18
Some Things about Stuff Author(s): Shieva Kleinschmidt Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 135, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 407-423 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208917 . Accessed: 12/05/2014 07:47 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Some Things about Stuff

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Some Things about Stuff

Some Things about StuffAuthor(s): Shieva KleinschmidtSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 135, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 407-423Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208917 .

Accessed: 12/05/2014 07:47

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: AnInternational Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Some Things about Stuff

Philosophical Studies (2007) 135:407-423 © Springer 2007 DOI 10.1 007/s 1 1 098-007-9075-2

SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF

ABSTRACT. I examine the implications of positing stuff (which occupies an ontological category distinct from things) as a way to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze that constitutes it. When characterising stuff, it's intuitive to say we often individuate stuff kinds by appealing to things and their relations (e.g., water is water rather than gold because it is entirely divisible into subportions which constitute or partially constitute H2O molecules). I argue that if this intuition is correct, there are important restrictions on how we can characterise stuff in order to avoid colocated portions of stuff.

There is a familiar puzzle in metaphysics involving a statue and the bronze that constitutes it. In this paper, I examine the implications of positing stuff as a sufficient solution to this puzzle. More specifically, I look at how proponents of this solution would need to characterise stuff in order to avoid the consequence of colocated portions of stuff (which would undermine their motivation for positing stuff in the first place). In §1 I present the puzzle. In §2 I discuss what stuff is and how we refer to it. I then show how one could ar- gue that the positing of stuff allows us to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze. Finally, in §3 I argue that there are important restrictions on how one must cha- racterise stuff in order to avoid colocation of portions of stuff.

1. THE PROBLEM

What Michael Burke calls the "standard account" of identity through time has the following components: absoluteness of identity, essentiality of sort, reality of the things in ordinary

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 3: Some Things about Stuff

408 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

ontology (like books, statues, etc.), and ability of many things1 of to survive mereological change.2 However, this standard account faces the problem of colocation. Colocation (also called 'coincidence') occurs whenever two material enti- ties3 of the same ontological category (thing, stuff, etc.) exactly occupy the same region.4

I should note that there is some disagreement about when it is problematic for two entities to be colocated. Some peo- ple believe it is never problematic. However, because my the- sis is directed toward those who are attempting to solve a problem of colocation, we can set this view aside.5 Others might say that it is always problematic, regardless of which ontological categories the entities involved belong to. For these people, positing stuff cannot be a sufficient response to the statue and bronze case (or any cases relevantly similar to it), so this view also falls outside the scope of my paper.6 Still others may say that it is only problematic if both entities in the region are things. This claim, if defended, would be a suc- cessful response to the problems I raise in §3 where I claim that the proponent of a stuff solution must avoid colocation of portions of stuff. However, the proponent of this view would need to explain why two material things cannot ex- actly occupy the same region, yet two portions of stuff can.7 Finally, there is the view that two entities exactly occupying the same region is problematic whenever the entities are of the same ontological category, but not when they are of dif- fering ontological categories. This is supported by arguments against the possibility of colocation combined with an appeal to constitution as a relation which allows (and perhaps even requires) material entities to share a region.8 This last view of colocation is what will be assumed in what follows, since it's the view whose implications I want to elicit. One putative instance of this type of colocation is the following:

1.1. The Statue and Bronze Case

Suppose that in region r there is a statue that is made of bronze. We can say of the region that there is a statue that

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 4: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 409

exactly occupies it. We can also say of r that there is some bronze that exactly occupies it. But the statue is not identical to the bronze: if we were to crush the statue, the bronze would persist but the statue would not. Thus, the statue has a property that the bronze does not: it cannot survive being squashed. Conversely, the bronze has a property that the sta- tue does not: the ability to survive being squashed. Due to having different properties, the statue and the bronze are dis- tinct. But this implies that there are two distinct things ex- actly occupying the same region, and thus is an instance of colocation.

2. A RESPONSE

One way to respond to this case is to deny that the bronze is a thing. This can be done in different ways.9 The response I am presently concerned with involves the claim that the bronze is not a thing but is, instead, a portion of stuff.

