Some thoughts on significant contributions of Buddhist logicians

M A N G A L A C H I N C H O R E

S O M E T H O U G H T S O N S I G N I F I C A N T

C O N T R I B U T I O N S O F B U D D H I S T L O G I C I A N S 1

There has been a considerable difference of opinion as to what could be held to be the significant contribution of Buddhist logicians in the field of Metaphysics, Epistemology and Logic, and with regard to which characteristic problems they could be explicated.

I shall discuss here three questions. (1) Is there any difference between Nydya and Buddhism regarding

the problems pertaining to the field of logic, epistemology and metaphysics, the relation between them, the perspective regarding the things belonging to the world and the world itself etc. or not?

(2) If there is a marked difference, is it just on a verbal or basically on a non-verbal level?

(3) If the difference between Nydya and Buddhism is merely on verbal level, then what is the significant contribution of Buddhist logicians? Is it merely the use of different technical vocabulary that marks them off from other logicians of Indian origin in general and those of Nydya in particular? And if so, can mere use of different technical terminology be called a significant contribution? And further, if there is a non-verbal difference between Nydya and Buddhism, then what is it? Is it the perspective regarding the world that is different or the conceptual framework that is different? Questions like these need to be answered before the difference between their views regarding other problems is finally sought to be settled one way or the other.

On this background, it may be held that there are three pillars, as it were, of the Buddhist approach and that each of them brings before us a different level of consideration. They are:

(a) The doctrine of universal flux. (b) The doctrine of impermanence, and (c) Vy~pti -- its nature and role (Avinftbhdva-niyama). It is sometimes held, especially in the light of the view of some

Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1987) 155--171. © 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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major Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakirti, that a peculiar relation between these three pillars could be the basis of spelling out the distinctive contribution of Buddhist philosophers.

II

The doctrine of universal flux is obviously crucial in Buddhism. Through Sahtdna, normally, two aspects are sought to be understood:

(i) That there is a flow, with or without continuity, and (ii) that there is a change. Generally, everything in the world is attempted to be explained in

terms of either change or continuity or both. All the schools, systems, are, it appears, trying to understand the world. Buddhists are the advocates of 'change' as the basic and inescapable nature of things in the world in the sense that nothing whatever, according to them, can be free from liability to change, and that such a liability to change is a built-in and non-purposeful feature of things. Continuity, they hold, is determined by neither staticity nor permanence in such a way that change and continuity are non-discordant features of the world. They further hold that in spite of non-discordance between change and continuity, the latter is not and cannot be a precondition of the former. Nor is the latter prohibitive of the former. On the contrary, Naiyfiyikas seem to argue that continuity is the basic nature of things in the world and is determined by the permanence and staticity of them. This does not mean that things do not change or give rise to other new things. But nothing of this kind happens on its own and non-purposefully. In spite of such a fundamental difference between Nydya and Buddhist approaches regarding change and continuity, both of them uphold discreteness of things. Thus mere subscription to and agreement regarding discreteness of things does not preclude their difference with regard to change and continuity. There could, likewise, be two different conceptions of things at work, and accordingly it would make a fundamental difference to the explication of the phenomena of change and continuity.

(1) On the one hand, it may be held that there is something of the nature of 'substance' and there are properties, features, traits etc. so that permanence or substantiality is considered to be a decisive deter-

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miner of continuity, and through connecting change with properties etc. change is indirectly attempted to be shown to be non-discordant with substantiality.

(2) On the other hand, things might be held to be nothing else but clusters of properties, and over and above this there is nothing like substance. Further, on this view, change is a built-in-feature (Svabhdva) of things and it is held that things change or for that matter anything changes for it cannot help changing, for the very simple reason that nothing whatever can be immunised from being liable to change on its own. Thus, the permanent possibility of and liability to change being inalienably writ large in things, nothing whatever could be permanent, static and eternal, although neither the fact nor permanent possibility of change rule out continuity. But continuity turns out to be an accidental and dispensable feature of things such that it can neither be held to be constitutive of a thing nor determinative of its being -- momentary or otherwise.

