Special Warfare · 2011. 3. 28. · Special Warfare As the special-operations forces of the United States adapt to an ever-changing environment, some of their activities and operations

Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–99–2 Spring 1999 Vol. 12, No. 2

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

As the special-operations forces of theUnited States adapt to an ever-changingenvironment, some of their activities andoperations must also change. The articlesin this issue of Special Warfare discuss thedirections, or azimuths, that some of thosechanges are taking.

But even in time of change, some thingsshould remain the same. In developing aforce for the future, we must find bedrockon which to build. For the U.S. Army, thatbedrock is a set of seven values:

Loyalty — Bear true faith and allegianceto the U.S. Constitution, the Army,your unit, and other soldiers;

Duty — Fulfill your obligations;Respect — Treat people as they should be

treated;Selfless Service — Put the welfare of the

nation, the Army, and your subordi-nates before your own;

Honor — Live up to all the Army values;Integrity — Do what’s right, legally and

morally;Personal Courage — Face fear, danger, or

adversity (physical or moral).These values are essential, but they

must be learned. As trainers, we must dis-cuss the values with our soldiers so thatthey will understand them. As leaders andmentors, we must exemplify the values sothat our soldiers will believe in them.

In this issue, we are publishing the firstof a series of articles that illustrate theArmy values as practiced by members ofSOF. The articles will show that the Armyvalues are more than words — values, too,are azimuths, and they can guide us in dif-ficult, dangerous and uncertain situations.

To initiate the series, I have chosenRoger Donlon, the first Special Forces sol-dier to win the Medal of Honor. His story isparticularly appropriate because it demon-strates moral courage and the trust andrespect among members of Special Forcesteams.

At the Special Warfare Center and School,we are working to establish the core pur-pose and the core values of Special Forces.This is a vital endeavor that must be accom-plished if we are to remain a relevant forcein the future. The SF core values will rein-force, not replace, the Army values. The factthat SOF operate in isolation, far from tra-ditional command and control, only makesit more imperative that we embrace theArmy values.

SOF soldiers have always exemplifiedthe best qualities of the service, and wemust ensure that they will exemplify thevalues we consider essential for success. Inthe years ahead, special operations mayinvolve traditional SOF missions, separat-ing warring factions and restoring order,evacuating civilians, delivering humani-tarian assistance or fighting battles. Theseoperations will require soldiers who havethe same character, moral courage andfirm will as those who have distinguishedthemselves in the past.

Major General Kenneth R. Bowra

Features2 Unconventional Assisted Recovery: Providing

the Doctrinal Frameworkby Staff Sergeant Michael McCrann

12 Humanitarian Demining Operations: Relieving Human Suffering Worldwideby Sergeant First Class Paul Clarke

16 SOF Initiatives in Demining: The Bosnian Entity ArmyTraining Centersby Captain Brian S. Petit

22 The Trek: Critical Event in SF Officer Trainingby Lieutenant Colonel Charles King

25 Army Values: Personal Courage

26 Scud Hunting: Theater Missile Defense and SOFby Captain John M. Clearwater

36 Mentoring: Critical Assistance for the SOF Communityby Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

39 Unconventional Warfare: Refining the Definitionby Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael J. Ivosevic

40 The Liaison Coordination Element: Force Multiplier for Coalition Operationsby Captain Chadwick W. Storlie

Departments47 Letters

48 Officer Career Notes

51 Enlisted Career Notes

52 Foreign SOF

54 Update

56 Book Reviews

PB 80–99–2 ContentsSpring 1999 Special Warfare Vol. 12, No. 2

Commander & CommandantMajor General Kenneth R. Bowra

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorSylvia W. McCarley

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Automation ClerkGloria H. Sawyer

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the Worldwide Web(www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Dennis J. ReimerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. HudsonAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

05264

Headquarters, Department of the Army

As our country’s military capabilitiesare increasingly employed in mili-tary operations other than war, or

MOOTW, failure to recover United Statesmilitary personnel lost during these opera-tions can have profound consequences onthe political-military situation. Personnelrecovery, or PR, reduces the enemy’sexploitation of captured personnel.

The U.S. Special Operations Command,or USSOCOM, is the only combatant com-mand with responsibility under Title 10,U.S. Code (Subsection 167, paragraph f),for recovery operations. With their opera-tional expertise and special equipment,U.S. special-operations forces, or SOF, canbe used in areas where the enemy airthreat or ground threat prevents conven-tional recovery, or in situations wherepolitical sensitivities call for clandestinerecovery.

The general concept of using SOF in PRoperations is to link the survivor with arecovery force as soon as possible and tomove the individual to an area underfriendly control. When properly tasked,SOF may be able to pre-position a recoveryforce in areas where the threat of losswould be too great for conventional recov-ery forces.

In 1995, USSOCOM’s Strategic PlanningGuidance specifically addressed PR:

“The level of effort trend for PR is steady. …Special operations forces (SOF) will havevarying degrees of responsibility across all

subtasks. USSOCOM must study the poten-tial role of SOF in the subareas of new PRdefinitions, as well as evolving require-ments such as PR in urban environments.”

In February 1998, the Assistant Secre-tary of the Army for Manpower andReserve Affairs, in coordination with theArmy Deputy Chief of Staff for Operationsand Plans, designated the Army SpecialOperations Agency as the point of contactfor unconventional PR policy issues, anddesignated the U.S. Army John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center and School, orUSAJFKSWCS, as the proponent forunconventional PR. USAJFKSWCS Pub525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recov-ery, from which this article is taken, formsthe basis for understanding the uniquecontribution that unconventional assistedrecovery, or UAR, makes to PR. The publi-cation provides a doctrinal framework forUAR operations as they pertain to the exe-cution of PR. It also describes the role, mis-sion tasks, capabilities, limitations andUAR employment techniques of U.S. Armyspecial-operations forces, or ARSOF.

By the year 2003, the U.S. Department ofDefense, or DoD, plans to have a fully inte-grated PR architecture that is capable ofrecovering designated personnel world-wide through military actions. Designatedpersonnel include U.S., allied and coalitionpersonnel; friendly military and paramili-tary forces; and other personnel, as direct-ed, who are in danger of isolation, belea-

2 Special Warfare

Unconventional Assisted Recovery: Providing the Doctrinal Framework

by Staff Sergeant Michael McCrann

guerment, detention or capture as a resultof hostile or nonhostile action. DoD’s PRarchitecture will also complement therecovery of personnel through diplomaticactions or other means.

BackgroundRecovery of isolated personnel has

always been a DoD priority. Yet prior to1994, there had been little PR guidancefrom the Office of the Secretary of Defense.Each service conducted its own search-and-rescue operations in accordance withits assigned functions. The services, as wellas the Coast Guard, were directed to con-sider each other’s capabilities and to con-duct joint combat-search-and-rescue, orCSAR, operations when required.

In September 1994, the Deputy Secretaryof Defense tasked the Joint Staff and theAssistant Secretary of Defense for SpecialOperations and Low-Intensity Conflict, orASD-SO/LIC, to review existing PR policies,requirements and capabilities. Their reviewrevealed that there was no single proponentfor the PR mission and that unified com-manders were often forced to divert person-nel and equipment from other missions tomeet their PR requirements.

On May 30, 1996, Congress passed theDefense Missing Persons Act of 1996. Withthe implementation of the act, policy pro-ponency for PR was realigned from ASD-SO/LIC to ASD-International SecurityAffairs. In this capacity, ASD-ISA coordi-nates DoD’s PR policy with the director ofoperations for the Joint Staff and with des-ignated executive agents.

The Defense Planning Guidance, or DPG,issued by the Secretary of Defense, detailsU.S. policy, articulates strategic objectives,and reflects the national military strategy.The DPG for fiscal years 2000-2005 con-tains several references to PR. The mostsignificant statement reads:

“A robust personnel recovery capabilitycontributes directly to protecting the U.S.forces. DoD should continue to develop afully integrated personnel recovery archi-tecture. To ensure that the DoD meets thisgoal, emphasis on PR must continue toincrease throughout the force. DoD must

broaden coordination among its compo-nents and establish and enhance coopera-tive ties with the interagency communityon PR matters. The Services must providethe commanders in chief (CINCs) sufficientequipment and trained personnel to con-duct PR operations effectively. The CINCsmust include PR in their operational plan-ning and joint training program andensure adequate PR-capable personnel andequipment are available to support contin-gency plans.”

Likewise, the 1997 Contingency Plan-ning Guidance, or CPG, directs combatantcommanders to “include personnel recov-ery planning in all operations and contin-gency plans.” The CPG is the principalsource document for the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan, or JSCP. With its cover-age of PR, the CPG ensured the incorpora-tion of PR into the JSCP. The latest Strate-gic Intelligence Review for Support to Mili-tary Operations, or SIRSMO, also address-es PR. Inclusion of PR in this documentindicates that the intelligence communitywill resource PR with a high priority. Thediscussion of PR in all four documents bol-sters efforts to develop and staff a DoD

Spring 1999 3

Personnel recovery is anumbrella term that in-cludes all military andcivilian efforts to recovercaptured, missing or iso-lated personnel.

Coast Guard photo

vision for PR and provides justification tocombatant commands to ensure either thatsufficient PR-dedicated and PR-capableassets are present in-theater or that theywill be immediately available.

Personnel recoveryPersonnel recovery is an umbrella term

that encompasses all military, civilian andpolitical efforts to recover captured, miss-ing or isolated personnel from hostile ordenied territory. PR efforts include searchand rescue; CSAR; survival, evasion,resistance and escape, or SERE; evasionand escape, or E&E; and the coordinationof negotiated or forcible recovery. PR alsoincludes attempts to communicate withisolated persons and to build up theirmorale during captivity. PR occurs primar-ily through military actions; however, non-governmental actions and diplomaticactions can also play an important role. Insome cases, a combination of all threeactions will be used.

Five specific tasks must be performed

during each PR incident: reporting, locating,supporting, recovering, and repatriating.

Reporting. Actions performed to reportall incidents, using required PR report for-mats; preparing additional reports asdirected by the joint search-and-rescuecenter, or JSRC, and by the joint-force com-mander, or JFC; and recording all informa-tion received about a given incident.

Locating. Actions performed to locate anisolated person and to pass information tothe appropriate organizations for coordina-tion and action.

Supporting. Actions performed once theisolated person has been located, andactions performed to support the isolatedperson’s family during a PR incident.

Recovering. Coordinating all efforts torecover the isolated person. Recovery effortsmay employ any of the capabilities availableand acceptable to the National CommandAuthorities, or NCA. Recovery operationsare classified as either assisted or unassist-ed. In an assisted recovery, assistance is pro-vided by an outside source.

4 Special Warfare

A Navy MH-53 helicopterhovers over the wreck-age of the aircraft thatcrashed carrying Com-merce Secretary RonBrown, near Dubrovnick,Croatia, in 1996.

Photo by Kyle Davis

Repatriating. Efforts to return recoveredpersons to their previous way of life or toreturn their remains to the next of kin.

The five PR tasks represent the core ofDoD support and recovery of isolated per-sons. They are critical to the success of PRoperations, but three other factors — indi-vidual training, support agencies andrecovery methods — are also relevant.

Individual training. Individuals who areat risk of becoming isolated must have ade-quate preparation to support their ownrecovery. Preparation includes training onpolicy, on force structure, and on opera-tional concepts.

Support agencies. Support agencies pro-vide functional expertise specifically relat-ed to the support and recovery of isolatedpersons. Agencies supporting PR includethe Central Intelligence Agency; DefenseIntelligence Agency; National SecurityAgency; National Reconnaissance Office;National Imagery and Mapping Agency;Department of State, or DoS; and Depart-ment of Transportation.

Recovery methods. Peacetime recoverymethods include search and rescue, orSAR; diplomatic solutions worked out byDoS, U.S. embassies, and host nations; andthe employment of UAR in uncertain ornonpermissive environments. During war,conventional CSAR is normally employedwhen the enemy air-defense threat is atthe medium level or below. UAR support-ing U.S. operations may involve SOF, othergovernment agencies, indigenous person-nel or other foreign nationals. It may alsomake use of various combinations of thosegroups. SOF resources can be used for UARwhen the threat is above the medium level.However, the use of SOF requires deliber-ate planning and preparation, and plan-ners should decide carefully where andwhen to employ SOF’s specialized recoverycapability.

Planners should also remember that thegreater the risk, the more time it will taketo prepare for the recovery operation. Nor-mally, PR decisions are reached as expedi-tiously as possible. It is extremely impor-tant that the SOF component of a jointforce provide the theater special-opera-tions command’s UAR options to the JSRC

in a timely manner. The SOF componentcontinuously coordinates with the JSRC toensure the correct employment of SOF inthe UAR role. Because many aspects ofUAR are sensitive in nature or involvecompartmented information, they mayrequire direct coordination with the JSRCdirector or deputy director. SOF represen-tatives at the JSRC work for the com-mander of the special-operations com-mand, or SOC. The SOC rescue-coordina-tion center, or RCC, facilitates the coordi-

nation and exchange of informationbetween the JSRC and SOF recoveryforces, as appropriate, to prevent duplica-tion of the PR effort.

TerminologyThe following definitions clarify common

PR terminology:Evasion and escape: The procedures and

operations that enable military personneland other selected individuals to emergefrom enemy-held or hostile areas to areasunder friendly control. E&E is an integralcomponent of unconventional warfare, orUW. UW organizations, tactics, techniquesand procedures are essential in developinga manned recovery mechanism.

Evasion and escape net: The organiza-tion within an enemy-held or hostile areathat receives, moves and/or exfiltrates mil-itary personnel or selected individuals.E&E nets have a cellular structure; theymove personnel by clandestine meansthrough enemy-held or hostile areas toareas under friendly control. When devel-oping an E&E net, a Special Forces teamcreates preplanned evasion-and-escaperoutes that will allow the operational ele-

Spring 1999 5

SOF resources can be used for UAR when thethreat is above the medium level. However, theuse of SOF requires deliberate planning andpreparation, and planners should decide care-fully where and when to employ SOF’s spe-cialized recovery capability.

ment to depart the area undetected.Evasion and recovery, or E&R: The full

spectrum of coordinated actions carried outby evaders, recovery forces and operationalrecovery planners to return isolated per-sonnel to friendly control. E&R can be con-ducted with or without assistance, as theresult of planned operations, as the resultof evader or escapee actions, or by conven-tional or unconventional recovery forces.

Recovery mechanisms, or RMs: DoD In-struction 2310.3, Personnel RecoveryResponse Cell, defines an RM as “that enti-ty, group of entities, or infrastructure inenemy-held or hostile areas that isdesigned to receive, support, move, and/or

exfiltrate military or other designated per-sonnel to friendly control.” The RM infra-structure consists of personnel, specializedequipment and facilities. RMs may beestablished by SOF, other governmentagencies, UW forces, insurgent groups orclandestine organizations.

Recovery operationsRecovery operations fall into two cate-

gories: conventional and unconventional.Recovery planning should evaluate avail-able assets and projected conditions todetermine the most effective operation touse.

Conventional recovery operations. Con-ventional recovery operations, which useconventional aerial, surface and subsur-face military forces, may be of three types:

• Search and rescue (available on-scene).Conventional recovery assets can be drawnfrom appropriately equipped air, ground ornaval forces that happen to be on-scene,even though they may not be trained in

combat recovery. In some cases, recoverytasking can originate at the lowest organi-zational level that is aware of the situationand that can react quickly. In all cases, therecovery effort should be coordinated withthe JSRC that monitors ongoing andplanned recovery operations.

• Combat search and rescue. CSAR is aspecific task to recover distressed person-nel during wartime or during MOOTW.Joint Publication 3-50.2; JP 3-50.21, Com-bat Search and Rescue Procedures; and AR525-90, Combat Search and Rescue Proce-dures, describe doctrine and procedures forjoint CSAR operations. According to the1998 SOF Posture Statement, “SOF areequipped and manned to perform CSAR insupport of SOF missions only. SOF performCSAR in support of conventional forces ona case-by-case basis not to interfere withthe readiness or operations of core SOFmissions.”

• Unassisted recovery. In an unassistedrecovery, the evader makes his way back tofriendly control independently or travelstoward a point where he can make contactwith a manned recovery mechanism or aCSAR force. Success depends largely onthe evader’s will and ability, personal back-ground, physical condition and previoustraining in SERE. Air-delivered or pre-positioned survival equipment significant-ly improves the evader’s potential for suc-cess. An evasion plan of action shouldalways address the possibility of anextended unassisted recovery.

Unconventional recovery operations.Unconventional recovery operations usespecially trained SOF, clandestine organi-zations, indigenous forces, or third-countrynationals that have specialized equipmentto assist an evader in returning to friendlycontrol. Unconventional recovery opera-tions may be covert or clandestine. The pri-mary intent of a covert operation is to con-ceal the identity of the sponsoring country,whereas the primary intent of a clandes-tine operation is to conceal the operationitself. SOF activities related to unconven-tional recovery include the following:

• Direct action, or DA, is a combat oper-ation conducted primarily by SOF in hos-tile or denied territory that is beyond the

6 Special Warfare

Unconventional recovery operations may becovert or clandestine. The primary intent ofa covert operation is to conceal the identityof the sponsoring country, whereas the pri-mary intent of a clandestine operation is toconceal the operation itself.

operational capabilities of tacticalweapons systems and conventional mili-tary forces. DA operations are normallylimited in scope and duration — they seekto achieve specific, well-defined, and oftensensitive results of strategic or opera-tional significance. DA missions may beconducted in high-priority operations tolocate and recover persons who are isolat-ed, threatened, or held captive in sensi-tive, denied or contested areas. DA mis-sions may also be used to rescue person-nel who are being detained by a hostilepower, such as political prisoners andprisoners of war, or POWs; or to locate,identify and recover other personnel whowish to be placed under U.S. control, suchas downed aircrews and political or mili-tary leaders.

DA operations to recover isolated per-sonnel take one of two distinctive forms. Inthe first form, the evader’s general locationis known, and the SF detachment conductsa contact reconnaissance. In the secondform, the SF detachment deploys to a des-ignated area of recovery prior to the start

of an air campaign so that it can be pre-pared to provide a recovery capability dur-ing operations.

• Special reconnaissance, or SR, encom-passes a range of intelligence-collectionactivities, including reconnaissance, sur-veillance and target acquisition. Like DAoperations, SR operations are normallyunilateral in nature and are limited inscope and duration. SR supports PR effortsby locating and surveilling the detentionfacilities of hostages, POWs or politicalprisoners. Operational elements conduct-ing SR can also be redirected to recover iso-lated personnel.

