Environment International, Vol. 10, pp. 437-440, 1984 0160-4120/84 $3.00 + .00 Printed in the USA. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1985 Pergamon Press Ltd.

SPECIFIC CASE OF LARGE ENERGY SYSTEM IMPACT IN BRAZIL--RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Luiz Pinguelli Rosa Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

This paper is a critical description and a general survey of the system of nuclear energy risk management in Brazil. The specific question of nuclear reactor safety, including risk assessment, and the case of the first Brazilian reac to r -ANGRA I - i s considered. The Nuclear Agreement between Brazil and Germany and the criticism of the Brazilian scientific societies, the official answers and the debate in the Congress are presented and discussed.

Introduction

The standards of safety, licensing and location of nuclear facilities have been under intense scrutiny lately in the countries where energy is used on a considerable scale. Such is the case with the United States, France, Germany and Japan. The debate involves not only the reactors but also the reprocessing plants, the disposal of radioactive wastes as well as the uranium mining facilities.

In the discussion over the nuclear safety standards, the stand of the various participants ranges from those who unconditionally oppose the use of nuclear energy to those who unconditionally uphold this type of energy.

The debate has been carried out not only by experts and scientists from the fields connected to nuclear en- ergy but also by others, including social scientists who have been called into the debate because of the political character it has acquired. The public debate has reached plebiscites, including the victory of nuclear energy in California in 1976 and its defeat in Austria in 1978.

An interesting point of view concerning the opposi- tion of certain environmental advocacy organizations to nuclear energy was suggested by Garribba and Vacca (1978): this opposition allowed the governments that were already committed to extensive nuclear programs the opportunity to reappraise their position. Areas un- der discussion are" the shortage of uranium to fuel nu- clear power plants that have been planned all over the world; the delay of the commercial utilization of liquid metal fast breeder reactors which produces plutonium and thus saves uranium; the political considerations in the United States during the Carter administration which

favored light-water breeder reactors using thorium- uranium 233 of the Shipping Port type; and the French and German preference for liquid metal fast breeder reactors. To these factors should be added the fact that the cost of nuclear energy has increased significantly. Many of these considerations and reasonings can be applied to Brazil.

However, there are areas peculiar to Brazil. Instead of coal, it is the hydroelectric energy that competes with nuclear energy. Furthermore, the opposition to the nu- clear policy has not been predominantly from environ- mental advocacy organizations but was caused by the massive imports of expensive technology.

This paper gives a survey of the nuclear energy impact in Brazil. The specific problems arising from nuclear technology transfer to a developing country are dis- cussed using Brazil as an example.

Structure of the Nuclear Energy Sector in Brazil

The Brazilian nuclear program includes the construc- tion of eight pressurized light-water reactors of 1,300 MW each, constructed by Kraftwerk Union of West Ger- many. In addition, a Westinghouse reactor is now start- ing operation (Angra I). A significant nuclear industry is also being established in Brazil in association with West German companies. The industry includes a heavy equipment factory for reactors, already complete, and the nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing plants, which are still in the design stage. A Nuclear Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany was signed in 1975 to facilitate these developments.

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438 Luiz Pinguelli Rosa

The hydroelectrical power potential of Brazil is signifi- cant and is estimated to be as high as 213 GW. Presently only about 30 GW is used. For example, the power gener- ated by the Itaipu plant is 12 GW, bigger than the entire Brazilian nuclear program (Eletrobras, 1982). The cost of the first nuclear plant of the Brazilian-German treaty, Angra II, is about US$ 3000/kW, while a very high cost for a hydroelectric plant in the country is US$1000/kW (Rosa, 1983).

According to the originally announced conception of the Brazilian program there would be approximately 8 nuclear power reactors operating by the year 1990, totalling 10 GW of electric power (Kraftwerk Union type). There are some doubts on the achievability of this goal.

The division of attributions in the sector of nuclear generation of electric energy after the nuclear agreement was established as follows:

CNEN-federal authority-regulatory, licensing and controlling agency;

NUCLEBRAS-state-owned company with German- Brazilian subsidiaries, manufacturer of the reactors and of the nuclear fuel (projected);

ELETROBRAS-state-owned company with subsid- iaries (such as Furnas), electric energy company, user of the nuclear power plants.

All of these are associated with the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME).

The NUCLEBRAS subsidiaries are constituted with the participation of German capital. The NUCON was created to build nuclear power plants and to manage the construction, which formerly was the task of the electric energy company.

Licensing and Safety of Reactors in Brazil

The History o f Angra I The standards for licensing nuclear power plants em-

ployed in the case of Angra I were established in ac- cordance with an agreement CNEN-ELETROBRAS for the licensing of the reactor. Such standards were based on the American Code of Federal Regulation, Title 10, Part 50.