Of these, Naiydyikas seem to accept the nature of things in the world and the world at large along the former alternative, while Buddhists seem to uphold the nature of things to be of the second type. Further, on the latter view, where impermanent things happen to be given to us one after the other we experience the phenomenon of succession, while where they are given to us together we experience the phenomenon of simultaneity. Thus, on this view, whereas succession makes us experience flow, togetherness can neither be the basis of change nor of continuity. Both succession and simultaneity are accidental and are non-discordant with change as a built-in feature of things. It is in so far as impermanent things are given to us either in succession or simultaneously that they could be sought to be related with one another causally or otherwise. What occasions their being so related is our experience of succession or simultaneity of things, although none of them could be said to be determinative of things being so related, for the latter is determined by two, thing-based and hence non-accidental relations of Tdddtmya and Tadutpatti and they cannot be said to be determined by simultaneity and succession respectively. Change, thus, is neither non-discordant on the Buddhist view with Tdddtmya or Tadutpatti, nor with continuity. For, continuity is after all an accidental feature of things. Contrast this view with that

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of those who consider permanence, staticity or even continuity in one or the other form to be basic features of the world and things in it, and change to be their accidental feature. In both the approaches change and continuity are held to be non-discordant, but with such a marked difference in them. Hence, mere ac6eptance of non-discordance between change and continuity cannot be made the basis of ignoring a fundamental difference between the two approaches under consideration.

On this view of change and impermanence it is not a small wonder that Buddhists oppose an experiential and mechanical view of change, advocated by Cdrvdkas, as also continuity-cum-permanence-cum- change view of Jainas. But they also oppose the building-block theory of change and continuity advocated by Ny~ya-Vaigesikas, as also Parindma and Vivarta theories of change and continuity advocated respectively by Sdrhkhyans and Advaita Veddntins. They can have no truck with any theory on which continuity, staticity, permanence, non-changeability is held to be a non-accidental and indispensable feature of the world or of things belonging to it, on whatever ground it might be held to be so. Likewise, they can make no compromise with any view on which change and impermanence are held to be either accidental, A-svdbhdvika, dispensable or even unreal features of the world at large or of things and organisms belonging to it.

Before we proceed, it is essential to understand and explain the notion of SahtFma, for it is inextricably connected with the phenomenon of change. By Sahtdna or flow are we to understand the world as a whole to be a (one) Sahtdna or are we to differentiate between things in the world as one Sahtdna and organisms to be another Saht6na? z Further, are we to count the duration or life of each thing or organism itself to be a Sahtdna, in which case there would not only be plurality but infinity as well of Saht6nas. For, as we can say that a thing is nothing else but a cluster of properties, similarly we can also say that the world is nothing else but a cluster of things and individuals belonging to it, each of which in turn is a cluster. In that case we may have at least two kinds of Saht~na -- one of things and another of individuals. Dharmakirti seems to be subscribing to the view of plurality of Sahtdnas. On this issue his difference from other Buddhist philosophers becomes pertinent. However we do not wish to

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discuss it here. On the other hand, Naiyfiyikas seem to be accepting the world to be one single whole, although composed of heterogeneous entities. They seem to hold that reality of anything -- simple or complex -- is determined by substantiality of something or other and that the whole is always something over and above its parts. No whole can ever be understood, in their view, to be merely a cluster of its component parts. Further, nothing in the world, in their view, happens purposelessly. The Naiyfiyikas, thus, seem essentially to understand and comprehend the world anthropocentrically and not cosmocentrically as the Buddhists do. Thus understood, the concept of Satitdna seems to be foreign to the Nydya view. The Nyfiya view, on the other hand, disallows change and does not subscribe to impermanence (Anityatva) of everything unconditionally and by the nature of the case. The Nydya abhorrence of Sahtdna does not seem to originate from its rejection of change but rather from its holding continuity and permanence to be the basic features of the world.