• Special activities are highly compart-mented and centrally managed and con-trolled. The theater SOC plans and directsall E&E activities in-theater. When sup-porting or conducting a special activity,SOF may perform any of their primarywartime missions, subject to the limita-tions imposed by the NCA. When conduct-ing special activities, SOF may berequired to coordinate with other govern-ment agencies. In some cases, those agen-

Spring 1999 7

INCIDENT

CWO Hall North North North Korea

CWO Durant Somalia Somalia

LT Goodman Lebanon/Syria

CPT O’Grady Bosnia/Herzegovina

Desert Storm Kuwait/Iraq

Compromised Intel ntel Activities – Haiti

Just Cause Panama st Panama

Sec Brown Bosnia Sec Bosnia

RECOVERY METHOD

Diplomacy

Diplomacy

Diplomatic/civil

Marine TRAP

SOF Avn and SF

SOF and TF 160

SOF and TF 160

SOF Avn and SF

PR MISSION

Diplomatic

Diplomatic

NGO/diplomatic

CSAR

SOF CSAR

Theater SAR

Force recovery

SAR

CONFLICT CLASSIFICATION

OOTW (peacekeeping)

OOTW (humanitarian assistance/peacekeeping)

Contingency operation (retaliation for the bombing of the Marine barracks)

OOTW (peacekeeping)

War

OOTW (intel activities)

Contingency operation

OOTW (peacekeeping)

Recent Personnel Recovery Incidents

cies have the authority to oversee or con-trol SOF. If an SF team is conducting spe-cial activities, an area specialist team,normally assigned at the group level, sup-ports the team’s missions.

• Combating terrorism, or CT, includesall offensive measures taken by the U.S.government to prevent, deter or respond toterrorism. (Note: CT does not necessarilyinvolve a PR incident.) In CT, SOF applytheir specialized capabilities to preclude,pre-empt or resolve terrorist incidentsabroad, including hostage situations.

• Psychological operations, or PSYOP,can significantly influence the targetaudience. Psychological preparation of

both the PR and the UAR area of opera-tion is essential in establishing the condi-tions for recovery mechanisms. Specifical-ly, PSYOP forces can persuade the popu-lace to provide assistance to escaping andevading personnel; they can warn the pop-ulace of retribution if evading personnelare mistreated or captured; they canreduce the interference of noncombatantsand minimize the resistance of combat-ants; and they can facilitate the conceal-ment of the timing and the method ofPR/UAR operations. PSYOP forces canalso assist in negotiations through multi-disciplined public diplomacy and informa-tion campaigns; they can conduct anassessment of how the indigenous popu-lace will deal with isolated individualswho are in captivity or who are in theprocess of escaping; and they can develop“pointy-talkies,” which can be used by iso-lated personnel to communicate with theindigenous population.

• Civil Affairs, or CA, operations arevaluable because of their direct access tonongovernment organizations, private vol-untary organizations, and diplomatic chan-nels. CA soldiers have an inherent role inearly PR planning and intelligence analy-sis. During the SOF mission-planningprocess and during the development of aPR contingency plan, CA soldiers are anessential information source. CA unitshave valuable resources that can assistSOF recovery teams and RMs. CA subject-matter experts who have been in the targetarea can provide details on the infrastruc-ture. Should negotiations become neces-sary, CA teams can provide negotiatorswith key information acquired through ananalysis of both the situation and the oper-ational environment. As planners identifypossible intermediate staging bases, CAteams can bring all players together in thecivil-military operations center to central-ize resources and to provide the greatestunity of effort toward the PR mission.

• Army Special Operations Aviation, orARSOA, is an integral part of specialoperations. ARSOA units provide theground commander a means by which toinfiltrate, resupply and extract SOFengaged in all core missions and collater-al activities. Personnel recovery is inher-ent in the development of ARSOA opera-tional and contingency plans. ARSOA canbe tasked to provide aircraft for the JSRCand to provide a liaison officer to coordi-nate ARSOA assets allocated to the JSRCforce. ARSOA may be tasked to conductCSAR if it is the only asset in the theaterthat can perform the mission. However,because CSAR is not a primary ARSOAmission, the aircraft and the aircraftcrews should be released to their support-ed unit as soon as possible to perform spe-cial-operations missions.

• Ranger personnel-recovery operationsare specialized raids used to recover des-ignated personnel and to return them tofriendly control. Ranger operationsinclude CSAR to recover and extractdowned aircrews, and noncombatant-evacuation operations to recover Ameri-can citizens or designated foreign nation-als. PR operations often require that the

8 Special Warfare

SF possess several capabilities required forUAR: an understanding of UW theory andinsurgent tactics; language proficiency;area and cultural orientation; small-unit tac-tical skills; advanced medical skills; knowl-edge of clandestine operations; and com-munication skills.

Ranger force be augmented with non-Ranger personnel who possess specialskills or abilities — medical personnel,technical experts, or translators, forexample. The Ranger PR mission usuallyends in close combat during darkness orlimited visibility. Recovery operationsmay employ any method or combination ofmethods of insertion and extraction,including ground, helicopter, or fixed-wingtransport. The Ranger PR mission nor-mally requires close planning and coordi-nation with both ARSOA and Air Forcespecial-operations aviation for deliveryand evacuation.

• Submarine operations are normallytasked by the theater Navy-componentcommander. Attack submarines and sub-marines equipped with dry-deck sheltersare the most effective platforms for estab-lishing submarine pickup points. Attacksubmarines are capable of inserting SOFPR teams clandestinely to conduct over-land PR missions in coastal areas. Theprincipal advantage of using the attacksubmarine in the recovery role is its capa-bility to clandestinely position itself closeto the enemy coastline.

• UW encompasses a broad spectrum ofmilitary and paramilitary operations con-

ducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, orpolitically sensitive territory. UW includesE&E performed by military personnel andother individuals who are attempting toemerge from an enemy-held or hostile areato an area under friendly control.

Unconventional recoveryThe military aspect of UAR is classic

UW, for which U.S. Army SF are specifical-ly trained, organized and equipped. In fact,SF are the only DoD forces with the pri-mary mission of planning and conductingUW. SF possess several capabilitiesrequired for UAR: an understanding of UWtheory and insurgent tactics; language pro-ficiency; area and cultural orientation;small-unit tactical skills; advanced medicalskills; knowledge of clandestine operations;and communication skills.

During unconventional recovery, ARSOFnormally operate in a selected area for eva-sion, or SAFE, or in a designated area ofrecovery, or DAR. The distinguishing factorbetween a DAR and a SAFE is that a DARsupports short-term evasion, whereas aSAFE supports long-term evasion.

ARSOF may conduct or support two typesof assisted recovery: planned and unplanned.

Spring 1999 9

Soldiers from the 10thSF Group discuss asearch-and-rescue exer-cise to be conducted aspart of U.S. operations toenforce a no-fly zone onIraq.

Photo by Gudrun Cook

Planned assisted recovery. In most SFmissions, E&R is an implied task thatrequires the same planning, preparationand support as the primary tasks. Deliber-ate recovery planning includes a follow-onSOF mission, recovery forces, and RMsthat can be operated by indigenous forcesand by other clandestine organizations.

If ARSOF are conducting short-termoperations, such as SR or DA, and the JFCdirects them to conduct an assisted recov-ery, ARSOF must assess the risk to theevader and to themselves:• Should the evader be recovered immediately?• What is the impact of diverting ARSOF

from their primary mission?

• Can the evader be recovered afterARSOF’s primary mission has beencompleted?

• Can other assets recover the evader?Any SOF operation may involve PR, and

planning for a recovery force is becomingan implied primary task for SOF. If taskedto include potential recovery actions intheir initial planning, SOF teams operat-ing in or near an evader’s known locationcould move to the area to contact, authen-ticate and recover the evader. When theenemy situation permits and when ade-quate planning has been conducted, resup-ply operations can reconstitute the teambefore it contacts the evader.

Recovery mechanismsRMs support E&R operations, particular-

ly in situations where U.S. unconventionalforces or allied personnel support or direct

the RM’s activities. An RM or its elementsmay recover personnel through differentoperational areas and environments.Depending on its size and range, an RM canvary the nature of its actions from overt tocovert to clandestine.

Indigenous forces or third-countrynationals may serve as an RM, and SOFmay also be directed to assist or operatewith insurgent groups. These insurgentgroups will normally be classified as eithersponsored or unsponsored.

• Sponsored insurgent groups may besupported, led or advised by U.S. or alliedSF elements. These groups may be recruit-ed and trained by friendly forces, or theymay be dependent on allied countries.

• Unsponsored insurgent groups mayinclude mercenaries, dissidents and out-laws. These groups may provide assist-ance to evaders if they perceive thatdoing so is in their best interests, or ifthey anticipate a reward. The use ofunsponsored insurgent groups presentscertain problems. Limitations in commu-nication between friendly forces andinsurgent groups can increase the diffi-culty in arranging the recovery ofevaders, thereby extending the evasionperiod. Under certain conditions, aninsurgent group may attempt to use theevader to augment its forces. This situa-tion could create legal problems for theevader if the insurgent group conductsoperations in violation of U.S. policy orinternational law. Such groups may alsowant to retain an evader for use as a bar-gaining chip.

Because independent insurgent groupsmay perceive the evader as a de facto rep-resentative of the U.S. government, theevader should conduct himself with theutmost discretion. While in an RM, theevader should:• Project a favorable image of the U.S. and

its values.• Avoid acts that violate international law

or that discredit the U.S.• Avoid expressing any ideas that could be

misconstrued as official U.S. policy.• Refrain from making any agreements

contrary to the interests of the U.S.• Demonstrate high moral character.

10 Special Warfare

Responsible authorities must carefully con-sider the sensitivity of RMs and the potentialconsequences for the SOF who perform them.If a hostile power detains or exposes UAR par-ticipants within politically denied areas, thatpower may consider the activity of the partic-ipants illegal, and thereby deny them protec-tion under international conventions.

Unplanned assisted recovery. Unplannedassisted recovery may occur when mem-bers of the general population in anenemy-held area assist an evader inreturning to friendly control. These peoplemay be classified as follows:• Opportunists. Individuals or groups may

assist an evader with the expectation ofmonetary gain, materials, or politicalrecognition for the evader’s safe return.

• Accidental contacts. Individuals mayhelp an evader for personal reasons orbecause they anticipate a reward.

• Good Samaritans. Individuals who per-form acts out of mercy or sympathy.

Legal considerationsSOF missions frequently involve com-

plex issues. Federal laws and executiveorders, federal-agency publications anddirectives, and theater rules of engage-ment may affect mission execution. Theguidelines become especially critical dur-ing sensitive peacetime operations, wheninternational and domestic laws, treatyprovisions, and political agreements affectthe planning and execution of the missionand of post-conflict activities. Responsibleauthorities must carefully consider thesensitivity of RMs and the potential con-sequences for the SOF who perform them.If a hostile power detains or exposes UARparticipants within politically deniedareas, that power may consider the activ-ity of the participants illegal, and therebydeny them protection under internationalconventions.

Planners must appreciate the distinc-tion between an evader and an escapee.Under international law, an evader is alawful combatant until captured. Anindividual who has escaped from anenemy confinement facility is legally anescapee (a noncombatant). However,evaders and escapees use the same tacti-cal skills to evade and avoid capture. Thedifference between an evader and anescapee becomes significant when theindividual emerges in a neutral state:The neutral power will likely detain theevader until the cessation of hostilities,and it will allow the escapee to remain at

liberty. Thus, the isolated person’s legalstatus can directly affect his course oftravel.

ConclusionBecause they offer the NCA several

options for recovering isolated personnel,SOF are invaluable in dealing with mili-tary and civilian PR issues. One of thegreatest strengths of SOF, in addition totheir cross-cultural training and languageskills, is their ability to respond immedi-ately to a wide range of conflict situationswith a only minimal preparation. SOFmust be prepared to act pre-emptively toprotect U.S. national interests. Whenever acrisis develops within a region, SOF will beready to respond. Once they have beenintroduced into a country, SOF can estab-lish on-the-ground contacts and develop anetwork infrastructure that can sustainand protect the recovery mechanism.

While many functions (legal affairs,casualty and mortuary affairs, publicaffairs and operational support) are inte-gral to the preparation and execution of aPR mission, ARSOF are the principaldevelopers and users (and in many casesthe sole providers) of RMs that supportUW missions. ARSOF must be prepared toplan, support and execute UARs in peaceand in war.

Staff Sergeant Michael McCrann is adoctrine writer assigned to the SpecialForces Training and Doctrine Division,Directorate of Training and Doctrine, JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School.

Spring 1999 11

The United States HumanitarianDemining Program, or HDP, isdesigned to relieve human suffering

by helping selected countries develop theirown indigenous demining capability.

The HDP concentrates on two elements:the research and development of technolo-gy for identifying and eliminating thethreat posed by land mines, and programsdesigned to assist designated countries ineliminating their uncleared mines. A keyobjective of the HDP is to ensure that

cadres of the host-nations, or HNs, arecapable of training their countries’ person-nel and of establishing a self-sustaininginfrastructure that can conduct indepen-dent demining operations.

Since 1993, the U.S. has provided morethan $246 million in humanitarian demin-ing, or HD, assistance to mine-affectedcountries. DoD has spent more than $28million in research and development, andhas transferred nearly $10 million worth ofequipment directly to host-nation national

12 Special Warfare

Humanitarian Demining Operations: Relieving Human Suffering Worldwide

by Sergeant First Class Paul Clarke

DoD photo

The threat from anti-per-sonnel mines is a grow-ing concern worldwide.In 1998, the U.S. provid-ed nearly $92 million indemining assistance to21 countries.

demining organizations. In 1997 alone,some 300 U.S. military and civilian person-nel trained more than 1,200 indigenousdeminers to conduct mine-clearance opera-tions, to provide emergency medical care,to establish national mine-action centers,and to train others to conduct mine-aware-ness campaigns. In 1998, the U.S. providednearly $92 million in HD assistance to 21countries in Asia, Africa, Central Americaand eastern Europe.

U.S. Army special-operations forces, orARSOF, play a major role in supporting theHDP. They are responsible for organizing,equipping and training demining elementsranging from battalion to company size.Although worldwide interest in humani-tarian demining is relatively new, ARSOFhave supported the demining programs ofthe United Nations for several years. Dur-ing fiscal year 1995, ARSOF supporteddemining operations in Namibia, Rwanda,Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Hon-duras. During FYs 1996 and 1997, ARSOFsupported demining operations in Mozam-bique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Laos, CostaRica and Nicaragua. Listed below are thespecific demining activities of ARSOF:

• Special Forces conduct limited mine-awareness operations as required, but theyare primarily responsible for training per-sonnel of the national demining headquar-ters and mine-clearance organizations toplan, organize and execute demining oper-ations. One of SF’s key objectives is toassist host-nation cadres in developingtheir capabilities so that they can trainforces over the long term.

Cadre training includes basic skills andindividual tasks — officer and NCO profes-sional development, leadership, communi-cations, emergency medical techniques,instructor training, land navigation, andengineer and demining techniques. Cadretraining also covers collective and teamskills, from the team or squad levelthrough the company level, includingdemining mission planning. The SF ele-ment supervises the HN cadre responsiblefor training operational platoons, then itmonitors the operational platoons in theconduct of their day-to-day operations.

• Civil Affairs assets also provide train-

ing to the national demining headquartersand conduct liaison activities with the HNinfrastructure, the U.N., and internationalor local nongovernment organizations. CApersonnel teach leadership skills, manage-ment techniques, and staff proceduresrequired for the headquarters to maintaincommand, control and communication withits subordinate organizations.

• PSYOP forces educate the HN nation-al government, local governments and theHN population in the proper procedures ofreducing the hazards caused by mine cont-amination. PSYOP personnel also teachHN forces to develop and execute mine-awareness campaigns, to conduct mine-awareness training programs, and todevelop and disseminate mine-awarenessproducts.

• The Special Operations Support Com-mand contributes to the demining effortthrough its forward-deployed, special-opera-tions theater-support elements. SOSCOMcan assist ARSOF forces in planning andobtaining logistics resources from within thetheater or from the HN support systems.

The Army Engineer Center and School,Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., is the proponentfor the U.S. Army’s military countermineoperations. The school’s HumanitarianDemining Training Center conducts a two-

Spring 1999 13

A U.S. Special Forcessergeant helps a studentduring a land-navigationpractical exercise con-ducted in Bosnia-Herze-govina during OperationJoint Endeavor.

Photo by Justin D. Pyle

week Humanitarian Demining Course. Thecourse prepares SF A-detachments to con-duct humanitarian-demining programs. Anew publication, TC 31-34, HumanitarianDemining Operations Handbook, preparedby the JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool, sets the standard for humanitari-an-demining training and is the primaryreference source used in the course. Thedemining training center also conducts aone-week, theater-oriented course for liai-son officers, or LNOs, who may be requiredto assist in humanitarian-demining opera-tions, or HDOs.

U.S. HD efforts are implementedthrough four theater commands: U.S. Euro-pean Command, or EUCOM; U.S. CentralCommand, or CENTCOM; U.S. PacificCommand, or PACOM; and U.S. SouthernCommand, or SOUTHCOM. The U.S.Atlantic Command, whose area of respon-sibility is the U.S. and the Atlantic Ocean,does not participate in an HD program.

The theater commands conduct HDOswithin their specific areas of responsibili-ty. Each theater command requires anational demining organization, or NDO,established in accordance with therequirements of the theater commanderin chief, or CINC. Each command uses adifferent approach in organizing and run-ning its NDO:

In EUCOM, the J3 of Special OperationsCommand-Europe is the executive agentfor HDO and has established a deminingcell that is supported by LNOs both fromARSOF and from explosive-ordnance dis-posal units. EUCOM’s HDP has increasedfrom two countries in 1995 to seven in1998. EUCOM expects to add six morecountries to its program before the end ofFY 2000.

In CENTCOM, the Special OperationsCommand-Central, or SOCCENT, passedexecutive-agent responsibility to the CINCin FY 1996. While the CINC relies on hiscomponent commands and on a civiliancontractor to manage the HDP, the SOC-CENT provides the training force. CENT-COM’s HDP has increased from two coun-tries in 1995 to five in 1998. CENTCOMexpects to add three more countries to itsprogram before the end of FY 2000.

In PACOM, Special Operations Com-mand-Pacific, the executive agent for HDO,has two active-duty soldiers to manage thedemining program. The PACOM programprovides training and resource support toregional mine-action centers, or MACs.MACs are responsible for in-country oper-ations, which includes organizing, equip-ping and training host-nation deminingelements. The number of countries that thePACOM program supports has increased

14 Special Warfare

A U.S. PSYOP soldierdistributes mine-aware-ness comic books tochildren in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Photo by Donte Robinson

from one in 1995 to two in 1997. PACOMexpects to add another country to its pro-gram before the end of FY 2000.

In SOUTHCOM, the Organization ofAmerican States/Inter-American DefenseBoard controls the HDP. The CINC pro-vides training and resource support to aregional demining training center in Danli,Honduras. The center is responsible fororganizing, equipping, training and coordi-nating operations throughout the theater.The Special Operations Command-Southplans to transfer executive-agent responsi-bility for HD to Joint Task Force Bravoduring FY 1999. The number of countriesthat SOUTHCOM’s HDP supports hasincreased from one in 1995 to five in 1998.SOUTHCOM expects to add five morecountries to its program before the end ofFY 2000.

Differences in cultures and in regionalrequirements, as well as variations inHDOs, make it difficult to standardizedemining efforts. In an effort to develop aneffective HD program and to reach the ulti-mate goal of eradicating all land mines, theSWCS and USASOC are working with theArmy Engineer School, the UnitedNations, and international HDOs to stan-dardize the recording and reporting of HDefforts.

