2: CAUSE III wireless system level diagram.

3.2 CAUSE IV

CAUSE IV took place in April 2016 over a two day period in Sarnia (Lambton County), Ontario and Port Huron (Saint Clair County), Michigan. The experiment’s backdrop was a tornado and ensuing train derailment that caused a chemical gas leak. The wireless component of CAUSE IV was focused on emergency medical services with patients being transported across the border. Building on the deployable LTE capabilities demonstrated in CAUSE III, this experiment designed and implemented fixed LTE cell sites (evolved Node Base Stations (eNodeB)) on both sides of the border with each tying into their respective LTE cores. In doing so, two fully operational LTE networks were deployed that provided the necessary wireless coverage for the experiment. A large list of participants including paramedics, paramedic dispatchers, hospitals, border authorities and bridge authorities made use of a large number of feature-rich broadband applications intended to significantly improve the transportation of patients between the two countries. Figure 3 provides a high level view of the CAUSE IV experiment.


Figure 3: CAUSE IV emergency medical services scenario.

The applications included video and voice conferencing, auto vehicle locator (AVL) applications, the sharing of live camera feeds, email, information sharing including patient records and data, medical transfer forms, 12-lead ECG scans and passport information. The key operational objectives of CAUSE IV broadband wireless were reduced patient transfer times between the two countries through the introduction and use of sophisticated broadband wireless applications, increased overall situational awareness, and a raised awareness of how broadband communications would improve standard operating procedures. From a technical perspective, the objectives were to establish two operational LTE networks on both sides of the border with remote core networks, demonstrate the use of Internet-hosted applications, and to demonstrate wireless network-to-network session persistence. In the case of the latter, this is essentially roaming from one network to another while maintain an uninterrupted communication session (normally, when roaming from one wireless network to another, the connection is broken and a new communication needs to be established by the user). Figure 4 describes the broadband wireless systems used in the CAUSE IV experiment.


Figure 4: CAUSE IV wireless system level diagram.


4 CAUSE V Broadband Wireless Experiment

The latest iteration in the CAUSE series of experiments was CAUSE V, staged in November 2017 in the Fraser River Valley between lower mainland British Columbia and Whatcom County in Northern Washington State. The setting for the fifth instance of the experiment was a Mount Baker eruption and ensuing lahar flow into the river valleys below [10]. Lahars are essentially rapidly moving mudflows resulting from a volcanic eruption that usually flow down along river valleys.

As mentioned, a key objective of the CAUSE experiments has been to demonstrate enhanced situational awareness for first responders in emergencies through the use of emerging communications and information sharing technologies. While this was the case in all CAUSE experiments, CAUSE III and CAUSE IV each consisted of a single scenario with two separate vignettes used to meet this objective. One vignette focused primarily on broadband wireless communications and information sharing whereas another focused on various capabilities that included alerts and warnings systems, digital volunteers, social media, common operating pictures and information sharing that provided enhanced situational awareness to emergency operations centres (EOC), emergency managers, and first responders. While both vignettes were framed by a common scenario and inter-related experiment injects, they were not directly tied together. In the case of CAUSE V, a key goal and major achievement was to directly tie all components of the experiment together in a manner that would further enhance the situational awareness of all wireless participants and emergency managers at EOCs. In addition to the fixed EOCs and emergency managers, the list of wireless users in the experiment included first responders, border agencies, First Nations, drones, robots, sensors and commercial users. This single vignette of activity, that was at times challenging, was monitored during the experiment and clearly demonstrated the significant benefits of the enhanced approach.

Finally, since a volcanic event can span many months or even years as participants react to the threat of an eruption, respond to the eruption itself and the resulting lahar flow, and finally begin recovery operations, CAUSE V followed a heavily compressed simulated timeline carried out over a two day period.

4.1 Experiment Description

This section lists the participants, the experiment scenario and the experiment design used to execute CAUSE V with emphasis on the broadband wireless components of the experiment. CAUSE V was carried out on November 15–16, 2017, with primary operational locations at the Whatcom County EOC in Bellingham, Washington, the Canada EOC located in the City of Abbotsford’s City Hall, Canada Border Services Agency sites in Surrey, British Columbia and Abbotsford, British Columbia, and Customs and Border Protection sites in Blaine, Washington and Sumas, Washington. Of these, all were connected over the wireless network with the exception of the US EOC in Bellingham, which was not within range of the wireless coverage. In all, the experiment involved over sixty participants of which nearly twenty were on the broadband wireless networks.

The two day experiment followed a shortened timeline that covered the anticipation of, response to and recovery from a volcanic eruption and the resulting lahar flows. In each of these phases, participants were required to monitor social media, identify mutual aid requirements, deploy resources, exchange information to support cross-border situational awareness, and leverage the available technology to develop an integrated common operating picture for all participants. The first day focused on preparation


for an eruption, response to flooding and the onset of the eruption. Day two focused on the response to the eruption and lahars, culminating with the recovery from the lahars. Throughout the experiment, all participants were able to communicate, and share and access valuable information that assisted in dealing with the emergency.

4.1.1 Participating Organizations

The principal Canadian agencies and organizations participating in the broadband wireless portion of CAUSE V included the City of Abbotsford, Abbotsford Fire Rescue Service, Canada Border Services Agency, E-Comm 911, City of Langley Emergency Program and Semiahmoo First Nation Emergency Preparedness. The agencies and organizations for the United States included Whatcom County, the City of Bellingham, DHS Customs and Border Protection, City of Blaine School District, Nooksack School District, the State of Washington.

The organization responsible for the wireless component of the experiment included the Defence Research and Development Canada Centre for Security Sciences (DRDC CSS), the Communications Research Centre Canada (CRC) and Public Safety Canada. The efforts in the Unites States were led by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology (DHS S&T) and Texas A&M University.

4.1.2 Experiment Scenario

The construct of the CAUSE V experiment scenario was a simulation of the eruption of Mount Baker and subsequent lahar that required close collaboration between Canada and the US on a coordinated cross-border response to and recovery from the major incident. This backdrop was used to demonstrate the use of advanced emerging technologies for communications, information exchange, situational awareness and emergency management capabilities.

The scenario of the experiment begins with the onset of volcanic activity in early August that triggers the United States Geological Service (USGS) volcano observatory to raise the volcano advisory level for Mount Baker. Seismic activity continues into October, further raising levels of preparation. In early November, an atmospheric river event causes major flooding. In late December, Mount Baker erupts resulting in the collapse of the Sherman Crater and the ensuing lahars extending to the lower river valleys. The events cause extensive damage in both British Columbia and Washington State and are responsible for loss of life and widespread damage to property and critical infrastructure. Recovery efforts could span years. Figure 5 portrays the predicted potential impact that such an eruption would have on the region including the resulting lahar flows into the lower valleys.


Figure 5: Impact of Mount Baker eruption and Sherman Crater collapse.

The coordinated effort in the experiment required the EOCs in Bellingham and Washington, but also a wide variety of wireless users in both countries to interact with one another and with the EOCs. In each phase of the scenario, participants were required to monitor social media, identify mutual aid requirements and deploy resources, exchange informational data to support cross-border situational awareness and leverage the available technology to develop an integrated common operating picture.

4.1.3 Experiment Design

To support the objectives of the experiment, broadband wireless LTE networks needed to be designed, planned and installed in both Canada and the US. LTE is the technology that underpins 4G cellular networks and is composed of two major components: the core network which is the centralized hub, and the radio access network (RAN), which by means of evolved node base stations (eNodeB) cellular sites delivers the over-the-air wireless coverage to users. In the case of CAUSE V, the RAN network is local to the experiment whereas the core networks were located in Ottawa, Canada. The CAUSE V broadband wireless design was carried out by DRDC CSS, the Communications Research Centre Canada and Texas A&M.

