I

;;

t,

Viktor Suvorov is in his mid-thirties and now lives in the

West with his family. He was a Soviet army officer' and

served in the GRU; he tann the world outside the Soviet

Union for the first time in 1968 when Czechoslovakia was

invaded. He writes under a pseudonym to protect his

relations and friends who remain in the Soviet Union'

He is the author of. The Liberators, described by Vladimirgo[ou.Ly as 'brilliant . . . this unique document' and by

Edward Crankshaw as 'unique and invaluable'' His book

iirii, tn Soviet Army has alio been published iri paperback

by Panther Books.

INSTDE THE SOVIET ARMY

'This important book reveals the system by which "the

tttiting force of world revolution'? is organized ' ' ' a dire

warning to the West'

Publishers WeeklY

'Worrying for the West, particularly his message that Soviet

grnrr.lt io not believe in graduated nuclear deterrence'-Financial

WeeklY

.Thebookasawholeringstruelitcertainlymakesinteresting

ffid very Pertinent reading'

lrlsh Times

I 'Much useful information'

Edward Crankshaw

rA revealing anatomy of the Sovigt army'

Elrmingham Post

!

By the same author

The LiberatorsInside the Soviet Army

VIKTOR SUVOROV

Soviet MilitatYIntelligence

GRAFTON BOOKSA Division of the Collins Publishing Group

l.On*DON GLASGOW

TORONTO SYDNEY AUCKLAND

To the memoryof Oleg Vladimirovich

PenkovskYGrafton BooksA Division of the Collins publishing Group8 Grafton Street, London W1X3LA

Published by Grafton Books 19g6Reprinted 1986

fint pub-lishedin Great Britain byHamish Hamilton Ltd 1984

Copyright @ 1984 by Viktor Suvorov

ISBN 0-58ffi5962

Printed and bound in Great Britain byCollins, Glasgow

SetinTimes

AII rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted, in any form, or by any meins,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recordinc orotherwise, without the prior permission ofthe publishers

This book is sold subject to the condition thatit shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, belent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulatedwithout.the publisher's priorconsent in anyform of bindingorcovei other.than thatin which it is published and without a similarconditior including this condition beingimposed on the subsequent purchaser.-

Contents

Introduction

PART ONE

1 The Triumvirate2 History3 The PYramid4 The GnU anO the Military Industrial

Commission (VPK)5 But WhY Is Nothing Known About It?

6 The GRU and the 'Younger Brothers'

7 The GRU and the KGB, 8 The Centre9 The Procurement Organs

10 Fleet Intelligence'11 The GRU Processing organs

12 Support Services

PART TWO

t Illegalst 2 The Undercover ResidencY

3 Agents4 Agent Recruiting5 Agent Communications6 The Practice of Agent Work7 OPerational Intelligence

8 TacticalReconnaissance9 The Training and Privileges of Personnel

17

N51

56

60

63

ffi73,7883

85

94

101

111

131

139

155

167

t772N203

,li,

ftu,,,

. Contents

ConclusionFor.GRU Officers OnlyAppendix A: kaders of Soviet Military

lntelligenceAppendix B: The GRU High Command and

Leading GRU OfficersAppendix C: Some Case Histories of GRU

ActivitiesIndex

217

223

225

237

242

247

Introduction

There is but one opinion as to which country in the world

possesses the most powerful secret intelligence service' With-

lrirfi" slightest doubt that country is the Soviet Union' and

the name- of the monstrous secret organization without

pi"*J"r, in the history of mankind is the KGB' But on the

q;;;d; as to which country possesses. the second most

powerful secret organization, ihe opinions of specialists

'OnLi. S,t.rge as ii may seem' the country to which this

;;;;ilt"""b.long, is also the Soviet Union''and the

oiiunirution itself iJcalled the Chief Intelligence Directorate

of the General Staff.--ilitL*t was written in order to confirm this simple facl'

rr At first it was conceived as an instructional manual for a

.iJ" of specialists. Subsequently it was revised by:tiiit naffOw clrclg or sPEutauDrs' euurwYsv'rrJ r

il.tl.;-;;d.io, u *i0". public'.d: fYi:io' *"::"gyili'fi *tiJt-i" ,f,e excision of certain definitions and technical

:ili ;;r;iil wtrictr woutd be of little interest'.Even "TllHl

I .'Ji*"ut. implies a desire to fight against i0' one must know

liii' its pathology as well as its symptoms'

i'',, ii"t"-t"..i".A in the book many details of a technical,',,1 ,utui", which may sometimes make for difficult reading.

'i ,,iuitr,ough I may apologize, there-is. nothing to be done' In., ,1

- der to inderstind a Oi;ase (and the desire to understand

For one of their very first chosen myths, the communists

O".iO.a to record thai the organs of enforcement of the new

State were not created until the nineteenth of December

igii. mit falsehood was circulated in order to prove that

mri.t power, in the first forty'one days of its existence'rl

ffi

10 Introduction

could dispense with the mass executions so familiar to otherrevolutions. The falsehood is easily .*porlO. It is sufficientto look at the editions of the Boishe;i;;'papers for thosedays which shook the.world. ffr. Oigun. and subsequentmass executions exisred-frgf

th" fi.st h;;;, the first minute,the first infantile wail.of this Soviet po*"r. ffrut first night,laving announced to the world the fi;h; the most blood_tl:], dictatorship in its history, I.*in ,ppoirred its leaders.Among tnem was comrade A. I. Rikov, the head of thePeople's Commissariat for Internal affairs wtrich sounds lessinnocuous in its abbreviation, NKVO. Comrade Rikov waslater shot, but not before he irad ,nunugJ-to write into thehistory.of the Organs certain bloodt p6;; which the Soviet

le-a-!-ershin.would prefer to forget iuir?. rit..n men haveoeen appomted to the post of Head of the Organg of whichthree were hounded out of the Soviei-government withignominy. One died at his post. O;*;; s'ecreuy destroyed

by members of the Soviet government f^ *u, later publiclyadmitted). Seven comradei were stot oi hanged, and tor-tured with great refinement before their officiaipr"irf,r"ri.[; are.nol going to guess about the futures of three still1::1i yT have occupie{ the post. The fare of tne Aeputyneaos nas been equally violent, even after the death oicomrade Stalin. .'

. The paradox of this endless bloody orgy would seem to bethis. Why does the most powerful ;rim'i;al organization inthe world so easily and friely give up ii, ieuaers to be tornto pieces? How is the politburi aUte to J.uf *itt them sounceremoniously, clearly not experiencing the slightest fearPf*: these seemingty- ail-powlrfur peilonalities and theorganizations headed by them? How ii it ttrat ttre politburohas practically no difficulties in displacinfnot onty individual1,.r9: "j

State Security but in O.rtioyinf *iote flocks of themost influential State Security officers? furrr. lies the secretof this limitless power of the politburo?

Introduction tl'The answer is very simple. The method is an old one and

has been used successfully for thousands of years. It boils

down to the principle: 'divide and rule'. In the beginning, in

order to rule, Lenin divided everything in Russia that was

capable of being divided, and ever since the communists

have continued faithfully to carry out the instructions of the

great founder of the first proletarian state.

Each system of governing the State is duplicated and

reduplicated. Soviet power itself is duplicated. If one visits

any iegional committee of the Party and then the Regional

Executive Committee one i5 struck by the fact that two

separate organizations having almost identical structures and

AeaAing idintical problems nevertheless take completely

contradictory decisions. Neither one of these organizationsrhas the authority-to decide anything independently.

This same system exists at all stages and at all levels of theri Government. If we look at the really important decisions of

i the Soviet leadenhip, those which are published in the

ii,'pup"r", we will find that any one g{them.,is Pry, "ily^:l{1" ioint sessions of the Central Committee of the Party and the

f',' Council of Ministen. I have in front of me as I write the last; joint resolution on raising the quality and widening the range-

, of production of children's toys. Neither the Council ofMinisters of the gigantic State structure nor the Central

Committee of the ruling Party is able, since neither has the

power and authority, to take an independent decision on

such an important matter. But we are not talking here just

about Ministers and First Secretaries. At all lower levels the

same procedure is to be observed. For example, only a joint

decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

of a republic and the Council of Ministers of the same

republic, or the Provincial Committee and the Provincial

Executive Committee, is valid. At these levels of course,

such crucial problems as the quality of children's toys are

not decided; but the principle remains that no separate and

'I

t::

)'

ffi

12 Introduction

independent decisions can be taken. In shape and form,Soviet power is everywhere duplicated, from the planning oiI*!"j launchings into space to the organizatiln for

-the

burial of Soviet citizens, from the managernent of diplomaticmissions abroad to iunatic asylums, froil the construction ofsewers to atomic ice-breakers.

In.addition to the goveming organs which give orders andsee that they'are carried out, there also exist central controlOrgans which are independent to the local authority. Thebasic one of these is of course the KGB, but independentlyof the KGB other powerful organs are also aitive: theinnocent:sounding People's Contiol for example, a secretpolice organization subordinated to a politburo member whoexercises almost as much influence as the Chief of the KGB.ln addition to the People's Control, the Ministry of theInterior is also active and this is subordinated niither tothe KGB nor to Control. There is also the Central Organ ofthe press, a visit of which to a factory or workshop iuur.,hardly less anger than a visit of the bBHSS, the socialistfraud squad. On the initiative of Lenin, it was seen asessential that each powerful organ or organization which iscapable of taking independent decisions bi counter-barancedby the existence of another no less powerful bureaucraticorganization. The thinking goes: we have a newspaperPravda,let's have another on a similar scare - Izvestia. Tasscreated, as a counter-balance to it, ApN. Not for competitionbut.simply for duplication. In this way the comradei in tl,ePolitburo are able to live a quieter life. To control everybodyand everything is absolutely impossible, and this ii whyduplication exists. Everybody jealously pursues his rival andin good time informs whoever he jhould inform of anyflashes of inspiration, of any deviation from the establishednorm, any effort to look at what is going on from the

lydqoilt of a heatthy.critical mind. DupliJation in every-thing is the prime principle and reason Ue'trina the terrifying

' stagnation of all walks of life in Soviet society' It is also the

rru-Son for the unprecedented stability of the regime' In

duplicating the Organs, the Politburo was able'to neutralize

any .tt.*it by thJm to raise the standard of revolt against

their creators, and thus it has always been'

Introduction

: tt" creation of a, system of parallel institutions began

' with the creation of itri tcnefa, an organization called into

r; existence to counter-balance the already growing powers of

f , itre People's Commissariat {or Internal Affairs'.D"d:.g l:lii .oorr" lr.the whole of the civil war these two bloody

i organizations existed independently, and as rivals, of each

), ;ffi;;. Their influence grew to immense proportions, andj, rcnin suggested the creation of yet another independelt

i,organto-.-u.tyoutthetaskofcontrolandretribution'theI Rabkrin. This organ, known today as the People's Conti'ol'

is still waiting forlomebody to research into its history' The

i, Rabkrin was-Lenin's love'child, remembered by him even

lii ;n f,ir deathbed. The Rabkrin or, more formally, the Wor-

ii,. *"rr' and peasants' Inspectorate was not created as an organ

'1 ;i;;;;.ion ioi the whole population, but as an organization

;,;' i;; it" .ontrol of the ruling -Bolshevik

6lite and, above all'l, itre f.U"ka and thg People's Commissariat for Internal

',;ri Affairs.

.,.' fn the meantime the tentacles of the Tcheka had spread

; ,r' srior.r the frontiers and the Bolshevik leaders were forced

: . to create yet another parallel organization to the Tcheka'

lcapable of counter-balancing its external activities. Neither

ir,i i.opre,s commissariat nor the Rabkrin was able to fulfil

thisrole.onthepersonalorderoftheindefatigableLeninon,;,, iTO.ru.t 1918, an external intelligence service, completely,,,1.

independent of the Tcheka, was created under the meaning-

,t i*r ii,f" of the Registered Directorate of the Workers' and

" Peasants' Red Army. At the present time it is called the,, bt i.f Inte,igence directorate of the General Staff of the

, Soviet A*y; and also known by its military classification as

14 Intoducrion

'unit 44388'. In history there is a number of examples ofsimilar organizations within repressive regimes. The most,obvious of these is of course Hitler's Gerniany. The SS andthe SA and, on lhe front, the Wehrmacht Divisions and theDivisions of the SS, all existed under the same duplicationprinciple, as did the two Intelligence Services, the'Gestapoand the Abwehr.

- This multiplication of institutions can only be explainedby the desire of the ruling class to guarantee the stability ofits regime. It is important to clarily this, so that one canunderstand the role of soviet miritary intefiigence in Sovietsociety and in the international areni, and, i-n addition, thereason why thisorganization has remained throughout Soviethistory largely independent from the KGB, inipite of themany ordeals it has been subjected to.

Part I

tThe Triumvirate

,ti"Jl,

l',:1,

fr,

The Party, the KGB and the Army form.the triumvirate

*hi.t ,oi.. the Soviet Union. All other institutions and

organizations, including those which appear officially to

wi-etd State power, occupy a subordinate position' But no

single one oi tt "

it t.. liolds aUsotute power' They are all

intirAepenAent and have to share power with their rivals'

There ii a constant underlying struggle between these three

forces, with attacks and retreats, bloody skirmishes, victor-

'ies, defeats, armistices, secret alliances and permanent

treachery.The Party cannot exist without a continuous represslon 9f

the people, in other words without the KGB' The KGB in

turn cannoi exist without a continuous fanning of the flames

' oi.orrnonist fanaticism and the deception of the people' in.otherwordswithouttheParty.Eachofthetwoconsidersitslown function to be the important one and the function of its

;;;i ;;;;t'supplementary. Thus the.Partv and the KGB

, aie strivini for'undivided rule, but with this in mind each

'understand's that it is not possible to kill off its rival' Too

, muctr depends on the continued existence of that rival' Both

the Party and the KGB need the Army, which plays the part

of a periorming crocodile, ensuring a quiet life for the other

two.in the triulmvirate system the Army is the most powerful

'' element but it is also the most deprived as regards its rights'

Unlike the Party and the KCB, the Army has never played

the leading roli in the trio. Should this ever happen' the

irrty unaine KGB would be swiftly destroyed' The fact.is

that'this crocodile does not need either the Party or the

KGB. Its natural state is a free life in a swamp, enjoying the

18 Soviet Mititary Intelligence

1bili_tyj9 gobble up whatever it wishes. Both the party and

the- KGB are perfectly well aware that they, in the role oftrainers of the performing crocodile, would be its first victimsshould the crocodile ever be set at liberty. So why has thecrocodile never gobbled up its trainers?

- The Party and the KGB hold the crocodile firmly in check

!V qeans of two strong leashes. The party leasli is calledthe Political Department, that of the KbB the Special

fe.ryytlngnt. Every organ of the Army is penetrated by thePolitical Department of the party and thi Special Oepart_ment of the KGB. On those occasions whin the Armyhas attacked the party, which has happened several times,beginning with the military opposition of the twenties, theTchekists of the KGB have iome into action and quicklygained control over dissident elements in the Army. WUen

lhe Army has attacked the KGB, as happened after thedeath of Stalin, the party has gone into action against it.And at times when the KGB his been plotting agiinst theParty, the Party has invariably hllowed the crocLdile to takea bite at the Tchekists, but not a bite to the death. Aftersuch incidents the situation has retumed to normal * thecrocodile's trainers have manipulated their reashes in such away and from differen-t sides that it is impossible for anyquarrel to have a conclusion. They have even been able togive the crocodile a few kicks anA, it necessary, to direct itto another side, as it is said .against any aggressor,. Itsdependent situation notwithstanding, the aimy ii sufficientlystrong sometimes to pull its two trainers aftei it. Thus it isnot possible for the Army to be left out of the triumvirate.None of the remaining inhabitants of the Soviet Union hasany.independent part to play in the concert. They fulfil anauxiliary role. They supply food to the trainers and thecrocodile, put on their make-up for the show, announce thedifferent acts and collect money from the terrified spectators.

The general staff of the Soviet Army is the brain of the

The Triumvitate 19

.6pcodile, and mititary intelligence is itseyes and ears' The

,6iU it a part of the general-staff, in other words 1.nart

o1

.the brain. in fact it is that part which analyses what the eyes

Jii una the ears hear, the part which concentrates the

'unlfinr.ing eyes of the crocodile onto the most interesting

frrg"tt a,iO tiains its ears to hear with precision every rustle

,iiit" night. Although the crocodile is-firmly tied.to the

I i;tw "rithe KGB, i-he general staff and the integral GRU

i', "[ itu.ticallv independEnt of external control' Why this

), it "yi g

. be is expl a,":lir-:T.

::-tr-: "::T":':S:.ll ":l;.. ;;;;"f; thi *ar, the Party supervisedthe general staff

i. Io-.at"ruflv, and the Tchekists insisted strongly on $e1,, ol.rruunoof every minute directive of the Party, that the

lr€r€ral staff compietely lost the ability to think indepen-

:iently. As a result the crocodile, delPlte its enormous sze'

,*rpitt"fy lost its presence of mind, its speed of reaction

,and any capability to think and take independent decisions'

rfif tnii brought ihe system to the.edee-:f.:it"tt*-p-h3l:.'' ttr" nt v bec-ame pru.ti.ally incapable of fighting' The Party

,, tearnl from this sad.experience and Yt?".d :Yt :t.,Y:i,11,:I ; i",rrf.i" fn the workirrg of the crocodile's brain,.even if this

i,,i[t.in t"a ceased to thlnk along Party lines' The'Tttl,:t'i[;-kcg preferred, for purely practical reasons, to keepI

ontv the body of the crocodile under control and not to

in,Jr"t" wittr ttre work of its brain, of its sharp ears and

piercing eyes.

2

History

Soviet military intelligencer and iis superior organ, the GRU,are an integral part of the Army. The history of Sovietintelligence can therefore only be surveyed in ihe ligtrt otthe history of the development of the Army and consequentlyin the light of the continuous struggle bitween the Army,the Party and the KGB.

From the moment of the creation of the first detachmentof the Red Army, small intelligence groups were formedwithin these detachments quietly and oftLn without anyorder from above. As the regular army developed intonewly-formed regiments, brigades, divisions, army cbrps andarmiesfso these intelligence organs developed wiih it. fromthe outset, intelligence units at all levels were subordinatedto.th€ coresponding staffs. At the same time the superiorechelons of intelligence exercised control and direction ofthe lower echelons. The chief of intelligence of an armycorp, for example, had his own personal intelligence uniiand in addition directed the chiefs of intelligenie of thedivisions which formed a part of his army corps. Eachdivisional intelligence chief, in his turn, had ftrs own intelli-gence unit at the same time as directing the activities of theintelligence chiefs of the brigades which formed his division.And so on down the scale. On 13 June 191g a front wasformed, for the first time in the composition of the Red

fThe Russian version of the English .intelligence' - razvedka _ haswider-significance and includes everything we rlnderstand by the terms'intelligence', 'reconnaissance', .surveiltaice'and all activitj governintcollection and processing of information about actual 6r"potentiaienemtcs,

Hisary 2l

. This front received the name of the Eastern Front'

in it ttr.re were five armies and the volga military

. On the same day there was created a'registrational'

gence) department in the Eastern Front' The depal'

f,ad ttre inielligence chiefs of all five armies and the

r reporting to iI. These intelligence chiefs of the front

" norbet of aircraft for aerial reconnaissance,

,i*- *rn. indeiendent and separate anrlies which did not

,,;iime cavatry squadrons and, most important, an agent

,,network. The agent network for the Eastern Front was

fr"t iot .a on ih. basis of underground organizations of

,,fitstrevifs and other parties which.zupported them' Sub'ilqr"nUy the network grew arf: d]lng. the advances o-f the

lffi;;;'F;t in the Uials and in Siberia, agent groups and

organizations intervened in the rear of the enemy P:J":: 1l:limiin forces attacked. Subsequent to the formation of the

,Eastern Front, new fronts were added to the Red Army:

tfre Southern, Ukrainian, Northern, Turkistan and' later'

6uu.uriun, W.rt"-, South-Eastern, North-Eastern and

i;;h;. The intelligence set-up for each front was organized

io tt" same way ui thut for the Eastern Front'.There were

,'-:In tt" spring of 1918, besides the agent, aerial and other

, types of intelligence services, the diversionuty t"ryit"-lTliiLt".g. Thfse diversionary detachments reported to the

iot"ttin n".. chiefs of fronts, armies, corps and sometimes

iiniriont, and were called the 'cavalry of special assign-

oi"no'. Formed from the best cavalrymen in the Army' they

ir dressed in the uniform of the enemy and were used to carry

out deep raids in the enemy's rear, to take prisoners -especialiy staff officers - to collect information on enemy

porition. and activities and to undermine and sometimes

ihvsicallv destroy the enemy's command structure' The'""'*U.t tt tn"t" diversionaiy units and their numerical

2322 Soviet Military Intelligence

strength comtantly increased. ln 1920, on the polish Front,on the staff of the Soviet forces, there was a separate cavalrybrigade foi 'special assignments' with a strength of morethan two thousand cavalrymen, arid this was on top ofseveral regiments and separate squadrons. All these units

,were dregsed in Polish uniform. Much later these divenion_ary units received the name Spetsnaz, now given to allspecial forces of the GRU.

From its inception, military intelligence suffered the great-est possible antagonism from the Tchekists. The Tcheka hadits own.central agent network and an agent network in localareas. The Tchekists jealously guarded their right to havesecret agents and could not resign themselves to the idea thatanyone else was operating similar secret networks. TheTcheka also had units of .special assignments' which carriedout raids, not in the enemy's rear, but in its bwn rear, destroy-ing those who were dissatisfied with the communist order.

During the civil war the Tcheka strove to unite all speqiala'ssignment units under its own control. Several cases arerecorded of the Tchekists trying to take over organs ofT!,]..y intelligence. One such atiempt occumed on-10 July1918 when the Tcheka shot the whoie staff of the EasternFront intelligence department, which had been in existencefor only twenty-seven days, together with the entire staff ofthe front and the commander himself, M. A. Muravev, whohad been trying to intervene in favour of his intelligencedepartment. The whole of the agent system of miiitaryintelligence passed into the contror or the tchekists, but thisbrought the front to the very edge of catastrophe. The newcommander, I. I. Vatsetis, and his chief of staff had nointelligence service of their own, and were unable to askfor the necessary information. They could only requestinformation in a very tactful way, being well awire of tneTcheka's attitude to those it disiikea. (As regards Vatsetisthe Tchekists did indeed shoot him, but much iater.)

History

i Naturally while the agent network.was under.the t",tlt:]rf the Tcheka, its own work was given priority' and any

i*k1ti it by'the Army Command w-ere given very low

fiiiority. This of course brought the forces very near to

iomotit" defeat. If the army inielligence service is separated

the army staff, then the brain becomes nothing more

the brain of a blind and deaf man' Even if the blind

ll'ihan ."..ines essential information from one source or

,anothe',n,:Y:I,:l_Yi,-':i[:,":fT.,T:^l:1"",il:H-i;frptJ.iJ.. The leader of the Red Army, Trotsky' placed an

,tiir.,u* before Lenin: either give me an independent

;,miiilt intelligence.service or let Dzerzhinsky lead the

A,rmv with his Tchekists'-1"'"i" knew what the Tcheka was capable of but he also

,lr[" irt.t its capabilities were extremely one'sided' He

,tfili.t * ordered Dzerzhinsky not to interfere in matters of

imitituw intelligence. tn spite of this, the Tcheka's attempts

{lt;;il"* ,p irilituty intilligence went on, and these efforts

continue on a reduced scale up to the present day'

1,,-"--io*,atas the end of 1918 the organization of military

lio,tffig"n.. from regimental staff level up to the level of

,,iir"i-"t,.tr n.d beeri virtually completed' There remained

,n ry *. - .'urrlhi*, 1": 1""p. 1* 1t",: :Jl *:')T?"fiI''J*i.. of the Republic, the staff of the Red Army (at that

I [m" ."[.a the Fietd staff, later the General Staff). For this

lrlffason the general staff remained blind and deaf' obtaining'',iirorr"ri"riindispensable to its work at second-.

"',1119-'il;;.-il;dition to this, the absence of a superior intelli-

,ii;;;Tq?.":1i1:,:::t':,::l::Ti:,,T::'"1'H':"L:iJ::li "ft"irr,ifuence services. Military intelligence had acquired

i',8 prramid siructure, but the top of the py'?ry.d *.T.rnjt119'

i ft " Ct i"f of the Army and in charge of all military pro-

I au.tion, Leon Trotsky ieveral times approached Lenin-with

,l,iire aemano that he ihould create such a superior mititary

24 Soviet Military Intelligence

intelligence organ. Understanding the necessity for the cre-ation of such an organ, but realizirig that this would inevitablymean a strengthening of the position of Trotsky, Lenii1:]:T"..d and repeatedty reifused Trotsky,s ,ugg.rti;.At the oeginning of autumn, the position of the cori"munistsworsened sharply. production, fuel and political crisesbecame more acute. Armed uprisings were taking placeagainst the communists. There was an-attempt on the life ofLenin himself. In order to save the regime the communistsdecided on- a desperate measure. In eich town and villagethey would take hostages and, in the cise of the slighte"simanifestation of discontent among the inhabitants, "thesehostages would be shot. The Soulet state was saved, bymas executions. Then another problem arose. The fcneta,released from its restraints and drunk with blood, got outoicontrol. In Tver and Toruhok the Tchekists, together with

ll:1"rpg,..,, destroyed communist teaders whJdispleaseJrnem. Une threat to the stability of the state had beenreplaced ty another, far worse. Lenin, not yet completelyrecovered, immediately resumed day+o-day l"ad;;hi;Without restricting the terror, he took , nurb., of ,t.p, iocontrol it. The most important of his decisions were, fiistly,lp

g,u" !o !h9 Peopleh Commissariats (i.e. the minisffi,

the provincial and town committees ttre iignt to take part incourt cases against arrested communists. A-communist woutdbe decla.red.not guilty if two memb".. of in" purty Commit_tee testified in his favour. Secondly, Lenin diiected hisattention to the annulment of the icheka,s ,onopliy

-oi

secret activity. He finally accepted Trotsky,s proposal andon 21 October 191g signed a decree, creatini r';G;;;organ of Soviet military intelligence *i,i.h *., to be calledthe Registrationat DirectoratJ of the Field Siaff-J;;Republic.

- The newly created directorate did not increase or decreaie

the importance of the front and army intellig;;;;il;ii

merelv co-ordinated them. But at this time the directorate

Lrm tne creation of a new network of agents which would

History

active in countries all over the world, including those

,i*rhere the front networks already had active agents' The

iorsanization created in 1918 has, in principle, survived to

tbf present day. Certainly the founding rules are fully

ipplicaUte to our own time. These are, firstly,-.that eachi:iappllcaole [o our uw

, liiiituty staff must have its own independent intelligence set-

up. Secondly, the intelligence set-up of subordinate staffs is

ti U" futty under the command of the intelligence of superior

;rformations. Thirdly, the agent network must be part of the.

i,composition of thl generil staff intelligence network azd

, oart'of the composition of the front and fleet intelligence

, oeruices. (In peace+ime this means military districts and

troups of iorces.) Fourthly, diversionary intelligence is sub-

iiOiury to agent intelligence. It must be found on front or

flpet level, rnititury districts and groups of forces and also at

the level of armies and flotillas. And, fifthly and most

impoRantly, military intelligence mrrsl !e. quite separate

hom ttre organs of enforcement and their intelligence ser'

lvices. Since 1918, each one of these rules has been broken'att 'l*trt once, if not more often, but invariably the mistake has

i been summarily corrected.

"'' ,T'lr" creation of the GRU2 was not only an act of self-

r preservation on Lenin's part from the ravages of the Tcheka,

1 but ul* a concession to Trotsky. Having entrusted this

*."pon to Trotsky and the A*y, Lenin was careful too:-^- t.,^-^,,i^Li , eqorp it with a safeiy device by the name oJ Simon lvanovich

i'" Atalov, who came irom the V. Tcheka. On becoming chief

i1 lof the registrational directorate, Aralov formally remained a

i'i member of the collegium of the Tcheka. This step was taken

2 The GRU, like the KGB, has been through several name chqnge.s

in its tristory; at this time it was called 'R egistuupf , latgr '.Razucdupf ': ior our pt"sent putpos"s the nam€ GRU will be used consistently'

26 Soviet Military Intelligence

in the interests of subterfuge, and even up to the presentday has confused many researchers. Remaining formallywithin the Tcheka, Aralov, trom tne nrsi Jay of his work inmilitary intelligence, had to become "

ii".f .ra.on*"qu"ntiyenemy of the Tchekists. This had entered into ieniniscalculations; he had not been ,to* to-r."-that it would beimpossible for Aralov to avoid Uaify sfrirmishes with theTchekists on the most mundan" qulrtions, and that thiswould inevitably lead to a confront tio, *t i.t *oufO pi._:lld: lnylossibility of Aralov Ueing exptoited as a trustedTchekist. But this was not all. In thJcase of any ugr."r.niwith the Army, not one of the Armyt .rri"r, wourd dare totrust Aralov. The GRUwould be u purt of it

" Army but theArmy would not be able to,.f"'u." oiit. CnU i, tt.struggle against the party and the Tcheka.

Lenin's calculations proved themselves sound remarkablygui:kfy.. 11 the spring of 1919 the reinforceO army underTro5Lf's leadership gnen]f

-came out ag;nst the p*y,;

meddling in the affairi of- th". 4lry. a" unitea group ,oi

Army delegates, the so-called ,military Oplosition,, at theeighth congress of the prirry in tvtarcti tgi6, o"r.n ded defacto independence of the Army f-, p"rty influences. Atllal

tiye it was still permitted . "*p."r,

pJrsonat opinionsl9^p?rty conferences, and more than tOO^Oelegates'out oi269 declaredthemselves in favour of tt

" ,ifitr.y programme.

*fl:- ":i" widespread abstentions unJ tf," party and thercneKa tound themselves in a minority at their ownconference.Only a few votes were necessary to secure the complete

and legal victory of the,Army, but at tfris point the delegatesfrol tle.military intelligerrce service, f.'no*ing the h;;;;hand of Aralov, maintained an icy ,iL;; and srrict neu_trality. Then at the most dramatic ,o*"nt of the sessionAralov spoke critically of tfie military opporiiior, after whichthe delegates of the military inteifigell r"*i.. with one

History 27

ir'foice supported the Party. The number of supporters of the

i r,rrilitary opposition shrank to ninety'five, a clear defeat' The

sossion cfoieO with a victory for the Party' The military

'ooposition crumbled and many of its members never agam

toof any action against the Party. The Army had learnt a

i"..on. fn the strulgle against the Party, never count on the

support of the military intelligence service.' Emboldened by

l,victory, the Tcheka renewed its penetration of the Army'' Many unrepentant members of the military opposition.were

,o"tt"A and shot. The hurniliation of the Army inevitably

affected military intelligence too, and on 13 May 1919

il, thr T.t.tists executed members of the staff of military

i :intettigence in the 7th Army who had displeased them'

. fr{ifitaiy intelligence naturaily objected - sharply to the

I Tat"ku'. taking-the law into its own hands, and from thati,.'time on it was ils sworn enemy. [,enin was delighted' Military

I intelligence henceforth was an inseparable part-of the Army,

but itJchief was the personal enemy of both the Army and

the Tcheka. Anothei unwritten rule was established in the

organization of the GRU, too, which was that the chief of

th; GRU must be appointed only from among the senior

officials of the Tcheka secret police (historically known as

the V. Tcheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MGB, MVD

and KGB and unofficially as 'the Organs')' This rule has

t' also been broken several times, but the Party has always

been able to correct its mistake in time'. The agent network of the GRU was reinforced at almost

lightninispeed' There are several reasons for this' Firstly'

iisiAe iusiia after the Revolution, in her central provinces

alone, there were more than four million foreigners: Ger'

mans, Austrians, Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, Czechs,"Kore-

ans, Bulgars, Serbs, Croats and others' Most of them were

former p-riton"tt of war. More than three hundred thousand

of thernvoluntarily enlisted in the Red Army' There was no

need to recruit such people. The overwhelming majority

2928 Soviet Military Intelligence Historyof them were convinced, fanatical communists. Militaryllelli8ence simp_ly sent them off to their own countries astrKU agents. Secondly, after the Revolution Moscowbecame the Mecca of communism, and after the foundationof the comintern, communists from a[ countries flocked toMoscow. The Comintern openly declared ; td-;il il;destruction-of capitalism, and in this manifesto it was helpedfrom all sides, the Tcheka and the GRU in particutardeveloping their espionage activities. on the orders of theuomtntern,, thousands of communists spread into foreignstates worldwide under the contror of the'soviet int"ttig"nz"organizations. some of these, like the German communists|ictlaf Sorge and Karl Ramm, the Finnish communist OttoIu.tr.ni.n, the Hungarian Sandor Rado, are now well knownto- history, but thousands more remained unknown, activists

P::i* :1..l:ou:ty to tutfir the wil of Soviet interrig"n.".lnrrdty, after the Revolution millions of 6migr6s apieared.from Russia, all over the world. eny SoviJt intjflig"n."officer who had undergone the most elementary linguistictraining could move about freely from country to countrywithout attracting the slightest suspicion.

External circumstances favoured communism too. Afterthe First World War the world veereJ .frurpfy towardscommunist doctrines. Communist parties were strong andunited.- In Germany and Hungary there were communistrevolutions. The heat of the conflagration was f.t *iJ"ir,France and China. Soviet intelligen-ce skilfully exploited thesituation which was unfolding. The First Woria Wir also.leftbehind a legacy of "despair - the world h.d gi";;;;;;;;|telgwere.many people who had lost their hopes and ideals.Embittered and depresed, their recruitment presented no

I The Communist Interrpa,tiesoithe.;;;ilffi '#Hlx,;fl:Tfl

Ts{fl E.i[it.ili;,"""#Ti?i'Jworldwide commuiist revolution'.

difficulty whatsoever. In one of the early GRU instruction

m;;;;il there is the following advice: 'If you-need a facilities

,hgent (a radio operator, owner of a safe,ho::: :t-.tt:f:, ilt*il point) find a tall handsome man who has lost a leg

i'the needs of esPionage.'

,, T1r"r" were many elementary errors and failures in the

' ;;;k- of these early field officers who had no experience

whatsoever. For example, the counter'intelligence officers

, 'ot Litt oania, Latvia and Estonia, which at the time were

i"A"r."J"r, states' simply told any suspicious person who

.luiti.O to be a fugitive Russian officer; or engineer or

'do.tor, to tie a necktie. In 1920, by this method alone' more

if,an torty GRU agents were unmasked-in these three small

countries. fhe GRU was unPerturbed by these failur.es'

io*lu.t, its philosophy being tirat if it could not have quality

it would go tbr quantiiy. It was an astute calculation' If one

ug.na in"u hundred ient abroad showed himself to be

ifi"nt"a, and his natural talent made up for his lack of

eJucation, then that was enough' Nobody was worried about

ii. .g"",i *ho *"r. discovered' Let them get out 9f lhe,... Tt they could. The Soviet Union will never admit that

the people it sends out belong to Soviet intelligence'-_r[it iarge-scale attack wai highly successful' Out of the

30 Soviet Military Inrclligencethousands of intefligence agents sent abroad, some dozenbegan to give posi'live ,;i;;. ih; ;;p of communistsl?-ig atso begin.lo te]r.lradr.lrf qr"ri,y began to creeprnto the work of the GRU. On" tdit" first outstandinssuccesses was the. creation of the ,"_."rr.J- ur".ilririiEnterprises" or, as it was officially.rf[Oj, GRU documents,'the network of commerci"f unOJJffirl'. ru.oU Mrachkov_ski (his brother was a mernber of thetentral Committee)was sent to Germany where he organized a small shop anjthin a small factory,.SubsequeJi fr.lougr,t, in fictitiousnames, several factories-in France, Creat ti.ritair, au;;;;the United States and_fin"ly Ctir" iil. ,or"y put intothese undertakincs quickly gr;* ;;;;f", seueral years, theMrachkovski ,ri"rt.ringr;t;-;;'.1;; profits of tens ofmillions of pounds. rr,J ,noiey .;r;'was used by theGRU as its chief source of ,clean, ,o*V, that is, moneywhich had never been on SovietieniffianO consequently

l"_rld b:,*:9 for agents, operution..i, ,io,oon to obtainingmoney the Mrachkovski undertaking, *"i" widely used forthe legalization of newly. pqrt"J iri.ilig"i." om..rs who by

T*.*1. beginning ro be better traiied. fou_"ying-r.#country to countrv. they found help and support from theMrachkovski network. ih"y s;i;;;;;, jobs and aftersome months received the most laudatory references andwent off into other countries *fr"r" it"-'.;.;tng #;place' This went on untir the ug"ni"ur'uire to stand on hisown two feet. The security of ti. ,.t*or['*, ,o tight thatno undertaking ever suspected tne exisilnce of another.Mrachkovski himself trav;lled alt oue. tt "

*orld, buying upnew enterprises, installing one or two of his own people and. :!:aiyng perfectty tegal and hisht [rrlii"" ricences andpatents.

Relations with the Tchekists were gradually stretched totheir limit. The partv.was striving to"innaie the hostilirybetween the GRU ,na tn. o;ril ; ir"* Lenin made a

History

red themseives outstanding thinkers, theoreticians

success of this, as did his successors. The next conflict

out in the spring of 1920. Both Lenin and Trotsky

practical men; men of deep knowledge a1 regards

irv affairs and international relations. Naturally neither

noi th" other took any notice of evaluated intelligence'

y both demanded thai the intelligence material should,te fiiO before them 'grey' and unevaluated: they would then

'&aw their orun .on.lotions and analyse the material on the$l,basis of Marxist doctrine' But Marxism had very precisely

iinO "ut"gotically foretold that there would be a world'u'ar in

hurope it i.t would be the last war of mankind' Therirnperialist war would develop into a worldwide revolution'

'after which a golden age wbuld begin' Yet the war had

finisheO two yein befori and no worldwide revolution had

happenea. Inielligence reported that there were no :9":,91i:this'revolution coming about, so both Lenin and Trotskyl,rrcr. either compelled to admit that Marxism Yt. *lonF.o1',"to t"k" ,"".or"t to bring the revolution about' They decided

I to trigger off a revolution in Europe, starting with Poland'

.tnt"nlfen.e assessments were ignored, and naturally the

l,adveniure ended in complete failure. Both the organizers

''immediately started to hunt for a scapegoat' The only

possible explanation for the scandal was that the intelligence

service had done its work badly. Lenin announced to the

rank and file of the Party, 'We have suffered this defeat as a

.result of the negligence'of the intelligence service'' But the

GRU was a compGtety unknown entity, even to some of the

hi{hest represeniativei of the Soviet bureaucracy, and much

,6r. ,o to the rank'and'file Party members' All eyes turned

towards the Tchekists. Their unpopularity among the people,

even before this, was evident. After Lenin's announcement

their authority finally fell. Dzetzhinsky caused a scandaf in

the Kremlin and demanded explanations from the Politburo'

,,r In order to calm the Tchekists and to support his own

32 Soviet Military Intelligenceversion of the storv. Lenin permitted the Tchekists to purgethe GRU. The first bloody purge took place in November1920. on L.enin's gr.9r*

'drdr";;-;i il,"[ig"n., officerswho had allegedly faited to "";i;.;; situation corectlywere shot.

- Up to this time there had been no need to account for theGRU's activities, but now information was made availableto. some party members. This t u, rcO1or" specialists to the'mistaken conctusion that the Gnil;;;t exist untit thistime.However, the GRU did not take long to recover from the1920 purge, This may be exptained ffi;i by the facr that

thloygseSs organs of tn" CfrU **"'pr".ii.ally untouched,and this f<ir eminentry sound .""r*I. N"ither Lenin norTrotsky had any idea of ,f,ooting iii.'ini"ffig"r." of;ficers

$:-Y::", oY"T"1', .1?'

o:rv. bd;ih;r*;; ;,;ir*trnnocent, but also becarrse thiir deaths *ouia nur" "#rt"ilno salutary effect on others .in." ,oUoAy-*ould hear aboutthem, not even the many members of tlie i"nrrul Commit-tee. The other reason. for the qui.f. .""ouery of the GRUwas that its agent inteltigence nefu;;k iriiri,ir"ry districtswas also left untouched at tf," "na

oi-iie civil war, thefronts were transformed.into .ritit*y oili.[i.,, but the chainof command in the new districts aiJnt;;-r;;g, any essential:-!ung_..r.

A .registration^' A"purtriri'*", i".rrded on thestrength of the staff of each district "f,il continued inpeacetime to carry on agent int.ttig"r." *ort-*'."rr,".,

where the district *oura iar"i;-."il;;r;[hry activitiesin any future war. Uo.to the time oi ,tl ig2O purge therewere fifteen mititary'distri.t, .ra ,;ii;;, in the RedArmy. They a[ .uoild out, indffii.rily ir", each orher,agent intelligence work of a very inr.rriuJnltu...The internat military districts ;;';;'.iJ.iiion. rr,.rintelligence centres were moved out to the irontiers and itwas from there that the direction oi ug"; *s undertaken.

History

ion of activities of a frontier district is very precisely

; at the same time the internal district, independent

circumstances, may operate in different directions. Conse-

ently its agent network in peacetime operates in different

too. For example, in 1920 agents of the Moscow

33

lEach internal military district also has its_tasks in wartime,

irnd its intelligence work is based around these tasks' The

:"ivailable for intelligence. We are richer now than we were

then.

I.lfter 1977 Soviet military intelligence began to blossom'

This was the year in which the first five-year plan was drawn

l', up, which aimed (as all subsequent five-year plans have)

,,militarv district operated on the territoriei of Poland, Lithu-irnia

1at that time still independent) and Finland' This

',bystem has prevailed in all respects, except that-the districts

iahd fl..tt have become more nume.rous, as alsci has money

eiclusively at the growth of the military potential of the

country. 'ihe plan stipulated the creation and speedy growth

of the tank, ahip-building, aviation and artillery industries'

The Soviet Union set itself the target of creating the most

powerful army in the world. The Soviet leadeiship made

haste and demanded from its designero not only the creation

oi new kinds of weaponry and military technology, but also

that Soviet armaments must be the best in the world'

Monumental sums of money were spent to attain this aim:

practically the whole of Russia's gold reserves was thrown

into the task. At Western auctions the Soviet authorities

sold off Russian corn and wood, pictures by Rembrandt and

Nicholas II's stamp collection. A tidy sum of money was

realized.All GRU residents received bookJength lists of forefgn

military technology which they would have to steal in the

near future. The lists included equipment for bombers and

3534 Soviet Military Inteliigence

fighters, anti-aircraft.and anti_tank guns, howitzers and mor-tars, submarines and torpedo Uouti, ,.aio valves and tankengines, the technolopl for th" p;;il;on of atuminiumand-equipment for boring out gun barrels. yet another GRUtradition first saw tle.tighl Jf a"y ii-if,is period: that ofstealing analogous kinds-of u_.r*ni, ,i'tt. .ur" time indifferent countries and then ,r"ayirg ii", ,o select thebest. Thus, at the beginning of ,ii"-?gjAi, Soviet militaryintelligence succeeded-in I"""1i"g,rrpl", o. plun, of tor-pedoes in Italy, France, the Unlted fr;;;., Germany andGrear Britain. Ir was hardty ;rpilr;;i, ,h" soui", ,or_pedo, manufactured in the sirorterrp"riiUi" ,ire, conformedto the highest international ,t"rtilrOr.- Sometimes Sovietcopien selected the best assemUlies ani*rpon"nts andconstructed out of them a new type which often turned outto be the.very best in the world. Lr.f tr" *rs on the side ofSoviet military intelligence. Nobody toof ,..y seriously theefforts of the Soviet i-inion t, th" ;i,;; sph.re, and fewcountries went to ereat pains to hide tfr"i, .".r.t, from it.Communists the wirld 6r", ,r"r"- our;r; by the idea ofhelping Soviet intelligence, Soviet resiaenJs were able tothrow their monev round, and firrit th"';reat depressionthrew into the arms ot soui"i inijtg"r& thousands ofopportunists who feared losing their fu.iori"r, workshops or

l[*:; Soviet inteflisenle,. b] the d;;;; of the te30s,had. attained unprecedentea heigtrts "f ;;;;. wirhin Sovietterritory the GRU had practicjly

"" iJiiL, influence. Inthe international sohere it did not;;ry;; seek to enterinto the poriticar riie of parties..ij;#iil, in the fierd.ofctean eqpionage the GRU-.trilr;,r;;il'#upied the tead-ing position in the wo1ld, f,uJin!-uy'fliorertak"n thepolitical intelligence work of ,f,. dCp'u.l, ,r," beginningof the 1930s the GRUbuag"t,".. ,;iui ,ir", targer thanthe overseas budget or trrJ ocit_1,-iirir',i*.,ion remainstrue today.

The system in use today of recruitment and running of

Bnts h;d aheady fully developed by the end of the 1920s'

agent organizations directly subordinated to the GRU the

,riitr"nt- and running of agents was in the hands of

tllegals', that is, GRU officers posted abroad undercover

rwitti torgea documents and offices, posing as Soviet diplo-:mats, co-nsuls, trade representatives, correspondents and so

,on.Inagentorganizationssubordinatedtomilitary-districts

History

and fleeti the recruitment of agents was carried out from the

embassies. This was a very serious mistake' With the begin-

; ttrritoty of the Soviet Union. Only rarely did certain officers

iOf ,t. intelligence directorates of districts travel abroad

i'with forged d6cuments for short periods' Before diplomatic

']. recogniilon of the Soviet Union, emphasis.was concentratedil,on tf,e activities of illegals, but after its recognition, under-

I couer residencies were idded to the numerous illegal reside-

l,'ncies. The GRU illegals and undercover residencies acted

I independently from eich other but in the Pf-wa1p"":i 1l', communications of illegals from GRU residencies with the

, Centre were frequently accomplished through the Soviet

ning of the war when the embassies were closed or block-

adJd, the communication with illegals was disrupted' The

mistake was subsequently rectified. Military district intelli-

gence always operated independently of the GRU illegals

Ind Soviet embissies, and for this reason at the beginning of

the war it was practically unharmed. Gradually a tendency

became noticeable in the operations of military district

intelligence services to limit the use of Soviet officers even

for shirt trips abroad. Faced with wartime conditions the

military district intelligence services began to recruit and run

their agents only from Soviet territory. The recruitment of

new ag-ents was carried out either on Soviet territory or on

the teiritory of neighbouring countries by me4ns of agents

who had been recruited earlier.

