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International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol. 24 No. 3 2012� The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The World Associationfor Public Opinion Research. All rights reserved.doi:10.1093/ijpor/eds023 Advance Access publication 11 July 2012
Social Capital and the Spiral of Silence
Francis Dalisay1, Jay D. Hmielowski2,
Matthew James Kushin3 and Masahiro Yamamoto4
1School of Communication, College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences, Cleveland StateUniversity, Cleveland, OH, USA; 2Department of Communication, The University of Arizona,
Tucson, AZ, USA; 3Department of Communication, Shepherd University Shepherdstown,WV, USA; and 4Communication Studies Department, University of Wisconsin—La Crosse,
La Crosse, WI, USA
Abstract
This study explores the role of social capital in the spiral of silence process and
investigates whether (1) individual-level indicators of social capital are associated
with willingness to express opinions, (2) individual-level indicators of social capital
are associated with the perception that others support one’s opinions, and (3) per-
ceived support for one’s opinions mediates the proposed relationship between
individual-level social capital and willingness to express opinions. Three commonly
examined individual-level indicators of social capital were analyzed—civic engage-
ment, trust, and neighborliness. Results of a representative survey conducted on
Guam showed that civic engagement had a direct effect on willingness to express
opinions. Neighborliness and trust had direct positive effects on perceived support for
one’s opinions, which in turn, were positively related to willingness to express opin-
ions. Implications were discussed.
It was over four decades ago when Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann first introduced
public opinion researchers to the spiral of silence theory. A key proposition of
this theory is that a positive relationship exists between citizens’ perception
that the majority supports their opinions and their willingness to express those
opinions (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). This key proposition has been supported
by various studies for a wide range of issues (e.g., Glynn & McLeod, 1984;
Gozenbach & Stevenson, 1994; Scheufele, 1999). However, two meta-analyses
have shown the relationship between perceived support for one’s opinions and
All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Francis Dalisay, PhD, School ofCommunication, College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences, Cleveland State University, MU 233,Cleveland, OH, USA. E-mail: [email protected].
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outspokenness to be weak at best (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997;
Shanahan, Glynn, & Hayes, 2007). This has increased skepticism regarding
the key proposition of the spiral of silence and stimulated a renewed interest
in augmenting the theory. As a result, researchers have shifted their focus to
other variables that might affect outspokenness—which include, among others,
one’s interest in politics (Kim, Han, Shanahan, & Berdayes, 2004), attention to
news (Lee, 2007), efficacy (Huang, 2005), communication apprehension
(Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2007), willingness to self-censor (Hayes,
Glynn, & Shanahan, 2005), and dispositional fear of isolation (Matthes,
Hayes, & Shen, 2009).
In the backdrop of the growing body of spiral of silence research, recent
studies have established social capital as a variable that enables citizens to
develop norms of trust and reciprocity, which are necessary for successful
engagement in collective activities (see Putnam, 2000). For example, research
shows that social capital is associated with higher levels of political participa-
tion (e.g., La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Despite the growing literature on
social capital, few studies have examined whether it serves as an antecedent of
political outspokenness. Research on social capital is important because social
factors beyond one’s assessment of public opinion may affect individuals’
willingness to express opinions. Scholars have criticized the spiral of silence
for treating the individual as socially isolated, and failing to account for
affiliation in social groups (Kennamer, 1990; Oshagan, 1996). Oshagan
(1996), for instance, found that individuals rely on reference groups to
assess the climate of opinion. Individuals are likely to express opinions
when their opinions align with those of their reference groups, and less
likely to do so when they do not.
The present study argues that social ties are essential when examining the
spiral of silence process. Given that extant research suggests social capital
facilitates political participation (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998), and that
people tend to seek out others who agree with their opinions (McPherson,
Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), which ultimately reduces diversity in their social
networks (Portes, 1998), we expect individual-level indicators of social capital
to play an important role in the spiral of silence. Specifically, our study ana-
lyzes three commonly examined individual-level social capital indicators—civic
engagement, trust, and neighborliness (e.g., Beaudoin & Thorson, 2004;
Beaudoin, 2007; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Shah, 1998)—and their relationships
with willingness to express opinions and perceived support for one’s opinions.
We argue that greater social capital is related to a greater willingness to
express opinions and higher levels of perceived support for one’s opinions.
Furthermore, we examine a mediation model whereby perceived support for
one’s opinions is hypothesized to transfer the prior effect of social capital on
willingness to express opinions.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H326
We test our propositions on the Western Pacific Island of Guam. Guam’s
local residents adhere to collective values such as interdependence and social
consensus (Perez, 2002; Rogers, 1995; Underwood, 1984). Because research
suggests that the spiral of silence is more prominent in collectivistic than
individualistic cultures (Huang, 2005; Scheufele & Moy, 2000), Guam’s col-
lective nature makes it an ideal research context to examine the spiral of
silence.