The immediate question is, what is stuff? Ned Markosian suggests we take 'stuff (as well as 'thing' and 'constitution') as primitive.10 But even doing that, there are still some things we can say about stuff: for instance, stuff occupies an onto- logical category separate from those of things and pluralities. And a portion of stuff is never identical to a thing (or plural- ity), even though it can be referred to, is self-identical, and can be differentiated from other entities.11 (I should note that I am using 'portion' merely as an easier way to say 'some stuff in a region'. Thus, portions are never things. Also, I am going to remain neutral on the persistence conditions of por- tions.12 In these ways, 'portion' differs from count nouns such as 'piece' and 'lump', which do refer to things.) Further descriptions of stuff are generally similar to this statement by Vere Chappell (describing "matter", which here refers to physical stuff): "Matter ... is the stuff of which certain indi- vidual things are made . . . [it's that] which constitutes them."13 But this description is mostly unhelpful without accounts of the terms used; there is nothing within it to help

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 5: Some Things about Stuff

4 1 0 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

us differentiate a portion of stuff from a thing, if both are seen as able to stand in the constitution relation to a thing. Thus in talking about stuff, we will have to stipulate that constitution is a relation between two relata, one of which is a thing, the other a portion of stuff (and hence not a thing). But doing this only leads us in circles.

Perhaps, to follow Markosian's example, in order to get a better idea of what stuff is we should contrast it with things. Examples of things include: a table, a coffee pot, a balloon, a sidewalk, and a lump. Examples of stuff include the wood of which the table is made, the coffee in the pot, the air in a balloon, the concrete of the sidewalk, and the clay that con- stitutes the lump. We refer to the entities in these categories in different ways: we use count nouns to refer to things, and mass-nouns to refer to stuff (though Peter Simons draws a distinction between mass terms, which refer to portions of stuff, and mass nouns, which refer to stuff itself. An example of the former is 'the water in the glass,' an example of the latter is 'water in the glass'). When we use mass nouns, we use phrases such as 'much' and 'a little' but not 'many' and 'a few' which are commonly used to describe things.14 Also, when we use mass nouns, we can precede them with the indefinite article 'some,' but we cannot do this with count nouns unless we make the count noun plural - and it never makes sense to make a mass noun plural.15 Finally, as Tyler Burge points out, common mass nouns have the unique fea- ture that any sum of portions of the referent of the noun can be referred to with the same noun. That is, the following statement will be true for any (common) mass noun x: Any sum of portions of x is a portion of x.16 These differences be- tween how we refer to things and how we refer to stuff are meant to provide some insight into what the entities are, by aiding in the identification of instances of stuff - or, for one who denies that stuff exists, what would be instances of stuff if it were to exist.

Positing stuff helps with the case of the statue and bronze in this way: Colocation, as we are understanding it, can only

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 6: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 411

occur when two entities of the same ontological category exactly occupy the same region. The statue is a thing and the portion of bronze is some stuff. Things and portions of stuff are not of the same ontological category. Therefore, the sta- tue and the bronze cannot be colocated (at least, not in the objectionable way described in §1). This solution to the prob- lem seems promising: with it, we get to avoid colocation while still making assertions we find intuitive, such as that the bronze exists and exactly occupies the same region as the sta- tue. And this doesn't seem to cost us much: the solution sim- ply requires the positing of stuff, which is often found intuitive.17

3. A PUZZLING INTUITION

We avoid colocation by positing stuff; in this case, bronze. Other paradigm examples of stuff include water and gold. But how can we differentiate between stuff kinds? What is it that makes gold gold and not water? Intuitively, we'd say it has something to do with atomic structure: Helen Cartwright has said "gold has an atomic structure,"18 and Peter Simons discussed "the gold atoms making up the mass of gold."19 What are we to make of such comments? They both seem to suggest that we individuate these stuff-kinds, at least in part, by appealing to things. But there is a central question that arises from this: what is the relationship between the stuff that constitutes a thing, x, and the things which compose xl20

One potential answer is suggested by Simons' quotation, which mentions gold atoms making up a mass of gold. The made-of relation indicates the constitution relation.21 So is gold constituted by gold atoms? Constitution, as I understand it, is a relation between some stuff and a thing. And we have used a portion of stuff constituting a thing to explain how the bronze and the statue can exactly occupy the same region. But is constitution always limited to stuff constituting things, or can things also constitute stuff?

