Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy || Rhodesia: More of the Same with a Difference

Rhodesia: More of the Same with a DifferenceAuthor(s): Robert C. GoodSource: Africa Today, Vol. 23, No. 3, Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy (Jul. - Sep.,1976), pp. 37-45Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185616 .

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Rhodesia: More of the Same

with a Difference

Robert C. Good

When a "crisis" has lasted more than a decade, it is worth asking whether anything has changed structurally or whether we are in for more of the same. The question is the more important when the sense of deja vu, as in the case of Rhodesia, becomes almost overwhelming. One more round of talks, meant to lead to a negotiated settlement (albeit this time with a mainline African nationalist), breaks off and Ian Smith announces yet again that there will be no Black rule, not even in a thousand years. The Prime Minister of South Africa suggests, as he has repeatedly on such occasions, that the door to renewed negotiations still appears to be open a crack. Meanwhile, President Kaunda of Zambia, again under ominous economic pressure, declares that the best solution would be British military intervention. There seems no possibility of that, but President Nyerere of Tanzania takes heart in Britain's reaffirmation of NIBMAR ("no independence before majority rule"), the policy which highlighted the Commonwealth meeting in London a decade ago. Borders are closed. Rhodesian Africans unite under the banner of militancy, while Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole remain at loggerheads, and observers wonder how long it will take to cultivate a sense of nationalism to match the verbal commitment to Zimbabwe. It is 1966 all over again.

In the meantime, that remarkable air of unreality seems still to pervade Salisbury based on the apparent confidence that at the end of the day, South Africa and even Britain and the United States will not permit the bastion of Christian vestern civilization to be overrun. Des Frost, Chairman of the Rhodesia Front, says (as he has as long as anyone can remember), "I don't believe in majority rule or in the inevitability of it. Therefore the concept of a transitional government never enters my mind."

But of course beneath the appearances, everything has changed and, significantly, in ways that no one had foreseen. The unpredicted collapse of Portuguese rule fundamentally transformed overnight the geopolitical landscape of Southern Africa. And the unpredicted massive intervention of Soviet materiel and advisers and Cuban troops into Angola has introduced an incalculable politico-military factor into the region. Calculable only is a quantum jump in both the delicacy of the

Robert C. Good is President of Denison University, Granville, Ohio, and was formerly U.S. Ambassador to Zambia and Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. He is the author of UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion, and an Africa Today consultant.

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situation now faced in Rhodesia, and the danger. Precise estimates (as is usually the case) are out of the question, for confirmed data are sparse. Yet the trends and contingencies are reasonably clear.

Detente

The first reaction to the Portuguese collapse was the policy of "detente" introduced by the South African government. With the loss of a white buffer zone, detente was to be the antidote to new dangers (racial confrontation) and the route to new relationships (Black Africa with South Africa). In Lusaka, the possibility of supping with the devil who now seemed to see Ian Smith as an intolerable obstacle to detente was eyed, however warily, with fascination. Perhaps there was a way after all of effecting a transition to majority rule in Rhodesia without recourse to escalating violence.

The scenario outlined in December 1974 -- the result of backstage maneuvers that had been in progress for months -- was disarmingly simple. The Black Presidents (Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, Khama of Botswana and Machel, soon to be President of an independent Mozambique) would pressure the fractious African nationalists into a coalition and towards the negotiating table. At the same time, Vorster would elbow Ian Smith into meaningful negotiations. The process would be facilitated by the desire of both Pretoria and Lusaka to avoid stepped-up guerrilla activities and by the realization that Mozambique would soon be capable of strengthening the sanctions squeeze on Rhodesia and opening a seven hundred mile boundary to guerrilla incursions.

Anyone familiar with the vagaries of the Rhodesian situation, however, should have known that in Southern Africa the shortest distance betwen two points is never a straight line. The coalition of nationalist movements kept exploding in the hands of the African Presidents. Fratricidal conflict among Rhodesian nationalists continued both inside Rhodesia and among the exiled nationalist groups. (The fissures opened not really along ideological lines and not exclusively along tribal lines, though the latter must not be discounted. They reflected also differences in tactics and these differences forewarned the struggle for leadership which always intensifies as the anticipated time of transition approaches.)