36 Soy iet Mititary Intelligence

There is an interesting story to be told about the recruit-ment of agents at this time, whose moral holds.r;;;;;.In the pre-war period, recruitment a* ;; little time. TheComintern simply made a decision unA jr'r"Aiutely

scores,sometimes hundreds of communists became Soviet secretagents. In the interests of successful agent *rrt, ii" -Ciii

always demanded from them that theysiiould prbli.lr;;;from the communist. party_ The vast'majority accepted thiswithout demur. Aftir ail, it. was

"r,r-; camouflage, aBolshevik manoeuwe to help defeat ,f"'.frs enemy. Some_times however, there were communists who were unwilling.11

c"Tlny,one group agreed to the GRU, d.,n;;J;-;;iyon condition that it was accepted into the Corrunisi furt!of the Soviet Union..The demand ,"u, , ,irpl. one, for it isnot difficult for the GRU to write out u O'or., ;; ;;;tycards, and as the new agent group was working ,o ,ui.aor,-fully, the GRU did not want to reiuse. At a routine meetingthe GRU case officer, an employee of the Soviet embassy inBerlin, informed the group'jr".o"r ttui trr"ir demands hadb:"T r.j.lt_. congratitated til ;;;il;; i..oring membersof the CPSU and informed tnlm, inl.on.fusion, that theGeneral Secretary of the party trimsett, .orruO" Stalin, had

XY_r:lrhe p3rty cards- As un .*..pional case, theuerman communists had been accepted without goin!through the candidacv s1aqe. Theirparty'cardr r".r. naturallyto be kept in the Ceniral Lommittee. ' ----'

- fr tni3.news the group's productivity redoubled. It wassupposed to receive a certainium of money for its work, buithe group members refused to acceptih;ri_"y. More thanthat, they began to hand over to tieir case-offi..r, sums of:*,1^"::. T^r]!I: in.order to pay trreir memuership fees torne Jovlet communist oarty. punctually they handed over totheir case officers all'document. *i O"i.UO, concerningtheir earnings together wirh their p.rtyGU.lfptions. Thistook up a $eat deal of time during tfre ageii meetings, but

History 37

the Germans were working very productively and nobody

: wanted to offend them.

i Some time later, the Gestapo got on their trail, but all the

il,urembers of the group managed to escape into Austria, then

Ito Switzerland anO finally through France to Spain where

the civil war was going on. From Spain they were brought to

Moscow. ferriUle disippointments awaited them in the capi-

tal of the proletariat of all the world, the chief of which was

that nobody had at any time written out their party cards, or

accepted them into the Soviet communist party' The GRU

officials had of course assumed that the agents would never

set foot in the Soviet Union and that therefore it would be

very easy to dupe them. Howevet' on their arrival in

Moicow,-the first ihing the agents did was to declare a hunger

strike and demand a meeting with the higher leadership of

the GRU. The meeting took place and the GRU leadership

did all in its power to help the Germans join the party, after

going through the candidate stage, naturally. But foreigners

Ian -onty

bE accepted in the CPSU through the Central

Committee, and the natural questions arose: 'Were you ever

members of the communist party? Why did you leave it?'

The fanatics told exactly what had really happened but were

damned out of their own mouths. To burn one's party card

is a cardinal sin - and the Central Committee threw out

their application. The Germans again declared a hunger

strike and demanded a meeting with Stalin in person' Atthis point the NKVD offered its help to the Central Commit-

tee,'but the GRU intervened, being in no way desirous that

its agents should fall into the hands of the NKVD' So the

ex-agents ended up in the GRU cellars.

Inlhe meantimi, the political situation had changed shar-

ply. Hitler had become Stalin's best friend and the commu-

nists likewise friends df the fascists. There ensued 'an

exchange of gifts * the most up-to'date German military

aeropla-nes foiStalin (including the top secret MEl09, JU87,

38 Soviet Military Intelligence History

on the GRU's fulfilling its promises; and they forgot

ithat ii iomebody puts a high enough price on the head of an

;!geni, however good he may be, the GRU will sell him

without hesitation.

In the meantime the Party, under the leadership of Stalin,

iarrived face to face with the ultimate necessity of subjugating

all layers of Soviet society and utterly eradicating dissension.

The decision was taken by the Party to purge the whole

itaken the decision to create a special security commission

r,:for carrying out mass repressions in the country, which took

lrplace in 1937 to 1938.

For almost two years the Special Commission prepared

,, th.e most bloody page in the history of mankind. Its members

i were Stalin, Zhdanov, Yezhov, Shkiriatov, Malenkov and

39

JU88, DO2|T,HBlll and even the M8110) in exchange forthe surender of all Germ-an ."r*riiro who had takenpolitical asylum in the Soviet Urir;. i;ii;r,s calculation wasvery simpre. In the short time uetore war broke out, theRussians woutd not.be able to *pt;;pi;res, but he wouldhave the heads of his potiticat #p;;;;, It was a fruitfuldeat for starin too. H9 was uor"iiit'r,-ice German commu-nists and now he wo.un u9 able to;i;;th;* to the cestapoin exchange for the Uest-Cerman-;rril;"r. In addition tothe ordinary members, there were m;il;"-i*"H#;C-entral Committee and the p"fitUrr","t"gether with theeditors of the communist newspap;;. Til" were not takento Germany, but the Gestapo

""', t"rJ'ii.ourd shoot themin situ, in the Moscow area. However, as far as the formerGRU agents were concerned, the a..irion had been takennot to hand them over. They inew too-rr.t . TIr; 6;;;embassy in Moscow was informeJ ,i"i iiiey r,rilidl.d;;Spain and had never got as far as Moscow. The fascists did

1gt o.bject. but suggJsted they ,rourJl."..nr one moreaircraft at the same pn1 Unfortunui.ly,.tt. former agents,1r3,

kroyns anything.about tfre Uaffiing that was goingon, again declared a hunger strike, irJ-iii, decided theirfate. The Soviet side-.nowidmitted to ,h.;;.*iT; ,h.ywere in Moscow and proposea u .orprorise. The fascists' could shoot their victims in tr," soui.i u;;;; without tarkingto them. The execurion- 1o9k pfu." uroig the huge coalbunkers of the Kashierski ff..iJ. po*""r't,rrion. Before-

l1{: ,!. Gestapo men had p"rrorufiy ru.ntified each of thepeople to be execut.l.ung pirorogr.fir"J nrrn; then, undercover ofprotracted whistling of fJ"oinoii""r, ,f,"y shot thematt. Afterwards, joint a.t..i'r.ni, "iii.'Ciru, the CentratCommittee of the Soviet :rr;i,ii n.r,;o rhe Gestapoburnt the bodies in the turnaces of the power station.The Germans, mistake ,"u, tt.r.toia-I iiey uetieveO tooquickty in the promises of tne cRtf; it.y tnrirt.o too .

country of potential dissidents. Today we have irrefutableproof that the 'Great Terror' was carefully planned and

ii,prepared. On the testimony of A. Avtorhanov the Central

l 'Committee of the Party had, as long ago as 13 May 1935,

' Voyshinski. [t is interesting to note that the then head ofNKVD, Yagoda, was not a member of the Commission, and

this was a sensible move. Before carrying out its massive

bloodJetting of the whole of society, the Party took pains to

, purge the surgical instrument itself, the NKVD organs. The

purge began secretly as early as 1935 and at that stage

ioncerned only the organs and the overseas residencies ofthe NKVD. In order not to fr.ighten anybody, it was carried

out secretly and without public trials. Naturally it was the

GRU which was entrusted with the task of purging the

NKVD overseas organs. In 1935 Yan Karlovich Berzin,

- the GRU's chief, travelled to the Far East with special

powers and a group of trusted helpers. Secret orders appoint-

ing one I. S. Unshlikht and later S. t Uritski as chief of the

GRU were issued. But no order was issued for Benin to

relinquish his post. [n other words, the appointment of

40 Soviet Mititary Intelligence

Uritskirvas simply a cover_up for the long absence of Berzin.In the Far East Berzin and his assistani;;ecretly liquidatedthe leading illegals of the NKVD. in-tle followin g yearBerzin, with his assistants, .pp.*"d-ii Spain. His officialjob was Chief Advisor to the Siunirt Coulrnment, a post inwhich he was extremely active. firsUy, fre endeavoured todirect the activities of ihe Spani.f, CJn*rent along linesfavourable to Moscow. Secondly, fr. p"iroruUy ran fromSpain the whole of the overseas;il,i.-;i rhe GRU. Andfinally, he did not forget his most irpiJunt task. The head9f j.he.Foreign Directorate of the NfiVO, Slutski, was alsoin spain, arso personafly supervising-itre activities of ail hisiverseas agents. In all probabilitytlutski was aware thatBerzin and the GRU had .orn. .orn..iion witfr the mysteri_ous disappearance of NKVD ilregars. Evidence has beenpreserved which shows that Slutski and Berzin had clashespractically every day.in Spain.Ilower.r, o ttre same time,the intelligence chief of the.NKvD-r"u.'nnaing himselfincreasingly

-subject to the chief of soviei military intelri_gence. At the end of September 1936 the NKVb chiei,Yagoda, was dismissed fr-o1 Li, pil;; the secretary ofthe Crntral Committee of^the party, E;ir;, was appointedin,his place. Ezhov himself began a ,"rt .*.f purge of theNKVD - and he no lglegr rIqrir"J ir,L-;;i.;.";#;;GRU. More than 3,000 Tchekists *"i" ,tr, on Ezhov,sll1!:l including yagoda and Stutski ttremsefres. It is inter-estmg to.note that yagoda's death followed an open trial,but Slutski was murdeied secretly, i, ;h; ,;r" way as hisillegal residents had b"-"n

"*"cui"A-pi"rio*fy. After thel11{, jo rhe person of Ezhov

"rO '*,iif,-iie

help of theC\U, -tra!

purged the NKVD, ,t" ,ir"-."r" fo, t[. arryto be dealt with. This porg" b"gu, with til; fiquidarion ofthe generat staff- and tfie c6mpJte d.r;;;, of the GRU.Among those militarv leaders nrrt .r..utJ together withMarshal Tukhachevs[i were army commanders yakir and

History

i and cooks on its payroll. Berzin, back from Spain, had to re-

i create the GRU from scratch.

4t

Uboreevich and Corps Commander Putna, the Soviet mili-

tary attacne in Lond-on. As might-be e-xpected, all militaryiaitu.net are GRU officers; but Putni.was not simply 1

,'*iliiurt attach6. Until his ippointment to.London he hadi

been oeputy chief of the GRU' His execution served as an

f ;;; "*.url

for the NKVD to carry out a special purge in

l, it "

runf.t of the GRU. Hatred which had been collecting fori,ruoy V"rrs at last came out into the open Il t|:.:":.*" "1, tt "

pors" first the acting head of the GRU, Uritski' was

Lrr"rt"dund shot, and after him all the rest' The NKVD

; ,iJ Cnu now exchanged roles. NKVD men with special

,;r po*ttt went around the world destroying L":1,GRY:199*'and also those intelligence officers of the GRU and NKVD

who had refused to return io ifr" So'itt Union and certain'

destruction. In the course of the 1937 purge the GRU was

completely destroyed - even down to the lavatory attendants

I By the autumn of 1937, by a special effort of the Comintern

i'- particularly in Spain with JLe--h:lp. and coerc$ -tll:

Iniernationaiftig"'d.t - the GRU had somewhat recovered

iir ttt.ngt. A lear later Soviet military intelligence had

,etorn"dlo its stbrmy activities. But in the summer of 1938'

in the course of a iecond wave of terror, the GRU was

alain destroyed, losing its entire,strength' This time Berzin

tr,imsetf, one of the cleverest and most successful leaders the

GRU has had, was among the victims'

The blow delivered automatically meant a blow to all

orjanizations subordinate to the GRU, that is to the in-

teligence directorates of the military districts' Here the

dea-h-dealing whirlwind came twice, literally destroying

.everything. iuring the pre-war yean, in the areas of western

,iiiiury d'istricts iire inielligence directorates had extended

the existing reserves of underground armies in case of the

4342 Soviet Military Intelligence Historyoccupation of these areas by an enemy. Secret depots andstores of weapons and explosives hia been established,radio sets had been secretei and refuges for partisans andintelligence officers had been set up. in tt" terror, aU thiswas destroyed, a.nd tens of thousands of trained partisansand. saboteurs, ready to meet the enemy, were shot orperished in prisons and.concentration camps. Military intelli-gence ceased to exist. And not only military intelligence; theArmy had been bled white, and military inOustryltoo.'guiEzhov, the head of the NKVD, had made a fataimistake infking Berzin's place when he was executed on 29 July 193g.

}:-y.ry-n:Iday, Stalin received only one report on bothGRU and NKVD activities, instead oi the usual two. Theimplication was clear:

-a monopoly of secret activity hadbegun, and Stalin now had no *ay'to balance the power ofthe NKVD. With his customary precision anO OetiUeratioihe realized that his control of S&ift int"lfi!*ce was stippingaway and the same day, 30 July, he set ii train tt

" &Lnti

which would lead to Ezhov,s removal and execution.In the winter of. 1939t40 there occurred an improbable

scandal. The Red A*y, whose strength at the moment ofthe attack was more than four milliori men, was unable tocrush the resistance of the Finnish A*y, whose ,rr.igihwas only 27,0U men. Reasons for this wire quickly fouiO-Of course there was th,e cold. (The Germa, A'rry,r:right';claim the same reason for its defeat in the winter of l94l wasunanimously denied.) The second reason was the intelligenceservice. In all Soviet historical works (which may be-pub-[S..d :ily wirh th_e permission of ttre iropiganAa Oeiart-ment of_the Party Central Committee), even t"o tt i, day, the -::t9

,:d poor intellig-ence are the reaions always given.'The -

Party.tbrgets to specify that from 1937 to 1939 Slvi-et militaryintelligence was practically non-existent, at tte fartf,, o*iwish.

After the Finnish scandal, Stalin did not order a purge of

GRU. It is probable that at that time there was nobody

pd;; uri i," still ordered I11:""'Y1i9o :t:::'.:l;il;;;,ih" new head of the GRU, and his staff becau-se

Proskurov's disagreement with him over the Hitler-Stalin

Jt. tn lon" Lg4dGeneral Filipp Golikov was appointed

i"f of ,t" GRU. Under Golikov the GRU was reborn

I"iiigry qrickty into an effective intelligence force' There

hiG."r'.irch sieculation about this period' D^td !h:,91:,l;;;iilplans for Germany's attack on the Soviet Unionlt'ii",i rt

" 6"riunt*.t to thequestion must-lie in G-olikov's

i&;;;;i;;i-s.;;, leaders before him and two after him'

*.rL ,*ta"red, yet he went on to become Stalin's D:.p.yt{

,ii'.tt*".f and"Marshal of the Soviet Union' The political

il;.;hi may not take the right decision' -eveL.mtlr,tle

;;1"6;""tion that Golikov could give, but it will not bite

:, ihe hand that feeds it.The war had begun with a catastrophic defeat for the

'Soni.i Union. In i-he first few hours the German Army

rr..""A"J in securing a strategic initiative'. Thousands of

serviceable aircraft were destr6yed on their airfields and

,'thousands of tanks burned in their own parks''"il;;t h*e been that Stalin spared Golikov in order to

gi* f,iit a testing assignment' He was certainly told to

iuf. t im.ett abroa-d and revive and renew the GRU agent

*i*ort which had been cut off immediately. He went first

io B"gf*O and then to the United States and' to give him

hitl;, this time he succeeded in carrying out his work in

an exemplary manner. For his visits to Great Britain and the

United States tre naturally did not use faked documents' He

came, with a numerous antouttgt, as the head of an official

-i;;i;i military delegation to obtuin American and British

urrurn"ntt. rlr ttre itrier of the GRU and his colleagues the

ooom or secret factories and laboratories were opened -the

"..y pi".* S"viet intelligence had been trying for decades

i"ifuii.,.. This historical visit was the beginning of intense

44 Soviet Military Intulligencepenetration by Soviet military intelligence of the armamentsindustries of Americ.a ana giitain.

-6;iil, atso succeeded,

1ll.:l :lty temporarily, in ".tuurirr,iif ilrruni.utions withGRU iltegals who weie tunctionint oi iJrrirory occupied byGermany; but this_also signail#tf,r't"ginning of GRUpenetration of the German general statr from many differentquarters. The consequences of this were tt ut,

"U"giriin;with $talingrad, even top secret pt.n. oitt" German HighC"ommand were known io Soviei front_line generals beforethey were known to the cermr;;;il;;anders. And the.Soviet mititary teadership *., ;q;;iiy-;rfightened as to theplans of its allies, the Americani .rd ru-b.irish. Churchillbears witness to the fact that $;il-;;;rerated severalpoints as to the contents of British ,op ,..i., plans, thoughhe attributes such enlightenr"ni ro Sr-u'firi g.nim in foresee-ing the tuture. The on-ry thing thai il;;;;L. is why Statindid not display a simitai.hd"yad Jrt ,"grrO to Hitter,sintentions in t94t and the b"gr;iil;i';;;.In the autumn of. t94t coilko;;:turn;d;* the United

ll.lll-.-"*her exceptionatty successrJ Jilir. H. could nor,ot course, expect to keep his post, but he stayed alive, andeven kept his General's rank. On fg O"t"i"; he was relievedof the command of the GRU ,rd"p;;;;;; commander ofthe 10th Anny.Iater, in 1944, starin gave Gorikov yet another chance to

:*plu(" his guilt with regard to the sudden-G"rrun attack.In October he was aoooi-nted pf"ripolrti.ry of the Councilof People's Commissars on euestion, of ii"'n.patriation ofSoviet Citizens. At the same time as f,. *u, ffii.i _,ththis task severat of the former ;.;td;il; the GRU inEurope were assigned to him. u" ".q"iitJ himself again

f1! -Sreat credit and, being able ,"

"rr'ru ""-rhe help of theGRU, succeeded in returning to rhe a;;; Union severatmillion people who were practically all shot on arrival.

History

ikov's career was on the up and up, and he eventually

the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

In the autumn of 1941, after Golikov had relinquished his

bost, ttre G'RU was divided into two. One of the newly-

iieated organizations was directly answerable to Stalin and

tntitled the Chief lntelligence Directorate of the Supreme

High Command. In the hands.of this organization was

coicentrated the agent network controlled by illegals and

45

liindercover residencies of the GRU in a small number of

,r,Sbviet embassies. The 'other' GRU was subordinated to

trate all its attention on carrying out intelligence operations

ir against German forces' In order to distinguish between the

, two GRUs; the term 'strategic intelligencet was introduced

for the first time and applied to the GRU of the Supreme

Command, and the new title of 'operational intelligence'

was given to the Intelligence Directorate of Fronts and the

GRU of the general staff which controlled these directorates'

Both the strategic and operational intelligence services of

the Red Army conducted themselves with great distinction

in the course of the war. The finest achievements of the

strategic agent network were of course the penetration of

the German general staff through Switzerland (via the illegal

residency 'Dora') and the theft of American atomic secrets

by way of Canada (through the residency 'Zaria'). Oper'

aiional intelligence meanwhile developed activities unparal'

leled in scale. Besides its agent intelligence, a very large role

M Soviet Military Intelligence

was allocated to diversiondry intelligence. Groups of guard-minelayers were fornned in the intelli-gence units of the frontsand armies whose basic purpose ias to hunt down theGerman military staff. parailet wittr ihese Oiversionaryelements of the GRU, analogous group, of NKVD menwere in action at the rear of the Girman forces. Betweenthese two.groups the traditional enmity fostered br,h;;;;iontinued.

After the-war, military_intelligence was once again fused intoone organization, GRU General Staff, whichlnO"prrO"nliycarried out strategic intelligence and directed oierationjand tacticar inte[igence. Ai this time the party and Starintook care to weaken.the Army and the Ministry .f S;;lecurity, both of which had strengthened thef positionsduring the war to such an extent

-that they had'stopped

acknowledging the civil leadership, i.e. tne farty. fne ieaA-ing commanders, headed by Zhukov, *"i" Oi.ri.red fromtI. 4rry and Beria was-alio deprived of the leadership ofthe Tchekists. It would obviously not be a simpte ,uttr. toexpel him, so Stalin technically-promoted tini, uppoiniir!his deputy to succeed him, Uui in fact this Jep.irda' hi, ;?direct leadership of the Organs of State because his title ofminister was taken away. Within tne fiamework of theprogramme for weakening. the Army and the Ministry oiState Security, Stalin deci-ded ,o ,"rou.lnielligence fromboth the Army and Sgle Seguriry. This plan was put intoeffect in 1947, T\e GRU and the organs iipoliticat intelli-,s:ic'"^"1-,1.

Ministry 9f sjale sgcurif were joined rogether

rn one organization called the KI: the committee of"Infor_mation. The man closest to Stalin was appointed to lead thisorganization, and this was the activisi'of the politburo,Molotov. Thus the Army and Ministry of Stut" S".u.iiywere deprived of ihtelligence. All inteliigence work wouldhenceforth be subordinaie to the rurty- si.r,-u ritruiionJii

History

rnot suit the Army or the Ministry of State Security' and they

the first time united against the Party'

Frgm its'inception the Committee of [nformation was an

Utteriy inefective organization. The intelligence officers of

ii" r,ii"iriw of State- Security an! lhe GRU, wtro f9rryfiii;; ;;;i";jof the committee of Information, strove by all;*"unr

to return from under the control of the Party back to

their own former organizations. Both sets of officers strove

io r"Uot"g" the actiiities of the Committee^of Information'

Ift.,f*Aini".try of State Security and the Army, acting in

,:aoiruSon, iniormed the Centrai Committee that they could

;; b"t; work effectively since they were receiving their

'informition at second hand. Then they exerted pressure on

their former officers in oider to try to make the Committee

oiintorrution collapse from inside' The Central Committee

;i ah" Party made "itortt

to improve the effectiveness of the

io.mitte" of Information. Irless than a year four chiefs

were appointed and dismissed, for the reason that not one

of them was able to counter the unified strqngth of tlefrfmi.tty of State Security and the Army' AAer long struggles

u"frinOifr" scenes Abakumov, a pupil and favourite of Beria'

became Chief of the Committee of Information'- et u stroke, all the intelligence services passed !9 t!'

control of the ivtinistry of Stati Security. Stalin immediately

r." CI" a mistake irad been made' In his opinion' the

.r"rti", of one intelligence service, even if it was under

ifre feuO"tsfrip of the Pirty, must sooner or later lead to the

Tchekists t.ting power over this organization, and this

*ouiJ ,ottully -endanger the Party' There was only one

*"V "ri"t ,u.h . sitiation: immediately to liquidate the

C#mittee of Information and divide the intelligence service

into two hostile camps - military intelligence to the Army'

and political intelligence to State Security' But the coup was

il; easy one.-To get round the problem' the Party

naturally found support from the Army which had not

48 Soviet Militory Intelligence

F.L.u, all happy with State Security's monopoly of theintelligence service. On the instructions of Stalin, the firstdeputy of the chief of the general staff, General Shtemyenko,made a report to the politburo on the subject of the ,blindgeneral stafiP, after which the GRU was removed from thecontrol of Abakumov and given to the Army. For hisdistinguished services, Stalin immediately appointld Generalshtemyenko as chief of the generar stafr- ihe senior curatorof the GRU. After two yeirs Shtemyenko and the GRU,seeking' to please Stalin, presented documents about theexistence of an agreement among subordinates of Abak-umov. Abakumov was immediately shot, the Committee ofInformation finally abolished, and the usual purge carriedout in the ranks of State Security.

But -the Ministry of State Slcurity did not forgive the

general staff and the GRU for having taken such liberties.1952was a year of struggle between the politburo and Stalin.The Ministry of State Security presented documents whichtl,"y_{tT"! proved the existenie of a plot in rhe ranks ofthe GRU. This time it was the turn of the GRU and all thegeyyl lrfjo be purged. Stalin was opposed to the move,but the Politburo insisted. Shtemyenko'was demoted to Lt_General and expelled from the general staff. The actioncontinued against the general staff and the GRU, and evenagainst Stalin himself who was removed as general secretaryof the Communist Party later that year.

^ +.t thg beginning of 1953, immediately after the death ofStalin, there ensued a fierce squabble among his disciplesand comrades at arms for the diJtribution of trie inheritance.

3.. r:, dangerous pretender to the throne was, of course,Beria. The united strength of Army and party was automati_cally against him. Beria *as arreited at a joint ,"sioo ofllny una Army leaders and immediately done away with.AJter this there began the usual p"r.".uiion of the brgansof State. During secret trials, incriminating documents were

49History

nroduced from the GRU concerning the leaders of thethiffit,y

"fi;.-i..otity and many oi its leaders Yt:-tlg

'Iif i'itilitui-il;;;. ihe torture was carried out in the

';iiiJ;;l"^ on Gogol Boulevard' At the beginning of 1954

;;ffistry ot statJSecurity lost its status as a ministry and

li was transformed into a committee'

' "li*oit.neously

with the fall of the Ministry,9f q::fSecurity, the Army acquired more and more weight wllhin

;il;;il;rk of ihe iiut". rni'Russian Bonaparte" Mar-

,[ur 7t uto", became Mini't"t of Defence' having returned

il", t i. exill under Stalin' After a slort lqrg Zl:T',*:i il;;#.";"il". "t1ii"

iolitburo' He quicklv effected the

return of all the exiled generals and marstrals i"d T tiil-:1them to key positiont. h" Ministry of State Security could

not exercise any restraint on Zhukov and he was therefore

;;i" ;; "pp"ini

Shtemyenko to the post of Chief of the

dnU,-t"i:nLo,ing him as a full general-after his demotion'

The GRU became an organization solely. dependent om the

ei*y. Zhukov's next stef, was-a blow.against Party influence

ilil; et "v'

On his od"tt all political workers and Party

commissars were expelled from in" Amy' He also ordered

il;-bil;i Political Directorate of the soviet Army to stop

interfering any more in Army affairs' and at the same

i*"liqrii"eo all ttre special d"Puttt"ntt of State Security

"."..ri i" the Army. The crocodile was clearly throwing off

lffi;;;;l il P;iil;'" sessions Zhukov openlv contradicted

Khruschev and PubliclY abused him'--

ft e farty understood how rashly it had behaved in depriv-

id A; rcg ot power' since thl Party.alone was clearly

l""t"*"r..t againsi the Army' There was absolutely no doubt

;i;;;"ty soo"n the Armv wluld u:-1ot: the only master.of

itre situation. But in (ictober 1957 Zhukov committed a

!iur" "rror. He went on a visit to Yugoslavia and in his

ib."n.", a plenum of the Central Committee of the Party

was hurriedly convened' Zhukov was secretly removed from

50 Soviet Military Inklligencethe Politburo and also from his duties as Minister of Defencebecause of ,bonanarti*,.

Th; .l;;i "i

ii" cnu, GeneralShtemyenko, learneatery seni a tG;j,:'ff:ffi; i:.#ffi xl tlrxri,f:but it was intercenred by the Ket Ai,k;v returned fromYugoslavia straisht into-renewed e*if r. ifri"ryenko followedhim, again reduled to the rank ;i ["#;;r-general. (Somesurvive vicissitudes better ttran oifieis:*unoq Brezhnev,Shtemyenko was again ,.irrt.i"i.ir'vrur

I

Now once more the post of chief of the GRU was held bv ameSnber of the KGb, Iv_an seror,. ilr-.;i;;h;"*dir;:r]9_.9: according to Lenin,s ,.""ijrg.. Serov, on hisappomtment, automatically turned into "u,

arch_rival andenemy of the KGB. and was not in the last interested inthe fusion of these two organizations. fut since he had beena general of the KGp,lry_Arry .ouflnot exploit him1-slnrlthe

party and the rCs. T#t;;il ail. rn order tocontrol the Armv in.th: int"rotr-of-rt""funy, GeneralGolikov, the former crriet oiJrre a;r;, ,"u", uppoinr.d chiefof the Politicat Directorate of the SovLt ;;;y. Golikov wasa former Tchekist and potiticai;;rk*;;;'i. ,"u, ready toserve anybody who Oeiireo tris services .ij a report onlythe data which woutd ptease th"i;J;fip] su.r, a personwas eminently suitable is far as th; p;;;s concerned.Serov's successor as _chief-oi1il'6iu was Colonel-General of the KGB,-petr fr.rf,riir.-C.ierat yepishev,who had been from 1951 to rg5i;;*y"iijnirt.. of StatCSecurity, succeeded Golikov ,, *,Ii'"i?r,e political Direc-torate of the Soviet 1*y. tn u ,nora,

"tie crocodile wasagain firmly on the leash.

The Pyramid

,If we approach the term GRU in a formal way in order to'explain everything that is covered by those three letters, we

. shill get a very impressive picture but one that is far

'from iomplete. To look at the GRU in isolation from its

subordinaie organizations is to look at Gengis Khan without

his innumerable hordes.The GRU may formally be described as an immensely

powerful intelligence organization forming part of the gen-

eral staff and acting in the interests of the higher military: command of the Soviet Union. On its strength there areI rnore than five thousand senior officers and generals who

have specialist academic qualifications in intelligence mat-

ters. The GRU has its illegal representatives in every countryI of the world. [n addition, officers of the GRU operate under

cover in every country of the world as diplomats, military

attach6s, trade representatives and so on. Both the illegals'

and the undercover officers independently from each other

carry out the recruitment of agents, who then, under the

direction of the GRU steal top-secret documents, axe

governments and kill statesmen. The central apparatus of

the GRU processes espionage information coming from a

thousand secret agents and it also carries out cosmic, elec'

tronic, air and sea intelligence on a global scale.

But we have not mentioned the most important point yet.

Up to now we are talking about Gengis Khan but not his

hordes. What is more important is that, in addition to all

this, in addition to carrying out intelligence work in the

interests of the general staff, the GRU is also the superior

52 Soviet Military Intelligence

direcling organ of the gigantic formation cailed Soviet miri-tary intelligence.

.O.rganizationally, the Soviet Army consists of sixteenmilitary districts, fo-u1,g.oups of forces, _ in Germany,Poland, Hungary and czechoirovakia - and four fleets - theNorthern, Pacific, Brack sea and Bartic fleets. on the staffstrengths of each district, group and fleet there are inte[i-gence directorates. In all, these directorates numbertwenty-f9ll.n.y are all subject to the GRU and are, in effect, aGRU in miniature. Each of these mini-GRUs utilizes itsown facilities. With all the forces at their disposal, theygather information on the enemy, both in peacetime andwartime.

When we speak of an intelligence directorate of a district,group or fleet as a mini-GRU, this does not in the leasimean that the intelligence directorate is small or weak. Weonly mean that the intelligence directorates (RU) of staffsare smaller than the chief directorate of the general staff.But each of these twenty-four intelligence directorates is

::[.l"lr$lTe ,t be abte to recruit -agents

inaepenaentryln me territories of countries or groups of countries whicirare in the sphere of interest of th-e given district, group o,6"s1. F,gch intelligence.directorate pdr"sre. sum"i"it porn.,to be able, without assistance, ro disrupt life in any *'nti!u-ous-country or group of countries. There is only one form"ofintelligence possesserl by the GRU which th; inte[it;;;*:::::::r 1g :o, possess, and this is cosmic o, ipu..lnteilrgence. At the same time, instead of this, they have a

f*-1p-r_":]::: imporrant means, which are the diversionaryJpetsnaz units. In addition

. to ordinary agents providini

secret information, the intelligence directora'tes recruit spefcial agent-terrorists destined io murder statesmen or seniormilitary officers and to carry out general terror in tfre counifi9r group of countries. Thus each district, group of forces oifleet has its own two independent secret ug".nt r"t*orks, the

The Pyramid 53

fust being the ordinary espionage.network, and the second

fi;-;pffi .g.+errorisinetwork ialled Soyn11' r1;:fl':iiii" ,ii*gtt of one intelligence directorate, it is suffrcient to

ierne*Ui that each one clontrols ah entire Spe*naz brigade:

i,iOO ptot"tsional cut'throats continually in readiness to

pun.trii" tte territory of a contiguous state and go to the

assistance of the agent-terrorists.l--d;;;;" best iiragine Soviet military intelligence in the

' to* of u powerful, ieudal state --the GRU..; "i1!-i fi::t:

',il;; -*y:There are twenty-four lesser satellite states' the

;,intelligence directorates (RU), subordinated to the head of

;hi;;i;i;, and each of these in its turn has its own army' and

, "'tit*g L"" at that. But each satellite also has its vassals

", "u"-t,

of"from has his own aimy and his own vassals' also

*iit "t*i.t, and so forth. The-only difference as regards

ttrir pyt"rii form of subordination is that Soviet military

intelliiience does not operate on the nnn{npltrat'the vassal

oiry"uu*d is not my vassal'. The GRU fully and without

a.f.iuting authority tontrols every step of the pyramid'

These stePs need to be examined'-'8..t -

riiritary district and group of - forces consists of

armies. Each flLet consists of flotillas which are equivalent

to ifr. ut*i.s of the land forces. On the staff of each army

it.t" i. an intelligence department (RO)-which is in effect a

iuil, nuttut of thJ superior intelligence directorate and the

.tiff top"tiot chief intelligence diiecto.rate' The intelligence

department (RO) of an irmy or flotilla does run an agent

neiwork of iis own. On the strength of each intelligence

J"putt*"nt, and there are in the Soviet armed forces at

La'rt nrty, there is a Spetsnaz gomplny' This company'

,"fri.t n.irUers 115 saboieurs and cut-throats, is capable of

n"nrt.uting into the enemy's territory to murder and kidnap

;4i", b6; up bridges, electric pgwer stations, dams' oil

Lio"tin.t and io on. And these Spetsnaz units are sup-

illr".rilo uy the intelligence department's wide choice of

Llectronic, air and other types of intelligence

5554 Soviet Military Intelligence The Pyramid

vassals who carry out the orders of the GRU as

y and with as much jealous zeal as do the intelligence

Ltes of military districts, the intelligence departments

regiments. These are the military intelligence services of

a, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary'

ia, Mongolia and a number of other countries' These

ies are satellites and in the full meaning of the word

ls of the Soviet Union. Their secret police forces are

r the complete control of the Soviet KGB and take the

of a miniature copy of the KGB. Their armies are in

to the Soviet Army and their military intelligence

ices are full vassals of the GRU, with all their gg!1ls, rlili!4ryj!!g![, LaFotase agents' di'*!g-.s and so on. But of these later.

.. ,{1 army in the Soviet Union consists of from four to six

divisions.- In peacetime there are in the soviet armed forcesabout 180 tank and motorized divisions. In the interests ofsimplification we can omit the eight divisions of airborneforces (VDV), the brigades of maine infantry belonging tothe fleets and still many more branches of tne SouieiaimyIIg! h-*l inteltigence units subordinated directty ro it lGR-U-{ the general staff. On the strength of the staff ofeach division there is a chief reconnaissarice officer. He hashis own lroops, a reconnaissance battalion, and ht. ;;;.;i.;the heads of regimental reconnaissance and their troops.The reconnaissance battalion of each division, apart fr6mtank and electronic reconnaissAnce, has a sabotage co*purywhich is also staffed with cut-throats capable of successfuloperations in the enemy's rear. In the interests of accuracy itis_necessary to add that not ail of the rg0 tank and motorizedrifle divisions.have a full complsrirent of personneil;;;".*time; many of them have a complete tecirnical staff and fulloffiyg1_slreneth, but only a pa.iiat complement of soldiersand NCOs. However, this ruie does not apply to reconnais_

LTf ,nilr: Atl the-spetsnaz brigades and companies of themilrtary drstricts and armies, all the reconnaissance battalions(180) of the divisions, a[ the regimentJ reconnaissanceqompanies (more than 700), are always kept at full strengthand staffed by 6lite officers and NCOs.

Everything that we have listed comes under the indivisiblecontrol_of the GRU, although none of it is called by thisname. The researcher who studies the GRU but does nottake into consideration the GRU,s vassals will have over-

1""rk:9 twenty-four separate espionage organizations, eachor wnrch ls as powerful as the intelligence service of one

certral European country. He will havl overlooked 100,000€lite troop_s_possessing as many fighting vehicles as a well-equipped Western European c-our-try. [ut .r.n that is notall. In addition to its ;fficial vassals the GRU also has

armies and the chief reconnaissance oifrcers of divisions

4The GRU and the Military Industrial

Commission (VpK)

When we use the term ,army, with regard to the SovietArmy we must have in mind not orl"y tne frainistry oiDefence, but also the twelve other ministries whose sole

*:::i-T,I;t1 nrolye weapons una rilit"ry technology.rogemer alt these ministries form the high_powered monoilthl.{.9 by the military industriat lorimission dpir:Included in the collegium of the military- industrial com-mission are: one of thi first deputies of tlie ctrairman of thecouncil of ministers, thirteen ministers, and the chief of thegeneral staff and the chief of the GRU. The military indus-trial commission is the-Army and the arry i, tt" ,ifituryindustrial commission. When we ,uft of-u ,iruggle betweenthe Army and the party and the KGB *. frur" in mind thestruggle of the whole military industrial .o.rirrior,;;;;fortunes, wax and wane in perfect fr.-ory ,"ith the A;/;own.

The economic and financial might of the military industrial::iit.,.,,_".1 can onty be corpui"d with the might of therovler unton itself. Theoretically the Soviet Uni6n spends,in the interests of defence, the irp.oU.Lfy small sum ofnineteen billion roubles a year. This nineteen billion, how-ever, is the budget of the Ministry of Defence alone. Thebudgets of the remaining twelve ,irl.tri.,

"trich produce

armaments are kept secret. The Soviet system is conitructedrn sucn a way that the Ministry of Defence does not buy; itreceives the armaments neceisary to it. For example, an{rcraft carrier is under construciion in the Soviet Union.The Ministry of Defence does not U"r, .nyoi the cost of this.

The GRU and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) 57

The price of the ship is paid to the Ministry of Shipbuilding.by

the bouncil of Ministers under the debit item 'shipbuilding

industry'. This Ministry, by the way, has never constructed

any non-military vessels. Non'military vessels are, without

exieption, bought for the Soviet Union in Poland, East

Germany, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Norway,

Sweden, Denmark - it is difficult indeed to list all of them'

It is probably true that only Switzerland is an exception to

this list. The same thing is true of aircraft, tanks, rockets,

nuclear bombs, military electronics, every item of hardware'

Nobody in the Soviet Union knows exactly how much the

military industrial commission swallows up, but in any case

it is an astronomical figure.At the heart of any Soviet five'year plan for economic

. development - not the propaganda plan which appears,in all

the newspapers, but the genuine, secret plan - will be found

the military industrial commission's plan. For all the other

branches of the Soviet economy, metallurgy, machine tool

construction, energy, transport, agriculture, have no inde'

pendent significance but only provide for the activities of the

military industrial commission. Soviet science is another

organ providing for the military industrial commission.'

Officially it is allocated about sixty billion roubles a year'

three times more than defence. But what sort of science is

it, if the Soviet Union can produce the first automatic

satellite destroyer in the world but cannot produce an ordi'- nary compact, imall-engined car? The Sotiet Union has had

to buy all its technology for the production of small cars

from ltaly. What are Soviet scientists up to if the Soviet

Union has first-class military poisons but has to buy fertilizor

technology from the United States? What are the sixty

billion roubles spent on if the USSR constructs gigantic

trans-horizontal radar, ultra'high frequency transmitters forcommunications with submarines whose undergtound aerials

amount to thousands of kilometres in length - but has to

58 Soviet Military Intelligence

bly rF technology for the production of ordinary householdtelevision sets from France? Sixty bilion roubrei on scienceis yet another means of camouflaging Soviet military expendi_ture and the true might of the military industrial commission.

What has the GRU to do with itris? The connection isthis.: the ludget of the GRU is many times greater than thebudget of the KGB. But the KGB is muchiigger than theGRU, it has a vast apparatus within ttre coiitry and itspolitical influence is colossal. So why is the financial mightof the GRU many times greater tlian that of the KG-B?(Some specialists consider it to be several tens of timesgreater.) The business may be explained as follows. The

fGB_!t_ its budget, which is without doubt enormous, andthe GRU also has a moderate budget. Both form a part ofState expenses and naturally the Slate tries to limii theseexpenses. But in addition.to its ,clean'budget

the GRU hascolossal orders from themilitary industriafcommission andfrom Soviet science which provides for the military com_mission. These orders are incalculably greater than thi actual'clean' budget of the GRU. For example, on receiving anorder from the military industrial commission to steal a tankengine, the GRU receives money allocated as a debit itemto''science' or 'industry'. With this money the GRU willrecruit an agent without spending a single cent of its ownmoney, industry and science will receive the engine theywant and save enormous expense, and finally ttri CnUt'free' agent will continue to work on its behaif for the restof his life. All twelve ministries of the. military industrialcommission, plus all of military science, are ready to placemoney with the GRU if only they can obtain the tichnologywhich is essential to them. Designers and factory directoisreceive medals and prizes for copying foreign iamples ofarmaments in the same way as they would ii they workedou! their own examples. The KGB depends oniy on itsactual budget, but the pRU draws on the buOgit of all

TheGRl]andtheMititaryIndwtriatCommission(vPK)59

Soviet armament industries and science' In the course of a

maior GRU operation, such as the theft of all the technologi

;;ru";tii-erfiion tot the American nuclear submarine

e;r;;;-,irtiinston (which enabled the Soviet Union to

build a perfect copy - nicknamed'Small George')' the GRU

;ilGi spend a single dollar of its. own- budget' Other

memoraUte examples were the copying of the American

*i..ii" ;n"o Eye' and the Anglo'French Concorde' among

many others.

Why does the KGB not carry out orders for the armaments

inJrrttyf This is very simple' The chairmen of the Council

of frfinitt"tt and Gosplanr are responsible for the Soviet

;;;;y. Trrey ptan hiw much money to allocate' to whom

and for what purpose. To the chairman of the Council of

f"flriri"" .r. *boiOinated both the armaments industry and

*r. Uinirt", of Defence with the general staff and the GRU'

The KGB, alas, is not answerable to the chairman of the

C""*il of Mini.t"t . Having given money to the GRU to

oU,uin something interesting]tile chairman of the Council of

itilffi;;; thJ chriirmariof the military industrial com'

i, mission may bang on the table and demand 1!'1*d:li'"Y. !:.*.J.4 op. eutit they give money to the KGB then they

;ii ;;;.; wait quietiv-until the KGB is readv to deliver

the goods. The Kdg is not usuallv il *uth-:1-1I1X'tff:' ilei;;u.- u."n handsomely and generously paid'. The

KGB is a vain and arrogant courtier, having the right to

.r.uf. u, the King's.oun.Il, but without a sou in his pocket'

h. -CnU

is an-ugly hunchback: a moneylender' ready to

r.rr.-uniUody ani'making millions in the pro99s::..Tle

courtier hates the moneylen'-der' The courtier would kill the

;;;ft;"t were it noi fot the fact that he serves the King

himself.

I Thc State Planning committee'

In the Soviet Union the registration plates of certain carsfr9r. g"orgra end with thi tetters 'ciiu. rr,i, ,r*ringcoincidence goes unnoticed by almost

"r"rybody, inril;i;;

the police, for the GRU is unknown in tire Soviet Unionexcept to a small circle of enlightened ones. Even in thegeneral staff, of which the GRU is a part, thousands ofcolonels simply consider that .military d"purtr"nt M3gg,,y|-t comes all espionage information, il a branch of therlurr. Moreover, KGB officials who guard Soviet embassiesoverseas but are not members of -the fCf inteffitenceorganization consider, in many cases, that there is

"rfi.r.residency in the embassy, that of tt "

icCg.Much is known about the GRU by Western specialists,

but.the ordinary Western man in thel street h;, ;r;;i;;d,yno idea at all about it. His attitude is analogous to hisattitude-to the mythical animal from a Scottish lih: either itexists, there have been photographs puUtlstreA of it, or the;again-perhaps it does not exist. Sorne berieve, others do::t, blt-decidedly nobody is frightened of the animal.Nevertheless, how can so little be

"known about the GRU,

given that it certainly exists and cgrtainly po.r".r., colossalpower?

There are quite a few reasons, so let us discuss themost important ones. Firslly having established their UfooJydictatorship, the communisis had t6 unroun." to the peoplethe existence of an ,extraordinary'

orgun oiih" dicih;;[i;of the proletariat which was permitted to deal in whateverway i! pleased with the piople _ including the massexecutions of millions. ffrey aid this through the mouth of

5But Why Is Nothing Known About It?

But Why ls Nothing Known About It7 - 61

Lenin when he informed the people about the birth of the

V. Tcheka. Later Lenin's succ€ssors informed people of all

the changes in the names of the Organs, underlining that itwas only the nomenclature that changed. The essence

remained as before. Traditions live, and it is still forbidden

to complain about the Organs. The GRU did not need such

publiciiy and therefore nothing official was-given out about

its existlnce. Secondly, the main function of the Organs is to

exert pressure on the people themselves. Consequently in

Jhe people's consciousRess everything tlqis dark, under-

, ground and secret is connected with the KGB but not at all

iitt tt. GRLI. In practical terms the GRU did not take

part in the struggle against the people. Not because it was

iott of humanity and love for its fatherland, but simply

i. b..uo.. nobody had given it this function. Naturally people

il'remember the kGB (on any pretext), but never the GRU'

1 Tniraty, in his struggle for power, Khruschev made known

to a siunned world some of the crimes of his predecesors

and honourable Tchekists. The effect was so strattering that

from that moment the whole world unreservedly saw the

[r leadership of the KGB in all spheres of secret criminal

[i activity. khruschev by no means revealed everything, but

only ihat which at a given moment might bring him

undoubted political capital. He poirtted to the mass

executions in Stalin's time but forgot to mention the mass

executions in Lenin's time. He mentioned the destruction of

the comrpunist leaders in 1937 but omitted the destruction

of the peasants in 1930. He demonstrated the role of the

NKVD but completely forgot the role of the communist

party as the main, leading and directing force. Khruschev

*as int.rerted in showing up the crimes of the Organs within

the country and he did show up several of them. Revelations

of crimes iommitted overseas did not enter into Khruschev's

plans. They could not bring him any political advantage. He

was therefore silent in this regard and did not mention the

62 Soviet Military Intelligence

overseas brimes of the KGB and, of course, those of theGRU. Fourthly, the struggles against dissent, emigration,and western radio stationJbroadJasting to the SovieiUnionare the-.sole responsibility of the fGE Uut not the GRU.Naturally the most talented representatives of liberationmovements and immigration address their best efforts toenlightening the KGB itself. It is the same as regards radiostation b-roadcasting to the Scviet Union and the Westernorgans of mass information in general. They certainly devoteto the KGB significantly greater attention. Fifthly, anyunpleasant things which happen to foreigners in the SovietUnion are first and foremost connected witf, tne KGB andthis gives rise to a corresponding flow of information aboutthe KGB- Lastly, havingtmadJ rivers of blood from thepeople, the KGB strove to whitewash itself at all costsadvertising the 'attainments' of the Tchekists. In this connec-tion all intelligence officers, KGB or GRU, were categorizedas Tchekists, and this at a time when iiRU inteiiigenceofihcers hated the fchglists many times more than thJy didthe Gestapo. The GRU did not object to this. It preferreJ

. to maintain silence, not only about its crimes and mistakes,.but

also about its successei. The spying breed of animalketip,s itself in the depths; muddy J.t.I.io darkness aremore to its liking than publicity.

