Sjedinjene Američke Države na početku 21. veka – aktuelni trenutak, izazovi i perspektive jedine svetske

supersile

Sadržaj:

• I Aktuelni trenutak jedine svetske supersile

• II Izazovi i izazivači jedinoj svetskoj supersili

• III Perspektive: čiji će biti 21. vek?• IV Literatura

I Aktuelni trenutak jedine svetske supersile

I Амерички колос: премоћ САД у светским пословима на почетку 21. века

• “Joш од Римског царства није се појавила ниједна земља која је била толико изнад других. Према речима часописа “The Economist”, Сједињене Државе су опкорачиле глобус попут колоса. Оне доминирају пословањем, трговином и комуникацијама; њихова привреда је најуспешнија у свету, њихова војна моћ је без премца” (Џозеф Нај)

• (Paul Kennedy) “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.

• The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap, Britain's army was much smaller than European armies, and even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies-right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy.

•Charlemagne's empire was merely Western European in its reach. The Roman empire stretched farther afield, but there was another great empire in Persia, and a larger one in China. There is, therefore, no comparison.”

• Сједињене Америчке Државе као једина светска суперсила

• Сједињене Америчке Државе као светска империја

• The United Stаtes of America as country in position of primacy

• Сједињене Америчке Државе као земља која је у позицији светског хегемона

• Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine says that he now defines the United States as a "hyperpower," a new term that he thinks best describes "a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories.

• "Superpower," in his view, was a Cold War word that reflected military capabilities of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But now, the breadth of American strength is unique, extending beyond economics, technology or military might to "this domination of attitudes, concepts, language and modes of life.

• Mr. Vedrine described France as a "power of world influence," situated in a category coming immediately after the United States, and including, he declared, "Germany, Britain, Russia, Japan, India, and perhaps others."

• Сједињене Америчке Државе као Überpower (Josef Joffe)

1.1. Нека теоријска појашњења

Велике силе, суперсиле...

• “Бити Велика сила – по дефиницији, држава која је способна да се носи са било којом другом државом” (Пол Кенеди)

• “Great Powers, as the words suggest, are the most influential states in the international system at any one time” (Martin Griffiths, Terry O’ Callaghan)

• Термин Велике силе је први пут употребљен на Бечком конгресу, 1815. године

• Великa силa – земља која је у стању да води конвенционални рат са свим другим великим силама, и да из тог рата изађе ако не непоражена, а оно бар да може да нанесе велике губитке најмоћнијој држави у међународном систему којем припада. Са појавом нуклеарног оружја, постало је јасно да уз конвенционално наоружање и њега морате имати у својим рукама да бисте се и даље рачунали као велика сила. (Џон Миршајмер)

• Како се тврди у Пингвиновом речнику међународних односа, употребом термина суперсила означава се „појава нове класе великих сила чија је моћ супериорнија (војно-економски посматрано) у односу на традиционални појам европских великих сила“. По ауторима речника, термин је смислио W. T.R. Fox 1944. године. Видети: W. T.R. Fox, The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain and Soviet Union- their Responsibility for the Peace, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1944. Наведено према: Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin Books, London, 1999,

• “We proposing the following definitional criteria for a three-tiered scheme: superpowers and the great powers at the system level, and regional powers at the regional level” (Barry Buzan)

• Superpowers – The criteria for superpower status are demanding that they require broad- spectrum capabilities exercised across the whole international system. Superpowers must possess first- class military – political capabilities (as measured by the standards of the day), and the economies to support such capabilities…

Империје

• Empires, more than nation-states, are the principal actors in the history of world events. Much of what we call history consists of the deeds of the 50 to 70 empires that once ruled multiple peoples across large chunks of the globe.

• Officially, there are no empires now, only 190- plus nation-states. Yet the ghosts of empires past continue to stalk the Earth.

• “Imperije su oblici političke kontrole nad efektivnim suverenitetom nekih političkih društava koje im nameću druga politička društva” (Majkl Dojl)

• Sve imperije koje su tokom vekova uspostavljene imale su tri zajednička obeležja: jedno se očituje u podređivanju, svaka imperija je nejednak odnos, pri čemu je jedna strana superiorna a druga inferiorna. Drugo se ogleda u prinudi. Iako veliki broj imperija uključuje i saradnju, katkad ekstenzivnu saradnju između onih koji vladaju i onih kojima se vlada, iza toga odnosa uvek stoji pretnja silom, koja se katkad i realizuje, od strane imperije u cilju održavanja vlastite kontrole. Treće određujuće obeležje sastoji se u etničkoj, religioznoj ili rasnoj razlici – ili u nekoj njihovoj kombinaciji – izemđu imperijalne sile i društva koje ona kontroliše. Imperija je oblik diktature, ali osobenog tipa: diktature koju sprovode stranci.

• Pojam “vlada” koji potiče od grčke reči za krmaniti, stariji je nego termin imperija koji se izvodi iz latinske reči “komandovati”… Vlada je opštiji pojam; imperija je samo jedna od mnogih oblika vladavine. (Majkl Mandelbaum)

• Naglasak na kvalitetu odnosa između političkih jedinica a ne samo na kvantitetu. Imperija može biti i regionalna po svom obimu

• “Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their external behavior and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behavior within the subordinate states. Merely powerful states do the former, but not the latter.” (Stephen Peter Rosen)

• AN EMPIRE is a multinational or multiethnic state that extends its influence through formal and informal control of other polities. The Indian writer Nirad Chaudhuri put it well: "There is no empire without a conglomeration of linguistically, racially, and culturally different nationalities and the hegemony of one of them over the rest. The heterogeneity and the domination are of the very essence of imperial relations. An empire is hierarchical. There may be in it, and has been, full or partial freedom for individuals or groups to rise from one level to another; but this has not modified the stepped and stratified structure of the organization.“ (Eliot A. Cohen)

Primacy

• Kao posledica rata u Iraku 2003. godine, drugi analitičari opisuju međunarodni poredak kao Američku svetsku imperiju. Na mnogo načina metafora o imperiji je privlačna.

• Američka vojska ima globalni domašaj, sa bazama širom sveta i njihovim regionalnim komandantima koji ponekad deluju kao prokonzuli.

• Engleski je lingua franca kao što je to svojevremeno bio Latinski jezik.

• Američka ekonomija je najveća na svetu, a američka kultura je magnet drugim kulturama.

• Ipak, pogrešno je pomešati politiku prvenstva sa politikom imperije.

• Sjedinjene Američke Države zasigurno nisu imperija na način na koji mi mislimo o evropskim prekomorskim imperijama iz devetnaestog i dvadesetog veka, jer je suštinska osobina takvog imperijalizma bila politička kontrola nad ostalim delovima planete.

• Iako odnosi u kojima postoji nejednakost zasigurno postoje između Sjedinjenih Država i slabijih sila i lako mogu dovesti do jednog eksploatatorskog odnosa sa američke strane, odsustvo formalne političke kontrole nad tim državama, čini termin "imperijalna" ne samo nedovoljno tačnim, nego i potpuno pogrešnim...