Meanwhile Prime Minister Vorster continued to have as much trouble with the slippery Mr. Smith as did the African Presidents with their clients. Each excess of the feuding nationalists played, as it always has, into Smith's hands. Vorster controlled virtually all the levers of crude power necessary to bring the Rhodesia Front to heel, but could not be seen to use these too openly without affording Smith the opportunity to appeal over his head to the South African white electorate, or himself to be confributing to and thus validating a program of international sanctions. Nor was Samora Machel, once he became President of an independent Mozambique, a free agent. He

38



Robert C. Good

had inherited a parlous economy and the enormous task of turning Mozambique into a going concern politically as well as economically. And there were measurable prices to be paid for not maintaining correct relations with Pretoria.

Thus, the orchestration of events and the manipulation of actors presented problems as complex as they were dangerous. What Vorster wanted most was a negotiated transition to majority rule which he himself would have been perceived to have facilitated. What Vorster wanted least was a transition to majority rule achieved as a direct result of successful international sanctions and, even worse, of guerrilla warfare. Yet to achieve the desired goal, the threat of the undesired one -- even in measured degree its reality -- must be operative. This suggested a further ripening process and the resulting ferment might either produce the desired mixture or explode the keg.

The last eighteen months have borne out this thesis. Neither the African Presidents nor Mr. Vorster have been able to pressure the Rhodesia Front or the African National Council (whether represented by Bishop Abel Muzorewa or Joshua Nkomo) into accepting the last viable fall-back position of the other. For the moment the strategy of "detente" leading to a negotiated settlement is dead. Three months of talks have ended again in total failure. Joshua Nkomo and Kenneth Kaunda, in harmony now with Julius Nyerere and Samora Machel, and with the exiled Rhodesians Sithole, Chikerema and Muzorewa, are calling for a military solution. Mozambique has closed its border with Rhodesia. Guerrilla incursions are on the increase.

Confrontation The Zimbabwe Liberation Army [ZLA] Under pressure from Presidents Nyerere and Machel, the fractious

Rhodesian African guerrillas have been coagulated into the ZLA under an 18 member High Command Council composed, according to reports, of equal numbers of ZAPU- and ZANU-inclined members. The hope is (and cannot yet be assessed) that by separating the fighting men from the disputatious political leaders, a new unity of purpose will arise as well as new leadership. (The hopelessness of achieving political unity among the nationalist movements, or even within them, has in recent months again been dramatized by the assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo, the denunciation by Bishop Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole of Joshua Nkomo's efforts to negotiate with Smith, the consequent expelling of Nkomo from the African National Council by Muzorewa and the convening of a "Congress" of his own supporters by Nkomo, who promptly had himself named President.)

The political leaders are not in command of the guerrillas, In fact they may visit the training camps (three in Mozambique and two in

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Tanzania) only by permission of Mozambican or Tanzanian authorities. Just who is in command is not clear, nor is it clear to what extent the command is unified. It seems reasonable to assume that in the course of time, a Rhodesian Samora Machel will emerge. As President Nyerere reported to Bridget Bloom (Financial Times,March 23), the guerrillas are not yet aspiring to political leadership but increasingly would be making the running and are a force to be reckoned with.

On the military front, the Rhodesian authorities have now declared the entire border with Mozambique a "military operational zone." Most estimates agree that there are upwards of 1,000 guerrillas (perhaps more) operating inside Rhodesia. The southeast border area near Chipinga and the tourist area around Inyanga and Vumba are now affected as well as the northeast sector which has been the site of sporadic guerrilla activity for years. According to the Rhodesian military, incidents are occurring virtually every day throughout this extended area.