In May 1996, President Clintonannounced a major land-mine policy thatwould expand research-and-developmentefforts for HD technology and that wouldstrengthen the U.S.’s HD program. At thesame time, the U.S. stopped using non-self-destructing anti-personnel land mines, orAPLs, except in marked and monitoredminefields in Korea. The U.S. alsoannounced that it would seek alternativesto APLs and have them ready for use inKorea by 2006. In 1997, more than 120countries signed the Ottawa Convention,banning the use, production, stockpiling,and transfer of APLs. The U.S. plans tosign the Ottawa Convention as well, if itsucceeds in identifying and fielding suit-able alternatives to APLs by 2006. Regard-less of whether we sign the convention, theU.S. is committed to eradicating the land-mine threat by 2010.

For more information about the Human-

itarian Demining Course, telephone theEngineer School at (573) 563-5518. Ques-tions or input regarding TC 31-34 shouldbe directed to SFC Paul Clarke, SF Train-ing and Doctrine Division, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, JFKSWCS, at DSN239-9802/7690 or commercial (910) 432-9802/7690.

Sergeant First Class Paul Clarke is adoctrine writer assigned to the SpecialForces Doctrine Division, Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, JFK Special War-fare Center and School.

Spring 1999 15

Concerned over the worldwide prolifer-ation of land mines and the sufferingthose mines produce, the United

States has pledged to lead the world in glob-al humanitarian-demining assistance.1

During 1996 and 1997, the U.S. govern-ment funded more than 14 demining mis-sions worldwide,2 and U.S. Army special-operations forces were involved in nearlyevery one of those missions. It is probablethat Special Forces groups will increas-ingly participate in demining missionsover the next three to five years. Not sur-prisingly, the operational tempo of thedemining missions is outpacing their pub-lished doctrine.

This article examines a unique deminingmission — the establishment of deminingtraining centers for each of the entityarmies in Bosnia-Herzegovina — per-formed by the 10th SF Group. The princi-ples of that pilot demining program mayserve as a model for future special-opera-tions teams deploying in similar foreign-internal-defense or humanitarian-assist-ance roles.

Mine problem in BosniaAn estimated 750,000 land mines

remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are19,000 recorded minefields, and the loca-tions of approximately 350,000 mines havebeen identified.3 Large sections of formerconfrontation lines are heavily laden with

mines laid in random patterns for which nomine-emplacement records exist. Even inareas where records do exist, confrontationlines shifted throughout the war, causingmany minefields to become over-seeded.

Time and weather adversely affectmines. Overgrowing vegetation concealsminefield indicators such as tripwires,demolition spools, small craters and ani-mal carcasses. Erosion displaces light-weight plastic mines, often washing theminto previously safe areas. Heavy rainsincrease the weight of the covering earth,thus sensitizing buried, pressure-fusedmines.

In many instances, local civilians emplacedmines in the areas surrounding their homes.The lack of records pertaining to these mine-fields impedes the resettlement of displacedpersons and refugees. To further complicatethe demining problem, Bosnian soil has ahigh metallic content that reduces the relia-bility of mine detectors.

According to estimates, each month Bos-nia suffers 50 mine-related incidents thatresult in injury or death.4 The mine-recov-ery efforts of both the international com-munity and the local government are hin-dered by the real and psychological threatof mines.

Unfortunately, the extent of the mineproblem was unknown to the authors ofthe Dayton Peace Agreement. The demin-ing clause mandated the total clearance ofthe zone of separation (1,075 km long and

16 Special Warfare

SOF Initiatives in Demining: The BosnianEntity Army Training Centers

by Captain Brian S. Petit

4 km wide) within 30 days, with an addi-tional 30 days allocated for clearing minesfrom roads and areas necessary to theduties of the implementation force, orIFOR.5 This stipulation grossly underesti-mated the ground truth. At the currentrate of mine removal, it will take 34 yearsto clear the country by mine-lifting opera-tions (the removal of mines with the aid ofmine-emplacement records) or 150 yearsto clear the country by mine-clearingoperations (removal by mine detection).6

To further complicate the situation,the demining efforts conducted by theformer warring factions in 1996 werewholly unsatisfactory. In 1997, the com-mander of the stabilization force, orSFOR, adopted a more coercive approachtoward mine-clearance operations byestablishing specific manpower and man-hour requirements for teams from theentity armed forces, or EAF.7

Overall, the mine situation remainedbleak: indigenous mine-removal effortswere sluggish; mine-removal operationswere highly dangerous and costly; andall aspects of entity-army demining oper-ations became a compliance issue, result-ing in SFOR-enforced sanctions againstentity armies that did not meet the stat-ed requirements.8 The country’s demin-ing picture further deteriorated whendozens of private and commercial organ-izations attempted to conduct deminingoperations without any centralized direc-

tion or oversight. During 1996 and 1997,no unity of effort existed for the Bosnia-Herzegovina demining operations.

Feasibility assessmentTo assist the EAF in building their

demining programs, Company C, 2nd Bat-talion, 10th SF Group, deployed to Bosniain December 1997 to plan a standard “trainthe trainer” mission.

Prior to its deployment, Company C hadreceived technical mine-clearance training

at Fort Carson, Colo., and at Fort LeonardWood, Mo. The training complied with theinternational standards for deminingdeveloped by the United Nations. SF engi-neers became experts in the family ofYugoslavian mines, as well as in the regu-lations governing internationally recog-nized mine-clearing operations.

When Company C arrived in Bosnia,SFOR engineers were already conducting the

Spring 1999 17

Soldiers from the 10th SFGroup attend the openingceremony of a deminingtraining center at Travnik,Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Photo by Carl Fountain

At the current rate of mine removal, it will take 34years to clear the country by mine-lifting opera-tions (the removal of mines with the aid of mine-emplacement records) or 150 years to clear thecountry by mine-clearing operations (removal bymine detection).

second and third iterations of basic deminingcourses for the EAF. The 10th Group repre-sentatives therefore proposed the idea ofestablishing entity-army training centersthroughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

These permanent school sites wouldhouse a fixed cadre and staff, train all enti-ty-army demining teams, and ultimatelyserve as the EAF proponent for deminingoperations. Company C’s long-term visionincluded the concept that the training cen-ters would develop and operate military-occupational-specialty qualifying courses inaccordance with the standards of the U.S.Army NCO Education Schools, or NCOES.The concept was approved in January 1998,and Company C began establishing the firstEAF demining training centers.

Training center conceptIn formulating the core of the training-

center model, Company C used ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command Regula-tions 351-1, 361-1-R, 351-17, 350-24,Army Regulation 351-1, materials fromthe Special Warfare Center and School’s

Instructor Training Course, and knowl-edge gained from visits to various NCOacademies. Company C planned its mis-sion using the principles outlined in theFID ARTEP Manual. Next, Company Cformulated the objectives and concept forthe training centers.

Given the magnitude of the mine situa-tion and the political and cultural consid-erations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, theSFOR determined that three separateentity armed-force training centers wouldneed to be established. This would giveeach center the best chance for successwithout undue ethnic or political disrup-tion. Each entity army (Bosnian-Croat,Bosnian-Muslim and Bosnian-Serb)agreed to the establishment of a trainingcenter on its existing military base. Eachcenter would be chartered by an SF A-detachment.

Equipping the schoolThe 10th Group soldiers initially assessed

a pool of entity officers and NCOs to maneach training center. The candidates were

18 Special Warfare

MedicalInstructors

Demining/DemolitionsInstructors

OperationsOfficer

SupplyOfficer

AdministrativeOfficer

Chief of TrainingSenior Instructor

AssistantCommandant

SchoolCommandant

Demining School Cadre Organization

tested in map reading, demolitions, demin-ing, first-aid and basic troop-leading proce-dures. The best-qualified candidates wereselected to serve as instructors and asschool staff members. Each school operatedunder a commandant, with a training sec-tion and a staff section. Cadre training wasconducted over four weeks. All staff mem-bers and instructors received commoninstruction in small-group leader tech-niques, mentoring and teaching techniques,and school disciplinary measures. Thetrainees then split into three groups: demin-ing and demolition instructors, medicalinstructors and school staff.

The demining and demolition instructorswere required to demonstrate all aspects ofmine-clearing operations, including thedestruction, in place, of land mines. The SFengineers reinforced the safety measuresrequired for compliance with internationalstandards of mine clearing. The deminingand demolitions final exam covered all thetechnical mine data, demining-site setup,mine-detecting and -marking, U.N. regula-tions and demolition operations.

The EAF medical instructors receivedtraining in first aid, in primary and sec-ondary survey, and in cardio-pulmonaryresuscitation. All EAF medical instructorswere soldiers or army nurses with previousmedical experience. This proved to be espe-cially helpful to the SF medics, becausethey were able to teach the advanced med-ical skills necessary in treating severelyinjured mine victims. The medical finalexamination consisted of a written portionand a minefield-evacuation-trauma sce-nario involving multiple casualties.

The staff training focused on techniquesfor effectively organizing and operating atraining center. SF soldiers taught theschool staff the duties of the S1, S3, S4and commandant, in accordance with U.S.Army staff-operations doctrine. Automa-tion training constituted a large portion ofthe staff training. Staff members learnedcomputer basics, database managementand hardware maintenance. Each schoolstaff created a similar training-centerdatabase designed to codify the trainingcenters’ operational and administrativerequirements.

Cadre training culminated in a one-weektraining exercise that tested all of theinstruction presented.

Following their four weeks of training,the entity cadre began a two-weekrehearsal: They assumed responsibility forall the instruction, logistics and planningof the demining course. During this period,instructors received their class assign-ments and rehearsed their class presenta-tion under the tutelage of the SF instruc-tors. The staff planned the inprocessing,billeting, meals, training schedule andlogistics requirements. The SF advisersensured that the curriculum presentationwas accurate, professional and organized.

Spring 1999 19

Photo by Brian Petit

A Special Forces soldiergives instruction to Bos-nian demining-instructortrainees.Training coveredall aspects of mine-clear-ing operations.

During this period, local contractorsand entity-army soldiers renovated thefacilities to create a functioning acade-mic and training environment. Eachschool received more than $175,000worth of equipment, including protec-tive gear, training aids, copiers, and afull complement of computer hardwareand software.

First basic deminer’s courseIn June 1998, each of the three training

centers began its first Basic Deminer’sCourse. The four-week course trainedthree nine-man demining teams at each

training center. All of the personneltrained were either active or reserve mili-tary members. The centers’ goal was foreach demining team to graduate, receiveequipment, and begin conducting demin-ing operations as part of the summer 1998campaign.9

Each center conducted its course witha high level of professionalism and inten-sity. In addition to the SF advisers who

served as monitors, there were SFORmonitors; monitors from the UnitedNations Mine Action Center; and repre-sentatives from various private agenciesinterested in the indigenous programs.

Altogether, the three training centersproduced 73 entity-army deminers,medics and team leaders who were qual-ified to conduct demining operations tothe internationally recognized standard.Encouraged by the progress of the entityarmy programs, the Canadian and Nor-wegian governments soon thereafter an-nounced a plan to insure EAF deminersthrough 2001 against the loss of life orlimb while conducting humanitarianmine-clearing operations.

Course sustainmentSFOR mandated that the training cen-

ters would conduct a minimum of threecourses per year, with the option of con-ducting refresher courses as necessary.SFOR assigned full-time monitors to thetraining centers to ensure that the curricu-lum and training remained to standard.The overall responsibility of sustainingand maintaining the training centers fellto their respective entity army and govern-ment. Failure to provide an adequate oper-ating budget or failure to conduct coursesaccording to schedule would result intraining and movement bans beingimposed on the offending army.

Essential to the effective sustainment ofthe training centers was the integration ofeach training site into the national demin-

20 Special Warfare

Soldiers from the 10th SFGroup meet with Bosnianand Serbian military lead-ers and officials of theU.N., to discuss deminingtraining plans.

Photo by Justin D. Pyle

The concept of the entity-army training cen-ters was to make the host nation responsiblefor clearing mines, and at the same time, toprovide the host nation with the expertise,confidence and organization it would need toconduct mine-clearance operations.

ing program. In a textbook example offacilitating interagency activities, Compa-ny C brought entity-army representativesinto discussions with civilian deminingagencies and members of U.N.-sponsoredprograms.

To ensure that the training centersbecame the focal points for all country-wide demining training, technology andexpansion, Company C leaders alignedthe groups and presented a vision of sus-taining a low-cost, indigenous trainingprogram in each of the training centers.This effort resulted in project plans forcivilian demining teams to work with thetraining centers in a mutually beneficialrelationship. SF involvement in theestablishment and operation of the train-ing centers greatly contributed to thelegitimacy and credibility of the indige-nous demining programs, and it helpedto reduce much of the reluctance of pri-vate organizations to invest in the EAFprogram.

The 10th SF Group has demonstrated itscommitment to the centers by sending SFengineers on periodic inspections of theschools. SFOR continues to monitor allentity-army activities, including the opera-tion of the three training centers. The pro-gram’s long-term success will be measuredby the continued operation of the centers,and by the safe but aggressive efforts of theEAF demining teams to clear the Bosniancountryside of mines.

ConclusionThe proliferation of land mines and unex-

ploded ordnance impedes the restoration ofpeace, the restructuring of war-torneconomies, and the normalization of life.

The concept of the entity-army trainingcenters was to make the host nation respon-sible for clearing mines, and at the same time,to provide the host nation with the expertise,confidence and organization it would need toconduct mine-clearance operations.

With their ability to build, to teach andto operate in situations polarized by eth-nic and political issues, SOF are ideallysuited for humanitarian-demining activi-ties. They will likely continue to assist

indigenous populations in implementingdemining programs similar to the one inBosnia-Herzegovina.

Captain Brian S. Petit is a detachmentcommander in Company C, 2nd Battalion,10th SF Group. His detachment establishedone of the three entity-army deminingtraining centers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Notes:1 Associated Press, “U.S. to lead effort to clear world

of land mines by 2010,” The Gazette (ColoradoSprings, Colo.), 1 November 1997.

2 Interagency Working Group report on demining, 28June 1997.

3 Mine Information Coordination Cell database as of1 May 1998, Tito Barracks, Sarajevo.

4 Mine Information Coordination Cell database as of1 May 1998, Tito Barracks, Sarajevo.

5 Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 1-A, ArticleIV.2(3)(d).

6 Peter Aldwinckle, “Background Brief — BosniaDemining,” 1997.

7 London Peace Implementation Conference, Chap-ter 8, Commander, SFOR, Instructions to the Parties,December 1996.

8 Ibid. Training and movement bans were placed onentity armies who did not achieve “effective effort”levels for the prior month’s mine-removal operations.

9 The delayed arrival of donated demining equip-ment prevented an immediate transition to livedemining operations.

Spring 1999 21

The Special Forces Detachment OfficerQualification Course, or SFDOQC,offers an individual training exercise

known simply as Trek. Over the years Trekhas had various names; it has been sched-uled at various points throughout the pro-gram of instruction; and it has been conduct-ed under a variety of conditions. However,two things about Trek have remained con-stant: It has always centered around a sololand-navigation event of several days’ dura-tion, and it has always been a critical eventin the training of Special Forces officers.

Trek is contentious. To some, Trek is theholy grail of officer training; to others, Trekis an example of outdated tab protection;and to still others, Trek is simply a gutcheck that belongs in Special ForcesAssessment and Selection, or SFAS. Andyet, all student officers, in class after class,consider Trek to be the defining moment ofthe SFDOQC. Trek and Robin Sage (thefinal FTX in the SF Qualification Course,or SFQC) are often mentioned as the twomost memorable events of SF training.Admittedly, however, the purpose of Trek isnot self-evident, and bears some definition.

First of all, I submit that Trek is the

most critical event in the development ofSF officers. It shapes the unique brand ofleadership that we need for our future.Although the training objective of Trek issomewhat counter-intuitive, and the stand-ards for the event are certainly open fordebate and change, the existence of Trek inthe broad scheme of training events thatmake up SF qualification is critical.

Second, allow me to propose two assump-tions from which to begin:• SFAS is not perfect.• Officers who have reached the midpoint

of the SFDOQC should be able to com-plete Trek.Given these assumptions, it follows that

although the training objective of Trekshould be attained by most, it may not beattained by all. The training objective canbe stated as follows:• Task: Make independent decisions.• Condition: Alone, with basic issue equip-

ment, under stress and fatigue, accom-plish a task that you have been trainedto do.

• Standard: Accomplish the given task tothe prescribed standard.The primary purpose of Trek is to evalu-

ate the decision-making capabilities of ourstudent officers. Trek is a test to ensurethat capable, independent decision-makershave been trained. It is not an assessmenttool; at least it is no more of an assessmenttool than any other test is. It cannot be con-ducted during SFAS because Trek presup-

22 Special Warfare

The Trek: Critical Event in SF Officer Training

by Lieutenant Colonel Charles King

In this article, the author shares his ideason the value of Trek and describes Trek’srole in the training of SF officers. From1995 to 1997, the author served as com-mander of the battalion responsible for con-ducting the SFDOQC. — Editor

poses a high level of training and condi-tioning. That first precondition is, by defin-ition, missing during SFAS.

The second purpose of Trek is to providethe student officers with an experiencethat will serve as an inoculation againstthe very challenges that can cripple theirdecision-making in the future: fatigue,uncertainty, stress, and lack of counsel. Inthis sense, Trek is similar to the resist-ance-training-lab, or RTL, phase of theSurvival, Evasion, Resistance, and EscapeCourse, or SERE, in that part of the pointof the event is the experience itself. Again,just as the RTL phase is not conducteduntil the SERE students have receivedtraining, Trek is not conducted until thestudent officers have been trained.

The third purpose of Trek is to presentthe student officers with challenges (bothphysical and mental). These challenges, inturn, produce two benefits. First, theyinstill confidence and pride, which simplyamplifies the inoculation mentioned above.Second, they reinforce the credibility of thestudent officers’ training. Trek is notoffered to the NCO students in the SFQC.It cannot be said that their leaders havenot been adequately tested and challenged.

Trek further illuminates the differencebetween the end state of the enlisted SFQC(which is designed to produce “journey-men” SF soldiers who are qualified at theentry level for service on an ODA) and theend state of the SFDOQC (which by neces-

sity must produce officers who are capableof commanding detachments). Unlike theNCOs, officers must be (at least in thesense of being prepared to command) fullyqualified upon graduation.

Last, as long as SFAS remains an imper-fect tool, Trek will provide those studentswho want out of the SFDOQC an opportu-nity to leave voluntarily. Even thoughthose students represent only a small per-centage of the officers who enter SF train-ing, if Trek causes them to quit, then itsvalue is significant.

It is also important to note what Trek isnot. Trek is not a test of land navigation —land navigation is trained and evaluated inPhase I. Trek requires students to demon-strate the skills and the knowledge thatthey acquired earlier in the course. In fact,every task required by Trek will alreadyhave been accomplished by the students.Seldom indeed does a student officer failTrek because he can’t navigate or becausehe doesn’t know the material being tested.Land navigation is used merely as a vehi-cle for the decision-making exercise. Givenour resources and the nature of SF, landnavigation is an appropriate vehicle, but itis not the only vehicle.