The Role of Social Capital in the Spiral of Silence
Social capital is composed of informal and formal social connections, or social
ties, which are facilitated through participation in political, civic, religious, and
work-related activities. According to Putnam (1995), social capital refers to the
‘‘features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants
to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’’ (pp. 664–665).
Although conceptualized as a societal-level factor (Putnam, 1995), numerous
scholars have emphasized the importance of examining the production and
manifestation of social capital at the individual level (e.g., Beaudoin, 2007;
Beaudoin & Thorson, 2004; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Shah, 1998). As a com-
munity is the aggregate of individuals, macro-level manifestations of social
capital should also be present in the individuals who comprise the community
(Brehm & Rahn, 1997). Following this reasoning, this study uses three com-
monly examined individual-level indicators of social capital: trust, neighborli-
ness, and civic engagement (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Shah, 1998; Beaudoin,
2007).
Trust is a norm of generalized reciprocity. It is characterized by a glue-like
quality that facilitates participation in formal and informal social networks.
Trust has been shown to be empirically separable from local social bonds
rooted in kinship, friendship, and acquaintanceship ties (Beaudoin &
Thorson, 2004). Citizens who trust others are more likely to volunteer, give
to charity, and participate in politics and civic organizations (Putnam, 2000).
Neighborliness refers to the behavior that occurs in the interactions
between people who live close to each other (Mann, 1954). Neighborliness
involves various forms of informal contact with neighbors, which include
visiting, inviting friends for dinner parties, borrowing or exchanging things
(e.g., yard tools), and watching over neighbors’ properties (Beaudoin &
Thorson, 2004; Mann, 1954). Neighborliness correlates with participation in
formal social groups, such as community organizations (Perkins, Brown, &
Taylor, 1996).
Civic engagement refers to ‘‘membership in formal community groups and
participation in social activities’’ (Shah, 1998, p. 477). Civic engagement in-
volves the process of improving one’s community through nongovernment
S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D T H E S P I R A L O F S I L E N C E 327
action. This includes activities such as church attendance and participation in
community projects (Putnam, 2000; Shah, 1998).
To summarize, consistent with the conceptualization of social capital,
neighborly ties and trust can foster shared expectations among members of
a community and civically beneficial, cooperative behavior. Similarly, activities
such as volunteering and participation in community projects and organiza-
tions cultivate a sense of civic duties and responsibilities and facilitate collect-
ive actions for the interests of a community (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Shah,
Kwak, & Holbert et al., 2001).
Social Capital and Willingness to Express Opinions
Previous studies have shown relationships between social capital and political
participation (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Forms of political participa-
tion include institutional (e.g., voting and working for a candidate or party)
and deliberative (e.g., opinion expression) participation (McLeod, Scheufele, &
Moy, 1999; Scheufele & Eveland, 2000). The existing evidence focuses mainly
on institutional forms of participation (e.g., Klesner, 2007; La Due Lake &
Huckfeldt, 1998), whereas the effects of social capital on willingness to express
opinions (i.e., deliberative participation) are not entirely clear. The present
study extends the literature on the spiral of silence by first assessing whether
three individual-level indicators of social capital are directly related to opinion
expression. Given the consistently strong relationship between social capital
and institutional forms of behavior, it is expected that a similar relationship
should exist between social capital and deliberative participation.
Trust is an important element that facilitates collective action for common
purposes (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). To the extent that people
are linked collectively by trust, their willingness to engage in cooperative
actions is increased (Sampson et al., 1997), and these actions might include
those that generate controversies within a social network. A study conducted
by Cho and McLeod (2007) found that trust is associated with higher levels of
group involvement and electoral, civic, religious, and protest participation.
Neighborliness promotes informal mechanisms by which residents voluntar-
ily act for each other, such as helping people in need (Freudenburg, 1986).
Intimate neighborly ties foster participation in civic and political groups
(Perkins, et al., 1996) and enable people to share and openly exchange opinions.
Putnam (1995) argues that civic engagement is positively linked with both
democratic participation and vibrancy. Extant research indicates that civic
engagement is associated with political participation (Wilkins, 2000).
Although the reasons for this are multifaceted, from an interpersonal commu-
nication perspective, greater civic activity goes hand-in-hand with greater
interpersonal discussion, and evidence suggests that discussion of political
topics often arises as a byproduct of nonpolitical discussion (Walsh, 2003).
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H328
Greater interpersonal political discussion is associated with increased political
participation as individuals gain political efficacy, knowledge, and sophistication,
all of which lead them to refine and solidify their political opinions through
dialogue (Katz, 1992; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999 and McLeod et al.,
1999; Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002).
Based on the literature reviewed earlier, individuals who have greater trust
in their community, are neighborly, and are engaged in their community
should feel more comfortable about speaking out. Thus, we propose the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
H1: (a) Trust, (b) neighborliness, and (c) civic engagement will be positively associated
with willingness to express opinions.