6

The GRU and the'Younger Brothers'

The state structure of any communist country strikingly

resembles the structure of ihe Soviet Union' Even if it finds

itself in conflict with the Soviet Union or has been able to

escape frorn its influence, it is much the same in character'

ffr"Lft of personality is a general rule for all co-mmunist

countries, .nd ury 'big brother' needs an all'powerful secret

potio otgunization to-counter'balance ihe power of the first

one.It is usually military intelligence which fulfils this cottnter-

balancing roie, the more solince all communist countries'

Gili; of the kind of'communism they adopt, are warlike

an? aggressive. In a number of communist countries there

*ouHlppear to be only one secret police organization' but

in these'cases closer inspection will clearly show a minimum

of two mutually hostiie groupings' Sooner or later the

dictator will be forced to split his secret service into two

parts. In the countries within the orbit of the Soviet Union

itrat separation has already been carried-out, for all of them

have bien created in the image of the elder brother'

The military intelligence sirvices of the satellite countrips

show great activity ii the collection of espionage multl3!'unA ufT such material obtained is sent directly to the GRU'

The fact is that the intelligence services of the satellite

countries are even legally inswerable to the Ministry of

Defence of the Soviet Union. The military intelligence ser-

vice of each Warsaw Pact country is subordinate to its chief

of the general staff, but the chief of staff is in his turn

subordiiate to the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact' Theor'

etically a general from any country of the Warsaw Pact may

U Soviet Mititary Intulligencebe appointed to this position. In practice of course therefavg only ever been Soviet s;;r;;;;inr"a. or" of themis already well known to us: the former .fri"t of the GRU,Generat Shtemyenko. After tf," faiiof iiirscheu, Brezhnev,trying to ptease the Army, ,"*[rt ri, Airgru."d generalfrom exile and reinstated irim as a fuli-general. As chief ofstaff of the Warsaw pact, his Air".i.up"ii-or was (and is) theHigh Commander of the Unitei-irr.O Forces of themember-countries. To this post i, t u, u-ioiuy. been a Sovietmarshal who has been appointed. FirsriJ was Konyev, thenGrechko, after him yat<ubovst<i .ra ir"fi, Xulikov. But the

,offcial titte of all rhese ,rof,ufr;;;g the time theycommanded the united- forces was .firsi Oeputy of theMinister of Defence _of

the USSR _ CorrurO"r_in_Chief ofthe United Armed Forces ot ir," ,;;;;;'.ountries of theWdrsaw pact,. In other words, the armies are the armies ofseveral states subordinated to a deputy ,ini.,", of defencein one of those states. There ir-J;;;.;;;;y for you. TheUSSR Minister of Defence-, through f,i, ?'.prty, directs allthe forces of staffs of the .fraternri".r"ri"r,, including, ofcourse' the military inteiligence s"r"i.", oiito." .ouni?"r,and we are not talking of-aor" .*op.ruLr, but of directsubordination in the legal sense.

- -r--Er'v

.This is all very welll some sceptics will object, but afteryhal hpnened in 1939, "u"ry

f&" iuO'l i"r.. dislike forthe Soviet communists, and their iri"[ig";.; services wouldhardly work their best in tf," int"i"ri, ";'rl" GRU, wouldthey? After 1953 the Easr Germanri;ily;i;;"d the feelingsof the potes. In 1956 Hungary dr.; ttreir,*ano in 1968 theCzechs and Slovaks. Surefi ,fi" i"r.ifig"r."'re*i.e, of thesecountries would not wor[ hard i, ,[" irr"i.sts of Sovietmilitary intertigence? unfortunater,,hr, ;;"rusion whichhas gained too wide an accentrr,.l;::::.contiadicts rt. rt,, u rult ff::1ffi:"rtlffif'ffllJ#lfthrall to the Soviet Union hare th;-$;;;t"communists; but

none the less their intelligence services work to the full

extent of their powers in the interests of the elder brother''The solution to ihe tiddle is this. By means of harsh economic

treaties the Soviet Union hai enchained all its 'younger

brothers'. For Soviet oil and coal, electric energy and gas

they all have to pay very heavily. The Soviet Urrion propGes '

to its satellites that 'you may pay by means of your orvn

wares or you may pay by providing the secrets of other,

people'. This alternative offer is a very tempting one,.to

wtrictr ttre general secretaries have unanimously responded

by orderin-g their intelligence officers- to-- redouble their

.ifortt. So the intelligence services of all countries tied

economically to the Soviet Union make the g[eatest possible

efforts. By itealing Western secrets and transmitting them

to Soviet military or political intelligence they reduce their

countries' indebtldneis and raise their peoples' standards of

living.Wistem states have been surprised by the extent of

the intelligence interests of communist states' Why should

Mongolian intelligence be interested in atomic reactors, or

Cuban intelligenci in high'powered rocket engines? These

questions arJeasily answered as soon as one realizes that

t'h.y .t. all part oi on" gigantic formation. [n the ranks of

officiats of Sbviet state institutions overseas it is almost

imposible to find one 'clean'one. All Soviet citizens' from

ambassadors to cleaning staff, in one way or another co'

operate with the KGB or the GRU. The same thing is true

oi the official institutions of the 'fraternal countries'' There

it is also diffficult to find a single 'clean' official' All of them

are to some extent co-oPerating with the Soviet KGB or

GRU - even though frequently they themselves do not

realize it.

The working methods of the GRU and the KGB are absol_utety identicat. h is imposriUfe ioie[ ii"i, ,igr.trr"s apart.Bur their funcrions differessentially;il;;, the orher. Thebasic functiqn of the fCA may Ue':_pr..*O in one guidingphrase: not b ailow le cgttapse j'iir"iq!,u, Union fromiyuide.lyw specific function ir"rJr.o, In*;r. To enumeratesome of those functions: lhe protection oi communist VIps;the suppression of any clashis o, Jir."* .rong rhe popu_ll jont rhe. carrying oit o1 ."r.roffi.nj oisinformation;the prohibition of any-contact betwein tte p"opl" and theoutside world - including tt. i*t.iion'oi'ior"ign visitors _and the cutting off of an-y .orr..i, .ii.Jdi established withthem;

and the guarding ,i rr*tL^ d;;;r. ren disrricts ofIj,.l.,t::1,..r forces).-rhe Kct ;i;;-.il'or.o..s but i tsactrvttres rotate around the same main axis _ to prevent thecollapqe of the ussR from within. i'J& can be dividedin the-same way inro.irs.fi" il; u*ggi. *irt emigrationand efforts to diminish iis influence oni't

" internal life ofthe Soviet Union; the srruggle with Wesiein radio stationsbroadcasring ro the SovietUrr, urj'J,r,ir'r"un, of massinformation which pive a correct picture of the situation'wirhin rhe srare or iorkers anG.'r;;i tte srruggte withreligious organizations which ,fiti-._"* innu.n.. on theSoviet population ; observing tr," :ii.rcri"t,' "orrunist par-ties wirh rhe aim of nippini i" *,. Lrj .nl rreresy whichmight emerge from trlm;-the ,r*.lli.# of all. Soviercitizens abroad, including fCg ;m;";

-t-hemr"tres; th.seeking our and destructio-n of tfre mosi altir" oppon.nt, orthe communisr regime. The KGc ;ir;'h*';er funoions,

7The GR(l and the'KGB

The GRIJ and the KGB 67

but these are all either a part of the main function or not ofprime importance.'

The function of the GRU may also be stated in one

parallel, but quite different phrase: to prevent the collapse ofihe Soviet (liion from an extemal blow. ln the opinion ofthe general staff luch a blc " may be struck at the Sovict

UniJn in peacetime, even in the course of routine Soviet

military "d".ntutes

in Asia, Africa or Europe' This, -the

most important function of the GRU, is undertaken on four

fg!s. On the ryi!'mrv i@!, literally everything is of interest

tffi" GRU.tTt;;e importance, of course, are the

composition, quantiiy and deployment of the armed forces

of ail countriei of the world; the plahs and thinking of the

military leadership and staffs; mobilization plans in case of

war; the type and direction of military training of forces;the

organization of forces; the means of supply; morale and so

onl Ot prime importance on the llilllgy'+oliticgl,fiont Lethe relaiions between the different oountries of the world:

overt and covert disagreements; possible changes in political

and military leadership of military and economic blgcs; new

alliances; any, eren the slightest, change in the political and

military orientation of armies, governments, countries and

whole 6locs and alliances. On the @lary'Echnologicdftmt-the GRU handles intelligence related t0 the devebPment or

new kinds of armaments and military technique in the

countries of a probable enemy; the carrying out of trials and

tests; new tecirnological processes which might be utilized

for military ends. And the @ry-rgrykfront presents

exceptional interest for theTF[l]Fl6t and foremost it is

fascinated by the capacity of such and Such a state or grouP

of states to produce modem types of weapons, but it is also

extremely klen to learn about industrial potential, energy'

transpori, agriculture, the presence of strategic reserves,

vutnirable areas of economy, and energy. The general staff

considers that if the GRU can give accurate information in

68 Soviet Military Intelligence

good time from every country in the world on these four!1o1ts, then it can count it impossible to Jestroy the SovietUnion by means of a blow from outside.-

-In.many instances_the interests of the'KGB and the GRU

a,re diametrically- different. For example, a demonstration of::I: Iussran €migrds is of absolurely no{nterest ro theyly, o:, an object of the greatest posible interest to theArJrr. Ano vlce-versa:. lo military exercises are of anyinterest to rhe KGB residents, Urt tir.y'.i. of great interestto GRU residents. Even in those fieldJ where the GRU andthe KGB have what would seem to u" iit.ror; jiili"r""for example in politics, their approa.f, ,o . particular prob-lem would differ in esse:ce. fo'r exarnple, inl pr"*n.rity otPresident Carter frorno interesr ril il',l[:iIfftili]: fl:"j',i"r*fflsuperficial possible examination of the presid"nt,, prrron"iitythe GRU infallibly decided thar he *ouH-i"r., be the fintlu..Ty out a pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union.But that same man, irom the poiit oi

"i"w of the KGB,

appears to be the mostdangeroui opponent possible, becausehis human rights poticies

T-e 8 weipon which coulj d;r;the Soviet Union from within. ln lnott.i..se, the GRUlirptlfa exceptionat interesr in the ;h;il;s of personnel inthe Chinese politicat and military feaOerriip. For the KGBll! qu":j,gn posed practica[y no iri;;;;ffi an. The KGBvery well knows that afte-r siity yean or.o*runir;-p";;the Soviet population will not Ue in ttre least interested in:rtTil::ii:lil"d9ey from China or Korea or yugosravia jrr rs aso qurte convinced that not one defector fipm theSoviet Union will ever seek refuge in Cnli.. China is, forthe KGB, almost an empty ptace.

,- In examining mutuar ieiaiions between the GRU and theKGB we have to return to the question of ,m GRU,;dependence on the KGB_ In the'chafter on history weendeavouied to show the character of th'ese mutual relations

The GRII and the KGB 69

in the past. The same mutual relations have been preserved

;l;{" ;t;sent day. The GRU and the KGB are readv at

.[V *rrf" to deitroy each other' Between them exist

;;;.it ,h"* mutual relitions which perfectly suit the Party'

ft. i..tou.y and mutual hatred between the GRU and

iCg "i. t *iti.t to the police of every country where the

Soviet Union has an embassy, and it is pycisell lhh t"*l!l

noticeable even to'unarmed eyes,'which provides proor ol

the independence of the GRU'If the fate or career of a GRU resident were to depe4

.r.i ,iigrrtry on his colleague from.--tlre KGB' he would

never iniisiife dare to diffei with, still less quarrel or brawl

;i;;,h. T.hekists: he would be like a cowed laqdo-g wilh

il i;ii between his legp, not even daring to bark for the

ily; ii. tour", [kJ the 'clean' diplomats in all Soviet

.*6.rritt. But officers of the GRU do not do this' They

il"" lr.i.",ees of their ind€Pendence-.and invulnerability

from ihe KGB. Some specialisis are inclined to consider the

eiu ;t a branch of th; KGB, usually adducing in -defence

of ttris opinion two arguments' Fintln ihey say- 9"t 9:.f,i"i of tire GRU is ahiays a former KGB general' but this

i.r .f*.Vt been the ."t", b"ginning vith Aralov' and has

i"ner otJ".nted the GRU from actively opposing the efforts

;i;;'idB io it".[o* it, and even sometimes on the order -

oi it. p"tty striking the Tchekists sudden and heavy blgl!:The second argument is that everybody joining the GRU

has to be vetied by the KGB' This argument aPPears

.on"in.ing only at first glance' The fact i1 that each new

"in.i.l of"the ientral Coirmittee is under the control of the

iCg ot is a branch of the KGB' Both the Central Commit-

ie" .na the GRU select for themselves the people necessary

io ,t "r, and in this connection consult the KGB' for any

*; until he becories a Central Committee official or

I.rirt itt" CnU is under the control of the KGB and possibly

ih. fCg may tlave some unfavourable information on a

70 Soviet Military lwelligencegiven person. The KGB in rhis case plays the part of a filter.

i{{fi ,fi;:t', xi'tr,,:lil r#:f *ll jt *::t,iliinside the Ceitrat Committie

", irrlO"'ii" GRU. The KGB

:Jik. I guard ar rhe gate or. *.r.ilnri.irurion. The guardmay refuse enrry to an engineer *ho;;;'f;rgotten his passat home, but he has no,ig[t to "*"r-inJrn.".onr.nts of thatengineer's safe. If it so Jesires, ,hr'ii-G;ray, of @urre,discred.it any unwantea-omciar Li';";RU or rhe Centrat

"?[:j:ft ,

However, this il i-ra ud; ffi ;;,fi ;;,p";There exists still another irrefutable indicator of the inde-pendence of the GRU.from the Kci.;;il GRU there isf ,:f-.1.t

department'. The securiiy oiiil. bnu is assuredDy rts own forces, and always has been. ffr. f.ny;;;;keen thar this should continue, U"our"'it;.;;*, that if theKGB were to orsanize its own jil;l i$anment,in tfreGRU, a similar dloartment would swiftly be introduced intothe Politburo.To illustrate the uneartam-,ro-^^.1-^ - . . ,{

.ryucg and the paradox of theI*"ff ?.i:T..,11_:il"J,,[riil!;";i;Jiilffi _T..jl;

The CRII and the KGB 7l

the command point that the aircraft from Paris had landed

at the centrat iirport and taxied up to the GRU building'

The day before, at I-e Bourget airport, the Soviet supersonic

passenger aircraft Tupolev TU144 had crashed. The whole

bf the paris residency had been at the show and the majority

had had cin€ cameras. The moment of catastrophe had been

photographed from different points by different officers, and

if,. CnU had at its disposal no fewer than twenty films

showing the same moment. The films had not been developed

in PariJbut brought straight to Moscow. Now the operational

technological inititute of the GRU would develop them

immediaiely. At nine o'clock in the morning the Politburo

sesion was to begin, at which they would hear evidencc

from Tupolev, his deputies, the minister of aviation pro-

duction, the director of the Voronesh aviation factory, direc'

tors of subsidiary concerns, test pilots and of course the

GRU and the KGB. But at seven, the telephone rang and itwas Andropov, at the time head of the KGB. 'Peter lvano'vitch, how are you?'

Peter Ivanovitch lvashutin (present chief of the GRU) did

not hasten to match the friendly tone. 'Well. How are you,

comrade Andropov?''Peter lvanovitch, don't be so official. Have you forgotten

my name? Peter lvanovitch, there is something I want totalk to you about. I hear you have got some films showing

the catastrophe.' Peter lvanovitch said nothing. 'Peter lvano'vitch, would you be very kind and give me just one littlefilm? You know yourself that I have to make a report to the

Politburo but I have no material. These shows are not ofgreat interest to my chaps and unfortunately not one ofthem was there with a cin€ camera. Help me to get out

of this mess. I need the film about the catastrophe.'

All service telephone calls to the GRU chief are relayed

through the GRU command point. The duty shift of oper-

ators is always in readiness to prompt their chief with a

fleet

flil'j' ffi il:r" ji':: jl- :y :r!ilrj ;'il'#:; ;fi; T;:,lr;r, j::If ,,.J-::Ti:lo,i,,ir,o,t'r,.Hrffi :,;:ffiIrj::3l*,.111,o_i,l,on,*iii;;i;.,"r;;i:,li:,xT:lpendenr.from the opinions or tne CnU ciiii.

This day began fbr tnejnU felO-JJnin at the unusualtyearly hour of 3.30 in the morning, *t"n i[ Jas informed by

72 Soviet Military Intelligence

necessary figure or fact, or to help him over a mistake inconversation. At this point the entire duty shift was frozento the spot. Their help was not called foiat all. The GRUchief remained silent for some time. The duty operatorswere quite certain that in a similar situation, the KGB::.:l9Jid"rbredty refuse if the GRU asked for its rreip.t ut what would be the decision of the GRU chief, an ei_colonel-general of the KGB and ex-deputy chairman ofthe .KGB? Finally, in friendly, even tones he answeredAndropov;

'Yuri Vladimirovich, 1..*9r', give you one film, I,ll givepy.ll rwenty. Only I will showihem at nine o,clock in-the

Politburo, and at ten oUock I'il send my chaps over to theCentral Cornmittee to give you all tne ntms.l-'

Andropov angrily slammed down the leceiver. A con-certed roar of laughter shook the walls of the undergroundcommand point. The senior operator, choking with laighter,entered the conversation in the log book.

({frcl Andropov became Generat Secretary of the Com-Ill,:t ?arty and Soviet Leader, Ivashutin stilt surviviJ asGRU chief, because an5/ attack from Andropov could easilyhave upset the fragite party-Army balance'with unpredict:-able consequences for Andiopov himself.)

Unlike the KGB, the GRU does not try to advertise itself'

,nJ i,t head office does not rise in the centre of the capital

on-io *ort crowded square' The head office of the GRU'

.iit*gr, it is in Moscow, is by no means-easy to find' Itis

enctosed from three sides by the central airpgrt' the old

Xt oOinfu field. The aerodrome is surrounded on all sides by

restricted buildings, among which are the offices of three

i..Jirg ""ioion

drms and 6ne rocket construction firm' and

,t. *fii,ury aviation academy and the aviation institute' [n

the centre bf thes" secret institutes the aerodrome cames on

*iitt i,. life as if half-asleep. Very, very rarely' in the middh

of the night, a covered'op t"ti"g" of a fighter aircraft is

taken oui of a hangar, loaded onto a transPort aeroplane

,nJ,r.nrpotted somewhere into the trans-Volga steppe for

i"rting. Sometimes another transport-aircraft lands' goes uP

io ,n."CnU building and unloadi a foreign tank or rocket'

afte, wtrictr everything becomes peaceful again' For two

months of the ye"t irepatations are carried out for the

srandiose military paradei, and the roar of tank engines can

B;;ilrilrte ii.n.ra. The parades finish, but the guarded

ui.. i.r.ins guarded, un it'pty field in the centre of

frf"*"" p",rotLa Uy watchdogp' Not one civil aircraft or

i .rmp,.i Jisturbs tire quiet oi Khodinka, only the watch'

J"g. t."r at night liki wolves' How many of them .are

rhe-re? one loses count. No, from three sides it is impossible

;;;;i,; ltt" cnu. From the fourth side, too' on the fourth

,io! ,n.r. is rhe lnstitute of cosmic Biology, with more dogs

;J;ffi; barbed wire. A narrow little- lane leads through

a hlind wall ten metres high, behind which is the 'Aquarium''

8

The Centre

tq Soviet Military Intelligence

In order to penetrate into the inner fortress of the GRU onemust negotiate either the area of the secret aerodrome orthe area of the top secret institute.The head office of the GRU is a nine_storey extendedrectangle. On all sides.the building is surroundei Uy

" trno-storey structure, the windows of w-hich give onto the centrarcourtyard. The external walts have no

-*indo*, at all. The

lfte1;s19reV building adjacent to tf," ur*u .lro belongs to:1" c!U,-ltthough ilis;ituated

"ririA"li externar wa[s.Many families of GRU officers lir" tLi.,-rnilrre1;ffinghas. a completely normal .pp""r"n..-.na mt, lilie anordinary block of flats.-onry a certain nuru., of the flats,ftoygver, are used for livini purp"*r, if,.'otr,"r, are usedby the service for official p,irporir. ile Jtrole of rhe area,centimetre by centimetre, is- undercur".iit.n., from thetele-cameras and narrolted continuousty bil;;;il;;'fi ,hbig, fat faces. Buieven if it *.r. ,oi tiur] a strange, thereutguld be apprehended immediately. an/ of the little oldmen seated on benches (minimum t*"nty years, service inthe GRU) would immediarely inform ,f,"i.Lo"ry people if!. fy ,op.t!,!q untoward. NoUoO/ is .fio".O to bring acar into the GRU's inngr area, not even the Minister ofDefence or General Secretary. One is oiiy uomitted aftergassine through a speciat inspection and s-ifnisticated elec-tronic equipment. Nobody may bring in'so much as acigare.tte tighter, stilt tess a Urilfcasel Th"r" ;;;"d-r;metallic object on- your person, not even a bert-buckre - theUtsU recommends braces. All necessities for work and lifeare ro be iound inside, ir.t"di;;-;ig;;;it" rigr,t"o unofountain pens: The GRU gives th; ;i:-;fter'ttrey rravebeen checked, of course.

The chief of the GRU is subordinate to the chief of thegeneral staff and is his deputy. Directly subordinate to thechief of rhe GRU are the bRU,, .6rr*o point, the

The Centre 75

deputy chief and a grouP of advise.rs' The.organizational

uniti ionrtituting t['e GRU .r. directorates, directions,

unJ .".tiont. Iriunits which are not directly concerned

"i,fr ,f,. acquisition and processing of information there

.*ir, ,n. divisions of dirictorates, departments and sec'

iions. Ttre military rank of the chief of the GRU is the

nity C.n"ral. Under him are a first deputy and deputies'

tn ttre case where the deputy has several directorates

under his command, his miliiary rank will be colonel'

g.n.t.f. If he onty has one directorate, lieutenant-genelal'

Lni"t of directorates are lieutenant-generals' The depu-

,i.r "t heads of directorates, heads of directions and-

departments are maior'generals' The. deputy ^l-"39t-:j

diiections and departments, the heads of sections and

tr,.ii O.futi"s are colonels. The rank-and-file members of

sections'are called senior operational officers and opef'

ational officers. The military rank of a senior operational

officer is colonel, of an operational officer lieutenant-

colonel.- -en ouet*t elming number of GRU officers hold the mili'

tuiy trnt of colone-!. This, however, does not at all mean

it ri tft.y are equal amongst each other' Between the colonel

"i"irihri the duties of i senior operational officer and the

J.p*t treaO of a direction who ii also a colonel there is a

*i[. itrf. The high service ranks existing in the GRU do

not pieclude the appointment of a very young captain or

senior lieutenant to the post of senior operational officer'

;i;h;r. ih. ryr,.rn aaoptio by the soviet Army permits this'

n captain may be an icting major, or a senior lieutenant

;.y b.-;; acting colonel. Seniority is judged not byrhe pips

on [n. officer's lhoulder, but by the position he holds'

In total the GRU has sixteen directorates: most of them

have a number from one to twelve' Certain numbers do

not e*itt and the directorate is simply called by its name'

,s for example the personnel directorate' Directions and

The Centre

t5JCl€t;b

.E6

-IolI;oa

departments forming parts of a directorate have numbers'

iJl-rrpl" 'at piriciion' means the first direction of

the fourtir directorate' Directions and departments not

i;;r*g f.ri ot a directorate have a single number with

ii" r.riei, GRU added, for example, the first department

GRU. The hierarchy iii tt" GnU is as follows' The chief

oftheGRUhasonefirstdeputyandsevendeputiesbeneath him. He controls:

i The Illegals Section' With the help of this section he' p.*nufly directs effective illegals and agents about

i"f,o, n6Uody knows' He also directs his own first

deputY.ii F*i b.pury Chief of the GRU (colonel'general)'

beneath whom are all the Procurement organs which

provide information'iii 'The chief of Information (colonel-general) in charge

of all the processing organs of the.GRU'

iv The chief of ttre pilitiJal section (lieurenant-general).

v The Chief of the Electronic Intelligence Directorate

(lieutenant-general) "vi itre Chief of Fleet intelligence (vice'admiral)'

vii The Chief of the Cosmic Intelligence Directorate

(lieutenant-general)'viii ihe Head

-of the soviet Army Academy (colonel-

general).i* "tt. Head of the personnel Directorate (lieutenant-

general).

i

TBx!

-'r,\,./

[]I EI/ ti

I*tr1

,F

E-t6E

EE

Et!8

E!oI(,I,acoC

IE(,

iIi

tri

iifi

E&::iE.rieEEI€95.i !sFi5 E

All units of the GRU are divided in their designations intoprocurement, processing and support. The greai majority ofthe prgcurement

,organi, the pioviders of information, arecontrolled by the fint deputy chief of the GRU. They in.fua.$" &t !t*StSfet", which cariies out agent inteiligence onEuropean territory, and consists of five directionsJeach ofwhich-carries out agent intelligence on the territories ofseveral countries (each direcr:on consists of sections whichdirect undercover residencies in one of the countries con_

f^T.-!)tSe gpC-dirgBge with an analogous organiza-tron carrying out agent intelligence in Americi, bottiNorth1!,,P1,!r.the^ Pird djricto=late, which carries out agenr

#1i'iili,,[ #' i f Tffi ffi Hf ,#:ldir€ctorate contains about 300 high-ranking officers in theMoscow centre, and about 300 airoad. geiides these fourdirectorates, there are also four directions which undertakethe sanie duties. Ttresejir:ffiot form pu.t, oidirectorates but are answerable to the first deputy chief. fiie

Siiei6ffil institutions used by the GRU as cover: rheMinistry of Foreign Affain, the Ministry of External Trade,Aeroflot, the Merchant Navy, the Academy of Sciences and

T .folh:.ft."se. representatives fit their young officers intostors tn tne tnsfitution serving as cover and guarantee theirsmooth progress in their future activities. In-addition someGRU officers, on their return from overseas, continue towork in their covering organization and not in the head

9The Procurement Organs

The Procurement Organs

and

The fourthfrom

.ouniti.. or entire continents'.The

::A:T ffiTffi: .oi ;;e;t'" inteuigence service and

[",,1"n.'i,.io ";r';';ii ;"*"* ;"d endeavours to direct the

' activities oi unaligned movements'

, The GRU adhere, i"l iiliri.nt principle in running its

:nregars rrom the p,in.iirJ{;ilJ 9! 1: 5:' Among its

Drocurement organs ii"it it no ttpitutt unit for directing

Iiffio:';;i,tl6nu J*s not consider such a unit neces'

: sary. Each of ,n. iitltttttt t'"tat and several of the

direction heads have'ii"i-1ntit ..::1Tt:9, T::*::",::ii:'*:"'.:"rifr";;il tii'n .o *' iilegals and residencies

under cover at the same-timt i" ittt tefrtories of group' of.^!-^-.- 'rha directnrete or direction

countries,

his iGgals for canyllg iglqhead may at

li[:xdlii':J ::ffi ";.'il; ;J;'1" ;;' ve rv. hilh-quaritv me gars'

rhe.nrsto.putvmavuJi:'::*::""-H:fl ::ffn*.ffi ill"i'-oi'..,o'lte'

and- direction -Yli ^,[l*{,#k"ffi{[

*ffi:;X;lr.ilr,:","""iffi:Lll'i,,iffi

are

80 Soviet Mititary Intelligence

.Jhere is a.fi_tth*Gj.g 4ifctp-tgtg, which is atso concernedwrn procurement and controlled by the first deputy. How-ever, its functions differ from those of the four directoratesand four directions listed above. The fifth directorate does

tyentf intelligence directorates_ belonging td the militarydistricts, gfoups of forces and ffeet inl[i"gence, ttre latie',having in its turn four more fleet inteltgJnce directoratesbeneath it. The numbelo{ secrer agent.-""J oir"^i#.ya€€nts ultimately controlled by the nftr, ar".ror.te exceedsthe number of all the agents controlled by the first fourdirectorates and four dir;;;n;,;;;il; J!.n,. operate onall the same territories where ilegars, underJover residenciesand agents of the above-mentionid directorates and depart-ments operate. Wth their help the first deputy, or indeedthe chief himself, may secretly-check on the aciivities of hisdrrectorate. This arrangement works in reverse too: with thehelp of agents of the first fouf directorates and four directionshe can check the activities of the ,".r., .g.ni;"i ;l,t;;;districts, fleets and groups offorces.

.. In addition to the proliferation of units outtined above,

there are two nlore GRU directorates which are concernedwith the procurement of information: the sixth directorateand the cosmic intelligence directorate. These directorates

Prgqure and partly process information, but they do not go

i1-for aeent intelligence, so they are not considered

", pu.jy

procurement directorates and are not subordinate to the firsideputy chief of the GRU. The chiefs of both rhese direcror-

S$Ictl' 8j9u.BI d fgryeq, gr*4pets. T[ffii'ectorffiTffiKrno o[ controller of vassals. Directly under its control are

ffikW EI

Mt-ir

/sll

r--ll.liilIIt?itE_i

I

i-rIJ 1

ItB Iti:jates answer to the chief of the GRU and are his deputies,but not first deputies.

82 Soviet Military Intelligence

intelligerice. For this purpose its officers are posted to under-cover residencies in the capitals of foreign itates and thereform groupc which intercept and deciphir transmissions ongovernmental and military networks. There are also manyregiments of electronic inteiligence on the territories of thiEastern bloc and Soviet Union, and these are integralparts ofthe sixth directorate. Furthermore, this directorate controrsthe electronic intelligence services of the miritary districts,groups of forces and fleets which in their turn havi their ownregiments, special ships, aircraft and helicopters for electronices-pionage. The electronic espionage services of each militarydistrict, group and fleet correspondingty control similar ser-vices in the armies and flotiilas, and thJse in their turn controrthose of the divisions. And so it goes on. All the informationaquired from the electroniccompanies of divisions, electronicbattalions of armies, regiments oi military distri.t, .nO gr*f,of forces and spy shipa of the fleet, is iollected in thl sixihdirectorate and analysed there.

The GRU cosmic irtdligg1*jit_g_ql_9gr-lejs no tess power-fu|. It has ifffff-cosmodromes, a number of researchinstitutes, a co-ordinating computer centre and hugeresources. It works out the technical details for spy satellitisinde-pendentty and prepares them in its own works. TheSoviet Union has sent into orbit more than 2,0fi) cosmicobjects for different purposcs, and one in three of themDetongs to the GRU. The vast majority of Sovietcocmonauts, with the exception of those who undertake ontydemonstration flights, work for half their time in space inthe interesrs of the GRU. The KGB lies far behind theGRU in this respect.

Fleet Intelligence

The GRU fifth directorate directs twenty intelligence direc'

torates of military oi.'it" t"JO"l* of fott"t directly' and

four intelligence directorates if niets co-ordinated by an

organization known tt;;;' intelligence' Fleet intelligence

was introduced u"ou'"'JJtn-*iritlty district and gro-up of

forces has a very .tti"iiv o"6n"a tpr'"1" of responsibility in

time of war, whereat'itt" tt'ip of ttt" four Soviet fleets

operate in widely *"J;t; are'as of ttre world's oceans and

each ship ,nu., .onuiiootti--1"* tull information on the

enemy. The chief of fleet intllligence comes under the GRU

chief as a deputy, "t'O

it co-ntrols the. four intelligence

directorates of naval ti;tt - N'nttern' Pacific' Black Sea and

Baltic - and the ne* Lsmic intelligence.directorate and

information service. ii iir o"y-,o-daf activities he is under

it" "io"^ "tthe

GRU fifth directorate'"'il"."ii","iu!ence directorates have a structure similar to

that of the directorattt 't tifi'"ty districts' There are small

;ff;;;; caused bv rnaritime,factgn'..yhich for our pur'

J"r"t "t i"tignificant, and the fleet intelligence directorates

ffi*i;;;i;fu il;;ging ,o military districts will be

ll?iiiio'ii' a.i.ii -ii

itrt"tt-under the heading of 'oper-

ational Intelligence"The GRU chief has at his disposal two indeoendent cosmic

intelligence r.*i."t' 5nt'l-Ut"tl"tn him dirictly-' the 91Ucosmic intelligence airJoitt"' and th,e other through the

chief of fleet intelligii;;' .Iltt'soviet High Command quite

reasonably .onrio"'Jitt"i' u""ting in mind the tasks to be

fulfilled, the fleet' 'utt i'tn" itJ own cosmic intelligence

service. This of t";;; iott not exclude the GRU chief

10

.84 Soviet Military Intelligence

controlling his own cosmic intelligence service with the helpof the other and vice-versa. Considering that not only theGRU cosmic intelligence service, but alio that of the fleetshas its own spy satellites, we may say'that out of all thesatellites put into orbit by the Soviet Union, about half aredirectly or indirectly subordinated to the GRU.

11

The GRIJ Processing Organs

material coming from

ug,!r t *..P*i:from the intelltgence

gp,up63iffiai#.*rf{n It has full Poweli:.:::'-::lffiin fact any.source

"f i"ttttiq:i::iesiile?itl@ETrtrlllegal' ln rasr arty Jve.rw'

information, to give 'ot" pt"tlte

-details - !:--t:*L*

iliffiffiil' *"u;il.i' rl'e' inrormatio". :"'"T"T1 ryii:

The GRU processing organs are sometimes called the infor-

mation service or ro'"-t"q'ently simply'informition'' The

chief of information h;t;; rank of colonel-general and is a

;;il'i" ,lt.-cnu';#i' Th" rollowing are under his

control:

i the information command Point;ii six information directorates;

iii the institute of information;

i" if," info*ation services of fleet intelligence;

v the information sernG of intelligence directorates of

militarY districts and grouPa;

,i .iiiii.-Ltg"nir"tiont u:t miiitary intelligence listed bclow

whichareconcernedwithiheprocesingofsecretmaterial acquired'

TheinformationcommandpointissecondonlytotheGRUcentralcommandpoint.ttreceivesallintelligence

works without breaks, without days off' without holidays' It

;; ;;a atr preriminaiy procissing. of all the material

,rUri,,.O; eactr morning at-six o'clock it publishes a top

*.i"i-;i"*[igence sumirary' destined for members of the

86 Soviet Military Intelligence

Politburo and the higher military command, and in themorning all material which has come to hand during theprevious twenty-four hours is transmitted to the inform-ationdirectorates of the GRU for detailed analysis.

In all, there are six directorates plus the informationinstitute on the strength of the information service. ThenlTFIng begins of course with the seventh directglqlg

*!ich rysgggqd witb a q$y,pf-tHlgi" anffiffilhe drrectorate consists of six departments, each of whichconsists of sections. Each department and each section

The GRIJ Processing Organs 87

may in the future possess them' This directorate carefully

.r"tii"" any signi oi-inttttt"o activity' any change in

;;l;;i. in itre -activities of strategic 1uclel forces in anv

ilffi";i;.'gr"u"- Ttre officen ot tttis directorate form

iiE-u..ruone it Soviet delegations to.the SALT talks'

Unfortunately we do noipo*it reliable information on the

activities of the twelfth directorate'--'ifr" gig.n,icfffi*iqn ii'stitute functions independently

of tf,. iir"..tor.iilIt ii .ontrolled by the chief of information

il;;il outside thi walls of the GRU' As opposed.to

,i" oir.o"r"tes, which base their analyses of the situation

exclusively on secret documents obtained by agent' elec'

;;;;i; and cosmic intelligence, the institute--sludjes ov:l

carries responsibility for the study of individual tren& oraspects or' NATO activities. I.lre eleh1!^gggdg:llg.-ggIieq^,++!gglg!-gf

'!g!y1tiq!- s-osotries wortowii-{ [fi spediv;of wheiEittraiEunifi beffi6 td NAto oinot. bpeciatattention is paid to questions of folitical structure, .rlrr.Aforces and economies, and special imphasis is put on a studyof the personal activities of statesmen and miiitary leaders.The ltiuth dilg-cjgt$e -qtsdr* ntlitery lgglrnqlgey. It is verytightly conneced with rhe Sovief ilsign omces and with thearmarnents industry as a whole. It is the only link betweenthe Soviet armaments factories copyrng foreign weapons andthe residents of Soviet intelligence who obtain the necessarysecrets. The tenth dlr"9g-!oqq!g studies military econori.,

.":uglgVj4p-, criffiliy*warching .-r satils, studying fro-duction and technological developments, strategic reiurcesand

-vulnerable points. The idea of an oil embargo first saw

the light of day in this directorate a, a suggeslion in the'Locomotive Report'of 1954, when it was pointeO out that,to wreck the 'locomotive of capitalism' it was not neoessary

!o sna$ the engine, only to deprive it of a crucial ingrcdient.

Immediately after this the Soviet penetration of the Arabnations began. Happily this stunning idea of the tenthdirectorate has not as yet been pui into practioe. The-pteve4t[__q1!rIli.e_s strate-gic . *1,.rpS. qn{ stratggic nugle.ar.

rithli '-o::1'-

Th;';.tt"tty of each information directorate in many

*.p".rJrpiiLtes the activity of its neighbour directorates'

ftr[ .Or.nt.ge of such a set'uP is-that it prevents a one-

ril"a ,i"" arid a subjective appioach to problems' Director'

.*1rJ *.tions nof at ptoblt't in i narrow' parochial

;il;, giving their opinions not on the whole question but

;;-;;';r.rtl e unified opinion is worked out bv the head

;i'i";o,iil;'"iitt irt" nlp of his best exPerts and the

.olnruna point. Many reports from the.procurement organs

"i ir,. AnU are analyzed simultaneously by several or even

in'^if unitt of the information at the same time' Let us

;#*:'i;, example, that a case officer belonging to an

un'a'.r.or., residency receives a short verbal report from an

,""ii," the effect ih.t . n.* jet fighter is in the Proceq

"?"f.rrg;;r;i"P.d in ttre united

-states and no offrcial

announcement has as yet been made' Immediately after the

;;;it"g with the agint the case officer would send an

.nripttJt"a telegram, one brief sentence' to Moscow' But

the information command point has no other report on this

;ffi-;:;;;anv enioence to supPort it' The rePort wouldforces of all countries who possess such capaliliiiei, or

88 Soviet Mitinry Intelligence

be published in the 'tntelligence Summary'under the heading'unchecked and unconfirmed report'. The next morning allmemben of the Politburo and the higher military commlndwould receive the volume printed during the night. At thesame time all branches of information would be studying

. the report. The seventh directorate, trying to put itseif i;the shoes of NATO leaders, would endeavour to calcutatewhat present and future value this fighter would have forNATO and, if it were really to be taken into service, how itwould affect the balance of power in Europe and in theutorld. The question of which country of the United States'allies would be likely to buy such an aircraft would also bestudied. Units of the seventh directorate would immediatelystart searching their archives for information on what NATOleaders have said about the future development of avi-

llign. Simultaneously with this tha eighth directorate respon-sible for individual countries including US studies wbuHthoroughly research the question as to who insisted on thedccision to develop a new aircraft; what forces in the countrymight oome out against such a decision; which aviationcompanies might be drawn into the development of the

'4fuuaft by tendering for the contract; who would be likely towin and who to lose. The ninth directorate, on the basii ofan analysis of the latest American achievements in the sphereof engine building, aerodynamics, aviation electronics, mightbe able to foretell the basic technical parameters of iheaircraft. The tenth directorate would uneningly tell, on thebasis of an analysis of military orders, military budgetsand the budgets of the country's main corporations, wfiichaviation companies would actually be involved and to whatextent. The eleventh directorate would study the problemfrom the angle of the aircraftis potential use as a carrier ofnuclear weapons. It would be able to draw conclusionswithout knowing very much about the new aircraft, simplyon the evidence of existing carriers of atomic weapons, their

The GRIJ Processing Organs 89

reolacement in service, the quantity of nuclear weapons and

::##;;;'u;ili;;' eiir'" same time' the inrormation

il:ii# ffiii;;li;p''u 1"" publications which might

have some bearing oi itt" problem.and. present its own

ooinion to the into,'nttion fimmand poini' end all resi'

;:il::'ifir;l r"I.pt"Jt'tlv operating asents' intelligence

;i;;;ffi or rnititttv disiricis' flelts a1! armv sroups

would receiv. .pp'op'itte orders to increase their activity

with regard to trre queJiion' S*t' an order would also be

received by the 'you,'gt' brothers" By the evening rePorts

of all the branches ;;;[; *thc-ied at the command

pl,r"l "ii u" ptint.a ttrai night in the routine 'Intelligence

Summary', amongst i"iai"ft of similar reports already

confirmed.The GRU lays great stress on questions of training special'

ists for the informati* littJotti"s' Alongpide professional

intelligence officers ;;tk-il bts snecill$s from a wide'

range of scientific, tttiiitti-tnO industrial fields' The GRU

has the right to ."d;;lr. tp"atntt frg-cosmic rescarch

or atoniic energy' rnittoUiotogy or computer technology'

strategic planning "i'in"rnttffrral relations' Such a rigltt

was accorded to trre bnU ui the geniralPmmittee on the

ii;;i;-,il it i. u""titoi the Soviet union to b€ in the

know about trre mosi moJern achievements of thc United

states, Japan' ct .tiJi"in, France and the Federal Repub'

lic of Germany than ;;;;i;out its own'.In conformity with

this the GRU, Ouriig ir" '*' dramatic moments of the

;p*.;. o}'tne. 'iitit'' unceremoniously co'opted the

leading Soviet specraiisit-in tf't field of piloted cosmic flights

and, with ,t.i, t.tp, 'onitored

every ste? of the Americans'

;;;;;' ii it .uiotnt that every Soviet programme rvas

based on an American model' but launched days or even

mirnths before th. fi;;;ns canied out theirs' As a result

;i;;;;;e' in.ruaii'fit" first orbitatflight' the first multi-

seater spacestrip, tne f,rst entry into outer sPace weht to the

The GRU Processing Organs 9190 Soviet Military lntelligence

Soviet Union. This state of affairs continued right up tothe time when the adventurism of the Soviet programmeproduced a series of tragic accidents.

The information directorates of the GRU have at theirdisposal the highest quality etectronic equipment producedby the best American firms, and the GRU teadenhip, notwithout reason, considers that the technical equipment ofthe processing organs of the GRU is vastly superior to thatof comparable units within the CIA - in spite of the factthat some Western specialists have said that the GRUinformation service is not as effective as it should be. Theybase this on two facts: that in 1941 the GRU had all the dataon the forthcoming German invasion but was unable toevaluate correctly the information it had, and secondty, thatmuch of the intelligence material was reported to the highercommand in a 'grey' unprocessed state. It is impossible todeny either of these facts, although one may complain thatthey belong to past history and not the present. If the GRUinformation service is truly less effective than it should be,the answer lies in the communist system itsetf. GeneralGolikov did possess detailed German plans for the invasion,but Stalin was not of a mind to believe them. Two yeanbefore, he had twice liquidated the whole staff of Sovietmilit'ary intelligence from the chief of the CRU downwards.So what more was Golikov to do? Thirteen years later, thenew chief of the GRU, General Shtemyenko, found thesolution. He ordered the publication of an intelligence sum-mary each night, which would include 'grey', unprocessedinformation and unsubstantiated data. In.this way the gallantgeneral implied that 'this is not my opinion, it is the opinionof my residents'. The GRU chief and the head of informationwould only give their own opinion twenty-four hours later inthe next isue of the summary. (This stroke of genius on thepart of the GRU was immediately adopted by the KGB too.

:ff '",'e,hl:ffi si:4h#;trlr'*i;tudependent on its superio', tnd'thtte is no organ which can

defend it from the caprices of its superior' This is the very

..r""* "iit. Soviet Union' and this is why it is necesary

;;;il kaders of Soviet intelligence to.l1n" recourse to '

such cunning. The ,y""' t'tt ieen-well+ried up to the

;;;;;imJuna ..,i"' as a kind of tightning conductor'

fi:;:#;,rt" cnij *mouflages his own opinion'.tly:[

;ilil,l" position adopted P, ft: senllal secretarv ol

the Party at a given rno"i'i and at the sume tlme he is able

il;;;J;J o."roping tituo'ion to.the leadership in a

most obiective way, tfi"ittn'tttting all responsibility from

his shoulders to ttre:s-i"fJt" "tiis subordinates' The

overseas intelligence o'gu*, separated by thousands of kilo'

metres from t*toscow, -t"nnot

possibly know what opinion

their rulers hold at t gi"tn momeni' They are-'h:ffot't

forced to give simply oUfioi* material which can be directly

;;il;" the higher lommand' onlv in this wav can the

;;Ld;;; rcaaerirrip exert anv. Tnu".lT "l 1'--:t::5:;;stei when the latter do not wish to listen to any opmron

which contradicts their own'

But the totalitariai system still exerts.a crushing influence

on all branch"s of socieiy, including the intelligence services'

li;b.d; h;t the right to bbittt to' or contradict' the supreme

command. Thus it was under Lenin and Stalin and Khruschev

and Brezhnev, and iiut it will be in the future' Should the

*pt;;";mand have an inconect view of thingp' then no

iiIJ ,*.. or information service can convince it otherwise;

ildoe; not dare. Nor does first'clas American equipment

it"tp, ;;*. very Uest specialists' It is not the fault'of the

in1iiig.n.. serviies, it is the systeT: fault' In cases where

the supreme .or*tJ is fran[ty deluded' as Stalin was in

92 Soviet Military Intelligence

1941, intelligence has absolutely no chance of influencinghim and its effectiveness at that moment is nil.

However, it is not atways like that. tf the desires of thedictator and his inte[igence service coincide, then the ratter'seffectiveness grows many times greater. tn this case, thetotalitarian system is not a brake but an accelerator. Thedictator does not care at all for moral sides of a question.He is not at all answerable before society for his aciions; hefean no opposition or discussion; and he is able to supplyhis intelligence service with any amount of money,

"u"n .i

"moment when the country is suffering from hlnger. fireGRU has canied out its most briltiant operations a-t exactlysuch moments, when the opinions of the dictator and thiintelligence service coincided. And the information servicehas played a first-ctass rote on these occasions.

Lct us consider one example. During the Second WorldWar a section of the tenth dircctorate (economics and,tlrt"gr. resources) wT slgdyrng the trends in the exchangeof pecious metals in the United States. The specialist *"i"surprised that arf unexpectedly large amounf of silver wasallocated 'for scientific research'. Never before, either in{mgrica.or in any other country, had such a large amountof silver been spent for the needs of rgsearch. Tfiere was awar going on and the specialists reasonably supposed thatthe research was military. The GRU information anatysedall the fields of military research known to it, but not one ofthem required the expenditure of so much silver. The secondreasonable assumption by the GRU was that it was somenew field of research concerning the creation of a new typeof weapon. Every information unit was brought to Ueaionthe study of this strange phenomenon. frirther anatysisshowed that all publications dealing with atomic physics iradbeen suppressed in the United Siates and that ail aromicscientists, fugitives from occupied Europe, had at the sametime disappeared without trace from tht scientific horizon.