Initially, allowing constitution to go both ways seems agreeable. It allows us to keep our intuition that sometimes a

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 7: Some Things about Stuff

4 1 2 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

portion of stuff falls under a certain sortal in virtue of the thing or things (and relations between them) located in the same region as the stuff. Thus our identification of water with H2O can be explained by water's being constituted by H2O molecules. And we get a nifty hierarchy of things and stuff: some stuff constitutes simples, which compose larger things such as atoms, which constitute portions of stuff such as water, which constitute things like drops, which constitute rain. But despite the initial congeniality of such a picture of the world, it presents us with the problem of colocation, which we must avoid if our motivation for positing stuff is to avoid such a problem:

3.1. The Water Case

Suppose a puddle exactly occupies region r, and is constituted by a portion of water, also exactly occupying r. The portion of water is constituted by H2O molecules (hydrogen and oxy- gen atoms which bear specific relations to one another) the sum of which exactly occupies r. The atoms are each consti- tuted by portions of stuff as well. We cannot say that the atoms are constituted by water, because we're taking as a defining characteristic of water that it is constituted by H2O molecules. So we have some non-water stuff that constitutes each atom. This means that, for every region where the water is located (every region occupied by a hydrogen or oxygen atom which stands in the proper relations to other atoms), there is a portion of atom-constituting stuff that is distinct from the water. But recall an earlier mentioned22 characteris- tic of stuff: Any sum of portions of stuff kind K is a portion of stuff kind K. There is a sum of the portions of atom-con- stituting stuff which constitute the atoms in r. Therefore, there is a portion of atom-constituting stuff which exactly occupies r. But this atom-constituting stuff and the water are not identical. Therefore we have two distinct entities (por- tions of stuff) of the same ontological category exactly occu- pying the same region. Thus, allowing the constitution

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 8: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 413

relation between things and stuff to go both ways leaves us with the consequence of colocation.

There are a few ways to respond to this.23 One might re- spond by denying that the atoms in the region are constituted by stuff at all. This response, while helpful in this case, will not help in other cases where denying that there are two types of stuff seems less plausible. For instance, consider The Oatmeal Case:24 Suppose I'm cooking breakfast. When char- acterising the stuff in my pot, I'd say that there is oatmeal ex- actly occupying region r, which is the sum of each of the regions occupied by an oat in the pot, and I would also say that there is oat-stuff which also exactly occupies r. The oat- stuff is entirely divisible25 into portions which each constitute an oat, and these oats constitute the oatmeal. The oatmeal is not identical to the oat-stuff because it is constituted by oats but the oat-stuff isn't. Thus, once again, we have colocation of portions of stuff. So there are cases in which denying that the atoms are constituted by stuff will not help to prevent the consequence of colocation. Further, denying that atoms (or simples) are constituted by stuff is not a good option for someone who posits irreducible stuff, because it means that if things are made of atoms (or simples), then all talk of stuff can be reduced to talk of things. And this precludes the exis- tence of irreducible stuff.26

Another way to respond to the water case is to deny the existence of a sum of the portions of atom-constituting stuff in region r.27 This requires denying that for any two portions of stuff, there is a sum of those portions. However, this will not help to avoid colocation in all cases. For instance, con- sider a Revised Oatmeal Case: Suppose I am particularly rav- enous one morning and eat all but one oat of my breakfast. We'd want to say that I've still got some oatmeal left (exactly located in the region which is exactly occupied by the oat), and of course we still want to say that there is oat-stuff there (also exactly located in the same region as the oat). But, even without appealing to sums, this gives us colocation of distinct portions of stuff. Thus, the no-sums response to the water

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 9: Some Things about Stuff

4 1 4 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

case will not be helpful in all cases for avoiding the problem of colocation that results from our allowing constitution to go both ways.