An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 additional guerrillas, more or less fully trained, are staged mainly in Mozambique, and some in Zambia. How many more are in the pipeline is a matter of conjecture. Many observers cite as many as 15,000. We may be sure, however, that the flow of young Africans from Rhodesia has been increasing and that the numbers reaching the training camps and probably the proficiency of the training have reached an all-time high. The Chinese remain the principal non-African training cadre,. The weapons are both Soviet and Chinese and include the Simonov semi-automatic carbine and the A.K. assault rifle.

Rhodesia Rhodesian force levels have been raised (all male civilians between

25 and 38 have been called up) and stocks of arms and fuel have been increased. The regular army stands at 4500. It is backed by 10,000 territorials (similar to our National Guard) and somewhere between 20,000 and 35,000 reservists. The Air Force encompasses 1200. Its capability for instant reaction strikes, troop mobility and air defense of ground forces is limited as it depends on aging British light bombers and fighters and one squadron (sixteen) of Alouette III helicopters. The defense budget is now just over ?40 million a year. Morale in the services is generally considered high.

A fact to conjure with is that the ratio of blacks to whites in the army is almost two to one; in the police (trained for paramilitary duties), three to one. There are two battalions of Rhodesian African Rifles. A third is being raised. One report has it that six times as many blacks are applying as can be inducted, even though the highest post they can aspire to is Warrant Officer. There are no present indications of disloyalty (65 percent of Portuguese African forces were black and for the most part remained loyal), although occasional reports leave the question open as to the future orientation of African 40



Robert C. Good

Rhodesian troops. It is noteworthy that the largest number of Africans in the army and the police are Karanga, a subgroup of the Mashona, also the source of most Rhodesian guerrilla recruits.

The closure of the Mozambique border on March 3, 1976, added further pressure to the struggling Rhodesian economy. According to David Martin's detailed report from Maputo (Observer,March 14, 1976), one-sixth of Rhodesia's rolling stock, 2300 railway wagons worth ?23 million, was trapped in Mozambique. The routes through Maputo (formerly Lourencjo Marques) and Beira prior to the Portuguese coup in April 1974 carried 80 percent of Rhodesia's trade. It was still carrying 60 percent at the time of the border closing (not the 20 percent claimed by Salisbury). The total tonnage involved, exports and imports through both Maputo and Beira, was over two million tons. Diversion of this traffic to the South African system, whether using the new line through Rutenga and Beitbridge or the old line through Botswana (which might itself be cut if sufficient international aid were forthcoming to Sir Seretse Khama's government), will significantly add to freight costs and reduce foreign exchange earnings. The South African routes are roughly three times longer than the Mozambique routes and, though apparently presently able to accommodate the new traffic are vulnerable when the South African economy is running at full tilt.

The mood of Rhodesia's population is difficult to read. All external evidence indicates that among the some 270,000 whites there remains massive support for the Front. In the last elections, more than 80 percent of the whites who voted (and who constituted 90 percent of the electorate) voted for Smith and the Front. Government figures reveal (or adhere to) a consistent 10 to 1 kill ration. Thus for the violent period at the close of February and the first week of March, it was announced that 86 guerrillas and 8 members of Rhodesia's security forces were killed. A few reports suggest a rising number of homes for sale, plummeting rents and a thriving black market for hard currency. Few as yet are running for the exits.

The African mood is even harder to assess. Again external evidence suggests no general rise in militancy on the part of the black population now numbering well over six million. The uprisings that accompanied the Pearce Commission hearings in 1971 are receding into the distant past, and, until the two recent bomb incidents, it had been some three years since there had been a single act of urban terror or even passive resistance. The "protected villages" in the border areas (some 100,000 Africans have been placed in approximately 50 of these in the last 30 months -- similar to resettlements in Vietnam, Mozambique and Algeria) have created, one suspects, considerable resentment and the African "imian in the middle" is having his head bashed by both the insurgents and the security forces. Such evidence as is available, however, indicates general and growing support for the African nationalist cause and the guerrilla effort.