The GRIJ Processing Organs 93

A week later the GRU presented to Stalin a detailed report

"i a.".[prents in the USA of atomic weaPons' It was a

i.pott "tti.t had been compiled ol Pe basis of only one

urLonnrm"O fact, but its contents left no room for doubt

about the correctness of the deductions it made' Stalin was

delighted with the report: the rest is well known'

95Support Services

L2

Support Services

All GRU organs which are not directly concerned with theprovision or processing of intelligence material are con-sidered-as support services. It is not possible for us toexamine all of these, but we will simply take briefly the mostimportant of them.

fhg pollggl&el4ue[E is concemed with the ideologicalmonitoring of all GRU personnel. The military rank of thehead of the political department is lieutenant-general andagain he is a deputy to the GRU chief. As opposed to anyother political departments the GRU political department ismade up not of party officials but of professional intelligenceofficers. There are also several other differences. All politicaldirectorates and departments of the Soviet Army are subor-dinated to the chief political directorate of the Soviet Army,which is at the same time one of the Centrat Committeedepartments. The GRU political department, however, issubordinated directly to the Central Committee administra-tive department. The political department of thd GRU hasconsiderable weight in Moscow, especially as regards staffmovements, but it has no right to interfere in intelligencework. It exerts practically no influence on the activities ofoverseas branches of the GRU. Overseas the residents arepersonally responsible for the ideological monitoring of theirofficers.

The Personnel DirectoB.t-q is directly beneath the chief oftte C nil]fr6"fiiilfof tiie bi rectora te, a t ieutenanr-gene ra l,is also a deputy to the chief of the GRU. The directorate isstaffed only by intelligence officers who, in common with

officers of the procurement and processing organs' the polili'

;;ffi;;;.;;ni-and "ti'i'ui"'!r'es of tfie gRU' regularrv

;;.;i"#;i a period of several years and then return to

work at domestic Postincs'The personnel direct'8iate has exceptional influence bgth

in the GRU and outsiie'-it ditects th" tnon"*tnts of all

officers, not only intiJt'trtl Onu' but in a number of

satellites, in ffeet inttirig";'-inteiligence directorates of

r"ili"ty hritr". "na

gffi ol ptt"t-11,'^and also in the

intelliience services of Eastern bloc countnes'"'iir." is

-concerned with

the development ano;;A"ttt""? itt espionage equipment

;;;;ffii;;. wi t'i" io Jo'inion fail several scientific

research institute tJ tp"tftfized undertakingp' On the

orders of the procu,."nt organs.the direclorate PrePares

equipment for secret ffi;;d micYphotography' several

kinds of dead-letter il*, ?taio appliances' eavesdropprng

- material, armaments and poisons' io name but a few' Its

head is a lieutenant;;ilil altirough he is not classed

officially as a dePutY'

"*i lu":r"'#ffi,il i"t.-.i,ir.. tr,it oittttotate is the curency middle-

;;t;;iri. rniiitttv industrial commission and the

il;il users. tt .ontiort all the curency resources of

the GRU and also ."ti"t out secret speculative operations

"" ,i. i",.*ational market' Possessed of colossal curency

il;;-ii-it"qu"ntty uses them in order to exert secret

;;;;;; ;" individuaf businessmen' statesmen and some-

lfir;;;;;;;-il;;;"nt'' No ress.important' it is

resoonsible for the gr8*rh or capital bclonging to the GRU

.ni fot the acquisition of 'clean' curency'

.,j;i'#mm'*PJflx:1"J1l}.:1',i:%fiiand its overscas unit*-N..ar"ss to say, it controls scveral

}6 Soviet Military Inrelligence

powerful reception and transmision centres of its own,but should the need arise to secure special channels ofcommunication, in case of a worsening of operational con_ditions, for example, then it can maki use of the servicesof the cosmic intelligence directorate, communicating withillegals and agents by means of GRU satellites.

tlre"fi olgd{PSeel1-41gl[ untike the administrative/tech_nical directorate, the finantid department deals onty withSoviet money, not with foreign currency. The financialdepartment carries out regar financial operations in the sovietUnion.

TheE$l*GjU*P'ep"egt.gent.(p-assport)studiespassportregulations worrdwide. In ihii punuii bt tris esoterii duiy ithas the greatest collection in the world of passports, ideniitycards, driving licences, military documents, passes, policedocuments, railway, air and sea tickets. Thl deparimentkeep maps of many thousands of frontier posts, customsand police posts, and so on. The department can at anymoment say what documents are required at any givencontrol point in the world, what sort of questions

"rj "ik.d,and what stamps are to be put on the passports and otherdocuments. Within a few houn, it can forge'the passport ofany oountry to conform with the latest changes in theqassport.and visa regulations of that country, hiving at itsdisposal hundreds of thousands of blanks for new passports,identity cards and driving licences for every couniry in the*gll9. ll ,y experience, the preparation of tha paperswhich will preserve one's true identiiy can be Aone in a veryshort time.

me Ei&&g--BU-Dspaflrqerlis the most secrer of an thetop secret units of the GRU. The eighth department pos-sesses all the GRU's secrets. It is here that the encipheringand deciphering of all incoming and outgoing documents iicarried out.

The Afgliv.gs__9_q.p-q*gg3l is possibty the mosr intere5ting

SuPPort Services 97

of all the departments. In its cellars are millions'of personal

;;"ilt and files on illegals, domestic officers' undercover

i"riJ"n.i"., successful relruitment of foreigners (and unsuc'

."r-.ruf on.t), material on everyone from statesmen and

ily;;. io prostitutes and homosexuals and designers of

ro"["t. and submarines. In every file lies the fate of an

inAiriaoU, in every file there is an unwritten novel'

Part II

Illegals

We can define an illegal as an officer of strategic intelligence

;r;ilffi it" tu.t, "iitt" centre on the territory of a

foreisn state, who passes himself off as a foreigner Uyt ry1

;".';";"il;'.i;;r:-iil";uit u" frequentlv confused with

asents, but these "t"

to'i'pft1"fy different fhings' The crucial

:ffi#;';;;1h" 's"nt ;i an inhahitant of-a foreign

."riiiy *t " has beerr ieJruited bVt 1d -1o1ks

in the interest

of, Soviet intelligence, whereas an illegal is first and foremost

a Soviet officer pus'ing t'i'ntelf off as a foreigner' S:ry^tli:.:

some of the most valuable and deserving agents recelve

Soviet citizenship as un inttntiu" and are awarded the rank

;i;;;ifr*t ot t'rre Gnu or the KGB' but.even so' an agent

;.r""f"t ."-.g"nt. go*eu"t, in the occlsioyl case when a

foreigner has been t"trui*d by Soviet intelligence and for

some reason or ottrer chang"''t'it appearance or name and

continues his activitiet--*iit' /alse dbcuments' then he is

called an illegal agent'

Both the GRU and the KGB have their own illegal

networks, but these are completely independent one from

tn" ott.i. Each organization selects' trains' prepares'

i"pf"V.' .ra utilizes. fis illegals as it sees fit' In the same

wav each orgu,,'u"on- *otit oot principles' methods of

ffik ffi ,..iri.J itiails of the illegal Jv-stem separatelv'

Th;:fi;;i runnmt illegals is entirelvdifferent in the two

services. tn the KGB ti'"t?it a special directorate of illegal

activities. In the GRU] tli iff"g"h are trained in a training

centre unde, tfre ttuO""t'ip oi Lieutenani-General V' T'

Gurvenko. ntter ttreir iiuining, the illegals are put at the

ffi;;i;f ,r,. r,".ot of the four geographical directorates

102 Soviet Military Intelligence

and are controlled personally by them. Thus each directoratehead supervises a number of directions and separately a

group of illegals. In order to help him, the directorate headcan call on a small group of advisers consisting in the mainof former illegals (though not 'blown' ones) who are readyat any moment, using false papers, to go to the targetcountry and 'fine-tune' and help the activities of the illegalnetworks. Directorate heads themselves frequently travelabroad for the same reasonS. A number of the more import-ant ille'gals are directly controlled by the first deputy head ofthe GRU, and there is a cream who are under the personalsupervision of the head of the GRU. Thus both one and theother have small groups consisting of the most experiencedand successful illegals who have returned from abroad andwho exercise supervision over the daily running of theillegals. If a young illegal begins to acquire really interestinginformation he is transferred from the control of the head ofa directorate to that of the first deputy or, in the case ofeven greater success, to that of the head of the GRU himself.This is, of course, a very high honour, granted only tothose who return information of a very high calibre -unprecedented or highly classified material which producesan intelligence breakthrough. Equally an illegal may bedemoted for failing to produce the goods. In certain cases

his grade may fall below that which is supervised by thehead of a directorate and he will be supervised only bythe head of a direction. This is a very critical stage for theillegal, although he may not even be able to guess that it hashappened. If he is demoted to direction head level - and heis, of course, not informed about this - the next stepcould well be a recall to the Soviet Union, regarded by allintelligence personnel as the direst form of punishment.Recall to the Soviet Union is a particularly effective measureagainst any Soviet citizen serving abroad. It is all the sameto them whether they are in Paris or in Pnom Penh. The

lllegals 103

only important thing is that they 1!o.ufa not be in the Soviet

Union, and transfer to ttre soviet union, even on promotion,

i. t"guta"a as the tragedv of a lifetime'

The selection ot pottitiuiiiregalt is carried.out by each of

,h. i;;;;iupt i.ur oii"tio'utJt independentlv' candidates

are selected on the basis of future req'uirements' In basic

;;r*t';iilrs of the so'iet ermv and Nalv are used Il"^1';;;;; il;w nothing about the GIY s:T'times expen-

1"".i 3m.".s of the "GRU u" used' those who have com-

;'t'iliir. r"riri,tw-nNiomutit Academv *9 ht"t- *::1v-worked in intelligencl or in the information processtng

i#"r*"",..' doti"ti'*t in" cnu will select for illegal

activities young Sou'ei citizens' mainly those who have

il;i;1;d'ringirirti. ;;';t;t in higher education' Higher

education i. un "t'"t'ii-J

itquagtint'.therefore the mini-

mum age at which u '"t'uii tJiff begin his training is?l to23

'"Ii,iourn General Guryenko's o.rganization is called the

'Training Centre', not-on'e ioniet ilLgal who has defected

h.. ;; been able to say exactly-where it is' The name

Training Centre tt"t' ti'pty to riflect the existence of one

;;ffi;,t* o".upiti *iitt'on" task' Either the organization

is constantly on the *o", or a secluded tittle place is

r.r..i.Ji"ttach individual irainee' normally in the Moscow

area where tfrere are greut numbets of' dac,has'T"be dachw

for the training tf ifftluft are well concealed among other

;;;;;iliBunoingl, where outsiders are not to be seen

on the streets ,nO uni"t"ttary questions.are not asked' but

;;";i.-;;; ot ,pottinf upt"u*ntt HI b,". seen walking in

irit.-i, ,t. qoi"t tr'?av avenues' T\e dacha provides an

ideally isolated terr'i'toiy ior training' In addition to the

candidate and his f"tliy; two or three instructors also live in

the dacha *t.r. tt "i'cun

immelse .him completely and

suoervise him very'tJt"i"ffy all the-time' His wife is also

. i#;J"il'ii" .'riilirrr-r.uo nor.ut lives and will be held

104 Soviet Military Intelligence Itlegals 105

husband. She scrutinizes his behaviour and sometimes may

*urn tt " GRU about his excessive interest in women or

alcohol. On their return to the Soviet Union' husband and

*it" ut. subjected to a detailed individual debriefing on all

;rd;Jrlieir life abroad' If the husband and wife have

decided to keep something secret from the GRU' their

eventually as hostages. The internal fittings of.the dacha areprepared very thoroughly and carefully. From the first daythe candidate becomes accustomed to the circumstances inwhich he will be living and working probably for rnany longyears. In this connection he wears the clothes and shoes,and eats the food, even smokes cigarettes and uses razorblades procured from overseas. In each room a tape recorderis installed which runs twenty-fsu1 hours a day. while he isoccupying the dacha. These tape recorders continuouslybroadcast news from the radio programmes of his targetcountry. From the first day of his training he is supplied withthe majority of papers and magazines. He sees many filmsand descriptions on video tapes of television broadcasts. Theinstructors, for the most part former illegals, read the samepapers and listen to the same radio programmes and spendtheir time asking their pupil the most difficult quesiionsimaginable with regard to what has been read. It is quiteobvious that after a number of years of such training, thefuture illegal knows by heart the composition of iveryfootball team, the hours of work of every restaurant andnightclub, the weather forecasts and everything that is goingon in the realm of gossip as well as current affairs, in icountry where he has never been in his life. The instructionalprogramme is tailormade for each trainee, giving due con-sideration to his knowledge, character and the tasks whichhe will be called upon to perform in the future. Attention isobviously paid to theJllCy_gl_lhe lansuage of the rarget.c!!MlU, to. ryq5llng methods and to a cove.r..slply. :*_-

often, ttreTiE[eTfwi6iho und?iffiffiG she as arule works as the radio operator. The posting of a husbandand wife together, leaving their children behind as hostages,is a very frequent occurrence. It is considered that mateinalfeelings are much the stronger and, with the wife posted,hostages are that much more effective. Perhaps more surpris-ingly, the wife also acts as a control for the GRU on her

stories will eventuallY differ'-- Afi.t as much u. th,ee or four years of intensive training'

the illegal passes a state commission of top GRU and Central

a;*;ii"; personnel, and goes abroad' Usually his journey

;il;-i;;g"i country is effited through a number of inter-

;;;t;"rntries. For example, a-journey to the USA

*"riJi" tt"m the Soviet Union to Fiungary to Yugoslavia

," Cypii., fuwait, Hong Kong and Hawaii'.At each stage'

;. ;J.i oi tter, he deiroys Jocuments with which he has

entered the country and gols on under new documentation

*i,i.t, t "t

U.en prepared-for him, either by.other:tt:gl} :1il;;;td;-;;ili,nJ"''o"' rnelleqSSWdlcuments in a re,served !9te! or 1jl93Ts!tP1:a9'n

qt P,1

fficfiTtage he goes on to

iilothffimonths

."""iiy *t.re he is to work' The first thing he does is to

;il rti" city where he is supposed.to have been born' gone

i";r,"i,'itd married. He gets a job and works.for^a time'

Denoo aDroas. llus Prrffifi o y"u'i aft:u+rslircrtjr+q+Hi':3the basis of the experiefiffifi-as gained' and the short-

comings which have .oi. t light inihe training'.tlie illegal

and his instructors work out a programme of training for a

. 106 Soviet Military Intelligence

period which lasts another one or two years. After this heagain undergoes state examinatioru, at which the head ofthe GRU or his first deputy have to be present. Then theillegal is placed at thd diiposal of one of the heads ofdirectorates

-and again commences the operation for hisroundabout journey to the target country. For operationalpurposes (though not for instructional purposes) much use ismade of Finland as a window to the Wesi. In the course ofhis operational journey, the illegal's stay in one of theintermediate couRtries may continire for several years. Thisstage goes by the name of the ,intermediate

legalization,.To take the case of an illegal whose target destination isWashington: hemight pretglA to bp a refug-ee from Hungaryescaped in 1956; this would mean period-s of residencl inIungu.ry to_begin with, then Austria and Germany beforehe arrives finally in America. An eventual Frenc'h illegalwodd be likely to make the journey via Armenia andkbanon. Both would consolidate their nationality everystep of the way. In the course of the ,intermediate

legaliz-ation',- the illelal endeavours to acquire as many frienis aspossible, to go to work, to get hold of genuineiapers andcharacter and work referencis. At the

"ia of these'years of

.preparation, he at lasf appears in the country where he is tospend so many more yJars endeavouring to Ao it as muchharm as possible.

The minimum age of an illegal clearly cannot be less thantwenty-seven to twenty-nine, but usually he is older, onaverage about forty. This age suits the GRU very well for anumber of reasons. A man of forty has a balanced, conse*u-tive approach to life. The stormy passions of youth havedisappeared and he is less .inclined to take ill-considereddecisions, especially if he ever suffers tn" aif"*mu'ofwhether to continue working or to go to the police. Hischildren are sufficiently old to be ablJ to live without theirparents in the complete care of the GRU, but not old

Illegals 107

enough to live independently, and so they are ideal hostages'

And ln the event of mobilization in the target country, he

may well be able to avoid being called up for the army

which would mean the breaking-off of relations and an end

to his active working life.On his arrival at

-his obje-qting'lhil!!9g3!-sJts about basic

r"eX#ffi ffi:riit"Efffi fr-.emto"a-p.p.^6j-tl"Utl@rs of the GRU on genuine blant passports' At the

same tiite he is extremely vulnerable if he is not registered

with the police or the tax departments. Any check may give

him away and for this reason he endeavours to change jobs

and places of work often to get his name onto as many

.ornpuny lists as he can and to acquire character references

signeO by real people. The ideal solution is for him to obtain

nJ* documen6tion from the police department under some

pretext or another. Often he will marry another agent (wlto

may already be his wife); she will then be given a genuine

futtport, unA n. will 'loie' his false one to have it replaced

wittr- a real one on the production of his wife's genuine

document. The acquisition of a driving licence, credit cards'

membershipdocumentsofclubsandassociationsareavitalelement in ilegalizing' the status of an illegal'

A vital role in the lives of illegals is played by cover

stories, in other words concocted life stories' The-basic or

sround cover storv is created on the basis of r66i-ffiiilfiirraiml, only changing a few details. He keeps

the date of his birth but of course changes the place of his

birth. The dates of birth of his parents and relatives are also

accurately recorded, usually along with the professions of

his parenis, dates of weddings and other details' The illegal

is thus not telling an out-and'out lie but only a half'truth'

He will not bat'in eyelid when he tells you that his fathe-r

served all his life in t-he army. The only thing is that he will

not tell you in which army he served.

There is also the emergency cover story, which is the last

Illegals 109108 Soviet Miliiary I ntelligence

line of defence of the illegal on having been arrested by thepolice. As its name suggests, this cover story is only to beused as a last resort when the illegal perceives that the policeno longer believe his basic cover story. Designed to be usedonly when the illegal is in the hands of the police department,it is ooncocted in such a way that the details it gives shouldbe impossible to check. For example, one illegal was arrestedby the police while he was trying to obtain a new drivinglicence because a mistake had been found in his old one. Hewas subjected to questioning, as a result of which his basiccover story was found to be inaccurate. Then he went overto his emergency cover story and inforrhed the police that hewas a Polish criminal who had escaped from prison andbought a passport on the black market. During this time theGRU, not having received from the illegal his routinesommunications, informed the Polish authorities about the.'criminal'. The Poles published photographs of the criminaland applied to a number of countries for his extradition.However strange it may seem, the police believed the storyand handed him over to the Polish Consul. It would havebeen easy to break the emergency cover story, if the policehad only thought to invite a real Polish immigrant for a ten-minute chat with his supposed fellow countryman. Of coursehe would not have known more than ten words of thelanguage. But for the police it was sufficient that he spoketheir language and did not object to being handed over tothe Polish Consul.

No less important than the cover story is the cover or thepiice e_ilFefi@a;. ffifrE"paganda paints agrave pictrire of the intelligence officer playing the role ofa colonel in the enemy general staff. But this is puredisinformation. Such a cover is unacceptable to an illegal fora number of reasons. Firstly, he mwt keep himself awayfrom counter-intelligence and the police. He must be a grey,

inconspicuous 'man in the street' such as millions would

hurry past without noticing. Wtturry yoDr f-r".i, bTfe lL Secondly, he

I the general statt he

ffiio;"";;0"*i' tr."tt1*mediatelv' Thirdlv' for such a

.o[ir,i"r"galizationwouldhareto.b"Yiit""fl,?:]Ill:t:T";i. ri;;;""io ."rtuinf ue asked about the military schools

and academies where't'e it supposed 1o .have been' the

;;; il which he has served' and his acquaintances

;ffiil:;ir;;;,; 'taff' Fourthlv' an illegal needs plentv

il;?-;;J;pfortunitv to meet whoever he wants to meet'

If a colonel on the general staff consorted with ryi

lffiffiF':'*it'i*l::li;ftiffi Jil&ffi he would be exposed within forty-eight hours'

Finally, and perhaps *otiiiponantly' the requirements of

it.-c'riu .t ing" ,"ittt great rapidity' Today they are inter'

ested in documents trori-a certain department of the general

;if ;;;-.,rorrow f,om unother' But our illegal is wo*i1s

in vet anothe, a"pu,t'n"ni and all his attempts to have talks

;liil#;;r;fi;;ildepartments have been met with

a blank wall or coto susiicion' No' the kind of cover offered

;;*.t a role is neitheifeasible nor a great deal of use'

l**til{*professional titters anOitren wiih atomic weapon workers' If

he doesn't want to work for three months' there is no

oroblem. If he gets muny tt'oosunds -of

dollars through the

["ti, i*iri no [tour"'' tt is part-of his cover' There are

il;;i;"uttJ' e ge!ag9-q"ner, for example' He hires his

staff and himself go.Iifr&-*er'he wants and for as long as

t. ."unrr, or he stands at the window and takes the money'

Thousands of peopte-pass him every day - ballerinas and

frL

ir

. -! , -r--lng a mlnlmum of twowireless" a at least one)

them. We iwithout agents, are not able to obtain anything. Gradually,as a result of recruiting new agents, the residency mayincrease in size. More illegals may be sent out to the resideni,one of whom may become his assistant. The GRU considersit counter-productive to have large residencies. Five illegalsand eight to ten agents are considered the maximum, butusually the residencies are much smaller than this. In caseswhere the recruitment of new agents has gone well the GRUprudently divides the residenry in twJ parts. Thereafterany contact between the two new residencies is of courseforbidden, so that if one residency is discovered the otherdoes not suffer.'

110 Soviet Military Intelligence

artists, senators and scientists - and colonels of the generalstaff. To one he gives money and instructions written insecret writing, from another he receives reports. For thebasic task of the illegal is not himself to penetrate secrettargets, but to recruit agents for this purpose. This is hisraison d'Atre.

An illegal residency is an intelligence organization compris-

2

The Undercover ResidencY

The undercover residency is one of the- basic forms of

intelligence ."urp t- -ifie

GRU abroad' (It should be

remembered that the unOt"ontt residency- and the illegal

r.riJ.*y "* completelv separate entities') In every country

where official Soviet 'Jpt"l"ntu'ion

exists there is a GRU

undercover ,.riO.,'y' il"-ittt i" parallel with' and is anal-

"g"". tr, it. KGB undercover residency'. Thus every over-

seas Soviet cotony--i' invisibly divided into three

"rg""ir.ri"*: the 'clean ones" thaf is th€ genuine diplomats

and correspondents, ""J it"i representatives of external

trade, civil airlines, ttre mercfrant ;vy' and Intourist' headed

;fiLt;;;.ruaoi; tr'"-onJo*ner iesidencv of the GRU;

unO tt "

undercover residency of the KGB'.

Very often, ,t" 'tf"tn; iersonnel rn?I: 'o distinction

between the KGB uio ir'" bRU ana cail them both dirty'

'savages','Vikings' t"'n"ighboors'' The.more enlightened

;ff,"lti; for example the imbassador' his senior diplomats

and the more observant people' understand the difference

between the two o'guii'"tions' dividing them up I clgse

;;i;;;ittre rcij, who continuallv meddle in the dav:

;J; uttuirc ot tuti'' person in the colony' and distant

;[il;;no tut" uutolutelv no il9l::t at all in the dav-

;J;iite otttre soviet colonv (the GRU)'

Forthecnuono",.o,"'.".io"n.ylivesasecludedandisolated life. It tonoint significantly fewer employees than

either of the other offiizuiiont' Normally in Soviet colonies

up to 40 Per cent ;f"il people may. be considered in the

'clean' category' Ghil "i tou"t does not prevent the

.1I2 Soviet Military Intelligence

majority of them, to a greater or lesser extent, from co-operation with both the KGB and the GRU; bur they arenot to be considered as professional intelligence offiiers.)Up-to 40 or 45 per cent are officers of the KGB and only lito 20 per cent, in rare cases up to 25 per cent, are officeis ofthe GRU. This does not however mein that the intelligencepotential of the GRU apparatus is less than that of theKGB. The. larger part of the KGB personnel is occupiedwith questions of security, that is with the collection ofcompromising material on Soviet people, ,clean, peopleincluding the ambassador, and theiiown colleagues'in iheKGB who have contact with foreigners and freqiently withofficers of the GRU. Only a smali proportion, in opiiru,cases half of the KGB personnel, are working againsf foreig-ners. The GRU, on the other hand, directs its intire potei_tial against foreigners. When one adds to this the unequalledfinancial power of the GRU, vastly in excess of that of theKGB, it becomes clear why the most outstanding operationsof Soviet intelligence have been mounted not by the KGBbut by the GRU.

The minimum number of staff for any GRU undercoverresidency is two - the resident and a combined radio/cipherofficer. such a theoretical minimum exists arso for the otherorganizations, the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Theoretically the Soviet colony in a very small co-untry mayconsist of six people, three of whom, ihe ambassaOor andtwo residents, are diplomats, and the other three radio/cipher officers. Each of the three branches of the Sovietcolony has its own enciphering machine and completelyindependent channel of communication with Moscow. Eqr-ally, each has its own boss in Moscow - the Minister ofForeign Affairs, the chairman of .the KGB or the head ofthe GRU. Supreme arbitration between them can only becarried out in the Central Committee, which in its turn hasan interest in fanning the ffames of discord between the

The (Jnderc:over ResidencY 113

three organizations. The Central Committee has the right to

[."ff ."V ambassador or resident and this same Central

Committee has to decide questions as to which slots' and

ho* rnuny, should be accorded to each of the three organiza-

iiont. fnit is a difficult task, as the Committee must not

offend the KGB on questions of security' on the shadowing

of its own diplomats above all, nor must it offend the GRU'

iot *irt ou, tire acquisition of data on present-day technology

if,. qu"fity of the'soviet Army would remain static' Finally

ii .,it, not offend the 'clean-ones'' They also must have a

sufficient complement to serve as a screen for the dark

activities of the two residencies'

This is why Soviet embassies, consulates' trade represen-

tations and so on grow and multiply and swell' As the

residency grows, thJ resident acquires several deputies-.in

;il;f ih" on" he had at firsi' The number of radio/

iipt.t officers increases. A technical services groupis organ-

J!J, ", operational group, a tech-ops grolP, a radio moni-

ioJng .ruiion on the- neiworks of the police and counter-

intelfigence. The number of operational officers engaged

Jit".riv in recruiting and running agents increases' In the

u..V Uigg.u residen-cies of the GRU, such as that in New

yoit , tt".t. may be from seventy to eightyofficers' Medium-

sized residencies like that in Rome would contain between

it irty una forty officers' All officers on the staff of a residency

ur. diuid.d inio three categories - operational staff' techni-

;;i;;"t;6"a1staff and te;hnical staff' The operational staff

are tirose officers who are directly concerned with recruiting

and running agents. In the operational staff are included

residents, deputy residents and operational officers' To the

technical-opeiations staff belong tho$e officers who are

ait..rfy concerned with and responsible for the production

of intjligence, but who do not have personal contact with

agents, ior often with foreigners at all' These are radio/

ll4 Soviet Military Intelligence

cipher officers, officers of the technical services and opera-tional technical services and the operators of the ;adiomonitoring post. To the technical staff belong chauffeurs,guards and accountants.

The ResidentHe is the- senior representative of the GRU in any givenplace, and answerable only to the head of the GRU inl tt

"Central Committee. He is the boss of all GRU officers andhas the right to send any of them, including his own deputies,out of the country immediately. In this case he dols noteven have to justify his decision, even in front of the head ofthe GRU and the Central Committee. The resident iscompletely responsible for security, both as regards the workof each of his individual officers and recruited agents, andthe security of the residency as a whole. He is chosen fromamong the most experienced officers and as a rule must havea minimum of three to five years of successful work as anoperational officer and three to five years as the deputyresident before his appointment. A resident in a largeresidency will hold the military rank of major-general, inmedium and small residencies that of colonel. This does notmean that a lieutenant-colonel cannot be appointed resident,but then, according to the GRU system,'he *ill be ;;id;full colonel's or major-general's salary and, if he copessuccessfully, will have to fill posts commensurate with thehigher rank. He is not afterwards permitted to return to apost ordinarily filled by a lieutenant-colonel.

The deputy resident serves as the resident,s assistant andassumes his responsibilities when he is absent. He undertakesthe duties given to him by the resident and carries onrecruiting work in the same way as all other operationalofficers. Frequently a deputy resident heads teams of officersworking in one or another specialized field. Sometimes theresident himself supervises the most experienced operational

The tJndercover ResidencY 115

officers and the deputy residents the younger' less experi-

enced officers. In some very large iesidencies, and also

sometimes where there it gttut uttliuity on the part o{ G}U

illegals, there is a post callJd deputy resident for illegals' The

undercover residency una tn" illegal residency are completely

;;;;;;J-it" ona"ttover risidencv has no idea how

many illegals there are, or where-or low they work' At the

,-u*. tirI, on instructions from the Centre' the undercover

;;;il.;.y ;rntinually gives them help and support' nllin'smoney and passports in dead-letter Loxes' emptying dead'

i"*i'uo*"r^ foi them, studying conditions and clarifying

certain important questions' Very often the undercover resl'

dency is used to rescue illegals'--iie military rank of an! deputy resident is full colonel'

efie same time the same rules appty as apply to residents'

ffr.-a"p-ry resident may be a lieutenant-colonel or even a

;;1";;i;.ver, from thl administrative and financial points

ot ri"* he is a full colonel with full rights'

The Operational Officer

This is a GRU omcei who carries out the recruitment of

"g."", runs them and through them receives or acquires the

secret documents and'.urf,I". of weaponry and military

technology' Every operational officer from the moment of

his arrival in tr," ,ooliiy is obliged to recruit a minimum of

,r" "g.r,,

as well ., oft"n having to take tharge of one or

two other .".r", ug"nJ*no nu'Jpteviously been recruited

fyiit-pt"O"."r.ori. He must keep these ag€nts and increase

their productivity. An identical burden is placed-.on the

deputy resident at the same time as he is fulfilling the

"iiigJti"* or a o"puiv' Thil svs19m is applied in.all small

,"si["n.i".. tn *"diu'-tized risidencies' the resident him-

;;iilt take a direct interest in recruitment or not as he

wishes. The residents of very large residencies are exempted

from Personal recruitment'

116 Soviet lrlilitary Intelligence

Alongside his recruitment work, the operational officer

::Ti::::ll thc acquisitio, or irliii!"niJ mate,iar uy arrpossible means. He

his military rank is not usually higher than that of major' the

,uAioLipt "t

officer is the seiond most important person in

the residency. He is not only responsible for cipher Tatte.rs'the storage and use of ciphers and cipher machines, but also

for the tr-ansmission and reception of enciphered cables and

the storage of all secret documentation in the residency' The

radio-cipf,er officer possesses all the secrets of the residency

.nO .inL he decipirers communications from Moscow he

knows the news even earlier than the resident' Nobody'

including the ambassador and the KGB resident, at any time

or undei any pretext has the right of access to his room'

ftty Oo noi"r"n have the right to know-the number and

typo of cipher machines installed there' These restrictions

utio uppty'to GRU deputy residents' Even during periods

*hen ihe-resident is away-and the deputy resident is acting

for him he does not have the right to go into the radio/

cipher operator's room or to ask lim^aly specific questions

*iri.t ttuu. a bearing on his work' Only the resident may

"*"r.ir" airy control 6ver the cipher officer, and he pays for

the privilege because the ciphei officer is the only man in

the iesidericy who is entitled to communicate with Moscow

*itt oot the Lnowledge of the resident' He can send a cable

containing an adversi report about the resident of which the

resident fiimsetf will know nothing. It is the duty of the,

cipher officer to.exercise silent watch over the behaviour of

thi resident, and if there is any shortcoming he must report

it. In small residencies, where there is only one radio/cipher

officer, only the resident may replace him should he become

incapacitated for any reason. If both the resident and the

ciphlr officer should become incapacitated at the same time

tten the deputy resident and the whole residency will remain

ccimpletely cui off from the Centre' Naturally the ambassa-

dor'i and the KGB's channels of communication can be

used, but only in order to inform the GRU in a very general

way. It is natural therefore that great care is taken of cipher

The I|ndercover ResidencY tl1

ant part of an officer's duty, and it cails it number onl 1i,addition to certain other coiloquiaf *orJsl.'eil other work _

::ltT ga $9 performing of operations for others, howevermportant - is known as zero. One may be added to zero ifa',zero'agent manages to recruit u for"i!r,.r, in which case hebecomes a '10,, which is clearly tne UJsi nlmber to be. Forthis reason an operationuf omi., *r,o1;;1."n abroad forthree years and not r.ecruited " ,irgf. ig.nt, even if hehas achieved outstanding success in colilcting the mostinleresting intelligence material, is consiaereO to be idle.According to the standards of the OnU, t

" t us sat for threeyears doing absolutely nothing anO tfreieflre tarafy me.iisconsiderarion for anoiher "".;";;;;i;;.""The.military rank of.an op"rrtiJnJotdcer is rieurenant-colonel or colonel but in practi:: h;-*;r;; a major (as Iwas) or captain, or even a senior lieuten"ri. iirr. is successfulin his recruitmeni work tre_-.tays on ffifu tevel receiving

automatic promotion accordingio ttre lenlitr of time served.If he does not manase.to ,..riit ury ug.iir, te is deprivedof all his colonel,s ori'ril.g., and again t".oi", an ordinarysenior lieutenant or capiain anO f,as ,o .orp.r" for pro_motion in the ordinary way, as automatic promotion is notgranted to unsuccessful offiters. - r--

my'm

The military ranks prescribed for undercover residenciesar.e also applicable fbr -illegal ,*f0.r.i.., with the soledifference that the iltegat reiideri;;y;;; major-generathaving many fewer p"-opr" una.r iiil.-o-riuna than theresident of the undercover residency.

The RadiolCipher OfficerAlthough he ls an offi.., of technical operational staff, and

118 Soviet Military Intelligence

gfficers (this is just as true of the KGB as the GRU).D-raconian living conditions are imposed on all ciphirofficers. They are only allowed to live in official Sovietembassy accommodation guarded around the clock. Neitherthe cipher officer nor his wife is allowed to leave the guardedterritory independently or unaccompanied. They aie at alltimes led by an officer who enjoys diplomatic immunity.Neither the officer nor his wife is allowed near places wheie

- foreigners are to be found. Even if these foreigners areBulgarians or Mongolians and are on guarded territorybelonging to a Soviet embassy, the restriction remains inforce. The cipher officer is not allowed in the same roomwith.them- even though he may be silent and in the companyof his resident. He and his family must have a diplomaticescert on their journey out from the Soviet Union and ontheir return. During the time of his assignment abroad, he isforbidden all leave. It is easy to see wh-y cipher officers arenot posted abroad for longer than two years.

Of course those cipher officers who have served theirwhole lives on the territory of the Soviet Union deeply envythose who have had postings abroad, no matter wtrir!; anOthose who have'been abroad will give their right arms to getanother posting abroad, no matter where - Cilcutta, Shaig-hai or Beirut. They will agree to any conditions, any climati,any restrictions on their family lives, for they hive learntwith their mother's milk the rule that ore.seaj life is alwaysbetter than in the Soviet Union.

Technical Service:. (TS) OfficerThey are concerned with electronic intelligence from thepremises of official Soviet premises, embasJies, consulates,and so on. Basic targets are the telecommunications appar_atus of the government, diplomatic wireless communications,and military channels of communication. By monitoringradio transmissions, secret and cipher, technical servicei

Rqdio Monitoring Station Officers

in .oniruOi.tinction to TS officers, these are concerned with

,""fi"*g tt e radio networks of the police and security

;;;i;";. the technical services and the radio monitoring

;;;,t*;l;o different groups, independent of each other'

;;;h ;;;t"lled by the -resident' The difference between

them is that the technical services work in the interests of

i't.'b"*t", ,rying to obtain state secrets' but the monitoring

;;;;;;k;'oniv in the interests of the residency trying to

a."i*i"" where in the city police activity is at its highest at

ffi;;p;nt ano ttu. *t'"'e operations may be mounted

and where they should not be mounted' Groups for the

;;i ;i ;p";aiional conditions are made "p- "l-tl:.*::

juniot officers who will eventually become operatlonat

officers and be sent out on independent recruitmen',*-11l1-

The lJndercover ResidencY 119

groups not only obtain interesting information but also cover

the system of governmental comhunications' subordination

of the different components of the state and the military

structure, . r^--Til rnitituty ranks of technical services officers are malor

and lieutenant-colonel.

These are small groups who continually sgql4l !9c41l9ryand oolice activities, "qdgrygqllg

to oPtaq.by me?n:.t

;r"il;"d";'r"t-.-.rpre, the numbirs o{ notice -v1!1t1ffiil;nJi,^ t; ;;$"Per Pictures. o"l:.1a1111::;;k. ;Iil;" una o"t!.ii,es'. Sometimes :T-f:":t*::[,"ri- u""g.' ,n.*p".t.a results. In one *T,tt]^ 1:":ii.,,r.n"tist 6n a small newspaper reported a police _plan

to

ffi;iil;;r;television ,urnltut in order to survey the most

irig-rrrv p"prlated parts of the city; this.was enough for

the GRU to become tnterested and to take corresponding

120 Saviet Military Intelligence

measures. Within a month the GRU resident was able to say

with conviction that he was fully informed with regard to thepolice system of control by television and this enabled thewhole residency successfully to avoid traps laid for them forseveral years. The military ranks of officers of these groupsare senior lieutenant and captain.

The Operational Technical GroupThis is concerned with the repair and maintenance of photo-graphic apparatus, photocopying equipment and the like. Atthe disposal of the group there are dead-letter boxes ofall types, radio transmission stations, SW (secret writing)materials, microphotography and micropantography. Theofficers of this group are always on hand to give the necessaryexplanations to operational officers and to instruct them onthe use of this or that instrument or method. These officerscontinually monitor television programmes and collect usefulitems on video tape, giving to Moscow material it could notget from any other source. The officers ofthe group, together,with the officers of the group for the study of operationalconditions, are widely used for the security of agent oper-ations, the carrying out of counter-surveillance, signalsorganization, dead-letter box operations and so on.

Technical PersonnelOnly the very largest residencies contain technical personnel.Driven are only allocated to residents who hold the rankof general. However, many generals, in an effort to beindistinguishable from other diplomats, dispense with theservices of drivers..The military rank of a driver is an ensign.However, sometimes an operational officer is to be found inthe guise of a driver and he, of course, has a much superiorrank. This is a widespread method of deception, for whowould pay attention to a driver? i

Some residencies, especially those in countries where

The [Jndercover ResidencY ' l2l

attacks on the embassy cannot be excluded, have a staff of

ilil [r.ia". ,t. x'ci- guatat.-Ylo are resPonsible for

the external prote'uon"If it't UoilAing' The GRU internal

;;;";t,;;;;is consist oi vii"ssp't'i*orficers in the rank

of lieutenant or sen'o=r iiuiEnint' The- internal security

guards of the reside"gV '1v

-U"-9q"1^"ijlth" request of

the resident in countrres where KG-B attempts to penetrate

the GRU get out "i;.il. Th" internal security guards

answer directly to the resident or his deqrty' Naturally they

O, ""i

t"f" part in agent handling operations'

An accountant, in itre;k oi captain or major, is

employed only in tt'ot" ittiO"ncies where the normal

monthly budget exceeds one million dollars' In other cases

the financial afairs are the concern of one of the deputy

residents.

ln our examination of the undercover-residency' we have

""*tAtr'i" .*utnin" its to'"t' the official duties used by

KGB and GRU officers to tu*ounuge their secret activities'

Without exaggeration ;t-;t be saii that any official,duty

;;; s;;ffi citizens auiofo Y*::::i:: T::- ;*:'J3ffi,:id;; ;;ffi;;"i "r sl"gqi,l10aP3l* sti:En' -: 'j:il"'ru;ffimffiilesses, heads of.D-::.7-ffi irit6ffigegc.e, miruffiH:r1'ffi;;ffii"iitr**'i't'' *a..the vast majoritv or

l'#.""ri"i,itu.t onry Sttupi"a in intelligenc" *:i^! ::::tv;;;;ti provide uettei possiuilities' some worse' Some

Ifi;;;;;"uv,t. cRu, 'o*" tnot" bv the KGB' Let us

look at the basic ones'-A;'trb;sry i. us"o to an equal extent blfoth organiza'

tions. Both residents tnJ tt"it iepuligs are in possestig.n ol "

;;;;ir;;;ont, ot information which would expose tht'ry

r22 Soviet Military Intelligence

to an unacceptably high risk of arrest. For this reason theKGB resident and his colleague from the GRU, and usuallytheir deputies too, are bearers of diplomatic passports, that

- is, they work officially in the embassies. Other officers ofboth organizations give themselves out as embassy diplomatstoo. They all prefer to concern themselves with technologicaland scientific questions, and questions of transport andcommunications; they are rarely found in cultural sections.The consulate is entirely KGB. You will almost never findofficers of the GRU there and only very rarely genuinediplomats. This is because all exit and entry from and to theSoviet Union is in the hands of the KGB. KGB officers inthe consulate issue visas, and the frontier forces of the KGBthen control them later on. Every aspect of immigration andof flight and defection has some connection with consularaffairs, which therefore rank extremely high in the KGB,ssphere of interest. So it follows that the percentage of KGBofficers in consulates is unusually high, even by Sovietstandards. (There do exist very rare instances of GRUofficers working in consulates. The KGB only agrees to thison the grounds of practical considerations, and so that itshould not appear to be too one-sided an organization.)

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E E:-* FSEEiEg!!gEE!-EEiEE

J llo'

*!tye 9.9[_qEo{.!!gQBIl,_!his can be explaineil 6y thtfact that aviation

of extreme interest to the Soviet armamentsindustry, and there is huge scope for any Aeroflot employeeto inform himself about the progress of the West: inter-national exhibitions, meetings with representatives of theleading aviation and space corporations, perfectly justifiablemeetings with representatives of firms producing aviationelectronics, oils, lubricants, fuels, high-tension materials,heat isolators and aero-engines. Usually the firms whichproduce civil aircraft also produce military aircraft androckets, and in this field lie the GRU's richest pickings.Happily, those officers whom the GRU selects at advanced

oooi

o

124 Soviet Military Intelligence

aviation institutes for work in Aeroflot do not need lengthyspOcialist instruction. Sometimes Soviet military and civilaircraft have identical parts. KGB officers are only rarelyemployed at Aeroflot, and then for the same reasons as theGRU in consular affairs. The merchant navy is almostidentical, the only difference being that the officers there areselected to study cruisers and submarines and not strategicaviation. An organization of exceptional importance to bothservices is the Trade Representation, that is the organ of theMinistry of External Trade. Literally swarming with KGBand GRU officers, this organization provides exceptionalaccess to business people whom both strive to exploit fortheir own ends. Representation in Tass, APN, Pravda andIzvestia are almost forbidden ground for the GRU. Even theKGB in this field has very narrow powers. Press matters arevery carefully kept in the Central Committee's own hands,therefore KGB officers and officers of the GRU do notoccupy key posts in these organizations. This does not meanof course that their secret activities suffer in any way.

Intourist is in the KGBj.l bggd!*-so much so that it is notjdFt arlorgefiffition strongly influenced by the KGB, but an

one rule wNch admits of no exceptions. Anything to do withthe military attach6s is staffed exclusively by officers of theGRU. Here there are no genuine diplomats, nor KGB. Thenaval, military and air attach6s are regarded by the GRU as

its particular brand of cover. ln.the West one is accustomedto see in these people not spies but military diplomats, andone assumes that this has spread to one's Soviet colleagues.This deep misapprehension is fully exploited by the GRU.Whenever you talk to a Soviet military attach6, remember

The llnd'ercover ResidencY 125

always that before you stands at the very least-an operational

officer of an undercovei residency wiro is faced with the

;;il "i recruiting foreigners 31q *T' if he does not

I;tt a single forei-g'ner, ies all- his other work become

il[rifical ina uil t[ t'opet of ashining career crash to the

;ffnd. ;;k into tri..vet una ask him how much longer he

iu, ,o serve in this hospitable country and if in his answer

,"" p.i."". a note of anguish, then be on your guard' for

'rr. ,^i[ ,".-it you if tre cin' But perhaps. he is happy with

life and his eyes express pleasure' This means he has

recruited one of yooi f"ltot"'countrymen' Possibly there

even stands in front oi yoo a deputy resident or the GRU

resident himself. f.u' ti' and'be'careful of him' He is

dangerous. He is experienceO anO cunning like an old hand

rt rifA be. This is not his first time abroad' and that means

;; h^ atready chalkedup a significant number of successful

recruits.

Every GRU officer in an undercover residency' whatever

his official duties may be, and under whatever cover he

;;t;;;;.;, has his place in the general structure of the

;;;;;;;i;."rchv. whit we see in oaitv -life

is onlv the

."i"r*"n." th; GRU wishes to show us' Internal relations

i;;;-;;.t.over residency have no bearing whatsoever on

;;;;i,-"fficial ranks' uitituty ranks.play an insignificart

role. The important rol is ttre actual job of the officer in the

,.tiO.*y- there have been cases wirere.residents with an

eve to cover havb occupied completely insignificant posts

i^linr" .*t***. et thl same time the resident remains

ii,l'i"tiO.", and his authority is unshakeable' Within the

,"rri.".y tt remains ir" tttiti, tyrannical' frequently wilful

il;-;t" during tris briefings will-frequently attack the

military attach6s - even ttrotigtr in.his life as seen by the

;tiJJ r"oito t" plays the parl of doorman for those same

attach6s. The seconi mosi important person' the deputy

,l

lrrlilI irli

t26 Soviet Military Intelligence

resident, may only be a lieutenant-colonel with operationalofficers who are colonels but this does not prevent him fromtalking to them as he would to captains or lieutenants. Theyare only operational officers, while the GRU has decreedthat he, a lieutenant-cotonel, is better than them, fullcolonels though they may be, and has given him full powersto dispose of them and order them about. Official coveragain plays absolutely no part. An operational officer mayassume the official duty of assistant to a military attach6 ormilitary attach6 himself, but still have the deputy resident as

his own personal driver. The deputy resident in no waysuffers from this. His situation is analogous to that of theSicilian waiter who, off duty, is senior in rank to therestaurant owner within the Mafia hierarchy.