The main considerations in designing the wireless networks were the actual experiment locations, site permissions and access, wireless user requirements, coverage at the experiment locations, support for technical demonstrations and the availability of backhaul connectivity. The latter of these is often very challenging in that most information technology (IT) departments of organizations are often reluctant to provide access to their network infrastructure, particularly for a short duration with no contractual vehicle in place.


For an experiment with a relatively high level of complexity such as CAUSE V, the design phase can start as early as one year before the experiment itself. Work in these early stages includes the identification of potential sites and collaborators, ensuring availability of backhaul, sophisticated coverage analyses and a number of site visits to validate the effectiveness of the selected sites. Once confirmed, the detailed design of each site of the network including the RAN and core networks ensues. After the investigation of many potential options over a period of several months, Figure 6 depicts the broadband wireless sites selected for the CAUSE V experiment.

Figure 6: CAUSE V wireless deployment.

4.1.3.1 Experiment Locations

The first wireless network design consideration is the actual experiment locations. CAUSE V had a US EOC in Bellingham, Washington and a Canadian EOC in Abbotsford, British Columbia with full communication channels between the two. Further to this, there were a number of wireless users in proximity to the CBSA Huntingdon and CBP Sumas ports of entry (right side of Figure 6) as well as the CBSA Douglas and CBP Peace Arch ports of entry (left side of Figure 6). Figure 7 and Figure 8 indicate these locations and the three wireless base stations (eNodeB) sites that were located, designed and installed to provide the wireless coverage for the experiment.


Figure 7: Abbotsford–Sumas border region.

Figure 8: White Rock–Blaine border region.


4.1.3.2 Site Descriptions

Three LTE radio access network (RAN) sites were used to provide wireless coverage during the CAUSE V experiment.

4.1.3.2.1 Eagle Mountain, Abbotsford, British Columbia

The Eagle Mountain site was the only wireless LTE eNodeB (base station) on the Canadian network for the experiment. It was a key site in that it is located at approximately 300 meters (m) above sea level (ASL) and provided very good coverage throughout the eastern part of the Fraser Valley, both in Canada and the US. The site is a commercial cellular site with a large yard that easily accommodated a tower and equipment enclosure for the wireless installation. E-Comm 911 BC, a key partner in CAUSE V, negotiated access to the site and made their emergency mobile unit (EMU) available for the experiment (Figure 9). The EMU unit is used to provide a rapid instantiation of wireless communications for emergencies or planned events. The self-contained unit consists of an equipment shelter and a 36 m self-support mast. For the purposes of CAUSE V, the mast was only raised to 20 m as this height provided sufficient coverage.

Figure 9: Eagle Mountain wireless LTE eNodeB site.

Because most of the software applications being used in CAUSE V were hosted remotely, Internet access was required at all eNodeB sites. In the case of Eagle Mountain, the gateway for this access was at the E-Comm 911 main operations centre in Vancouver, BC. Because of the distance from Eagle Mountain, a multi-hop path made up of microwave wireless and wireline links was made available for the experiment by E-Comm 911, with a bi-directional capacity of 20 Megabits per second (Mbps). The radio spectrum used for the wireless coverage was 3GPP Band 14 operating in the 700 megahertz (MHz) band (758-768 MHz downlink and 788-798 MHz uplink). This 20 MHz of spectrum delivered greater than 30 Mbps downstream and 20 Mbps upstream, but was limited to 20 Mbps bi-directionally due to the backhaul capacity. The eNodeB equipment was transmitting at 20 Watt with a 12 decibel-isotropic (dBi) sector antenna resulting in approximately 50 decibel-milliwatt (dBm) of Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) after system and cable losses were taken into account. The Eagle Mountain site is located approximately 5 kilometers (km) east of central Abbotsford and 5.5 km north-northeast of the border ports of entry. Emergency responders from both Canada and the US connected to this wireless site.


4.1.3.2.2 Sumas Elementary School, Sumas, Washington

The Sumas Elementary School was one of two eNodeB sites on the US wireless network for the experiment. This site provided additional coverage at the Abbotsford–Sumas border crossing area and was required to support key technological demonstrations, which is one of the objectives of the CAUSE series of experiments. The eNodeB omnidirectional antenna was located on the roof of the school with the equipment located in the school penthouse (Figure 10). The height of the antenna was approximately 10 m above ground level (AGL).

Figure 10: Sumas Elementary School wireless LTE eNodeB site.

As mentioned in Section 4.1.3, backhaul connectivity to the Internet was required for the wireless eNodeB sites. In the case of Sumas Elementary, fibre optic backhaul was provided by the Nooksack Valley School District, which then connected to the Washington State K-20 network that provides educational Internet access in Washington State. The bi-directional capacity of the backhaul configuration was greater than 30 Mbps. The radio spectrum used for the wireless coverage was again Band 14 using the same 20 MHz of spectrum as the Canadian network (758–768 MHz downlink and 788–798 MHz uplink), delivering greater than 30 Mbps downstream and 20 Mbps upstream. Traditionally, spectrum channelization avoids such co-channel coexistence in the same geographical area with overlapping coverage, but the sophistication of 4G LTE technology is such that significant amounts of throughput are achievable even in such conditions (albeit not maximum throughput). The eNodeB equipment was transmitting at 20 W with a 6 dBi omnidirectional antenna resulting in approximately 44 dBm of EIRP after system and cable losses were taken into account.

The Sumas Elementary School site is located in the southeast end of Sumas approximately 1 km south of the border. Users connecting to this wireless site were emergency responders from both Canada and the US.


4.1.3.2.3 Blaine Middle School, Blaine, Washington

While both a Canada and a US eNodeB site were deployed to provide wireless connectivity in the Abbotsford–Sumas area of the experiment, Blaine Middle School was the only site to provide wireless connectivity in the White Rock–Linden area of the experiment. Being the only site at this location, Blaine provided coverage in both Canada and the US for the experiment. The eNodeB was located in a secured area of the school yard. Omnidirectional antennas were installed on a trailer hitch mounted mast on the back of a pickup truck, with the eNodeB equipment located in a mechanical room at ground level (Figure 11). The height of the antenna was approximately 8 m AGL.

Figure 11: Blaine Middle School wireless LTE eNodeB site.

Similar to the Sumas Elementary School, fibre optic backhaul was provided by the City of Blaine School District, which then connected to the Washington State K-20 network. The bi-directional capacity of the backhaul configuration was greater than 30 Mbps. The radio spectrum used for the wireless coverage was again Band 14 using the same 20 MHz of spectrum as the two sites located in the eastern portion of the experiment (758–768 MHz downlink and 788–798 MHz uplink), delivering greater than 30 Mbps downstream and 20 Mbps upstream. Unlike the eastern sites, Blaine did not have to contend with co-channel co-existence as it was the only Band 14 site in operation in the coastal area of CAUSE V, and was therefore able to deliver maximum capacity. The eNodeB equipment was transmitting at 20 W with a 6 dBi omnidirectional antennas resulting in approximately 45 dBm of EIRP after system and cable losses were taken into account.

The Blaine Middle School site is located in the centre of Blaine approximately 1.5 km southeast of the CBP Peace Arch border crossing point. Users connecting to this wireless site were emergency responders from both Canada and the US.

4.1.3.2.4 Emergency Operations Centre, Bellingham, Washington

The main emergency operations centre (EOC) for the experiment was located on Airport Way in Bellingham, as shown in Figure 12. All experiment participants located at the EOC were able to communicate with all wireless participants in the field, both in the US and Canada.


Figure 12: US Emergency Operations Centre—Bellingham.

4.1.3.2.5 Emergency Operations Centre, Abbotsford, British Columbia

The Canadian emergency operations centre for the experiment was located at Abbotsford City Hall on South Fraser Way, as shown in Figure 13. Similar to the EOC in Bellingham, all experiment participants located at the Canadian EOC were able to communicate with all wireless participants in the field. Both EOCs also communicated and shared information regularly with each other.


Figure 13: Canada Emergency Operations Centre—Abbotsford.