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South Africa

The impact on South Africa of its ill-advised incursion into southern Angola has been both considerable and difficult to project. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in strength has confirmed South Africa's unquestioned assumption that the real issue in southern Africa is communism. But the corollary assumption, equally unexamined, was that once the communist danger clearly showed itself, the U.S. would intervene to counter it, acknowledging (from Pretoria's view) the natural alliance of interest and values between Americans and South Africans in the face of "the world communist menace." One would suppose that South African hawks would be negative to a policy of accommodation after what happened in Angola. Doves, on the other hand, would support all the more firmly a policy of accommodation after the failure of the U.S. to intervene in Angola. South Africa, I suspect, has become at one and the same time more cautious and more susceptible to panic reactions.

There has been no discernible attempt to turn the screws more tightly on Smith. Quite the reverse, the General Manager of South African Railways has made clear that because of a drop in domestic traffic, South Africa has the extra capacity to handle the increased traffic generated by the closure of the Mozambique border. Congestion in South African ports, a real problem some months ago, has largely cleared and the situation will be further eased by the opening of Richards Bay.

Vorster may be able to put added economic pressure on Smith, but acceptance for such a policy will decline among the white electorate as the incidence of guerrilla activity increases and atrocities against Rhodesian whites begin more frequently to make the headlines. The military reinvolvement of South Africa in Rhodesia is at this point, however, unlikely except under circumstances identified below.

The African Presidents and the Communist Presence

The commitment to a major guerrilla campaign was undoubtedly entered into as carefully calculated, high risk policy. Mozambique and Zambia are particularly vulnerable economically and militarily. The closure of the border will, according to published estimates, cost Mozambique in rail and port revenues over ? 20 million per annum, cause a substantial proportion of the rail and port workers to be laid off, and increase the costs of running the port facilities and rail system to handle Mozambique's internal needs - a not inconsiderable price for an already sick economy. Zambia's torment is also increasing. Its frontier with Rhodesia has officially been closed since January 1973 and the rail line to Benguela remains closed as a result of the turmoil in Angola. It will be a long time before the new Tan-Zam Railway and congested East African ports will be able to take up the slack. The world price of copper currently at a dangerous low may create a deficit for Zambia approaching t100

42



Robert C. Good

million this year. In addition, both countries are vulnerable to Rhodesian "hot pursuit" or punitive raids.

Nonetheless, there is little disposition to try to bring the Soviets and Cubans into the conflict. The reasons relate to a deep suspicion of Soviet motives, especially in Zambia, a desire to avoid great power confrontation, concern to avoid provoking South African involvement and especially deference to the liberation leaders' conviction they can win without external manpower support. We may be sure that the Chinese, who unlike the situation in Angola are well established in East and Central Africa, are losing no opportunity to underscore these arguments.

For their part, the Soviets and Cubans, although naturally wishing to expand their influence, will be cautious not to become involved on the scale of Angola until they are relatively certain that their intervention will result in a swift military operation with tolerable risks.

Towards a Denouement - and Two Intervening Contingencies

The problem today is what it has been from the outset. It is to effect a colonial transition in Rhodesia without an imperial arbiter. Never having deployed forces on the ground in Rhodesia, Britain has never exercised imperial authority. Detente placed South Africa in the odd role of a surrogate for such authority. But under the circumstances, there was small chance that Vorster could have got Smith to sign the instrument that would have obliged the regime to self-destruct in three years, or in five years, or for that matter could have provided guarantees of irreversibility to the Africans.

Vorster has called the alternative "too ghastly to contemplate," meaning of course the rapid escalation of guerrilla warfare leading to an attemlpt at an all-out military solution on both sides which could trigger a racial cataclysm well beyond Rhodesia's frontiers. He is right. It is ghastly indeed. We have arrived at the point, however, where the only possibility of avoiding the ghastly alternative is to risk its realization -- that is, to increase the pressure of sanctions and the pace of coinflict. Wre are thuIs entering a period of maximum opportunity and imlaxiimiuImi danger.