All operational officers are legal equals, from seniorlieuten4nts to full colonels. Their seniority in the residency,however, is established by the resident exclusively on thebasis of the quantity and quality of their recruitments.Recruitment work is the sole criterion for all GRU officers,regardless of age, rank or official duties. Their relations witheach other in the residency might be compared with therelationships existing between fighter pilots in time of war.They also, in their own circle, pay little attention to lengthof service or military rank. Their criterion of respect for aman is the number of enemy aircraft he has shot down, anda lieutenant who has shot down ten aircraft may patronisinglyslap on the shoulder a major who has not shot down a singleaircraft. The attitude of the operational staff engaged inrecruitment work to other officers may be summed up bycomparison with the attitude of the fliers and the groundstaff at a fighter base: '[ fly in the sky and you shovel shit.'The only exception to this attitude is the radio/cipher officer;to whom all show the greatest respect, because he knowsmuch more about intelligence matters concerning the resi-dency than the deputy resident.

deputy residents. TheY are:

Colonel B, cover Uefuty Trade Representative' He has

,*ir"" 6iaU om".,' uio" t'i'' all working in the Trade

il;;il;on- u. is in contact with one agent' one of his

officers runs an agent $oup of three agents' Another is in

contact with two ug.ni' and a third officer has one agent'

The remaining officers have as yet noagents'

Lt-Colonel C, co'er-Assistant to thi Naval Attach6' He

t*'r-V-"perational otfrcers beneath him' two of whom

work in the Merchani No*ry Representation, three in

Aeroflot, five in,fr. e'Lutty and ten in the.departmelts-oJ

the Military, Naval u"a Xt Attach6s' All three of the

military departments are considered to be a diplornatic

;;i-;n'd"p.;dent from each other and from the Embassy'

However, in this case, all officers entering the three military

d"p"il;;i; including the three attach€s. are beneath one

assistant military aualne' The deputy.resident it it::1T'

The lJndercover ResidencY ln

Let us take a typically large residency as.?n example and

examine it. Everything is tlctuat' The resident is a Major-

General A and tris omcial cover (relativqly unimportant)' is

fir.iS..t",.ry, Embassy' Directly beneath him are a group

;i;";;;;i;r.ipt"t officers, three verv experienced opera-

;;;;i"ffr."^ (one of whom runs an agent group' and two

;;;;tun ..p"tiatty valuable agent-sources)' and four

;il';;; ;.nt. Twelve other operaiional officers subordi-

nate to him have one agent each' The.remainder have

;;;;"i;,;;;;. *ho u" to be recruited within one to two

vears. In addition to his agent-running work, this deputy

i".ra"."i"*-ttlponsiure for i-nformation work in the whole

residencY.Colonel D, cover First Secretary' Embassy (deputy resi'

O."ilrt if[gat). This dtputy "tid"nt-ltt no agent and

does not carry out recruiiment work' He has no officers

beneathhim,butwhenheiscarryingoutoperationsinthe

rI

tII

I

III

I

128 Sovict Mititary Intellilence

interests of illegals, he can make use of any of the bestofficen of the first and second groups.

Lt-Colonel E, cover Second Secretary, Embassy. He is incontact with one agent. One operational officer is subordi_nale to_ him, disguised as the military attach6,s driver, andthis officer runs an agent group. In addition, this deputyresident controls the following: one technical service gioui(six officers), one group for the study of operationaicon_ditions-^(four officers)_,- one group of operational technique(two officers), the radio monitoring staiion (three officers),five officers of the internal security guards for the residency.and one accounts officer.

In all there are sixty-seven officers in the residency, ofwhom,forty-one are operational staff, twenty operationaltechnological staff and six technical staff. The residency hasth-irty-six agents, of whom twenty-five work independlntlyof each other.

In some cases part of the undercover residency, under thecommand of one of the deputy residents, functions in anothercity permanently detached from the basic forces of the mainresidency. This is true, for example, of Holland, where theuldercover-residency is located in The Hague but partof the residency is in Amsterdam. Such an arrangementcomplicates work to a considerable degree but in the ipinionof the GRU it is better to have two imall residenciei thanone big one. In this case any failure in one of the residenciesdoes not reflect on the activities of the other. Everywhere it ispossible-, the GRU endeavours to organize new, independentresidencies. For this it has to observe two basic conditions:the presence of official Soviet diplomatic representation _ anembassy, consulate, military attach6,s department, militarycommunications mission or a permanent UN mission; andthe presence of an officially registered radio station in directcontact with Moscow. Where these two conditions obtain,

The Undercover ResidencY 129

residencies can be quickly organized, even the very smallest

possible, consisting of two men but independent and self-

contained.Apart from the security angle, this practice also ensures

parallelism, as the GRU can control one resident by means

Lf another. Such possibilities are open to Soviet intelligence

in many countriei. For example, in Paris there is one of

the moit expansionist undercover residencies of the GRU'

Independeni of it in Maneilles there is another, smaller

residlncy. Their performance is vastly enhanced by the fierce

competition between them. In West Germany the GRU has

been able to create five residencies. Wherever there is official

Soviet diplomatic representation with radio transmission,

there is also an undercover residency of the GRU' In many

cases there is also an undercover residency of the KGB' But

while the residencies of the GRU are organized in any

official mission - civil, military or mixed - those of the KGB

are not. In Marseilles, New York, Amsterdam, Geneva and

Montreal the Soviet missions .are clearly civil, and in all

these cities there are undercover residencies of both KGB

and GRU. But where the mission is clearly military, as for

example the Soviet observation mission in West Germany,

the KGB may not have a residency. This also applies to the

numerous missions of Soviet military advisers in developing

countries. The KGB presence there is only for the mainten-

ance of security among the genuine military advisers.

In speaking about the undercover residency we must not

forget to mention another category of people participating

in elpionage activities - go-opted pgrsonn=e,!-Ihese 4{eg".llg!.ifizens-ebroud wt o ai. o$."^ -olllle-iiCg, uut fuml a nurnbei of test-.*aet- th.e[t by lhese.offirson may be of anY rank

riffi?66ffian to ambassador and he carries out very differ-

ent tasks, from studigs ofjbr ioreignelllgrroundins him

to clearins dead-letter boxes. The KGB hffilwayi6E;*

130 Soviet Military Intelligence

interested in the exploitation of co-opted persons; followingthe principle of 'don't stick your own neck out if you can get

somebody else to stick it out for you'. The GRU is not so

keen, using co-opted persons only in exceptional cases. Itsguiding principle is: 'don't trust even your best friend withyour motor car, girlfriend - or agent'. The rewards for a co-opted person are monetary ones which, unlike the basicsalary, are not subject to tax. Usually in every embassy,consulate and trade representation, out of every ten 'clean'offieials, seven are co-opted onto the KGB staff, one ontothe GRU staff; only the remaining two are clean. Eitherthey are complete idiots, or the sons of members of theCentral Committee whom wild horses could not force tohave anything to do with intelligence. [n other words, inSoviet official institutions, it is a very, yery tricky matterindeed to meet a man who has no connections withintelligence.

In present-day Soviet intelligence terminology the term

'ug.rr' fras only one meaning' An agent is a foreigner

r"iruir"a by Soviet intelligencelnd carrying out secret tasks

on its behaif. All agents, i-rrespective of the group or section

of the GRU to *hi.h they belong, are divided into two

groups: the basic agent andthe sopplementary agent"Hasig-

in.ri, fall into four categories: they are residents or group' :;a-'

videri of information; they are exeeutiveleaders; theY are Pro',g*r. whose main task is to kill; or they are recruiting

alents. In the sJpflglg$ggglggp are wireless operators'

L'g"iiringagents]d6ffi-entalistsJtreownersof saf ehouses'

udir"ssei, telephones and radio transmission points'

Head Agentsii."O .i""n are the leaders of agent groups and agent

residenti. Head agents are selected from the most exper-

ienced agents available, men and women who have had long

yrurc of'."*ice and have given proof of their devotion to'ouiy. fn"y are invested with wide powers and possess

Slnin.rnt hnancial independence' In cases where the organ-

iz"ation entrusted to thim collapses, the head agent must

iil-iil ;..ision to do away with unwanted people who

;;; ; threat to it. In this and ofher emergencies he can

ut*uyt count on the full support of the GRU'

Th, diff"..nce between the group leader and the agent

resident is that the group leadei may take a whole range of

irronun, decisions-conierning the group entrusted to him'

but he may not recruit agents at all' The agent resident has a

3

Agents

132 Soviet Military Intelligence

wider range of interests, the most important being recruit-ment. The group leader may be subordinate to the residency,to the illegal, undercover or agent residency or directly tothe Centre, but the agent resident may only be subordinateto the Centre.

Sources

These are agents who directly obtain secret information,documents or samples of military technology and weaponry.In the recruitment of such people, it is first and foremosttheir access to political, military, technological and othersecrets which is taken into account. It is clearly unnecessaryto recruit an officer from the Ministry of Defence if one canrecruit his secretary. In other words, the GRU has contactwith people occupying relatively unimportant posts but withpossibly greater knowledge than their superiors. With this inmind, apart from secretaries, the people of special interestto the GRU are workers in printing and typing officeswhich produce secret documents, cipher officers, diplomaticcouriers, computer operators, communications clerks,draughtsmen and other technical personnel.

Executive AgentsThese are agents recruited to carry out assassinations, diver-sions or sabotage. The recruitment of executive agents is notusually caried out by the central GRU, but by the localorgans of the GRU - the military district departments.Sometimes even strategic intelligence needs similar special-ists, but in smaller number.

Executive agents are recruited from criminal elements andfrom that band of naturally brutish characters who, withpassing time, become accustomed to executing any ordersthdy are given. Frequently agents who have been acting asproviders of information are transferred by both the strategicand operational branches of the GRU to the category of

Agen* 133

executive agent, in cases where they may- have lost their

access.

Agent Recruiters

Tf,.*. urc the most devoted and thoroughly tested agents'

people who either never had access or who have lost it' As

ih.ii nu*. suggests, the GRU uses them solely for the

recruitment of niw agents. The most successful will eventu-

ally become group leider or sometimes agent resident'

Agent Legalizerst[.r. urJ subsidiary agents. They work in the interests of

illegals and as a rull aie recruited and run only by illegals'

Caididates for this category of agents are sought among

om.iuft of the police and passport departments, consular

.f.r[t, customs and immigrition officials, and small

"rnptoy.tt of labour. Agent legalizers are subjected to

"+,l"iiffy thorough vetting, becayle the fate of illegals is

"niru.t"d to them. When a Soviet illegal arrives in a country

tf,e tast of the legalizing agent is to ensure the issue of

Jocuments by makiig the necessary entries in the registration

books and to ensure that the illegal is in possession of the

necessary documentation.In the history of the GRU quite a few priests carrying

falsified documents and registers of baptism and death have

!ir.n ir*"nse service to illegals who, on the basis of false

Intries, have been able to obtain the necessary documents'

A simiiar role to that of the legalizing agent is played by the

documentation agents. These are recruited by the undercover

residency and their job is to obtain passports, driving licences

uno'u*pt..ofofficialpoliceforms.Incontradistinctionto, the leealizing agents' documentation agents do not have any

lJir..i=.or,.i iitr, illegals. Although they obtain tens and

i "or.tir"t

hundreds, even thousands of passport-s' they have

no ait.., knowledge of how and when the GRU is going to

'134 Soviet Military Intelligence

use them. Frequently the GRU uses the passports obtainedthrough the good offices of documentation agents only as

a sample for the preparation of similar falsified copies.

Documentation agents may be recruited from among crimi-nal classes who are occupied with the forging and selling ofdocuments on the black market and also from clerks con-

cerned with the production, inventory, storage and issue ofpassports. Frequently documentation agents have success-

fully worked among poor students, persuading them, for a

financial consideration, to lose their passports. .

CouriersThese are supplementary agents engaged in transportingagent materials ovcr state frontiers. Obviously it is notnecessary to employ special couriers to transport the materialinto the Soviet Union or its satellites.

The basic flow of agent material which is not subject toparticular suspicion goes from countries with hard regimes

into countries with more soft regimes. In the opinion of the

GRU, an opinion fortified by the experience of many years,

the hardest country is Great Britain, followed by France,

the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Bel-gium and Holland. As soft countries the GRU includesFinland, Ireland and Austria among others.

The GRU also makes very wide use'of countries of the

Third World for this purpose, and couriers may sometimes

make very long journeys before the material finally arrives

in the hands of the GRU. Examples are'known of materialobtained in the United States going first to Latin America,then to Africa and only from Africa being conveyed to theSoviet Union. tn- recruiJilg co_u!,ie{s, the GRU pays particu-1

lar attention to t@long:ar$gre quE!, Ico m me rcial trave I leFilil-s ai I oJiif Ge'iChint fl

"9!!. Wtre n I

fii-jacking of aircraft became more frequent and controls at

Agents 135

airports became stricter, the GRU virtually gave up recruit-

ing ,t "

.rt*s of airliners. If it uses these at all' it is only for

trinsporting small-sized non-metallic objects'

The Owner of a Safe Howe or Flat

He is a supplementary agent occupying a position of great

trust, usuaiiy recruited from among house-owners' conct-

erges and hotel owners, in a word, all those who possess not

on"e but several flats or dwelling places' The term 'safe flat'

,rr"rrJ be understood not only-in its generally accepted

meaning but also as a well'equipped cellar' attic' garage or

sto;;. F-"t safe flats the GR0 selects quiet secluded places

where they may want to be able to hide a man sometimes

for a lenith of several months; to carry out meetings'

;ri"fi"g; ind de-briefings; to cha4ge clothes and change

;;ffi;; and to hidle stolen miterials and-photograph

,ioi"n ao.urents. The owner of a safe house or flat is known

in ttre cotloquial language of the GRU by the abbreviation.KK"

The Safe Address Owner

He is an agent who receives and transmits secret messages

i"i ir,. cfu, usually recruited from among those. people

*f,, i...in. copious correspondence frorn-abroad; the work

is normally restricted to inhabitants of 'soft' countries'

5oor.". who hane obtained information and intelligence in

tuia .ountties send letters in SW to these addresses and

,h. o*n"r, transmit the correspondence to officers of the

undercover residency. One interesting aspect of recruitment

i. tf,ut tt. GRU prefers'middle'aged people who would not

be affected by general mobilization in the country' so that

ihe chain of clmmunication is not interrupted''-fftt fo.t"ssors of secret telephones and' more recently'

teleorinters are recruited by the same rules applied to the

;;;:;;it.cret addre'sses. in GRU language these types of

136 Soviet Military Intelligence

agent networks and their possessors are known by theabbreviations 'KA', 'KT', 'KTP'.

The owners of transmitting points are used for transmittingagent materials within the limits of one city or area. Usuallythey are.stregt--s.eJlgrq"ir.r. sq4ll kiosks, stalls or paper stalls.An agent who has acquired intelligence will stop and handover the material to the owner. Hour. later, sometimesdays, GRU officers will visit the stall to collect the materialand hand over money for the agents together with newinstructions. This avoids direct contact between the GRUand the agent. Increased security might mean the sourceageirt using a dead-letter box which the stall holder willempty, not knowing who has filled it. The GRU willannounce the dead-letter box's whereabouts to the transmit-ting point only after it hai been filled. A different one willbe used for each operation, and so even if the police discoverthat the GRU has a special interest in the small shop orstall and subsequently establishes that this stall serves as ahansmitting point, it will still be very difficult to discover thesouroe agent. To mount a surveilldnce operation in theneighbourhood of the dead-letter box is impossible since thetransmitting point only acquires its location after it has beenfilled; the agent himself has disappeared long before. Thetransmitting point is known by the abbreviation'PP'.

ln examining different kinds of agents, people from the freeworld who have sold themselves to the GRU, one cannotavoid touching on yet another category, perhaps the leastappealing of all. Officially one is not allowed to call themagents, and they are not agents in the full sense of beingrecruited agents. We are talking about the numerouS mem-bers ofUnion. Officially, all Soviet representatives regaid thileparifrilSiies with touching feelings of friendship, bui privatelythey call them 'shit-eaters' ('govnoed'). k is difficult to say

Agents 137

where this expression originated, but it is truly the only

name they deserve. The use of this word has become so

firmly entrenched in Soviet embassies that it is impossible to

imagine any other name for these people. A conversation

might run as follows: 'Today we've got a friendship evening

with shit-eaters', or 'Today we're having some shit-eaters todinner. Prepare a suitable menu.'

Officers of both the GRU and the KGB have very much

more respect for their agents than for the shit-eaters. The

motives of agents are clear - an easy life and plenty ofmoney. If you take risks and lose, then no money and no

easy life. To the end of his life the agent will not be able to'

tear himself away from this servitude - as is the case in the

criminal world. But the behaviour of the numerous friends

of the Soviet Union is utterly incomprehensible to Soviet

people. In the Soviet Union everybody without exception

wishes to be abroad, to go absolutely anywhere, even if only

with one eye to look at Mongolia or Cambodia. Oh! to be

abroad, is the cry, led by the children of Brezhnev, Gromyko

and Andropov. When Soviet people want to say that a

thing is outstandingly good, they say, 'Really, this must be

foreign.' [t does not matter which country it comes from, orwhat its quality or age - it has to be foreign. But suddenly

one finds these friends of the Soviet Union, who enjoy all

the fruits of civilization down to Gillette razor blades, who

can buy anything they want in the shops, even bananas, and

yet they praise the Soviet Union. No, these people are

nothing but shit-eaters according to Soviet intelligence. The

contempt felt for them does not prevent the GRU and KGB

from using them whenever they can. They do everything

free,'and they will even come to meetings in secure places

like the Soviet Embassy.

The recruitment of such people is not recommended by

the Central Committee, but why bother to recruit them

when they bring such advantages without being recruited?

,ril'

,il,ii,'

'i]li

138 Soviet Military Intelligence

The GRU usually makes use of the shit-eaters 'in the dark',in other words not saying what they are used for or how

4

Agent Recruitingmuch they benefit from their services. They usually ask fromthem information abour their neighbouffiEifiifiGiil

workers and so on. Sometimes one tm lswith one or another of

They are very goodAgent recruiting is the most important task of both strategic

and operational-intelligence. No real problems can be solved

without agent penetration in basic government, military and

technological centres of the enemy

In the previous chapter we examined the types of secret

agents and also the various differences between them' [twould not.be an exaggeration to say that any citizen of the

West, having been recruited by the GRU, may be used very

effectively for intelligence purposes, some for the acquisition

of secret documents, some for assassinating people, and

some for the transporting of agent materials' No citizen of

any age and either sex would be idle for long once he or

sni fe1 into the hands of the GRU. Nevertheless, basic

importance is attached to the provider of information. longexperience has persuaded the GRU that it is essential above ,*,"

alfto recruit sources, and only after the GRU has acquired

through these sources all possible material may the sourcg

himseif be used for other purposes' as a recruiter, head

agent or supplementary agent. The GRU is convinced that a

former sourie who is now working, for example, as the

owner of a transmitting point will never on his own initiative

go to the police; but the same cannot be said of agents who

hare neuet provided secrets for the GRU, who have not had

firm contacts with them. The search for suitable candidates

is implemented atthe same time in certain d,tr"::iT:l::_q 0

scruDulous collection of information on persons of interest !o----r _ .---+:-i.:-.

thF-GRI I includins sovernment instltutlons tor sta[s, mlll-th@nmenttaifS-aiilOesign bureaux and people connected with these

to organize an eveninghis acquainianG$

ffiJfi,ilffi "?.u foreigners without **pti"" *t'' 6)

Agent Recruiting 141140 Soviet Military Intelligence

have anv contacts at all with officers of the GRU; and

@ $-!,1-ql9!,tqlegail1anceq - 1m gnsforeigners. If an operational officer has a hundred acquain-

tiilG3i6ne of these must surely be a potential provider ofinformation which will be of interest.rr A candidate for recruitment must fulfil the following

fi', cond iat is he must 5ev -'in the position to_Jlgvigt .llformation of real use to the

n GRU, .irt .r io'1r"fi;;6p-y.r.rets, to communicate secret

,g information by word of mouth, or,llo Jesruit new agenls.

f;There must exist .rnglives by means of which he may bev recruited - displeasure with the regime or other political

motives, personal financial problems, or private motives likea desire for revenge on somebody or secret crimes which he

is trying to hide. It is desirable that he be sympathetic tocommunism without being a communist. Communist parties

everywhere have been compromised to a certain extent by

their contacts with the KGB and the GRU, and it is always

recommended that agents recruited from communist parties

should leave the partys-,*Ei After the selection of a candidate for recruitment, the

sec@!r4g - commences. Details are

collected aboui ihe candidate, details which may be obtained

through reference books, telephone directories and the press;

the task of obtaining all available information about the

candidate may well be given to other agents. The GRU may

equally want a surveillance on him to collect extra data

about his daily life. This process sometimes gives very

gratifying results. Up to now the person himself does not

, suspect that the GRU exists and he has had no contact withits-representatives, but it already has a considerable wealth

7q of detail on him. Subsequently the GRU enters the processY of cultivation, which consists in a further definition of

motiGs which will be used in the actual recruitment of the

person. It also tries to exacerbate his weaknesses: for exam'

p*, if the man experiences financial problems, the GRU

*ili endeauour to make them worse. If he is displeased with

the political regime, the GRU will endeavour to turn his

dispieasure inti hatred. The cultivation process may be

carried out after the establishment of an acquaintanceship-

with the candidate. The whole process, from the beginning of

the search for a candidate to the completion of a cultivation

period, normally extends for not less than a yeat1' only after

ihis does actual recruitment take place.

There are two principal methods of recruitment'.qL9gt4-

ual.approach and the crash approach' The crash approach sffiffifi""-ffiisbt agCnt woik. ttre GRU may authorize

the reJident to mount iuch an operation only if the resident

has been able to provide good irgumerlts for the taking of

such a risk. Quite a few examples are known of recruitment

at the first meeting, of course fo[owing the secret cultivation

which has gon. oi for many months. It was in this way that

many Amirican creators of the first atomic bomb were

,".rrit"d. Their subsequent argument was that it was as a

mark of protest againsi the bombing of the Japanese cities

ifru, tt"y, on theii own initiative, established contact with

Soviet intelligence. However, for some reason they forgotto

add that thiJ contact had been established long before the

first experiments with the bomb, when there was no cause

for proiest. They also evaded the question,as to how several

p.opl", simultaneously and independently from one another'

irta-Utitn.A contact with the undercover residency of the

CiU in Canada, but not with the undercover residency of

the KGB in Mexico, for examPle.

The crash approach, or 'love at first sight' in GRU jargon'

has a numbei of irrefutable advantages' Contact with the

future agent takes place only once, instead of at meetings

nr., *uiy months, as is the case with the gradual approach'

After the first contact the newly recruited agent will himself

142 Soviet Military Intelligence

take action on his own security. He will never talk to hiswife, or tell her that he has a charming friend in theSoviet military attach6 who is also very interested in stampcollecting.

In the gradual approach method, this sort of thing happensvery, very often. The candidate has as yet not felt the deadlygrip of the GRU, has not yet understood what it wants fromhim. He still nourishes his illusions, and naturally he willnot hide his good friendship with such charming people.However, the gradual approach method, despite its short-comings, is frequently used. The fact is that the GRU is notalways, indeed not even in the majority of cases, able tocollect a sufficient amount of material about the candidatewithout his knowledge to prepare him sufficiently for recruit-ment. In many cases it is necessary to establish contact andto use each meeting with the candidate to study his motivesand to carry out vetting and cultivation.

Having estabhshed contact, the operational officer tries byevery possible method to avoid'blowing'the candidate; thatis, he tries to hide the connection from the police, fromfriends and acquaintances of the man himself, and also fromhis own fellow countrymen. The only people who shouldknow anything about an agent and therefore about candi-dates for recruitment are the resident, the deputy residentand of course the cipher officer and the Centre - nobodyelse. In order that he should'not blow the candidate fromthe very first meeting, the operational officer will try tocarry out meetings in secluded restaurants, caf6s, bars farfrom the place where the candidate lives and far from hisplace of work. At all costs he will try to avoid the candidatetelephoning him either at home or in the embassy. He willtry to avoid the candidate visiting Soviet official institutionsand places where Soviet people gather together. He willdecline invitations to meet the candidate's family or visit hishome. (The particular pretexts I used were that my office

.f

ing and useful as possible for the candidate. tf they exchange

postage stamps, then the Soviet, by apparent mistake or out

of frGndthip, will give the future agent a very valuable

stamp. The officer may then ask for a very innocent and

insignificant favour from the man and pay him very gener-

ously for it. During this stage the most important thing is

that the future agent becomes accustomed to being asked

favours and fulfilling them accurately. It does not matter

what sort of favours or services- Maybe he will be asked to

accept at his address and forward to the officer letters

ostenpibly from his mistress, or to buy a complete set of

telephone directories and give them to the officpr as if he

did not know how or where this could be done' By degrees

the tasks become more complicated, but the payment for

them grows equally. Perhaps he will be asked to acquire in

his name some works of reference which are not on sale and

are distributed only on signature, or he will be asked to talk

about and describe his friends who work with him' In many

cases the actual recruitment proposal is never made, as the

candidate gradually becomes.an agent of the GRU without

having fully realized it. He may consider that he is simply

doing his business an<l doing favours for a good friend'

Then, much to his surprise, the man will one day find that

all ways of extricating himself have been cut off, and that he

is deeply ensnared in espionage work. After he has become

aware of this for hirnself, the GRU informs him what the

affair is all about and there begins a new stage. The tasks

become more serious but the payment for them gradually

Agent Recruiting t43

never there. so the candidate

t woutO tell him, there was a small

After the acquaintanceshiP

will try to make every subsequent meeting as interest'

144 Soviet Military Intelligence

decreases. This is done on the pretext of his own security.

What can he do? Go on strike?There exists yet another method of recruitment, perhaps

the most effective and secure. This method was worked outby the GRU in the first decade after the war and seems not

to be used by the KGB. It can only be used at exhibitionsand only against the owners of small firms which produce

military material. In spite of the fact that the method has so

many limitations, including the impossibility of recruitinggenerals and their secretaries, and equally its complete

unacceptability for illegals it does, however, give positive

results. It is very similar to the direct approach, but isdistinct from the classical 'love at first sight' in that a lengthy

search for a candidate, his tracing, vetting and cultivation -#*-G;r-"'--4';as'vare absent."Before

the opening of exhibitions of military etectronics,

armaments and military technology, ship-building and

engine-building conferences, air shows and so on, hundreds

ofwhich take place every year, a scientific delegation appears

at the GRU residency with a list of everything which is

essential for the Soviet military and the armaments industry.

The experts of course know that at the exhibition there willbe demonstrations of models whose sale to the Soviet Unionis categorically prohibited. None the less, the delegation willcarry suitcases crammed full of money' with full powers tospend it as they wish. All expenditure is approved and

justified. The examination and construction of such samples

as they have been able to obtain in the Soviet Union willoccupy much more time and money. The delegation visits

the exhibition and looks at the stands of the big corporations

only to disguise its real object. At each of these stands there

are several salesmen and guides, any one or all of which

may be from the security services. The delegation is only

really interested in the stands of small firms where the

exptanations are .carried out by the owner or a director

Agen.t Recruiting 145

himself. The delegation gets into conversation with him and

an officer of the- local GRU residency acts the part o!

interpreter. The experts pass themselves off as an offlcial

Soviet delegation. At thelame time they manage to let the

operationaiofficer know that they hare arrived at just such

a firm as could be of use to them and that the exhibit is not

just a model, but an actual piece. 'Is it really forbidden- to

Luy such a piece? Oh! What i pity. N$yqjo be done' but

teli us, how much does it coit? 20,000? How cheap! We

would pay twenty times that much for such a piece! Great

pity that it is not for sale.' All this in a light-hearted way' as

if.incidental. The conversation turns to another subject.

After a few minutes the delegation takes its leave in a

friendly way. The interpreter stays behind for a few seconds'

'It was so nice meeting you. Could we not continue our talk

over dinner this evening? No? You're busy? What a pity'

Many thanks. It was very nice to make your acquaintance-"

And that is all, nothing criminal, just a short, friendly

conversation. The Soviet lelegation did not propose anything

to anybody. It did not ask, it did not demand' It was merely

interested. In the meantime the delegation goes on with its

inspection. The exhibition is huge, hundreds of firms' and

ttre tist of essential things is too long' Another stand, another

firm, the same result, ii does not matter' Not everything !T. been lost. There are still more stands' 'How much does this

piece cost? 25,000? Only 25,000, we- would give half a million

ior that. Great pity that it's not for sale'' The delegation

!o", on. The inierpreter stays for a few seconds' 'Could Iiot invite you to dinr"t this evening in the restaurant?' '[don't know whether that would be all right' We hardly know

each other.' And that is all. Recruitment is accomplished'

The delegation continues its inspection' New interpreters

are proviied. Drinking martinis in the bar, they wait their

turn. The exhibition iJtruge. Hundreds of films and the list

of equipment wanted by their government is very long'

146 Sovict Military Intelligence

The GRU's calculation has shown itself to be unfailing.The owner of a small firm, even a very successful one, isalways at great risk, always keen to strengthen his situation.When he receives a proposal to sell his own wares at a pricefifteen to twenty times the highest normal price, he thinks tohimself: this is a matter of industrial espionage, which inseveral countries is not even considered a criminal offence.From the first moment he knows what is wanted from himand carefully evaluates the step that he decides on. [n anycase, if he sells his product he can hide the fact from theauthorities. It is equally easy for him to hide the moneyhe has received. The only thing he has not taken intoconsideration is the wolf-like greed of the GRU. He hopesto dispose of the products of his firm, supposing that thiswill be sufficient. He is deeply mistaken. Having bought thefirst model or set of documents, certainly at a staggeringprice, the GRU will later on lower the prices and finallydictate them. One might object that the really big secretsare all in the hands of the big firms, but this is not absolutelytrue. Very often Soviet designers are not interested in thewhole rocket or the whole aircraft, but only in some smallpart - an engine, a steering system or some particularinstrument (in many cases not even an important part butonly a membrane, a heat sink or some such thing) * exactlythe sort of thing that would be produced by a componentslnanufacturer. And of course recruitment in small firms doesnot in any way hinder the GRU's attempts to penetratelarge firms. Far from it. After he has been milked, theowner of a components manufacturing firm, now turnedagent, must turn his attention to the recruitment of otheragents in the big firms to which he supplies his parts.Then suddenly in the Soviet Union an aircraft exactly likeConcorde appears. (To blame the GRU for the trials anddifficulties of the TUlzl4 Concordski is not justified. WeakSoviet industry, using antediluvian technology, was simply

Agent Reuuiting 147

not able to copy the aeroplane properly, despite havingall the necessary drawings and documents.) Recently, the

number of exhibition recruitments by the GRU has steadilyincreased. They have been facilitated by the fact that inthese recruitments the GRU does not spend one rouble ofits own money. The money which the delegation brings withit to the exhibition comes out of the budget of the armaments

industry which is ready to spend as much money as it has toin profitable business. For its money the armaments industryreceives essential documents and samples, and the GRU,without paying a penny, receives an agent who will serve itfor long years afterwards. Exhibition recruitments are also r:

attractive because they can be carried out with completeimpunity. Only one case of detection is known, an air show . t

at Le Bourget when the assistant Soviet military attach6 iwas detained for endeavouring to carry out just such a liltrecruitment. He was detained, but not for long because a lilJ{

military diplomat cannot be held. Declared persona non i:itri

grata, atter three years he went to another country in anothei ilill

official capacity as a deputy resident. The only thing which is ll,,

not clear in all these stories is the attitude of those countries

who joyfully accept these supposed 'diplornats'.As for QBl]*jlbeat$, they basically use the first two

methods. The work of illegals of course is made egjgr by

the obvjous s:lqrg!!{:lti9rtptlbe.-s*f9_L&t _S?pdidqQl tndtheir tracins and vetting. Since they very often play thj part

oJ flr- n aIE, J;. s p g ggl e Ifiiloome-fi t5Ee qEn t cont aar[nn tne ownerftTInffi-s producing military material, and by

means of proposing advantageous deals, they gradually

attract these people to play the part of agents. There isanother verv imoortant factor. Illesals hardlv ever recruit in.---------::!-::-L- e +-J-*the riame of Soviet intellieence. Thev alwals assume another

ffi.y *uy pass themselves offas American industrial spies, in Northern Ireland as an

148 Soviet Military Intelligence

organization going in for terrorist activities against the Eng-lish military presence, in Arab countries as anti-Zionists. Incountries with dictatorial regimes GRU illegals recruitpeople in the name of anti-government organizations carry-ing on the underground struggle against tyranny. A Arethodoften used by illegals is to pass themselves off as supportersof separatist movements. [t is only necessary for the illegalto know some of the important political views in order to beable to adopt them for himself and begin recruiting. Some-times such recruitments are implemented very quickly andwithout problems. 'We are reprLsentatives of such and sucha liberation army, this or that red brigade. Can't you helpus? If you can't we ask you not to let anybody know aboutour visit.'The candidate is then recruited in the name of anorganization fo'd-nscience all his lif@s a revolution-ary and defends ideals near to his heart, not even suspectingthe existence of the GRU and its illegals. He is so full ofpride that he has been selected for such secret work that hemay not even tell those who think likewise about it.

There is one last method of recruiting. This is when aforeigner comes in and says, lPlegs--e recruit me.' Howeverstrange it may ,""r, .u"ry y;ffi;;dr;,ii-of:*.t p"opi.come into Soviet embassies and the same answer awaitsthem all. 'This is a diplomatic representation and not anespionage centre. Be so kind as to leave the building or wewill call the police.' The police are usually not called but theembassy stdff chase the would-be agent out quickly. Even ifthe GRU (and the KGB, for that matter) is sure that thecaller is not a young reporter anxious to publish a sensationalarticle or somebody purporting to sell secret documents butreally only selling some nonsense, how can they be sure thatthe caller is not a police agent who wants to know who inthe embassy.is concerned with secrets? Thus the answer toall is the same. 'You have got the wrong address. We are

Agent Recruiting 149

not concerned with such things.' This does not mean that itwould not be interesting to have a look at what the callerhas brought, but long experience has shown that the person

who really wants to be recruited and really has something tosell does not say very much but simply hands over theriraterial, together with instructions as to where he can be

found, and leaves. He might add a note to the effect that'this is not all the material I have but only a part, if you are

interested.'Elementary psychological analysis shows that this is per-

haps the only way to convince the GRU that they can trustthe.person. Indeed if a person has decided to entrust his lifeand the happiness of his family to such dark and unknownpersonalities, why on earth should he not hand them some

papers? By such a gesture he not only draws attention tohimself but he gives time for reflection on his proposals

and for the necessary checking with higher authorities and

checking of the material. However, if the visitor bringspapers and documents to the embassy and begins to demandimmediate financial reward, this leads one to think, 'If, after

careful consideration, he has decided on this step, if he isreally ready to entrust his life to us, why does he think that

we would deceive him and not return the papers if they wqre

of no use to us? And where is the guarantee that the papers

which he has brought are not forgeries? Who would carry

the can if we paid him money for papers which afterwards

turned out to be forgeries? No, we are not interested in such

things.'That these 'walk-ins' are an extremely unpredictable form

of recruitment is perhaps best illustrated by two examples,

both of which occurred at the same residency in West

Germany. An American sergeant came to one of the Soviet

observation missions in West Germany (each of which is aGRU residency), bringing with him the block of a cipher

machine used in one of the American bases. The sergeant

150 Soviet Milinry Intelligence

announced that for a certain sum he could bring a secondpart of the machine and added that there could only be adeal on condition that the GRU would not subsequentlyattempt to recruit him. The residency immediately acceptedboth proposals. The sergeant got his money and an assurincethat the GRU would forget all about him immediately afterthe deal was done.

The cipher machine which was obtained, or moreaccurately two of its basic blocks, enabled the technicalservices of the GRU to decipher thousands of Americanradio communications which had been intercepted earlierbut remained undeciphered. They also enablid them tostudy the principles of cipher work in the American Armyand in the armies of its allies and, by exploiting th!,dmerican principles, to create more complete Sovietexamples. What about the sergeant? Of course he wasimmediately recruited. . .

On another occasion a couple of years later an Americanmajor approached the same Soviet residency proposing tosell an American atomic artillery shell. In proof of his goodintentions he handed over free of charge to the residincydetailed plans of the atomic depots and instructions onchecking procedures and standing orders for work withatomic equipment. These documents by themselves were ofgreat value, although the major's main proposal was ofvastly greater interest. The major announced that he woulddemand a substantial sum for the shell, and imposed thecondition that the Soviet side, having studied the she[, mustreturn it after two months. Some days later, the specialistsof the GRU information service confirmed the genuinenessand very great importance of the documents whiih had beenacquired. The GRU leadership decided to buy the atomicshell and to pay the price demanded for it by the American.A number of the senior officers of the residency were calledto Moscow and given a crash course in American atomic

Agent Reouiting 151

technology. A week later, on a dark rainy night in a clearingin the middle of a forest, two motor cars met. In one was

the American major, in the other three operational officers.There were two niore Soviet cars hidden nearby, ready tointervene if necessary. Many people did without sleep thatnight. The Soviet Consul dozed by his telephone, in fullreadiness to come tearing out to the wood and in the name

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to defend themilitary diplomats. On the orders of the Central Committee,many highly placed officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairsand Tass were also on alert. Of course they did not knowwhat was going on or where, but they were ready toannounce to the world that the imperialists had mounted yet

another provocation against the Soviet Union. In fact, theTass and Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcements were

already prepared. But everything went according to plan.

The American and the three Soviets transferred the shellfrom one car to the other, and a thorough check was carriedout. The operational officers knew beforehand the serialnumber, the level of radiation, the exact weight and themarkings which would identify it as a genuine shell. All was

as it should be. The Soviets handed over a briefcase full ofbanknotes to the American and agreed to meet in twomonths' time for the return of the shell. Once the shell was

in the Soviet car with diplomatic number plates, it was

tantamount to being on Soviet territory. The police couldstop the car, but they did not have the right to search it norremove anything from it. Diplomatic immunity is not to be

trifled with. In the event nobody stopped the officers, and

the car drove peacefully into the courtyard of the Sovietdiplomatic mission. Later the shell was transported in a

diplomatic container under armed guard to the Soviet Union.The GRU chief joyfully informed the Central Committee

of the successful outcome of the operation. 'Where is the

152 Soviet Military Intelligence

bomb?' asked a voice on the telephone. .We have it in GRUheadquarters.''In Moscow!?''Yes.'

A long and largely unprintable tirade ensued, whoseimport was roughly as follows: 'And what hhppens if there isa little spring inside this shell and it explodes right inthe middle of the Soviet capital and turns Moscow intoHiroshima?'

The GRU had worked out the whole operation with themaximum number of precautionury *"urures and the planto acquire the shell had been confirmed by all departmentsfrom the chief to the general staff up to the Central Commit-tee. However, nobody had foreseen the possibility that therecould be a timed device in the shell and that the CentralCommittee, the Politburo, the KGB, the GRU, all theMinisters and departments of State, the general staff, all theMilitary Academies, all the principal design bureaux, in aword, everything which constitutes Soviet power, could beinstantaneously destroyed. There was no answer. No defencewas possible. One shell and the whole system could havegone up, because everybody and everything is controlledflom Moscow. The possibility of such an occurrence hadonly been realized in the Central Committee when the shellwas already in Moscow. Instead of the 6<pected decoration,the GRU chief received a 'service incompetence note' - astrong warning that in the future even the most trivialmistake wouldlead to dismissdl.

The shell was taken for the time being to the centralaerodrome and a military transport aircraft speedily trans-ported it to Novaya Z*mlya The shell did not explode. Atthe same time there was no guarantee that it would notexplode while it was being dismantled and destroy theleading Soviet specialists who were working on it, so thedismantling was conducted in a special pavilion hurriedlyconstructed on the atomic testing ground. preliminary workon the shell had already disquieted the Soviet specialists, as

Agent Recruiting 153

it was much more radioactive than it should have been.

.After protracted arguments and consultations, the shell was

dismantled with the greatest possible care. Only then was itfound that it was not a shell at all - but a beautifullyexecuted copy.

The American major from the depot for atomic armamentshad known to the last detail how to do this. He had taken a

written-off practice shell or, as it is called, a 'standard weightequivalent', had painted it as a real shell and put on a

corresponding marking and number. Inside the shell he hadput some radioactive waste which he had obtained. Of coursehe'was not able to regulate this to the extent that the levelof radiation would conform to the level of radiation of .a

genuine shell, but this was not necessary. At the time whenit was first checked after having been handed over to theoperational officers, there had been no attempt to determinethe exact level of radioactivity. The officers had only beeninterested to see whether there was radiation or not. Afterall that had happened the officen who had taken part in theoperation, of course, received no decorations but at thesame time they were not punished and neither was the GRUchief. The Special Commission of the General Staff andCentral Committee established that the forgery had beenvery skilfully and thoroughly executed and that there hadbeen little possibility of exposing it at the time of the hand-over. All the same the GRU was not happy about it. Itbegan a search for the American major. The first attemptsproved unsuccessful. [t was established that he had beenposted to the USA immediately after the sale of the forgery,and it would not be so easy to find him there. He hadapparently known of the immlnence of his posting andchosen his moment perfectly. Steps were taken to find himin the United States, and at the same time the GRU askedfor permission to murder him from the Central Committee.However, the Central Committee turned down the request

t54 Soviet Mililary Intelligence

on the basis that the major was incredibly cunning and couldwell outwit the GRU a second time as he had outwittedthem earlier. They were ordered to forget about the majorand stop searching for him. Now, whenever a 'walk-in'appears at a Soviet embassy and suggests the purchase foran exorbitant price of technical documents of exceptionalimportance, GRU residents always remember the Americanmajor.

That it is extremely difficult to find real volunteers is asimple fact. It is much, much harder to discover a volunteerthan an agent whom the GRU has spent a year and more inprocessing. But real volunteers, however warmly they maybe welcomed, do not take into consideration another simplething. The Soviet operdtional officer, having seen a greatdeal of the ugly face of communism, very frequently feelsthe utmost repulsion to those who sell themselves to itwillingly. Even amongst those few who still believe in com-munism, the intelligence officer will make a great distinctionbefween the agent he has recruited by using a whole arsenalof trickb and traps, and the volunteer. And when a GRU orKGB officer decides to break with his criminal organization,something which fortunately happens quite often, the firstthing he will do is try to expose the hated volunteer.

Agent Communications

GRU theoreticians officially admit that agent communi-

cations - that complex of channels for transmitting instruc-

tions and material - is the weakest link in the chain. It is the

fault of communications, they say, that there are so many

failures, and to some degree they are right. Whatever thetheoreticians say, however, we in the field know that by far

the greatest damage to Soviet intelligence is caused by the

defection of GRU officers. Enormous damage was done

when lgor Gusenko went over to the West. By this one

gesture the whole powerful current of technological intelli-gence on the production of atomic weapons, which was

flowing tike a river into the hands of Stalin and his blood'

thirsty clique, was stopped dead. And historians will remem-

ber with gratitude the name of the GRU Colonel' Oleg

Penkovsky. Thanks to his priceless information the Cuban

crisis was not transformed into a last World War. Neverthe-

less, it is indisputable that after the phenomenon of willing

and mass defection to the side of the enemy, which was

clearly absent in the old Russian intelligence service of the

pre-rivolutionary period, agent communications is the most

vulnerable sector of Soviet intelligence.

All agent communications are divided into personal and

non-personal. Personal contact is the most vulnerable

element, and preference is always given to non-personal

contact. At the same time, in the first stages, especially

during cultivation, recruitment and vetting, personal meet-

ings are an inescapable evil with which one has to come to

terms. Later on, as agents gain experience and involvement

I.

1,

tI't

t.ittt

illi)

i'

156 Soviet Military Intelligence

in their work, personal contacts gradually give way to non-personal ones. Many of the most experienced agents havenot had a personal meeting with their case officer for severalyears. If such meetings are absolutely unavoidable, the GRUprefers that they should take place either on its own or onneutral territory.

Routine meetings are organized between agents, however.For example an illegal will meet his agent or officers of theundercover residency their agents. The details for thesemeetings are worked out previously. Whoever is the seniorman will give instructions to the junior as to where, when,and in what circumstances they will meet. Experiencedagents are often given a programme of meetings for sixmonths ahead, sometimes a year, and in some cases evenflve years or more..Et,rE!gIIu!$, cintfriiogie'pre$fii-thaiifisfn6ffii-ffitingbetweenordinary people discussing important topics. Frequently theywill try to give the impressioh that they are collectors ofsuch items as postage stamps, postcards or coins and willhave these'objects spread out in front of them in therestaurant or cafd where they are meeting. Sometimes thesemeetings take place in cinemas or public conveniences.l.onger meetings, especially during the vetting stage ofagents, will take place in hotels and camping places, cara-vans, yachts or boats which either are the property of theagent or are hired by him. In all cases, and this also appliesto other operations involving agents, C!'Vo[g11wl!!t!Jlto avoid city quarters which are known 6-56-ih;Taunt of

-

criminals or prostitutes, and railway and police stations,airports, guarded state military or commercial undertakings- in other words all those places where police activitv mavbggrcts:d to be lil:itifriffilmfficarbon copy of the main meeting for which arrangementsare made at the same time as the main meeting: 'If one of us

Agent Communications 157

should be unable to get to the meeting we will meet in the

same place in a week's time'. A complicated system ofalternative meetings is set out for experienced agents, and

there may be up to three or four alternative meetings foreach main meeting. With so many alternatives it is essential

that places and times are changed.

This system of alternative meetingp is introduced by GRUofficers long before recruitment. A man who has as yet

done nothing for the GRU, who does not even suspect its

existence, isilready being indoctrinated into iecrecy and is

already being introduced to the system of agent communi-cations. Usually the subject is introduced in various quiteinnocent ways; for example, the officer says, 'I shall be very

pleased to meet you again but I simply don't know whether

I shall be able to be on time. The life of a diplomat contains

so many unexpected happenings. If I am late, then don'twait for me more than ten minutes. In any case we will rneet

again in three days' time.' [f you have a good friend in theSoviet embassy and he says that sort of thing to you, and atthe same time has a hundred reasons why he cannot use the

telephone in such a simple case, be sure that the GRU has a

thick file on you and that sooner or later you will receive a

proposal of recruitment and notice with astonishment thatall ways out seem to be blocked.

At the other end of the spectrum there is the eryerggrumeetiye.Tris access is accorded only to the most experiencedIffits, and those who may communicate information ofsuch outstanding importance that it brooks no delay at all.

The agent is told how he should go about calling the officeron stipulated telephones or telegrams or signals. In the same

way the agent is also given the possibility of communicatingdanger. For example, if he rings up on the telephone and

says, 'I need John,' then the officer will come immediately.If the agent says, 'Ring John,' then they will reply that he

has made a mistake. If the agent uses the second variant,

lirirrti

158 Soviet Military Intelligence

then he is showing the GRU that he has been arrested bythe police who are trying to get to the case officer throughthe agent.