Further, granted that Dharmakirti accepts plurality of Sahtdnas, is he treating them on a par or are they sought to be graded? This is not an issue which can be ignored lightly. This sort of plurality of Sahtdnas must have come to be acknowledged at his hands primarily because within the framework of a single Sahtdna of things and organisms it would be impossible to distinguish one thing from the other and a thing from an organism, let alone the possibility of their being held to be discrete and separate. The reason why we are making specific reference to Dharmakirti is that his difference from other Buddhist, as well as non-Buddhist philosophers cannot be treated lightly, as very often is sought to be done. Further, the distinctive contribution of Buddhist logicians is sometimes understood with special reference to Dharmakirti especially because quite a number of his works have become recently available in Sanskrit. Moreover, Dharmakirti being one of the most important Buddhist logicians, explication of his metaphysics, epistemology and logic is held to be a royal road to bringing out distinctive contributions of Buddhist logicians and philosophers in these fields, although this unwittingly amounts to ignoring conveniently contributions of Vasubandhu, Diflnfiga, Asafiga, Nfigfirjuna and others. Nonetheless we do not wish to inquire here into some of the important aspects of intra-Buddhist


controversy. It is the above-mentioned consideration, however, regarding Saht(ma together with that of change which seems to have prompted him to write a small and yet important treatise called Sahtdndntarasiddhi, although it also has additional considerations about it apart from this. We need hardly to dwell further on this point.

III

To come back to the issue of change and impermanence. It is quite obvious that Sahtdna cannot be understood and explicated without impermanence and change. According to Dharmakirti it is true that we experience change in the world. So, too, we experience that everything is or at least is liable to be short-lived and that nothing whatever is or could be permanent. But a twin question can be asked: how long should a thing last in order that we may experience it and what built- in features should a thing have if every change that we experience occurs purposelessly and by the very nature of the thing. The former of these questions seems to be answered by his saying that a thing needs to last at least for a moment in order that we may experience it. What this means is not that a thing needs to last no more than a moment or at the most for a moment -- the literal sense in which Ksanabhahga came to be understood in the post-Dharmakirti period. Thus, according to Dharmakirti, it is enough even if things are given to us for a moment for our being able to experience them. Even if a thing exists just for a moment this in itself cannot inhibit us from experiencing it. The second question is answered saying that things change because it is their nature to change, and whether a thing lasts just for a moment or for more than a moment, no thing can ever stand immunised from its coming to change or its being destroyed. Thus, things change because Anityatd is writ large in their nature inalienably and such changing things are in no way a bar on our coming to experience them, nor are they discordant with our experience of continuity.

Thus, according to Dharmakirti, in order that we may experience a thing it should neither be permanent, or static, nor immunised from changeability. Likewise, things change not in order to give rise to an experience of Sa~tdna, in which case change would be purposive, but rather because they being by their nature impermanent cannot help


changing. Things change on their own, not due to being goaded by any agency exterior to them. We experience Sahtdna when such changing things are given to us in succession, although members of changing strings of things could also be given to us simultaneously. If different Sat~ghdtas of such simultaneously changing things happen to be given to us in succession then we might also come to experience Sat~tdna of the cluster of simultaneously given things. But for our coming to experience Sahtdna what is minimally enough is that single changing things are given to us in succession and not necessarily that the cluster of such changing things be given to us simultaneously. It is successive presentation of things that is determinative of Sahtdna, while it is impermanence as a structural and constitutive feature of things which is determinative of our experience of change. Likewise, one thing emerges from another or one thing causes another to emerge from it for the very simple reason that it is its nature to do so, and not for the fulfilment of any purpose. Purposiveness (Sahetukatva) of anything is a feature of it that would be available only in the anthropocentric world. In a cosmocentric world events, phenomena, things occur or emerge since they cannot help it, not due to their being generated, manufactured, produced, structured or constructed by any agency. Things or organisms thus emerge for they are bound and naturally prone to emerge, they last till and in so far as their impermanence does not take its toll, and they change or cease to be because it is their nature to do so. Everything that happens naturally happens non-purposefully (Nirhetuka) and that being the fundamental feature of a cosmocentric world Dharmakirti is all opposed to purposefulness in any form which is a paramount feature of the anthropocentric world. Thus, given impermanence as a built-in feature of the world and of things and organisms belonging to it, change is its inevitable outcome, and emergence and/or destruction are real and yet non-purposive features of them.