The object of course is to erode fturther the structure of white powxer in Rhodesia by increasing the costs of moving exports and iml)orts through the sanctions barrier, by draining the economy of manpower now re(qtuired to maintain the swollen security forces and by placing the white population in increasing jeopardy -- thus hastening the exodtLs of wxhites fronm the country. As a result, the reginme xNill become nmore brittle wxith the passage of time. Whether under Smith or mlore likely a successor regime, a negotiated transition to an African go-vernment is not to be ruled out, though the terms

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would probably involve hardly more than the right of evacuation of a recalcitrant white population. As the unraveling proceeds, a facilitative British role might yet be important, including even the positioning of a small security force to "guarantee" the transitional process.

The dangers of course are commensurate with the opportunities. There are two major ones. First, Soviet-Cuban involvement might reach proportions that would call the South Africans back into play in military support of Rhodesia. If this were to happen, it would contravene the present intentions of the African PresIdents who are determined to make the ZLA the effective change agent and to limit external support to hardware and training. Mozambique's economic crisis, Rhodesia's capacity to carry the war into Mozainbique and Zambia and the questionable effectiveness of guerrilla operations could of course change all that, placing a premium on the high risk policy of inviting Soviet-Cuban battlefield assistance.

The correct modulation of assistance from communist countries to the external guerrilla units is a matter of grave consequence -- and something we can do little about. It is questionable that we have the leverage, and to attempt to exercise it would inevitably be viewed as a policy favorable to Rhodesia and South Africa. It was one thing to consider preempting a Soviet initiative in an African civil war in Angola (where, remember, we found we could do little). It is quite another to preempt or blunt Soviet or Chinese initiatives against Rhodesia where the opponent is an illegal white minority regime.

The second major danger is that the gradual expansion of guerrilla war involving atrocities on both sides could unleash uncontrolled racial hostilities of rapidly expanding proportions. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which an international peace- keeping operation might become an urgent necessity.

Options for U.S. Policy Given the grave consequences for the United States of Cold War

confrontation or a racial conflagration in Southern Africa, it is regrettable that we can operate only on the periphery of this critical area.

What can we do? There is still time to demonstrate where our long ternm interests lie and to take certain limited though important remedial and preventive actions.

--We can repeal the Byrd Amendment. --We can continue to make it clear that Rhodesia will receive no

assistance from the U.S. under any circumstances. --We can endorse the policy of international aid to Mozambique

and Zambia for losses incurred conse(uent on economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and make generous contributions for this purpose.

--WA'e can offer humanitarian assistance to the nationalist moveements.

--We can encourage Sotuth Africa to place increasing pressure on 44



Robert C. Good

the Rhodesia Front to agree to a realistic, enforceable transitional process to majority rule.

--We can privately warn the South Africans on the one hand and the Soviets and Cubans on the other that the risks of a direct, major military involvement in Rhodesia are of a totally different order of magnitude from their adventures in Angola.

--Finally, we can promote planning for the composition and development of our international peace-keeping operations against the possible outbreak of uncontrolled racial violence. Though we are still upstream from such a danger, it is by no means too early to make this contingency the object of detailed conversations beginning in London - and perhaps even including Moscow.

Secretary Kissinger's Lusaka speech of April 27th embraced many of these proposed actions specifically. And the others seemed implicit in his remarks. But after seven years of not-so-benign neglect, one awaits actions to match the words. By themselves the words are not inconsistent with "option two" of Kissinger's NSSM 39 of 1969 which called for verbal support of majority rule and practical support of the status quo. As yet, except for the apparent agreement to provide $125 million in com- pensatory assistance to Mozambique, but for which the terms of transfer, we are told, are still being negotiated, little has happened to indicate that the Ford Administration intends to move beyond verbiage in support of change, for example to repeal of the Byrd Amendment. It seems unlikely that much more will happen until after the November election.

For the first time, however, it is possible that a presidential election campaign may include significant, if peripheral, discussion of policy toward southern Africa. Concerned Americans at least have the opportunity, by bringing these issues to the fore, to increase the chances of a new approach by a new administration, or, if the present administration is given another four year mandate, to see to it that Kissinger's Lusaka objectives will have some chance of being implemented.

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Southern Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy || Rhodesia: More of the Same with a Difference