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Fortnight Publications Ltd. Social and Economic Programme Source: Fortnight, No. 76 (Jan. 25, 1974), pp. 4-5 Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25544865 . Accessed: 24/06/2014 22:23 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Fortnight Publications Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Fortnight. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 185.2.32.96 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:23:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Social and Economic Programme

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Fortnight Publications Ltd.

Social and Economic ProgrammeSource: Fortnight, No. 76 (Jan. 25, 1974), pp. 4-5Published by: Fortnight Publications Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25544865 .

Accessed: 24/06/2014 22:23

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Fortnight Publications Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Fortnight.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.96 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:23:13 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

4 FORTNIGHT

Thoughts on an Amalgamated Ireland from Ardglass

There are two ways to be- >^L9^^^^^^mwm. come well known, any ad

e^*-** ^ITT^^bW

either advertise or wait for ^^^1 *^5^T^^^ "word ofmouth" to get your lfcJRf IC^^W^S product sold. The latter, ^^J r^lPTfflB) though less reliable, does pay | r^T^V KIb^s/^ the biggest dividend?ask iLl^M^^lff^K^^! Rolls Royce, ask Desmond

rl\>3ElVlx'^IbP^^n\i Boal. Boal has attempted to \^%kF-jff/flr^lP^

become over the years a sort C* *Sbbb?SHi ~*

of political Howard Hughes, ^W^mmwL^nW \ remote in Ardglass, reserv-

kKt^K^LW* y

ing his public appearances \ . l^L-AW)

for the court rooms and - ~?*JcZ5mWmWM

avoiding newsmen like the plague. Thus, by word of mouth, the Boal legend has sprung up and become one of the

strongest in the Province. Boal is fair, according to Republi cans, a man of his word according to Loyalists. He is also a

little Machievellian so it is somewhat out of character to find

his remarks, seemingly at his own request, printed in the

Sunday News?the only paper in Belfast, Boal felt, that was

capable of getting his views across to the working population on both sides of the religious divide. With the Paisley

mouthpiece no longer available to him Mr. Boal probably felt the situation called for exceptional measures.

Desmond Boat's idea of an amalgamated Ireland is not

new, it has been blessed with support in one form or another

by such people as Frank McManus and the liberal Southern Senator Mary Robinson. It is also akin to the Provos view of Paradise. What is new, of course, is that the idea should come

from the other side of the fence. It is also the first alternative to Sunningdale to appear from a Unionist (or should he now

be called,an amalgamist?) There are two main factors which make Boal's idea

attractive. The first is that Sunningdale, however fair and reasonable a solution to the problem is unlikely to lead to a

complete cessation of violence. It is for fair and reasonable

people. The Provisional IRA are not prepared to accept the

Assembly, and although they are likely to find themselves with less support in the areas in which they operate they will be able to continue a campaign of some sort for years to come. Secondly, amalgamation might become more and

more attractive to Protestant militants who find themselves

increasingly alienated by hostile governments at both Stor mont and Westminster. The effect of a few rampant soldiers

let loose on the Shankill or in East Belfast on the strength of

feeling for the British way of life is remarkable, consider the ease with which "the link" could subsequently be broken.

Thus while Sunningdale is a solution for the centrists,

amalgamation is a solution for extremists and since it is the extremists who cause the trouble it is, basically, a theoretical solution for lasting peace.

Where the trouble lies, of course, is in getting amalgama tion set up in terms of human rights guarantees and

democracy. Gerry Fitt declared the idea to be a recipe tor the return of a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people and he may have a point. Both extremes are so determined to have

power, or access to it, that they would probably be just as irreconcilable in a Federated Ireland^as they are in the UK.

The other unknown, of course, is the measure of support that , the Sunningdale agreement has. Both sides have travelled so far since the last election that support for the new institutions

just cannot be gauged. Sunningdale could have anything from 40-80% support. Until that time comes Mr. Boal's conversion on the road from Ardglass to Belfast will remain as a viable alternative to the present structure ... so far the

only alternative.

Social and Economic Programme

Any hope that the new power ^^ _

**

?%l^? sharing administration

^^P^^^Sl' ^^^ff would surprise us all with its ^a^^^l^^y^ ^^

the hurried programme pre- ^^:-^'i\i Sa'/ikl^ifiH & 1

Whitelaw's talks the au- H|R|^^^^^^|H^B^^ tumn, with a few sentences Bttttfl^Hj^^B^^flj and reservations added here ̂ HR^^j|^^BBH^^^ and there to suit the civil fc^ ^J^^^L^^^R^3 service mind. That is not to k^alEgSmMliBMkSI^

say that the thing does not contain a number of creditable ideas and objectives. But too many of then remain at that level, or on the next stage of promises of more detailed studies. Those who are not disposed to support anything the new power-sharers say or do just because they are there could

legitimately complain that something better than this could have been produced over the past two months, or alterna

tively that if this is all there was it should have been published long ago. Certainly publication of the programme now is

unlikely to make much impact on the immediate political situation, a fact that was beautifully demonstrated by the

speed with which the media dropped it as a front runner in

place of the latest UDA threat to Belfast's buses. Some may feel that to publish a programme which immediately put the Executive on the defensive was positively harmful at the

present critical stage in its life. Still we must make the best of what we are given, at least as

a pointer to the kind of policies which may emerge when the Executive and its minister have had more time to consider their respective positions. On the economic side, after the inevitable promises of full employment and prosperity fairly shared by nil, the intention seems to be to carry on much as