Many sections and items of the original American code concerning nuclear facilities were omitted. Such omissions are justified since the American code deals with both the production and the utilization of nuclear facilities, whereas the purpose of the Brazilian regula- tions was to license the reactor of Angra I. Furthermore, according to the same source, the original regulation has detailed information and specific points applicable to the procedure of licensing in the USA. (LABORNE, 1975).

The process of licensing Angra I began in the begin- ning of 1970 with the selection of the place where the reactor would be built, with the following prerequisites:

- i t should be located in the Centre-South region, with Rio de Janeiro as the main consumer;

- f a r from dense population areas; - o n the coast to make the transportation of imported

heavy component parts easier and to have water avail- able for the cooling system.

After completion of the studies, the place was chosen at 133 km from Rio de Janeiro and 14.4 km from Angra dos Reis (population 20,000), on the cove of Itaorna and surrounded by hills from 200-700 m high.

Then the CNEN advised Furnas-Eletrobras to take special care aiming at:

(i) geological, seismic and foundations surveys, to be in- cluded in the project with a margin of safety of 0.1 de- gree of SSE (Safe Shutdown Earthquake) at least; (ii) forecasts concerning the Rio-Santos road; (iii) meteorological survey; (iv) study of the water and sea fauna.

In 1971, the type of reactor to be installed was known - P W R Westinghouse of 627 MWe, and engineering works by Gibbs and Hill. By the end of 1972, a pre- liminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and the request for construction were submitted to CNEN by Furnas.

In the absence of adequate national norms, the CNEN adopted the norms of technically developed countries, specifically the regulations and criteria for safety and licensing of the USA. National public and private insti- tutions were invited to cooperate in some fields such as geology, meteorology, and seismic analysis. In other fields, advisors from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the USA were consulted. Some information of the PSAR presented by Furnas was qualitative and required more detailing. The permit for the construction was given partially in successive steps and the final per- mit for the construction was given in 1974.

In the part concerning the quality assurance of the design and construction of Angra I, Furnas included in the contracts with suppliers of equipment and builders the obligation of implementing the program of quality assurance in their respective tasks. The main companies are:

Westinghouse -design and erection of the power plant and supply

of the nuclear system of vapor generation; -supply of nuclear fuel.

Gibbs and Hill/PROMON (Subcontractor) - engineering.

Risk and management of nuclear energy in Brazil 439

Chicago Bridge and Iron Company -design, manufacture and erection of the steel con-

tainment vessel. Construtora Norberto Odebrecht S/A

-civil engineering works. Ansaldo Mecanica Nucleare

-design, manufacture and erection of the fuel pit.

Furnas in turn made its own program of global qual- ity assurance and contracted independent advisors- Ebasco Services Incorporated-who were not involved in any part of the design and construction of the power plant. On the other hand, it contracted Westinghouse to act on behalf of Furnas in monitoring the activities of quality assurance connected with the design, manufac- ture and erection of the steel containment vessel.

For the final license of operation it is necessary to have the final safety analysis report of Furnas. In fact, a serious problem of design caused a defect in the steam generator that prevents the reactor from operating nor- mally and the operation at a reduced power was author- ized. Some pre-operational tests were carried out but the steam generator has to be repaired before the reactor can be authorized to operate at full capacity, as will be shown below.

An important fact is that with the Nuclear Agreement it was decided to install the first two reactors of the Agreement at the same site of Angra by integrating three reactors. This decision brought serious inconvenience.

Official Measures after the Nuclear Agreement With the decree-laws, in October and December 1980,

the Federal Government created the Protection System for the Brazilian Nuclear Program (SIPRON), directly subordinated to the General Bureau of the National Security Council (SG/CSN) involving many bodies and institutions.

The SG/CSN is in Charge of the general guidelines, superior supervision and control of the SIPRON and is responsible for the coordination and preparation of projects to update the specific legislation on safety of the Brazilian Nuclear Program and its personnel as well as the population and the environment.

The CNEN is responsible for the sectorial co-ordina- tion in the fields of Physical Protection, National Safe- guards, Nuclear Technical Safety and Radiological Protection, pursuant to the legislation in force, behoov- ing it specially: to set up norms or instructions of physi- cal protection of facilities and materials; for safeguards and control of material and equipment; for safeguards of confidential technical information; of nuclear techni- cal safety; of radiological protection.

The Special Bureau of the Environment (SEMA) is responsible for the sectorial co-ordination in the field of Environmental Protection and it lies with it specially; to promote the preparation and establishment of norms and standards related to the preservation of the environ-

ment; to supervise and control the application of such norms.

The AC/SNI (Central Agency of the National Intelli- gence Service) is responsible for the sectorial co-ordina- tion in the field of information, pursuant to the legisla- tion in force, and it lies with it specially:

a)

b)

to plan, manage and co-ordinate the activities of information referring to the requirements of safety of the Brazilian Nuclear Program and its personnel, as well as of the population and environment con- nected to it. to follow up the execution of said program: -detecting the effects, influence and repercussion with the national regional and local public opinion; - t o characterize the problems for its implementa- tion; - t o survey and identify protest movements and contrary actions that may constitute emergency situations.