-Brush contacts are for handing over material, instructions,

--*-

money and so on. The officer and the agent carry out onlyone contact, in very populous places, in the underground,on full buses, at peak hours and when the crowds come outof stadiums, for example. Brush contact must be carried outwith great precision otherwise the crowd may separate thosetaking part. On the other hand the transmission of thematerial must not attract attention especially if one of theparticipants is under strict surveillance. The check meeting iscarried out in the same conditions as the routine meeting.However, the most junior of those taking part must notsuspect that it is not a routine meeting and that he is in factbeirtg checked. A number of GRU officers take up positionbefore the meeting, in places where they can easily observewhat is going on (for example, on observation platforms fortourists where there are powerful binoculars and telescopesinsta[ed). The entry of the agent to the meeting place ischecked from a great distance. They check his punctuality,his behaviour, they watch for anybody who follows him,they observe the presence of any suspicious movement inthe area of the meeting place prior to the meeting. After theagent has realized that nobody is going to come and meethim, the GRU officers may observe what he does, where hegoes after the aborted meeting and what action he takes.

fheryklg2.llgy.talk often confused with thesecret house or Yavotchnayi Kvartira. At the present timethe term 'secret house' is not used in the GRU. It has beenreplaced by the term 'secret flat' or KK but the word yavkais used to mean a meeting between two men who'areunknown to each other, for example two illegals, or an agentwith his new case officer. The secret rendezvous as anelement of agent communications is given to all agents

Agent Communications 159

without exception - they are given the place, time, recog-

nition signals, password and answer - because the secret

rendezvous is essential for re-establishing lost contacts. Forexample, if in extreme circumstances the whole of the Sovietembassy was declared persona non grata and had to leave

the country, the agent who had lost contact with his case

officer would be obliged to go to a certain place on the 3lstof every month which has thirty-one days, that is seven

times a year, having previously agreed recognition signals(brief case in left hand, book in right hand, and so on). Inthe appointed place another person will come towdrds himand will give the previously arranged password to which theagent gives the proper reply. In giving the correct reply theagent shows to his new leader that he has not made a mistakeand secondly that the agent acknowledges the authority ofhis new case officer. If nobody comes to the pre-arrangedplace, the agent is obliged to repeat the process until such

time as somebody does appear to re-establish contact.As the agent becomes more and more involved in his

work, elements of non-personal contact gradually take theplace ofpersonal contact. The most experienced agents have

only one element of personal contact - theSgg3J-legdggpgl

W - and sev.eral qlements of .

L,et us examine these. Fifst there is the long-range two-*ayradio link, generally imagined as a special portable radio'setwhich may transmit information directly to the receivingcentre on Soviet territory or to a Soviet ship or satellite.This classical element in all spy films is in practice only used

in wartime. Instead agents and illegals are issued with smallwritten instructions containing several types of ordinarycurrent components which may be bought in any radio shop,

and the means whereby they may be put together to make along-range two-way set. This solves two problems at the

same time. [f an agent is arrested there is only to be foundin his flat a pair of good Japanese receivers, a tape recorder

l6l160 Soviet Military Intelligence Agent Communications

cover of a fireman, ambulance driver, construction workerI or a policeman. All radio conversations within the city limits

are thoroughly studied by GRU specialists and any of themmay. be used by the GRU for its dark ends. A short-range

i: special link is an alternative to short-range radio links: Inconnection with increasing the monitoring of radioexchanges, the GRU frequently undertakes the transmissionof signals under water. One fisherman will transmit signals

by means of a rod put in the water and another several

kilometres distant from him will receive the signal by using

the same method. Or water and gas pipes can be used.

Significirnt research is also going on in the field of electro'optical communications.

Pg&lgttel!9les-are the favourite GRU means of con-tact. They have the moct universal application and in additionto communications they may be used for the storage ofeverything that has to do with a spy's work - documents,money, radio sets, special photographic equipment, forexample. Thousands of types of dead-letter boxes are known,from cracks in gravestones and brickwork to specially devisedmagnetic'letter boxes' in the form of metal nuts. Applied tothe structure of a bridge among thousands of similar nutsand rivets this device is easily hidden and just as easy toundo. The GRU also makes wide use of boxes constructedin the form of a plastic hollow wedge with a lid. These canvery easily be pushed into the ground in any public park.Underwater dead-letter boxes are also widely used.

Their selection is always a complicated and responsiblebusiness. The primary criterion is that as far as possible

they must not be prone to accidental discovery. They arethreatened by rnany possible happenings: they may be foundby children, by the police, even by archaeologists. Theremay be floods, or the heat of summer may affect them.Someone may start building on the site. All lhis must betaken into account. Equally important is that the dead-letter

and other components which can be bought in any shop.There is therefore no way that he can be ,urpett"d ofany criminal activity. And secondly the problein of thetransportation and secret storage of a radio set of compara-tively large proportions is avoided. The GRU is continuallylooking at the market as regards radio sets and components,ald working out new recommendations as to how theyshould be assembled. In times of war, however, quick-actingand ultra-quick-acting sets are used, exploiting technica'imeans of radio transmission in seconds or micio-seconds.Satellites are used in conjunction with these sets and thismakes it possible to transmit information on a narrow radiobeam vertically overhead. The long-range one-way radiolink does not replace, but augments the two-way tink. fhemost convenient, reliable and secure type of link is inevitablythe one by which the'agent receives from the Centre. One-way radio links are usually broadcast by Soviet radio stationsor special ships or polar stations to be received anywhere inthe world by ordinary radio receivers. Instructions to theagent are transmitted in the form of previously agreedphrases or numbers in ordinary radio programmes, or as asimple numerical code. Even if a poiice force should bysome means or another guess that the transmission they arehearing is not a coded transmissjon for cosmonauts orrya1hip1, they cannot possibly determine for which spy it isdestined, or even which country. The agent who hears sucha transmission is also not exposed to any great risk. However,for the GRU it is often necessary that the agent himselftransmits. For this the short-range radio link exists. Theagent transmits information to the Soviet embassy with thehelp of small transmitters, tike the sort of walkie-talkie setswhich can be bought in any shop and which are used forguiding model aeroplanes and ships (one cannot help noticinghow many aerials there are on the roof of tlie Sovieiembassy). In this type of radio exchange the'GRU takes the

.'!l;

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'rl ii'

box's location must be easy to describe to another person,even by somebody who only knows about it at secondhand.It must also be located in a place where it is possible for thecase officer to go at any time with a plausible cover story forhis presence there. Some random examples from GRUpractice are worth describing.

As a general principle of security, each dead-letter box(DLB) may only be used once. Documents on all DLBs arestored in the GRU.command point and after the completionof a DLB operation the document is stamped ,used' andtransferred to the archives. An ofEcer at a @mmand point,working in a GRU top secret archive, once discoverid thedescription of a DLB on which there was no ,used' stamp.The doctment was very old, pre-war. The DLB had beinselected in 1932 and three years later some material hadbeen put in it - money and valuables for the use of theillcgal residency in case of emergency, apparently .in variouscurrencies to a total sum of 50,000 American dollars,. Thiofficer carefully inspected the document again, but therewas nottiing on it to show that the DLB had been emptied.The officer informed his chief of what he had found and hein his turn informed the GRU chief, who decided on aninvestigation. The affair was not complicated and a weeklater the investigation disclosed that the dead-tetter box hadbelonged to the flamburg illegal residency which in 1937had been recalled to Moscow lock, stock and barrel for'instructions', and shot. All the materials of the residencyhad been handed in to the archives, together with thidocument about the unused DLB. The niw officers whotook the place of those who had been shot were completetyinexperienced and started work with new sets of documents-.There was no time, in any case, to look into the olddocuments. Then the new GRU staff was also liquidated. Sothere were many documents which were completely forgot-ten and simply collected dust in the archives.

Agent Communicatiors 163

The GRU chief took two decisions, firstly, to nominate a

group of specially trusted officers for permanent archive

ruorf - peitraps something else of interest might be- dis'

covered - and secondly, to give an order to one of the GRU

residencies in West Germany to find this old unused DLB'Suppose it was still there. If it was, then the value of itscontents would have increased many times.

In fact the DLB ftad survived, in spite of the war, the

fierce bombing of Hamburg, the rebuilding of the city after

the war, and the enormous expansion in the development ofthe city. The DLB consisted of a hermetically sealed con-

tainer, about the size of a small suitcase, which had been

buried at the bottom of a lake in a quiet park. For gleater

security it had been covered with an old tombstone which

had been sprinkled alt over with sand and silt. The corytainer

was removed to Moscow and opened there. Much to the

disappointment of all those present, all that was inside was a

few dozen old-fashioned silver.watches of very little value, a

hundred or so American dollars and a few thousand crisp

German Marks of the time of the Third Reich.

The second dead-letter box was in the very centre of the

American capital. At the beginning of his lunch break, the

agent would go into a park and hide top secret documents in

the hollow of a tree. Some minutes later a Soviet 'diplomat'would appear, remove the documents and with the help oftwo other'diplomats'copy them in his car which was parked

at the Capitol. The operation was an especially daring one,

and succeeded several"times - after the GRU chief had

sanctioned repeated use of the DLB. The copying of the

documents in the car did not take more than twenty minutes,

and the agent, on his return from his lunch break, was able

to walk in the park for a few minutes longer and retrieve his

documents. One day'the case officer was making his way

towards the dead-letter box. Suddenly his attention was

attracted by a sheet of white paper blowing about with the

Soviet Mililary lruelligence

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164 Soviet Military I ntelligence Agent Communicatbns

had to lower into the pipe a small metal box with a magnet

attached. The magnet was very strong and normally there

would have been no risk that the box wbuld come unstuck'

Pretending to tie up his shoe-lace, the officer carefullylowered the little box into the drainage pipe with the magretand took out his hand. But the first frosts had started and

the officer had not taken into account the fact that the

interior of the pipe was covered with a thin layer of ice. The

box slid down the pipe, giving out a harmonious ringingnoise, and after a few seconds flew out into the river, which

was unfortunately also covered with a thin sheet of ice. Hadthe river not been iced over, the box would have sunk and

that would have been that. But instead it skidded on the ice

right to the middle of the river. The ice was too thin to walk

on, and nor was it possible to throw things at the box acrosthe ice to send it to the other side. In the box was a film with

instructions fo1 an agent. There was only one way out. The

officer ran into a shop and bought a fishing rod; then, for an'

hour and'a half, to the astonishment of passers'by, he casl

his hook onto the ice until it was taken by the magnet. By

carefulty winding in his line, he succeeded in retrieving the

valuable box. This happened in the heart of one of the

Western capitals in broad daylight.Signals, too, are a means of exchanging information which

is highly favoured by the GRU. Office pins are used as

signals stuck in a predetermined place, dots, bands, crosses,

signats are made with chalk, pencil, paints, lipstick' A car

parked in a pre-arranged plaee at a pre-arranged time may

s€rve as a signal or a doll placed in a window of a house.

These are used as qarnlttg:-gf-gqqger, [gggestrfpr m99!!!gS

.edlsalion "of th- @;dig * and forhundreds of other intentions.

Usually an agent who has worked for some years with the

GRU will have as a minimum the following elements of

first yellow and red leaves. The officer picked it up and,honified, saw the stamp .top secret'. He looked around. AIIover the plrk were dozens of similar sheets of paper. Theofficer realized that squinels getting ready for winter hadtaken up residene in the hollowed-out trie; the pieccs ofpaper had got in their way and.they had thrown tLem out.He. immediately set about picking up the pieces, many ofwhich were torn by the sharp tieth and'claws of tleselovable little animals. At that dramatic moment a policeman

lppearedin the park. He evidently took the Soviei diplomatfor one of the lillrite House workin who had had his papersblown out of his hands by the wind. Without

" ,"o.d,'the

policeman also started to collect the papers. Having gathereda'comiderable number, the policemanheld them out to theembanassed case officer. The latter took them and smiled inthe most foolish way, even forgetting to thank his saviourand helper, who satuted ana wittrOiew. Nevertheless thesituation

-remained highly critical. There was absolutety no

tir^,n9, as the agent had already appeared on the opposite sideof the park. The case officer hunied to meet him, althoughllth yr strictly forbidden. euickly outlining the situatioi,the officer. suggested two posible ways out: Jither the agenishould tell his department that he had in error torn ufthepapen and thrown them into the waste-paper baskei butthen had remembered in time; or he should wait for fourd1ys. The agent chose the second option. Within hours, anofficer with diplomatic rank had made two changes of aircraftin Europe and arrived in Warsaw where i fast fighterinterceptor was waiting for him. Again only hours latei theGRU had carried out a complete forgery of the documents,and a. day later they were returned to the agent. Of .ou*",all this time he had been threatened with eiposure, but theGRU's swift action had saved him.

A third. dead-letter box was in a small drainage pipe onthe embankment of a river in northern Europe. mi ofncer

,i.;,'.!l l

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16 Soviet Mitiury Intelligence

The Practice of Agent Work

So our agent has been ,during long routine

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meetings(p9l$nsige$d!lp-t*g"$tIS-be._aten"track),andthere hasTeen worked out for him a complicatdd system ofagent @ including both personal and non'personal fonns of communication and also the actions tobe taken in case of a sudden break of all channels ofcommunication. Elements of non-personal communicationhave been gradually introduced and have gradually super'

seded the personal meetings. In these meetings thc agent

has handed over photocopies of secret documents and has

received in exchange small sums of money. Attempts by the

agent to protest or refuse to work have been succcsfullySuppressed. The material received from him has been tho-roughly compared and checked with analogous materialreceived from other souroes. So far, all is going well. Whathappens next is a new stage, the thinking behind which

includes the segregation of the agent from the Soviet embassy

and from all meetings with official Soviet representatives.Up till the Second \ilorld War not only the agents of

undercover residencies, but also illegals and agents subordi-nate to illegals, were tied to the embassies. With the out-break of war, when the embassies were closed, all contactwith the powerful agent network was lost. The flow of agent

information was cut off at the very moment when it would

have been of the greatest value. The deputy head of rhe

GRU was sent into occupied Europe with several radio

officen and unlimited powers. Within a short time he had

successfully organized a small illegal resident network on the

territories of Belgium and.Holland. Subsequently, by means

,.11 .

($,,

A.n aEent.gfoue in aqgliqnljt tong-range two-way radio

169168 Soviet Military Intelligence The Practice of Agent Work

,,rUnited States, Great Britain and Canada which were com-of secret rendezvous, he was able to re-establish contactwith all the illegal residencies. However, the agent radiostation by the name of .Sever', which had been established

Ffor: the war, provgd useless. Nobody had supposed thatthe advance of the Nazis would be so precipitaii, and theradio station had notteen_designed to deal with iuch longdistances. The ships of the soviei Bartic fleet were brockadeiin their own bases and coutd not be used for the reception ofagent transmissions. Then the GRU organized a riceivingcentre on the territory of the Soviet embassy in SwedenlInformation from all the illegal residencies came to theillegal rcsidency network and from there was transmitteddirectly to the Soviet Union. This was perhaps the only.posible solution at the time and of course ii naA manyqisaqvantages. Fint of all, the agents, their case officers andthe illegals found themselves in one gigantic residency, astate of affain which compromised many hundreds of men.

It cout! ,gj be tong before it collapsed, and the coilapseDegan m the most vulnerable place, deep in the nervecentre of this most unprecedently powerful undergroundorganization. One of the- illegal radio operators, wisf,ing toobtain th6 favours of a girl, b-oasted to her that he knew a[the latest news in the world, as he regularly listened to theradio (which was, of coutse, forbiddin on occupied terri-tgry). Tne girl, in her turn eager for the favours oi a certainGerman corporal, informed him of this fact. So the mostpowelful underground intelligence organization in historywas discovered - this organization *hich had penetratedmany of Germany's most sensitive secrets. Referred to bythe Germans as 'the Red Orchestra', the organization wascompletely neutralized and a[ the agents and-ilegars of thisgigantic octopus arested.

The GRU learnt its lessons very quickly. Already, only afew months after what had happened; illegal residencieiwere functioning on the territories of its tire .allies',

the

s,ll

;pletely separate from the embassies. This now cast-iron ruleris

observed by the GRU everywhere. Undercover residencies

:support illegals, but only on instructions from the Crntrewiifiout having any idea for whom they are working. Alloperations in support of illegals are worked out in such a

way that the officers of the GRU undercover residency do

, not have one crumb of information which is not necessary.

Operations are ptanned in such a way that there is no

possibility of the illegals becoming dependent on the actions

of the undercover residency. Another lesson leamt from the

arrest of the 'Red Orchestra' is the division of residencies

into even smaller independent parts, especially insofar as

this concerns illegals. And, thirdly and significantly, there is

the separation of agents from the embassy which is our

present concern.The recruited, tested and trained agent must be kept

separate from official Soviet institutions abroad. The process

of separating the agent is undertaken only after he has

handed over to the GRU a significant quantity of sscret

material, that is, made it imposible for himself to go to the

police. The separated agent oom€s in three guises: the

separated acting agent, the agent group and the agent

ffiffi#.f, rovidespeciarry

1 important material, are taken out of residencies very quickly.'ii The moment the Centre feels that such and such an agent is

, handing over material of exceptional importance, it will

.ii immediately demand that no more information or documents

toaa

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are taken from him. All attention is switched fromof obtainins informatior to

the steD ofto

transferred

to his own

170

Thence

Soviet Military Intelligence

he will backThe Practice of Agent Work

have to take place, they aie only canied out in soft countries

or secretly in the Soviet Union. In any case, they are carried

out extremely rarely.Other agents recruited by rgsidencies arg gradually organ-

ized into agent groups oI-.!!hree-to five m94 r4q-lr. Usually,.

agents working-ln one'particular field of espionage are put

together in one group. Sometimes a group consists of agents

who for various reasons are known to each other. Letus suppose that one agent recruits two others. A group

automatically organizes itself. The GRU obviously considen

family groups containing the head of the family and his wifeand children to be more secure and stable. The members ofsuch a group may work in completely different fields ofespionage. The leader of an agent group is called a gropovod,

and only he is in contact with Soviet officers. Thus to a

certain extent the members of agent groups are complctely

isolated from Soviet diplomatic representation. The agent

group.is in contact with the undercorer residency for a

period of time, then gradually the system of oontact with the

residency comes to an end and orders begin to be received

directly from Moscow. By various channels the group sends

its material directly to Moscow. Finally the ontac( withMosgow becomes permanent and stable and the agent SrouPis entirely separated from the residency. With gradual

changes in penonnel at the residency, like the resident

himself, the cipher officers and the operational officers withwhom there was once direct contact, nobody outside the

Centre will know of the existence of this particular group.

Should it happen that operating conditions become difficult,or that the embassy is blockaded or closed down, the group

will be able to continue its activities in the same way as

before.The GRU tolerates personal contacts with group leaders

only in exceptional circumstances and where there is favour-

able security. Agents going into ageht groups do not by any

r7tbut as an

the deputy head of the GRU or the head himself. Thegi$_gf such an agent is thus carried out .*..tt, ., ffiof non-personal communications and

contacts must be wo$9d out for.an independent agent.Usually he will transmit his material by means of dead-letterboxes. The residency which was responsible for the agent,srecruitment may receive the order to empty such and such anumtlered dead-letter box of films. It wili not know fromwhom it is.receiving these films, whether from a local illegalor__a rransiting illegal, an .artist on tour' as they .r, jillcalled,.or from an agent who has been recruitei by thatpa.rticular residency. The processing of films (whidh arecalled schtchl'r: the Russian word foi shield) is carried outonly in the Centre. The film will be a dual-purpose one.Ilntly a pseudo,secrer document is photographid on thefilm by the GRU, then the film is given to tf,e agent and hephotogmphs genuine secret materiil on it. Any attempt todevelop the film outside the wails of the GRU Technicatoperations scientific Research Institute teads to the realse6et text being destroyed and only the pseudo-secret textappearing, which is designed to leaO the police on a wildgoose chase.

The Scientific Research Institute of the GRU haldonemuch important work in developing films of the schtchittype. Hundreds, or even possibly t[ousands, of formulaehave been worked out. In each iase, for each

"nA ""iryvaluable_agent, a separate and unrepeatable formula is used.The GRU tries by all possible means to limit tt e numUeioipersonal contacts with. independent agents, which is whythey are taken out of the residencies. if personal meetingl

#

*,172 Soviet Militory liulligence

Tearyj a|wuyt know each other, nor is it necessary that theyshould.-They may know the group leader alone, not guessingat the existence ofother agents.

-

An agent-group may gradually get bigger as the group leader

11 ! is, recruilin g age n t contin uei Io rec.fr it ottr", .g.nfr - ii ir,i

::T::fT* a group.teader to recruit agents indlpendentty,nts agent group, even if it consists of only two men, acquiresthe status of anEElllgrdeluy, and the gioupil;;;#;;;me agent resident. This status was acquirid by one of theAmerican nuclear phpicistq whom the GRU permitted torecruit his colleagues at his discretion. Interestingly this agentresident never made a mistake.

Sometimes the GRU will post one or more illegals to anagent residency. The presenoe ofeven one Soviet iilegaLlfreis of co-urse considered.as the leader) in an agent residencyof any sizr automatically transforms ihat resiiency Ao, ui

fii*Jffi:"tJl1t":';il11tffi"il:"::f,X:iindependent organizations continries enatGyl fn" p;;;f simltar-tg the spread of a fearful iltness, wiitr the difierence

:nar:.rn tns case, surgical intervention always gives excellent

resutts. Hundreds of examples have proved thii.If the GRU feels that there is likely to be a ctampdown

and that operating conditions wil beclme more difficurt atany moment, it takes measures to ensure that it does notlose the agent network which has already been recruited but19t u: yet separated from the undercover residency. Withthis aim in mind some of the most experienced officen ofthe undercover residency are in a continual state of readinessso that at all moment, on the order of the Centre, they maygo over-to illegal status and run the work of theirui"ntrlThese officers are in possession of previousty prepareO docu-ments and equipment, and gold, diamonAs and other valu-ables which will be of use to them in their illegal activitieswill have been hidden in secftt hiding-places beforehand.

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The Practice of Agent Work 173

In case of war actually breaking out, these officers willunobtrusively disappear from their embassies. The Sovietgovernment will register a protest and will for a short time

refuse to exchange its diplomats for the diplomas of the

aggressive country. Then it will capitulate, the exchange willtake place and the newly fledged illegals will remain behindin safe houses and flats. Afterwards they will gradually, by

using the system of secret rendezvous, begin to establish the

systern of contacts with agents and agent gloups which have

recently been subordinated to the undercover residency.

Now they-all form a new illegal residency. The new illegals'never mix and never enter into contact with the old ones

who have been working in the country for a long time.This plainly makes life more secure for both Parties. Thcformation of new illegal residencies where there were alreadyold ones in action is yet another example of the constantstriving for duplication.

However important the problems of recruiting agents,

training them and organizing agent networks may be, thereis still one overriding objective: the acquisition of secrets

belonging to an enemy or a probable enemy. The materialacquired by the GRU breaks down into ig&Igq[qg, 9g."tf:ments and soecimens or samples. Information includes com'

ffi6mes-fr4'iaponi.'D&limiints are not the subjectiveopinions or observations of agents but offrcial secret papcrs,

books, drawingp or copies of them. Specimens o1 samples

are self-explanatory: actual weapons, examples of militarytechnology, instruments and equipment which the GRU uses

for study and copying.The photographing of documents and eavesdropping on

conversations are in real life exactly as they are portrayed inspy films. But how does the agent contrive to steal secret

equipment and remain undetected? Many ways and means

exist: we have already examined one of them when we

discussed the recruitment of the owners of small private

ffiF

174 Soviet Military Intelligence

com.panies producing military equipment. The owner of asmall firm has not much difhculiy'in produ.ing.on" .*iruspecimen of an instmment or a gadget and it is

-n"ry aOrun-

tageous for him to sell it to the GRU. But what aUout reallybig objects like a tank, an aeroplane or an atomic reactor?Not only does one have to obtain such an object without itsloss.being noticed, but it also has to be transported to theSoviet Union. There is, perhaps surprisintly,'a number of1!.utions

to.these problems. Samples of oijects which canonty be used once _ rockets, torpedoes, shelts, cartridges _are usually stolen during in.i..tion"ip.rioor, military dis_plays or tests. An entry may be made, for example, in thegmcilt. aocounting documents that there were a hundredlaunchings of a certain anti-tank rocket *h;;;; i;;;;fact there were only ninety-nine. The hundredth rocket willnave been quietly sold to the GRU without anybody noticing.Very often written-off equipment is aUte io Ue sold becausethere,exist official documents certifying that it has beeny"tt:n o-ff o1 destroyed. One agent iugiested to the GRUmat ne should obtain for them a lateral scanning radar foraircraft which permitted the aircraft to carry out i-ntelligenceyrxk on the territory of the_enemy while it was actually overitt own terrilory. The GRU, of .oro., agreed to thesuggestion, although the agent said that tre Oa not knowexactly when he would be ible to acquire the apparatus. Itm,ightbe within a day or two, it mightiake years. The GRUagreed to wait. Several months latJr the agent obtained theapparatus, and a year later it was taken int6 service with the

*:::r,O:1.-The agenr worked in an experimentaf trainiiggrouno, and when an aircraft. equipped with the requireiapparatus crashed, the agent, in spitC of very strict control,was able to steal a broken radar. This was quite sufficienifor the Soviel4-y to catch up with the United States in that

fT1,:: !11!,^rreeuentty agents go as far as detiberateryoamagng secret arms and equipment so that they .", b.

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The Practicc of Agent Work 175

written off and then sold. Wide use is made of countries ofthe Third World which receive equipment from Westerncountries, as was made clear in the GRU's (unsuccessful)

attempt to acquire a French Mirage III from the Lebanon.Any armed conflict or change of government is usuallyaccompanied by intense GRU activity, because this is themost favourable time for stealing military technology and

armaments.The diplomatic mail is the most often-used method of

transporting specimens to the Soviet Union. The main prob-lem is to transport the specimen into the Soviet embassy.From that time onwards, of course, it crosses all frontiers insealed packing cases and accompanied by armed diplomaticcouriers. Sometimes the difficult problem arises of a speci-

men weighing several tons which cannot be accomrnodatedin the diplomatic post" This happened when, in one of thecountries which had bought lropard tanks in the FederalRepublic of Germany, GRU agents were able to steal a

written-off tank engine - an item of exceptional interest toSoviet industry. The theft went unnoticed but the engineweighed more than a ton and there was no way it could be

accommodated in diplomatic containen. The Soviet consul-ate then bought an old cruising yacht. The yacht was straightaway sent for a refit and, for a very substantial sum, thesmall repair workshop installed the heavy tank engine in theyacht. The yacht went to sea on a number of pleasure tripsand during one such trip fortuitously met a Soviet trawler. Aspecial team of fitters literally tore the tank engine out ofthe yacht in a few minutes. The yacht put to sea severaltimes after this to maintain its cover, before being sold.

Another, more reliable method of transporting heavyequipment exists. After an item has been acquired, GRUofficers in the guise of a trade delegation will poach from afirm some completely unnecessary item of quite innocentnature. The important thing is that the quantity of containers

fi6 Soviet Military Intelligence

and. their weight approximate to the packing of the secretequipment. Subsequently the markings on ttri packing casesare changed and they make their way innocintly tf,roughcustoms control. So items of exceptional importance aietransported to the Soviet Union in the form of equipmentfor,. say, a canning factory. Sometimes, too, specimen, ur.sent to a safe address in one of the Third Woim countrieswhere they can be loaded onto Soviet ships without anytrouble.

In general terms the GRU leadership is quite confidenttlrat_i! is capable of obtaining any technblogical secret fromthe West provided it has UeJn aitocated a iufficient sum ofp9ney. Only one technological secret exists which the GRUis incapable of obtaining. Even if it did obtain it, the Sovietsystem would not be able to copy it since for that, the wholestructure of communism would have to be changed. yet thistechnological secret is of vital importance to the Sovietsystem. It is the Achilles' heel of socialism _ strike at it andstTl"tirq will fall to pieces, all invasion, nationalization andcollectivization will cease. This secret is nothing more d;;the means of producing br-e1d. Sociafism, foi all its giganticresourses, is not capable of feeding itself. How easy ii iouldbe, one sometifies thinks, to place-an embargo on the supplyof bread to the Soviet Union, until Soviet firces no loirieifound thernselves in occupied Czechoslovakia, Lithuanla,!s19nia and Latvia, intil such time as the Cubans no longerheld. sway in Africa, until the Berlin Wall OisappeareA."liwould only be necessary to withhold supplies of'grain for afew months, and the whole edifice of socialism mlght fall topieces.

O perational Intelligence

L;Operational intelligence marks a complete departure from

f the mna we have talked about until now. It embraces

:lntelligence organizations subordinated to operational unitsL'- fronts, fleqts, groups of forces, military districts, armies,, f,otillas - whose job is to aid in the implementation of the, military activity. Organizationally, the Soviet Army consists

of sixteen military districts and four groups of forces inGermany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. [n war, orat the time of preparations for war, the groupc of fotces

All twenty heads of military district intelligence and groupof forces are under the command of the head of the GRU

'r, Fifth Directorate. The GRU Fifth Directorate supervises

. i' the activity of the intelligence directorates, carries out the

ri posting of senior officers of operational intelligence, mllates"(r; the work experience of all operational intelligence and issues

:i! corresponding recommbndations and instructions. In

#,fl addition, the head of intelligence is subordinated to the chief

$l' of the military district staff. The chief of staff directs the,

"', daily activity of the head of intelligence. The head ofI intelligence of a military district works exclusively in the

'lr -interests of his military district, in conformity with the orden

)t,,,. of the chi.ef of staff and the commandei of the military'rf,r'

#

178 Soviet Military lntelligence

district. At the same time, all information obtained is for-warded to the GRU too. The role ,n" bnU pluy, is tcollect information from alt heads of intefligence and forwardto them information.obtained Uy o*,", inillligence orgrnr.Sometimes, the interigence direciorate Liiie mititary districtmay.work directly in the interests of the GRU but tiri. .urrrrc oone onty with the agreement of the military districtcommander. The chief of the gpneral staff is th"i6;;;;:*,'j:::1,o1loll": between thJcommander of trre miliiaryslsmct and the head of the GRU" However, in practice sucfidisputes occur extremety rarely.

Each front, group of iorces ind mititary district consists ofarmies. Normally a front !r". T air force,l tank army andtwo to.three all-arms armies. Each army consists "f

f;;;seven divisions. sometimes a corps is inciuded - two to ttrree

*:::: -8.:h ."qI and corps'r,", u ,i.n, among whosememoers rs an intelligence section which is calhdhOr orArmy Staff Second Department. ff,e teuA of the iltintelligence section is the head or att--intertigence unisbelonging-to a given army. He arso ranks

-berow two other

officens: the chief of staif of his armi,-.ia tn" chief ofintelligence of the military district. -' ' ---

.-His relationship with riis chiefs is based on similar rines.He works ex-clusively in the interert, oifri, .rmy, obeyingthe orders of the army commander and the army chief ofstaff. At the same timi, all information acquireA iy fri* i,also forwarded to ihe interrilerrce"Hit the m,itarydistrict..A reciprocal arrangement exists whereby the intelli-gence chief of the military district forwards informarion iohis heads of army intelliglnce *f,i.f, f,.-t..';;;;;;;fi;;;other armies, the intelligence directorur., of *,. mifit.iydisrricrs and the GRU.

The Soviet navy consists of four fleets, the Northern,

I Razvedyvotelnyi ordcl

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Operational Intelligence 179

Black Sea and Baltic fleets. Each of the fleets is the

of a military district, group of forces, and front, and

thas a staff which includes an intelligence directoratb or Naval,Staff Second Directorate. Its head is the chief of NavalIntelligence. The naval directorates have the same organiza-

'i tion as thobe in military districts, fronts and groups of forces.

The difference lies in the fact that while the army directorates

t ;are subordinated directly to the Fifth Directorate of the

G,RU, the four naval directorates fall under an organizationcalled navai intelligence. In its turn naval intelligence comes

under the head of the GRU and is controlled by the FifthDirectorate. The reason for this extra organizational step is

that ships of all four ffeets frequently operate in all oceans

as combined squadrons. For this reason the ship need

information, not about a narow sector like the troops of amilitary district, but on a much wider scale.

Naval intelligence was created to co-ordinate naval infor-mation from every ocean of the world, and is a component ofthe High Staff of the Navy of the USSR. [n addition to itsnormal powerful apparatus for gathering information, thereis also the naval cosmic intelligence department. The SovietUnion therefore possesses two independent cosmic intelli-gence organizations, the GRU's own and theNavy's cosmic

intelligence organization. Although naval cosmic intelligenceworks in the interests of the High Commander of the Soviet

Navy, all information from it is handed over to the GRU. Theco-operation between the two cosmic services is co-ordinatedby the chief of the General Staff. Should a very serious situ-ation arise, the same task may be set at the same time to bothservices and the results arrived at then collated and compared.

The organization of intelligence directorates (RUs) on thestaffs of military districts, groups of forces, fronts and flietsis standardized. The intelligence directorate consists of fivedepartrnents and two groups:

CIrE

.!co:I66E

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Operational Intelligence 181

First Department or Department of Reconnaissance directsIthe activities of the reconnaissance units of the tacticalwing, that is, reconnaissance battalions of divisions andreconnaissance companies of regiments. In naval termin-ology this department is called the S&rp ReconnaissanceDepartment. It directs the collection of information whichcomes directly from serving surface vessels and submarinesat sea, bearing in mind that what is meant here are normalwarships and not special intelligence collecting ships. Thetraining of officers of First Departments is carried out inthe intelligence faculty of the Frunze Military Academy andthe corresponding faculty of the Naval Academy. Theofficers of First Departments are usually experienced armyand navy officers who have considerable experience of ser-

vice in reconnaissance units.

Second Department or Department of Agent Intelligence is

concerned with the recruitment of secret agents and theobtaining through them of intelligence information of interestto the staff. The recruitment of agents and the creation ofagent networks is carried out on the territories of contiguouscountries where the military district concerned would expectto operate in wartime. Naval Intelligence is interested inrecruiting agents from all territories, especially in large portsand naval bases. An intelligence centre and three or fourintelligence points are subordinated to the Second Depart-ment which is directly concerned with agent work.

The centre is concerned with the recruitment of agents inthe contiguous state, whereas the intelligence points onlyrecruit agents in specific sectors and areas. They work

. independently from one. another, although they are co-ordinated by the chief of the Second Department. Thetraining of .officers for work in the Second Departments andalso in centres and points is carried out by the Third Faculty

o(,coooE

oEo6oAo!'

ln Soviet Military lntelligence

of the Military-Diplomatic Academy (the Academy of theSoviet Army).

The Third Department or Spetsnaz Department is concernedwith the preparation and carrying out;f divenionary acts onenemy territory, the liquidation of political and militaryleaden, the destruction of lines of communication and supplyand the carryrng out of terrorist operations with the aim ofundermining the enemy's will to continue fighting. A Spets-zaz intelligence point is subordinated to this depaitmeni andthis canies out the recruitment of agent+errbrists on thetenitory of any possible future enemy. There is also aSpetsnaz brigade which onsists of l,30Ocut-throat sotdien.The officers who work in the Speerzaz intelligence pointsand those who direct their activities in the Thirdbepartmentare trained, rather incongruously, in the Third Faculty ofthe Military-Diplomatic Academy, although for the Speinazbrigade and the officers connected with it trainini takesplace in the Frunze Academy. Analogous organizations can

S..s11in the Navy, with this differince: the brigades arecilled Spetsnaz naval brigades (not to be confused withNaval infantry brigades) and the same .diplomats'direct

theactivity of all agent-asassins in the fleets.

Thc lounh Deparrment or lnfornution Departmen carriesout the collection and collation of all intelligence cominginto the intelligence directorate.

The Fifth Departmentis occupied with etectronic intelligence,and this department directs two regiments, the Radio inteili-gence Regiment and the Radio-Technical Intefiigence Regi_ment- Radio_Intelligence carries out the interception of radlosignals and Radio-Technicat Intertigence is concerned witlitracking emissions from the enemy'Jradar.

OPerational Intelligence 183

The Inteltigence Directorate Technical Facilities Group isoccupied with the interpretation of air photographs. The

training of specialists for such work is carried on at the

Second Kharkov Higher Military Aviation and Engineering

School.

The Interpreters' Group'or 'the Inquisition' deals with the

deciphering and translation of documents obtained, and with

the interrogation of prisoners of war. Specialists for this

group aie prepared at the Military Institute (of Foreign

Languages).

The Intelligence Department of the Armf StaffThis may be seen as an intelligence directorate in minia'

ture. It has very similar organization: Flrst @roup orReconnaissance Group: analogous to the First Departmentof an Intelligence Directorate and concerned with directingtactical reconnaissance, the difference being thal it is'onlyresponsible for the divisions of one army, whereas the FirrtDepartment of an Intelligence Directorate is resporsible forall the divisions of its milithry district; Second Group orSecret lntelligence Group; Third Group or Spetsnaz Group:

responsible for terrorist acts in the area of operations of itsarmy - a specialist comPany of 115 cut-throat soldiers is part

of it; Foutth Group - Informationah Fifth Group which

commands two battalions, radio intelligence and radio-tech-

nical intelligence - the Intelligence Department likewise has

its own interpreters.

It would be a mistake to think that operational agent

intelligence is a kind of second+lass citizen compared withstrategic intelligence. Every intelligence directorate is a kindof GRU in miniature with its electronic facilities, informationservices, secret agents and even, whcre the fleet is concerned,

its independent cosmic service. During the course of a war,

184 Soviet Military Intelligence

or immediately before war breaks out, the power of anintelligence directorate is immeasurably incrCased by theinfiltration in the enemy's rear of thousands af Spitsntazsaboteurs. The intelligence directorates taken altogether

fo1m. a very powerful intelligence conglomerate, in n-o way

ilfelog in its scope to strategic intelfig;nce. In other wordsthe GRU, in the form of strategic and operational intelli_gence, has created two agent networks independent of oneanother and each duplicating the other. In countries like

" Norway, Sweden, West Germany, Austria, Turkey, Afghan_istan and China the operationai intelligence agent networkby far exceeds strategic inteiligence in sirength; effectivenessand invulnerability. This can be confirmed 6y examining thetask of the different intelligence directoratesi

Northern Fleet - covering Norway, Great Britain, France,Spain, Portugal, Canada and the USA. There is no doubtthatNorthern Fleet intertigence is mainry restricted to targetson the sea shore or coastline, althougir this certainly d-oesnot preclude deep agent penetration of the whole territoryof the country being investigated, including the centralgovernment organs.B1lti9

leet _ covering Sweden, Denmark, West Germany.Black Sea Fleet - covering Turkey and the whole Mediier-ranean coastline.Pacific Fleet - covering the USA, Japan, China, Canada andall countries of the pacific Basin.Leningmd Military District - Norway and Sweden. Agentintelligence work is not carried out on Finnish t.rrit"ory,since this country is well inside the Soviet sphere of influence,and its behaviour pleases the Kremlin ,u.h ,or" than thato_f ::n?in Warsaw pact countries, for example, Romania.Baltic Military District- Sweden, Denmark.Soviet Groups of Forces in Germany, rhe Norrhern Group of

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186 Soviet Military Intelligence

Forces in Poland, the Byelorussian Military District_ ail areconcerned with the study of the German Flderal Republic.

lntral Gloyn of Forca in Czechoslovakia _.ouffi it.German Federal Republic and Austria.Sluthey Group of Forces in Hungary_ Austria.

9*po!y, Military District - coiering Greece and Turkeyfrom Bulgarian territory.Kiev and Odessa Miliury District -Turkey, Austria.Trans-Caucashn M ilitary D istrict -furkev. i;;;:"-ly1lceynn Military District - Iran, Afghanistan.yid-Aty, Military District - Afghani-stan, China.Trarc-Baikal and Far Eastern Utttn y Districts_ China.Moscow, Northern Caucasian, Volga, (tral and SiberianMilitary Districu - these do not run alent networks in peace.time.

Taking two countries, West Germany and Turkey, asexamples, let us analyse the strengths and facilities of ,tru-teg c and operational intelligence networks and likewise theKGB networks:

Wesr Germany has becn infiltrated by: the GRU strategicagent network; several illegal resideniies and agent grouf,s;five undercover residencies-in Bonn and Cologne, and threeSoviet*ontrolled missions in British, emerican and Frenchsectors; the Berlin direction of the GRU; it is also coveredby the GRU operational-agent network. Here, completelyindependently, work ir. rlp carried out by the intellige#directorate of the Baltic Fteet, Soviet troops in Cerriany,and the Northern and Central groups oi for.., in theByelorussian Military District. In oi-her words West C".manyis subject to the attentions of: the agent nefirorks of fiveintelligence centres; fi{een- ro eighte;n intelligence p"irt,plus five intelligence points belonSllg ro the Speunazgroup;five Spetsnaz brigades and up to-fift-..n to twenty separate

Operational Intelligence 187.

Spetsnaz companies belonging to the same organizationwhich are at full alert to carry out terrorist acts (the totalnumber of cut-throats is up to 8,0(X) men). This accounts

only for GRU activities. The KGB agent network also

runs several illegal residencies and agent groups and twoundercover residencies in Bonn and Cologne.

Turkey contains a similar proliferation of Soviet espionage:

a GRU strategic agent network in the form of an illegal

residency and twci undercover residencies in Ankara and

Istanbuli a GRU operational network in the form of five

intelligence-centres belonging to the Carpathian, Odesa,Kiev and Trans-Caucasian Military Districts, and the BlackSea fleet; fifteen to twenty intelligence poiltts, plus 6ve

Spetsnaz intelligence points and a corresponding quantity ofSpetsnaz brigades. The KGB provides a strategic network(one illegal residency and two undercover residencies); and

a KGB operational network. Thh network is subordinatcdto the KGB frontier troop6.

These two examples provide a blueprint for intelligenceactivity in many other countries, especially those havingcommon frontiers with the Soviet Union or its satellites.

'ihe basic difference in working methods between strategicand operational intelligence in the GRU is that officers ofoperational intelligence do not in peacetime work on the

territories of target countries. All operations concerning the

identification of suitable cand@,recruitment. trainins and all Dractical work are carried outofr'-Th-siffitories within the Eastern bloc or from inside its

frontiers. lt may be thought that opcranonal mtelllgenceil6Elil-o-t have the range and potential of the strategic branch,whose officers mainly work abroad, but this is not so.

Without the possibility of recruiting foreigners in their own

countries, operational intelligence seeks and finds other ways

188 Soviet Military Intelligence

of establishing the necessary contacts. Its officers exploit

iiH, t'iffi :*'L:"3.1,ii.:"ffi.J [:";-m;ll :,ii*jattention is paid to stud€nts undergoing instruction in Soviet

f Usj:: :,1y:l,r-"-r1 insti tu tes,

." f ; r"p".i a I ists vi siti n g theI rovrer unron as members.-of delegations. Naval intelliience

tr *fl*:-:_1s1nu saitors i.,i, i#le, ships cauing atIl pu"t.pols, and operational intelligencJis equally ..rlful(|l to study the affairs of Soviet anA Ea"stern bloc citizens whor[ have relarives in countries of int"rot io ii.

-'

operationar intefiigence _is

quite un..i"ronious in usingmethods of pressurizing. its canaiOates, seeing that the

f:Tjy-:11.ol-r3r1ign1ni1 taking place on it, o*-n tenitor),.travmg recrulted one foreigner, the intelligence directoraiethen uses him for selectin{and ,..*iring?ther candidateswithout a Soviet officer tak-ing p"rt. rr"tu".il;;ffi;:

years, and cases are known whlre agent. lir". never met:Tli;:lT officer a1d hlve never bee-n eithei on Soviet or

ffi,*i":::'l?^-l W rqrry o,iy.i

It*r:"::ry:lti oi at i n teti i gen.. Jr, i i ri ffi ,; dil:i::::j::;-t:5:ITU,:havingieturil;;1i;;;";;",,r,;:f:T*.*_t::1"1d llo.*o1re-o in- un .r,n.r.i,, il;i;;;

Operational Intelligence r89

airport; The lorry driver only occasionally visited eastern.Europe and rarely had contact with Soriet offrcers because

,there was always a driver's mate with him. However, everyjtime a journey to eastern Europe was planned, he notified,his case officers in good time by means of pootcards. Post'',cards with pre-arranged texts were sent to different addresses

in the Eastern bloc and every time the driver- crossed

, into Soviet-controlled territory, officers met him either atcustoms, or in the restaurant or evcn the lavatory, to give

him short instructions and money. The meetingp were carriedqut in the shortest possible time so that the driver's mate

would not suspect anything.The absence of contact with agents outside territory under

l; the control of the Soviet Union gives GRU operational,intelligence exceptional advantages. Firstly, it is extremelydifficult to unmask and expose such agents; secondly, and'pcrhaps more important, the Soviet officers of operationalintelligence have no chance to defect to the West and expose

the activities of the agents recruited by them. (In strategicintelligence this occurs quite regularly but we have as yet not'one example of it happening amongst operational intelligenceofficers.)' Yet another important advantage of operational intelli-gpnoe, and one which gives it exceptional invulnerability, is

iB diversification. A defecting officer from strategic intelli-gence can say a lot about the activities of the centralspparatus of the GRU, but an officer of the operationalnetwork who did succeed in defecting would be able toreveal only one or trno intelligence points or centres - and

there are more than a hundred of these in the Soviet Army.Each of them is carefully isolated from the others and, to agreat extent, camouffaged. Centres and points are mostlyfound on the premises of military buildings of exceptionalimportance, and consequently wittf the maximum possible

protection. Even if an officer did succeed in disclosing the

agents

his brother who tived not far il-;;il'l;rg. ;iffi;

190 Soviet Military lnulligence

true significance of a particular building, he could only saythat it was, for example, a store for niclear weapons or a

T.k:t depot; it would be almost impossible to determinethat in addition there

_was also an intelligence point. Casesare known where inteiligence points trav-e Uben located onthe premises of the p.r*-n.! country houses of importantgenerals or the well-guarded premisls of punishment bat-talions (in other words, military prisons). ei,a tf,. Ol".^ii._ation of the operational networks in no way indicates theabsence of coordination. All these organs anA organizationsare inctuded in a rigid pyramid ,pt.il headed UI tf," FifttGRU Directorate (in turn, of couo, subject t" t'h" h;;i-;;the GRU). However, in the activiiies of tn" intelligencedirectorates there exists a certain freedom wtrictr invalaUiyengenders uscful initiative. The GRU central apparatusprefen not to interfere.rn th.e daily running of tne intiffilencedirectorates provided that they wlrk in a"productive mannerand toe the line. The GRU will occasionally interfere, incases where two different directorates have recruited theoI* .q:lt, although. it will always encourage a situationrylrere different intelligence directorates ,".*it agents forthe same

lalget: For example, the intelligence directorate ofa group of forces once recruited an ageit for an importantscientific research target. Unwittingly ihe intelligen.i dir..-::1.,: g:i:ther group of forces.recruited-anothi,

"g"nt io,rne same target. Both agents provided almost identical

information which was eventually received in Moscow where

I^:: f:lfll aytrsed. The homeni on",or tne agenis .

Degan ro provide false information, it was spotted Ui ttreFifth Directorate which demanded'tt.t *oii shoulO'stofwith one agent and that there ,froula-il.-gr;er vigilance inthe work with the other ag€nt. naepenOlenipenetration is,as we know, practised at all levels in'the GRU. fhe head oian intelligence point may check his agents and reveal nega-tive aspects in their work in goodtime. The heads"of

elseifr;

Operational Intelligence 191

intelligence in military districts check the heads of points

and ceritres and the head of the GRU checks his heads of

intelligence is the sharpest and most effectiveweapon in the hands of the heads of intelligence directoratesor departments. It cg_qslg!! sf1Wggk[g3ts - SPtEI4g-?XgIlsand Spesnaz-dclac-ilm?nts. Spetsnaz agents are requited by

an iriielligence point, and the whole process of recruitingand running agent-saboteurs is identical to the work withordinary agents of operational intelligence. However, theirtasks differ in essence. The basic task of the procurement

agent is to provide necessary information. The task of theSpetsnaz agent i9 to carry out terrorist acts. Intelligencedirectorates try to recruit these agents from within the most

important economic and transport targets. On receipt oforders, they must be able and willing to carry out acts ofsabotage upon these targets. For the GRU the most import-ant thing is to render unserviceable power and transport

targets, electric power stations, electric power lines, oil and

gas pipelines, bridges, tunnels and railway equipment. Greatstress is placed on carrying out acts of sabotage which willhave a strong effect on the morale of the inhabitants over a

wide area, such as the blowing up of a large dam or the

burning of oil storage tanks. Spetsnaz agents form the so'

called'sleeping'agent network which does no work in peace'

time but springs into action the moment hostilities break

out. Operational intelligence tries to limit its meetings withthese agents to exceptional cases.