• Sjedinjene Američke Države imaju više izvora moći nego što ih je imala Velika Britanija na vrhuncu svoje imperijalne moći, ali Sjedinjene Države imaju manje moći u smislu kontrole nad ponašanjem i unutrašnjom politikom drugih zemalja, nego što je to imala Britanija u doba kada je vladala četvrtinom Planete. Na primer, škole u Keniji, izbori, proces donošenja zakona i ubiranje poreza - da ne pominjemo spoljnu politiku zemlje - bili su pod kontrolom britanskih zvaničnika.

• U poređenju sa tim, Sjedinjene Države imaju malo takve

kontrole u današnje vreme. Tokom 2003. godine Sjedinjene Države nisu čak uspele da zadobiju glasove Meksika i Kine za drugu rezoluciju o Iraku u Savetu bezbednosti Ujedinjenih Nacija. Analitičari imperije odgovaraju da je termin "imperija" samo metafora. Ipak, problem sa tom metaforom jeste da ona podrazumeva kontrolu iz Vašingtona koja se teško uklapa sa složenim načinom na koji je moć u svetu danas raspodeljena... (Džozef Naj)

• The U. S. Position in the current World order is best understood as one of primacy. The United Stets is not a global hegemon, because it cannot physically control the entire globe and thus cannot compel other states to do whatever it wants… Nonetheless, the United States is also something more than “first among equals” …If primacy is defined as being “first in order, importance or authority” or holding “first or chief place”, then it is an apt description of America’s current position.” (Stephen M. Walt)

Хегемонија

• Americans, in short, don't "do" empire; they do "leadership" instead, or, in more academic parlance, "hegemony."

• According to S. Ryan Johansson, the word "hegemony" was used originally to describe the relationship of Athens to the other Greek city-states that joined it in an alliance against the Persian Empire. "Hegemony" in this case "mean[t] that [Athens] organized and directed their combined efforts without securing permanent political power over the other[s].“

• By contrast, according to the "world-system theory" of Immanuel Wallerstein, "hegemony" means more than mere leadership but less than outright empire. A hegemonic power is "a state ... able to impose its set of rules on the interstate system, and thereby create temporarily a new political order." The hegemon also offers "certain extra advantages for enterprises located within it or protected by it, advantages not accorded by the 'market' but obtained through political pressure."

• Yet another, narrower definition is offered by Geoffrey Pigman. Pigman describes a hegemon's principal function as underwriting a liberal international trading system that is beneficial to the hegemon but, paradoxically, even more beneficial to its potential rivals.

• Pigman traces this now widely used definition of the word back to the economic historian Charles Kindleberger's seminal work on the interwar economy, which describes a kind of "hegemonic interregnum." After 1918, Kindleberger suggested, the United Kingdom was too weakened by war to remain an effective hegemon, but the United States was still too inhibited by protectionism and isolationism to take over the role.

• This idea, which became known, somewhat inelegantly, as "hegemonic stability theory," was later applied to the post-1945 period by authors such as Arthur Stein, Susan Strange, Henry Nau, and Joseph Nye.

1.2. The Foundations of American Primacy

• “By virtually any measure, the United States enjoys an asymmetry of power unseen since the emergence of the modern states system. Some leading powers in the past had gained an advantage in one dimension or another – for example, in 1850 Great Britain controlled about 70 percent of Europe’s Wealth, while the number two power, France, controlled only 16 percent – but the United States is the only Great Power in modern history to establish a clear lead in virtually every important dimension of power…

• The United States has the world’s largest economy, an overwhelming military advantage, a dominant position in key international institutions, and far – reaching cultural and ideological influence. Moreover, these advantages are magnified by a favorable geopolitical position. If primacy is defined as being “first in order, importance or authority” or holding “first or chief place”, then it is an apt description of America’s current position.” (Stephen M. Walt)

1.2.1. Economic Dominance

• Economic strength as foundation of national power• The United States has been blessed with the world’s largest for

over a century• The U.S. share of global production ballooned to nearly 50

percent after World War II – reflecting the damage that other countries suffered during the war – and then gradually declined as the rest of the world recovered. Nevertheless, it has hovered between 25 and 30 percent from the 1960 to the present, and the U. S. Economy is still the roughly 60 percent larger than its nearest rival, Japan.

• The U. S. Economy is also more diverse and self-sufficient than other major economic powers, making it less vulnerable to the unexpected economic shifts

• Although the United States is more dependent on the outside world than it was a generation ago, it still depends far less on others than they depend on it

GDP real growth

Svet GDP – Nominalni

1 Evropska unija 18,140,000 2 Sjedinjene Američke Države 14,260,000 3 Japan 4,924,000 4

Narodna Republika Kina 4,402,000 5 Nemačka 3,668,000 6

Francuska 2,866,000 7 Velika Britanija 2,674,000 8 Italija 2,399,000 9 Rusija 1,757,000 10 Španija 1,683,000 11 Brazil 1,665,000

Rank Country GDP (purchasing power parity) Date of Information

1 World $ 65,610,000,000,000 2007 est.

2 European Union $ 14,380,000,000,000 2007 est.

3 United States $ 13,840,000,000,000 2007 est.

4 China $ 6,991,000,000,000 2007 est.

5 Japan $ 4,290,000,000,000 2007 est.

6 India $ 2,989,000,000,000 2007 est.

7 Germany $ 2,810,000,000,000 2007 est.

8 United Kingdom $ 2,137,000,000,000 2007 est.

9 Russia $ 2,088,000,000,000 2007 est.

10 France $ 2,047,000,000,000 2007 est.

11 Brazil $ 1,836,000,000,000 2007 est.

12 Italy $ 1,786,000,000,000 2007 est.

13 Spain $ 1,352,000,000,000 2007 est.

14 Mexico $ 1,346,000,000,000 2007 est.

15 Canada $ 1,266,000,000,000 2007 est.

16 Korea, South $ 1,201,000,000,000 2007 est.

17 Turkey $ 888,000,000,000 2007 est.

18 Indonesia $ 837,800,000,000 2007 est.

19 Australia $ 760,800,000,000 2007 est.

20 Iran $ 753,000,000,000 2007 est.

• In 2000, for example, only three countries had lower ratios of trade to gross domestic product (GDP) than the United States, and only one of them was a major military power. – with Argentina, Brazil and Japan

• For example, Chinese exports to the United States were a whopping 5 percent of Chinese GDP (19 percent of total Chinese exports) and critical to Chinese economic growth. U. S. exports to China, by contrast, were a mere 0. 16 percent of U. S. GDP

• A state can be wealthy without being powerful, of course – think of Brunei, Kuwait, or Switzerland – but it is impossible to be a Great Power without a large diverse economy. In particular, a strong economy enables a state to create and equip a powerful military force.

1.2.2. Military Supremacy – Command of the Commons

• Today the United States is not only the world’ s foremost economic power; it is the dominant military power as well

• While America’s military economic advantages are manifold, its military lead is simply overwhelming.

• U. S. Defense expenditures in 2003 were nearly 40 percent of the global total and almost seven times larger than that of the number two power (China). To put it another way, U. S. Defense spending was equal to the amount spent on defense by the next thirteen countries combined.