4.1.3.2.6 Experiment Vehicles

Four vehicles, provided by Semiahmoo First Nation, Whatcom County, the Langley Emergency Program and Abbotsford Fire and Rescue Services, were used extensively in CAUSE V. All vehicles were equipped with LTE Band 14 modems and Windows laptops, which were essential for carrying out the experiment. They are shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14: Experiment vehicles.

4.1.3.3 Wireless Network Coverage

In planning for the CAUSE V experiment, wireless network coverage simulations were produced using sophisticated radio frequency (RF) coverage analysis tools and three-dimensional digital terrain elevation data. The simulation tool used was InfoVista Planet and the elevation data sources were Geobase 0.75


Arc-Second for Canada and SRTM V3 1 Arc-Second for the US. The coverage simulations were based on no co-channel interference. Table 1 lists the coverage parameters used for the three sites.

Table 1: Wireless coverage parameters.

As can be seen in the table, the antenna heights used in the simulations were marginally different that the actual installed antenna heights as they were produced before the actual experiment. This is a result of the final site installation decisions that were made once on site. In the cases of the two school sites in the US, the predicted coverage with somewhat higher antennas nevertheless fell within acceptable margins of tolerance. In the case of Eagle Mountain, again the predicted and actual coverage were close since the difference in antenna height was significantly offset by the elevation of the site relative to the valley below. Figure 15, Figure 16 and Figure 17 provide estimates of the predicted coverage from Eagle Mountain, Sumas Elementary School and Blaine Middle School.

Coverage Parameter Unit Eagle Sumas E.S. Blaine M.S.Mountain

Site elevation [m] 296 12 21Frequency band 14 14 14Downlink RF channel [MHz] 788-798 788-798 788-798Uplink RF channel [MHz] 758-768 758-768 758-768Coverage prediction setting (up to) [km] 15 15 15Elevation data Yes Yes YesData resolution [m] 20 or better 20 or better 20 or better Clutter data No No NoBuilding data No No NoAntenna type Sector Omni OmniAntenna Gain [dBi] 12 8 6Antenna height (AGL) [m] 15 12 12Antenna azimuth [degree] 190 N/A N/AElectrical downtilt [degree] 3 N/A N/A


Figure 15: Eagle Mountain—predicted wireless coverage.

5 km

Eagle Mountain


Figure 16: Sumas Elementary School—predicted wireless coverage.


Figure 17: Blaine Middle School—predicted wireless coverage.

4.1.3.4 Wireless Network Coverage Validation

In order to validate the wireless network coverage of the sites, drive testing was conducted using sophisticated tools that measure the reference signal received power (RSRP) of the wireless signal at various locations. Since the coverage maps in Section 4.1.3.3 are based on the received signal strength indicator (RSSI), the relationship between the RSRP and the RSSI needs to be determined. In LTE the relationship between the two is described by the following:

RSRP [dB] = RSSI [dBm] – 10*log (12*N)

where N is the number of resource blocks. In the case of a 10 MHz channel, N = 50 and the value for RSRP is 27.8 dB lower than the RSSI.

The tool used in CAUSE V was TEMS Discovery, a measurement data analysis and network optimization tool that provides a comprehensive network analytics and optimization platform. It is typically used by mobile network operators and wireless vendors to provide insight into network performance as perceived by subscribers at the device, application and network level. The holistic approach to TEMS Discovery allows operators to lock-in premium subscribers by validating that they are receiving the service levels they demand, around-the-clock, from any location, and across voice, data and integrated media services.

5 km

Blaine Middle School


Figure 18, Figure 19, Figure 20 and Figure 21 show the drive test results for Eagle Mountain, Sumas Elementary School, Blaine Middle School and a composite of all three, respectively. The composite is simply an aggregation of the first three with one site turned on at a time. As such, there is no accounting for co channel interference that, similar to the previous section, would normally lessen the coverage.

Figure 18: Eagle Mountain—TEMS drive test results.


Figure 19: Sumas Elementary School—TEMS drive test results.

Figure 20: Blaine Middle School—TEMS drive test results.


Figure 21: Composite—TEMS drive test results.

The results of the extensive drive testing after site installation and leading up to the experiment validated that the coverage simulations were acceptable for the purposes of the experiment. Typically, tuned RF propagation models are considered acceptable within 6–8 dB of accuracy.

4.1.3.5 Overall Experiment Design

While considering all the information on the CAUSE V experiment scenario and experiment design including experiment locations, site selection, user requirements and technology demonstration needs, Figure 22 illustrates the overall wireless design of the CAUSE V experiment.


Figure 22: CAUSE V—system level diagram.

The diagram shows the various components that made up the wireless network design and implementation. The eNodeB at Eagle Mountain connected to the Canada core network over the E-Comm 911 network and the CANARIE1 [11] network. The Sumas eNodeB site in the US connected to the US core network over a series of connections between the Nooksack School District Network, the Washington K-20 network and finally, Internet22 [12]. Similarly, the Blaine eNodeB site connected to the US core network over a series of connections between the Blaine School District, the Washington K-20 network and Internet2. The use of the Research and Education (R&E) networks such as Internet2 in the United States and CANARIE in 1 “Twelve provincial and territorial network partners, together with CANARIE, collectively form Canada’s National Research and Education Network (NREN). This powerful digital infrastructure connects Canadians to national and global data, tools, colleagues, and classrooms that fuel the engine of innovation of innovation in today’s digital economy. CANARIE’s national backbone network provides interprovincial and international connectivity for Canada’s NREN.” https://www.canarie.ca/network/ [11]. 2 “Internet2 operates the nation’s largest and fastest, coast-to-coast research and education network that was built to deliver advanced, customized services that are accessed and secured by the community-developed trust and identity framework, with Internet2 Network Operations Center powered by Indiana University. Internet2 serves 327 US universities, 60 government agencies, 43 regional and state education networks and through them supports more than 94,000 community anchor institutions, over 900 InCommon participants, and 72 leading corporations working with our community, and 61 national research and education network partners that represent more than 100 countries.” https://www.internet2.edu/about-us/ [12].

https://www.canarie.ca/network/

https://www.internet2.edu/about-us/


Canada allowed for the establishment of a high quality, reliable transport networks to the LTE cores. As such, the backhaul network was able to be removed from the list of experiment design variables.

The Eagle Mountain and Sumas wireless sites provided the necessary coverage for the wireless participants located in the eastern border crossing region while the Blaine site provided wireless coverage for participants in the western border crossing region. In order to get wireless connectivity to the networks, participants were provided handheld smartphones or modems for vehicles, drones, robots and sensors. A variety of feature-rich applications such as map-based situational awareness tools, video conferencing, live video and sensor feeds, email, voice and chatting were also made available to the experiment participants. While most applications were hosted over the Internet, some were either hosted remotely on private networks or hosted locally. Wireless users, devices and applications will be described in the following sections.

4.1.4 Wireless Users and Devices

In CAUSE V a large number of wireless users participated in all three phases of the experiment. They made use of wide variety of applications to communicate and share information with each other as well as with the two EOCs. Some users were in fixed locations while others were mobile. Furthermore, while most wireless users were humans, there were also machine users in the experiment such as sensors, drones and robots. Table 2 lists all users involved in the wireless component of the experiment.3

Table 2: Wireless users.