As contrasted with this view about change and causality advocated by Dharmakirti the view advanced and defended by Naiyfiyikas is in marked contrast. According to them nothing happens non-purposefully and no change, emergence or destruction occurs without an agency -- animate or inanimate, abstract or concrete. That is why in order to generate a change, make anything emerge or destroy some-


thing over and above Samavfiyf and Asamavfiyi Kdranas they not only need Nimitta K~ranas but also Icch. d, Prayatna, (not only of human beings but of God also) etc. This is not acceptable to Buddhists in general and to Dharmakirti in particular. He says change in, emergence or destruction of, anything can be legitimately sought to be explained only on account of the nature of the things concerned and nothing else, inward or outward, abstract or concrete. Things change, emerge or happen t o b e destroyed on account of their Svabhdva, nothing more, nothing else.

On the Nydya view, change and impermanence not being the very constitutive and structural features of things, no change or destruction would come about unless it is brought about. Unless change is brought about things would continue to be unchanged and it is this that is determinative of their continuity. Dharmakirti rejects this view saying that change is the basic nature of things but not continuity, although the latter is not discordant with the former. A question may, nonetheless, arise regarding the Buddhist view as to how our experience of continuity arises. It is held that although anything is a cluster of features, in so far as things cannot-help changing, in spite of such changes between or among our experiences of the same thing, there may be convergence of certain features and such a convergence is enough for our coming to experience continuity. Every time we experience a thing it is nothing short of cluster of features, and between or among two or more such sequential and consecutive clusters we experience there might be convergence of certain features in the sense that some features might figure as members of two or more such consecutively experienced clusters. It is neither staticity nor permanence of things which is determinative of our experience of continuity but rather the accident of such convergence. It is held to be an accident primarily because neither for our experience of a thing nor for the being of a thing is such a convergence essential, although independently of such convergence our experience of continuity would be difficult to be made sense of. It is not unlikely that between two clusters of features which we might experience in succession there may not be any similarity or shareability or convergence. In such a case we can never experience continuity. But whether there is such a convergence or not, each such cluster is discernible from other


clusters. It is similarity or sharability which gives rise to continuity on the one hand, and, on the other, their discernibility to discreteness. It should be noted that according to Dharmakirti such continuity we experience not independently or in spite of change but rather because of it, although change without convergence would merely give us succession and not continuity. Nor has continuity been imputed to things from our expectation or use of a particular language etc. with reference to them. Rather, it is a disposition of things. Things are given to us as discrete, unique particulars and what determines their being or our experience of them is not an accident of their possessing sharable features, although accidentally they may possess such features. In so far as they do, we can experience them to be similar, where a number of things, each of which might be experienced just for a moment, may be given to us simultaneously and might possess, however accidentally, sharable features. In such a case we might experience similarity, but not necessarily continuity. Hence the fact that things have sharable features cannot be held to be a decisive determiner of our experience of continuity of them.