• The United States also spends more to keep itself in the vanguard of military technology. The U. S. Department of Defense now spends over 50 billion dollars annually for “research, development, testing, and evaluation”, an amount larger than the entire defense budget of Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan or China

• The United States deployed more than 500 000 troops in the Persian Gulf for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; mobilized substantial air, ground, and naval forces in Kosovo in 1999, and in Afghanistan in 2001; and then deployed more than 180 000 troops and other personnel to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003.

• Over - Sea power projection capabilities

• The United States has the largest and most sophisticated arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, and it is the only country with global power projection capability, stealth aircraft, a large arsenal of precision guided munitions, and integrated surveillance, reconnaissance, and command-and-control capabilities.

“Command of the Commons- Military foundation of U. S. Hegemony”

• One pillar of U.S. hegemony is the vast military power of the United States.

• The U.S. military currently possesses command of the global commons. Command of the commons is analogous to command of the sea, or in Paul Kennedy’s words, it is analogous to “naval mastery.” The “commons,” in the case of the sea and space, are areas that belong to no one state and that provide access to much of the globe. Airspace does technically belong to the countries below it, but there are few countries that can deny their airspace above 15,000 feet to U.S. warplanes. Command does not mean that other states cannot use the commons in peacetime. Nor does it mean that others cannot acquire military assets that can move through or even exploit them when unhindered by the United States. Command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States. Having lost such a contest, they could not mount another effort for a very long time, and the United States would preserve, restore, and consolidate its hold after such a fight.

• Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S. global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies.

• Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance. Command of the commons has permitted the United States to wage war on short notice even where it has had little permanent military presence. This was true of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 1993 intervention in Somalia, and the 2001 action in Afghanistan.

Command Of The Sea

• U.S. nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) are perhaps the key assets of U.S. open ocean antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability, which in turn is the key to maintaining command of the sea.

• At more than $1 billion each (more than $2 billion each for the new U.S. SSN), modern nuclear submarines are prohibitively expensive for most states. Aside from the United States, Britain, China, France, and Russia are the only other countries that can build them, and China is scarcely able. Several partially built nuclear attack submarines remained in Russian yards in the late 1990s, but no new ones have been laid down. Perhaps 20–30 Russian nuclear attack submarines remain in service. Currently, the U.S. Navy has 54 SSNs in service and 4 under construction.

• The U.S. Navy also dominates the surface of the oceans, with 11 aircraft carriers capable of launching high-performance aircraft.

• The Carrier Mission is:

- To provide a credible, sustainable, independent forward presence and conventional deterrence in peacetime,

- To operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary forces in times of crisis, and

- To operate and support aircraft attacks on enemies, protect friendly forces and engage in sustained independent operations in war. 

• The Soviet Union was just building its first true aircraft carrier when its political system collapsed. Aside from France, which has 1, no other country has any nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. At $5 billion apiece for a single U.S. Nimitz-class nuclear–powered aircraft carrier, this is no surprise.

• Moreover, the U.S. Navy operates for the Marine Corps a feet of a dozen large helicopter/VSTOL carriers, each almost twice the size of the Royal Navy’s comparable (3 ship) Invincible class. To protect its aircraft carriers and amphibious assets, the U.S. Navy has commissioned 37 Arleigh - Burke–class destroyers since 1991—billion-dollar multimission platforms capable of antiair, antisubmarine, and land-attack missions in high-threat environments.

• 24 This vessel is surely the most capable surface combatant in the world.

Command Of The Air

• and electronic intelligence aircraft allows the U.S military to achieve the “suppression of enemy air defenses” (SEAD); limit the effectiveness of enemy radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and fighters; and achieve the relatively safe exploitation of enemy skies above 15,000 feet. Cheap and simple air defense weapons, such as antiaircraft guns and shoulderred lightweight SAMs, are largely ineffective at these altitudes. Yet at these altitudes aircraft can deliver precision-guided munitions with great accuracy and lethality, if targets have been properly located and identified.

Command of the Space

• Though the United States is not yet committed to actual combat in or from space, it spends vast amounts on reconnaissance, navigation, and communications satellites.

• These satellites provide a standing infrastructure to conduct military operations around the globe.

• the United States had 100 military satellites and 150 commercial satellites in space in 2001, nearly half of all the active satellites in space.

• According to Air Force Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, air component commander in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, more than 50 satellites supported land, sea, and air operations in every aspect of the campaign.

• For fiscal years 2002–07, the Pentagon plans to spend $165 billion on space-related activities.

• The NAVSTAR/GPS (global positioning system) constellation of satellites, designed and operated by the U.S. military but now widely utilized for civilian purposes, permits highly precise navigation and weapons guidance anywhere in the world. Full exploitation of GPS by other military and civilian users is permitted electronically by the United States, but this permission is also electronically revocable. It will not be easy for others to produce a comparable system, though the European Union intends to try. GPS cost $4.2 billion (in 1979 prices) to bring to completion, significantly more money than was originally projected.

• Hoewer, below 15,000 feet, within several hundred kilometers of the shore, and on the land, a contested zone awaits United States. The U.S. military hopes that it can achieve the same degree of dominance in this zone as it has in the commons, though this is unlikely to happen.

1.2.3. Institutional Influence

• The norms and rules that govern these institutions will prevent any single state (or group of states) from controlling them completely, yet the United States plays a unique role in the most important global organizations.

• UN• WTO• NATO• 22 percent of UN budget

• Who determines agenda of something, he is powerful

• IMF, World bank• “The record of landing from both

institutions strongly supports a pattern of U. S. interests and preferences”

1.2.4. Cultural and Ideological Impact

• Another key advantage for the United States is its ability to shape the preferences of others – to make them want what America wants – through the inherent attractiveness of U. S. culture, ideology and institutions.

• The “soft power” is remains hard to define or measure, but there is a little doubt that the United States casts a long cultural and ideological shadow over the rest of the world.

• English as a “lingua franca”• American University system as a potent mechanism

for socializing foreign elites

• Nearly 600 000 foreign students at American universities in 2002/2003

• “If there is a global civilization, it is American. Nor is it just McDonald’s and Hollywood, it is also Microsoft and Harvard. Wealthy Romans used to send their children to Greek Universities; today’s Greeks, that is, the Europeans, send their kids to Roman, that is, American Universities.

• As of 2004, the top twenty five highest-grossing films of all times were U. S. productions

• American consumer products and brand names are ubiquitous• Free market and democratic governance become a world

model• American way of life as a world way of life

1.2.5. The Blessing of Geography

• Economic, military, institutional and cultural dominance may define U. S. Primacy, but its geopolitical situation is the icing on the cake.

• The United States is the only Power in the Western Hemisphere, and it is physically separated from the other major powers by two enormous oceanic moats

• America is blessed among the nations. On the north, she had a weak neighbor; on the south, another weak neighbor; on the east fish, and the west, fish” (Jules Jusseraud, French Ambassador to the U.S., 1925.)

• Because the other major powers lie in close proximity to one another, they are inclined to worry more about each other than they do about the United States.