3 The two EOC locations were connected by wired Ethernet.

No. Wireless Users Device Type Designator Location

1 CBSA Douglas Port of Entry Modem/Laptop LT1/M1 Fixed2 DHS CBP Peace Arch Port of Entry Modem/Laptop LT3/M3 Fixed3 CBSA Huntingdon Port of Entry Modem/Laptop LT2/M2 Fixed4 DHS CBP Sumas Port of Entry Modem/Laptop LT4/M4 Fixed5 Abbortsford Fire Vehicle Modem/Laptop LT7/M7 Mobile6 Langley Vehicle Modem/Laptop LT8/M8 Mobile7 Semiahmoo First Nation Vehicle Modem/Laptop LT9/M9 Mobile8 City of Bellingham Sherrif Vehicle Modem/Laptop LT10/M10 Mobile9 Commercial User 1 - Langley Smartphone SONIM 1 Mobile

10 Commercial User 2 - Abbotsford Smartphone SONIM 2 Mobile11 Public Safety User 1 - Whatcom County Smartphone SONIM 3 Mobile12 Public Safety User 2 - Abbotsford Smartphone SONIM 4 Mobile13 Public Safety User 3 -CBSA Douglas Smartphone Bittium Eng1 Mobile14 Public Safety User 4 - Semiahmoo Smartphone Bittium Eng2 Mobile15 Public Safety User 5 - Langley Smartphone Bittium Original Mobile16 Public Safety User 6 - CBSA Huntingdon Smartphone Bittium TEMS Mobile17 Whatcom County EOC Laptop LT5 Fixed18 City of Abbotsford EOC Laptop LT6 Fixed19 Sensor Platform 1 Modem/Laptop LT11/M11 Fixed20 Sensor Platform 2 Modem/Laptop LT12/M12 Fixed21 TAMU Drone/Robot Platform Modem M13 Mobile


In all, four vehicles provided by Semiahmoo First Nation, Whatcom County, Langley Emergency Program and Abbotsford Emergency Rescue were equipped with modem+laptop setups. Additionally, the CBSA border sites at Douglas (Surrey) and Huntingdon (Abbotsford) as well as the CBP border sites at Peace Arch (Blaine) and Sumas were equipped with modem+laptop installations. Each laptop was Windows-based, was set up with a suite of applications to support participants’ involvement in the experiment and provided a direct link to all content being shared. While the vehicles, border agencies and the Canada EOC laptops4 were connected by means of Band 14 wireless modems, the US EOC laptops were connected via wired Ethernet since the site was not within the wireless coverage of the experiment. The EOCs made use of all the same applications that the wireless users had, thus allowing them to fully communicate and share information with all CAUSE V participants and, as required, with the outside world.

Two sensor platforms with vibration, water level and temperature monitoring capabilities used Band 14 modems, as did the drone/robot platform provided by Texas A&M University.

With respect to handheld devices, eight smartphones were provided; six were used by experiment participants that had public safety roles, and two were used by participants that had commercial roles. The devices used the Android operating system and had a similar suite of applications as the laptops.

All modem laptop and smartphone devices allowed users to view and upload to the common operating picture while within range of either broadband wireless network in Canada and the US. Furthermore, the devices were used to support the technology demonstration component of the experiment that showcased access class barring, prioritization, pre-emption, session persistence, congestion-based session persistence, drones, robots and a variety of sensors. All of these will be further described in upcoming sections.

Figure 23 shows examples of the modems and handheld devices used in the experiment.

Figure 23: CAUSE V—modems and handheld devices.

Figure 24 lists the configurations of the various modems in the network.

4 Depending on the phases of the experiment, the Canada EOC laptop was connected to either the Band 14 wireless network or over wired Ethernet.


Figure 24: CAUSE V—modem/network configurations.

4.1.5 Wireless Applications

A wide variety of applications were made available to wireless users during the two day experiment. They allowed experiment participants to communicate and share information with one another, and in many cases with anyone around the world. Table 3 lists the applications, followed by a more detailed description of each application.

Table 3: Wireless applications.

Application Host Device Hangout Google Laptop/Smartphone Email Google Laptop/Smartphone Chrome Google Laptop/Smartphone VLC VLC Laptop MX Player MX Player Smartphone DragonForce CRC Laptop/Smartphone Sensor Platform Local (CRC) Laptop/Smartphone VPN CRC Laptop/Smartphone Drones/Robots Texas A&M Laptop/Smartphone VoIP CRC Laptop/Smartphone IP Cameras CRC Laptop/Smartphone Wowza Wowza Laptop/Smartphone

4.1.5.1 Hangouts

VoIP application used to message contacts, start free video or voice calls, and join a conversation with one person or a group.

4.1.5.2 Chrome

Web Browser designed for Android devices. It allowed users to access the Internet.

4.1.5.3 Email

Web-based email accounts were provided to all experiment participants. Participants could email one another or anyone outside of the experiment.


4.1.5.4 VLC and MX Player

VLC and MX player media players are free and open source cross-platform multimedia players that play most multimedia files as well as discs, devices, and network streaming protocols. In this experiment, VLC was used on Windows computers while MX player was used on Band 14 Android smartphones.

4.1.5.5 Wowza

Wowza is the video server for the VLC and MX Player video players.

4.1.5.6 Drakontas DragonForce (DForce)

DForce is a mobile collaboration application that allows teams to create and share information (Figure 25). Capabilities include real-time team-based user tracking on maps, chat messaging, collaborative whiteboards, document distribution, file sharing, pictures geo tagging, situational reporting, after-action reporting, and logging of all user actions.

Figure 25: Drakontas DForce mobile collaboration application.

4.1.5.7 Drones and Robots

Texas A&M in College Station, Texas has established a world-renowned capability in the use of remotely-controlled drones and robots in response to emergencies, disasters and large planned events [13]. While their participation in CAUSE V was experimental in nature, they have been called upon many times to respond to actual incidents not only within the US but around the world. In CAUSE V, the team from Texas A&M made use of terrestrial and submerged robots as well as aerial drones to provide real-time imagery and video feeds from key locations such as the volcano, rivers, the lahar, bridges and roads. Examples of the drones and robots are shown in Figure 26.


Figure 26: Texas A&M drones and robots.

4.1.5.8 IoT Sensor Gateways

IoT sensors were connected to the wireless LTE networks and monitored vibration/shock (G force), water level and temperature, as illustrated in Figure 27. The information was logged and made available through a web portal or through email alerts. These sensors were also geo tagged, with links to the web portal available on DForce. Two sensor platforms were installed in two rental vehicles in order to have timely access and control of them as the experiment unfolded, where technical staff could manually manipulate them to replicate real-life readings at various points during the experiment.

Figure 27: Sensor platform.

4.1.5.9 IP Cameras

Panasonic IP cameras were installed at both CBSA border crossing stations in order to provide real-time video feeds from the field. For security reasons, the real-time video feeds were simulated and did not actually monitor the border crossing, but the simulated content being displayed by the cameras nevertheless changed as the scenario progressed.

4.1.5.10 Virtual Private Networking (VPN)

The VPN Client software allowed a secure connection to another network over the Internet. This was required for the EOCs, which unlike the participants connected over wireless in the experiment, connected to the Internet over wired Ethernet. As a result, VPNs were required to view the live camera and video feeds available in the experiment, with unique credentials for authentication assigned to both EOCs.


4.1.5.11 ArcGIS Online

ArcGIS Online provided a common platform that participants could use to create, share and discover content through a shared CAUSE V collaboration group. It supported shared maps and applications, including the Common Operating Picture, Survey123 forms, Operations Dashboards and other information products. Wireless users had temporary user accounts created for them on the National Information Sharing Consortium (NISC) Member Portal for the duration of the experiment.

All of the above applications were very effective in increasing the situational awareness of all participants in CAUSE V. An important point worth noting was that during the experiment, DForce information was imported into the ArcGIS application, which had not been done before. By doing so, all participants and observers at both EOCs were able to access real-time information such as the location of all wireless users on both DForce and ArcGIS at the same time. Figure 28 provides the experiment’s applications’ network configurations.

Figure 28: Applications—network configurations.


4.2 Technical Demonstrations

An important goal of the CAUSE series of experiments is to demonstrate enhanced resilience in Canada–US border regions through joint response to major incidents and to advance emergency management and responder situational awareness, communications and information sharing capabilities. Another key objective is to test, evaluate and demonstrate emerging technologies that improve the operational capabilities of emergency responders.