Consider again another fundamental difference between the Nydya and the Buddhist approach. The nilya dravyas, nitya gun. as, sdmdnya, vigesa, etc. could be considered to be building blocks of the world into which the world could be finally dismantled and from which it could be reconstructed. For Buddhists in general and Dharmakirti in particular although Svalak4.anas alone are genuinely real things, it is not into them that the whole world could be dismantled, nor can every. thing be constructed or reconstructed from them. Further, while for Naiyfiyikas the domain of knowables and reals are co-extensive, for Buddhists they are not so. Likewise, while for Naiyfiyikas everything that is knowable is not only real but is also communicable, for Buddhists every knowable is neither real nor is it communicable. This is especially because although Svalaks.an.a as a cluster of features is certainly knowable, in so far as each of the features which is a member of such a cluster might be non-sharable, nothing could be communicated about such a Svalak4.an.a or any of its features. This being the case the domains of ontology (world), epistemology (knowables) and communication (language) are at least partly non-convergent for Buddhists, which they are always convergent for Naiyfiyikas. That


is why through the analysis of knowledge or language Naiyfiyikas can always hope to comprehend the world, whereas for Buddhists this project is fraught with insurmountable troubles in its very conception.

Even if for the sake of argument it is conceded that both Naiy~yikas and Buddhists seek to understand and explain the same empirical world, yet from this it does not at all follow that their respective conceptual frameworks must also be the same. It is equally implausible to hold and difficult to defend as well that the problems they discuss in their logic, epistemology and ontology, the way they seek to solve, resolve or even dissolve them must be identical. For example, though both try to explain the seed-sprout relation, which we experience in the empirical world, the perspective from which they analyse it and the conceptual framework within which they explain it is crucially different and it would be a folly of a very serious kind to ignore such a difference between them and jump to the conclusion that they are saying the same thing just because they consider the same or similar phenomena. It would be as untenable as the view that since two mothers come to deliver their respective children similarly, therefore, they should have come to deliver the same child.

Granted further that the whole exercise of Buddhists and Naiyhyikas is directed towards relating our knowledge (Jfidna) with our life in all its aspects. It makes, however, all the difference as to within which framework they seek respectively to bring about this kind of bearing of our knowledge on our life. While Buddhists in general and Dharmakirti in particular seek to do this within the framework of the teaching of the Buddha and through our following the Middle Path, Naiyftyikas prefer to do it within the framework of the Vedic lore and in accordance with the directions available therein. Additionally, whereas Buddhists seek to establish such relation between knowledge and our life within a cosmocentric world, Naiyhyikas seek to do it within an anthropocentric world. Accordingly, the very conception of the world at stake would be fundamentally different as also the corresponding conceptions of life. Add to this the point we attempted to draw attention to earlier, viz. whereas for Buddhists everything that happens happens by the very nature of the case and non-purposefully, for Naiyftyikas nothing happens non-purposefully. Given this, even if


Buddhists and Naiy~yikas might be said to be considering the same empirical world, their respective conceptions about it make a world of difference. To hint at one such difference is to understand that whereas the empirical world is paradigmatic for Buddhists it does not appear to be so for Naiy~yikas. On such a background it seems extremely hard to hold that difference between Nydya and Buddhism is merely verbal and of employing differential technical terminology, unless one confuses their respective approaches or ignores altogether the fundamental difference between their perspectives.

Consider further the difference between them with regard to the perspective from which they look at knowledge. For Buddhists and especially Dharmakirti a thing is nothing else but a cluster of properties and its natural dispositions. On the contrary, Naiyfiyikas consider any thing in the substance-quality model. Buddhists, however, reject this model. On their view, a thing has only one disposition and that is to manifest its own nature. This kind of manifestation of the nature of things is possible through various aspects and states. But at any stage a thing is never over and above them. The nature of a thing becomes available to us through experience but this does not necessarily mean that our experience or knowledge of a thing guarantees it. Our actions are directed towards capturing the thing and discovering its true nature, it being instrumental to Purusdrthasiddhi within the framework of the teaching of the Buddha through our being able to accept (Updddna) or reject them (Hdna). But our discovery is determined by Svalaksanas manifesting themselves and through such a manifestation provoking us to discover them. Though experience does not guarantee such and such to be the nature of a thing, it does open a possibility of manifestation of a thing reaching us, our being provoked to discover and also of our being able to discover it in its true nature. Buddhists do not, in this way, seek to analyse world and our knowledge of it from our point of view but rather from that of the world, while Naiyfiyikas go about their business from an altogether different approach -- that of ourselves, of an anthropocentric perspective. This being the case Arthakriydkdritva of Buddhists and Saphalapravr.ttijanakatva of Naiyfiyikas cannot be confused with each other. For, that would force us to bring anthropocentricism into a


Buddhist approach which is foreign to it, while on the other hand, we might be tempted to consider the Nydya approach to be basically cosmocentric, which is not the case.