So, it seems that constitution must be limited to stuff con- stituting things.28 But the intuition that made us want to deny this, the intuition that we individuate (at least some) stuff kinds by appealing to things, still seems correct. How can we explain this? Perhaps we should do nothing more than what that intuition directs us to: use things to individuate some stuff kinds. That is, we'd say that a portion of stuff is of kind K iff the portion is entirely divisible into subportions which constitute things which bear certain relations to one another (what the things are and what relations they bear to one another will vary depending on what the stuff kind is). If we say this, then we can keep our intuition that sometimes a portion of stuff falls under a certain sortal in virtue of the thing or things located in the same region as the stuff, and we don't have to appeal to constitution of stuff by things to do it. Unfortunately, we still face the problem of colocation:

3.2. The Revised Water Case

Once again consider the water and atom-constituting stuff. The water has as an essential feature that it is entirely divisi- ble into subportions which constitute hydrogen and oxygen atoms that bear certain relations to one another, but atom- constituting stuff does not have this feature. Suppose that an endothermic reaction, such as a process of electrolysis, results in the hydrogen atoms within region r separating from the oxygen atoms in that region, so that the atoms no longer bear the relations to one another that result in H2O mole- cules. In this case, we would say that there ceases to be water in the region occupied by the atoms, but we would not say that the atom-constituting stuff ceases to exist. So the persis- tence conditions of the water and atom-constituting stuff are not identical, due to the dependence on things that water has (which follows from our characterisation of it). And since the atom-constituting stuff and the water are exactly located in

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 10: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 415

the same region, we once again have colocation of distinct portions of stuff.

There are several ways to respond.29 One way is to deny that there are ever two stuff kinds instantiated in exactly the same region. Michael Burke's view has this result. Because he posits stuff only when the mass term in question refers to a homeo- merous entity30 (stuff of which every subportion is a portion of the same kind of stuff31), he never has to deal with two distinct kinds of stuff in the same region.32 Thus, Burke would avoid colocation in the revised water case by denying that water is actually stuff. However, he would also deny that the bronze from the statue and bronze case is actually stuff. Thus, his view requires one to respond to the initial case with an appeal to pluralities instead of just stuff, and so with his response the positing of stuff is not sufficient to avoid colocation.

Burke's solution to the statue and bronze case is still rele- vant, however. He asserts that a piece of bronze goes out of existence as soon as the bronze (a plurality) constitutes a sta- tue.33 That is, a piece ceases to exist as soon as its parts con- stitute something with "more structure." Could we apply an analogue of this view to the revised water case? Perhaps there ceases to be atom-constituting stuff as soon as the things the stuff constitutes come to bear certain relations to one an- other, at which point water begins to exist. If this were the case, then at any time we would have only one portion of stuff exactly occupying the region. But is it plausible to think that there really ceases to be atom-constituting stuff when those atoms come to bear certain relations to other atoms? This is counterintuitive, as is Burke's view (which is its ana- logue). Burke deals with the counterintuitiveness of his view by saying that although the piece goes out of existence, all of its parts persist, and this is why we want to say that the piece persists.34 But this will not work for portions of stuff because the only "parts" that portions have are subportions. If we were to say that a portion ceases to be of atom-constituting stuff35 but all of its sub-portions (also of atom-constituting stuff) continue to exist, we would be contradicting ourselves,

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 11: Some Things about Stuff

4 1 6 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

given that for any two portions of stuff there is a sum of those portions. Recall that any sum of portions of stuff kind K is a portion of stuff kind K. There is a sum of the persist- ing sub-portions of the atom-constituting stuff in region r.36 Therefore, there is a portion of atom-constituting stuff that persists and exactly occupies r. Thus, when water comes into existence, the atom-constituting stuff continues to exist as well, and we have colocation. So Burke's way of explaining away the counterintuitiveness of his view does not work for our analogue view, which remains immensely counterintuitive.