As with the CAUSE III and IV experiments that preceded it, CAUSE V conducted significant emerging wireless technology demonstrations that will be of benefit to the broader public safety broadband wireless initiatives that are live and operational as opposed to experimental. These included quality of service demonstrations on access class barring, prioritization, pre-emption, seamless wireless communications over multiple networks when moving from one country to another, congestion-based session persistence, and the use of drones and robots providing live video feeds during a simulated volcanic event. The first five demonstrations are explained in this section.

4.2.1 Prioritization

If enabled on a network, prioritization is invoked when both public safety and commercial users are connected in the same cell of a network. As more and more users of any type enter the cell, the capacity eventually becomes congested. In such conditions, if the prioritization function is enabled on the network, commercial users will begin to notice an impact on the quality of their communication session, whether it be through broken audio, video pixilation or unusually slow web browsing. This is done in order to increase the amount of capacity available to the public safety users in the congested cell. Figure 29 illustrates traffic prioritization. The left side represents a US network that is not congested, but as more and more users enter the cell to the point that it is congested, the commercial users in the US network will have their level of service degraded in order to satisfy the needs of public safety users. Higher priority public safety users maintain a solid connection whereas the quality of the commercial user connection is noticeably impacted. Because of a somewhat limited number of wireless users in the experiment, a traffic generator located at CRC in Ottawa was used to inject a large amount of continuous traffic into the network in order to reach the point of congestion and trigger prioritization. To further aid in reaching a congestion point, a maximum number of users, much less than what would normally be acceptable, was set in the experiment. Prioritization was successfully demonstrated multiple times during the experiment.


Figure 29: Traffic prioritization.

Prioritization of traffic on a network is accomplished by assigning different quality of service (QoS) class identifiers (QCI) to different classes of users. These QCI values are stored in the Subscriber Profile Repository (SPR), co-located with home subscriber server (HSS), and are associated to the default bearer that is assigned to a user at attach time. At the eNodeB level, different scheduling weights can be associated to different QCI values. When a cell becomes congested, the scheduling weights determine the percentage of resource blocks that the eNodeB allocates to a bearer for a certain QCI value. In CAUSE V, two QCI values were used (a lower QCI value has a higher level of priority):

• Public safety users: QCI 8

• Commercial users: QCI 9

Based on the number of user devices and applications being used at any given time, the eNodeB then determines the resource scheduling weight associated with each QCI value.

4.2.2 Pre-emption

Pre-emption is a prioritization of access to the network. If enabled, it is invoked when both public safety and commercial users are connected in the same cell of a network. As more and more users of any type enter the cell, the capacity eventually becomes congested. In such conditions, commercial users will begin to become fully disconnected from the network. This is done in order to increase the amount of capacity available to the public safety users in the congested cell. Figure 30 illustrates pre-emption. The left side represents a US network that is not congested, but as more and more users enter the cell to the point that it is congested, the commercial users in the US network will lose connectivity while public safety users maintain solid connections. Pre-emption was successfully demonstrated throughout CAUSE V.


Figure 30: Pre-emption.

An LTE function known as allocation and retention priority (ARP) is used to prioritize the actual access to the network by pre-empting lower priority users. Different priority levels can be assigned to users. These values are stored in the SPR, co-located with HSS, and are associated to the default bearer that is assigned to a user at attach time. Also contained in the SPR and associated to the default bearer is the pre-emption capability/vulnerability that determines if a user can pre-empt another user or be pre-empted by another user.

Pre-emption is triggered if certain limits defined at the eNodeB level are reached. These limits are typically reached when a large number of users begin to cause congestion in a given cell of the network. In the case of CAUSE V, because there was a relatively limited number of users, a traffic generator located at CRC in Ottawa was also used to inject traffic into the network, thereby causing congestion. Furthermore, by limiting parameters such as the maximum number of user equipment (UE) and a subset reserved for high priority users, default bearer pre-emption scenarios can be demonstrated using a few UEs and without requiring full cell congestion. Both of the above techniques were used in CAUSE V. Furthermore, the proposed pre-emption scenario constructed below uses non-guaranteed bit rate (non-GBR) bearers to allow a greater flexibility and support of high throughput applications such as high quality video streaming. Pre-emption services on guaranteed bit rate bearers is also possible but would be very difficult to effectively demonstrate in CAUSE V since the LTE RAN equipment used in the experiment limited the amount of throughput assignable to GBR data bearers. In CAUSE V, two priority levels were assigned with different ARP values (a lower ARP value has a higher level of priority):

• Public safety users: ARP 8 (pre-emption capability / no pre-emption vulnerability)

• Commercial users: ARP 9 (no pre-emption capability / pre-emption vulnerability)


4.2.3 Session Persistence (Service Continuity)

Roaming in wireless networks is the ability to connect to a visited network when the user is not in coverage of its home network. To do so, the visiting user needs to be authenticated by the visited network, at which point a connection to the network is then established. Session persistence is an advanced form of roaming in that a user is able to automatically and seamlessly maintain network and communication sessions when moving from one network to another (in this case, one country to another as well). Figure 31 describes a session persistence scenario that was continuously used throughout CAUSE V without any issues.

Figure 31: Session persistence.

On the left side of the diagram, a US public safety user is travelling along a path indicated by the blue arrow and is connected to the US network. As the user continues along the path to a point where the US network’s coverage has degraded but where the Canadian network is strong, the US user then automatically connects to the Canadian network as indicated by the middle portion of the diagram. In the right portion of the diagram, the user then returns to a point where the US network’s coverage is good and reconnects to its home network. Session persistence is achieved by using the typical LTE network interfaces used to achieve roaming but also uses the S10 interface5 to establish a control plane connection between mobility manager entities (MME) in each network.

4.2.4 Congestion-based Session Persistence

Congestion-based session persistence is similar to session persistence, but where the level of network congestion determines where the user is connected as opposed to the strength of coverage of the two networks. If enabled, it is invoked when public safety users located in areas covered by both the Canada and the US networks experience significant congestion on one of the networks. When this occurs, public safety users whose network becomes congested will automatically and seamlessly connect to the network

5 The S10 signaling interface is the reference point between MMEs used for inter-MME handovers and MME to MME information transfer.


that is not congested. This is done in order maintain a high quality communication session for those users that move to the uncongested network. Furthermore, in doing so, traffic is reduced on the congested network which then increases the amount of capacity available to the public safety users that remain in the congested cell. Multiple iterations of congestion-based session persistence, illustrated in Figure 32, were successfully demonstrated during the experiment.

Figure 32: Congestion-based session persistence.

The left side represents a US network that is not congested, and as such US public safety users in the border region are connected to the US network. In the middle portion of the diagram, the US network becomes congested as more and more users enter the cell. For the CAUSE experiment, this was achieved using the two techniques described in 4.2.2, namely the use of a traffic generator and setting a maximum number of users on a given cell. The two US public safety users that have good coverage from both the US and Canadian networks will automatically switch to the uncongested Canadian network without any break in their communication sessions. In the right portion of the diagram, many users have left the cell such that the US network is no longer congested. The US public safety users at the border then automatically and seamlessly revert to the US home network.

The demonstration of congestion-based session persistence was not trivial. It required a multi-step implementation plan that first applied LTE load-balancing as specified by 3GPP, which was challenging in that it is only specified in situations where disparate radio spectrum channels are involved. As such, load-balancing needed to be adapted to work between identical channels, and then to implement this when each channel was on a separate network from one another. The versions of the Nokia eNodeBs used at CAUSE V supported an intra-frequency load balancing feature. Once activated, eNodeBs with neighbouring cells exchange cell loading information via the X2 interface between eNodeBs. Although several parameters can be configured in this feature which modifies its performance, a high-level functional description is as follows: once a certain load threshold is reached on an eNodeB/cell and the neighbouring eNodeB/cell reports a lower load level, the eNodeB with the highest load level reduces its cell size offset (based on RSRP) by 3 dB. After this change, and while the load level remains above the threshold, any UEs falling in this receive signal level region will be handed-over to the less loaded eNodeB/cell.