So turning to the notion of Arthakriydkdritva. A thing in order to be a thing must have certain dispositions naturally and cannot help manifesting itself. It is this manifestation of a thing that induces certain action on our part. Given that we naturally are endowed with a disposition to be induced, we happen to be induced. Being induced through manifestation of a thing we are provoked to reach out to it and that is how we come to discover it. After having discovered the true nature of a thing and being convinced that it is instrumental to our Purusdrthasiddhi we retain or acquire it or otherwise reject it. Given this, it may come to be said that a thing has a disposition to lead to a successful activity of our acquiring it through our discovery of its nature. But this is more a matter of post-mortem analysis of the whole phenomenon in an anthropocentric world. This is what Naiy~yikas seem to be doing. Buddhists, on the contrary, in their cosmocentric perspective choose to remain rightly satisfied only with Arthakriydkdritva. This merely means, through the manifestation 3 of itself a thing can lead to our discovery of it and never independently of it. That is, our discovery of a thing is determined primarily by manifestation of it on its own and not by any purpose or goal for the appropriate realization of which such a discovery and through such a discovery our acquiring of it may be held to be respectively indirectly and directly instrumental. Thus, it is Arthakriydkdritva alone which becomes available in the cosmocentric perspective of Buddhism, while it is subscription to an anthropocentric perspective that leads Naiy~yikas to take Saphalapravrttijanakatva seriously. But as pointed out above, the latter is more a matter of post-mortem analysis in an anthropocentric world rather than that of straightforward analysis of what is the case in a cosmocentric world. 4 It is the latter in which Buddhists are interested.

Similar fundamentally differential considerations emerge with reference to analysis of Kdrya-kdrana-bhdva at the hands of Buddhists and Naiy~tyikas. On the Buddhist view things emerge, change, phenomena occur on their own through natural dispositions, as observed earlier, and not because they are generated, manufactured, created or


produced. Whereas Arthakriydkdritva has something always to do with

our being able to discover that which is Paramdrtha Sat, Kdrya- kdrana-bhdva, especially where it is not thing-based or Svabhdva- based, has something to do with Sarhvrtti-Sat. That is why it is a folly to interpret Arthakriydkdritva within the framework of Kdrya-Kdrana- bhdva. Every sort of conceivable Kdrya-kdrana relationship can by no means be taken to be thing-based or Svabhdva-based. Thus, for instance, many causal relationships are entertained in an anthropocentric world and in an anthropocentric perspective, but they can hardly be held to be thing-based. Further, holding everything to be purposive the whole range of causal relationship happens to be further complicated and it would be a mistake, on the Buddhist view, to consider every such causal relationship to be determined by things as they are and by such nature of them as we may discover in themselves and through our reaching out to them or finding them via their manifestation to us. On the basis of the fact that both Buddhists and Naiyfiyikas seek to analyse causal relationship it would be indefensible to hold that they come out with the same kind of analysis of it and that the difference between them is after all merely verbal, not penetrating beyond employment of differential technical terminology. Had it merely been the case then controversy between adherents of Buddhism and Nydya that went on for centuries should be held to be a device indulged in by indolents and idlers to spend their time and energy for the outlet of which no alternative avenue was perhaps open.