Trek is not an assessment or a test ofendurance, although it is physicallydemanding. Physically, Trek is conductedat a pace that should be achievable, giventhe other physical standards that the stu-dents have met prior to that point. If stu-

Spring 1999 23

File photo

While Trek is centeredaround a land-navigationexercise, its primary pur-pose is to examine thedecision-making capabil-ities of student officers.

dent officers fail Trek at an unacceptablerate, the cause could be traced back toSFAS. The problem is not that Trek is anextension of SFAS. The problem may bethat SFAS is not adequately assessing thestudent officers, or the problem may bethat the officers selected for the SFDOQCare not properly preparing themselves.

Trek is an important and valuable toolfor training and preparing unconventionalwarfare leaders for the future. My experi-ence with eight iterations of Trek leads meto conclude that failure can largely beattributed to the student’s inability tomake appropriate and timely decisions, orto the student’s inability to trust his ownskills and knowledge. Students who havebeen overcome by the stress of solitude andfatigue have also failed Trek. Implicit here,just as it is in SERE, is the realization thata response to stress can be learned — thatwe can inoculate ourselves against certaineventualities. The goal of decision-makingeducation is unsupervised predictability.1The experience of Trek tests to that end.

Is there a need for Trek? Surely, the SFBranch has a justified requirement to trainits officers to be both capable and ready tomake independent decisions. Indeed, thisrequirement is unique in degree among theother branches. The requirement to beindependent is such an overwhelming partof what we expect from our officers that itlends itself to being considered a core valueof our branch. Army Research Institutestudies conducted on SF candidates duringSFAS show that the vast majority of thecandidates have never been alone for a sig-nificant period of time. For the rest of theArmy population, being alone is atypicaland is avoided. Yet our officers must beconsummate decision-makers and self-reliant to the highest degree. Maybe theywon’t be completely alone; perhaps theirteam will be with them. But they will bealone in the sense that they will be makingfundamental decisions without any super-vision. Trek is a critical building block inthe development of our officers, and it isdirectly focused at preparing them for anuncertain and ambiguous future.

Lieutenant Colonel CharlesKing is chief of the SF OfficerBranch, Officer ProfessionalManagement Division, U.S.Total Army Personnel Com-mand. His previous SpecialForces assignments includecommander, 1st Battalion, 1st Special War-fare Training Group, JFK Special WarfareCenter and School; company commander,operations officer and group executive offi-cer, 10th SF Group; detachment command-er, 5th SF Group; and branch assignmentsofficer, SF Branch, U.S. Total Army Person-nel Command.

Notes:1 Major Peter Dillon, “Ethical Decision Making on

the Battlefield,” MMAS Thesis, Command and Gener-al Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 1992.

24 Special Warfare

Spring 1999 25

Army Values

Personal CourageRoger Donlon

In July 1964, Captain Roger Donlon was commander of Special Forces detachment A-726, stationed at Camp NamDong, Republic of Vietnam. In the early-morning darkness of July 6, a reinforced Viet Cong battalion launched anattack on the camp. During the five-hour battle that followed, Donlon, under intense fire from small arms and mor-tars, directed the defensive operations of the camp,personally recovered weapons and ammunition andmoved them where they would be more effective, res-cued wounded soldiers, and administered first aid.Despite his own wounds in the stomach, face, shoul-der and leg, he moved around the camp perimeter,directing firing operations, hurling hand grenadesback at the enemy, and encouraging his soldiers tofight on. For his actions, Donlon was awarded theMedal of Honor, the first given during the VietnamWar and the first given to a Special Forces soldier.

Reflecting on his actions and those of his team,Donlon said, “When you read the award citation, youthink of physical courage. That’s only one dimensionof it. There is a greater courage that feeds physicalcourage: moral courage — a kind of mental tough-ness. … That was the core that allowed us to dothings beyond what we thought we’d be capable of.When we saw what the other members of the teamwere doing, we gained more strength.”

Donlon retired from the Army in 1988 as acolonel. He is executive director of the Westmore-land Scholar Foundation, a nonprofit educationalfoundation dedicated to supporting academic schol-arships and exchange programs that will foster rec-onciliation and harmony between the people of theUnited States and the people of Vietnam. He isdonating all proceeds from the first edition of his1998 book, Beyond Nam Dong, to the foundation.

Beyond Nam Dong is available through the SpecialWarfare Museum Gift Shop (910-436-2366) or directlyfrom R&N Publishers (913-772-5480). — Editor

Captain Roger Donlon, the first Special Forces soldier to win the Medal of Honor.

One of the most significant trends in21st-century warfare has been therapid proliferation of offensive mis-

sile systems. Theater missiles, or TMs,which include theater ballistic missiles, orTBMs; cruise missiles; and air-to-surfacemissiles, pose a great threat to world sta-bility and can diminish our nation’s futureability to conduct force projection and toresolve regional conflicts.

Worldwide, a buying spree is under wayfor advanced missile systems. Affordable incomparison to other weapon systems, suchas combat aircraft and warships, missilesoffer countries with small budgets a chanceto get the most bang for their weaponsbuck. As TMs make leaps in range, accura-cy and lethality, developing militaries willview them as strategic equalizers.

The TM threat is diverse: South Koreaand the Japanese mainland are now with-in range of North Korea’s latest Nodongmissile. And Iran is building two new mis-sile systems based on the Nodong design.Both of Iran’s systems will be equippedwith 2,200-pound warheads, and both willbe capable of hitting targets as far away ascentral Europe.1 Israeli intelligencereports that Iran has a goal of an evenlonger range — 6,000 miles — that wouldallow Iran to hit targets in the easternUnited States.2

As weapons of terror, missiles present aformidable threat to U.S. forces, populationcenters, and critical assets. This threat

becomes even greater when the missilesare combined with chemical weapons andother weapons of mass destruction, orWMD. In July 1997, the highest rankingofficial ever to defect from North Korea tes-tified that North Korea prides itself on itschemical-warfare capabilities, and that ifthe U.S. should attempt to intervene in aninvasion of South Korea, North Koreaplans to annihilate Japan with a massivewave of missiles armed with chemical war-heads.3 In September 1997, AlexanderLebben, former Russian Minister ofDefense, announced that possibly 100 ormore suitcase-sized, one-kiloton nuclearbombs were missing from the Russianinventory. Presumably, they had been soldor were on the black market.4 The poten-tial of converting such devices into missilewarheads emphasizes the importance ofrefining our tactics, techniques and proce-dures necessary in combating the theater-missile threat.

Importance of SOFOne of the core functions at all levels of

command is force protection. With theirincreased accuracy and versatility oflaunch, TBMs will most likely demonstratetheir effectiveness at the very outset of aconflict. Suitable as weapons for long-range surprise attacks against U.S. forces,TBMs are a priority of the theater com-manders in chief, or CINCs.

26 Special Warfare

Scud Hunting: Theater Missile Defense and SOF

by Captain John M. Clearwater

Special-operations forces, or SOF, willperform crucial roles in the theater-mis-sile-defense plans of the CINCs. Joint Pub3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater MissileDefense, states that locating and targetingthe launchers and support structure beforelaunch is the most effective method of com-bating the TBM threat.5

Defensive measures aimed at disruptingthe enemy’s attack preparations andmomentum would draw SOF into the earli-est stages of a conflict, and could lead toshort-notice SOF mission taskings. Suchwas the case during the Gulf War, whenelements of the British Special Air Servicefound themselves rushed from Englandand quickly inserted into Iraq.6

Background The Gulf War remains our only experi-

ence with ballistic missile defense. It stillinfluences our thinking on theater-missiledefense, or TMD, and shows the value ofSOF in TMD operations.

From 1982 to 1988, Iraq and Iranexchanged more than 500 Scud missilesduring the infamous “War Between theCities.” Iran subsequently claimed to havekilled more than 3,000 civilians in a singleweek.7 While the Iraqi and Iranian Scudcampaigns accomplished little militarily,they did allow Iraq to begin the Gulf Warwith a pool of experienced rocket teams andengineers. Saddam Hussein was hopeful ofusing Scud attacks against Israel to promptan Israeli response and to draw Israel intothe Gulf War.

To avoid the political consequences ofsuch a situation, the coalition began a mas-sive air campaign to destroy the Iraqi Scudinfrastructure. The objective was to elimi-nate missile manufacture, storage facilitiesand fueling installations. The coalition’sattacks against the fixed infrastructurewere very effective, but locating the highlymobile MAZ-543 transporter, erector,launcher, or TEL, was remarkably difficulteven in a desert environment. The TELsproved to be surprisingly elusive and sur-

Spring 1999 27

During the Gulf War, theU.S. deployed Patriotmissiles such as theseto help defend Israelagainst Iraqi Scud mis-sile attacks.

Photo by Bill Thompson

vivable, despite the intense efforts to findand destroy them.

The Soviet Scud missile and the MAZ-543 launcher were designed for mobility.Thirteen meters in length, the MAZ-543launcher is an extremely powerful, 560-horsepower, rough-terrain vehicle. Power,ground clearance and a central tire-pres-surization system allow the vehicle tonegotiate rough terrain while transportinga 12-meter, 15,000-pound missile.

At the start of the Gulf War, intelligenceservices estimated that Iraq had 18launchers. When coalition aircraftdestroyed 16 in the first night’s strikes, thethreat seemed to have been eliminated.Unfortunately, the initial estimate hadbeen wrong, and the intelligence servicesrevised their figures to reflect 15 Scud bat-talions and as many as 225 launchers.8

In 43 days, the coalition carried out morethan 1,500 strikes against Iraqi missiletargets — ranging from suspected hidingplaces to Scud support facilities. Only 215strikes were reported against TELs. Coali-tion aircrews reported destroying 80 TELs,mostly by A-10s.9 (It now appears thatmany of these “TELs” were either decoys orvehicles unfortunate enough to have had“Scud-like” infrared and radar signatures.However, as the air campaign intensified,Scud launches, which had averaged fiveper day for the first 10 days, dropped toonly one per day for the last 33 days of thewar.10

On Feb. 25, 1991, a SOF element operat-ing in western Iraq reported a force ofapproximately 20 Scud launchers. SaddamHussein may have planned to use theScuds in a massive saturation strike tooverwhelm Patriot batteries defendingIsrael and to trigger an Israeli interven-tion. During the six hours following theSOF report, A-10s, guided in by SOF,destroyed all of the mobile launchers.Then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,who later met with members of the SOFelement, reportedly told them, “Thanks forkeeping Israel out of the war.”11

During the Gulf War, Iraqi forces fired 93Scuds: 42 at Israel, 48 at Saudi Arabia, andthree at Bahrain.12 The worst tragedy,however, occurred when a Scud missile hita barracks in which American soldierswere being housed. In all, 97 were wound-ed, and 28 were killed — 36 percent of theU.S. Army deaths from enemy action dur-ing the war.

Missile unit proceduresMissile units undergo rigorous training,

and they are often noted for their high levelof discipline and morale. Independentlyemployed and sustained from remote loca-tions, missile units have a support infra-structure that is streamlined and flexible.

Iraqi and North Korean Scud missilebrigades consist of three battalions, eachwith nine TELs, for a total of 27 TELs per

28 Special Warfare

Photo by Lee F. Corkran

An Iraqi Scud missile hitthis barracks in whichU.S. soldiers were beinghoused, killing 28 andwounding nearly 100.

brigade. North Korean surface-to-surfacemissile forces consist of two or morebrigades of Nodong launchers. Brigades alsomaintain headquarters companies, as wellas signal, engineer, weather, decontamina-tion, and technical-maintenance companies.

The missile battalion’s survival dependsupon speed of execution; preplanned hidesites, launch sites and reload sites; andsome form of cover and concealment. Whenconflict appears imminent, the missilebrigades and all support vehicles dispersefrom garrison locations and move to sepa-rate battalion forward operating bases, orFOBs.

The FOB may comprise 30-50 vehicles:command-and-control vehicles, cranes, fueltrucks, a pressure-test vehicle, oxidizertrucks, electrical-system-test vehicles, andmissile-warhead-transport vehicles. Thebattalion also has two or more resupplymissile transporters, each of which carries1-3 spare missiles. The missile battalion’sAchilles’ heel is its size. Such a large col-lection of vehicles may cover an area of 500square meters. The FOB will have indica-tors pointing to it from two directions: sup-ply routes and traffic to and from higherechelons, and support routes and traffic toand from the TELs.

Among the most critical of the missilebattalion’s assets is the crane vehicle, and

a battalion may have two or more. Thecrane is used to lift a missile off the mis-sile-transport vehicle and onto the TEL, aprocess that takes about 20 minutes. War-heads can be switched out in less than anhour.13 For sustained operations, a brigademay be allocated as many as 50 missiles.Resupply sites are generally located nearthe brigade headquarters, but their loca-tion varies depending upon the terrain andthe roads.

Prior to operations, battalion command-ers will very likely have selected TEL hidesites, launch sites and reload sites. Hidesites, in particular, are chosen for their nat-ural cover and for their ability to reducedetection by electro-optical, infrared, andradar sensors. Some countries, such asNorth Korea, use an extensive network ofhardened underground facilities, oftendesigned with multiple camouflaged exitsand entrances spread over a wide area. Intime of war, the TELs emerge briefly, movea short distance, launch, and return to thesafety of the hardened facility to reload.

Decoys are a significant part of each mis-sile battalion. Decoys and real TELs arenearly indistinguishable when observed bythe naked eye, daylight video, or videoimaging. Only subtle differences can bedistinguished by infrared and radar sen-sors.14 U.N. observers who oversaw the

Spring 1999 29

The MAZ-543 transporter, erector, launcher is amobile, powerful rough-terrain vehicle.

File photoFile photo

destruction of Iraqi launchers after theGulf War reported that it was impossible tovisually distinguish a decoy from a reallauncher at a distance of more than of 25yards.15

Targeting decisions are normally madeat the strategic level and are then passedto the missile battalion for execution. Thebattery commander receives targeting dataand launch-site locations, and designatesthe TELs to fire. Launch plans pass downthe chain of command from the brigadecommander approximately 12 hours inadvance. To preserve electronic silence, thebattalions transmit execution orders byland line or courier.

Missile launches are conducted underthe direct supervision of an officer or asenior NCO. This person carries with himthe vital target and launch data as hemoves about the assigned missile-opera-tions area in a command-and-control vehi-cle. In order to launch, the MAZ-543requires virtually level ground, and itsoperators can level the vehicle as much astwo degrees left-to-right, and three degreesfront-to-rear. Locating level ground can bea major constraint in establishing new,unsurveyed launch sites. However, even inrough terrain it is still possible to findsmall level spots.16 Immediately afterlaunch, as the missile is still climbing, thecrew readies the vehicle to move out of thearea to a preplanned hide site. U.S. Armytests of the MAZ-543 have demonstrated amove-out time of less than two minutesafter launch.

Prior to the Gulf War, researchers whostudied Soviet missile exercises and Iraqilaunches during the Iran-Iraq war theo-rized that there might be enoughprelaunch signature to give patrolling air-craft time to attack the launchers beforethey fired. But during the Gulf War, theIraqis executed 80 percent of their launch-es at night; they drastically reduced theirprelaunch set-up times; they avoidedprelaunch electromagnetic emissions; andthey seeded their launch areas withdecoys. Even F-15Es orbiting in the vicini-ty of the launches experienced great diffi-culty spotting the TELs. For these reasons,searching for the TELs is considered a los-

ing effort, and TMD planning and analysiscells focus on locating and destroying theFOBs, instead.

The missile unit’s strengths lie in skilledand motivated crews using well-designedequipment; preplanned operations deepbehind the border; and the effective use ofdecoys. The missile unit’s vulnerabilitiesinclude large vehicles; a sizable support-vehicle signature; and the dependence upona road network. The TEL itself requires avirtually level surface for launching. Aftereach launch, the TEL must expose itself inorder to link up with a missile transporterand a crane for reloading.

Attack operationsWith the proliferation of the missile

threat, TMD has become a major battle-field challenge and a major research-and-development challenge. TMD involveslocating and destroying missiles beforelaunch (attack operations), shooting downmissiles in flight (active defense), andalerting soldiers at predicted points ofimpact (passive defense).

Considering the immense challenge ofintercepting inbound missiles (essentiallyhitting one bullet in flight with another),and the consequences of missing, U.S. doc-trine stresses the urgency of locating anddestroying the missiles before they can belaunched.17 Attack operations are designedto prevent launches by attacking and elimi-nating each element of the overall system —launch platforms, command-and-controlnodes, support vehicles, missile stocks andinfrastructure. The more effective theattack operations, the less active ourdefense will have to be in contending withinbound missiles. Attack operations is anarea for which SOF are particularly well-qualified.

As the TEL launches, the satellite systemof the Defense Support Program picks upand reports the missile’s infrared signature.With that report, in-theater TMD networkswill, within minutes, plot and distribute theestimated location of the launch. Attackassets, such as F-15Es or A-10s, may deployto the area, but the TEL will most likelydepart the site before they arrive. During

30 Special Warfare

the Gulf War, orbiting strike aircraftobserved 42 Scud launches, but on onlyeight occasions were they able to acquirethe target long enough to drop ordnance.18

TMD analysts will define a named area ofinterest, or NAI, whose boundaries arebased upon the distance the TEL could havetraveled after launching. To aid in a system-atic search of the NAI, analysts also identi-fy sensor requirements and availability.

For TMD planning, SOF are usually clas-sified as a sensor asset, along with satel-lites; unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs;and radar systems. However, SOF provideadditional benefits to the CINC in the crit-ical areas of dependability, attack opera-tions and battle-damage assessment, orBDA. Effective TMD hinges on accurateand timely intelligence. SOF surveillance,with its ability to conduct near-real-time,eyes-on reporting, is widely considered themost reliable method of obtaining targetinformation. SOF reports may initiate atargeting process that SOF can furtherassist in by guiding attack assets towardthe target. SOF can then follow up with

immediate BDA. The importance of BDA isevident: If the attack fails to destroy thetarget, the attack must resume while thetarget is still identified and pinpointed.Once the target has been destroyed, it isimportant to call off further attacks to con-serve attack assets.

The search for TELs and their supportstructure can be enhanced by blending thehuman strengths of SOF with emergingsensor technologies, including remote sen-sors, thermal imagery, UAVs and the JointSurveillance Target Attack Radar System,or JSTARS.

Remote sensors. SOF can establish a net-work of various types of remote sensors inan area, as well as monitor a network ofair-dropped sensors. Remote sensors cansignificantly strengthen SOF’s ability tomonitor areas when the enemy is mostlikely to be active — during hours of limit-ed visibility.

Thermal imagery. Thermal imageryoffers the ability to peer through effectivecamouflage, and advances in technologyhave reduced the size and weight of ther-

Spring 1999 31

Photo by Lance Cheung

While satellite communi-cations can provide real-time battle information,eyes-on reporting bySOF surveillance is stillconsidered the most reli-able method.

mal-imagery equipment to the point that itcan easily be carried by SOF elements.