The Spetsnaz detachment is quite different. It is the true

dlite of the Soviet armed forces. Its memben are crack

military district intelligence.be used to check the

, Of course

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, Operational Intelligence 193

'soldiers and officers. On Soviet territory they wear the'uniform of airborne troops, on satellite territories they are

disguised as auxiliary detachments, normally signals units.

(Of course they have no connection with airborne troops or'signals. Eight divisions of airborne troops are subject to the

rlcommander of airborne forces., who in his turn is answerable

'only to the Minister of Defence. The airborne forces form a

strategic element acting exclusively in the interests of the

higher command.) Spetsnaz detachments are an organ of the

,' ,operational field and act in the interests of fronts, fleetsI and armies. The Soviet Army includes four naval Spetsnaz

brigades (one to each fleet); sixteen Spe*iaz brigades - one

ii to eactr group of forces and the basic military districts; and

'li. , z fnrfw-nne cpnarate comnanies-i , forty-one separate companies.j, r A Spetsnaz brigade consists of a headquarters compaiy,

* three or four airborne battalions and support detachments.

I In all there are 900 to 1,300 soldiers and officers ready to

t&, .uory out terrorist operations in the rear of the enemy. Att Spetsnaz naval brigade is similar, containing a headquartersi;(. company, a group of midget submarines, a battalion of

parachutists and two or three battalions of frogmen. Some-, iir.t the Spesnaz naval brigade is confused with the brigade

of the fleet marine infantry, mainly because naval Spetsnaz

' use the uniform of marine infantry to disguise their soldienand officers. Spetsnaz companies in armies and tank armies' consist of three platoons of saboteurs and one communi-

cations platoon. This means that, all told, there are in peace-

time alone 27,ffi0 to 30,000 first-class saboteurs available.

During mobilization this number can be increased by four-

'r, or five-fold by recalling reservists who have previously served

11 in these detachments.The deployment of saboteurs'in the enemy's rear is nor-

mally carried out by parachute, though in the fleets frogmen

also take part. Spetsnaz hardly ever use helicopters, because

the deployment generally takes place at a considerable

Operational Intelligence

r distance from the front line. Small groups of. Spetsnaz brig-ades are dropped at a depth of 500 to 1,000 kilometres to act

in the interests of the frontal forees who will be attackingthrough areas cleared by atomic action, air attacks and

sabotage activities. Simultaneously with the dropping of thefront brigade, each army taking part carries out the dropping

ll of its own Spetsnaz companies. These are also dropped in, small groups, a maximum of fifteen consisting of five or six

men each, at depths of 100 to 500 kilometres. There arei' tisually three or four armies and one tank army in each

front, so in the course of an attack at a frontal level, there are one brigade and four or five separate companies

operating at a depth from 100 to 1,000 kilometres in the rearof the enemy. In other words around 250 groups totalling1,5fi) to 1,700 men. It must be added that, on West Germanterritory for example, preparations are in hand for not one,but four or five fronts to operate. At the same time theSpetsnaz agents are activated.

Tlre Spetsnaz detachments have two basiQ duties: the

, destruction of the system of the State government and itsarmies, that is the destruction of staff, command points,

networks and lines of communication; and the destruction of .,

nuclear weapons and the means of supplying them - attacks

on depots and stores of nuclear weaponry and rockets,aerodromes, rocket launchers and launching pads. Simul-taneously with these two basic tasks, the Spetsnaz detach-

ments strive to disorganize the internal life'of the State and

Army and to sow uncertainty and panic.In carrying out the first task, the leading role is allocated

to the staff companies of the Spetsnaz brigades. These

companies differ from other detachments of Spetsnaz in thatthey are not manned by soldiers who are serving their time,but by

.professional .men, 'ensigns'. These Spetsnaz staffcompanies are specially trained for the kidnapping ordestruction of .State leaders of the enemy, memben of the

195

l,

.i,|:

Organlzatlon ofa Spctsnazbrlgade

t -llo@monvZ- llOga dutniaancom3 - gotrbrt swhrn r Settifto".a - Parehuls brflrfion5 - Slgnrlg cotrisil6- Sr[rporUng rin[d

#,'

government and senior military comrnanders. Their existenceis cloaked in the very strictest ,..r".y.

-ir"quently, manyofficers and sergeanti of Spersnaz brigades do not even

suspect the existence of such companie-s in their Onr**.They.are kept apart from the normal brigade and camou-flaged as parachutists, boxers, wrestlers, irnarmed combatexperts, marksmen, even sports teams of the military district.Thestaff company ot tle Speysnaz Arigii i. tr," Lnry uniiwhich carries out its tasks not in camoufraged uniform but incivilian clothes or in the military or poli"ce uniform of the

,"1^.TI:.T-..e, companies. are aiso thi only or", urongr,

tne $petsnaz detachments which, in the course of militaryoperations, inay establish contact and act together with theagent-saboteurs of Spetsnaz. All the rema-ining units oisaboteurs undertake night flights, mine_laying and the seizureof prisoners in order to obtain information. Tanks and otherarmoured fighting vehicles (AFV$ belonging to the enemyare ofspecial interest for saboteurs, and ail groups have thetask .of making sudden attacks on AFVs iitt it

" aim ofstealing them for future.use in attacks against given targets.several groups may take part in an a"ttack on a certaintarget, and after the attack they will disperse and go theirown ways. There is a constant alternition u.tr"J"n iil"collecting of information and. the camying out of sabotageacts. A group may collect informatiln -on

enemy troopmovements in a certain region and transmit the informationto its staff, then it may deslroy a rocket launcher in anotherarea, then go on to coflect more informution on t.oo!movements. Everything depends on the tasks set to th;group and the initiative of the group commander. Whenprisoners are taken, the saboteurs-kno* no lr*r;;;".;;i;;in their methods of interrogation; nobody *t o t m been inany way connected with Spetsnaz will deny their brutality,which extends even to theii own memberr, L".urr" speed ofresults is paramount. They will kill their own wounded _ the

t96 Soviet Military Intelligence Operational Intelligence 197

, group cannot transport a wounded man, nor can it let himi fall into the hands of the enemy. And if a rocket launcher or

an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons is ready for action, theyl"will attack it even if it means the inevitable destruction of

the entire group.Let us examine one case study which underlines both the

importance and effectiveness of operational intelligence.The greaiest interest for the staff of military districts.is

r not the political situation or technology but pure military;,, information: the deployment, numbers, equipment and plans

of the troops of a probable enemy in sectors where an attack

by Soviet forces is likely. An agent who had been recruitedby the second department of the intelligence directorate ofthe Byelorussian Military District on West German territoryselected places for parachute landings by the Spetsnaz

groups. He photographed these locations and made dia-grams. Obviously, since the prime motive was sabotage, his

choices were near important bridges, dams and narrowpasses in lakeland areas. His photographs were transportedby courier into East Germany to one of the intelligencepoints of the Byelorussian Military District. Copies were also

sent to the third and fourth departments of the ByelorussianMilitary District intelligence directorate. While they were

r being studied, an officer noticed a group of American soldierswho kept on appearing in close-up. The soldiers were doingsomething at a kind of metal hatchway on the side of the

l road, and the suggestion was put forward that they were

laying a cable for military communications. This was

scotched by officers of the fifth department who had been

invited for consultations and who said categorically that theAmericans would not have a cable in that region. The layingof military cable qn West German territory would in any

case be discovered by agents of the military district. [n theopinion of the signals officers, the photographs showed thatthe soldiersl work was unlikely to be concerned with cables.

198 Soviet Military Intelligence

The photographs were immediately dispatched to the GRUinformation service, where a new suggestion *u, puiior-ward. Could these not be anti_personiit.tanU minei which3re nrgna-red in peacetime where Soviet sabotage units mightbe active in the event of war? This suggestion greatly alanriedthe GRU leadership. The fifth direct-Jrate immediately gavegders to all intelligence directorates running agents iri Westuermany to pay particular attention to the activities of smallgoups of soldiers in the neighbourhood of important bridges,damg railway stations and crossroads. At it, ,.r" t1il.,the fint GRU directorate gave similar orders to all itsresidents in West Germany. A month later, the informationservice of the GRU h1{.at its disposal thousands of photo-graphs.of qroups ot $aigrs working at metallic hatchways.Every hatchway that had been disc&ered was marked on amap. This qlone did not permit a final conctusion to Le. 9r1*n about the significance of the hatchways, and the GRUhad a series of enlargements taken from a distance of notmore than one metre., The photographic interpreters wereinterested to see that the thiikness-of the hatchw"y, ,"". nogreater than that of the wall of a good safe, butihe lockswould have been the envy of any bank. This led to theopinion that the land mines were of a more complicateddesign. Further analysis showed that the mine-shafts werevery deep, and sometimes placed at some,hundreds of metresfr-om the object which they were supposed to destroy in caseof war. It was this which finally convinced the speciaiists thatit was not a case of ordinary land mines, but of a nuclearyarietl, whose purpose was not to counter a parachute attackbut to halt all Soviet troops in case they began an attack on

,

Europe. Simultaneously, one of the 6Rti resiAencies onWest German territory acquired documentary evideqceconfirming the conclusions of the information service.

. The p-ossibility of nuclear land mines being used com-

pletely disrupted all Soviet plans for a blitzkrieg attack on

Operational Intelligence 199

Europe. The general staff, the Ministry of Defence and theCentral Committee would now have to find new ways ofattack, new methods of employing their troops and waysand means of surmounting strong radioactive fallout caused

by thi underground exploiions. in a word, all tactics, oper-ational methods and strategic plans would have to be

changed. All this was thanks to the fact that the new NATOt'actics had become known to the general staff in good time.

8

, Tactical Reconnaissance

There is yet another level to the practice of military intelli_genoe. Intelligence organs and detachments subject to tacti-cal units and formations of divisional strength and below,which facilitate their military operations, come under theheading of tactical reconnaissance. Their activities.are underthe full control of operational inte[igence, which of coursecomes under the control of the GRU central apparatus. Soall tactical reconnaissance organs have, in exactty the sameway as operational intelligence organs, a twofoid subordi_nation. The head of reconnaissance of a division is subordi_nated to the chief of army intelligence, more accurately thefint group of the Army Intelligence Department. The chiefof regimental reconnaissance is subordinate to the regimentalchief of staff and the chief of divisional reconnaissanL. Eachmotorized*ifle and tank division has on its strength anindependent reconnaissance battalion. The word .iniepen_

dent' shows that the battalion does not form part ol theregiment but is directly subject to the divisional staff. Eachof the four motorized-rifle and tank regiments on the strengthof a division has a reconnaissance company. Reconnaissancecompanies are controlled by the regimental reconnaissancechiefs. Artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments are notincluded as their reconnaissance detachments are not activein the enemy's rear.

A divisional independent reconnaissance battalion consistsof a headquarters, a deep reconnaissance company, tworeconnaissance companies, a company electronic reconnais_sance and auxiliary services.

, Tactical Reconnaissance nlDeep ReconnabsanceThe deep reconnaissance company is the smallest but the

best of all the companies and batteries of the division. There

are twenty-seven men in the company including six officers

and an ensign. It has a small headquarters of the commander

and a sergeant-major, and five reconnaissance groups of fourmen, each with an officer at its head. There is a total of six

jeeps, each group having one and one for the commander,

The company's task is to discover and destroy enemy

rocket launchers in its divisional sector. Deep reconnaissance

groups are deployed in the enemy's rear by helicopter, either

with or without their jeeps, to depths of from thirty to 100

kilometres.On discovering an enemy rocket installation, the group

immediately reports it to the itaff. Should the rocket be

ready for launching, the group must attack it. However,

unlike the Spetsnaz groups, the group will not kill its

wounded unliss the action is on foot - a rare occurreice.

The deep reconnaissance company may be called upon tokidnap staff officers and to hunt for their staffs, but only in

cases where the commander of a division is certain that

there are no enemy nuclear facilities in his divisional sector.

The Reconnaissance Companies of the Batnlion have exactly

similar organization. [n each company there are three tanks,

seven reconnaissance vehicles and ten motorcycles.

The Electronic Reconnaissance Companies have eighty men

and thirty vehicles with electronic equipment. The company

operates only from its own territory. Among its tasks are

intercepting and deciphering radio conversations of the

enemy, taking bearings on radio stations and radio locators,

and monitoring the extent to which its owrr side observes

radio security regulations.

202 Soviet Mililary Intelligence

Each motor-rifle and tank regiment has its own reconnais-sance company..Regimental companies operate at a depthof up to fifty kilometres.as againit the baitatio, .orpffioperation to'eighty kiloinetres. All these companiei pen_

:-,.i1"^.1_.1I lelit:ry under their o*n po*e., using gapsm me enemy's defence: The basic meihod of ouialiinginformation is the capture and cruel interrogation, ofprisoners.

. T"..S.oyirt aflny has approximately 1g0 motor_rifle andtank divisions. Many of these,. especiafly those deployed inthe rear, are under strength.

'Undeimanning is never

allowed, lowever, in the case of reconnaissance detach-ments. There is about the same number of independentreconnaissance battalions, and there are also abiut 700regimental reconnaissance companies. In other words thereare.about 95,000 men direiUy under GRU command intactical reconnaissance. We havl not includeJ in this numberthe strength of chemical, engineering and artillery reconnais_sance companies independent of these.

The Training and Privileges of Personnel

These are the educational institutions which take part in thetraining of personnel for Soviet military irrtelligence: the In-

I telligence Faculty at the General Staff Academy; the Train-ing Centre of lllegals; the Military-Diplomatic Academy;the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Frunze Military Academy;

:,the Reconnaissance Faculty of the Naval Academy; the

i Special Faculty of the Military Signals Academy; the Militaryi Institute of Foreign Languages; the Cherepovetski Higher

, Military Engineering School for Communications; theSpecial Faculty of the Higher Military Naval School of

1 n"Oio Electronics; the Sfeunaz Facuity of the Ryazan

Higher Parachute School; the Reconnaissance Faculty of theKiev Higher Military Command School; and the Special

Faculty of the Second Kharkov Higher Military Aviationand Engineering School.

I This list gives an impression of the extent of the trainingI of specialists for the GRU system. Some of these educational

establishments are devoted exclusively to this work, others

i have only one faculty. However, in any case, we are talking. of many thousands of first-class specialists who go into

military intelligence every year. All the higher militaryschools give instruction at university level to their students.

! The best of these subsequently enter the academies whichprovide a second university education.

Students entering the Soviet Army's higher military train-i ing establishments undergo a period of instruction which' lasts for four to five years. The minimum age is seventeen,

maximum twenty-four. Candidates must have finished sec-

ondary education anb be of normal mental and physical

2U Soviet Military Intelligence

development with a suitable ideological background. Theysit an entrance examination and are iiterviewed by a medicalcommission; they then take a competitive examination. Thevast majority of them have no idei of the true character ofthe educational establishment they have chosen. In somecases, the name of the school givei a reasonably exact idea9f the subjects studied. in it. The Ulyanov Guards ffigh.iTank Command School leaves little to the imagination.-Butwhat does a name like the Serpukhovski Higher CommandEngineering School tell us? If a candidate chooses it, he maybe surprised to find himself learning about strategic missiletroops. Signals schools are largely tfre same _ the candidatehas little idea of exactly what subjects are studied there. Heselects one of them, the Cherepovltski schoot, say; and findshimself in strategic inteiligence. The point is thaithere is nochoice.

-. Qlndrralss of higher commantl schools receive the rank oflleutenant and a university diploma on graduating. Graduatesof higher mititary enginiering ,.ho;f ;;;ive the rank ofengineer lieutenant and an engineering Oiptoma. atteigraduation, the officer is posted to a unit 6n tfie instructionsof the General Staff, and from the first day of his service hisfight with his fellow officers for the rigtlt of entry to theacademy begins. The ac-ademy is the paisport to th; higherechelons of the Army. Without passing through the acadelny,the officer may serve on until majoi or lie-utenant_colonellevel at the most. Success in thi academy opens widePdrol. and speeds up progress on the promotion i"OaL;.The officer may submit his first application to tfre acalemyafter three years of service. The ipplication is confirmed atevery level of command, beginning with his immediatesuperior. Any higher commander may hold up the appli.cation under any pretext: that the officer is too young; tooold; too.stupid; or too clever, In which case the officJi willput off his application until the next year . . . and the nexi

: The Traintng and Privileges of Personnel 205

year, and so on possibly for all his twenty-five years of

"' There are more than fifteen military academies in the. Soviet A*y, but for most officers it does not matter which''one he gets into. The important thing is to get into one of

them. tf his commanders decide that an officer is suitable,; he must still pass examinations and undergo a rigorous

entrance competition. The period of study at all the academ-lies is three years, and they are all similar bar one, theGeneral Staff Academy. To enter it there is no competition,rnd tto examinations, nor are there applications for entry.Candidates are selected by the Central Committee from thenumber of the most successful and dedicated colonels andgenerals up to and including colonel-general, who have

already completed their study at one of the militaryacademies.

The General Staff Academy is the passport to the veryhighest levels of Soviet military leadership. The colonel orgeneral continues to serve and never suspects that he maybuddenly receive from the Central Committee an invitationto attend yet a third spell of university education. TheGeneral Staff Academy is the highest dream of the most

eager careerists.Let us examine the progress of an intelligence officer on

the promotion ladder. As a graduate of the intelligence'faculty of the Kiev Higher Command School, for example,he will be posted to the command of a reconnaissance

.l detachment of a regiment or division. Here begins theofficer's gradual upward movement on the service ladder,from platoon commander to company commander to com-mander of regimental reconnaissance and deputy com-mander of reconnaissance battalions. To secure furtherpromotion, the officer must now enter the reconnaissance

faculty of the Frunze military academy. This same faculty isalso open to graduates of the Spetszaz facalty of the Ryazan

206 Soviet Military Intelligence

Higher Parachute School. AII officers study there togetherand then return to their own units, only ihis time with ahigher command.

So far all this is straightforward, provided that the offficer,ssuperiors co-operate in signing the necessary documents.But one insititute, the Military Institute instruciing in foreignlanguages, is rather peculiar. This is a privilegeJ establisir_ment for the children of the highest echelons of th6 SovietArmy. The Institute exists on the same basis as the MilitaryAgad9ly, although young people enter it according to therules laid down for military schools. This means, in fact, thata candidate's father has only to worry about placing his littleson on the first rung of the military ladder and the ladderitself will move upwards.

The period of study in the institute is from five to sevenyears depending on the faculty. The student receives edu_cation to the level of that of the military school and the rankof lieutenant; he then proceeds with his training as he wouldin a normal military academy. That is to say, these scions ofthe military aristocracy are spared the rigours of genuinemilitary service as well as the cruel competition betweenofficers for the right of entry to a military academy. Every_thing proceeds automatically.

The Institute is not only a stepping-stone to the highestArmy ranks, but to the highest ranks of the KGB too. Theconditions of acceptance are naturally graded according torank: for the children of colonel-generals and higher, tf,ereare no examinations; the children of lieutenant-generalsundergo a very cursory examination; and the children ofmajor-generals undergo the most rigorous examination.However, in order to soften this clear class distinction, theInstitute every year accepts a ten per cent intake of ,non_

aristocrats', sons of colonels and majors, sometimes even ofworkers and kolkhoznilcs.

The Training and Privileges of Personnel 207

Discipline and competition are fearsome. Should any stqd-ent commit the slightest offence, he is speedily expelled fromthe Institute in disgrace. But there is'a deeply-entrenched setof privileges too. For the sons of lieutenant-generals, and'colonel-generals even more so, the special entran'ce provides,for the appointment of individual tutors and the taking ofexaminations privately at home, so that the candidate doesnot get nervous. For colonel-generals and abgve, there existsihe privilege of being able to send not only their sons to theInstitute, but also their daughters, who constitute a speciallittle group. The girls are given instruction in French for thesake of prestige and in English for obvious commercialreasons. They, together with everybody else, receive officer'srank. They will find their way into the Ministry of Defence.

After the Institute's final examinations, interestedorganizations carry out their selection of the graduates. Thefirst selection is carried out by the KGB and the GRUaccording to the principle of 'one for you, one for me'.There is no friction, firstly because the system has been laiddown for many years and secondlylecause GRU and KGBhave different interests.

The KGB is quite happy to choose the sons of high-ranking, serving KGB officers, but the GRU devotes itsattentions largely to the proletarian ten per c€nt. For twoprincipal reasons the GRU has had a long-standing rule thatit will not admit the sons of high-placed parents into itsorganization, nor will it admit children of GRU officerswhatever post they occupy. Only after a father retires fromthe GRU can his son be considered for admission. Thereasoning goes that if a son is refused something the fathermay refuse the same thing to all his subordinates. Secondly,there is no father who really wants to risk his own career bylinking it with that of a son who is on agent work and towhom anything could happen. This principle of the GRU'shas to a very great extent eradicated corruption in the

208 Soviet Military Intelligence

selection of officers, although corruption flourishes in otherGRU fields of activity. (The KGB has adopted diametrically_.opposed principles. Everywhere within it are the children ofTchekists, frequently under the direct supervision of theirfathers. This is justified by the false notion of handing downtraditions from father to son.)

The unclassified narne of the institution is .military unit35576'. Its secret designation is the Soviet Army Academy.Its top secret designation is the Military-Diplomatic Acad-emy of the Soviet Army. Regardless of the abundance ofnames, none gives any idea of what is studied there. Ifsomebody wanted to convey an idea of its activities bymeans of a name, then that name would most probably besomething like the Military Academy of Agent Intelligence.Very few people inside the Soviet Union know of theexistence of this academy, and should any officer ever hear arumour about it, and write an application to enter it, immedi-' ate enquiries would be made to establish the source of theinformation. One may rest assured that a cplprit would befound and put in phson for spreading government secrets.For spreading a secret like the existence of the Soviet ArmyAcademy the sentence is ten years in prison, perhaps fifteen,perhaps even the 'ultimate sanction'. Those connected withthe Academy understand this rule and obey itenthusiastically.

The GRU seeks out candidates for the Academy andsecretly suggests to officers that they should enter. Beforemaking this proposal to an officer, the ofificer will of coursehave been very carefully checked out by.the GRU, whomust not only be certain that he will agree but will also haveobliged him to sign a document about the divulging ofmilitary secrets. In this document are described alt theunpleasant things which await him, should he decide to sharehis secrets with anybody else. However, they do not tell him

The Training and Privileges of Personnel 2W

any secrets. They simply tell him that there exists a certain

academy which is keen to welcome him as a student. To his

question as to what sort of studies he will undergo, he

receives the answer that the work is very interesting. There

will be no soldiers and no hierarchy of rank, and the

conditions of life are vastly better than those of any other

organization known to him.At the outset this is all they will entrust to him. The GRU

holds nobody against his will and is perfectly frank about

future privileges. For the GRU officer who completes the

Academy, success is assured - unless he makes a mistake, inwhich case retribution is equally swift. He may either be

deprived of overseas work and be sent instead to work inthe central organs of the GRU in Moscow; he may be

deprived of work in the GRU and sent back to the Army;and finally, he may be shot. All of these punishments, notonly the last, are regarded as harsh in the extreme' The firstmeans the end of overseas life, and GRU offrcers are envious

even of dustmen overseas. The second means an end toprivilege and the sweet life within the GRU, and a return to

the grindstone of life as an ordinary Soviet officer. The thirdis only marginally worse.

The Soviet Army Academy is located in Moscow on

Narodnogo Opolchenia Street, but many of its secret

branches are scattered all over the place disguised as inno-

cent offices, flats or hotels. The central building reminds one

of an elegant museum with its Greek colonnade and richlycarved ornamentation. Around it are several large buildings,

and the whole is surrounded by a very high iron lattice-workfence. The area wallows in greenery so that nothing can be

seen. There are no name plates or number plates on the

building. From the outside there is little to indicate that it issecret. Only sometimes on the upper storeys and in certain

windows'-can one see grilles and casements covered in cord

nets, an indication that within those rooms there is work on

il!j,

lr r,

ill

210 Soviet Military Intelligence

top secret documents being carried out. The string nets areso that no pieces of paper can be blown out of thJwindowsby draughts.

The Training and Privileges of Personnel 2llattach6s are the same GRU officers as those who workunder civil cover. They face the same tasks and use the same

-methods as all other officers of the GRU. For this reason

. the instructional programme in both faculties is absolutelyidentical. Furthermore, when students have completed theirstudies, in whichever of the two faculties that might be, theGRU will post them under whatever cover they considersuitable. Many of the officers who have studied in the fintfaculty will find themselves working in military organizationsand vice-versa. The artificial distinction exists in order to

, further the following aims: to confuse Western intelligence' services and to create the illusion that there is some differ-ense between military attachds and other GRU ofificers; tosegregate the students for security reasons (a defector willnot know all his fellow students, only half - with this inmind the first faculty is isolated from the central block ofthe academy buildings); to simplify control over individualstudents; and finally, since the academy is after all designatedas a military-diplomatic academy, it seems wise that not allits faculties should bear names connected with espionage.

The third facully deals with operational agent intelligenceand Sfitsnaz intelligence, preparing officers for intelligencedirectorates of military districts. There exists a deep enmitybetween officers of the first two faculties and officers of thethird. An officei of one of the two strategic faculties,however newly arrived, feels the very deepest contempt forall those studying in the third faculty. He will be goingabroad but the despised third faculty student will recruitagents from Soviet or satellite territory only. But fate can becruel- and kind. When the worst (usually the most arrogant)officers have graduated from the strategic faculties, they aresent to operational agent intelligence; in their place aretaken the best of the officen graduating from the thirdfaculty.

ft. tg[$I, like the first, is not located on the

The AgEggy is an integrat part of the GRU. The chief ofthe-Academy has the military rank of colonel-generuiiid't3 O9n{f head of the GRU, not of cours"- first deputyhead. The chief of the Academy has tgg.dep&s wtro arelieutenant-generats beneath him. ft "sf ifr,ifoggpgg,and the deputies for the poriticar, administrativtlffiir

- Th: Lrs! deprtty is in charge of the graduate school,four faculties and academic courses. The political derollisresponsible for the state of political ariaEness affi'-ilemorale- of all officers of the Academy. The adryrinistrative_tecltcat OE *y is responsible for the-personfiffi[iiffiiian<l the security department (with the commandani,s of;ficeand a corirpany of security guards) together with the finance,stores and transport departments. Under him there are alsothe libraries, including collections of secret and top secretliterature. T}e leputy for the apaclggqic secllg has underhim the academic sub-facutties wTiffiif6Ei by major-generals. These sub-faculties are strategic agent inteilige;ce,operational agent intelligence and Speinaz\aeafng wi'ttr thearmed 9*: 9f fikely enemies), sirategic and oferationaltrade-craft of the Soviet Army, foreign linguages and studyof countries-, history of international relatiois ana diplomaticpractice- and, fi nally, Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

- fr"j5! ar\d sggglg faqlties prepire their students for

the. central GRU apparatuslFfowever, the first faculty iscalled the Special servii:es Faculty and the second the tvtiti-tary-Diplomatic Faculty, and it is officially considered tha,the first faculty prepares officers for civilian cover _ embas_sies, civil airlines, merchant navy, trade representations _while the second faculty prepares its students for militarycover. But we Elust again remember that Soviet military

212 Soviet Milinry Intelligence

academy premises. Moreover, its individual courses andS9upu are separated among themselves in conditions of thestrictest secrecy. The fourth faculty trains foreigners _ poles,

le.rmans, Czechs, Hungarians, Bulgars, frongols urjCubans. Naturally, not oni of these trai ever set foot in theacademy buildings and has no idea where the academy islocated; equally naturafly, the soviet trainees in ttre acaoJmymust not have even the slightest contact with their ,brothersi.

For each of these students in the Soviet Army academy, aspecial personal cover story will have been worked out.Frequently., many of them will study for

" y; i;-;;;normal military academy concerned with tant or artifleiystudies, for example, before spending their three to foury.:Ts on secret premises. And these students do not receivediplomas from the Soviet Army Academy. Their diplomas-I. lloT,for example, the Tank Warfaie a.aae*y. Onfya handful of people will know what is hidden under thisname.

The academic courses are something different. These aredesigned.not to provide a complete trating, U"t ,"fy prrti.ione, 1n!t the period of study is only onl y"ar. fhiy ur"attended

-principally by the most experienced officers andthose with the greatest future prospects, who were chosen

for e.ntry to strategic facultiei of the u..a.ry Uut tf,"ntransferred by the GRU into the diplomatic (civit) o, ouir_seas trade academy where they completed a'full murse ofstudy. They are considered on a par with the other civilstudents and carry out their specialized training in theirspare time and receive-the sami diplomas as the-graduates

:l tl,. t*9 strategic faculties, having already receiuei genuinediplomatic diplomas. This is the riost secret part of Sovietintelligence after-illegals, foi even genuine,.l.i"r; aip[."i.consider them their own kind ana ao not suspect theirintelligence connections. The academic courses are arsoattended by graduates of the Military Foreign Languages

The Training and Privileges of Personnel 213

Institute who have been chosen by the GRU for workabroad. The GRU uses them in residencies mainly for dutieswith technical and technical-operational services. After a

first assignment abroad these may, provided they have served

successfully, enter the academy in one of the strategicfaculties. Lastly, the academy receives specialists from otherfields whom the GRU invites to work in technical services oron information work.

There is a post-graduate school too, which prepares scien-

tific penonnel for the GRU and also instructors for theacademy itself. An officer who has completed one of thestrategic faculties, and has been abroad on agent work and

shown good results, is accepted by the post-graduate school

for a period of instruction of two to three years during whichhe must prepare and defend a scientific dissertation on asubject chosen by himself. The resulting qualification is ascientific degree, Master of Military Science.

Who is eligible? this is a very complex problem. The candi-

date who hopes to please the GRU must fulfil the followingconditions: racial purity - there must be no Jewish blood as

far back as the fourth generation (the KGB has no such

restriction); ideological stability and purity; membership ofthe communist party; the absence of any contact with over-seas, excepting the 'liberation' of Hungary and Czechoslo-

vakia and the 'defence of socialism in eastern Europe'. Hemust have a wife and children of complete ideologicaland racial purity. He must have strong and reliable familyconnections, on his own side and his wife's. There must be

no compromising material on the files of any of their rela-tives. None of his relatives may have been either prisonersof war in Germany, nor on Soviet territory under thetemporary occupation of German forces. And there must be

no signs whatsoever of alcoholism, sexual promiscuity, family

214 Soviet Milinry Intelligence

problems, comrption and so on, nor must the officer haveany prominent distinguishing features or speech defects.

One of the most difficult things in selecting candidates is tofind people who understand the political situition in the wqrldand can clearly see possible future developments without beingsecret free-thinkers. Obviously anyone who is politically inepiis not acceptable to the GRU, but if a man is modirateiyintelligent, there is always the danger that secret doubts wiilbegin to penetrate his head. Naturally, when this rare creatureis found he is instantly made to sit meaningless examinationsand, from the very first day, accorded appropriate honours.

In a classless society, everybody is equal and life is thereforehappy and free. All people are friends.and brothers andnobody will try to do his neighbour down. people may pursuetheir ambitions without let or hindrance. Of coune, if ybu fivein-the country, you cannot rnove to the city, still less thi capitalMoscow, without the permission of the-Central Commiitee.Society may be classless, all right, but it is divided, for thegood of the people, into parts - you have the right to live inthe city or you have not. You may rightly say thtt you wouldprefer to live in the city, but you are branded from birth - ifyou were born in the country, you must stay there and so mustyour children and grandchildren - for theii own good. Unless- unless you do something like become a GRU officer.Immediately, you will find yourself in Moscow, with a perma-nent ro,sidence permit. This is good news for not only you, butyour children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren andgrcat-great-grandchildren down to the fortieth generation,who will all have Moscow residence permits and will legallyreside in Moscow.

It is as if you had moved onto a higher sphere, as if youand your relations had suddenly been ennobled. you shoulddraw your family tree on the wall of your apartment so thatfuture generations of your family will knowwho it was whoIifted them up to the heights.

The Training and Plivileges of Personnel 215

In capitalist societies, whereeverybody is naturally out for

each otirer's blood, people move around chaotically, causi.ng

untold social problems. These could all be eradicated with

the introduction of residence permits on the Soviet model'

The Moscow residence permit, logically, is the first privilege

of a GRU officer. There are others, of course. For example,

an ordinary general staff officer is unable to buy a car during

the whole of his life unless of course he steals or is sent

abroad. A GRU officer may in three years buy not only a

car, but also an apartment. Drawing another distinction, it is

often asked how much more a GRU officer abroad earns in

comparison with the same officer in Moscow. It is impossible

to unr*", this question sensibly, because in Moscow the'

officer spends money which is to all practical purposes

incapabli of buying anything except food of rather inferior

quality and equally inferior clothes. He who is sent abroad,

ho*"uet, receiues foreign currency and can buy everything

he needs both while he is abroad and at home in the Soviet

Union in the special foreign curency shops. In possessing

foreign currency a GRU officer becomes a man of completely

diffeient class, very sharply distinguished from all those who

do not have it. Special shops and r€staurants are open to

him, where he canbuy anything he wants, without queueing'

The ordinary Soviet citizen, including the general staff officer

or even the: GRU officer who does not serve abroad, may

not even enter these shoPs.

So Soviet society is as racial as it can possibly be, only

race is not determined by the colour of your skin but by

whether you have the right to travel abroad or not. lmagine

any country, France perhaps, putting up outside shops the

urrorn..*"nt that: 'Nobody of French nationality is allowed

to enter this shop. Only those on the list of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party are admitted'' But

in the Soviet Union there are everywhere shops, .hotels,restaurants which Russians may not enter, because they are

216 Soviet Military Intelligence

Russian. Life for a GRU ofifrcei possessing foreign currencyis on an infinitely wider scale than for the 270 million whoare deprived of the right to hold foreign currency. And oncehe has bgcome a representative of the upper class, hebecomes inordinately jealous of his right,'flaring

"bor.anything the loss of the privilege which allows him to travelabroad. This is why he defends himself against any revelationabout his own person, against uny,

"rei the most insignifi_

cant, contacts with the police. This is why he tries tolidefrgm his superiors even the smallest shoitcomings. This isytry he is capable of any dirty trick upon anybody]includinghis own comrades, when what is at staki is whether hEshould remain another year in a hot, humid, subtropicalposting - or return early to Moscow.

Conclusion

For a GRU officer, there are countries in which he dreams

of working. There are also countries in which he wouldrather not work. There are cities he dreams of, and cities he

sees in nightmares.The dream city for a GRU officer is Peking. Its infernal

counterpart - Tokyo. This might appear strange, because

for the top brass of the GRU quite the reverse is true:Tokyo is heaven, Peking hell. But the interests of a GRUofficer are directly opposed to the interests of the top brass.

The top brass desire high productivity, while the work forcehas rather different aims.

Imagine that you are lucky and are posted to China. Whatawaits you? A vast, splendid embassy behind high walls.Chit-chat with colleagues from other embassies, gossip aboutthe state of health of the Chinese leaders and the Ambassa-dor's wife. After five years your return home, obviouslywithout having recruited any agents. But nobody will bawlyou out for it, you will no! have your epaulettes torn off,no one will call you lazyior a coward. Everyone under-stands that you-have been in hell, where serious work is

impossible . . .

And now imagine that you are an unlucky spy and the

GRU post you to Tokyo. Both you and the GRU top brass

know that there are no laws against spying there, thatconditions for spying are ideal. So what awaits you? Exhaust-ing stressful work,'fifteen to seventeen hours a day, with norest days and no feast days. No matter how many secrets

you manage to acquire it will never be enough. No matterhow many agents you recruit it will never be enough. Your

218 Soviet Military Intelligence

paradise will be snowed under with cipher cables fromMoscow addressed to the resident saying: .you have seventyoperational officers! Where's your productivity? What youmanaged to get yesterday we have already received fromHong Kong! From Berlin! From illegalsl Where are thesecrets!!!???' You may rest assured that this question is putby the GRU daily to the resident * who will in turn ask youthe same question, pounding the table with his

"nor*-ou,Irt. !9 will fight for the kind of productivity that can onlybe achieved through merciless competition. Ii your output isnot up_ to scratch you will simply be sent home and yourcareer broken.

Penonally I have never been to Tokyo, but I have had toIlt i, a country which was considered .paradise, by theGRU top brass. Understandably, for us it wis ,hell,. A weakpolice system in that country meant that the other residentscontinually used it as an intermediate base for their opera_tions-and it was a busy crossing point for GRU illegals, too.All of them had to be taken care of and hdlped. AJting as asupply base for agent network operationi is rathei likeserving in a signals unit during a war: as long as communi-cation lines are maintained nobody ,emembers you, butshould communications be intemrpted the signaller is sentto a penal battalion forthwith, charged with the failure ofthe entire operation. The differenci between us and thesignals boys lay in the fact that no matter how well wemaintained supplies, how successful our own work was, wealso had to recruit agents. After all, we were living in'paradise', where the police was weak and Soviet diploiatswere never expelled.

_ I'd like to beg all who are responsible for the security of

the West: be human. Do expel Soviet spies occasionally. Byexpelling one you enable othen to reduce their fiantilactivity. A spy is a human being. He bears on his shouldersthe immense pressure of the gigantic GRU establishment,

Conclusion 219

and he has no excuse for any lapses. He needs one, so be

human.Who should be expelled first? The answer is obvious: the

resident. The expulsion of the resident is equivalent toclearing the King off the chess-board: it spells checkmate tothe 'residentura', no matter how aggressive and successful itis. Usually the local police know who he is. He is easy toidentify. He has already served abroad for twelve to fifteen

years, he has been very active and, judging by the signs,

successful. Now here he is serving abroad again, in a senior

diplomatic post, and hardly ever leaving the embassy, but

sitting there motionless, like a spider. Clearly it is against

him that all forces must be mobilized. This is not easy. Hebreaks no laws, does not speed up and down the motorways

day and night, carries no stolen secrets in his car. But he is

more dangerous than all his bfficers put together.There is a deep-seated and erroneous belief that known

residents should not be allowed into the country. Sometimes

they aren'!, sometimes they are simply not granted entryvisas. This is a mistake. I will try to explain, using my own

resident as an example. He was a man of unflinching willand powerful intellect, a true ace of spies: gareful, perfidious,

calculating and fearless. He was promoted to major-general

at the age of thirty-six, and he had a brilliant career in frontof him in the upper echelons of the GRU. But all he wanted

was to be a resident, pnd as a result he remained a major-general. Without any doubt the Security Services in the

West knew him well. Prior to one of his postings abroad the

Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked for a Belgian visa

for him. [t was refused. They asked for a French one - again

refused. Then a West German one - refused again. Finally a

small country with a soft, friendly government agreed togrant him entry. The GRU gave the resident his final

briefing, which of course included the names and addresses

of the members of the network run by the 'residentura'. As

220 Soviet Mititary Intelligence

soon as he arrived in the country he started extendingthe network speedily and vigorously, until it was workingsuccessfully against the USA, against Belgium, againstFrance, against all the countries which had refused himentry. In other words, barring a resident from a countrydoes not mean rendering his network ineffective (see Appen-dix C).

_ Now imagine another set of circumstances. Supposing thefirst country approached, in this case Belgium,-had issuedthe visa. The resident would be briefed, let into all the'residentura'secrets, and would arrive in the country. How-ever if, three to four months later, Belgium found somereason or other to expel him, the results of this would bethreefold:

1. The resident will have had time to disrupt the existingsystem of work in the residency but not to UuitA up a neisystem.

2. Having to leave the country suddenly, the resident willleave his army without a commanding officer. Time will beneeded for the successor's visa application and more time tobrief the new resident. In the interim the residency willremain inactive.

3. The experienced resident, on returning to Moscow,will be completely neutralized. For the following three tofour years, visa applications cannot be sent for him either toFrance or West Germany or any other country that Belgiumwill have notified as an ally.'One

experienced, authoritative, demanding and mercilessresident serving in a neutral country with ten officers underhis command can sometimes harm the West more than twohundred very active GRU officers working in the USA,Great Britain, West Germany or France. This is not only amatter of my opinion, it is also the opinion held by MoscowCentre, and it was the opinion held by my first resident, whotaught me unforgettable lessons in concentration on target,

Conchuion 221

persistence and mad risk. I am sincerely sorry that he has

stayed the other sidebf the barricade . . .

How should one go about the business of expulsion? The

short answer is: as noisily as possible. To expel a Soviet spy

is of course a victory. But to expel him noisily means that

you are making as much capital out of the victory as you

can. The silent expulsion of a Soviet spy is an action directed

against one man. The noisy expulsion is a slap in the face forthe GRU, for the KGB; it is an action directed against all

their spies, against thousands of unstable people preparod to

listen to the proposals of the Soviet intelligence service.

Here is another example encountered during my work.I had a reasonably good relationship with a young man

who agreed to 'lose' his passport. [n return he agreed to

'find' some money. This was the first step towards the

morass. Further well-tried steps were planned which wouldhave pushed him deeper in each time; once in, he wouldnever have been able to get out. However, on the day

scheduled for a meeting, an insignificant local paper pub-

lished an item stating that fifty per cent of the Soviet

Embassy staff were spies. So at our meeting, instead oflosing the money I had with me and finding his passport, Ihad to spend the time proving to him that the news item was

a lie. And it really was a barefaced lie, as at that time not

fifty but eighty per cent of the Embassy staff were spies. Imanaged to convince the young man. We remained good

friends . . . but nothing more. He did not take the crucial

step. Should you, young man, be reading my book, my

greetings to you. I am glad for your sake, in spite of the fact

that at the time I felt my failure deeply. But what can a poor

GRU spy do in a situation when the powerful free Western

press publishes such items at the least suitable moment?Finally the question arises as to how many Soviet spies

should be expelled. The only answer is all. What do you

need them for? Why keep them in your country? They are

222 Soviet Military Intelligence

professionals specially selected and trained to destroy yourcountry. If you have the evidence to prove that thly arepies - expel them. Sometimes the theory is put forwarj thatit is better to unearth a spy and keep him under surveillancethan to expel him, as then a new ore will be sent in and wewill not know whom to keep under surveillance. That iscorrect. But every expelled spy represents a nightmare to thenew ones, who fear deeply being appointed asleplacements.Secondly, intelligence experience is much more valuablethan any amount of education, and one experienced spy is ahundred times more dangerous than a yourg, green one.The more inexperienced spies you have in your country the' more mistakes will be made, the easier it will be to watchthem.

__But if we expel people, runs the argument, the SovietUnion will retaliate and expel our innoJent diplomats fromMoscow. That is so. But to that there is an antidote _ youmust expel large groups of diplomats simultaneously. Lookat these statistics: Holland expelled one - the Soviet

-Union,s

reply: two. Turkey expelled one - the reply: two. But if youincrease the number to five the Soviet riply will be five orfewer-. Canada expelled thirteen - the riply: two. Franceexpelled forty-seven - the reply: nil.

Great Britain simultaneously expelled 105 (the entire staffof the GRU and KGB residencies). There was no comeback.If you take similar action against Soviet spies I guaranteethat your diplomats in Moscow will be safe. I guarintee thatyour diplomats will be greatly respected, and ihat the Sovietleadership will look for opportuniiies to improve its rerationswith you. The Soviet leadership understands and acknowl_edges strength. But only strength and nothing else. TheSoviet Union can respect the sovireignty of any country, nomatter how small it looks on the map. But the Soviet Unionrespects the sovereignty only of those nations who respecttheir own sovereignty and defend it.

For GRU Officers Only

I was condennned to death by the Military C.ollege of theSupreme Court according to article 64a. My crime - betrayalof the homeland. I still plead not guilty as charged. Thebetrayers of the homeland are those who are now in the

-Kremlin. The betrayers of the homeland are those who shot. millions of the best Russian farmers. Russia has alwaysgrown wheat. Grain was its most irlportant export. Thosewho have made of Russia an importer of grain - they are thebetrayers who should be sentenced under article 64. On the.eve

of war the communist leaders shot the best marshals andgenerals. They were motivated not by the interests of thehomeland, but by the desire to hold 9n to their power. Theyshould be tried in a court of law. For the deaths of themarshals and generals, my people paid the price of tens ofmillions of lives. Those who are guilty of that should betried. Those in the Kremlin who have brought my people tocomplete moral and physical degredation - they are thetraitors. These people are driving my comrades to theirdeaths in Afghanistan, demanding the deaths of innocentpeople - they are the criminals.

If they at some future time should be judged and giventheir just deserts, and if, then, my country then consideredme to be a traitor also for deserting it, then I am ready tolake my punishment, but only after they have taken theirs.

When I was in the GRU I could see two ways to protest:either I could commit suicide; or I could escape to the West,expiain my disagreement with the communists and thencommit suicide. I chose the second way, which is not a whiteasier than the first. It is an agonizing way. If any GRU

224 Soviet Military Intelligence

officer now finds himself in the same dilemma _ to go or tostay - I advise him to think over his decision a hundredtimes, and then again. If he is thinking of fleeing to theWest,.then my advice to him is _ don,t d"o it. article 64 willbe waiting for him, as will the ihameful epithet ,traitor,,

andan agonizing death, maybe even on the frontier itserr. rvryadvjce. would always be_ - donl go. He shouldn,t go untilsuch time as he is certain why hJ is going. If you iant aneasy life - don't go. If you like long,I*u-rious motorcars _don't go, it is not worth it for the Jate of a car. If you areattracted to Western wolel - don't go, theirs are rially nobetter than orrrs. If you think that in tlre-West it is good,'andat home in Russia bad, then you are mistaken _ ours is abeautiful-muntry. Don't go foi the sake of foreign beautiesand wonders.

Only if you know there is no other way for you, if youconsider your leaders as criminals, if you yourself do notwish to be a criminal- - then you should !o. If you areprep_ared to risk your life for one minute of ireedom _ thengo. If you don't feel yourselfa traitor by going _ go. If, bygoing, you can bring nearer the momeni.itren tnJ.orru_nists are judge! by the people of our country, if you canhelp your people, if you arelhen ready to stand before thepeople and await their decision on youifute _ then you mustgo. You will dream of Mothe-r Rusiia every night, but go forthe sake of her future and I promise you that you wilt behappy.

Appendix ALeaders of Soviet Military Intelligence

I soon realized that a history of the GRU would be a veryfraught undertaking. [t is clear that the very shortest history

iof the GRU would fill several massive tomes and could onlybe written after the fall of communist power. The historywritten in this book consists only of isolated details, only{ague outlines of a continent shrouded in the mists. The

i picture may be made clearer by studying the destiny of thosetindividuals who have held the highest power in Sovietmilitary intelligence. In their destinies the whole history ofthe organization is reflected.