The basic difference between Buddhist and Nydya analyses of causal relationship has also another crucial aspect connected with it. If according to Buddhists things emerge, change and if phenomena and events occur non-purposefully and not on account of their being generated or manufactured, engineered or plotted then they could be said to be emerging automatically and on their own, without any exterior agency being responsible for it. Now, things manifest themselves because they cannot help doing so. That is, because it is their nature (Svabhdva) to do so. But to manifest is not the same thing as generating anything else or making something else emerge. As Naiyfiyikas hold, auxiliary causes (Sahakdri-kdranas) or instrumental causes (Nimitta kdranas) cannot be said to be responsible for and


determinative of emergence of effect (K(trya). A seed manifests, for example, as seed on its own. But it also sprouts on its own because and in so far as it has a built-in feature to sprout (Kfirvat-rfipatva). It is this latter that is determinative of its sprouting. This disposition to sprout is inalienably a built-in feature or natural disposition of a sprouting seed and cannot be manufactured in an impotent and sterile seed by any agency exterior to it. In so far as the given seed lacks such a built-in feature it cannot sprout, no matter what we do. Further, a sprouting seed sprouts on its own and not for the fulfilment of any purpose. Those things, therefore, in which Kftrya-K(lran. a relationship could be discovered stand causally related with each other non- purposefully and on their own. That is why that kind of natural relationship or feature which is there by the nature of the thing (Svabhdva) cannot be altered, generated or destroyed through our efforts, collective or individual. They are, therefore, rightly held on the Buddhist view to be unalterable through our effects (Aprayatndhtariyaka) and as necessarily being there (Avagyarhbhdvi). A seed does not sprout just because it is a seed but rather because over and above its being it, it also has a built-in feature to sprout on its own, naturally and automatically.

While capturing or discovering the thing as it is, one needs to have at one's disposal such a tool with the help of which one will not only be in a position to discern a thing from other similar or dissimilar things in order that confusion and error does not become the basis of one's discovery, but also capture it in its uniqueness. To do this Buddhists bring in Apoha in its twin aspects:

1. Differentiation of a thing from things similar to it (sa]dtiya- Vydvrtti), and

2. Differentiation of a thing from things dissimilar to it (asajdtiya- Vydvrtti).

But Sajftiya- Vyav.rtti and AsaHttiya- Vyavrtti cannot (separately or jointly) give us the law of contradiction in the sense that the law under consideration cannot be held to be derived from them, although the law under consideration could be held to be instantiated through them. If one accepts, as Dharmakirti does, the plurality of Sahtdnas then one Sahtdna will also be required to be marked off from another Sahtdna -- no matter if similar or dissimilar to it. Likewise, if different


Svalaks..a.nas are given to us simultaneously or in succession then one Svalaksana will have also to be marked off from others - - no matter

• •

whether similar or dissimilar to it. In the same vein, features or their clusters will also be required to be discerned without falling prey to

confusion and error. It is only in this way that we would be in a position to capture and discover unique particulars the way they are structured and constituted and not the way we are normally prone to comprehend them. But, on the contrary, Naiyfiyikas accept plurality of heterogeneous items and through their having sharable properties as their structural and constitutive features. The problem before them is not so much of marking one particular thing off from another as much as that of marking off one kind of item, property from another kind of item, property etc. That is why sharability or commonness as well as differentia -- both of which are sharable features - - gather so much importance at their hands.

IV

Lastly, regarding Vydpti also there is a fundamental difference in the very conception of it between adherents of Nydya and Buddhism. In the Nydya tradition Vydpti is always understood as a relation

(Sarhbandha) while in the Buddhist tradition it is sought to be understood as a rule (Niyama). 5 There can of course be a rule about certain relations; but by no stroke of imagination could it be held that any rule itself is a relation or that it is about a certain kind of relation. Further, the rule called Vy@ti, on Buddhist view, is unexceptionable or never failing and hence holding necessarily (Avindbhdva). Now, a relation can also be exception-intolerant, though it does not become so just because it is a relation. Further, on the Buddhist view the rule called Vydpti may indeed come to be disclosed in the Anvayi or VyatireM way but the rule that comes to be so disclosed is the same, viz. the rule called Vydpti. There are not, therefore, types of Vydpti on the Buddhist view, as they have come to be acknowledged on the Nydya view. In addition, whereas making a distinction between fashioning and formulating an argument on the one hand and com- municating an already fashioned and formulated argument on the other Buddhist logicians seem to be right in distinguishing between