The Federal Police Department is also called to take part in the steps to be taken as to: the follow up of in- ternal security aiming at detecting clues that may lead to emergency situations; to ascertain by investigation re- sponsibilities in the crimes committed specifically with the purpose of impairing the Brazilian Nuclear Program.

The System established a connection with the State and Municipal authorities to carry out programs and campaigns to elucidate the population as to the pro- tection measures, especially these connected to the en- vironment or human life and to be kept informed of the actual situation at the area of the project or activity, with special care for clues that may lead to emergency situations.

It also behooves the Municipal Governments to take steps and measures relating to the co-operation for the realization of programs and campaigns to elucidate the local population.

The Studies on Reactor Safety

The research staff of the Post Graduate College of Engineering (COPPE) of the Rio de Janeiro Federal University is developing studies on probabilistic reactor safety analysis in cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) group in charge of reactor licens- ing. Besides that, the same nuclear engineering staff from COPPE have recently installed a new computer program in the Westinghouse plant (Angra I). That is a sub- cooling program developed in COPPE under a research contract with Furnas and it is working satisfactory.

Problems at the Start-Up of the Nuclear Program

The Defect in the Steam Generator of Angra I A defect in the steam generator piping has caused sig-

nificant problems at Angra I. A similar defect has been

440 Luiz Pinguelli Rosa

found in the Ringhals 3, a Swedish reactor, and the Spanish Almaraz-1 reactor. The problem in all of these reactors was vibration caused by a turbulent fluid at a high speed. The manufacturer of all these reactors, after acknowledging that there was an error of design, pro- posed to carry out the appraisal of the phenomenon, the modification of the design, the alternative of provi- sional operation, and to remedy such defects. The alter- native considered was to place a dispositive of flowing distribution.

The Problems of Angra H In the Congress, a committee of local representatives,

whose report was published in August 1982, revealed some facts concerning the problems of safety of the reactors, specifically the foundations of the reactor of Angra II, the first constructed subsequent to the Ger- man agreement. Although the site was suited for the foundations of one reactor, Angra I, there were prob- lems with the building of the turbine, close to the reac- tor. For the second unit, Angra II, it was necessary to thrust in more than one thousand concrete stakes with an average height of 40 m.

Another problem found by the committee was the resistance to seisms. The CNEN had defined a safe turning-off earthquake as such that the amount of max- imum acceleration would be 1/10 of the gravity acceler- ation at the rock at the bottom of the stakes. In the reac- tor design, this amount was considered at the top of the stakes and this may result in a difference due to the amplification of the effect on the layers between the bottom and the top of the stakes.

Upon discussions and an appeal to international ad- visors, the foundations were reinforced.

The Discussion of the Risks of the Reactors in Brazil

The criticism of the Nuclear Program was started by the Brazilian Society of Physics (Sociedade Brasileira de Fisica-SBF) which concluded that the procedure of licensing and safety of the reactors in Brazil proves to be unreliable when compared to the countries from which we import nuclear technology. Among other differ- ences, in Brazil the choice of the location of the reactors

is not open to public discussion by law. Already in 1976, the SBF warned the government about the importance of aspects connected to public safety, since, after the Nuclear Agreement, the country would begin to utilize reactors on a large scale. (SBF 1977).

A study published by the SBF in 1977 on the risks and safety of the reactors emphasized the problem of acci- dents, especially those of loss of coolants of the primary circuit (LOCA). They may at worst melt the core of the reactors due to the lack of removal of the heat generated by radioactive break-up of the fission products inside the fuel bars, which goes on for a few days after turning off the reactors. The points questioned by the American Physical Society (A.P.S., 1975) about the Rasmussen Report were considered as relevant.

References

A.I .F . -Atomic Industrial Forum (1981) A Proposed Approach to the Establishment and Use of Quantitative Safety Goals in Nuclear Regulatory Process.

D . C . - Di~irio do Congresso (1982) August. Brasflia. D . O . - Di~irio Oficial (81980) Rept~blica Federativa do Brasil, Oct 8,

1980 and Dec. 22, 1980, Brasilia. Eletrobras (1982) Plan to Supply Electric Energy Requirements up to

the year 2000--Ministry of Mines and Energy, Brasilia. F .F . -Fo rd Foundation (1977), Nuclear Power, Issues and choices,

Ballinger, Cambridge. Garribba, S. and Vacca, S. (1978) To Sviluppo Nucleare in Fase di

Transizione, Instituto di Economia delle Fonti di Energia, Franco Angeli, ed., Milano.

Lahorne, J., Grimberg, M., Simonato, A., Pollis, W. (1975) Brazilian German Seminar, of Procedural Steps, Rules and Regulations for Licensing of Nuclear Installations, CNEN, Rio de Janeiro.

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