For CAUSE V, this capability was taken a step further to then work across different public land mobile networks (PLMN) in Canada and the US, where the load-balancing feature triggered a handover of a user attached to a congested eNodeB in one PLMN served by one EPC to another non-congested eNodeB in a different PLMN served by another EPC. This involved the use of the S10 interface between the MMEs of the different EPCs to maintain session persistence during the handover. For session persistence to be successful, the latency of the S10 link needs to be kept reasonably low. In CAUSE V, the link between the Canada and US MMEs consisted of a large number of hops traversing North America, which could experience relatively high latency and as such, tests were conducted to confirm proper functionality and acceptability for the experiment.

As mentioned above, load-balancing features are typically used between dissimilar frequencies (inter-frequency load balancing) in comparison to the case of intra-frequency (same channel) where the carrier to noise+interference ratios (C/N+I) become critical and hence works more effectively closer to the cell intersect points. Further investigation could lead to a greater environment where congestion-based session persistence is more viable, but such work fell outside of the scope of CAUSE V.

Finally, the demonstration of session persistence in CAUSE IV was a first between two separate networks in two countries. Similarly to CAUSE IV, it is the understanding of the authors that, at the time of the writing of this report, the demonstration of congestion-based session persistence during the CAUSE V experiment was accomplished for the first time between networks in two countries.

4.2.5 Access Class Barring

In LTE, a user is assigned an access class that is stored on the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). There are fifteen access classes: ten (09) are for general use and five (1115) are defined as special categories. Access class 14 is assigned to emergency services. For a variety of reasons including congestion management, a network can choose to bar certain access classes from connecting to the network. When access class barring is enabled, commercial users are not able to connect to the network under any conditions. Access class barring is described in Figure 33.


Figure 33: Access class barring.


5 Key Findings, Observations and Recommendations

This section offers the key findings, observations and recommendations on the public safety broadband wireless component of the CAUSE V experiment. As with other CAUSE experiments, the broadband wireless component successfully delivered the expected operational and technical capabilities. Additionally, there were many positive revelations and discoveries that were not anticipated.

With regards to recommendations in this report, they are more related to the future conduct of similar experiments, and less on operational aspects of first responders. Such recommendations can be found in the overall CAUSE V after action report [9].

5.1 Operational Findings, Observations and Recommendations 5.1.1 Wireless Network Activity

There were over 20 wireless participants in the experiment, and based on the numerous injects in the scenario that spanned two full days, not all participants were actively involved in all scripts at all times. Because CAUSE V was an experiment that was not staged and rehearsed as would be the case for an exercise, participants were asked to refrain from making use of their wireless connectivity unless directed to do so by experiment control. This was to ensure the proper functioning of each inject by controlling the amount of wireless traffic on the networks at all times. While this request was adhered to for the first two hours of the experiment, the wireless users then began using the wireless applications throughout the rest of the experiment, even if they were not part of the injects at that time. A decision was made at noon of the first day to allow this to continue in such a manner, as it was seen to add additional value to the experiment given that a primary objective of CAUSE is to expose participants to the capabilities offered by broadband wireless. As a result of this, network traffic increased significantly.

5.1.2 Expectations of Network Performance

The CAUSE series demonstrated both enhanced operational and technical capabilities. During the demonstrations of prioritization, pre-emption, and congestion-based session persistence, those wireless users who were not part of the inject but continued to use the network saw their performance either degrade significantly, or experience full loss of connectivity. Based on the goals of these technical demonstrations, this was not only expected but also served to successfully validate these experiment

Key Finding: Allowing the use of the wireless networks outside of the scenario injects enabled wireless participants to actively familiarize themselves with all applications within the experiment as well as others outside of the experiment. This subjected the personnel operating the network cores in Ottawa to a very significant amount additional workload, but the additional network activity had no detriment to the experiment itself. Recommendation: Because it supports a key objective of CAUSE, which is an experiment, allow participants the flexibility and opportunity to make use of the wireless networks outside of script.


components. Unfortunately, such users were often not aware of this and reported occasions of poor network performance in their experiment surveys. This was also the case for those that were actually involved in the experiment components, where members of the wireless team received calls from users asking why they were disconnected during an Access class barring experiment, although the expected outcome was described in the vignette documentation. That said, the vignette description was rather comprehensive, and as such, having simplified versions for participants is recommended.

5.1.3 Use of Wireless Applications Outside of Injects

As mentioned in Section 5.1.1, wireless users continuously used their wireless devices to familiarize themselves with the various experiment applications, browse the Internet, or communicate with people within and outside of the experiment. During the two day experiment, wireless users often found themselves at many different locations or in movement from one location to another. From an experiment control perspective, it proved challenging to keep all eighteen human participants fully informed throughout the experiment. At times, this created confusion at certain wireless locations where participants were unsure of their involvement in a given inject. Interestingly though, the participants learned to resolve this issue by using the email application and moreover, the multi-party chat feature in DForce to discuss amongst themselves and clarify involvement and responsibilities throughout the experiment.

5.1.4 Enhanced Ability to Communicate and Share Information

Certain applications allowed participants to conduct video conferences, and while not always directly part of the experiment scripts, participants saw high value in being able to do so during the response to an incident. Furthermore, experiment applications that provided the location and status of all users at any given time was viewed as a game changer. This, combined with live video feeds from drones, robots and IP video cameras, and real-time information from sensors greatly improved situational awareness.

Key Finding: Wireless users not actively involved in the technical demonstration injects experienced degraded performance or full loss of connectivity but did not realize that this was the expected outcome. Recommendation: A better understanding of the expected performance should be conveyed to wireless participants prior to the experiment and be frequently repeated.

Key Finding: Wireless users made effective use of the broadband wireless capability outside of the experiment script to communicate and share information with one another in order to conduct the experiment in the most effective manner. Recommendation: When such a large number of participants are involved, ensure that expectations are well understood by each user throughout the experiment.


5.2 Technical Findings, Observations and Recommendations 5.2.1 Canada–US Wireless Collaboration

In CAUSE III, IV and V, the experiment included a wireless vignette that was led by Canada while working closely with their counterparts from the US. The experiment design was led by the Centre for Security Science in Canada with strong support from the Communications Research Centre Canada. On the US side, Texas A&M University was the counterpart responsible for the wireless components in the US.

5.2.2 Canada–US Applications Interworking

CAUSE experiments have always had a common scenario with vignettes led by Canada and others led by the US. In CAUSE III and IV, the wireless vignette led by Canada did not directly tie to the US led vignette although some indirect links were achieved on alerts and warnings, a common operating picture, and the use of social media. In CAUSE V, the two countries worked closely together to directly tie their respective experiment components together in a single vignette. This was achieved by enabling the interworking of applications, where participants and observers could monitor the real-time activity of wireless users in DForce but could also see the same information in the ArcGIS application used to provide a common operating picture throughout the experiment.

Key Finding: The selection of applications and capabilities in CAUSE V were very effective in enhancing the situational awareness of emergency responders, managers and all experiment participants. Furthermore, it can be assumed that this enhancement in situational awareness, through the use of feature-rich applications, would also be of very significant benefit to first responders in live operations. Recommendation: Canada and the US should continue to investigate follow-on activity between the two countries. This would include the establishment of public safety broadband networks in both countries that are available to first responders when they need it most.

Key Observation: For the three CAUSE experiments that featured public safety broadband wireless technology, the close collaboration between Canada and the US led to highly successful and impactful experiments that met the CAUSE objectives. Recommendation: Continue with this model of collaboration for future work between the two countries on cross-border wireless communications. This could be either through additional CAUSE experiments, or through the establishment of a more permanent collaborative initiative, and could help identify and address gaps that may arise in live operational cross-border communications and information sharing.