Svdrthdnumdna and Pardrthdnurndna, this distinction seems to have been considered quite differently in the NyFtya tradition. Moreover, the principal kinds of arguments -- Svabhdva, Kdrya and Anupalabdhi - - acknowledged by the Buddhist logician Dharmakirti -- telling us that whereas through the first two kinds of them alone we can hope to show one thing being naturally related with another, with the help of the third we can talk only about an absence of a thing -- seem to be appropriate kinds of them. As contrasted with this the Nydya classification of arguments into Anvayf, Vyatireki and Anvaya- VyatireM seems difficult to be defended. For, it seems to originate from the corresponding classification of Vydpti and if Vydpti is understood as a Niyama as Buddhists understand, rather than a relation as Naiyhyikas take it to be, then since the Niyama called Vydpti cannot be classified, arguments can also not be classified on the basis of the classification of Vydpti. Further, whereas according to Naiyfiyikas there are five constituents of Anum6na and Uddharana is necessarily one of them, according to Dharmakirti there are only three validity- determinative features of Hem and since violation of any of them leads to a Hetvdbhdsa, Buddhists acknowledge only three kinds of Hetvdbhdsas, Nydya logicians accept five Hetvdbhdsas without any appropriate and methodologically respectable basis.

On such points of fundamental difference between Nydya and Buddhism a further detailed discussion is hardly necessary to impress upon the knowledgable reader that in the face of them it would be a mistake of a very fundamental kind to put forth and seek to vindicate a claim that the difference between Nydya and Buddhism is not fundamental and that it is merely verbal. Ignoring conveniently such points of basic difference between them to hold that difference between them is just linguistic amounts to misunderstanding each of the traditions under consideration. Moreover, the strategy of some scholars of considering Dharmakirfi's or Buddhist logicians' views on the basis of the way in which their views have come to be presented in the treatises written by adherents of Nydya -- Prddna and Navya- Ny~ya -- is all the more objectionable.

From the foregoing it should be fairly clear, we believe, that the claim that the difference between Nyaya and Buddhism is merely a matter of different technical terminology or that Buddhist logicians


have no specific and impor tan t distinctive contr ibutions to make is

misplaced, and that it is only at the cost of over looking and ignoring

some of the basic differences between Nydya and Buddh i sm or not

making a careful and concer ted study of the prominent treatises

written by Buddhis t logicians that such views seem to gain currency.

Similarly, it is at the cost of ignoring penetrat ing and deeper inquiries

that the significant contr ibut ion of Buddhis t logicians comes to be

considered superficially. If we have succeeded in impressing upon

the readers the need of going about their business of considering

significant contr ibutions of Buddhist logicians in a way different f rom

what is generally done, our effort should be considered to be fruitful.

NOTES

I am indebted to Prof. M. P. Marathe for initiating me to write this article. He was kind enough to spare his valuable time for discussions and giving suggestions. I am also thankful to Pandit Jagannath Upadhyaya for going through the early draft of this paper and his suggestions. 2 Likewise it is profitable to explore whether starting with Saht~n6ntara paves the way to the problem of other minds. 3 Exploration into the corresponding Sanskrit expressions and determination of their range and significance falls outside the purview of the present paper. 4 We wish to work out investigation of this hint sometime later. 5 Vydpti is not a Sarhbandha (relation) but a Niyama (rule). There can be a rule about relation, though no relation in itself constitutes a rule. It is interesting to make the distinction between the two. However, it lies outside the scope of this paper.

Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, Ganeshkhind, Pune 411 007, India

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Some thoughts on significant contributions of Buddhist logicians