Social Capital and Perceived Support for One’s Opinions
We also propose that these individual-level indicators of social capital are
positively associated with the perception that others support one’s opinions.
Research indicates that people tend to flock to similar others. In essence,
people tend to form and join groups that they perceive as possessing a set
of values similar to theirs. For example, people often choose a church with the
expectation that the values preached from the lectern are similar to their own.
With this expectation comes the perception that others share similar views of
the world. It is possible that as people increase their level of social capital, they
will perceive that those around them share their opinions on important issues.
This expectation is based on two theoretical lines of social capital research:
homophily and social control.
Nevertheless, because greater social integration lends itself to increased
involvement in associations, an argument could also be made that a gain in
social capital increases the number of people in one’s social network who hold
opposing opinions. However, the relationship between having diverse social
interactions and political outcomes is less clear. Some research has supported
the notion that greater heterogeneity leads to political participation (McLeod,
Scheufele, & Moy, 1999 and McLeod et al., 1999; Scheufele, Nisbet,
Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004), whereas others show that homogeneity is more
strongly linked to political participation (Eveland & Hutchens, 2009; Mutz,
2002).
Social network theory demonstrates that individuals tend to self-select
their connections, which results in people associating with similar others
(Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; McPherson et al., 2001). This sociological phe-
nomenon is termed homophily and is widely supported in the literature across
a number of demographic variables, including race, age, gender, religion, edu-
cation and occupation (McPherson et al., 2001). Homophily is central to the
concept of social capital. As Mouw (2006) stated, it may be that social capital’s
S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D T H E S P I R A L O F S I L E N C E 329
effects are reflective of selectivity in forming homophilous social groups.
Associating with a group articulates a set of values and beliefs, which likely
leads to perceived similarities between members of the group (Jussim &
Osgood, 1989; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). For instance, research shows
that people generally self-segregate in the communities where they live, and
that people tend to form bonds with like-minded neighbors (e.g., Lee,
Campbell, & Miller, 1991). Consequently, the homophilous structure that
makes up close social networks potentially limits an individual’s experiences
and access to information, minimizing their exposure to a diversity of ideas.
Along similar lines, Portes (1998) stated that a basic function served by
social capital is social control, which can be defined as the capacity of a social
group to enforce norms and, as a result, regulate itself according to common
ends (Janowitz, 1975; Reiss, 1951). One source of social capital is bounded
solidarity. This bounding tightens groups of similar individuals (e.g., immi-
grants and minorities), induces norms of expectation and reciprocity, and
promotes compliance and discipline to norms. When social capital functions
as a form of social control, it renders formal or overt controls unnecessary.
Coleman (1988) stated that norms constitute a form of social capital by facil-
itating particular actions, yet constraining others. As a case in point, Coleman
explained the norm that people should act in the interests of their collective
and forgo their self-interests constitutes a form of social capital, and this norm
is ‘‘reinforced by social support, status, honor, and other rewards’’ (p. 104).
Prior research has shown, for instance, that social capital components includ-
ing trust, neighborliness, and civic engagement increase the social control
capacity of a community, reducing rates of crime in neighborhoods (Bellair,
2000; Hawdon & Ryan, 2009; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Veysey & Messner,
1999). Through trusting in others, strong neighborly commitment, and higher
civic engagement, individuals may defer their self-interest and act in a way
consistent with the group. This integration may act as a way to conform
people to hold similar attitudes and beliefs as those around them.
In sum, as the principle of homophily states, ‘‘birds of a feather flock
together.’’ It is logical to expect that citizens who are strongly connected with
others, and have high social capital, as demonstrated through trust, neighbor-
liness, and civic engagement, would perceive that others hold opinions similar
to theirs. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:
H2: (a) Trust, (b) neighborliness, and (c) civic engagement will be positively associated
with perceived support for one’s opinions.
The Mediating Role of Perceived Support for One’s Opinions
The relationship between perceived support for one’s opinions and opinion
expression is a key proposition of the spiral of silence theory. The theory
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H330
states that the decision to express an opinion is influenced by surveillance of
the social environment to gauge whether the majority shares the opinion
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974). As noted earlier, previous studies have demonstrated
this relationship, and recent meta-analyses confirm the relationship as signifi-
cant (Glynn et al., 1997; Shanahan et al., 2007). In line with these studies, we
also test the following hypothesis:
H3: Perceived support for one’s opinions will be positively associated with willingness to
express opinions.
Finally, perceived support for one’s opinions is posited to mediate the
relationship between individual-level indicators of social capital and willing-
ness to express opinions. Perceived similarities serve as a catalyst for starting
conversation (Walsh, 2003), which is critical to assessing the opinions of social
contacts. The reference group research supports this reasoning, showing that
reference groups, rather than society at large, are key factors that influence
citizens’ perceptions of the climate of opinion (Oshagan, 1996). Based on the
hypotheses outlined thus far, it is possible that there is an indirect effect of
our three individual-level indicators of social capital on citizens’ willingness to
express opinions through their perceived agreement with others. In essence,
people’s perception of others’ opinions explains the relationship between
individual-level indicators of social capital and people’s willingness to express
opinions.