• Tеорија равнотеже претњи сматра да је претња, односно њихова перцепција оно против чега се државе удружују. Претња се састоји од четири дела: процене нечије моћи, близине (мисли се на географски положај земље која се схвата као претња у односу на оног ко претњу перципира), офанзивних војних капацитета које поседује и агресивности намера (Stephen M. Walt)

1.2.6. Контекст

• “То да ли је држава данас моћна и богата или није, не зависи од обиља или сигурности њене моћи и богатства, већ првенствено од чињенице да ли њени суседи поседују више или мање тога од ње.” (фон Хорник, немачки меркантилистички писац)

• Drugi problem tiče se određivanja koji resursi pružaju najbolju osnovu za moć u nekom određenom kontekstu. Resursi moći uvek zavise od konteksta. Tenkovi nisu tako dobri u močvarama; u devetnaestom veku uranijum nije bio resurs moći. U ranijim razdobljima ljudske istorije bilo je lakše suditi o vrednosti izvora moći. (Džozef Naj)

II Izazovi i izazivači jedinoj svetskoj supersili

• Sjedinjene Američke Države kao “depresivna supersila” (Gabor Steingart – dopisnik nemačkog časopisa “Der Spiegel” iz Vašingtona)

• A “Three Thrillion War” – Joseph Stiglitz – procena troškova rata u Iraku i Avganistanu do 2017. godine

• Kako su Sjedinjene Američke Države za samo par godina od “najmoćnije svetske imperije ikada” postale “imperija čije je vreme prošlo”?

• Nova administracija, novi ljudi, nova politika?

Raspored moći u međunarodnim odnosima kao međuzavisnost na više nivoa

• U globalnom informatičkom dobu, moć je među državama raspodeljena po obrascu koji podseća na složenu trodimenzionalnu šahovsku tablu, na kojoj se igra odvija i horizontalno i vertikalno.

• Na vrhu šahovske table gde su političko-vojna

pitanja, vojna moć je uglavnom unipolarna sa Sjedinjenim Državama kao jedinom supersilom, ali u sredini table gde su ekonomska pitanja, Sjedinjene Države nisu hegemon ili imperija, i moraju da se cenjkaju sa Evropom sa jednakih pozicija kada Evropa deluje kao ujedinjena celina.

• Na primer, povodom antimonopolskih ili pitanja koja

se odnose na privredu, one moraju naći kompromis, da bi postigle sporazum.

• I na dnu table transnacionalnih odnosa koji prelaze granice van kontrole vlada država i tako uključuju raznovrsne aktere kao što su bankari i teroristi, moć se haotično raspršava.

• Uzmimo kao dodatak pitanjima terorizma samo nekoliko

primera; privatni akteri na globalnom tržištu kapitala ograničavaju način na koji se kamatne stope mogu koristiti za upravljanje američkom ekonomijom, a trgovina droge, AIDS, migracija stanovništva, i globalno zagrevanje koji imaju duboke društvene korene u više od jedne zemlje, izvan su kontrole američkih vlasti.

• U takvoj jednoj situaciji čini se da nema baš puno smisla

koristiti tradicionalne termine poput unipolarnost, hegemonija ili imperija s ciljem da se opišu takvi problemi. (Džozef Naj)

Да ли Америка може и хоће да буде светска империја?

• „Tри дефицита“ са којима се Сједињене Америчке Државе данас суочавају, а све у вези са евентуалним покушајем ове земље да постану светска империја. Најал Фергусон сматра да Америка „пати“ од дефицита војних трупа, буџетског дефицита и дефицита пажње (мисли се на слабу заинтересованост самих Американаца за тако нешто и за светске послове уопште).

• На пример Велика Британија је 1920. године (у време гушења тадашње побуне у Ираку) имала једног војника на 23 становника Ирака, данас један војник америчке војске долази на 210 Ирачана. Проблем није у томе да Американци немају довољан број младих људи (САД имају већи број становника између 15 и 24. године него Ирак или Авганистан), већ је проблем у томе, тврди он, да САД преферирају да ниво својих војних снага држе на нивоу релативно малог процента становништва.“

• Такође, он тврди да се због недостатка воље и капацитета, али и огромних унутрашњих проблема изазваних пре свега енормним трошковима око пензионог и социјалног осигурања (рачуна се да ће у годинама које долазе), Америка бити „кратка“ за неких 45 000 милијарди долара, колико износи разлика између оног што треба исплатити у корисницима тих осигурања и оног што ће бити државни приходи.

• Према најновијем истраживању јавног мњења спроведеног од стране Асошиејтед преса (Associated Press- Ipsos poll), „иако 6 од 10 Американаца подржава Бушове поступке у вези са самим нападом (мисли се на терористичке нападе од 11. септембра 2001 – прим. Д. Ж.), половина од њих сматра да су трошкови бробе против тероризма превисоки, док 6 од 10 испитаника верује да ће рат у Ираку призвести само још више антиамеричког тероризма...

• Такође, и Пју (Pew) истраживање проналази да „већина Американаца верује да набољи начин да се умањи опасност од терористичких напада на Сједињене Америчке Државе није да се повећа већ да се смањи америчко војно присуство у иностранству, што представља оштар заокрет у односу на слично истраживање из 2002. године.“

• “Немогућ је покушај да се далеке провинције држе у пoкорности” (Едвард Гибон)

• Myth of Empire (Myths of Security Through Expansion) – OFFENSIVE ADVANTAGE, POWER SHIFTS, PAPER TIGER ENEMIES, BANDWAGONS , BIG STICK DIPLOMACY, FALLING DOMINOES, EL DORADO AND MANIFEST DESTINY, NO TRADEOFFS, - Jack L. Snyder -

„МИТОВИ ИМПЕРИЈА“: суштина мита

1. „офанзива доноси предност“ „Напад је најбоља одбрана“

2. „померање у расподели моћи“ Ако ћеш већ морати да нападнеш сутра, нападни данас, јер изгледа да време није на твојој страни

3. „непријатељи попут тигрова од папира“ Наша одлучност и агресивност победиће сваког противника. Јер нису они толико јако колико се то чини

4. „Сврставање уз јачег“ „ако не можеш да га победиш, придружи му се“

5. „дипломатија великог штапа“ „Само оштро и на прву“

6. „падајуће домине“ Сваки педаљ земље је стратешки важан. Нема безначајних губитака

7. „Ел Дорадо и „manifest destiny” С мисијом у боље сутра

8. „нема уступака“ На све или ништа

• Nacionalizam kao “rak rana imperija”• Imperije su iščezle zato što su postale preskupe –

(Majkl Mandelbaum)• Hierarchy is usually costly. Dominant states can

offer concessions to induce subordinates to give up their valued freedom. The Soviet Union rejected this course, at first, electing to extract resources from Eastern Europe rather than share its benefits from cooperation. Indeed, by one estimate, Moscow withdrew nearly $1 billion per year from the region until 1956. By the late 1950s, however, the flow of resources reversed, and by the 1980s the Soviet Union was subsidizing Eastern Europe to a total of about $17 billion per year. (David Lake)

• “ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦИЈА НАСИЉА” (Fareed Zakaria)• “Једанаести септембар 2001. био је значајан

догађај у историји политике моћи (Power Politics). Деветнаест фанатика, од којих нико није имао западно образовање, са оскудним финансијским средствима, гурнули су најмоћнију и технолошки најнапреднију светску силу у панику и довели Планету у стање политичке кризе.