A RA LOV, Simon Iv anovich : I 8. 12. I 880 - 22. 5. I %9.Hewas born in Moscowto rich merchantparents and educatedto follow his father's profession. In 1905 he joined the Tsar'sarmy and serveil in WWI as a major in military intelligence. Aparticipant in the October Revolution he was one of the cre-ators of the Tcheka. In January 1918 he became chief of theOperational Department of the Moscow military district. Rap-idly promoted, in October 1918 he became the first chief ofmilitary intelligence until July l92f..ln1920he moved downto chief of intelligence, 12th Army, and then regained groundcommanding intelligence of the S.W. front. After 1921 hewas a deputy of the chief of military intblligence, working inTurkey, Latvia and Lithuania as undercover ambassador andlater was responsible for setting up residencies in the UnitedStates, Germany and Japan. ln 1937 , dismissed from all posts,he was employed as a deputy director of the LiteratureMuseum. Arrested in 1938, he speht three years underinterrogation. In 1941 he was serving as a private in a penal

226 Appendix Abattalion. Four years later, he was a colonel, and when thewar was over he was taken back into the GRU. Then, arrested

ll 191, he spent ten years in a concentration camp. On hisliberation he was immeiliately appointed deputy tothe chiefof the GRU. In 1957 he was agiin dismissed inthe Zhukov/Shtemyenko purge, but lived quietly until his death.

SitCCe, Oskar Arcovich: lg94 - 2g.7.3g.Born in Latvia, he served in WWI and became a communistafter the Revolution, and a leader of th6 Red Latvian$!emen. He engaged in suppressing counter-revolutisnariesin Moscow and became a private boAyguara of Lenin. InOctober 1918 he was. a diputy of t[J chief of militaryintelligence and immediately moved as an illegal into polan{Lithuania and Latvia. In 1919 he became chieiof intblligenceof.-the Western front, and in August 1920 became chief ofmilitary-intelligence. Reduced to deputy status after 1922,he travelled extensivery as an ilegar to cieate new networksuntil his recall to Moscow in 193g, when he was shot.

NIKONOV, A.M. (Nikonson): ? -29.7.38.It remains uncertain whether this was his real name or simplya party pseudonym like Lenin,.Stalin, Trotski, Zinoviev andothers. His date of birth is unknown. He was giief of militaryintelligence after Stigga, but it is not known whether Beruintook over from him or from another, so far unidentified,chief of military intelligence. He too was executed in thegreat teror of 1938.

2nd Grade Army Commissar BERZIN, yan Karlovich (realname Kyuzis Peteris) : I 3. I L l&gg - 29.7.3g.Born in Latvia, Berzin joined the Social-Democratic partyin 1904. He was conscripted into the army in the First WorldWar but deserted and went underground. He took part inthe October Revolution and afterwards he worked in the

Appendix A 22V

central apparatus of the NKVD and in the NKVD in Latvia.One of the main organizers of the 'Red Terror', he initiatedthe hostages system. He was also a fervent supporter of theestablishment of a communist dictatorship in Latvia and oneof the organizers and leaders of the Latvian Red Army(subsequently the 15th A*y). He was head of a specialdepartment of this army and played a part in the suppressionof the Russian sailors' mutiny at Kronstadt. He particularlydistinguished himself in the course of the pursuit and liqui-dation of captured sailors. From April l92l he was DeputyHead of Intelligence Directorate (GRU) but, from his firstdays in military intelligence, he was, dc facto, its head. Witheffect from March 1924 he became its head legally as well.He was one of the most talented, industrious and iuccessfulheads of intelligence, the creator of the most powerful andsuccessful intelligence organizations in existence anywhere.He personally recruited and rah the most outstanding intelli-gence officers - Yakov Mrachkovski (Gorev), MosheMilstein (Mikhail M), Ruth and Rolf Werner, RichardSorge, Lev Manevich, Sandor Rado, Karl Ramm, AinoKuusinen, Ignati Reis and the most eminent intelligenceofficer of the 20th century, Konstantin Efremov. In 1936

Berzin transferred the Soviet military intelligence commandpost from Moscow to Madrid, where he carried out his mostnotable recruitments while he was working under cover,officially designated as chief military adviser to the Republi-can Government. [n order to sustain this cover story hisdeputies Uritski and Unshlikht carried out his duties inMoscow. On returning from Spain he continued to leadmilitary intelligence. On 13 May 1938 he was arrested andon 29 July he was shot.

U N S H L I K H T, I o s if Stanis lav ovich : 19 . 12.187 9 - 29.7 .1938.An hereditary Polish nobleman and an active member of thePolish (left-wing) Social-Democratic Party, he was one of

nB Appendix A

the leaders of the October Revolution. Immediately afterthe revolution he became a member of the NKVD college.He began the policy of state terror before Dzerzhinsky, andat one time he was considered by Soviet historians is the'first founder of the Tcheka' at the same time as Dzerzhinskywas considered the 'chief founder of the Tcheka'. A fervenisuppo.rter of the establishment of communism in poland,in 1920 he was a member of the ,polish RevolutionaryGovernment'. From l92l:3 he was deputy chairman of thiAll-Russian Tcheka and one of the fathers of the ,Red

Teiror'. From 1923 he was deputy head of the registrationdirectorate (GRU). In the interests of cover he constantlyfilled responsible posts in the Soviet Government and theRed Army. He travelled abroad several times with falsedocuments to organize illegal work in poland, Lithuania andGermany. In 1935-6 during Berzin,s absence he carried outthe duties of chief of the GRU although he remained in factonly deputy to Berzin. He was shot with Berzin in the celtarof the'Hotel Metropole'in Moscow.

Corps Commandcr IIRITSKI, Solomon petovich:1895-1937 was chief of the GRU during Berzin's absence.He was shot in the first wave of the Terror.

Commissar-General of State Security EZHOV, NikolaiIvanovich: 1895-190. A petty official who only joined theBolsheviks when it became clear that they had won, heoccupied iirsignifiihnt party posts in the provinces, but froml!27 Ezhov was in Stalin's personal secretariat. In 1930 hewas in charge of the Central Committee personnel Depart-ment and in 1935 Party Secretary, controller of NKVDwork. In 1936 he became Peoples' Commissar for JnternalAffairs and Commissar-General for State Security. In 1937-gthere began under his leadership the .great purge' whictlstarted as a purge of the NKVD and was then extended to

Appendix .A, 229

the army, the party and the entLe country . On 29 July 1938

there was a repeat purge of the GRU and, having liquidatedthe whole of the leadership and the operational stpff, he

took over its control, thus establishlng a monopoly of secret

activities in the state. From this moment on it would be

impossible for the activities of the GRU and NKVD to be

subject to reciprocal checking. However, the monopolyalarmed Stalin and 29 July saw the beginning of Ezhov'sdownfall. In October he was removed from his post. Hewas arrested in January 1939 and liquidated after atrocioustorture. According to unconfirmed data, he was buried alive

dt the NKVD sanatorium at Sukhanovo.One of the bloodiest careers in the history of mankind.

Ezhov was the shortest serving Chief 'of the GRU and

suffered the most painful death. The date of his death has

not been established with'certainty; there are grounds forthinking it could have been on 4 June 1940. There are also

grounds for believing that Ivan Serov, a future chief of theGRU, played a perscinal part in Ezhov's death.

Lieut-General of Aviation PROSKUROV, Ivan losifuvich: ?

-^J"'"l"lr{;"oing.sovietintelligenceoffi cerandfi ghterpilot,

he combined both these professions simultaneously. In1937-8 he served as a Soviet Military Adviser in Spain. Hetook part in air battles and shot down several enemy aircraft.At the same time he carried out a series of first-class

recruitments amongst internationalists of many countries and

assured a regular flow of military and military-technicalintelligence. On his return from Spain he became chief ofthe GRU, a post he occupied from the end of 1938 to July19,CI. He openly came out against the pact with Hitler. Onthe 4 July 1940 he was arrested, and the following day shotwithout trial.

230 Appendix A

Yyr:W of the Soviet Union GOLIKOV, Filipp lvanovich:16.7.1%A - 29.6.19ffi.He entered the Red Army as a volunteer in 191g and tookan active part in the suppression of anti-communist peasantriots on the staff of the 3rd Army Special punitive Biigades.After the civil war he commanded a regiment, bri'gade,division and corps. In September 1939 he iought in pilandas commander of the 6th Army. In 1940 he became the chiefof the GRU. After Hitler's invasion and the loss of contactwith the most important agent network he transferred the

, GRU command point from Moscow to London under theguise of the Soviet military mission. In October l94l hereturned to the USSR. He commanded an army, then afront. From April 1943 he was deputy to Stalin for RedArmy cadres, and, at the same time, from 1944 directedoperations against the Russian Liberation Army and ther.ur.l f9r, 1nd liquidation of, the leaders and those takingpart in the Russian anti-communist opposition. Golikov difacto directed the forcible repatriation and destruction ofmore than a million people who did not want to return tothe USSR. Golikov directed the post-war purge of the Army.When it was over he himself was remoued from all hisposts. He spent two years in prison, but by 1950 he wascommanding another army and, from 1956, he was AcademyChief. From 1958 he was head of the Chief political Directoi_ate of the Soviet Army and, simultaneously, Director of aParty Central Committee Department. Golikov agreed tobe Army Controller on the side of the party. In 196i he wasmade Marshal of the Soviet Union. In May 1962 he wasremoved from office without much rumpus oi scandal, how-ever. Golikov may be said to have had the most distinguishedcareer in the whole Soviet Army.

From July 1941 to htly 1942 Aleksei pavlovich PANFILOVwas Chief of the GRU. He was shot in I94Z.In 1942_3 the

Appendix A 231

GRU leadership was held by Ivan lvanovich ILICHEV. Hewas also shot.

Colonel-General KII ZN ETSOV, Fedor Fedotovich: 6.2. 1904

- 1979.

A country boy who came to Moscow and became a factoryworker, he quickly assessed the situation, joined the Partyand embarked on an meteoric career. By 1937 he was lstSecretary of the Proletarski district of Moscow, and in theheat of the great purge he showed exceptional cruelty. In1938 he was called up into the Army and appointed deputyhead of the Chief Political Directorate. He was an active

. participant in the army purge which included the GRU, andfrom 1943 he was chief of the GRU. On his appointmentStalin asked him whether he could be as good an intelligenceofficer as he had been earlier Party Controller of the Army.Kuznetsov's reply - '[s there any great difference?' - hasbecome proverbial. Kuznetsov at work demonstrateA tmtthere was no great difference between the cruel, bloodystruggle within the party and intelligence work. He was oneof the cruellest but also one of the most successful chiefs ofthe GRU. In 1943 he received the plans of operation'Citadel' (the German attack near Kursk) before General-Field Marshal E. von Manstein, whose duty it was toimplement those plans. Kuznetsov had a special role to playin the organization and carrying out of the great powen'conference in Teheran and, as a reward for his success inthis, received the rank of Colonel-General. In 1945 he playedan active part in the preparations and implementation of theYalta and Potsdam conferences and also penonally directedoperations to steal American atomic technology.

In 1948, at the height of the posr-war purges Stalinappointed Kuznetsov supreme Party Controller of the Army- Head of the Chief Political Directorate. He held this postright up to the time of Stalin's death, mercilessly purging the

232 Appendix A

Soviet Army of dissidents. After Stalin's death a slow declineset in, first to the post of Head of the Chief personnelDirectorate at the Ministry of Defence, then AcademyHead and, finally, Head of the Political Directorate of theNorthern Group of Forces. He retired in 1969.

General of the Army SHTEMYENKO, Sergei Matveevich:7.2.1907 -23.4.1976.Shtemyenko joined the Red Army as a volunteer. He com-pleted military training and two academy courses, and from1940 was on the General Staff. His rise was swift. In l943hewas head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staffand one of the principal Soviet military planners and theclosest to Stalin. He accompanied Stalin to the Teheranconference. He became chief of the GRU from April 1946,General of the Army and Chief of the General Staff fromNovember 1948. In June 1952, at the time of the squabblebetween Stalin and the Politburo he came out on Stalin'sside and was, by Politburo decree, stripped of all his posts,demoted to Lieut-General and despatched to command theVolga military district staff. In 1956, at Marshal Zhukov,sdemand, he was returned to Moscow, reinstated in his rankof General of the Army and re-appointed chief of the GRU.In October 1957 during the conspiracy against Zhukov, hecame out on Zhukov's side. Once again he was stripped of hisoffices, demoted to Lieut-General and sent off to command amilitary district staff. In June 1962 he was Chief of Staff forLand Forces. In 1968 his rank of General of the Army wasrestored and he was appointed First Deputy Chief of theGeneral Staff - Chief of Staff of the Warsaw pact. He wasstill in favour when he died.

Shtemyenko's career was feverish as rryell as resilient. Hewas put forward three times for the rank of Marshal of theSoviet Union, the first time at the age of forty-one, but he

Appendix A 233

never received the honour. He is considered to have been

the most energetic, erudite and merciless of all GRU chiefs.

General of the Army KURASOV, Vladimir Vasilievich:7.7.1897 -29.11.73.A Russian Army officer who went over to the side of thecommunists after the revolution. He served on various staffs,

and from 192[0 was deputy head of the General Staff Oper-ations Directorate. During the war he was Chief of Staff ofthe 4th Shock Army, and later a front. After the war he

was Commander-in-Chief of the Central group of forces inAustria. Promoted General of the Army, he was made chiefof the GRU in February 1949. In the same year he was

removed from this office and appointed Chief of the GeneralStaff Academy. From 195ffi1 he was Deputy Chief of theGeneral Staff. His career ran smoothly..It has been said

that, having accepted the GRU post and learning of the fateof all his predecessors Kurasov, on a specious pretext,declined the office and transferred to a less hazardous post.

This story is corroborated by several independent sources.

Marshal of the Soviet Union ZAKHAROV, MaweiVasilievich: 5. 8. I 898 - 3 1. 1. 1972.

Zakharov was in Petrograd in the First World War and

avoided being conscripted into the Army. He came outactively against the war, joined the Red Guard in April 1917

and stormed the Winter Palace. He then took part inthe suppression of anti-communist manifestations and heldunimportant posts in the Red Army. By 1936 he had workedhimself up to the command of a regiment. The great purgeopened up many vacancies, and in July 1937 Zakharov was

Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, and, fromMay 1938, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. During the

war he was Chief of Staff of the 9th Army and later front,and, after the war, Head of the General Staff Academy. He

234 Appendix A

became chief of the GRU in January 1949. In June 1952 afierce struggle broke out about convening the 19th partyCongress. The Politburo insisted, Stalin objected. The Chiefof the General Staff Shtemyenko, and the Chief of the GRUZakharov, supported Stalin and were dismissed from theirposts. After Stalin's death Zakharov,s fall continued, but inMay 1953 he was appointed Commander of the LeningradMilitary District and was able to hold on to this post. InOctober 1957 a struggle broke out between the pbfitburoand Marshal Zhukov. Zakharov was fully on the side ofthe Politburo and for this he was immediately appointedCommander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forcei in Ger-many. In 1959 he was made Marshal of the Soviet enion,and Chief of the General Staff in 1960. In 1963 he wasdismissed. He took an active part in the conspiracy againstKhruschev and, after the successful coup d'etai *is re-appointed Chief of the General Staff where he served up toSeptember lW - practically up to the time of his death.

Colonel-G eneral S HA LI N, Mikhail Atelcseevich waschief ofthe GRU from 1951-6 and from November 1957 toDecember 1958.

General of the Army SEROV, Ivan Alekseevich.An 9ffic11of military intelligence, at the time of the purgesof the GRU he managed not only to survive but also totransfer to work in the NKVD . On l2June 1937 he appearedin the capacity of executioner of Marshal Tukhachevski andother leading figures of the Red Army. Amongst all,theprotagonists of the terror he distinguished himself as themost fervent exponent of 'scenes or a massive scale,. Hetook part in the pursuit and liquidation of the inhabitants ofFstonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940 and in lS!17. Druluexists as to his personal involvement in the murder of thePolish officers in Katyn. During the war Serov was one of

Appendix A 235

the leaders of Smenh, and in August 1946 he personallytook part in the execution of the command of the RussianLiberation Army under Lieut-General Vlasov. Subsequentlyhe betrayed his leaders in Smersh and the NKGB, goingover in time to the camp of the victorious groups. Hedeserted Abakumov's group for that of Beria and betrayedhim (as did General Ivashutin - the present GRU leader).

' tn 1953 he was deputy chief of the GRU and one of theconspirators against Beria. After the fall of Beria, Serovbecame Chairman of the KGB. Together with AmbassadorAndropov he seized the leaders of the Hungarian revolutionby deceit and took part in their torture and execution. InDecember 1958 Serov became chief of the GRU. As an ex-KGB and Smersh officer he had many enemies in the GRU.Under Serovls leadership, corruption in GRU attained unbe-lievable proportions. ln 1962 he was dismissed and quietlyliquidated.

Serov's was the dirtiest career in the history of the GRU.He displayed a high degree of personal sadiim. The yearswhen Serov was chief of the GRU were also the mostunproductive in its history. It was the only period whenGRU officers voluntarily made contact with Western servicesand gave them much more valuable information than theytook from them.

General of the Army IVASHLITIN, peter lvanovitch:5.9.r9W-.A volunteer in the punitive formations of the Special purposeUnits, Ivashutin came into the Army counter-intelligencefrom 1931. During the war he held leading posts in Smersh.Even at this time [vashutin had powerful enemies in theNKGB. In 194/-5 he was chief of Smersh on the 3rdUkrainian Front and in that capacity waged a ferociousstruggle against the Ukrainian insurgent army and played anactive role in the establishment of communist order in

236 Appendk A

Bulgaria,'Yugoslavia and Hungary. It was at this time thathe first met Brezhnev, and in all subsequent activities thetwo men always supported each other. At the end of the warIvashutin took part in the forcible-repatriation of Sovietcitizens who did not want to return to the Soviet Union. Healso played a special part in the liquidation of soldiersand officers of the Russian Liberation Army. After thedisbandment of Smersh he managed to outlive its otherleaders by a timely transfer out of the Abakumov factioninto that of Beria. At Beria's downfall he went over to theSerov faction and was appointed head of the KGB 3rd ChiefDirectorate. He then took part in the arrest and liquidationof Serov. On Brezhnev's recommendation in 1963, Ivashutinwas appointed chief of the.GRU. Jn this position he had anumber of very serious confrontations with the KGB andpersonally with Andropov. However, Ivashutin deferrdedthe interests of the Army with more vigour than any of hispredecessors and, therefore, in spite of hi pastties with the KGB, enjoyed unlimited support from thefirst deputy chairman of the Council of Minisiers, the chair-man of the Military Industrial Complex Smirnov as well asMarshals Ustinov and Ogarkov. After Andropov,s comingto power Ivashutin held on to his post in view of powerfuisupport within the Army.

Appendix BThe GRU High Command and Leading

GRU Offi.cers

The following list gives names of the most prominent seniorGRU officers with their official titles where possible. This isfollowed by an alphabetical list of some of the knownoperational officers workirtg under cover around the world.

Army General IVASHUTIN, Petr Ivanovich: deputy chiefof the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Head ofGRU. Official pseudonyms'Tovarishch Mikhailov','DyadyaPetya'. The first pseudonym is also used in connection withall military intelligence.Col.General LEMZENKO, Kir Gavrilovich: GRU represen-tative in the Party Central Committee; 'Papa Rimski'.Col-General PAVLOV, Aleksandr Grigorevich: first deputychief of GRU.Admiral BEKRENEV: deputy chief of GRU.Col-General ZOTOV, Arkady Vasilievich: deputy chief ofGRU, head of lnformation.Col-General MESHCHERYAKOV, V. V.: deputy chief ofGRU, head of the Military Diplomatic Academy.Col-General IZOTOV, S. I.: head of GRU PersonnelDirectorate.Col-General SIDOROV, Y. I.

Lieutenant-G enerals and Vice Admirals (ap p roximately 20 )Lt-General DOLIN, G. I.: head of GRU PoliticalDepartment.

238 Appendix

Lt-General GURENKO, Vyacheslav Tikhonovich: head ofthe Illegals Training Centre.Lt-General Aviation SHATALOV, Vladimir Aleksandro-vich: GRU representative at the Cosmonaut TrainingCentre.Lt-General KOLODYAZHNY, Boris Gavrilovich: GRUdeputy chief for Internal Security.Lt-General MILSTEIN, Moshe: GRU deputy chief for Dis-information. A former illegal and author of top secretmanual Honourable Service. Codename 'Tovarishch M','Mikhail M.'.Lt-General KOSTIN P. T.: chief of GRU 3rdDirectorate.Lt-General Engineer PALIY A.: chief of GRUDirectorate.Lt-General GONTAR: dief of GRU 7th Directorate.Lt-General DRACHEV t. M.Lt-General KOZLOV M-: Chief of GRU 1lth (?)Directorate.Lt-Generdl BERKUTOV, S. : Information Service.Vice Admiral ROZHKO, Gennadi Aleksandrovich.

Major-Generals and Rear Admirals (approximately 125)Maj-General. Aviation CHIZHOV, Mikhail Teren-tyevich.Rear Admiral KALININ, Valeri Petrovich.Maj-General Aviation KUCHUMOV, Aleksandr Mik-hailovich.Maj-General SHITOV.Rear-Admiral KLYUZOV, Serafim Timofeevich.Maj-Ceneral BARANOV, Aleksandr Vasilievich.Maj-General LYALIN, Mikhail Ammosovich.Maj-General BEPPAEV S. U.: Chief of Intelligence ofGroup Soviet Forces in Germany.Maj-General Artillery LYUBIMOV, Viktor Andreevich.

Appendix B

Maj -General GONCHAROV, Gennadi Grigorevich.Maj-General KHOMYAKOV, Aleksandr Sergeevich.Rear Admiral KOZLOV, Andrei Nikolaevich.Maj-General MIKHAILOV, Boris Nikolaevich.Maj-General ZIMIN, Valentin Yakovlevich.Maj-General ANDRYANOPV, Y.: SpetsnazMaj-General Aviation MIKRYUKOV, L.Maj-General GLAZUNOV, N.Rear Admiral SMIRNOV, M.

Leading GRU OficersABRAMOV, Vladimir MikhailovichBAYLIN, Madimir IvanovichBELOUSOV, Mikolai MikhailovichBELOUSOV, Konstantin NikolaevichBLINOV, Boris AfanasyevichBARCHUGOVBORISOV, Gennadi AlekseevichBORODIN, Viktor MikhailovichBUDENNYBOROVINSKI, Petr FedorovichBUBNOV, Nikolai lvanovichBUTAKOV, Ilya PetrovichDEMIN, Mikhail AlekseevichDENISOV \DORONKIN, Kirill SergeevichEGOROV, Anatoli EgorovichERMAKOV, Aleksandr IvanovichERSHOV, Yuri AlekseevichEVDOKIMOV, Sergei VasilevichFEKLENKO, Vladimir NikolaevichFILATOV, AnatoliFILIPPOV, Anatoli VasilevichGENERALOV, Vsevolod NikolaevichGERASIMOV

239

(?)

6th

2N Appendix

KAPALKIN, Sergei VasilevichKASHEVAROV, Evgeni MikhailovichKOZYPITSKI, Gleb SergeevichLOVCHIKOV, Vasili DmitrievichLAVROV, Valeri AlecseevichLEMEKHOV, Dmitri AleksandrovichLOBANOV, Vitali IlichLOGINOV, Igor KonstantinovichMOROZOV, Ivan YakovlevichMYAKISHEV, Aleksei NikolaevichNEDOZOROV; Valentin ViktorovichNOSKOV Nikolai StepanovichOSIPOV, Oleg AleksandrovichPAVLENKO, Yuri KuzmichPETROV, Nikolai KirillovichPIVOBAROV, Boris Alekseevich '

POPOV, Gennadi FedorovichPOTAPENKO, Leonid TerentyevichPOTSELUEV, Evgeni AleksandrovichPUfiLIN, Mikhail SemenovichRATNIKOV, Valentin MikhailovichRADIONOV, Aleksandr Sergeevich

ROMANOV, Anatoli AleksandrovichRUBANOV, Aleksandr NikolaevichSALEKHOV, Yuri NikolaevichSAVIN, Viktor GrigorevichSELUNSKI, Valentin IvanovichSEMENOV, Aleksandr AleksandrovichSERGEEV, Yuri PavlovichSHEPELEV, Viktor PetrovichSHIPOV, Madilen NikolaevichSOKOLOV, Viktor AleksandrovichSTRELBITSKI, Vladimir VasilevichSTUDENIKIN, Ivan YakovlevichSUKHAREV, Georgi Nikolaevich

Appendix B

SUVOROV, Georgi BbrisovichUMNOV, Valentin AleksandrovichVETROV, Yuri PavlovichVILKOV, Boris NikolaevichVINOGRADOV, Feliks VasilevichVOLNOV, Vladimir GrigorevichVOLOKITIN, Vladimir IvanovichVOTRIN, Sergei IvanovichVYBORNOV, Ivan YakovlevichYAKUSHEV, Ivan IvanovichYURASOV, Viktor VladimirovichZHELANNOV, Vladimir MikhailovichZHEREBTSON, Aleksandr VasilevichZHERNOV, l,eonid AndreevichZHURAWEV, Ivan MikhailovichZOT OV, Viktor Nikolaevich

241

Aitpendix C

of money for documents from his place of work. He alsosought to find out details about othbr staff at the organizationwhere the Frenchman worked. Kulik was arrestid at themoment when he was about to receive from the Frenchmana document about a French weapon.

In February 1980 the Soviet Consul and No. 2 in Marseilleswas withdrawn. He had been detained by the French authori-ties between Toulon and Marseilles witli plans of the Mirage2000 fighter aircraft in his briefcase. They had just beenhanded to him by an agent.

Travkov had arrived in 1977. The area of Marseilles andthe Bouches du Rhdne contains many installations andobjects of defence interest. Travkov was officially concernedwith 'scientific subjects connected with the port and airport,,and these interests enabled him to meet people involvid inthe aeronautical field and to visit firms and installations.Travkov obtained copies of files on staff working on defencecontracts and used the details thus revealed to build up anetwork of informers. Four Frenchmen were taken intocustody at the time of Travkov,s arrest. Travkov had alsobeen interested in the twin-jet Mirage 4000 which used thesame engine as the 2000.

The Soviet Press Attachd declared the French action a'provocation by the police' but the documents were, ofcourse, genuine. A few days later Frolov, himself a KGBofficer, was required to leave France too. He had been inMarseilles for two years and had earlier had a posting toParis. His job, like Travkov's had given him opportunitiei tomeet all sorts of people and he had made the most ofit. Both Travkov and Frolov were personable, charmingindividuals who made many friends

Great BritainAnatoliy Pavlovich Zntov, the Soviet Naval Attach6 inLondon, was expelled in December l9B2 after trying to set

243

Appendix CSome Case Hislories of GRU Activities

Rather than sprinkling the text with examples t have puttogether a representative pample of GRU officers uncoveredin the course oI operations abroad, as reported in the press.The number of GRU officers caught and expelled and thenature of their activities is indicative of the power and scaleof rhe GRU.

.

Canada and the United StatesIn June 1980 the Canadians announced that they hadrequested the withdrawal of three Soviet officials from theEmbassy, Captain lgor A. Bardeev, Colonel E. I. Aleksan-jan and the chauffeur Sokolov. The case involved anunnamed individual employed in a sensitive position in theUSA, who had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy andbeen given the task of obtaining information. Soviet officialshad maintained clandestine contact with the American citi-zen over a period of some months.

FranceIn October 1979 the Naval and Air Attachd of the SovietEmbassy in France, Vladimii Kulik, was expelled from thecountry. He was an officer of the GRU working in Frenchmilitary circles and had been in contact with firms specializingin military supplies. ln 1979, at a reception in anotheremba$sy, he had met by chance a young Frenchmanemployed in the armaments department of an importantorganization who was carrying out studies on behalf of theMinistry of Defence. Kulik sought to maintain contact withthe Frenchman, and in due course offered him a large sum

244 Appendix C

up a network of agents to gather information about weaponssystems and electronic hardware used by the Royal Navyduring the Falklands campaign. His interests had .alsoextended to the Royal Navy's nuclear submarines.-

lapanA retired Japanese major-general, Yukihisa Miyanaga wasarrested in Tokyo in January 1980. He was a GRU agentwhose case officer at the time of his arrest was ColonelYuriy N. Koslov, Military and Air Attach6 at the SovietEmbassy. Miyanaga had been recruited as an agent in 1974by one of Koslov's predecessors. He was equipped with andinstructed in various means of clandestine communication,including particular ciphers for use with radio. Miyanagaand two other offioers of the Japanese Ground Self-DefenceForce were subsequently sentenced to long terms of impris-onment for passing military secrets to the GRU.

NonuayValeriy Moiseevich Mesropov served in Norway as an engin-eer with a Russian firm in Drammen, as a representative ofStankoimport, from 1fti8 to 1970. Mesropov, who was not a

diplomat, was arrested in 1970 on suspicion of intelligenceactivity and finally expelled from Norway for security reasonsin September 1970.

Igor Ivanovich Zashchirinsky served in Norway from 1974 tol9l7 as representative at the Soviet Trade Delegation of anumber of Soviet import/export organizations. He wasengaged on clandesiine operations to obtain information andproducts of a scientific./technical nature including materialclassified as Top Secret. He too was declared persora nongrata on28 January 1977.

:

In June 1983 Lt-Colonel Zagrebnev was expelled from

Appendix C 245

Norway. He was Military Attach6 at the Embassy in Oslo,and had visited a military area in the north of Norway,where he had attempted to bribe a Norwegian officer tohand over secret information.

Spain(ileg Churanov, Director of Aeroflot in Madrid, was arrestedin February 1980, accused ofespionage for the Soviet Llnion.His case was part of another_expulsion of six officials whohad already left. It was alleged that Churanov had boughtplans of certain aviation electronic equipment. The .seller'

was a member of the Spanish Secret Services who purportedto be a member of a Spanish firm. Churanov was an engineerwho had been Aeroflot representative in Canada beforecoming to Spain. He was very popular with staff and pilotsat Madrid airport where he had shown interest in radiofrequencies and the security regulations at the airport. Hehad also tried, on one occasion, to get a Sphnish pilot tointroduce him into the American airport at Tarrejon. TheSpanish security authorities themselves claimed that Chu-ranov was a member of the GRU

In May -1982 the Aeroflot Director in Spain was againexpelled for spying, this time with another official. VasiliyFedorin and Vladimir Tertishnikov were accused of trying toobtain information on the supply of US military materials toSpain and on Spanish weapons manufacturen.

Sweden

In March 1979 Stig Bergling, a Swedish police inspector andreserv_e officer, was arrested in Israel. He had been an agentof the GRU for some ten years. In January 1969 he hadbegun service with the Police Board, and from 1971-5 wasgiven leave of absence to serve in the Defence Ministry andto do duty with the UN.

246 Appendix C

Bergling had access to information about security policepersonnel and counter-espionage organizations; and aboutdefence establishments and Swedish defence plans. He wasequipped with radio to receive messages from the GRU,and also made use of micro-dots. He kept in touch with hiscase officers in a number of countries, particularly in theMiddle East, having been trained in East Berlin.

Index

Abakumov 47, 48Abwehr 14Aeroflot

GRU predomi nance in 1224Agent communications

alternative meetings l5G7brush contacts 158damaged by GRU defections

155dead-letter boxes 161-5, 170emergency meetings 157-8non-personal 155, 159

,personal 155-6radio 15!61routine meetings 156schtchit films l7Osecret rendezvous l5&9signals l6i{

Agent recruiting 35-{, 13}41candidates for recruitment

14041crash approach 141-2exhibition recruitment 144,7for operational intetligence

187-9gradual ap_Droach 141, 1424main duty of GRU officers

l1rt6, t26-7methods of illegals' 147-8problem of 'walk-in' volunteers

148-54Agent work in practice 167

acquisition of secrets l7!5organization of agent groups

t7t-2segregation of agents from

embassies 167,16&70stealing military hardware, 174,

t76

training and control ofindependent agents 170

transport of heavy equipment1754

use of diplomatic mail 175use of scfttcftr', films 170

Agentsagent recruiters 133couriers 134-5defined 131documentation agents 133-4executive agents 132-3friends of Soviet Union l3G8groups of 171-2head agents 131-2legalisers 133safe address owners 135safe house oi flat owners 135sources 132

Amsterdamundercover residencies 128, lZ9

Andropov, Yuri7l,72APN 12,124Aralov, Simon lvanovich 25-6,

69,22frbecomes first head of GRU 25establishes GRU opposition to

army and Tcheka}G7Atomic bomb

Soviet intelligence and 93, 141

Beria, Lavrenti 46,47executed 48

Berzin, Yan Karlovich 22G7' deceptions as head of GRU

3!40directs liquidation of NKVD

'illegals'40

248 Index Index 249

purged 41-2Brezhnev, tronid 50, 91

Canadaexpulsion of Soviet spies222,

242'7-aia'residency 45

Carter, Pres. James 68Central Committee of CPSU 11,

32,36-40 passim 69-70, 89,94, 105, 114, 137, 151, 152,ts3, t99,205

control of press 124control of Soviet embassies

tt2-13plans'Great Terror'of 1930s 39

Cherepovetski Higher MilitaryEngineering School forCommunications 203, 204

CIA 90Comintern 28,28n,41

recruitment of agents by 36Committee of Information (KI)

&7.iCommunist Party of SU 36,48,49

Political Department 18role in ruling triumvirate 17-19

C.oncorde 59, 1z16

Council of Ministers 11, 59

Deadletter boxes 16l-6, 170

Dzerzhinsky 23

Ezhov, Nikolai lvanovich 22&9becomes head of GRU ,lO

becomes head ofboth GRU andNKVD 42

purge of NKVD by, late 1930s

&.

purged 42

Franceexpulsion of Soviet spies222,

242-3GRU activity in2A-3

Frunze Military Academy 181,t82,203,205

Genevaundercover residencies 129

General Staff Academy 203,205George Washington, USS 59Germany, West

GRU residencies in 149, 186recruitment of US sergeant as'

Soviet agent in 149-50Soviet intelligence infiltration

t867Gestapo 14,37,38Golikov, Marshal Filipp Ivanovich

50,90, 230becomes head of GRU, 1940 43

made commander of 10th Army44

organizes return of unwillingRussians after SWW,14-5

restores GRU's foreignnetwork, l94l 4U

Gosplan 59Great Britain

expulsion of Soviet spies 222,24y4

GRU activity in24!4'Great Terror'of 1930s 3942Grechko, Marshal 64GRU Centre 73-7, ll9, 172, 220

command point 74, 85organizational units 75, 77ranks in 52,54,75,77use of independent agents 170

GRU (Chief Intelligence. Directorate of General StafQ

ix,9, 19, 65anonymity of fi-62anti-Semitism in choice of

officers 213'basic function 454, 66-7brief 25control of operational

intelligence 171, ls9lcosmic or space intelligence 52,

82. 83-4. 179

deceived by American majorover'atomic' shell 150-54

directorates and directions7&-82, 8t-9 passim, 9L6, 177

discovers US work on atomicbomb 92-3, 140

eligibility for 2lll4enmity for KGB 69-72foreign expulsions of officers

221,222,242-5 passimgeneral opposition to army and

KGB2G7High Command23T-9history of:.foundation 13, 25;

creation of first agent network27-8; early failures andsuccesses 2F30; purged byLenin, 192o 32; agents abroadin 1920s 32; Wst-1927blossoming 33-4;embarrassed over Germancommunist agents 3G7;shoots German agents atbehest of Gestapo 38; purgesNKVD overseas, 193F639q0; destroyed by purges,late 1930s 4041; penetratesGerman and Allied staffs,SWW ,l4; 'strategic' and'operational' divisions inSWW 45; forms diversionaryelements in SWW '16;destruction of foreignintelligence network, SWW167-8; sets up receivingcentre in Sweden, SWW 168

information command point8H

'Intelligence Summary' 88interests compared with KGB's

66-8leading officers 239-41military attach6s as officers of

124-6military-economic role 67military-political role 67

military role 67military+echnological role 67opposition to recruiting sons of

officers 207-8privileges of officers 21,t-16processing organs 8!93procuremcnt organs 7&{2relation with military indusrial

commission 5&9rule about appointment of head

27,69safety measure of producing

'grey' intelligence 90-91Scientific Research Institute 170

'shopping list' for secrets, early1930s 3}.4

subordinate organizations 51-5support services 9zl-.-7

system of recruitment andrunning of agents established35

training 20!13'unit 44388' classification 13-14,

60use of American electronics 90use of specialists 89

Guryenko, Lt-Gen. V. T. l0l, 103

Gusenko, Igor 155

Hague, theundercover residency 128

Hamburgabandoned dead-letter box in

162Higher Military Naval School of

Radio Electronics 203Hitler, Adolf ,14

supplies Soviet Union withGerman planes 37-8

Hollanddivision of undercover

residencies in 128expulsion of Soviet spy 272

'Illegals' 37 ,79, 144agent legalisers 133

2s0 Index Index 251

agent recruiting methods 147-8ages of l(bcontrol of lUL, ll0cover stories 107-8defined 101deputy resident for 114-15husband and wife 104-5residencies 35, 110, 169, l7O,

172selection 103settling abroad 107stages of journey to foreign

destination 105, 106suitable type of employment for

108-10training 10}{Training Centre 101, 103,203

Ilichev, I. I. 231Information Institute 85, 86, 87,

89Intelligence directorates 52-3,

7&*82,8*9 passim, 177amiy 177, 178duplication amorig 87foreign areas covered by 184-{navy 17&9support services 94-5

Intouristas branch of KGB 124

Ivashutin, Gen. Petr Ivanovich 71,72,2354

becomes head of GRU 50Izvestia 12,124

JapanGRU activity in 244

Kashierski Electric Power Station38

KGB (Ministry of State Security)9,12, t4,55, 58, s9, 60, 61,62,65

basic function 66, 112control of consulates 122embassy guards 121

enmity for GRU 47-50, 69-72

foreign expulsion of officers 222'illegal'network 101

interests compared with GRU'stu8

military Institute for training2M

iretwork in Turkey 186, 187netwoik on W. Germany 186role in ruling triunrvirate 17-19safety measure of supplying

'grey' intelligence 9G91sons of officers welcomed in

2M,207,.2MSpecial Dilartment 18undercover residencies lll, 129

Kiev Higher Military CommandSchool 203, 205

Konyev, Marshal 64Kruschev, Nikita 49', 91

reveals past Soviet crimes 6lKulikov, Marshal 64Kurasov, Gen. V. V.'233Kusinien, Otto 12, 28Kuznetsov, Col-Gen. F.F. 231-2

Lenin x, xii, xiii, 10, 11,12, 13,23,24,30,31,32,61,91

allows formation of GRU 24,25

policy of 'divide and rule'exemplified 11-13

purges GRU, 1920 32

Malenkov, Georgi 39Marseilles

undercover residencies 129Military Academy 205,2MMilitary College of Supreme

Covt223Military-Diplomatic Academy of

the Soviet Army 182,203as'military unit 35576' 208courses 212-13faculties 210-l Ilocation 209organization 210

post-graduate school 213secrecy about mF9,2l2sub-faculties 210

Military district intelligenceservices 32-3,35

destroyed in late 1930s purges41-2

Military industrial commission5G9 passim

Military Institute of ForeignLanguages 183, 203, 212-13

exclusivity of. ?.W7Military Signals Academy 203Ministry of Defence 56, 199,m7Ministry of Foreign Affairs 112,

tst,2t9Ministry of State Security, see

KGBMinistry of the Interior 12Molotov, V. M.,t6Montreal

undercover residencies 129Moscow

'Aquarium'73Gogol Boulevard 49Institute of Cosmic Biology 73Khodinka field 73Narodnogo Opolchenia Street

2@restrictions on residence

permits 214Mrachkovslii, Jacob

espionage activities 30Muravev, M. A.22

NATO 88, 199Soviet information directorate

concerned with 86, 88Naval Academy 181,203New York

undercover residencies lti3, 129Nikonov, A. M.226NKVD (People's Commissariat

for Internal Affairs) 10, 13,37,39,61

diversionary elements in SWW46

overseas organs purged byGRU, r93H 39-40

purges. army and destroysGRU, late 1930s 4l

Norwayexpulsion of Soviet spies 244GRU activity in2,l4

OBHSS (fraud squad) 12OGPU 34oil

Soviet'l.ocomotive Report' on86

Operational intelligence 177army 177-8, l8l-3, 184, 186co-ordination of l9O-91difficulty of defection, 189navy 179*81, 184officers' limited knowledge of

organization 189-90recruiting methods 187-8Soviet foreign coverage 184-7tactical reconnaissance contlol

2N

Panfilov, A. P. 230Paris

undercover residency 129Peking

impossibility of recruitingagents in 217

Penkovsky, Col. Oleg 155Politburo,l8, 49, 70, E8

secret of power lFll, t2, 13Pravda 12,124Proskurov, Gen. I. I. U,43,178,

229Putna, Corps Commander 4l

Rabkhin (People's Control) 12, 13Radio Intelligence \egiment 182Radio-Technical Intelligence

Regiment 182Rado, Sandor 28Ramm, Karl 28

253252

Reconnaissance battalions 54, .

20['2Asabotage companies 54See abo Tactical reconnaissance

'Red Eye'missile 59'Red Orchestra' organization 168,

169Rikov, A. I. 10Russo-Finnish War 1939-40 42Ryazan Higher Parachute School

203,205-4

Safe address 135-6Safe house or flat 135SALT talks 87Satellite countries

military intelligence seryices 55military subordination to Soviet

Union 63-5Second Kharkov Higher Military. Aviation and Engineering

School 183, 203Serov, Gen. Ivan Alekseevich

23+5becomes head of GRU 50

Serpukhovski Higher CommandEngineering School 2O4

Shalin, Col.-Gen. M. A.234Shkiriatov 39Shtemyenko, Gen, Sergei

Matveevich m,X2-3becomes head of GRU 48disgraced 195248made Chief of Staff of Warsaw

Pact 64survivability 49, 50

Slutski,l{)Sorge, Richard 28, 109Soviet Army

lcavalry of special assignments'21-2

development of fronts 21-2early intelligence development

20-25fronts become military districts,

1920 16

General Staff liquidated, late1930s 32-3

hampered by lack ofintelligence in Russo-FinnishWar,1939-40 42

judgement of seniority in 75'Military Opposition' defeated,

1919 26-7organization 52, 54, 177, 178role in ruling triumvirate 17-19state of readiness 54strength on land 202

Soviet Arm/ Academy, see: Military-DiplomaticAcademy of the Soviet Army

Soviet army intelligencedirectorates 177-8, 18H

agent intelligence control 181departments of 53electronic intelligence control

182information control 182Intelligence Department of

Army Staff 183Interpreters' Group 183reconnaissance control 181, 183Spetsnaz control 182Technical Facilities Group 183

Soviet merchant navyGRU predominance in 124

Soviet navy and fleets 52cosmic intelligence department

179intelligence 83-4, 178-81organization 53,17&-9

Soviet Union'clean'diplomats l1l, 112, l13,

130concentration on military

expenditure 57-8duplication of government

organs I l-14establishment of organs of

enforcement 9-10gold supplies for espionage 29,

33

post-1927 military development33-4

post-1945 politicalmanoeuvrings 4G8

press 12,124racialism in 215restrictions on moving house

214ruling triumvirate 17-19shortage of grain 176, 223totalitarian misuse of

intelligence 90-92Space programme

in parallel with American 89Spain

expulsion of Soviet spies 245GRU activity in 245

Spanish Civil War,l0International Brigades 41

Spetsnaz units 184brigades 193, 195, 196department controlling 182detachments l9l, 193development 22directed against Turkey 187directed against W. Germany

t'u6-7,195information collection role 196naval brigades 182,193of army intelligence

departments 53, 54, 182of Army Staff 183of intelligence directorates 52-3photographic analysis in 197-8residency guards 121sabotage role 193, 195, l!),6'sleeping'agents l9lstaffcompanies 195-6training schools 203, 205,

210-ttStalin, Josef 10, 18,39, 42,43,44,

91,93blindness to German invasion

plans,1941 43,90,91-2death, 1953 48hands German communists to

Hitler 38

Index

post-SWW attempts to weakenarmy and KGB 4G7

struggle with Politburo, 195248Stigga, Oskar Ansovich 226Support services

Administrative/TechnicalDirectorate 95

archives 96-7ciphering 96Communications Directorate

9frfinance 70, 96OperationaUTechnicat

Directorate 95passports and documents 95-6Personnel Directorate 94-5Political Department 94

SwedenGRU activity in?/,S-$

Switzerland'Dora' residency 45

Tactical reconnaissance Z)G2control of 200deep reconnaissance 201electronic reconnaissance

companies 201reconnaissance battalions 54,

20/J,202reconnaissance companies 200,

2ot,2A2,Tank Warfare Academy 212Tass 12, 124,151Tokyo

easy to recruit agents in 217-18:Irade Representation

GRU and KGB officers in 124Training 203

educational institutions 203-14passim

first period of2034getting into Military Academy

zm-sTrotsky, Lron 31, 32

tries to restore army intelligence23,24

Index

254 Index

Tukhachevski,Marshal40 Unshlikht, 1.5.39,227-8Tupolev TU144 ('Concordski') Uritski, S. T. 39, 40,41

copies from Concorde 146 USAcrashes at k Bourget 7l GRU activity in 242

Turkeyexpulsion of Soviet spy 221soviet intetligen"" in'n1tiifron v',T*k-11,'-11,28, 6t, 62,86,187 :[:llll'ilil.i];?l,l,"rf,u"n..

Uboreevich, den. 4l staff.'.1919 27

ulyanov Guards Higher Tank "p,pj:ili:1-t^t Titlt"ryCommand Sctrdbl ZOa intelligence units 22

Undercover residencies 35, plrges GRU' 1920 3l-2lll_l4,l7, shoots E. Front intelligence

co-optedpersonnell2g-30 .,^.-l:itt;l?l:^22covei duties of staff 121-5 LutTtft'.t: 1'^zzdeputy residents 11rt-15, 125-6 voysnrnsKr Jv

example ofl27-Bgoing'illegal'in emergency Wanaw Pact 63, 64

172-3 Washington, DChierarchy in 125-6 dead-letter box exposed by'illegal' 35, 1lO,169,172 squirrels 163-4occasional division of l2&-9operational officers 115-16, 126operationat technicat group 120 J:g:-"L': 1lpint-sww in Allied c-ounthes ilfll;ffil;,franhar o+168-9radiohipher offi cer ttilt8, t26, Y:fitl"lbc"".

to- 127

radlo monitoring station officersllY20 Zakharov, Marshal M.y.2334

resident in 114-15, 125,141, Zhdanov 39219-20 Zhukov, Marshal 46

security guards 121 becomes Minister of Defence 49staff l 12, 1 13;14 increased power of army undertechnical personnel l2O-21 49technical services (TS) officer removed for'bonapartism'

1l&19 49-50

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