A mediation model is designed to explicate the underlying process by
which a presumed independent variable is related to a subsequent outcome
via a third explanatory, mediating variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hayes,
2009). The hypotheses proposed earlier provide the conceptual framework
for our mediation model. Specifically, we posited that our individual-level
indicators of social capital (i.e., trust, neighborliness, and civic engagement)
should be related to our proposed mediator, people’s perception that others
support their opinions (see hypotheses 2a through 2c). Moreover, hypothesis 3posits that perceiving others to hold similar opinions should lead to a greater
willingness to express opinions. Based on this rational, a final set of
mediation-based hypotheses is proposed:
H4: Perceived support for one’s opinion will serve as a mediator of the association
between (a) trust, (b) neighborliness, and (c) civic engagement and willingness to express
one’s opinions, with trust, neighborliness, and civic engagement leading to greater per-
ceived support for one’s opinions and greater willingness to express one’s opinions.
The Research Context: Guam and the Military Buildup
We test our predictions in the context of local public opinion expression
concerning an impending U.S. military buildup in the Western Pacific
S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D T H E S P I R A L O F S I L E N C E 331
Island of Guam. This military buildup involves the relocation of 8,600 U.S.
Marines and more than 10,000 of their dependents and civilian support from
Okinawa, Japan to Guam (estimates cited in Fuentes, 2009).
Guam is located roughly 2,000 miles north of the tip of Australia, 3,700miles west of Hawaii, and 1,500 miles east of the Philippines. Its population is
estimated at 154,000 residents, composed of 44.6% Pacific Islanders, 32.5 %
Asians, and 6.8 % White-Americans (U.S. Census, 2004). As the largest island
in Micronesia at 30 miles long and 12 miles wide, Guam has served as a site
for bases and installations of the U.S. Air Force and Navy. The U.S. military
presence on Guam serves a vital role in sustaining the island’s economy.
Historically, Guam has relied on a tourism industry, with most visitors
arriving from Japan. However, due to Japan’s recent economic circumstances,
Guam’s tourism industry has struggled, resulting in a sharp economic down-
turn. Local leaders and residents have sought to increase U.S. military
presence with the hopes of revitalizing the island’s economy. Although a
majority of Guam residents support the military buildup for economic pur-
poses, some have expressed concerns about its potential negative impacts to
the island’s environment and culture (Murphy, 2008). Yet two polls conducted
on Guam indicated that a majority endorses the buildup (Guam Variety, 2011;
Tamondong, 2009). A poll conducted in 2009, during the same year in which
data were collected for the present study, indicated that 70% of the island
supported the military buildup, and 82% believed it would bring in tax
revenue and create jobs (Tamondong, 2009). For a spiral of silence to
occur, a critical criterion that a majority must be supportive of a controversial
issue (Scheufele & Moy, 2000) must be met, hence we chose the context of
Guam, as a majority of the island’s residents support the buildup.
Method
Sample and Procedure
The final sample composed of a representative 319 registered voters of Guam.
Results show that 56% of the respondents were female. The mean age was 48(SD¼ 15.97). The population was relatively educated, with most respondents
completing ‘‘some college, no degree’’ (n¼ 87, 27.4%) or having a college
degree (n¼ 73, 23%). The three ethnicities most represented in the sample
were Chamorro (i.e., indigenous residents of Guam) (n¼ 169, 53.3%),
Filipino (n¼ 99, 31.2%), and Caucasian (n¼ 26, 8.2%).
A co-author of this study traveled from the U.S. mainland to Guam in the
summer of 2009, and collected data through a self-administered mail survey of
a systematic random sample of registered voters on the island. Names and
postal addresses of registered voters on Guam were obtained from the Guam
Election Commission (GEC). The GEC director stated that there are roughly
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H332
52,000 registered voters on Guam (personal communication, March 7, 2009).
Surveys were sent to 1,100 registered voters. Strategies from Dillman, Smyth,
and Christian’s (2009) Tailored Design Method were adopted to implement the
mail survey.1 The present study used only two of the five compatible contacts
recommended by Dillman and his colleagues. Respondents were first sent a
survey packet during the first week of June 2009. The packet included a
detailed cover letter explaining why a response was important, the question-
naire, a self-addressed stamped return envelope, and a $1 token incentive. The
cover letter was personalized, printed on institutional letterhead displaying the
name and logo of the sponsoring U.S. mainland university, and assured
respondents that their answers would remain confidential. A week after the
packet was sent, respondents were mailed a thank you postcard. This
expressed appreciation for responding, and reminded those who had not
returned the survey to do so.
One hundred seventy-three of the survey packets were undeliverable
(i.e., the address did not exist, the respondent had relocated or no longer
received mail in the address, the respondent was deceased), reducing the
sampling frame to 927. Total response rate was 34.4%, as calculated using
the American Association for Public Opinion Research’s (2009) response rate
2. Data collection ended July 3, 2009. Questionnaires returned after this date
were not included in the analyses. One-way analyses of variance showed no
significant differences in item scores between questionnaires that were re-
turned during the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth week. This indicated
that the pattern of responses did not change over five weeks.
Measures
Independent variables2
Trust. Trust was measured with one item adapted from Beaudoin and
Thorson (2004), ‘‘Most local people on Guam can be trusted’’ (1¼ stronglydisagree, 7¼ strongly agree; M¼ 4.79, SD¼ 1.61).
1The authors thank Dr. Don A. Dillman for the advice he provided on how to best implement a mailsurvey on Guam. Dillman is familiar with the cultural dynamics on Guam and has been to the island toserve as a research consultant.
2A series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted looking at the items measuring civicengagement, neighborliness, and trust using Mplus version 6.11. Specifically, the CFAs tested a one-factormodel in which all the items were part of the latent construct of social capital, a three-factor model in whichtrust, neighborliness, and civic engagement were three separate variables, and a final model in which thethree variables were part of a higher order latent variable of social capital. The results showed poor fit for aone-factor model. The analysis did find adequate fit for the three-factor model that treats our variables asseparate constructs. Finally, the CFA for the higher-order, 3-factor model did not converge. The reason thisfinal model did not converge is because civic engagement was not correlated with neighborliness and trust.Although these variables were not part of a higher order factor of social capital, the results do show thatneighborliness was highly correlated with trust. Moreover, the lack of relationships between trust/neigh-borliness and civic engagement may speak to the theoretical standpoint of bridging and bonding socialcapital.
S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D T H E S P I R A L O F S I L E N C E 333
Neighborliness. Neighborliness was measured with three items adapted
from Beaudoin and Thorson (2004): (a) ‘‘within the last year, how often did
you borrow or exchange things with your neighbors,’’ (b) ‘‘within the last
year, how often did you visit your neighbors,’’ and (c) ‘‘within the last year,
how often have you and your neighbors helped one another with small tasks,
such as repair work’’ (1¼ not often, 7¼ very often). The items were averaged to
form one index (�¼ .87, M¼ 4.20, SD¼ 1.80).
Civic engagement. Seven items were adapted from Cuillier (2008) to
measure civic engagement. Respondents rated the level of importance that
certain activities have in their lives: (a) ‘‘giving blood,’’ (b) ‘‘signing commu-
nity petitions,’’ (c) ‘‘attending public meetings, rallies, or speeches,’’ (d) ‘‘at-
tending religious services,’’ (e) ‘‘contacting and talking to elected officials,’’
(f) ‘‘volunteering for community organizations,’’ and (g) ‘‘contributing money
to a political or public interest campaign’’ (1¼ not important at all, 7¼ very
important). The items were averaged to form one index (�¼ .79, M¼ 4.75,
SD¼ 1.69).
Mediating variable
Perceived Support for One’s Opinions. Perceived support for one’s opin-
ions was measured by asking respondents about the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed that the following people shared their opinions on the
buildup: (a) family, (b) friends, (c) the present majority of Guam, and (d) the
future majority of Guam (1¼ strongly disagree, 7¼ strongly agree). The items
were averaged to form one index (�¼ .79, M¼ 4.93, SD¼ 1.26).
Dependent variable
Willingness to Express Opinions. Respondents were asked how willing
they were to express their opinions about the buildup in four public contexts:
(a) a community meeting, (b) a TV interview, (c) a barbecue,3 and (d) a
restaurant (1¼ not willing, 7¼ very willing). The items were averaged to
form one index (�¼ .84, M¼ 4.67, SD¼ 1.60).
Control variables.
Previous research shows that those who are interested in politics (Kim et al.,
2004; Lee et al., 2004), are knowledgeable (Shamir, 1997), and pay attention to
media (Lasorsa, 1991) are also more likely to be outspoken. Thus, these
3This item, along with the ‘‘restaurant’’ item, are adaptations of the hypothetical ‘‘train’’ and ‘‘bus’’scenario question used in previous spiral of silence studies. There are no trains on Guam, and becausepublic transportation is minimal, particularly by bus, respondents may not have been able to provideappropriate answers if they were asked the question of whether they would be willing to join a conversationamong others they were riding in a public mode of transportation. It is far more common for Guam’sresidents to attend barbecues and frequent public restaurants. Therefore, these settings are more appropriateand culturally relevant.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H334
variables were measured and added to the regression models as controls.
Political interest was measured by asking, ‘‘How interested would you say
you are regarding issues on the buildup?’’ (1¼ not interested, 7¼ very interested;
M¼ 5.35, SD¼ 1.70). Perceived knowledge was measured by asking, ‘‘How
knowledgeable would you say you are regarding issues on the buildup?’’
(1¼ not knowledgeable, 7¼ very knowledgeable; M¼ 4.63, SD¼ 1.47).
Respondents were also asked how much attention they pay to the following
news media to stay informed or to learn about the buildup: (a) the Pacific
Daily News (a local newspaper with the largest circulation size on Guam) and
(b) local TV and radio newscasts (1¼ not much attention, 7¼ lots of attention).
These two items were highly correlated (r¼ .67, p< .001) and averaged to
form a single index (M¼ 5.21, SD¼ 1.55).
For descriptive and control purposes, personal support was measured
by asking respondents about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed
with the statement, ‘‘I support the military buildup’’ (1¼ strongly disagree,
7¼ strongly agree; M¼ 5.11, SD¼ 1.96). Demographics were also included
in the analyses and measured by asking respondents to report their sex,
age, household’s income before taxes, highest level of education, and
race. The race item was turned into a dichotomous variable (1¼Chamorro,
2¼ non-Chamorro).
Analyses
To analyze the data and test the proposed hypotheses, a series of OLS
regression models were created. These models tested the proposed relation-
ships between the individual-level indicators of social capital (i.e., trust, neigh-
borliness, and civic engagement) and willingness to express opinions
(H1a–H1c). These models also tested the relationship between trust, neigh-
borliness, and civic engagement and perceived support for one’s opinions
(H2a–H2c). An additional model examined the relationship between perceived
support for one’s opinions and willingness to express opinions (H3). Finally,
the MEDIATE macro developed by Hayes and Preacher (Under Review) was
used to simultaneously estimate the indirect effects of the individual-level
indicators of social capital (trust, neighborliness, and civic engagement) on
willingness to express opinions through the mediating variable of perceived
support for one’s opinions (H4a–H4c).
Results
Hypothesis 1 proposed that (a) trust, (b) neighborliness, and (c) civic engage-
ment would be associated with greater willingness to express opinions. As
Table 1 shows, results supported H1c, which focused on civic engagement
(�¼ .142 [SE¼ .064], p< .05). However, there was no support for H1a or
S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D T H E S P I R A L O F S I L E N C E 335
H1b, which respectively proposed that trust (�¼ .071 [SE¼ .041], p> .05)
and neighborliness (�¼ .006 [SE¼ .067], p> .05) would be associated with
willingness to express opinions.
Hypothesis 2 proposed that (a) trust, (b) neighborliness, and (c) civic
engagement would be associated with greater perceived support for one’s
opinions. As Table 2 shows, results supported H2a and H2b, which respect-
ively proposed that trust (�¼ .074 [SE¼ .035], p< .05) and neighborliness
(�¼ .152 [SE¼ .058], p< .05) would be associated with perceived support
for one’s opinions. However, there was no support for H2c, which proposed
that civic engagement would be associated with perceived support for one’s
opinions (�¼ .033 [SE¼ .055], p> .05).
Results also support H3. The analysis showed that perceived support for
one’s opinions is associated with greater willingness to express opinions
(�¼ .237 [SE¼ .068], p< .05).
The final set of proposed hypotheses examined whether perceived support
for one’s opinions mediates the relationship between trust, neighborliness, and
civic engagement, and willingness to express opinions (H4a–H4c). Using
Hayes and Preacher’s MEDIATE macro, one analysis was conducted that
simultaneously estimated the indirect effects of each independent variable
through support for one’s opinion on willingness to express opinions.
Results show support for H4a and H4b, which respectively proposed that
Table 1Predicting Willingness to Express One’s Opinions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age .003 (.005) .003 (.005) .004 (.004)Sex .076 (.144) .094 (.143) .067 (.139)Income �.046 (.045) �.037 (.044) �.023 (.043)Education �.119 (.050)* �.110 (.049)* �.116 (.048)*Ethnicity �.147 (.145) �.109 (.144) �.152 (.140)Personal Support .038 (.038) .041 (.037) �.041 (.041)Interest .308 (.051)*** .287 (.052)*** .258 (.051)***Knowledge .375 (.062)*** .342 (.062)*** .311 (061)***Attention to media .112 (.053)* .091 (.053) .080 (.052)Neighborliness .076 (.040) .051 (.040)Trust -.046 (.045) -.073 (.045)Civic Engagement .149 (.064)* .139 (.062)*Perceived support for one’s
opinions.284 (.068)***
Constant 1.122 .526 .243R2 .471*** .492*** .522***
Note. Table presents unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.*p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H336
there would be an indirect effect of trust (point estimate¼ .028, 95% CI: .005to.058) and neighborliness (point estimate¼ .025, 95% CI: .005 to .050)
through perceived support for one’s opinions on willingness to express opin-
ions. However, there was no support for H4c, which proposed the same in-
direct relationship for civic engagement (point estimate¼ .011, 95% CI: �
.021 to .044) on willingness to express opinions.