UAVs. UAVs are making great leaps as areconnaissance tool. Their infrared andthermal imagery can rapidly scan selectedroad networks, and they are particularlyeffective when used in conjunction withSOF. For the near term, UAVs remain inshort supply, and they are limited in rangeand staying power when used for huntingdeep targets like TELs.

JSTARS. The JSTARS is a flying radarstation designed to locate and targetground forces. With its powerful, deep-look-ing radar, JSTARS can track hundreds ofpotential ground targets, especially vehi-cles. It can also build a database of enemyactivity. Its radar, however, cannot deter-mine the kind of vehicle being observed. AsSOF teams transmit reports detailingvehicle types, airborne observers can elec-tronically tag and track the vehicles asthey move around on the battlefield. Thisscenario shows the value of having eyes onthe ground and detailed reporting.

In the search for the enemy, communica-tions flow is the key to effectiveness. Justas the intel gathered by SOF is used toalert intel and analysis cells to TBM activ-ity and to assist sensors in narrowing theirsearch area, the same intel must be used toalert SF detachments in isolation and onthe ground. The MI detachment of the SFFOB maximizes its links to the joint intel-ligence center and theater analysis and

control elements, normally located at thecorps level. Periodic intel updates to theSOF element in an NAI or in a joint spe-cial-operations area significantly improvethe element’s survivability and its abilityto perform the mission.

Effective sensor-to-shooter report flowrequires constant refinement. Hittingmobile, time-sensitive targets like MAZ-543s requires that the sensor-to-shootertime line be measured in minutes. ArmyTMD attack operations are a subset ofdeep-attack and precision-strike opera-tions, but while they use the same process-es for planning and destroying targets thatdeep attack and precision-strike opera-tions use,19 TMD attack operations have amuch faster tempo. TMD operationsplanned according to an air tasking order,which is normally built around a 37-hourplanning process, will probably not beeffective unless their mission is to elimi-nate fixed support sites.

During TMD operations, the SOF ele-ment should report its observations inaccordance with the SALUTE format (size,activity, location, unit, time and equip-ment). In addition, the SOF elementshould include information regarding itsproximity to the target. With the distance-to-target information, the targeting cellcan determine whether the SOF element isin the “danger close” range. The SOF ele-ment does not report itself “clear for fire”because it may not know the type of air-craft, weapon system or munitions allocat-ed to the strike. Also, if the SOF element isable to employ a ground-laser designator, itshould report that fact to assist the target-ing cell.

To transmit the SALUTE report fromthe SR site to the targeteers as rapidly aspossible, a solid theater-level liaison net-work must exist between joint organiza-tions. Liaison personnel located with thejoint special-operations task force, orJSOTF, serve as conduits to various groupssuch as the Army Air and Missile DefenseCommand, or AAMDC; the corps deep-operations coordination cells, or DOCCs;and the air operations center, or AOC.

The AAMDC represents the Army’seffort to develop a command that focuses

32 Special Warfare

Photo by Larry Aaron

Two JSTARS aircraft waiton the airfield at Rhein-Main air base in Ger-many. The flying radarstations can track hun-dreds of targets simulta-neously and build data-bases of enemy activity.

on analyzing, coordinating and directingthe TBM fight. The AAMDC commander, abrigadier general, is the TMD special staffofficer for the joint forces land-componentcommander, or JFLCC. The AAMDC servesas both principal adviser and operationalintegrator for TMD, and it coordinates onbehalf of the JFLCC and the JSOTF.

The 5th Special Forces Group, whosearea of operations (southwest Asia andNorth Africa) is home to a number of roguenations and potential adversaries withTBM and WMD capability, has placed par-ticular emphasis on training for the TMDfight. During Exercise Roving Sands 1997,held at Fort Bliss, Texas, the 5th Group’sdesert-mobility teams, whose mountedcapability gives them critical missionendurance and flexibility, demonstratedtheir potential.

During the week-long exercise, twomounted SF detachments infiltrated intoNAIs and established SR sites from whichto observe remote road networks in NewMexico. The detachments sent back morethan 60 SALUTE reports detailing enemymissile activities. According to the AAMDCcommander, these reports were an “absolutesuccess,”20 The reports were sent back to aspecial-operations command-and-controlelement and a forward element of SpecialOperations Command-Central that was act-ing as the JSOTF. An AAMDC liaison officercopied the SALUTE report as it came in andflashed it to the AAMDC’s analysis and tar-geting cells. If the SALUTE report present-ed an opportunity for an immediate strike(such as a TEL erecting for launch) it was

passed to both the corps DOCC and the bat-tle-coordination element of the AOC as atarget nomination. Attack responsivenessthen became a matter of asset availability.

Three TMD-related exercises in 199721

revealed the need for further refinement incommunication with the inserted SOF ele-ment, principally in regard to notifying theelement of impending strikes, and in repo-sitioning SOF to observe areas in whichother sensors have reported possible TBMactivity. Although the SOF element mayhave to be repositioned in response to adeveloping intel picture, SOF personnel dorisk exposure during movement. Restrict-ed-fire areas, or RFAs, must also move asthe SOF element relocates. During theGulf War, a SOF element that had movedoutside its RFA was spotted by patrollingA-10s. The element’s vehicles, hidden in awadi and parked end-to-end under camonets, appeared on infrared sensors as aTEL. Fortunately, the pilot missed the ele-ment with his first shot, and before hecould fire again, he was alerted to the SOFpresence.22

Combat air patrols, or CAPs, are oftenconducted as near as possible to thepotential location of Scud launchers in aneffort to minimize fighter-response times.SOF elements may find themselves guid-ing in Air Force or Navy CAPs via laser-target designators. TBMs, however, areoften protected by an integrated air-defense network because of their strategicvalue. Once these enemy air-defense sys-tems assume a wartime full alert, theymay check the free employment of air

Spring 1999 33

Photo by John Clearwater

The mounted capability ofSF desert-mobility teamsgives them flexibility andmission endurance thatare important in TMDoperations.

assets, and the risks associated with aeri-al insertion may be prohibitive. Necessitymay require a CINC to ask the NationalCommand Authorities for cross-borderauthority in order to insert SOF prior tothe actual outbreak of hostilities.

It appears unlikely that an SR elementwould be asked to jeopardize itself and itsmission by attempting to engage anddestroy the missile and the launcher. Such adirect-action mission would depend uponthe criticality of the target (for example, theknown or potential launches of WMD), theavailability of other attack assets, and theproximity of the SOF element to the target.In these kinds of circumstances, surprise,speed, and shock effect, particularly atnight, are likely to accomplish the goal ofdestroying or disabling the missile and thelauncher. All the vehicles associated withthe missile battalion are thin-skinned, andtheir night-vision capabilities are limited.The ground defense of the TEL may be lim-ited to a crew equipped only with smallarms, and the defense may have to relyupon assistance from a reaction element.

The missile itself is an especially easytarget. Because missiles must be capable ofoperating at high speeds and at high alti-tudes, even the smallest puncture fromsmall-arms fire can render them inopera-ble for launch or incapable of reachingtheir target. Considering the amount ofhighly volatile liquid propellant carriedwithin the missile, tracer rounds might

very likely detonate the propellant anddestroy the TEL. Stand-off weapons withnight optics, such as the .50-caliber Barrettor the M-24 sniper system, are ideal forthat purpose. Assaulting the TEL itselfwould be necessary only for gathering crit-ical intel, such as maps and targeting data,or for destroying the warhead.

Even though a TEL may appear to be agreat target of opportunity, the more valu-able objective will almost always be tolocate and destroy the support structure —the FOB. In the larger perspective, skillfulSR and timely, accurate reporting will havethe greatest impact on the enemy’s abilityto conduct missile operations.

ConclusionWhile there is no magic formula for con-

ducting TMD, solid intelligence-gathering,rapid communications and close coopera-tion are the keys to success. Attack opera-tions require a close working relationshipbetween the SOF team on the ground andthe quick-reaction strike assets. Effective-ness comes only from extensive coordina-tion all along the chain of command —from the theater’s joint forces commanderto the SOF team in a hide site.

During Roving Sands 1997, the sensor-to-shooter communication time line wasmeasured in minutes. After-action com-ments concentrated on the need to bringresponse times down to seconds. Advances

34 Special Warfare

DoD photo

This Iraqi Scud was shotdown during DesertStorm by a Patriot mis-sile. Although missilesare thin-skinned, highlyvolatile targets, targetingthe missile support struc-ture is more effective thantargeting the missilesthemselves.

in communications and data-processingequipment will continue to shorten thetime line, as will liaison links and the com-mitment to refine organizational tactics,techniques and procedures.

As the range, accuracy and payloads ofTBMs continue to evolve, the influence ofTBMs will increase dramatically. Theseweapons could pose a potential threat toU.S. forces employed in force projection,intervention or peacekeeping. They couldalso generate significant political and mili-tary pressure. China’s missile demonstra-tions off the coast of Taiwan in March 1997sent a clear signal to the Taiwanese peopleas they prepared to hold elections.

The successful use of tactical ballisticmissiles and land-attack cruise missilesduring the Gulf War indicate a major shiftin the nature of future warfare.

Cheap in comparison to their catastroph-ic results, missiles will allow states withotherwise limited power-projection capa-bilities to exert regional or global influ-ence. Because missiles and unmannedattack vehicles will have a forceful impacton virtually every aspect of 21st-centurywarfare, TMD will most certainly beincluded in a theater CINC’s priority intel-ligence requirements. SOF will be a crucialasset for the CINC in prosecuting the mis-sile battle through timely reconnaissance,attack operations and BDA.

Captain John M. Clearwateris the public affairs officer forthe 1st Infantry Division. Inhis previous assignment, hewas the special-operationsplanning officer for the U.S.Army Air and Missile De-fense Command. A Special Forces officer, hehas served in the 12th SF Group as adetachment commander; and in the 5th SFGroup as the S5, 3rd Battalion, and ascommander of a long-range desert mobilitydetachment. Captain Clearwater is a grad-uate of the Psychological OperationsCourse, the Civil Affairs Officer Course, thePublic Affairs Officer Course and theArmor Officer Advanced Course.

Notes:1 Bill Gertz, “Russia, China Aid Iran’s Missile Pro-

gram,” Washington Times, 10 September 1997.2 Steve Rodan, “Secret Israeli Data,” Defense News,

6-12 October 1997.3 Reuters News Service; Seoul, 22 April 1997.4 CBS News, “60 Minutes,” Interview with Alexander

Leben, 14 September 1997.5 Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile

Defense, 22 February 1996, p. xi.6 Author’s interview with SAS member captured in

Iraq; Fort Campbell, Ky., 21 July 1994.7 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner,

The Lessons of Modern War, The Iran-Iraq War (Boul-der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 525.

8 Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq, Air Power andthe Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institu-tion Press, 1992), p. 179.

9 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolutionin Warfare?: Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis,Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 73.10 Hallion, p. 183.11 Ibid., p. 184.12 Ibid., p. 185.13 Briefing by Joint Theater Missile Defense-JointTest Force; Republic of Korea, August 1997.14 Army Air & Missile Defense Command Handbook,January 1997, p. 21.15 Hallion, p. 75.16 Briefing by Joint Theater Missile Defense-JointTest Force; Republic of Korea, August 1997.17 Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater MissileDefense, March 30, 1994.18 Keaney and Cohen, p. 76.19 FM 100-12, Army Theater Missile Defense Opera-tions, September 1996.20 BG Dennis Cavin, commander, AAMDC, duringafter-action review of Roving Sands 1997, describingSF participation in the exercise.21 Author’s notes from Roving Sands 1997, Fort Bliss,Texas; Coherent Defense 1997, U.S. Atlantic Com-mand, Norfolk, Va.; Ulchi Focus Lens 1997, Republicof Korea.22 Author’s notes from discussion of Scud-hunting inIraq with one of the participants. Fort Campbell, Ky.,June 1996.

Spring 1999 35

Throughout most of history, the con-ventional mentoring paradigm hasdefined mentors as those who

impart wisdom, advice and guidance totheir protégés.

The word mentoring is taken from theOdyssey. Odysseus is getting ready to fightthe Trojan War and realizes that he mustleave behind his heir, Telemachus.Odysseus recognizes that he won’t bearound for several years, and that someonewill need to coach and teach Telemachus.

Odysseus must find someone to completeTelemachus’ education. He chooses a trust-ed family member named Mentor to be thetutor. Mentor possesses wisdom and sensi-tivity — both of which are important ingre-dients in any mentoring situation, eventoday.

The form of mentoring, as many envi-sion, has as its aim to increase the ability

of key personnel to achieve organizationalgoals while at the same time inspiringthem to more easily realize their ownwants and needs. As a result of this proc-ess, protégés will have gained improvedperformance, increased satisfaction andgreater knowledge. The context is thereforedifferent from counseling, which focuses onthe evaluation of an individual’s perform-ance, from an organizational perspective,by someone within the individual’s chain ofcommand. Counseling is hardly a situationin which an open, wide-ranging, and frankdiscussion can take place.

The problem with mentoring in the SOFcommunity is that it just “happens” spon-taneously or naturally — it’s a matter ofbeing in the right place at the right time tobe noticed by the right person who pro-vides the right kind of help. This is not thesystematic assistance that key personnelneed in order to enrich themselves and addvalue to their organization. Too many peo-ple “fall through the cracks” and do not getthe mentoring they require when it is mostneeded.

It is doubtful, in spite of all the zeal andidealism surrounding mentoring, that theArmy or the SOF community will establisha formalized mentoring program. The rea-son is simple: Mentoring is critical, but it isnot urgent. And, as we all know, most of ourtime and energy are spent on urgent stuffthat is not critical. However, although it isspotty, mentoring does occur in our com-

36 Special Warfare

Mentoring: Critical Assistance for the SOF Community

by Major General Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

It is doubtful, in spite of all the zeal and ideal-ism surrounding mentoring, that the Army orthe SOF community will establish a formal-ized mentoring program. … Mentoring is criti-cal, but it is not urgent. And, as we all know,most of our time and energy are spent onurgent stuff that is not critical.

munity. For an individual who is contem-plating becoming a mentor, a good start isto keep in mind the six universal desiresthat motivate people to work, volunteer,join and affiliate:

1. The desire for recognition, which caus-es a person to seek experiences that bringsocial approval, commendation or prestige,and to avoid experiences that result inridicule, scorn or disapproval.

2. The desire for affection, which causesa person to seek experiences involvingappreciation, understanding, intimacy orsupport, and to avoid situations in whichthere is a lack of appreciation or support.

3. The desire for power, which causes aperson to seek experiences that promiseachievement, success, self-determination

or mastery; and to avoid situations thatpromise frustration or a sense of failure.

4. The desire for new experiences, whichcauses a person to seek novelty, adventure,thrill, excitement or change; and to avoiddullness, monotony or boredom.

5. The desire for security, which causes aperson to seek experiences that give asense of protection, belonging or confi-dence, and to avoid situations involvingdisloyalty, abandonment, insecurity or fear.

6. The desire for friends, which causes aperson to seek experiences that involvemeeting and interacting with people whoshare some common values.

If one has an appreciation of what moti-vates people, knowledge to impart, and awillingness to give his or her time and

Spring 1999 37

Pick ’em up, dust ’em off …In one of my assignments as a young infantry officer, I was sent to the 48th

Infantry near Frankfurt, Germany. In those days our prize weapon was a huge 280-mm atomic cannon. Guarded by infantry platoons, these guns were hauled aroundthe forests on trucks to keep the Soviets from guessing their location. One day Cap-tain Tom Miller assigned my platoon to guard a 280. I alerted my men, loaded my .45-caliber pistol and jumped into my jeep. I had not gone far when I realized that my.45 was gone.

I was petrified. In the Army, losing a weapon is serious business. I had no choicebut to radio Captain Miller and tell him. “You what?” he said in disbelief. He pauseda few seconds, then added, “All right, continue the mission.” When I returned,uneasily contemplating my fate, Miller called me over. “I’ve got something for you,”he said, handing me the pistol. “Some kids in the village found it where it fell out ofyour holster.”

“Kids found it?” I felt a cold chill.“Yeah,” he said. “Luckily they only got off one round before we heard the shot and

took the gun away.” The disastrous possibilities left me limp. “For God’s sake, son,don’t let that happen again.”

He drove off. I checked the magazine and found it was full. The gun had not beenfired. Later I learned that I had dropped it in my tent before I ever got started. Millerhad fabricated the scene about the kids to give me a good scare.

Today the Army might hold an investigation, call in lawyers and likely enter a badmark on my record. Miller gave me the chance to learn from my mistake. His exam-ple of intelligent leadership was not lost on me. Nobody ever got to the top withoutslipping up. When someone stumbles, I don’t believe in stomping on him. My philos-ophy is “Pick ’em up, dust ’em off and get ’em moving again.”

— General Colin Powell, U.S. Army (ret.)

From My American Journey, by Colin Powell (New York: Random House, 1995).Copyright 1995. Used with the author’s permission.

effort to help an individual, one is ready tobe a much-needed mentor. At the sametime, the mentor will enjoy a rewardingand satisfying experience.

For mentoring to be successful, theremust be a good relationship between thementor and the protégé. The relationshipshould be based on trust and confidence, sothat effective communication can take

place. Mentoring is not lecturing. The pro-tégé may seek information, propose orexchange ideas, express feelings, solve aproblem or pursue opportunities. This isnot a complete list, but merely a samplingof topical exchanges. The mentor’s role, onthe other hand, is to coach, nurture, collab-orate, advise and support.

At the individual level, the benefits ofhaving been mentored will vary widely,depending on the protégé’s particularneeds, aspirations and situation. Onemay:• Have the confidence not simply to tag

along with organizational changes butto lead the organization and to champi-on the new culture.

• Have improved leadership and manage-ment skills.

• Have improved listening, challenging,and empathizing skills.

• Have the confidence to set and achieveperformance goals.

• Have someone with whom you canspeak freely and candidly.

• Be more ordered and reflective, ratherthan rushing into things.

• Have a wider perspective on theimpact of his or her leadership and

management style.• Be less ruled by feelings and more able

to cope with difficult situations.• Have the courage to be more bold and to

sell one’s ideas more strongly, therebyopening up additional ways of thinking.

• Be more mindful of the need to be com-passionate and understanding, and beable to deal with the underlying problems,not just the symptoms, of subordinates.Needless to say, the list could be much

longer. Mentoring is one of those rare activi-ties that makes everyone a winner — the pro-tégé, the mentor and the organization.

Major General SidneyShachnow’s commissionedservice spanned more than 30years, during which he servedas either a commander or astaff officer with Infantry,Mechanized Infantry, airmo-bile, airborne, and Special Forces units. Heserved as commanding general of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School, of theArmy Special Forces Command, and of U.S.Army-Berlin. Shachnow holds a bachelor’sdegree from the University of Nebraska anda master’s degree from Shippensburg Uni-versity, Shippensburg, Pa. He retired fromthe Army in August 1994.

38 Special Warfare

For mentoring to be successful, there must bea good relationship between the mentor andthe protégé.The relationship should be basedon trust and confidence, so that effectivecommunication can take place. Mentoring isnot lecturing. The protégé may seek informa-tion, propose or exchange ideas, express feel-ings, solve a problem or pursue opportunities.