Никада раније толико много бола није било нането тако моћном мноштву од тако немоћне неколицине. Ту лежи дилема за једину светску суперсилу: Како се борити са непријатељем који је физички слаб али који поседује фанатичну мотивацију.” (Zbigniew Brzezinski)

The Inheritance

• The next president will inherit perhaps the most challenging set of strategic problems in a generation.

• Not since the Truman administration has an incoming commander in chief taken responsibility for two major ongoing wars.

• First, the next president will inherit wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—conflicts in which the ability of the United States to shape outcomes is eroding.

• In both theaters, the dynamics of insurgency, tribalism, and ethno-sectarian tensions are preventing the achievement of anything close to the maximalist goals of the Bush administration.

• In Iraq, it seems all but certain that the next commander in chief will take office with approximately 130,000 troops on the ground. Much has been made of the drop in violence associated with the “surge” and the assorted tribal truces that the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy has helped to consolidate.

• The reality, however, is that the underlying political and security situation is still exceedingly fragile. Several persistent tensions threaten to renew the simmering civil war:

• According to the January 2008 report of the Afghanistan Study Group, “the mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering.”

• Second, America’s economy is showing serious signs of weakness.

• What began as a problem in America’s

subprime mortgage market in 2007 has sent worrisome ripples across the global economy.

• Domestic views of America’s economy are more negative than at any point in nearly 15 years...

• Also, the Bush administration’s last and largest budget—$3 trillion—will likely push this year’s budget deficit to at least $400 billion.

• According to the Congressional Budget Office, the United States will face “severe long-term budgetary challenges” as a result of pressure from “ongoing increases in health care costs, along with the aging of the population.

• Moreover, if the proposed fiscal year 2009 sum of $515.4 billion is passed, the next president will inherit a defense budget that in inflation-adjusted dollars is the largest since World War II.

• Since 2001, Congress has approved a total of $691 billion for the so-called “global war on terror,” and the cost of the wars could rise to nearly $900 billion by next spring and may reach $1 trillion by the end of 2009.

• The next president will have to deal with real economic and budgetary tensions that will force hard choices about where to place emphasis and how to manage risk.

• Third, America is suffering from strategic distraction.

• The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the global campaign against terrorism have so transfixed America’s leadership and dominated the exercise of statecraft that areas of the world and key relationships vital to our interests have been given scant attention.

• The next president will have to contend with several emerging challenges: the future of Russia’s political evolution is in doubt; the continued rise of China poses challenges to America’s strategic alliances in the region; stability in Pakistan could unravel quickly; relations with Latin America have deteriorated; North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon; and Iran continues to undermine our interests in the Middle East

• According to Francis Fukuyama, “American preoccupation with Iraq limits Washington’s options in other parts of the world and has distracted the attention of senior policy makers from other regions such as Asia that in the long run are likely to present greater strategic challenges.

• Moreover, the continued rise of transnational challenges such as radical Islamist ideology, non-state weapons proliferation, global climate change, and energy security will pose ever-increasing problems for the United States and its allies. (Shawn Brimley and Michèle A. Flournoy)

• There are six features of the current international environment most salient to devising an effective grand strategy for the United States.

• They are: (1) the absence of a peer competitor to the United States;

• (2) the lack of legitimacy for U.S. actions in the eyes of other states;

• (3) the continuing advance of democracy; • (4) the advance of globalization, together with the

backlash that is forming against it; • (5) the rise of China and the coalescing of Europe;

and • (6) the trilogy of ills of grand weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) terrorism, the global Islamic jihadi threat, and climate change.

• The United States has six fundamental national interests in the current era:

• first, to protect the homeland from attack;

• second, to keep a deep peace among the Eurasian great powers;

• third, to preserve assured access to stable supplies of oil;

• fourth, to preserve an open international economic order;

• fifth, to spread democracy and the rule

of law, protect human rights, and prevent mass murders in civil wars;

• and sixth, to avert severe climate change (Robert J. Art)

• Among all the possible challenges in engaging the world—from a resurgent Russia to our interests in Latin America and Africa— such a liberal realist strategy for your administration should place priority on five major challenges.

• Probably the greatest danger to the American way of life would be the intersection of terrorism with nuclear materials.

• Preventing this requires policies for counterterrorism, nonproliferation, better protection of foreign nuclear materials, stability in the Middle East, and attention to failed states.

• Political Islam and how it develops is the second priority.

• The third major challenge would be the rise of a hostile hegemon as Asia gradually regains the three-fifths share of the world economy that corresponds to its three-fifths of the world population. Forestalling this outcome requires a policy that embraces China as a responsible stakeholder, but hedges against possible hostility by maintaining close relations with Japan, India, and other countries in the region.

• The fourth major threat would be an economic depression that could be triggered by financial mismanagement or a crisis that disrupts global access to the Persian Gulf (where twothirds of world oil reserves are located). Meeting this challenge will require policies that gradually reduce dependence on oil while realizing that we will not be able to isolate the American economy from global energy markets and must not succumb to costly and counterproductive protectionism.

• The fifth major threat to our way of life may be termed ecological breakdowns such as pandemics or climate change.

• Again, part of the solution requires prudent energy policies, combined with leadership on climate change and greater cooperation through international institutions such as the World Health Organization. (Joseph S. Nye)