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FRIDAY 25th JANUARY 1974 5

before. There is a nod in the direction of state industry and

worker participation, but little more. The more practical

question of how these things are to be organized is

completely ignored, as too is the more immediate issue of the future of the Northern Ireland Finance Corporation which

has been making the first tentative steps in the direction of

state control over individual firms. It looks very much as if

the Executive is waiting to see which way the wind blows in

these matters in Britain, with a green paper on participation soon to be published there. One windfall which the Executive

is about to inherit on this, however, is the report of a

committee appointed under the old Stormont Government to

review company law. The report itself is unlikely to contain

much of a radical nature, but there is to be a trade union

memorandum of dissent on which a more radical programme for the reform of the capitalist system of private companies

might be based. In the housing field there is a clear and welcome recog

nition that a building programme is as much an industrial as a social problem. Building the 20,000 houses a year which

Austin Currie is promising in places where people are willing to live is no easy matter these days. The most economical

method, which was the solution adopted in the past, is to

build on a large scale in new estates. But there is a limit to this

policy, which fhe 500 houses which have been completed but

remain empty in the new city of Craigavon makes very clear. It is no use building any number of houses in the wrong place. In Northern Ireland, as in other developing societies, much of the worst of the housing conditions are to be found in rural areas, and especially West of the Bann. Simply to concen trate on building in the main urban centrea will do nothing to solve this problem or to improve the statistical record, let alone the conditions in which the people live in those areas. It looks as if something may have to be done to bring the new

concept of the integrated work unit into the construction

industry so that small building projects can be effectively and

economically completed, with the housing executive provid ing basic architectural plans for use in any number of

different local circumstances. Education is another area where something more exciting

might reasonably have been expected. But here too there is

little more than the promise of action in a number of

incompatible directions: doing something about the privi leged position of the grammar schools based on the 11 plus selection; making parental choice more real; and beginning to move in the direction of integrated education between the two communities. If these ideas are to have any impact at all there will have to be a good deal more commitment to

government action rather than the inertial force of supposed parental (or bishops') choice.

In all these areas, as in less contentious issues of agriculture and transport planning, where there is less divergent com

mitment in the various parties making up the Executive, there are two major issues to be thrashed out. First there is the question of the extent to which the new government is

prepared to diverge from the British example, and the related

question of the extent of freedom of local action which the Whitehall government will permit without loss of revenue.

Hence the much publicised plans for a measure of indepen dent local taxation. It is to be hoped that the Executive will

press these ideas of independence a good deal further, if only to permit Northern Irish goods to become more competitive in international markets by selective industrial subsidies

funded by a mixture of EEC regional aid and some local taxation. This means accepting as a deliberate act of policy some measure of reduction in the standard of living of those taxed. Not perhaps the stuff of popular electioneering, but

something which may have to be faced up to in Britain as well in the coming months.

The other issue is the question of party policies. The current programme appears to be the lowest common

denominator acceptable to all three participants. A better

strategy might be for each minister in the Executive to be

encouraged to pursue his own philosophies in consultation with the consultative committees of the Assembly (which have not been much heard of lately). The SDLP could have some socialism, Alliance some participation and the Union ists some more ad hoc conservatism in their various fields.

Otherwise we have little to look forward to other than a

continuing series of diluted compromises.

Kevin Boland failed in his constitutional challenge to the Sunningdale agreement last week. But the court's decision was based on a legal technicality. The Irish Constitution is still a major stumbling block in attempts to deal with fugitive terrorists from the North, and thus indirectly affects the kind of Council of Ireland which is possible. Tom Hadden argues that little real progress can be expected until the Irish Constitution is altered and suggests how it might be done.

The commission of eight top lawyers and judges from Britain, Northern Ire land and the Republic was promised in the Sunningdale communique met last

week and is reported to be making good progress. But the attempt to portray the

problem of dealing with terrorists on an all-Ireland basis as a legal rather than a

political issue is unlikely to succeed. In the end the lawyers are almost bound to be forced back to setting out the various

legal possibilities and leaving it to the

politicians to thrash out a settlement.

THE EXTRADITION PROBLEM The basic task of the commission is to

find some way of dealing with fugitive

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