Unconventional warfare, or UW,is a popular topic of discussionamong Special Forces operatorsand commanders. Around theworld, there seems to be a greatdeal of interest in everythingimplied under the heading of UW.

According to Joint Pub 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionaryof Military and Associated Terms (7December 1998), UW is “A broadspectrum of military and paramili-tary operations, normally of longduration, predominantly conductedby indigenous or surrogate forceswho are organized, trained,equipped, supported, and directedin varying degrees by an externalsource. It includes guerrilla war-fare and other direct offensive, lowvisibility, covert, or clandestineoperations, as well as the indirectactivities of subversion, sabotage,intelligence activities, and evasionand escape.”

One school of thought in the UWdiscussion questions whether theterm “unconventional warfare”should be replaced by the term“unconventional operations,” or

UO, and proposes the following def-inition for UO:

The conduct of missions andoperations through, with, or byindigenous or surrogate elementsthroughout the operational contin-uum. Unconventional operationsinclude, but are not limited to, abroad spectrum of operations thatcan be of long duration. UO areconducted by elements that areorganized, trained, equipped, sup-ported, or directed in varyingdegrees by external sources. UO arecharacterized by their joint andinteragency complexion and areeither overt, covert, or clandestine.Examples of UO include stabilityoperations; guerrilla warfare; sub-version; sabotage; information andintelligence activities; evasion andescape; special reconnaissance;underground operations; auxiliaryoperations; establishing supportsystems; establishing command-and-control systems; and directaction conducted by indigenous orsurrogate elements.

It has been argued for some timethat our definition of UW refersmore to an environment than to amission, and that the UO definitiondoes provide greater detail in defin-ing the nature of operations to beconducted. But while our definitionof UW does have room for improve-ment, the validity of the term“unconventional warfare” is in noway negated. In fact, there are goodreasons for preserving it.

Army FM 100-5, Operations,speaks of principles of war as theyapply to wartime operations. Itdoes not speak of principles ofoperations. A second reason forpreserving the term is to maintainthe focus on our war-fighter capa-bilities. Our task as soldiers is tofight our nation’s wars and to winthem. It is imperative that all sol-diers, SF in particular, preserveand nurture the war-fighter out-look. SF were designed to conduct

unconventional warfare, and theyhave developed the capabilities tocombat insurgencies and theireffects around the globe.

FM 31-20-2, Unconventional War-fare, Tactics, Techniques, and Proce-dures for Special Forces, is current-ly undergoing revision at the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and School,and the initial draft is scheduled forpublication in the near future. Nowis the time for SF soldiers toaddress and discuss the UW issue.With further discussion and com-ments from the field, we hope toclarify the definition of UW and tobring clarity to our doctrine.

In 1962, John F. Kennedy stated,“There is another type of warfare —new in its intensity, ancient in itsorigin — war by guerrillas, subver-sives, insurgents, assassins; war byambush instead of by combat, byinfiltration instead of aggression,seeking victory by eroding andexhausting the enemy instead ofengaging him ... It preys onunrest.” He also said, “Our forces,therefore, must fulfill a broaderrole, as a complement to our diplo-macy, as an army of our diplomacy,as a deterrent to our adversaries,and as a symbol to our allies of ourdetermination to support them.”

UW was the original premise ofSpecial Forces. We owe it to ourselvesand to our nation to maintain a capa-bility for unconventional warfare andto preserve the war-fighter outlook inSpecial Forces.

Debate or comments may be sub-mitted to Special Warfare or to CW3Michael J. Ivosevic, DSN 239-9802;commercial (910) 432-9802; fax -5341;or e-mail [email protected]. — Editor

Chief Warrant Officer 3 MichaelJ. Ivosevic is chief of the DoctrineBranch, SF Doctrine Division, inthe SWCS Directorate of Trainingand Doctrine.

Spring 1999 39

Unconventional Warfare: Refining the Definition

by Chief Warrant Officer 3Michael J. Ivosevic

Coalition forces assemble to conduct avariety of operations, from combat tooperations other than war. But

whatever their mission, all coalition forcesface similar challenges: differences in theirlanguage, military perspectives, training,doctrine, command-and-control architec-ture, and support relationships. To mini-mize these challenges and to maximize thecoalition’s power, theater commanders mayemploy a flexible, effective, economy-of-force option: liaison-coordination elements,or LCEs.

When employed, LCEs are attached tounits of the coalition to help those unitsachieve seamless integration into the over-all force. LCEs do not duplicate the ele-ments or the missions of the supportedunit, nor do they provide additional com-bat-maneuver elements. Instead, LCEsprovide or enhance the battlefield operat-ing systems that the supported unit musthave in order to accomplish its mission.

LCE activities are designed to be trans-parent, so that the presence of the LCEdoes not overshadow the supported unit’saccomplishments. The LCE mission istruly a task for quiet professionals. And theskills of U.S. Army Special Forces — intraining, planning, executing independentoperations, operating in varied environ-ments, language and intercultural commu-nication — form the foundation for suc-cessful LCE employment.

In recent years, there have been several

successful LCE operations: During Opera-tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm,LCEs (referred to as coalition-supportteams, or CSTs) provided liaison, commu-nications integration and close air support,or CAS, to the various coalition countries.During Operation Uphold Democracy inHaiti, CSTs provided communications con-nectivity and liaison support thatstrengthened the operational proficiency ofcoalition units.

During Operation Joint Endeavor andOperation Joint Guard in Bosnia-Herze-govina, LCEs were employed initiallywith units of the United Nations Protec-tion Force. LCEs assisted in the rede-ployment of those units or in integrat-ing them into the lead peace-implemen-tation force, or IFOR, of the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization. In thelater stages of IFOR and in the eventu-al stabilization force, or SFOR, LCEswere attached to the Hungarian Engi-neer Battalion, or HUBAT; to theRomanian Engineer Battalion, orROBAT; and to the Independent Rus-sian Airborne Brigade, or RUSBDE.

There are five LCE supporting tasks:provide communications connectivity;provide intelligence connectivity; provideclose-air support, or CAS, capability; pro-vide liaison support; and provide medical-evacuation, or MEDEVAC, capability.LCE mission-essential tasks focus on thesupporting tasks. The LCE mission-essen-

40 Special Warfare

The Liaison Coordination Element: ForceMultiplier for Coalition Operations

by Captain Chadwick W. Storlie

tial task list, or METL, is shown below:1• Deploy.• Build rapport.• Provide command, control, communica-

tions and intelligence, or C3I.• Conduct terminal-guidance operations.• Maintain mobility.• Redeploy/recover.

LCE individual tasks, collective tasks,and cross-training tasks vary according tothe detachment training levels and thespecifics of the mission.

Task organizationDepending on the requirements of the

operation, the LCE employs from four to12 personnel. A solid mission analysisthat examines detachment manning, the-ater-specific movement policies, and indi-vidual soldier strengths will determinethe most effective task organization andpositioning.

There are two types of LCEs: the static-position and the multiple-position. The sta-tic-position LCE is appropriate when thesupported unit has adequate tactical skillsbut requires additional support in com-mand-and-control functions at the battal-ion level and higher. A four-man elementlocated in the supported unit’s headquar-ters can conduct a static-position LCE,

through coordination with an establishedhigher headquarters. The LCE that wasinitially attached to the RUSBDE duringOperation Joint Endeavor was the static-position-type.

The multiple-position LCE is appropri-ate when the supported unit requiresassistance at the tactical level and at thebattalion-headquarters level or higher.Consisting of a base station and one ormore mobile teams, the multiple-positionLCE may require a 12-man detachment.During Operation Joint Endeavor andOperation Joint Guard, the LCEs thatwere attached to the HUBAT and ROBAT,as well as the LCE that was attached tothe RUSBDE during the latter half ofJoint Endeavor, were of the multiple-posi-tion type.

The LCEs that were attached to theHUBAT and the ROBAT performed liaisonand coordination with other engineerunits, supporting forces, adjacent IFORunits, and higher headquarters; and theirmobile teams provided protection for workcrews. The RUSBDE LCE’s mobile teamsaccompanied area patrols and weapons-storage-site inspection teams.

The special-operations terminal attackcontroller, or SOTAC, a highly trained com-bat-control team of the U.S. Air Force, pro-vides the LCE with CAS capability, and

Spring 1999 41

MULTIPLE-POSITION LCESTATIC-POSITION LCE

BASE STATION

18A Commander180A/18Z Asst det commander18E Communications18D MedicalSOTAC

TEAM 2 – MOBILE

18Z Tm 2 commander18C Asst Tm 2 commander18B Weapons18D Medical

BASE STATION

18A Commander18F Ops & intel sgt18E Sr communications18E Jr communications

TEAM 1 – MOBILE

180A Tm 1 commander18B Asst Tm 1 commander18C Engineer18D MedicalSOTAC

Types of Liaison Coordination Elements

trains LCE members in the proper proce-dures for requesting emergency CAS.

LCE operations consist of four phases:predeployment, deployment, employment,and redeployment.

PredeploymentThe predeployment phase is the time

during which the LCE prepares for itsentry into the theater of operations. Thepredeployment phase consists of three sub-phases: mission planning, training on mis-sion-essential tasks, and individual andunit administrative preparations.

Mission planning. Mission planningbegins with a thorough mission analysis,in accordance with the guidelines of thetactical decision-making process, orTDMP. TDMP is “the military decisionmaking process that includes a systemat-ic approach to decision making, which fos-ters effective analysis by enhancing appli-cation of professional knowledge, logic,and judgment. It must consist of the esti-mate of the situation and one of the three

methods of decision making (deliberate,combat or quick).”2

The TDMP cannot ensure that the mis-sion plan will be flawless. Creativity, criti-cal thought and shrewd analysis must beexercised throughout each step of missionplanning.

Training on mission-essential tasks. Thesecond subphase of the predeploymentphase is the period during which thedetachment trains on individual and col-lective mission-essential tasks. These tasksare derived through the detachment’s mis-sion analysis, and are incorporated intotraining schedules, situational-trainingexercises, and other events used in prepar-ing the detachment for the LCE operation.

Pre-mission training, or PMT, shouldinclude mounted and dismounted immedi-ate-action drills, or IADs. IADs should besimple and tactically sound. Any memberof the detachment must be able to leadthe drills and be able to execute them dur-ing day or night. IADs should includestandard deployment configurations fordaily patrol operations as well as special

42 Special Warfare

PHASE

PREDEPLOYMENT

DEPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT

REDEPLOYMENT

DEFINITION

Training and planning that the LCE conducts prior to entry into the theater of operations

Movement of the LCE from home station into the theater of operations

Initial assessment; tran-sition; and execution of the specific subtasks of the LCE mission

Return of the LCE from the theater of operations to home station

ENDING

Upon takeoff of the de-parture aircraft

Upon arrival at the initial point of contact and link-up with the supported unit

Upon completion of the operation; relief by another unit; or change of mission

Upon redeployment of all personnel and equipment to home station and completion of mission recovery and main-tenance

ASSOCIATED TASKS

Order preparation; wea-pons qualification; cross training of mission-es-sential skills; and im-munizations

Equipment shipping and personnel movement

Providing CAS and fire-support capability; ME-DEVAC; liaison; intel-ligence and communica-tions connectivity

Property accountability; equipment maintenance; and movement of per-sonnel and equipment

BEGINNING

Upon receipt of the warning order or initial notification of the mis-sion

Upon takeoff of the de-parture aircraft

Upon arrival at the initial point of contact with the supported unit

Upon completion of the operation; relief by another unit; or change of mission

Phases of a Liaison Coordination Element Operation

employment configurations for CAS andMEDEVAC operations.

The detachment should use informationgathered through the intelligence prepara-tion of the battlefield, or IPB, in developingor modifying IADs. An IPB analysis of theuse of mines in the heavily mined areas ofBosnia-Herzegovina, as well as an analysisof the activities in those areas, led to theformulation of the IAD titled “React to aMine Detonation.” Existing IADs, such as“React to Indirect Fire,” were modified torestrict their activities to routes and areasthat have been cleared of mines. Ideally,IADs should be formulated in two sets: onefor heavily mined areas and one for areasclear of mines.

A solid area orientation should includethe history of the region, local courtesiesand customs, survival language phrases,and information about hostile and nonhos-tile military forces in the area. Collectively,the IADs, IPB, standard mission configura-tions, and area orientation provide soldierswith a comprehensive understanding ofwhat they are likely to encounter and whattheir reaction should be.

Individual and unit administrativepreparations. Individual and unit adminis-trative preparations encompass the finalstep in the predeployment phase. Individ-ual preparations include required immu-nizations; counseling; preparation of willsand powers of attorney; and the initiationor the deletion of additional pay allow-ances. Unit administrative preparationsinclude coordination of departure aircraft;equipment packing and palletization; dec-laration and labeling of hazardous cargo;and family-support-group meetings.

DeploymentThe deployment phase is the period dur-

ing which the LCE and its equipment aremoved from the home station into the the-ater of operations. Although this phase isrelatively simple, it does include someimportant considerations.

Civilian airlines or military aircraft, or acombination of the two, can be used fortransporting the LCE and its equipment.Although civilian airlines offer the greatestflexibility and responsiveness, their policies

Spring 1999 43

LCE SUPPORTING TASKS

Provide communications connectivity

Provide intelligence connectivity

Provide CAS capability

Provide liaison support

Provide MEDEVAC capability

INDIVIDUAL TASKS

Operate an LST-5C SATCOM radio system

Operate an MST-20 SATCOM radio system

Perform an area orientation

Call for NATO CAS strike

Operate an AN/PRC-113 radio

Conduct refresher training in the target language

Call for a nine-line MEDEVAC request

Initiate an IV

Treat for shock

COLLECTIVE TASKS

Incorporate language skills into STX lanes

Individual and Collective Tasks

pertaining to the transporting of weapons,equipment and hazardous materials areinflexible.

Military aircraft offer the best deploy-ment option. Equipment can be either pal-letized in footlockers or placed in shippingcontainers. The footlocker method (withdetailed packing lists for both civilian andmilitary aircraft) allows the greatest flexi-bility. Footlockers are also easy to trans-port inside both U.S. and foreign vehicles.Weapons, sensitive items and hazardouscargo can be shipped in accordance withexisting military transportation regula-tions and systems.

EmploymentThe employment phase encompasses all

activities necessary to accomplish the LCEsupporting tasks. There are three subphas-es in the employment phase: the initialassessment or transition; the execution ofthe LCE supporting tasks; and the transi-tion or end of mission.

Initial assessment. To determine thescope of its duties, the LCE conducts anassessment of the supported unit. Duringthe assessment, the LCE should meet withthe commander, the chief of staff, each staffsection, and other significant personnel,such as subunit commanders and liaisonofficers. The assessment should reflect thesupported unit’s strengths, areas that needimproving, and recommendations forimprovement.

The LCE should not attempt to force thesupported unit to function exactly as a U.S.unit does. Instead, the LCE should encour-age the supported unit to integrate withother coalition units. Eventually, the sup-ported unit should view the improvementsin its operational methods as being its ownaccomplishments. The LCE should accom-pany the supported unit on patrols,observe checkpoint operations, and visitwork sites in order to learn about the ter-rain, to interact with the local populationand civic leaders, and to understand thesupported unit as much as possible.

A smooth transition between the incom-ing LCE and the outgoing LCE is critical. Ifthe outgoing LCE fails to properly advise

the incoming LCE of the task at hand, theincoming detachment could be misinformed,leading to a lack of mission support, loss ofcapabilities, and degradation of force protec-tion. Once the transition is complete, theincoming detachment should assess thesupported unit in order to revalidate itsneeds. Throughout the mission, periodicassessments will help to ensure that thesupported unit’s needs are being met.

Execution of the five supporting tasks.During the second subphase of the employ-ment phase, the LCE executes the support-ing tasks in order to improve the support-ed unit’s combat power, flexibility andcoalition cohesiveness. The LCE’s capabili-ties supplement, but do not replace, thesupported unit’s capabilities.

• The LCE provides communicationsconnectivity horizontally (with the sup-ported unit) and vertically (with higherheadquarters). LCEs should develop pri-mary, alternate, contingency and emer-gency communication plans to ensure con-nectivity during all operations. Primaryand alternate communication systemsshould offer real-time, long-range, consis-tent and secure communications, such asthat offered by satellite radio systems.Older capabilities, such as high-frequencyradios and Morse-code skills, should bemaintained in order to supplement thecommunication plan and to reduce trafficon high-traffic communication nets.

• The LCE provides intelligence connec-tivity by giving the supported unit accessto U.S. and NATO intelligence products. Toaccomplish this, the LCE may give intelli-gence reports to the supported unit, or theLCE may become involved in the support-ed unit’s IPB process. The LCE’s IPBanalysis can serve as an excellent supple-ment to the supported unit’s intelligencesystem. Intelligence connectivity also helpsto ensure that the supported unit providestimely intelligence, SALUTE reports (size,activity, location, unit, time and equip-ment), and other intelligence products tosupport cohesive intelligence operations.

• By providing CAS and MEDEVAC capa-bilities, the LCE can give the supported unitsignificant improvements in non-organicfirepower and ensure timely access to med-

44 Special Warfare

ical facilities. MEDEVAC and CAS requestscan occur at any time. Each member of theLCE should carry a laminated 3-by-5 cardwith the CAS and MEDEVAC formats, fre-quencies and code words printed on it.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, CAS presencemissions coordinated by the RUSBDE LCEwere a significant factor in the de-escala-tion of potentially explosive situations andwere instrumental in demonstrating theresolve of IFOR and SFOR soldiers. In July1996, a ROBAT soldier was injured by amine while clearing a railroad line in aheavily mined area of Maglaj, along thezone of separation. Members of the ROBATLCE stabilized the patient and evacuatedhim to a U.S./Norwegian hospital for treat-ment. MEDEVAC became a major point ofvalidation for the continued presence ofLCEs with the Romanian and Hungarianengineer battalions. The LCEs’ ability toconduct CAS and MEDEVAC operationsimproved the morale among the personnelin the supported units and strengthenedtheir units’ mission focus.

• Providing liaison support is vital increating rapport with the supported unit.Without strong rapport, the LCE will notbe able to create a significant impressionupon the supported unit. Liaison tasksrange from advising the supported unitcommander to emulating the customs andmilitary courtesies of the supported unit.Simple acts, such as setting a positiveexample or treating the supported unit’ssoldiers as equals, facilitates the process ofbuilding and maintaining rapport. Mutualtraining events, such as weapons-firingand vehicle-driving instruction, provideexcellent opportunities for establishingand maintaining rapport.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, SF soldiersimmediately established credibility withsupported-unit soldiers when they demon-strated their tactical and technical profi-ciency. Russian and Romanian soldierswere impressed when SF weaponssergeants expertly disassembled andassembled Russian and Romanianweapons. Cross-training skills also yieldedtremendous dividends when SF NCOsdemonstrated their proficiency in execut-ing each other’s MOS tasks.