Rank CountryOil - consumption

(bbl/day) Date of Information

1 World 80,290,000 2005 est.

2 United States 20,800,000 2005 est.

3 European Union 14,550,000 2004

4 China 6,930,000 2007 est.

5 Japan 5,353,000 2005

6 Russia 2,916,000 2006

7 Germany 2,618,000 2005 est.

8 India 2,438,000 2005 est.

9 Canada 2,290,000 2005

10 South Koreauth 2,130,000 2006

11 Brazil 2,100,000 2006 est.

12 Mexico 2,078,000 2005 est.

13 Saudi Arabia 2,000,000 2005

14 France 1,999,000 2005 est.

15 United Kingdom 1,820,000 2005 est.

16 Italy 1,732,000 2005 est.

17 Iran 1,630,000 2006 est.

18 Spain 1,600,000 2005 est.

19 Indonesia 1,100,000 2006 est.

20 s 1,011,000 2006

Rank Country Reserves of foreign exchange and gold Date of Information

1 China $ 1,534,000,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

2 Japan $ 954,100,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

3 Russia $ 476,400,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

4 India $ 275,000,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

5 Taiwan $ 274,700,000,000 31 December 2007

6 Korea, South $ 262,200,000,000 31 December 2007

7 Brazil $ 180,300,000,000 31 December 2007

8 Singapore $ 163,000,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

9 Hong Kong $ 152,700,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

10 Germany $ 136,200,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

11 Algeria $ 110,600,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

12 Malaysia $ 101,100,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

13 France $ 98,240,000,000 2006 est.

14 Italy $ 94,330,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

15 Thailand $ 87,460,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

16 Mexico $ 87,190,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

17 Libya $ 79,600,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

18 mirates $ 76,620,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

19 Turkey $ 76,510,000,000 31 December 2007 est.

20 United States $ 70,570,000,000 31 December 2007 est

Rank Country Debt - external Date of Information

1 World $ 53,970,000,000,000 2004 est.

2 United States $ 12,250,000,000,000 30 June 2007

3 United Kingdom $ 10,450,000,000,000 30 June 2007

4 Germany $ 4,489,000,000,000 30 June 2007

5 France $ 4,396,000,000,000 30 June 2007

6 Italy $ 2,345,000,000,000 30 June 2007

7 Netherlands $ 2,277,000,000,000 30 June 2007

8 Spain $ 2,047,000,000,000 30 June 2007 est.

9 Ireland $ 1,841,000,000,000 30 June 2007

10 Japan $ 1,492,000,000,000 30 June 2007

11 Switzerland $ 1,340,000,000,000 30 June 2007

12 Belgium $ 1,313,000,000,000 30 June 2007

13 Australia $ 824,900,000,000 30 June 2007

14 Canada $ 758,600,000,000 30 June 2007

15 Austria $ 752,500,000,000 30 June 2007

16 Sweden $ 598,200,000,000 30 June 2006

17 Hong Kong $ 588,000,000,000 2007 est.

18 Denmark $ 492,600,000,000 30 June 2007

19 Norway $ 469,100,000,000 30 June 2007

20 Portugal $ 389,500,000,000 31 December 2007

II Изазивачи: Јапан; Кина; Русија; Европска унија; Индија…

Power resources of the Major U. S. contenders, 2007

Sources of power

United States

Japan China Russia European Union

India

tangible

Basic resources

strong medium strong strong strong Strong to medium

Military strong weak medium strong medium medium

Economic strong strong strong and medium

medium and strong

strong medium to strong

Science/ Technology

strong strong medium medium strong

Intangible

National Cohesion

strong strong strong medium weak weak and medium

Universalistic Culture

strong medium medium medium strong medium

International Institutions

strong strong medium medium strong medium

Ваш одговор?

Sources of power

United States

Japan China Russia European Union

India

tangible

Basic resources

Military

Economic

Science/ Technology

Intangible

National Cohesion

Universalistic Culture

International Institutions

III Perspektive: čiji će biti 21. vek??

“The Age of Nonpolarity - What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”

By Richard N. Haass Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008

• The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.

• In contrast to multipolarity -- which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power -- a nonpolar international system is characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power.

• At first glance, the world today may appear to be multipolar. The major powers -- China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States -- contain just over half the world's people and account for 75 percent of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending.

• Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world differs in a fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states.

• Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well.

• States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations.

• Power is now found in many hands and in many places.

• In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania.

• A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization).

• So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and Shanghai.

• Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing.

• Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace).

• Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.

• In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable.

• Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest. The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television), information, and innovation.

• But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United States' position in the world -- and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence.

• The U.S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent. Although U.S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's total, this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and projected differential between the United States' growth rate and those of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United States.

• Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no great-power rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United States. In part, this is because the disparity between the power of the United States and that of any potential rivals is too great.

• The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior, which has not stimulated such a response.

• A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. They do not, accordingly, want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests

• But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, Unipolarity Has Ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out.

• The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and

piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally.

• A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them…The war in Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world.

• Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons.

• Nonpolarity will be difficult and dangerous. But encouraging a greater degree of global integration will help promote stability. Establishing a core group of governments and others committed to cooperative multilateralism would be a great step forward. Call it "concerted nonpolarity." It would not eliminate nonpolarity, but it would help manage it and increase the odds that the international system will not deteriorate or disintegrate

PARAG KHANNASecond World – Empires and influence in New World Order, Random House, New York, 2008

• It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term.

• America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar.

• Afghanistanis stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea.

• The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.

• At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership.

• So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China.

• This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. • Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by

Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite.

• The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world.

• The more we appreciate the differences among the American, European and Chinese worldviews, the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game.

• Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The cold war, too, was not truly an “East-West” struggle; it remained essentially a contest over Europe.

• What we have today, for the first time in

history, is a global, multicivilizational, multipolar battle.

• The Big Three are the ultimate “Frenemies.” Twenty-first-century geopolitics will resemble nothing more than Orwell’s 1984, but instead of three world powers (Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia), we have three hemispheric pan-regions, longitudinal zones dominated by America, Europe and China.

• As the early 20th-century European scholars of geopolitics realized, because a vertically organized region contains all climatic zones year-round, each pan-region can be self-sufficient and build a power base from which to intrude in others’ terrain.

• But in a globalized and shrinking world, no geography is sacrosanct. So in various ways, both overtly and under the radar, China and Europe will meddle in America’s backyard, America and China will compete for African resources in Europe’s southern periphery and America and Europe will seek to profit from the rapid economic growth of countries within China’s growing sphere of influence.

• Globalization is the weapon of choice. The main battlefield is what I call “the second world.”

The Swing States

• There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America’s global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like.

• But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I’ve spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet — the countries of the second world.

• They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics.

• From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America’s coalition (as in “coalition of the willing”), Europe’s consensus and China’s consultative styles.

• The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century.

• Second-world countries are distinguished from the third world by their potential: the likelihood that they will capitalize on a valuable commodity, a charismatic leader or a generous patron.

• Each and every second-world country matters in its own right, for its economic, strategic or diplomatic weight, and its decision to tilt toward the United States, the E.U. or China has a strong influence on what others in its region decide to do.

• Will an American nuclear deal with India push Pakistan even deeper into military dependence on China? Will the next set of Arab monarchs lean East or West?

• The second world will shape the world’s balance of power as much as the superpowers themselves will.

Fareed ZakariaThe Post-American World, W. W. Norton,

New York, 2008

• This is not book about american decline but of rise of the rest.

• The real test for the United States is the opposite of that faced by Britain in 1900. Britain's economic power waned even as it managed to maintain immense political influence around the world. The U.S. economy and American society, in contrast, are capable of responding to the economic pressures and competition they face. They can adjust, adapt, and persevere.

• The test for the United States is political -- and it rests not just with the United States at large but with Washington in particular. Can Washington adjust and adapt to a world in which others have moved up? Can it respond to shifts in economic requirements and political power?

• The world has been one in which the United States was utterly unrivaled for two decades. It has been, in a broader sense, a U.S.-designed world since the end of World War II. But it is now in the midst of one of history's greatest periods of change.

• There have been three tectonic power shifts over the last 500

years, fundamental changes in the distribution of power that have reshaped international life -- its politics, economics, and culture.

• The first was the rise of the Western world, a process that began in the fifteenth century and accelerated dramatically in the late eighteenth century. It produced modernity as we know it: science and technology, commerce and capitalism, the agricultural and industrial revolutions. It also produced the prolonged political dominance of the nations of the West.

• The second shift, which took place in the closing years of the nineteenth century, was the rise of the United States. Soon after it industrialized, the United States became the most powerful nation since imperial Rome, and the only one that was stronger than any likely combination of other nations. For most of the last century, the United States has dominated global economics, politics, science, culture, and ideas. For the last 20 years, that dominance has been unrivaled, a phenomenon unprecedented in history.