The most plausible response seems to be this: water is just atom-constituting stuff that has certain properties,37 such as the property of constituting things that bear certain relations to one another (or having subportions that constitute those things). This response seems intuitive and plausible, but it leaves us with an odd result: no matter how small a portion of stuff is, its size alone is not enough to preclude its being water. That is, for any time that the water exists, since it is identical with atom-constituting stuff which has certain prop- erties, at that time each atom is constituted by water. So an oxygen atom would be constituted by water, which is identi- cal to H2O. However, this consequence is not so counterintui- tive when we remember that it is not water in virtue of the portion's being constituted by H2O molecules (which it isn't).

Those wanting to avoid colocated portions of stuff needn't cash out the property requirement in that way, however. They could instead say that water is atom-constituting stuff that is entirely divisible into subportions (proper or improper) that constitute certain things (H2O molecules). This view avoids the odd result that oxygen atoms can be constituted by water, because there's a "minimum size" requirement for the portions to be water. But this has the result that any por- tion of water is entirely divisible into subportions that are not water. Still, this is not threatening to the view, because even though every sum of two portions of stuff kind K is a por- tion of stuff kind K, it is not the case that for any property <f> that two portions of stuff have, the sum of those portions of

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 12: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 4 1 7

stuff also has </>. So though one could plausibly deny that "stuff that isn't water" denotes a natural kind to which the sums principle would apply, even if it did, it wouldn't be the case that this stuff kind would have the property of not being water essentially.38

So, the positing of stuff is one potential solution to the ori- ginal problem of colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze. However, if this solution is used, the proponent of the solution must defend numerous claims (such as claims that we should accept one view of colocation rather than oth- ers, and that the bronze and the portion of stuff have identi- cal persistence conditions). They must also provide some explanation of the relation between the stuff constituting a thing in a region and the plurality that compose that same thing. This must account for the intuition that the identities of some stuff kinds depend, at least in part, on things and their relations. The attempt to explain the intuition by claim- ing that constitution is a relation that can go both ways be- tween things and portions of stuff leaves us with problems of colocated distinct portions of stuff. Likewise, explaining the intuition by defining some stuff kinds in terms of things pre- sents us with the same problems. It seems that the most attractive option for a stuff theorist who wants to avoid colo- cation is to say that what we take to be differing stuff kinds are simply portions of a fundamental kind of stuff with dif- fering properties.39

4. NOTES

1 Throughout this paper I will use 'thing' in a narrow sense, as synony-

mous with 'object'. Burke, "Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel.", p. 11. I'm

going to assume everything in the above statement of the standard account for the purposes of this paper. One thing that Michael Burke includes in the standard account but that I have omitted, is Three-Dimen- sionalism. I have not included it because it is not part of what gives rise to the problem of colocation; its alternative, Four-Dimensionalism, which is (roughly) the thesis that objects persist in virtue of having different proper temporal parts at different times, faces the problem as well (for

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 13: Some Things about Stuff

4 1 8 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

more discussion on this, see Theodore Sider's Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, especially pp. 140-208). In this paper, I will remain neutral between Three- and Four-Dimensionalism, and the problems I present will apply to both. 3

'Entity', here and throughout this paper, is being used as a term that can refer to whatever can be quantified over. It applies to any member of any ontological category, including things, stuff, and pluralities. It is not meant to imply that the referent in question is a thing.

That is, x and y are colocated iff (i) x and y are both material, (ii) x is not identical to y, (iii) x and y are of the same ontological category, and (iv) there is a region, r, such that any subregion of r is occupied by both x and y, and there is no region not within r which is occupied by either x or y. I am basing this formulation on the account presented by David Wiggins in "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," p. 5 in Rea 1997. By his account, colocation (which he calls 'coincidence') occurs when "two things of the same kind (that is, . . .which satisfy the same sortal or substance concept) . . .occupy exactly the same volume at exactly the same time." There are other definitions of colocation as well however, such as a sharing of all spatial and temporal parts (Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology, p. 210). The difference between these two definitions seems to be that the first allows two entities to exactly occupy the same region with- out being colocated if they are of different ontological kinds, whereas the second does not (another difference between the accounts arises when one denies DA UP). Also, what the relevant ontological kinds are differs across sources - that stuff and thing are (at least some of the) relevant kinds needs to be defended by the proponent of this solution. 5 About the scope of this paper: the thesis is particularly biting for