5.2.3 Network Performance in Co-channel Environments

The public safety broadband network initiatives in both Canada and the US use the 700 MHz Band 14 spectrum in a fully harmonized manner. While this is highly desirable from interoperability and interworking perspectives, it does create a co-channel interference environment where the coverage of both the Canada and the US networks overlap. This will often be the case at border regions where overlapping coverage is expected to occur. Fortunately, the LTE technology that underpins 4G cellular mobile service in Canada and the US features sophisticated functionality that helps limit the impact of co-channel interference between LTE networks. While network performance is then impacted to some extent depending on the level of co-channel interference, networks in both countries are still capable of co-existing in the vast majority of border regions. This co-existence is also necessary to support session persistence.

5.2.4 Session Persistence

In CAUSE IV, session persistence was the key technology demonstration, and was a world first between networks in two countries. Based on the successful demonstration in CAUSE IV, this feature was used throughout the CAUSE V experiment as wireless users moved from one network to another, unbeknownst to them as there was no impact on network connectivity or the continuance of their applications. This occurred throughout the two day experiment.

Key Finding: For the first time, the systems in the wireless component of the experiment were able to not only interact with the US led systems of the experiment, but also interwork with them. Recommendation: Continue to build on the two countries ability to collaborate at a direct, physical interworking level. This would require a level of coordination between the border regions in Canada and their US public safety counterparts.

Key Finding: The LTE technology used for public safety broadband networks has the ability to operate in co-channel interference environments, albeit at less than maximum capacity. Recommendation: Both countries to consider this LTE functionality when implementing their public safety broadband RAN networks in the border regions.

Key Observation: Session persistence was taken to the next level in CAUSEV, where it was not closely monitored for success as was the case in CAUSE IV, but simply included as a capability within the experiment. Recommendation: Continue to investigate public safety operational environments where session persistence would be of benefit.


5.2.5 Prioritization and Pre-emption

A key feature of public safety broadband networks is the ability to prioritize the traffic of priority users and to pre-empt certain users when networks become congested. Prioritization and pre-emption were both successfully demonstrated in CAUSE V over multiple iterations.

5.2.6 Congestion-based Session Persistence

The technology demonstration in CAUSE V that is believed to be a first of its kind was congestion-based session persistence where a user in a fixed location covered by two networks could move from one network to another in conditions of congestion. Such a feature could contribute to achieving a high level of wireless performance in co-channel border regions.

Key Observation: The demonstration of prioritization and pre-emption was successful from a technology perspective. From an operational perspective, non-priority users that were impacted by these features viewed this as poor performance of the networks although the functions were performing as planned. Recommendation: To better communicate the expected outcomes of each experiment segment to participants.

Key Observation: Congestion-based session persistence was demonstrated successfully on multiple occasions throughout the experiment. Because of the nature of the technology, wireless users were not aware that they were moving from one network to another, which in itself indicated its success. Recommendation: Continue to investigate enhanced wireless network capabilities that improve inter-network performance.


6 Conclusion

A key objective of the CAUSE series of experiments is to enhance the situational awareness, communications and information sharing capabilities of emergency responders and managers in anticipation of, response to and recovery from major incidents in border regions between Canada and the United States. In the case of CAUSE V, the emergency incident was the simulated eruption of Mount Baker in Washington State and the ensuing lahar flow to the valleys below. As part of the experiment, broadband wireless technologies were used to demonstrate enhanced and improved operational capabilities. This was successfully accomplished by significantly improving the situational awareness of all experiment participants through the use of sophisticated wireless applications such as voice and video conferencing, map-based real-time situational awareness tools such as DragonForce and ArcGIS, live video feeds from drones and robots, real-time information from a suite of sensors, and email and chat capabilities.

As is the case in all CAUSE experiments, technology demonstrations are also an important objective. Access class barring, quality of service, user prioritization and pre-emption were all successfully demonstrated in CAUSE V. These features are vital to public safety broadband networks in that they ensure that first responders maintain continuous communications even under conditions of network congestion. Furthermore, the use of session persistence first demonstrated in CAUSE IV was expanded upon in CAUSE V where all wireless users were able to move freely between the Canada and US networks without experiencing any break in communications. Finally, it is believed that CAUSE V delivered the first demonstration of congestion-based session persistence, where users in a network that becomes congested are automatically transferred to a less congested network, where coverage from both networks permits.

In CAUSE V, broadband wireless technology was successfully used throughout the experiment to deliver on both the operational and technical objectives. This Report has provided technical details on the wireless component of the experiment. For a more comprehensive description of the overall experiment conduct, it is recommended to refer to the CAUSE V After Action Report [9].


References

[1] Government of Canada, “Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness,” http://actionplan.gc.ca/grfx/psec-scep/pdfs/bap_report-paf_rapport-eng-dec2011.pdf, published 2011. Access date 30 March 2015.

[2] Public Safety Canada, “Communications Interoperability Strategy for Canada,” January 2011. [Online]. Available: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntrprblt-strtg/ntrprblt-strtg-eng.pdf. Access date August 2017.

[3] Kjelland, C., Grennan, P., Heyrich H., and Merrell, H. “Potential Economic Impacts of a Mount Baker Eruption,” Whatcom County Division of Emergency Management, 2017.

[4] Galbraith, J.M., and Li, G.M. “CAUSE 1 - West Coast Report”, DRDC-CSS-2012-011, October 2012. http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc118/p536604_A1b.pdf. Access date September 2014.

[5] Vallerand, A., Boyd, D. et al., “Canada–US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment II on Enhancing Trans-Border Resilience in Emergency and Crisis Management,” Technical Report , Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Security Science, DRDC-CSS-TRR-2013-006, July 2013.

[6] Fournier, J. et al, “Canada-US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment Series (CAUSE III): Western Scenario – Wireless Communications Interoperability,” Defence Research and Development Canada, Scientific Report, DRDC-RDDC-2016-R047, March 2016, http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc223/p803564_A1b.pdf. Access date November 2016.

[7] Gusty, D., Dawe, P. et al, “Canada-US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment (CAUSE III), Northeastern Scenario After Action Report,” June 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/cause-iii-northeastern-scenario-after-action-report. Access date November 2015.

[8] Gusty, D., Dawe, P. et al, “Canada-US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment (CAUSE IV) – Binational After Action Report,” June 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/cause-iv-binational-after-action-report. Access date January 2017.

[9] Gusty, D., Weimer, G. et al, “Canada-US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment (CAUSE V) – After Action Report,” May 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/881_CAUSE-V_Binational-After-Action-Report_180514-508.pdf. Access date August 2018.

[10] USGS, “Volcano Hazards Program,” October 2017. https://volcanoes.usgs.gov/vhp/lahars.html. Access date October 2017.

[11] CANARIE Network, https://www.canarie.ca/network/. Access date March 2017.

[12] Internet2, https://www.internet2.edu/about-us/. Access date March 2017.

[13] Texas A&M University, “Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue (CRASAR).” http://crasar.org/. Access date January 2018.