• We are now living through the third great power shift of the modern era -- the rise of the rest. Over the past few decades, countries all over the world have been experiencing rates of economic growth that were once unthinkable. Although they have had booms and busts, the overall trend has been vigorously forward. (This growth has been most visible in Asia but is no longer confined to it, which is why to call this change "the rise of Asia" does not describe it accurately.)

• The emerging international system is likely to be quite different from those that have preceded it.

• A hundred years ago, there was a multipolar order run by a collection of European

governments, with constantly shifting alliances, rivalries, miscalculations, and wars. • Then came the duopoly of the Cold War, more stable in some ways, but with the

superpowers reacting and overreacting to each other's every move. • Since 1991, we have lived under a U.S. imperium, a unique, unipolar world in which the

open global economy has expanded and accelerated. • This expansion is driving the next change in the nature of the international order. • At the politico-military level, we remain in a single-superpower world. But polarity is not a

binary phenomenon. The world will not stay unipolar for decades and then suddenly, one afternoon, become multipolar.

• On every dimension other than military power -- industrial, financial, social, cultural -- the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance. That does not mean we are entering an anti-American world.

• But we are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people.

• The United States has a window of opportunity to shape and master the changing global landscape, but only if it first recognizes that the post-American world is a reality -- and embraces and celebrates that fact.

Kishore MahbubaniThe New Asian Hemisphere – The Irresistible shift of the Global power to the East, PublicAffairs, New York, 2008

• THERE IS a fundamental flaw in the West's strategic thinking. In all its analyses of global challenges, the West assumes that it is the source of the solutions to the world's key problems.

• In fact, however, the West is also a major source of these problems. Unless key Western policymakers learn to understand and deal with this reality, the world is headed for an even more troubled phase.

• The West is understandably reluctant to accept that the era of its domination is ending and that the Asian century has come.

• No civilization cedes power easily, and the West's resistance to giving up control of key global institutions and processes is natural.

• Yet the West is engaging in an extraordinary act of self-deception by believing that it is open to change. In fact, the West has become the most powerful force preventing the emergence of a new wave of history, clinging to its privileged position in key global forums, such as the UN Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G-8 (the group of highly industrialized states), and refusing to contemplate how the West will have to adjust to the Asian century.

• Partly as a result of its growing insecurity, the West has also become increasingly incompetent in its handling of key global problems.

• Many Western commentators can readily identify specific failures, such as the Bush administration's botched invasion and occupation of Iraq.

• But few can see that this reflects a deeper structural problem: the West's inability to see that the world has entered a new era.

Stiven Majer, NDU, Washington, D. C.

• Међународна структура и односи у периоду после Хладног рата одумиру и на њихово место долазе нови који ублажавају улогу Запада. Утицај ових промена у Европи одржаваће Косово и целокупан регион југозападне Европе неколико година у нестабилном стању.

• За ово постоји пет разлога.

• Прво, током претходних пет година Сједињене Државе стално су губиле моћ, ауторитет и утицај на светској позорници. Такозвани „униполарни тренутак”, који је требало да опише америчку моћ после слома Совјетског Савеза и комунизма, у стварности није био ништа више од тренутка. Свакако да амерички дебакл у Ираку има много везе са слабљењем снажне америчке позиције у свету, али на моћ Сједињених Држава такође су у великој мери утицале и промене у Европи које Вашингтон не може у пуној мери да држи под контролом.

• Друго, Европска унија је у извесној мери посустала и постала несигурна када је реч о плановима за проширење и продубљење. Лисабонски споразум, потписан крајем прошле године, представља покушај да се ЕУ преоријентише и опорави после пораза уставног референдума у Француској и Холандији. Међутим, велика површина, различити интереси и мноштво „брзина” у данашњој ЕУ чине да управљање, одлучивање и сличност намера буду много компликованији – и с времена на време – готово немогући за остваривање. Сходно томе, све више се чини да ће ЕУ бити ограничена на веома простран трговински и економски блок

• Треће, НАТО је постао застарео. Упркос завршетку Хладног рата – када је НАТО био неопходан за заштиту Запада, овај савез наставио је да постоји по инерцији и због неспособности западних лидера да се упусте у веома напоран посао стварања система безбедности који одговарају стварности 21. века. Разуме се да је НАТО наставио свој живот, али је у суштини једна шупља организација с незнатном безбедносном наменом у свету који настаје. Највећи тест за НАТО данас јесте Авганистан. Али, чак и тамо он је као савез неуспешан јер има знатне проблеме у обезбеђивању одговарајућих снага за тамошњу борбу. Код већине европских чланица НАТО просто постоји мало интересовања за укључење у Авганистан на били какав значајан начин.

• Четврто, Русија се с Владимиром Путином поново појавила на светској позорници као значајна сила. И поред тога што су односи Москве са Европом и Сједињеним Државама често неспретни, нема сумње да економски и политички утицај савремене Русије расте. За разлику од периода комунизма, Русија не представља озбиљну војну претњу, већ је јасно постала магнет за земље и процесе који не налазе задовољење на Западу. На пример, подршка Русије за српски став у односу на Косово има изузетно важну улогу за Москву као начин на који показује своје противљење Сједињеним Државама, али, што је још важније, као средство за представљање њене нове силе на међународној позорници.

• Коначно, све бољи односи између Русије и Турске обећавају преоријентисање политичких, економских и војних односа не само у приобалном подручју Црног мора, већ потенцијално и у читавој југоисточној Европи. Наравно, иза Русије и Турске стоји дуг период сукоба, али оне знају и за периоде сарадње – који потичу још од времена Ататурковог отварања према новом Совјетском Савезу током двадесетих година 20. века. Данас, слични интереси између Анкаре и Москве воде ка све тешњим везама у области трговине, безбедности и цивилне заштите у региону Црног мора.

Запад више нема монопол над будућношћу

.

Koji su glavni problemi kad se procenjuje moć u međunarodnim odnosima?

Power is an elusive concept. It is hard to define, measure or describe exactly how it works. Former John Kennedy School of Government Dean, Joseph Nye wrote: “Power is like weather.

Everyone talks about it, but few understand it.. Power is like love… easier to experience than to define or measure”

Hard and Soft Power

• Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get a desired outcome. Historically, power has been measured by such criteria as population size and territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability.

• Hard power enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want. The Pentagon’s budget for FY2008 is more than $750 billion and growing, many times more than the nearest competitor. The United States has the world’s largest economy, and more than a third of the top 500 global companies are American. There is no other global power, and yet American hard power does not always translate into influence.

• Trends such as these have made power less tangible and coercion less effective. Machiavelli said it was safer to be feared than to be loved. Today, in the global information age, it is better to be both.

• Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead without using threats and bribes.

• Legitimacy can also reduce opposition—and the costs—of using hard power when the situation demands. Appealing to others’ values, interests and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction.

• Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas. Today, victory depends on attracting foreign populations to our side and helping them to build capable, democratic states. Soft power is essential to winning the peace. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic.

Smart Power

• Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both.

• Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action.

• Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world’s interests and values.

Moć je uvek moć u odnosu na neke druge

• “То да ли је држава данас моћна и богата или није, не зависи од обиља или сигурности њене моћи и богатства, већ првенствено од чињенице да ли њени суседи поседују више или мање тога од ње.” (фон Хорник, немачки меркантилистички писац)

• Stalna promenjivost• Subjektivnost• “Percepcija moći”• Nepostojanje instrumenata za merenje

moći – rat kao najbolji instrument za merenje moći?