those who posit irreducible stuff in order to avoid colocation, because if they don't restrict their characterisations of stuff then they will undermine their motivation for positing it in the first place. But the arguments apply to anyone who would like to posit stuff while avoiding colocated entities. On an autobiographical note: I do not posit irreducible stuff, or see colo- cation as problematic. Thus, the assertion of either of these views should not be seen as part of my thesis. Rather, my thesis can be read as this conditional: if one posits stuff as a sufficient solution to one instance of the problem of colocation (or wants to posit stuff while avoiding colocat- ed portions of it), then they should characterise stuff in a certain way.

Also, the view has some strange consequences. For instance, it has the result that either events are not located, or they are problematically coincident with things that exactly occupy the same regions, given that those things are not themselves events. 7

Conceivably, this is defensible; the denial of the underlying general principle, that it is problematic whenever more than one material entity exactly occupies a certain region, is entailed, for instance, by the claim

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 14: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 4 1 9

that events are material (due to having spatial location) and can be colocated. Once this claim (or one relevantly similar to it) is defended, the proponent of this response would need to show that portions of stuff are like these colocatable entities rather than like things in the relevant re- spect. I, however, do not see that second step as very promising. 8

Obviously, further defence is needed. For instance, the appeal to con- stitution is problematic. In much of the literature, 'constitution' is not used in the sense in which I will be using it in this paper. Thus there is a potential response with which someone can say that constitution, on their account, requires distinct entities of the same ontological category to be exactly located in the same region. Insofar as their account begs the ques- tion, perhaps the same can be said for the stuff theorist's appeal to con- stitution as allowing things and stuff to unproblematically exactly occupy the same regions. Also, I do not intend to give the impression that I have given an exhaustive list of views about when colocation is problematic. One I didn't include, for instance, is the view that events can be colocated, but entities that are "more paradigmatically material" cannot. 9 Michael Burke responds to the problem by denying that the bronze

is an object, but he does not assert that the bronze is stuff (at least, not

by the account of irreducible stuff that we are using), and instead says that the bronze is a plurality. He does posit stuff, however, when confronted with cases of homeomerous entities, which are described below (Burke, "Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel"). 10

"Simples, Stuff, and Simple People," p. 3. 11 Zimmerman, "Coincident Objects: Could a 'Stuff Ontology' Help?" p. 22. Zimmerman evaluates this predication over stuff, and if he's right in thinking that it must be incorrect then the view I'm evaluating cannot

get off the ground. But because I'm interested in drawing out other consequences of the view, I'll set this issue aside. 12 When asserting that the bronze is actually a portion of stuff, however, it's important to consider that in order for this to be plausible the portion of stuff must have the same persistence conditions that we took the bronze to have. Thus, if the bronze does not have mereological constancy as a persistence condition but we think that any portion of stuff would have such a persistence condition, then we cannot use stuff to avoid colo- cation in this case. Another persistence condition which may vary from stuff to thing is the requirement of spatial proximity of an entity's parts. The proponent of the stuff-solution must be aware of these issues. Further, even if the stuff theorist's characterisations of bronze correspond to the characterisations we took it to have, there will still be worries about colocation involving the statue: for instance, what of the statue and the lump of bronze (which may have close spatial proximity of its parts as one of its persistence conditions)? However, the question addressed in this paper is not whether positing stuff can adequately address all instances of

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 15: Some Things about Stuff

420 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

the problem of colocation in the vicinity (!), but rather whether it can solve even one, and how we would need to characterise stuff in order to achieve this. These other instances of the problem of colocation do raise an important concern, however: they must be addressed somehow, and if the way in which it's done can also address the statue and bronze case (or whatever case we're trying to address by positing stuff), it seems that avoiding colocation no longer gives us motivation to claim stuff exists. 13