Discussion
This study explored how individual-level indicators of social capital fit into
the spiral of silence process. We investigated whether (1) these indicators were
positively associated with willingness to express opinions, (2) whether these
indicators were positively associated with the perception that others support
one’s opinions, and (3) whether perceived support for one’s opinions mediates
the proposed relationship between these individual-level indicators of social
capital and willingness to express opinions. These hypotheses were tested in
the context of local public opinion expression regarding a U.S. military
buildup that may occur on Guam.
Several conclusions can be derived from the present findings. First, civic
engagement had a direct effect on people’s willingness to express opinions.
This finding reinforces Putnam’s (1995) notion that civic engagement is
linked with both democratic participation and vibrancy, and research indicat-
ing that civic engagement is associated with political participation (e.g.,
Table 2Predicting Perceived Support for One’s Opinions
Model 1 Model 2
Age .000 (.004) �.001 (.004)Sex .076 (.125) .095 (.122)Income �.039 (.039) �.047 (.038)Education �.001 (.043) .021 (.042)Ethnicity .154 (.126) .151 (.124)Personal Support .294 (.032)*** .290 (.032)***Interest .141 (.044)** .103 (.045)*Knowledge .130 (.053)* .109 (.053)*Attention to media .053 (.046) .038 (.045)Neighborliness .088 (.035)*Trust .098 (.039)*Civic Engagement .037 (.055)Constant 1.65*** 1.00R2 .405*** .437***
Note. Table presents unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.*p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001.
S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D T H E S P I R A L O F S I L E N C E 337
Wilkins, 2000). Civic engagement fosters opinion expression likely because
voluntary action and institutional participation often benefit the larger com-
munity such as helping people in need, community safety, and decision
making that reflects the common good (Swaroop & Morenoff, 2006). To
the extent that civic engagement rests on a pro-social mentality oriented
toward the betterment of a community, people show a greater willingness to
express opinions.
Second, neighborliness and trust had direct positive effects on perceived
support for one’s opinions. Strong neighborly ties and trust form the percep-
tion that others share one’s opinions because intimate social interaction and
identification tend to stem from networks that rest on strong bonds among
group members (Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Portes, 1998). People rely on their
reference groups rather than society at large when making judgments about
the opinion climate (e.g., Oshagan, 1996). Third, consistent with the literature
(e.g., Glynn & McLeod, 1984; Glynn et al., 1997), perceived support for one’s
opinions had a direct effect on willingness to express opinions. These findings
support a key proposition of the spiral of silence theory stating that when
citizens perceive that others support their opinions, they will feel more com-
fortable expressing their opinions (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).
Finally, neighborliness and trust were indirectly associated with willingness
to express opinions via perceived support for one’s opinions. On the other
hand, civic engagement did not have an indirect effect on opinion expression
through perceived support for one’s opinions. These findings may be inter-
preted within the context of different dimensions of social capital. Scholars
have distinguished bonding social capital from bridging social capital (Lin,
2005; Putnam, 2000). Bonding, or homophilous social capital, is the strong
ties with kin and close friends that offers social support, builds collectivity,
and is shared among people with similar values and goals (Lin, 2005; Putnam,
2000). Bridging, or heterophilous social capital, on the other hand, is
goal-oriented and offers networking opportunities and access to external re-
sources via extra-community ties (Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Putnam, 2000).
For example, the indirect effects of neighborliness and trust suggest that
these individual-level social capital indicators are linked with bounded solidar-
ity (Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Portes, 1998). Dense neighborly interaction and
trust lead to the formation of the perception that others in their networks
share their opinions, as association with a group serves to articulate a set of
values and beliefs and therefore fosters perceived similarities between members
of the group (Jussim & Osgood, 1989; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). This may
explain why neighborliness and trust were not directly associated with will-
ingness to express opinions. These results indicate that people with close ties
to others in their community may find it important that others support their
opinions before deciding to express those opinions.
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P U B L I C O P I N I O N R E S E A R C H338
In contrast, our finding of only a direct (but not indirect) effect of civic
engagement on opinion expression further highlights a potential difference
between bonding and bridging social capital. It might be that civic engagement
is more conducive to connecting people across social divides (e.g., race, class,
religion) than reinforcing ties in a closely-knit group of people (e.g., family,
friends). Participating in civic activities such as community organizations
and public meetings could enable people to meet and interact with those
from different social and cultural backgrounds, and learn different ideas and
perspectives that they may not regularly encounter in everyday life. This
bridging quality of civic engagement, combined with its orientation to larger
social goals, may enable people to overcome the expectation that others hold
similar opinions to their own. It is possible, therefore, that the quality and
consequences of social relationships rooted in civic engagement are different
from social relationships that rest on strong bonds among group members.
That is, a stronger relationship may exist between civic engagement and
heterogeneity than homogeneity, as has been shown in some political partici-
pation research (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999 and McLeod et al., 1999;
Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004).
In addition to highlighting the contributions of this article, it is important to
acknowledge this study’s limitations. First, because the present study aimed to
investigate individual-level indicators of social capital, we did not specifically
measure differential effects of bonding and bridging social capital on opinion
expression. Given the potentially differential effects of bonding and bridging
social capital on opinion expression noted earlier, future research should further
explicate the mechanisms by which they promote or constrain a person’s willing-
ness to express opinions. Second, the present sample was restricted to registered
voters, which might limit the generalizability of the results to the entire adult
population of Guam. For example, registered voters may have higher levels of
political interest or political involvement compared with unregistered voters.
Third, although our measure of perceived support for one’s opinions was reliable,
we recommend that future research also examine results using additional meas-
ures of this variable, such as those used by other studies (e.g., Glynn & McLeod,
1984). Fourth, we believe scholars should use a better measure of trust in future
research projects. Although we found statistically significant findings, it would be
ideal to use a multi-item trust index instead of the one item used in the present
study (see Uslaner [2002] for items). Fifth, although suggestive, the present
study’s use of cross-sectional data limits what can be said about causality between
these variables. Our goal was to provide a more comprehensive understanding of
how these variables work within our proposed communication model. Our med-
iating model was theoretically derived from the literature on homophily and social
control aspects of social capital (e.g., Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Portes, 1998),
which suggest that people develop shared expectations of how others feel and
S O C I A L C A P I T A L A N D T H E S P I R A L O F S I L E N C E 339
respond through social and cognitive involvement. Thus, it was reasonable to
expect that perceived support for one’s opinions would be cultivated through the
three indicators examined in this study, without which it would be difficult for
people to form common values. Nevertheless, alternative models are equally
plausible such as one in which perceived support for one’s opinion, or perceived
opinion diversity (Wojcieszak, Baek, & Delli Carpini, 2010), leads to opinion
expression through civic engagement (Wojcieszak et al., 2010), neighborliness,
and trust. Thus, future studies should specify and test a set of theoretically
plausible models in quasi-experimental settings that allow for causal inferences.
Sixth, there is a lack of consensus on how best to measure social capital at the
macro, micro, and meso levels (see Claridge, 2004). Although the individual-level
measures used in the present study have been affirmed in prior research and have
been shown to have a social control function, future research should assess the role
of other individual-level indicators of social capital such as life satisfaction (Shah
et al., 2001) in affecting opinion expression. Future research should also seek to
clarify the link between outspokenness and social capital from a social control
perspective. Finally, the unique nature of our sample begs the question of gen-
eralizability. Guam’s local residents adhere to collective values such as inter-
dependence, social consensus, respect for old age, reciprocity, and family
obligation (Rogers, 1995), all of which speaks to close ties between reference
groups. This suggests that the island’s social structure is homophilous; therefore,
these findings could be unique to cultures that are exclusively collectivistic and
homophilous (e.g., other Pacific Islands, islands around the world). Furthermore,
research indicates the spiral of silence is more prominent in collectivistic than
individualistic cultures (e.g., Huang, 2005). It could thus be that collectivistic and
homophilous cultures would facilitate opinion climates that are more susceptible
to the spiral of silence, whereas cultures that are individualistic and heterophilous
would facilitate climates that are less susceptible. This potential needs to be fur-
ther examined in cross-cultural studies.
Despite the earlier limitations, this study concludes by noting that
individual-level social capital serves as a protective factor against the spiral
of silence. Those with higher levels of individual-level social capital, as mea-
sured with our indicators, may be more likely to perceive that their opinions
are held by the majority and more willing to express their opinions; those with
low capital may be less likely to perceive that their opinions are held by the
majority and less willing to express their opinions.
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Biographical Notes
Francis Dalisay (PhD, Washington State University) is an Associate Lecturer at the
School of Communication at Cleveland State University. His research interests
include social- and individual-level communication processes and effects in interna-
tional and intercultural contexts.
Jay D. Hmielowski (PhD, The Ohio State University) is Assistant Professor in the
Department of Communication at The University of Arizona. His research interests
include the study of science communication, with interest in how specific message
factors generate attitudinal ambivalence, and how ambivalence affects information
processing, information seeking and political engagement.
Matthew James Kushin (PhD, Washington State University) is an Assistant Professor
in the Department of Communication at Shepherd University. His research interests
include political campaigns, civic and political engagement, online media, and social
media.
Masahiro Yamamoto (PhD, Washington State University) is an Assistant Professor in
the Communication Studies Department at the University of Wisconsin – La Crosse.
His research interests include mass media and community social organization, public
health, and new media and politics.
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