It is important that LCEs build andmaintain rapport with units of the U.S.,NATO, and other coalition forces. In Bos-nia, the ROBAT was a subordinate elementof the Multinational Combat Support Ele-ments, or MCSE, and the RUSBDE was asubordinate element of the MultinationalDivision-North, or MND-N. For both theROBAT LCE and the RUSBDE LCE, itwas vital to develop professional relation-ships with the commanders, staff and liai-son officers of the MCSE and the MND-Nto ensure unity of effort and exactness ofpurpose in their operations.

To adequately assist the supported unitin its command-and-control functions andin the execution of its operations plans, theLCE needs a centralized operations center,or OPCEN, that can track, record and

report the operations of the LCE and thesupported unit. The OPCEN should bemanned by two personnel during the dutyday, usually from 0600 to 2200, and itshould be capable of conducting limited 24-hour operations. OPCEN personnel areresponsible for the daily base-station oper-ations, including monitoring communica-tion nets; reporting; coordinating withLNOs, the supported unit, and adjacentunits; performing routine area mainte-nance; assisting mobile teams in missionpreparation; planning missions; and moni-toring special projects.

Force protection should be an overridingconcern for all operations, but force-protec-tion methods will vary depending on themission. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, LCE per-sonnel traveled with all their equipment;and when outside their vehicles, they

Spring 1999 45

The LCE should not attempt to force the sup-ported unit to function exactly as a U.S. unitdoes. Instead, the LCE should encourage thesupported unit to integrate with other coalitionunits. Eventually, the supported unit shouldview the improvements in its operational meth-ods as being its own accomplishments.

dressed according to the threat conditions.Maintenance is a vital aspect of force

protection. During operations, an LCEmust perform proper maintenance on allits assigned equipment. All vehicles shouldreceive preventive-maintenance checksand services, or PMCS, at least once aweek. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, LCE vehicledrivers performed the required PMCS.Other detachment equipment (night-visiondevices, radios, etc.) was checked once aweek. Any inoperable equipment wasimmediately sent to supporting mainte-nance units.

Transition or end of mission. The finalsubphase of the employment phase encom-passes the transition of a newly arrivingLCE or the conclusion of the mission. Asupported unit will not always require thecontinued employment of an LCE. In con-ducting its mission, the LCE may augmentthe supported unit with systems that willreduce the need for the LCE’s contribution.In turn, as the coalition performs orchanges its assigned missions, a supportedunit may “outgrow” its need for an LCE,while another unit may develop a need forLCE support.

RedeploymentDuring the final phase, redeployment,

the LCE returns from the theater of opera-tions to its home station. Once again,equipment maintenance, inspections andequipment-packing become key concerns.

Redeployment requires an after-actionreview, or AAR. The AAR should includethe following:• Purpose of the mission.• Detachment mission statement.• Task organization through all phases of

the operation.• Concept of the operation.• Equipment employed.• Sequence of events.• Issues (in issue-discussion-recommen-

dation format).• Listing of daily detachment missions

throughout the deployment.• Photo log of major missions.

The AAR provides a detailed record ofthe LCE mission. Detachment briefing

slides, operations orders, results of theTDMP, photos, and an AAR provide com-manders, staffs and future LCEs an excel-lent record of plans, coordinations andlessons-learned.

SummaryLCEs are vital to the coalition com-

mander in improving and sustaining effec-tive operations. LCEs foster excellentteam-building between U.S. and coalitionforces. These team relationships can oftenhelp the supported unit overcome thesometimes high learning curve encoun-tered during the initial periods of coalitionoperations. With their unique qualifica-tions and special competence, LCEs are anideal option for enabling countries to inte-grate into coalition operations and to exe-cute their required missions to NATOstandards.

Captain Chadwick W.Storlie is the S4 for the 2ndBattalion, 10th SpecialForces Group, Fort Carson,Colo. As the commander ofSFOD-A 045 (maritime oper-ations), he served one rota-tion during Operation Joint Endeavor withthe Romanian Engineering Battalion LCEand one rotation during Operation JointGuard with the Independent Russian Air-borne Brigade LCE. He is a 1989 graduateof Northwestern University.

Notes:1 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, “Mission

Guidance,” November 1996, Fort Carson, Colo.2 Joint Readiness Training Center, “Isolation AAR”

(slide presentation), Fort Polk, La., 1996.

46 Special Warfare

SO/LIC program has appropriate focus

Although I agree with the centralmessage of retired Navy CaptainPaul Shemella’s article “AcademicPreparation: Sharpening the Tip ofthe MOOTW Spear” (Fall 1998) thathigher education is essential for SOFpersonnel, the rest of his argumentcontains some misperceptions andfallacies about the Naval Postgradu-ate School’s Special Operations andLow-Intensity Conflict program.As aSO/LIC graduate, I would like torespond to two of his points.

First, Captain Shemella thinksthat a SO/LIC student “does most ofhis or her critical thinking in the lan-guage of mathematics.” This is incor-rect. Of the more than 20 classes Itook to earn my degree, only four weremath-oriented. Furthermore, theseclasses were far from irrelevant formy military professional develop-ment. They gave me the skills neces-sary to thoughtfully analyze and crit-ically question the math-based mod-els and simulations that are so preva-lent in today’s military.

Second, Captain Shemella arguesthat the SO/LIC program lacks “class-es pertaining to area studies and gov-ernment” and results in a master ofscience (his emphasis) in defenseanalysis. But when you consider morethat just the name of the SO/LICdegree, you may find that the pro-gram is actually an innovative inter-disciplinary curriculum that givesstudents a broad understanding ofthe world around them and allowsthem to focus on their area of interest.My transcript, for instance, showsclasses in international-relations the-ory, military history, ethnic conflict,

and information warfare.In conclusion, instead of being a

narrowly focused program with lim-ited relevance to the SOF communi-ty, the NPS’s SO/LIC program isespecially appropriate for SOF offi-cers of all services. Students in theprogram learn a mix of skills andproduce a thesis focused on theirchosen regional or operational areaof interest. To get a full appreciationof the value of this program, I sug-gest one go beyond Captain Shemel-la’s or my opinions, and look at thetheses produced by SOF students.The broad range of topics coveredand the insights within reveal thefull story of the SO/LIC program.

Captain Michael R. LwinArmy studentDefense Language Institute

Review failed to give book’s author credit

J.H. Crerar’s review of Night of theSilver Stars (Fall 1998) fails to givethe book’s author the credit hedeserves.

Bill Phillips went to great lengths tocapture the lack of unity of command inthe northwest I Corps area of SouthVietnam. One of the book’s theses wasthat there was no healthy relationshipbetween the various commands andthat this contributed greatly to the fall ofSpecial Forces Camp A-101,or Lang Vei.

The Marines did not respond toWestmoreland; C Company, 5th SF,did not respond to the Marines;SOG’s CCN did not respond to CCompany; and because the A-campwas trying to protect its CIDG fromthe I Corps Mike Force soldiers,

there was even some bad bloodbetween the commanders of the A-team and the Mike Force.

If Phillips erred,he erred on the sideof attention to detail. He consulted toomany people, gathered too much infor-mation and captured the heart of theproblem: A-101 was hung out to dry.

Through lengthy interviews withthe A-101 commanders, opssergeant, members of the rescueteam from CCN, and the Mike Forcecommander sent to do the camp’slong-range patrolling, the authorhad the total picture and relayed itvery clearly in the book.

The one area that I found humor-ous in the review was the implicationthat there were no distinct differ-ences between the camp strike-forcemembers and the I Corps Mike Forcemembers. To help the uninformedunderstand: Mike Force soldierswere paid and retained based ontheir performance. They were offen-sive in nature, commanded by U.S.SF, airborne-qualified, and they lefttheir families to seek out the enemy.

CIDG soldiers had the job of pro-tecting their women and children.They were “legs,” and conducted lim-ited defensive patrolling in the vicin-ity of their village or the A-camp site.

Is Night of the Silver Stars per-fect? No. Does it belong in every SFsoldier’s library? Yes. Even if my pic-ture weren’t on the front cover, Iwould still recommend it.

Paul LonggrearPine Mountain, Ga.

Spring 1999 47

LettersSpecial Warfare

48 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The 1998 Army colonel promotion-selection board considered 32 SF offi-cers in the primary zone and selected 20. The SF selection rate was 62.5percent — higher than that of any other branch, and 12.9 percent higherthan the Army’s overall selection rate. The promotion rate reflects the highfile quality of year group 1977: 11 of the selectees are former battalioncommanders. Board statistics were as follows:

Cons. Sel. % sel.Army (AZ) 868 29 3.3SF Branch (AZ) 32 0 0Army (PZ) 806 341 42.3SF Branch (PZ) 32 20 62.5Army (BZ) 1990 30 1.5SF Branch (BZ) 70 0 0

Selections have been made for this year’s Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict program at the Naval Postgraduate School. The programis sponsored by the U.S. Special Operations Command as a means of train-ing joint SOF officers. It features a rigorous academic curriculum designedto help students meet the future requirements of special operations.Although various concentrations are available within the program, all grad-uates receive a master of arts in national-security affairs. Utilization isexpected within joint or Army SOF billets. Officers selected this year are:MAJ Franco, SF; CPT Bendewald, SF; CPT Amato, SF; CPT Orman, SF;CPT Tester, SF (USMA, SF representative); CPT James, AV; CPT Mingus,CM; CPT Bottiglieri, IN; CPT Stebbins, MI; CPT Gardner, FA 39; and CPTZacheral, FA 39. Applications for FY 2000 are now being solicited. Contactyour branch manager at PERSCOM or phone CPT Les Brown at the SpecialForces Branch, DSN 221-3178 or commercial (703) 325-3178.

The 1998 Army colonel promotion-selection board considered seven FA 39 offi-cers in the primary zone and selected four. The FA 39 PZ selection rate was57.1 percent, vs. 42.3 percent for DA. Two FA 39Bs and two FA 39Cs wereselected for promotion. Two of the selectees are former battalion commanders,and one is scheduled to attend senior service college. The increase in the num-ber of FA 39C officers who were considered and selected for promotion indi-cates the functional area’s improving health. Board statistics were as follows:

Cons. Sel. % sel.Army (AZ) 868 29 3.3FA 39 (AZ) 10 0 0Army (PZ) 806 341 42.3FA 39 (PZ) 7 4 57.1Army (BZ) 1990 30 1.5FA 39 (BZ) 15 0 0

Board selects 4 FA 39 officers for O6

SF Branch leads Army in O6 selection rate

Selections announced for NPS SO/LIC program

Spring 1999 49

The 1998 Army Reserve colonel promotion-selection board considered3,379 officers and selected 405. Board statistics were as follows:

Cons. Sel. % sel. Qual.CA Branch 159 13 8.1 152SF Branch 29 1 3.4 29Army 3379 405 11.9 3254

The number of SF officers selected was nearly 9 percent below the Army’s aver-age, which is unusual, because SF officers have exceeded the Army’s average forthe past six years. Civil Affairs officers finished 4 percent below the Army’s aver-age.Of the 13 CA selectees, seven of the nine troop-program-unit officers were cur-rent or former battalion commanders. Self-development was another factor in theselection process: Six of the selectees had earned a master’s degree, and two wereArmy War College graduates or enrollees.Although manner of performance is themost important criterion that distinguishes an officer for promotion, ArmyReserve and National Guard officers should seek self-development courses to max-imize their chances for promotion. Officers should follow guidance in the revisedDA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management(http://books.army.mil:80/cgi-bin/bookmgr/books/p600_3/ccontents), to enhanceand sustain their military competencies. For more information, telephoneMAJ Jim Berenz, Civil Affairs Branch Manager, Special Operations Propo-nency Office, at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432-6406, or e-mail [email protected].

The Army Acquisition Corps will conduct its annual accession board in Octo-ber 1999. Year group 1993 will be the target for this year’s board. Officersfrom prior year groups may still apply. Officers interested in the ArmyAcquisition Corps can telephone Rick Yager at DSN 221-3127 or commercial(703) 325-3127, or contact the SF Branch for more information.

The 1998 Army command-and-staff-college selection board considered 250FA 39 officers and selected 46 — a selection rate of 18.4 percent, vs. the DAselection rate of 16.7 percent. Results by year group were as follows:

FA 39 FA 39 FA 39 Avg sel. %Cons. Sel. % sel. (other FAs)

YG 1985 38 3 7.9 5.6YG 1986 49 5 10.2 10.3YG 1987 68 21 30.9 21.6YG 1988 95 17 17.9 21.5

In March 1998, the Army initiated a voluntary recall to active duty for prioractive-duty officers. This is a recall to active duty, not a call to active duty, soofficers who have never served on active duty (other than for training) are noteligible. There is no requirement for the officer applicant to be branch-quali-fied. Officers who wish to be recalled to serve in SF do not have to be previ-ously qualified in SF, but they must complete SF qualification in order toremain on active duty. Officers must meet the following eligibility criteria:• Captains must have a date of rank of 941002 or later.• Applicants must have served at least four years of active commis-

sioned service.• Applicants must be medically qualified.• Applicants must meet all prerequisites for SF training as outlined in

DA Pam 600-3, paragraph 15-7b(1).

46 FA 39 officers selected for CSC

RC SF, CA selections for O6below Army average

Officers may volunteer for recall to active duty

Acquisition Corps to conduct accession board

50 Special Warfare

A volunteer statement for SF duty must accompany the officer’s applica-tion for SF training and branch transfer. Officers interested in the recallprogram should contact the SF branch at DSN 221-3178 or commercial(703) 325-3178. Officers interested in being recalled to service in otherareas of ARSOF should contact the manager of their basic branch.

The 1998 Army command-and-staff-college selection board considered 222SF officers and selected 41. The selection rate was 18.5 percent — 1.8 per-cent higher than the Army’s overall rate of 16.7 percent. This year’sresults, by year group, were:

Cons. Sel. % sel.YG 85 29 1 3.4YG 86 31 4 12.9YG 87 58 14 24.1YG 88 104 22 21.1

Officers in year groups 81, 87 and 90 will receive their career-field designa-tion, or CFD, next fiscal year. YGs 81 and 87 will go before their CFD boardOct. 5-29, 1999; YG 90 will go before the board June 1-15, 2000. Officers’career-field preferences will be gathered electronically through PERSCOM’snew CFD internet site (at the PERSCOM web site under “career field desig-nation.”) Officers should ensure that their current mailing address is on filewith the branch manager and annotated on their officer record brief. Offi-cers should also ensure their branch has their e-mail address so that thebranch can contact them electronically. The CFD time line is shown below:

CFD mail-out April or May 1999Suspense for CFD preference 5 September 1999 YG 81 and YG 87 CFD 5-29 October 1999YG 81 and YG 87 CFD results December 1999YG 90 CFD 1-15 June 2000YG 90 CFD results August-October 2000

SF accessions from year groups 92, 93 and 94 are on track, according to theSF Branch. The Branch acknowledges the outstanding job performance ofthe SF recruiters in accessing officers for SF training.

The following boards are scheduled for the summer of 1999:

Board DatesCaptain (Army) 1 Jun 99-2 Jul 99Joint specialty officer 15-21 Jun 99Colonel (Army) 3-23 Aug 99CGSC (Army) 24 Aug-24 Sep 99

MILPER messages concerning the boards will be available at http://www-perscom.army.mil/tagd/msg/1999.htm upon release.

SF recruiters commendedfor outstanding work

YGs 81, 87, 90 slated for CFD in FY 2000

Selection boards to meet in summer of 1999

41 SF officers selected for CSC

Spring 1999 51

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

Soldiers in CMF 37F, Psychological Operations, may now request affiliationwith the PSYOP Regiment, which will have its home base at the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School. Soldiers must complete a DA 4187 in accordancewith AR 600-82, Chapter 7, paragraph 7-2, and forward it to Commander;Attn:TAPC-EPK-S; Alexandria, VA 22332. For more information, telephone MSGJulius C. Storch III at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

MOSs 18D and 18E are now in the Bonus Extension and Re-enlistment, orBEAR, program. Soldiers in MOSs 18B and 18C may reclassify into 18D and18E and receive a bonus. Contact your unit retention NCO for further details.

MILPER Message 98-044 contains significant changes to AR 623-205, includ-ing the deletion of paragraph 6-136 (3). The bullet comment “within body-fatstandards of AR 600-9” is no longer authorized when “yes” is entered in theheight and weight data in IVc. “Yes” now indicates that the NCO is in compli-ance with AR 600-9’s body-fat standards. Raters are also reminded that whencounseling dates are omitted from the NCO-ER, the senior rater will state inpart Ve why counseling was not accomplished.

The 1998 sergeant-major selection board chose 32 CMF 18 master sergeants forpromotion — a selection rate of 11.8 percent, vs. the Army average of 22.1 percent.Twenty-five selectees were in the primary zone; seven were in the secondary zone.Time-in-service and time-in-grade statistics are as follows:

TIS TIG Education Age

CMF 18 (PZ) 19.2 4.5 13.7 39.2Army (PZ) 20.4 3.9 14.4 40.4CMF18 (SZ) 16.0 2.7 13.6 36.7Army (SZ) 19.9 3.5 14.1 40.0

The following comments were extracted from the board’s review and analysis:• Excellence ratings were frequently not supported by quantifiable data. Raters

routinely did not address “Areas of Special Emphasis.”Across the board, seniorraters discussed potential and failed to address performance and competence.The majority of senior-rater ratings were “1” in performance and potential, butthey were often accompanied by comments such as “promote with peers” or“promote after additional assignments in demanding positions.”

• NCO-ERs that gave marginal ratings for misconduct did not always reflect thesoldier’s potential for future service, making it difficult for the panel to evaluatethe soldier for possible action under the Qualitative Management Program.

• Raters are not listing three positions in which the NCO can best servethe Army. Instead, they are listing general positions that sometimes donot show a line of progression to the next higher grade.

PSYOP soldiers can requestregimental affiliation

MOSs 18D, 18E eligible for BEAR

Raters reminded of NCO-ERpointers

32 SF MSGs chosen for promotion to SGM

52 Special Warfare

Foreign SOFSpecial Warfare

Rising levels of crime and violence in Ecuador — particularly in the capi-tal city of Quito and in the major port of Guayaquil — have prompted thegovernment to make wider use of army troops in anti-crime patrols.Ecuador’s President Mahaud declared a state of emergency in early 1999and ordered the army to more intensively support law enforcement. ByFebruary 1999, the Ecuadoran armed-forces chief reported that more than8,000 soldiers were assisting the police in dealing with criminality. Ongo-ing troop-patrol efforts in rural areas and along the coast are intended tofree police for demanding urban law-enforcement duties. The army is alsoengaged in border-protection duties aimed at halting the flow of drugs andillegal immigrants, as well as maintaining what Ecuador considers a req-uisite presence opposite Peru. The armed forces have controlled customssince 1996 — a move undertaken to reduce corruption and inefficiency. Themilitary claims that customs receipts have increased by 40 percent duringthe armed forces’ tenure in this role. However, customs is scheduled toreturn to civilian control in 1999.