• Uspon i opadanje u moći je pre proces nego nešto što se dešava brzo.

• Power is not a simple and stable phenomenon. Indeed, it is very much a political chameleon, constantly changing even while it remains the same (John T. Rourk)

• Power Dynamics• Absolute and relative power• Objective and subjective power• Situational power

WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTHThe Rules of Power Analysis

• Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of Power

• Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts• Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single

Indicator• Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power

Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of Power

• What have shifted are peoples' views of the real utility of these resources and capabilities. Current discussions of the limits of US power are really focused on the limited usefulness of large amounts of military and economic capabilities.

• Political scientists generally use the term "power" to refer to a relationship of influence. As Robert Dahl put it, power is "ability to get B to do something it would not otherwise have done" or, of course, to prevent B from doing something it otherwise would have done).

• In international relations, the same term of "power" is often equated with resources: measurable elements that states possess and use to influence others. In popular commentary-, these two meanings of power are often conflated, with unfortunate results.

Rule No. 2: Watch the Goalposts

• The larger problem with conflating power-as-resources with power-as-influences that it leads to a constant shifting of the goalposts. The better die United States becomes at acquiring resources, the greater the array of global problems it is expected to be able to resolve, and the greater the apparent gap between its material capabilities and die ends it can achieve.

Rule No. 3: Do Not Rely on a Single Indicator

• Current projections of China's economic rise may well be overstated. Iraq aside, what is most responsible for the virtual shift to multipolarity is not a word but an acronym: PPP.

• PPP stands for the "purchasing power parity" estimate of countries' exchange rates—the size of their economies in dollar terms.

• Although the prices oi many manufactured products tend to be equalized by international trade, the price of labor is not, and therefore labor-intensive products and services tend to be relatively cheap in poor counties. PPP corrects for this discontinuity by using prices for a locally selected basket of goods to adjust the exchange rate for converting local currency into dollars.

• As University of Pennsylvania professor Avery Goldstein notes, "the World Bank's decision in 1994 to shift to a PPP estimate for China's economy was crucial in propelling perceptions of that country's imminent rise to great power status."

Rule No. 4: Consider Latent Power

• US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits arc high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch."

• And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must he careful to take Into account both the level of resources that can he mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them.

• And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged.

• "self-inflicted overstretch"— in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power ;and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today.

• Да ли ће САД бити једина и последња глобална суперсила? (Збигњев Бжежински)

• Амерички и антиамерички век? • Да ли је успон и пад великих сила стање

или процес?• Има ли Империја наследника?• The 21st Century World as a World Without

Power? (Niall Ferguson)• Ваш одговор?

• “As we work our way through this seemingly intractable problem in Iraq, we must constantly remember that this is not just a troublesome issue form which we can walk away if it seems too costly to continue. What is at stake is not only Iraq and the stability of the Middle East, but the global perception of the reliability of the United States as a partner in a deeply troubled world. We cannot afford to fail this test… And this is why America can’t just walk away. (Brent Scowcroft, The International herald Tribune, Thursday, January 4, 2007, p. 6)

• “Here’s my theory: Prosperity and Security are boring. Nobody wants to read about them. The same phenomenon occurred in Ancient Rome, the last state to acquire such a firm hegemony… of course America could be falling, but I have my doubts. For one thing, the book market is too strong. So, on this Fourth of July, I am going to watch the fireworks and be grateful for the place and time in which I live. When Polibius, Sallust and Livy, wrote their books the Roman state still had more than millenium of life in it. Perhaps ours does too.” (Thomas F. Madden)

• “So the question is not whether America is in relative decline as a result of global productive power shift. Of course it is. The question is whether it can carry out policies that mitigate the impact of those broad secular trends, play to its own massive and undoubted strengths and avoid actions that are, essentially self-weakening. There actually may be such a thing as “smart relative decline”, however contradictory that idea sounds.” (Paul Kennedy, 2007)

However, if the United States was not an Empire, then what was it?

(Niall Ferguson) What to do with Power, the question is now… end,

ever…and, forever…

IV Литература

• Pol Kenedi, Uspon i pad velikih sila, CID Podgorica, Službeni List SRJ, Beograd, 1999 • Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons–The Military Foundation of U. S. Hegemony”, International Security, Vol. 28, No.

1, Summer 2003, pp. 5 – 46. • Niall Ferguson, Colossus – The Price of America’s Empire, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004 • David Held, Mathias Koenig – Archibugi, Eds., American Power in the 21st Century, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003 • Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power – The Global Response to American Primacy, W. W. Norton, New York, 2005; • Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map”, in: Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Colletta, Collings G. Shackelford, Jr., American

Defense Policy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 2005, Eight Edition, pp. 66-69; • Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and Powers – The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge, UK, 2003 • Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts – the American Military on the Ground, Random House, New York, 2005• http://www.navy.mil/navydata/our_ships.asp• William C. Wohlforth, “U. S. Strategy in a Unipolar World”, in: G. John Ikenberry, Ed., America Unrivaled – The Future of the

Balance of Power, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002, pp. 98 -118. (osobito grafikoni na stranama 105, 111, 112 • Charles Crauthammer, “Unipolar moment”, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/1991, pp. 23-33. • David Held, Mathias Koenig – Archibugi, „Introduction: Whither American Power?“, in: David Held, Mathias Koenig –

Archibugi, Eds., American Power in the 21st Century, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003, pp. 1- 20; • Niall Ferguson, Colossus – The Price of America’s Empire, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004, pp. 1-29; • Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power – The Global Response to U. S. Primacy, W. W. Norton, New York, 2005, pp. 11 – 61• Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited”, The National Interest, Winter 2002/03, pp. 5 – 17; • Niall Ferguson, “A World Without Power”, Foreign Policy, July / August 2004, pp. 32 -39; • Michael Mandelbaum, „David’s Friend Goliath“, Foreign Policy, January / February 2006, pp. 50 – 56• Niall Ferguson, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, “Going Critical– American Power and the Consequences of Fiscal Overstertch”, The

National Interest, Fall 2003, pp. 22- 32.• Brian Knowlton, “In America, a Day to reflect on impact of 9/11”, International Herald Tribune, Tuesday, September 12,

2006, p. 4. • Niall Ferguson, Empire – The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for a Global Power, Basic Books,

New York, 2002• Francis Fukuyama, “The end of history”, The National Interest, No. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18.• Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994• Џозеф С. Нај, Како разумевати међународне сукобе, Стубови кулуре, Београд, 2006• Stephen Peter Rosen, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It” ,  The National Interest, Spring 2003, pp. 51-61.• Jack L. Snyder, “Imperial Temptations”, The National Interest, Spring 2003, pp. 29-40.• Niall Ferguson, “Empires with Expiration Dates”, Foreign Policy, September/ October 2006, pp. 46-52.• Niall Ferguson, “Hegemony or Empire”, Foreign Affairs, 2004• Мајкл Манделбаум, Треба ли свету голијат, Филип Вишњић, Београд, 2006

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