"Matter," p. 681. Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology, pp. 153-154. One might wonder about the statement "two coffees." It seems that

'coffee' is a mass noun, but it can be made plural. However, as Peter Si- mons points out, 'coffee' is ambiguous: it can refer to stuff, or to a thing such as a cup of coffee {Parts: A Study in Ontology, p. 154). In the former case, 'coffee' is a mass noun, and in the latter it is a count noun. Also, one might worry about an instance where someone says "two clays." Again, 'clay' is a mass noun which has been made plural. But a statement like this would only make sense in a case like the one with the coffees, or in a case where someone is referring to two types or kinds of clay. But in that instance the person is not really referring to the stuff but rather to a kind, and thus is not using a mass noun. However, I should mention the issue of counting here: Some may believe that, because of the strangeness in saying things like "two clays", we can- not count stuff and thus we have a further difference between stuff and things. I do not think this is so: insofar as counting merely requires dis- tinctness of the entities being counted, we can count stuff: we can recog- nise some stuff and some distinct stuff, just as we can recognise distinct things. This suggests to me that there'd be nothing wrong with pluralising references to stuff, and that it's merely a matter of linguistic convention that we do not do so. 16

Burge, "Truth and Mass Terms," pp. 264 and 275. I will appeal to this principle later in the paper, and will take it as understood that I am quantifying only over those stuff-kinds that are widely recognised (though perhaps not qua stuff), such as water, wood, energy, etc. 17

Positing stuff is also independently motivated for anyone who thinks there can be maximally continuous simples. See Markosian, "Simples, Stuff, and Simple People," for a discussion of this. 18

"Chappell on Stuff and Things," p. 375. 19 Parts: A Study in Ontolozv. P. 212. 20 Vere Chappell asks this at the end of his paper "Matter": "What is the relationship between . . .the gold (matter) which constitutes the gold (aggregate) in those hills there and the gold molecules which also, though in some different sense or way, constitute that same thing?" His different sense of 'constitution', I assume, corresponded to composition.

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 16: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 421

21 Recall Chappell's earlier characterisation of stuff: "[that] of which cer- tain individual things are made . . . [that which] constitutes them" ("Matter," p. 681). 22 This was mentioned in earlier, and is based on the assertions in Tyler Burge's "Truth and Mass Terms," pp. 264, 275. 23 One response is to deny that the portion of water stuff and the por- tion of atom-constituting stuff are distinct. A response to this will be gi- ven below. 24

Perhaps other more common stuff kinds can be used in this example, for instance: water constitutes snowflakes, which constitute snow which constitutes a snowman. I did not use this example because there is some dissension in the literature about whether or not water and snow are iden- tical stuff-kinds. I could also, more controversially, use analogous cases involving apple-stuff that constitutes apples, which constitute the food on the bottom shelf in my refrigerator, or oak which constitutes tables which constitute furniture. 25 I'm using 'entirely divisible' as a technical term, x is entirely divisible into the vs iff x is a fusion of the vs. 26 This point was suggested in conversation by Ned Markosian. 27 This option, if successful, would help not only with this case but also with the revised water case, which is presented later in the paper. 28 There is another argument that takes us to this conclusion, which was suggested in conversation by Hud Hudson. He pointed out that if things, the jcs, can constitute some stuff, and the stuff constitutes some thing, y, and constitution is transitive, we get the result that the xs consti- tute y, so things can constitute things (and the analogous case can be made to show that stuff can constitute stuff). Thus, either constitution is not transitive, constitution is not what we thought it was (a relation be- tween entities of differing ontological categories) and composition is a type of constitution, or constitution cannot go both ways: either things can't constitute stuff, or stuff can't constitute things. Since the stuff theo- rist is already appealing to stuff constituting things, they'd have to deny that things can constitute stuff. 29