List of Symbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms

3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project

4G 3GPP Fourth Generation Mobile

AAR After Action Report

AGL Above Ground Level

ARP Allocation and Retention Priority

ASL Above Sea Level

AVL Automatic Vehicle Locator

BC British Columbia

BTB Beyond the Border

CANARIE Canadian Network for the Advancement of Research, Industry and Education

CAUSE Canada–US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment

CBSA Canada Border Services Agency

C/N+I Carrier to Noise + Interference

CRASAR Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue

CRC Communications Research Centre Canada

dB decibel

dBm decibel-milliwatt

dBi decibel-isotropic

DForce Dragonforce

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DHS CBP DHS Customs and Border Protection

DHS OEC DHS Office of Emergency Communications

DHS S&T DHS Science and Technology

DHS S&T FRG DHS S&T First Responders Group

DRDC CSS Defence Research and Development Canada Centre for Security Science

ECG electrocardiogram

EIRP effective isotropic radiated power

EMD Emergency Management Division

EMU Emergency Mobile Unit

eNodeB Evolved Node Base Station


EOC Emergency Operations Centre

EPC Evolved Packet Core

GBR Guaranteed Bit Rate

HSS Home Subscriber Server

IoT Internet of Things

IP Internet Protocol

IT Information Technology

ITEC Internet2 Technical Evaluation Center

km kilometer

LTE Long Term Evolution

Mbps megabits per second

MHz megahertz

MME Mobility Manager Entity

NISC National Information Sharing Consortium

PLMN Public Land Mobile Network

PS Canada Public Safety Canada

QCI QoS Class Identifier

QoS Quality of Service

QPP QoS, Prioritization and Pre-emption

RAN Radio Access Network

R&E Research and Education

RF radio frequency

RSSI Received Signal Strength Indicator

RSRP Reference Signal Received Power

SA Situational Awareness

SPR Subscriber Profile Repository

TEMS Test Mobile System

UE User Equipment

US United States

USGS United States Geological Survey

USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module

VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol


VOST Virtual Operation Support Team

VPN Virtual Private Networking

WA State of Washington

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA *Security markings for the title, authors, abstract and keywords must be entered when the document is sensitive

1. ORIGINATOR (Name and address of the organization preparing the document. A DRDC Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, is entered in Section 8.) DRDC – Centre for Security Science Carling Campus, 60 Moodie Drive Ottawa Ontario K1A 0K2 Canada

2a. SECURITY MARKING (Overall security marking of the document including special supplemental markings if applicable.)

CAN UNCLASSIFIED

2b. CONTROLLED GOODS

NON-CONTROLLED GOODS DMC A

3. TITLE (The document title and sub-title as indicated on the title page.) Canada–US Enhanced Resiliency Experiment (CAUSE) V: Public Safety Broadband Wireless Communications

4. AUTHORS (Last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc., not to be used) Fournier, J.; Gurnick, J.; Tomich, S.; Wilson, J.; Nadeau, C.; Laflèche, S.; Auger, C.; Picard, V.; Lafrenière, V.

5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.) December 2018

6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total pages, including Annexes, excluding DCD, covering and verso pages.)

60

6b. NO. OF REFS (Total references cited.)

13 7. DOCUMENT CATEGORY (e.g., Scientific Report, Contract Report, Scientific Letter.)

Scientific Report

8. SPONSORING CENTRE (The name and address of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development.) DRDC – Centre for Security Science Carling Campus, 60 Moodie Drive Ottawa Ontario K1A 0K2 Canada

9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)

9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)

10a. DRDC PUBLICATION NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) DRDC-RDDC-2018-R239

10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)

11a. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.)

Public release

11b. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.)

Public release

12. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Use semi-colon as a delimiter.)

wireless; broadband; long term evolution (LTE); communications networks ; public safety communications; 700 MHz; Situational Awareness; Canada-US cross-border communications

13. ABSTRACT (When available in the document, the French version of the abstract must be included here.)

On December 7, 2011, President Obama and Prime Minister Harper released the Beyond the Border (BTB) Action Plan, which set out joint priorities and specific initiatives for cross-border collaboration [1].. A common goal within this partnership focused on enhancing the coordination of responses during binational disasters. Specifically, the plan states that Canada and the United States will “focus on cross-border interoperability as a means of harmonizing cross-border emergency communications efforts.” The Canada–US Enhanced Resiliency (CAUSE) experiment series addresses this binational goal and hypothesizes that technologically enhanced multi-agency and cross-border Situational Awareness (SA) and communications interoperability [2] measurably improves regional resilience.

The fifth experiment in this series, CAUSE V was once again jointly sponsored by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) First Responders Group (FRG), the Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Centre for Security Science (CSS) and Public Safety Canada (PS Canada). This cross-border initiative consisted of a single experiment, performed in November 2017, based on a simulated eruption of Mount Baker in Washington State and the ensuing lahar flows to river valleys in Canada and the US.

This border region between British Columbia and Washington State is understandably important for both countries. There are three border crossings, of which one is the third busiest between the two countries, and another is the second busiest truck crossing point. The area is a major hub for regional energy transmission including a natural gas pipeline (3.8 billion ft³/day) and three hydroelectric facilities. It is also a very important area for agriculture, natural resources and tourism, where the potential economic impact of a Mount Baker eruption is very significant [3].

Emergency management agencies and jurisdictions in British Columbia and Washington State worked closely together to assess the effectiveness of a variety of technologies expected to improve communications interoperability and situational awareness by exchanging and sharing information in real-time. Such technologies included broadband mobile wireless communications, the use of digital volunteers and social media, and situational awareness tools that provided a common operating picture.

This Report describes the impact of the Canada-led component of CAUSE V, broadband mobile wireless. It describes the design, planning and execution of the wireless technologies used in the experiment. Recommendations provided at the end of the Report are derived from the key findings and propose actions to further push the envelope of communications interoperability between Canada and the US. Pertinent elements of this Report are also captured in a Canada–US After Action Report.

Le 7 décembre 2011, le président Obama et le premier ministre Harper ont rendu public le Plan d'action Par-delà la frontière (PDLF), qui énonce les priorités communes et les initiatives particulières de collaboration transfrontalière [1]. L'un des objectifs communs qui sous-tendent ce partenariat est d'améliorer la coordination des interventions lors de catastrophes binationales. Plus précisément, le plan indique que le Canada et les États-Unis doivent « mettre l’accent sur l'interopérabilité transfrontalière comme moyen d'harmoniser les efforts de communications en situation d'urgence ». La série d'expériences Canada-États-Unis de renforcement de la résilience (CAUSE) vise cet objectif binational et pose l’hypothèse selon laquelle une meilleure connaissance de la situation (CS) et l'interopérabilité des communications [2] interorganisationnelles et transfrontalières à l’aide d’outils technologiques accroîtrait sensiblement la résilience régionale.

La cinquième expérience de cette série, CAUSE V, a elle aussi été parrainée conjointement par le Groupe des premiers intervenants (FRG) de la Direction de la science et technologie (S&T) du département de la Sécurité intérieure (DHS) des États-Unis, le Centre des sciences pour la sécurité de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC CSS) et Sécurité publique Canada (SP Canada). Cette initiative transfrontalière comportait une seule expérience, effectuée en novembre 2017, fondée sur une éruption simulée du mont Baker dans l'État de Washington et les lahars qui s’ensuivraient dans les vallées fluviales au Canada et aux États-Unis.

Naturellement, cette région frontalière entre la Colombie-Britannique et l'État de Washington est capitale pour les deux pays. Il y a trois postes frontaliers, dont l'un se situe au troisième rang parmi les plus achalandés entre les deux pays, et un autre est deuxième parmi les points de passage les plus empruntés par les camions. La région constitue une plaque tournante majeure pour le transport de l'énergie et comprend un gazoduc (3,8 milliards de pi³/jour) et trois installations hydroélectriques. C'est également une zone très importante pour l'agriculture, les ressources naturelles et le tourisme où les répercussions économiques potentielles d'une éruption du mont Baker sont considérables [3].

Les organismes de gestion des situations d'urgence et les autorités de la Colombie-Britannique et de l'État de Washington ont travaillé en étroite collaboration pour évaluer l'efficacité de diverses technologies susceptibles d'améliorer l'interopérabilité des communications et la connaissance de la situation en échangeant et partageant de l'information en temps réel. Ces technologies comprenaient les communications mobiles sans fil à large bande, l'utilisation de bénévoles numériques et des médias sociaux, ainsi que des outils de connaissance de la situation qui fournissaient une image commune de la situation opérationnelle.

Le présent rapport décrit l'incidence de la composante canadienne de CAUSE V, les communications mobiles sans fil à large bande. Il décrit la conception, la planification et la mise en application des technologies sans fil utilisées au cours de l'expérience. Les recommandations formulées à la fin du rapport découlent des constatations clés et comportent des mesures visant à repousser encore plus loin les limites de l'interopérabilité des communications entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Les éléments pertinents du présent rapport sont également consignés dans un compte rendu après action canado-américain.

Documents

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