A Hong Kong publication — reportedly with close ties to the Chinese mil-itary establishment — has recently described the structure, roles and mis-sions of special-operations units of the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA.Attention focused on an exercise in northern China in which a newlyorganized special-operations unit from the Beijing Military Region sur-prised opposing forces in an assault conducted thick fog. The unit para-chuted in, using steerable “powered parachutes,” and was followed by addi-tional forces rappelling from a helicopter. The mission of blowing up thetargeted command post and other objectives was supposedly completed inthree minutes, after which the special-operations unit departed by heli-copter. According to the publication, China began to organize its modernversion of special-operations units in the late 1980s, selecting personnelfrom the best PLA units. Dropout rates for selected recruits are reported-ly 50-90 percent, and the training is described as analogous to thatreceived by other special-operations forces around the world.

Despite the proliferation of and the continued reorganization of “counter-terrorist” and other special-operations forces in Russia in recent years, thetopic of restructuring and coordinating these various military and securi-ty units preoccupies Russian planners. In February, Russian FederationPrime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov endorsed the idea of “creating anationwide system for antiterrorist action” in light of the continuing vio-lence in a number of regions and the threat of intensified Chechen terror-ist acts. Among the organizations expected to take part in this system arethe Antiterrorist Center of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, and theAntiterrorist Center’s principal arms, the Department for Combating Ter-rorism, the Directorate for Special Operations (that was formerly called

Ecuador employs military in anti-crime role

Exercise highlights Chinese SOF

Russia reorganizes antiterrorist groups

Spring 1999 53

Vympel), and the Alfa counterterrorist unit. The Ministry of InternalAffairs’ Militia Detachments of Special Designation, stationed in areasaround the country, constitute another major contribution. The FSB’sDirectorate for Counterintelligence Operations is also present in all ofRussia’s major cities. While it is not clear how these organizations wouldbe reorganized, the intent is to “make the antiterrorism system in Russiaflexible, controlled from a single center, well-equipped, and capable ofinflicting pre-emptive strikes.” Drug trafficking is also a concern for spe-cial-purpose police units. A heroin shipment of 220 kg was seized inAstrakhan in January 1999 — one of the largest shipments ever for Rus-sian law enforcement. On a different terrorism front, the FSB has alsoestablished a new organization, the Information/Computer Security Direc-torate. Its aim is to protect Russian information systems from foreign spe-cial services and from other attacks and penetrations.

Colombia’s Urban Antiterrorist Special Forces Group, or AFEAU) — withapproximately 70 officers and men — is intended to fight violent crime andto combat a range of terrorist activities. The unit is composed of specialistsdrawn from the armed forces and police who are skilled in hostage rescue,urban-assault operations, and sharpshooting. A special team from theAFEAU recently deployed to Cali to combat “the activities of the guerril-las, narcotraffickers, and common criminals” at the request of Cali’s mayor.The city has experienced rising murder rates and heightened activity byarmed groups and gangs throughout the area.

A recent article in a publication of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,or PLA, highlighted Internet security as a critically important strategicissue. In defining the problem confronting the PLA, the article cited “hack-er” efforts to attack or access U.S. military computers and noted what ischaracterized as a high success rate (65 percent) and a low detection rate(only one detection in 150 attempts). Attention also focused on U.S. coun-termeasures, including the formation of special groups intended to counterinformation attacks and penetrations. After establishing a wide range ofmeasures that the PLA must undertake to increase the security of itsInternet and other information systems, the article summed up its mes-sage: “We need to be highly responsible to our country, drawing up Inter-net attack and counterattack countermeasures, and ensuring the securityof our computer systems, to ensure that our armed forces ‘win’ future infor-mation wars!” In fact, in another recent PLA publication, an articleauthored by a recognized Chinese information-warfare specialist called forthe Chinese establishment of “information protection troops” to guard the“national information boundary,” just as navies guard maritime bordersand air forces protect air space. Such information troops, in the author’sview, should include military, police, scientists, and information specialistswho would be prepared not only to protect systems, but to counterattackagainst countries, groups or individuals.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military StudiesOffice, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Colombian special-ops unitfights urban crime

Chinese express ‘strategic’Internet-security concerns

SOSCOM welcomes new commander

Colonel Yves J. Fontaineassumed command of the U.S.Army Special Operations SupportCommand from Colonel Brian I.Geehan Jan. 8.

Fontaine, a native of La Lou-viere, Belgium, moved to theUnited States and became a U.S.citizen in 1973. He was commis-sioned a second lieutenant in theArmy Ordnance Corps in 1975.

During Operations Desert Shieldand Desert Storm, Fontaine servedas chief of plans for the 24th InfantryDivision and as liaison officer to the6th French Light Infantry Division.He was previously assigned to the82nd Airborne Division as a logisticsofficer.

Geehan’s new assignment ischief of the Deployments Division,Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

New manual to reflectchanging SF activities

The Special Warfare Center andSchool is revising FM 31-20, Doc-trine for Army Special Forces, toreflect changing SF missionrequirements and to address thefull scope of SF activities.

To give greater emphasis tounconventional warfare, foreign-internal defense, direct action, andspecial reconnaissance, the subjectmatter in the current FM 31-20that pertains to those SF missionshas been expanded and publishedas separate manuals: FM 31-20-2,Unconventional Warfare; FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense; FM31-20-4 Direct Action; FM 31-20-5,Special Reconnaissance. To reduce

redundancy, these missions will beaddressed briefly in a single chap-ter of the revised FM 31-20.

The revised manual will addresstwo new SF missions: informationoperations, and counterprolifera-tion of weapons of mass destruc-tion. It will also address severalmodifications to existing SF mis-sions: Counterterrorism willremain a mission, but only as asubunit of the combatting-terror-ism mission. The definition ofdirect action has been modified toinclude close-quarters battle.

The revised FM 31-20 will alsolist countermine activities as a newSF collateral activity. Countermineactivities are measures taken toreduce or eliminate the threat tononcombatants and friendly mili-tary forces posed by mines, boobytraps and other explosive devices.These activities include providinginstruction in demining and mine-awareness to host-nation person-nel. TC 31-34, HumanitarianDemining Handbook, contains thedetails of how SF conduct humani-tarian demining operations.

Another SF collateral activity,personnel recovery, or PR, has beenmodified to include the former col-lateral activity of search and rescue.PR describes the entire spectrum ofactivities to locate, recover andrestore to friendly control selectedpersons or material isolated andthreatened in sensitive, denied orcontested areas. The full scope ofSF’s role in PR is addressed inSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconvention-al Assisted Recovery.

Some liaison and command-and-control activities not previouslyunaddressed in doctrine, or

addressed only in handbooks, havebeen included as appendices to FM31-20: the special-operations coor-dination element, the special-oper-ations command-and-control ele-ment, and the SF liaison element.

The draft of the revised FM 31-20is available on the Army SpecialOperations Command homepage( h t t p : / / a s o c i w e b . s o c . m i l /swcs/dotd) and on the Army Train-ing and Doctrine Command home-page (www-tradoc.army.mil). Toaccess the draft on the TRADOChomepage, users must first obtain auser identification and a passwordfrom the SWCS SF Doctrine Divi-sion. For passwords or for addition-al information, contact Major Gre-gory McMillan, DSN 239-5333 orcommercial (910) 432-5333; fax -5341; e-mail [email protected].

Pub outlines current PSYOP characteristics

A new publication from the JFKSpecial Warfare Center and Schooloutlines current characteristics,organization and command andcontrol of U.S. psychological-opera-tions forces.

USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-15,Psychological Operations: Capabili-ties and Employment, incorporatesthe recommendations of a process-action team chartered at SWCS in1998 to examine Army psychologi-cal-operations issues. The PAT rec-ommended a PSYOP force thatleverages technology and achievesflexibility through centralized plan-ning and decentralized execution.

The PSYOP organizationalstructure depicted in the new pubreflects the current task-organiza-

54 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

tion of the 4th PSYOP Group.Regional battalions are task-organized into PSYOP develop-ment centers, and tactical battal-ions are task-organized into small-er elements that allow more flexi-ble and responsive support to com-manders at all levels. The publica-tion also addresses PSYOP equip-ment, as well as changes inapproval authority that result fromthe organizational changes.

SWCS Pub 525-5-15 will besuperseded later this year by therevised FM 33-1, PsychologicalOperations.

SWCS Pub 525-5-15 is availablefrom the SWCS PSYOP Training andDoctrine Division on the ASOC inter-nal web (http://asociweb/swcs/dotd/PSYpage.htm). The site lists mis-sions, projects, and points of contactfor the PSYOP Division, and it con-tains examples of recent PSYOPproducts and recommended PSYOPreadings.

SWCS 3rd Battalion has web site

A new web site on the ASOCinternal web offers a variety ofinformation for students in CivilAffairs and Psychological Opera-tions training.

The site, which belongs to the 3rdBattalion of the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School’s 1st Special War-fare Training Group, caters to stu-dents in courses taught by the 3rdBattalion: CA and PSYOP courses,special-operations language train-ing, Functional Area 39 training, andSpecial Forces warrant-officer basicand advanced courses.

Students can visit the web site toobtain welcome letters, school areamaps, class schedules, policy let-ters, course descriptions and doc-trinal reference materials.

Researchers can read and down-load Army, joint, and Departmentof Defense publications. The sitecontains various CA and PSYOPpublications, including a complete

set of CA special texts not availableelsewhere. The site also featuresan extensive listing of links to mil-itary and strategy-related sites.

The web site address is http://asociweb/swcs/tng/3/.

Manuals geared towardARSOF CS, CSS

The Special Warfare Center andSchool is developing or revisingfive field manuals oriented towardcombat support and combat servicesupport for ARSOF operations.

Produced by the Directorate ofTraining and Doctrine, the manualswill supplement the ARSOF cap-stone manual, FM 100-25, Doctrinefor Army Special Operations Forces.

FM 1-108, ARSOF Aviation, is arevision of FM 1-108, Army SpecialOperations Aviation Forces, dated1993. The manual describes com-mand and control, employment,combat support, and combat serv-ice support for ARSOF aviationoperations. The manual is in final-draft editing and will be forwardedto TRADOC for approval. The proj-ect officer is Mr. Funk at DSN 239-4427; e-mail: [email protected].

FM 8-43, Combat Health Sup-port for ARSOF, is a new publica-tion that establishes doctrine forthe provision of combat health sup-port to ARSOF. Designed for use bycommand surgeons and their staffsand by personnel planning CHSoperations in support of ARSOFmissions, the manual discussesARSOF organic capabilities and theconventional support required fromtheater or CHS elements of theArmy service-component command.The project officer is CW2 Malone,at DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: [email protected].

FM 24-31, C4 for ARSOF, is anew publication that will covercommand, control, communicationsand computers for all ARSOFunits. The manual describes thearchitecture of command-and-con-trol, or C2, in operational com-

mands and the information flowfrom ARSOF operational units toSOC, theater and national C2 sys-tems. The project officer is CaptainGlynn, at DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: [email protected].

FM 34-31, Intelligence Supportfor ARSOF, is a revision of FM 34-36, SOF Intelligence and ElectronicWarfare Operations, dated 1991.The manual describes the organi-zation and the capabilities of intel-ligence elements within ARSOFunits. The manual also describesthe intelligence structures of the-ater SOCs, joint intelligence cen-ters, and higher-level agencies, andtheir connectivity with ARSOFoperational units. The initial draftwill be available for review in April1999. The project officer is CaptainGlynn, at DSN 239-5393/8689;e-mail: [email protected].

FM 63-31, Combat Service Sup-port for ARSOF, is a revision of FM63-24, Special Operations SupportBattalion, dated 1995. It will pro-vide a base document for determin-ing future CSS doctrine and proce-dures. The revised manualaddresses ARSOF CSS structure,capabilities, and support require-ments and provides users with asingle publication that will assistin operational planning and in edu-cating personnel. The project offi-cer is Captain Glynn, at DSN 239-5393/8689; e-mail: [email protected].

A unique aspect of all these man-uals is that their development andproponency are being shared withtheir respective TRADOC serviceinstitutions. Drafts of the manualswill be posted on the DOTD web site(http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd)and on the Automated SystemsApproach to Training.

Spring 1999 55

Psychological Operations: Prin-ciples and Case Studies. Editedby Colonel Frank L. Goldstein,USAF, and Colonel Benjamin F.Findley Jr., USAR. Maxwell AirForce Base, Ala.: Air UniversityPress, 1996. 364 pages. $21.

The inherent strength of Psycho-logical Operations: Principles andCase Studies lies in the expertiseand experience of its editors and con-tributors, most of whom participatedin the Cold War’s “war of ideas” dur-ing their service in academic, gov-ernment and military positions.

As with any edited volume, some ofthe essays contained in this book arebetter than the others. Specifically,the case studies are not as strong asthe articles dealing with principles.The four-part volume begins with ablock of essays that provide a founda-tion for the understanding of psycho-logical warfare. This section includesnot only a strong introduction to thenature and the elements of PSYOP(by Goldstein and Colonel DanielJacobowitz) but perhaps the best-written essay of the volume: A studyof U.S. military psychological opera-tions,by Colonel Alfred H.Paddock Jr.

Part II of the work focuses onPSYOP planning at the nationallevel and includes an exceptionalessay by Dr. Carnes Lord, whowrites about the historical influ-ences that have shaped U.S. psycho-logical-operations strategy. Part IIIincludes several assessments ofSoviet PSYOP activities during thelatter stages of the Cold War, as wellas short pieces on the role of theU.S. Information Agency, PSYOPduring the Hukbalahap insurgencyin the Philippines, and intelligence

activities related to PSYOP. Part IVcontains traditional case studies,including an analysis of U.S. andViet Cong psychological warfare inSoutheast Asia, one of the fewunclassified assessments of PSYOPin Operation Just Cause, and casestudies on both Iraqi and U.S. psy-chological-warfare activities duringDesert Shield/Storm. The highlightof the final two sections is GeneralStilwell’s classic study of PSYOPand counterinsurgency, a solidexamination of the psychologicaldimension of conflict within theAmerican way of war.

Despite the strengths of the vol-ume, it contains a few deficiencies.The volume has suffered at thehands of time: It was conceivedalmost a decade ago, and several ofits essays are notably dated. MajorJames Keifer’s essay does notassess PSYOP support to counter-drug operations in recent years,while Lloyd Free’s piece on public

opinion — written almost 30 yearsago — cannot take into account theeffect that satellite news has had onpublic opinion and on the making offoreign policy. Additionally, the read-er is forced to examine case studiesdeveloped largely within the frame-work of the Cold War. Though thevolume is fortunately not filled withgratuitous homages to “IW” and the“information revolution,” there arealmost no references to the profoundtechnological advances and politicalrevolutions that have already affect-ed the nature of PSYOP as a tool ofdiplomacy and as a weapon of war.

An additional shortcoming liesin what the volume omits. One ofthe strengths of earlier PSYOPcasebooks was the use of severaldozen case studies to illustrateparticular points addressed in thecasebook. In this volume, however,the inclusion of some of the casestudies can be questioned, becausethey do not sufficiently addresseither the critical organizationaland conceptual issues, or the prob-lematic areas such as target-audi-ence analysis and success criteriafor PSYOP. Furthermore, the read-er will notice the absence of casestudies on U.S. PSYOP support tohumanitarian and peacekeepingoperations (Northern Iraq, Soma-lia, Haiti) and assessments ofpeacetime PSYOP programs, suchas mine-awareness campaigns.

While the volume accomplishesthe editors’ goal of bringing togeth-er a number of articles that mightotherwise have gone unread, it maynot prove as useful a tool to practi-tioners and policy-makers as it willto historians. If the volume as awhole could have explored the sig-

56 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

nificant and unsettled issues facingPSYOP today and expanded its con-ceptualizations beyond those of theCold War, it might have provenmore instructive regarding futuredirections in PSYOP.

Mark R. JacobsonOffice of the Secretary of DefenseWashington, D.C.

Crippled Eagle: A HistoricalPerspective of U. S. SpecialOperations 1976-1996. By RodLenahan. Charleston, S.C.: Nar-whal Press, 1998. ISBN 1-886391-23-8 (paper). 272 pages. $19.95.

In the Japanese classic movie,“Rashomon,” a number of observerstell the story of the same event, butwith markedly different views. Ifone were to gather and condensethe accounts of the 1980 Americaneffort to rescue the hostages inIran, one could readily create amodern military “Rashomon.”

Chronologically first was thereport of the Halloway Board,which analyzed the operation andgave its opinions of why the effortfailed. The conclusions were notheartily accepted by all of thosewho had participated in the rescueeffort. Next was Colonel CharlieBeckwith’s book, Delta Force (Har-court, Bruce and Jovanovich,1983), which told the story fromthe ground commander’s not neces-sarily unbiased viewpoint.

Colonel Jim Kyle, the senior airplanner, wrote The Guts to Try(Crown, 1990), which gave outstand-ing descriptions of the aircraft andweather aspects. Now, Colonel RodLenahan, the J2 of the joint task forcethat was created to plan and conductthe operation, has added CrippledEagle, which brings a joint-staff viewof this intriguing subject.

Crippled Eagle is an outstandingaddition to the list of accounts. In itsbuildup to the rescue effort, the bookprovides an understanding of howgaunt the special-operations forces of

the United States had become sincethe end of the Vietnam War, and itdescribes the nation’s first stumblingsteps in the attempt to create a coun-terterrorism capability.

Those familiar with the modernstanding joint task forces and withthe theater SOCs as joint task forcesin-waiting will probably find theassembling of Joint Task Force 1-79quaint. While many assigned to thetask force were having their firsttaste of the heady elixir of specialoperations, the task force’s nucleuswas a couple dozen experienced spe-cial operators who were pulled infrom all over the world. These weremembers of the small, all-services fra-ternity who by their dedication anddetermination had kept the coals ofspecial operations glowing despitenumerous efforts to stamp them out.

In conjunction with the air- andground-force commanders, the JTFplanned an operation of great daringin order to overcome the problems ofenormous distances, limited target-area intelligence, aircraft that wereinadequate in numbers and in capa-bility, and aircrews that were inexpe-rienced in long-range operations. Forits daring, dedication and willingnessto attempt the near-impossible, the

JTF deserved success, but even a sur-feit of those sterling values could notovercome equipment inadequacy. Anaircraft accident that occurred afterthe decision to withdraw the forceshort of the target added tragedy tothe already acute disappointmentand frustration.

As the J2 of the joint task force,then-Lieutenant Colonel Rod Lena-han had probably the best position ofall the participants for observing thedevelopment and the execution of theoperation. The nature of his jobensured that he knew all the prob-lems, all the plans, and what wasknown and unknown. He has aug-mented his on-the-spot knowledgewith materials that have been declas-sified in recent years. He tells hisstory well: His style is comfortable,informative and, where necessary,sufficiently explanatory for most non-military readers.The reader, however,is cautioned to keep track of theabbreviations, or he may lose his way.

Unfortunately, this excellent pre-sentation is undermined by publi-cation faults. The book suffers fromlack of a good index, from a mini-mal glossary, and from numerousmisspelled words and names. Butwhile they are annoying, thesefaults are considered petty in anotherwise highly competent pre-sentation that deserves the atten-tion of professional special opera-tors. The modern operator who hasmuch greater resources at his dis-posal should be spared JTF 1-79’spains, but he might find it interest-ing to read how a rescue effort wasattempted in the bad old days ofshortage, make-do and dedication.

COL J.H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret)Vienna, Va.

Spring 1999 57

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