Any of the responses to the original water case could still be asserted. Notice, however, that the no-sums response still fails to avoid colocation in the revised oatmeal case, for reasons analogous to those in the revised water case: the oatmeal in region r has different essential features from the oat-stuff which exactly occupies the same region. 30 Burke, "Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel." 31 Zimmerman, "Coincident Objects: Could a 'Stuff Ontology' Help?" p. 19. Zimmerman's account of homeomerous stuff is as follows: "K is a homeomerous stuff =df Every mass x of K is such that every part of x has a complete decomposition into a set of masses of K' (Zimmerman, "Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution," p. 62). That is, stuff

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 17: Some Things about Stuff

422 SHIEVA KLEINSCHMIDT

of kind K is homeomerous iff "it is K 'through and through'" (Zimmer- man, "Coincident Objects: Could a 'Stuff Ontology' Help?" p. 19). 32 For this we must take homeomerousity to have the result that, for any homeomerous portion of stuff, /?, there is no subportion of p which has persistence conditions and essential features that are nonidentical with those of p. 33

Burke, "Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel," p. 12. 34 Burke, "Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions," pp. 596-597. 35

Or, at least, that the portion ceases to be of atom-constituting stuff. Once again, this can be denied but it will not help avoid the underly-

ing problem which will reappear in an analogous case involving the oat-stuff, oats and oatmeal. 37 This alternative view was suggested by Ned Markosian in conversa- tion. An anonymous referee made the following observation: if one accepts the identity of atom-constituting stuff and water (or of analogous pairs of stuff kinds), they cannot accept the view that things can constitute stuff as well as stuff constituting things without giving up the claim that two entities can't constitute one another (that is, saying constitution can be symmetrical). 38 There's also an interesting question (brought to my attention by an anonymous referee) of where the water is located on this view. The referee pointed out that one can say that, though there's no water in any single atom (that is, there's no water such that all of its subportions are in a sin- gle atom), the water is located at the same regions the atoms are located at. To use Josh Parsons' terminology (Parsons, "Theories of Location"), the water pervasively occupies each region exactly occupied by any atom that partially composes a H2O molecule, but it does not entirely or exactly occupy any such region. 39 I am grateful to Andrew Egan, Hud Hudson, William Kilborn, Ned Markosian, Kris McDaniel, Daniel Nolan, Michael Rea, Jonathan Schaf- fer , Ted Sider and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

REFERENCES

Burge, Tyler (1972): 'Truth and Mass Terms', Journal of Philosophy 69, 263-282.

Burke, Michael B. (1997): 'Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel', Analysis 57 ', 11-18.

Burke, Michael B. (1994): 'Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations Among Object, Sorts, Sortals, and

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 18: Some Things about Stuff

SOME THINGS ABOUT STUFF 423

Persistence Conditions,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: pp. 591-624; Reprinted in Michael Rea (ed.), Material Constitution: A Reader (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1997), pp. 236-269.

Cartwright, Helen Morris. (1972): 'Chappell on Stuff and Things', Nous 6, 369-377.

Chappell, Vere. C. (1973): 'Matter', Journal of Philosophy 70, 679-696. Markosian, Ned. (2004): 'Simples, Stuff, and Simple People', The Monist 87,

405^28. Parsons, Josh. (2007): 'Theories Of Location', in Dean Zimmerman (ed.),

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. 3, ch. 7., Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rea, Michael C. (1995): 'The Problem of Material Constitution', Philosophical Review 104, 525-552.

Rea, Michael C. (ed.) (1997). Material Constitution: A Reader, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Sider, Theodore. (2001): Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Simons, Peter. (1987): Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wiggins, David. (1968): 'On Being In The Same Place At The Same Time,' The Philosophical Review 77 (pp. 90-95). Reprinted in Rea (ed.) 1997, pp. 3-9.

Zimmerman, Dean. W. (1997): 'Coincident Objects: Could A Stuff Ontology Help?', Analysis 57, 19-27.

Zimmerman, Dean. W. (1995): Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution', Philosophical Review 104, 53-110.

Department of Philosophy Rutgers University Davison Hall, 26 Nichol Avenue New Brunswick, NJ 08902 USA E-mail: [email protected]

This content downloaded from 151.225.81.222 on Mon, 12 May 2014 07:47:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions