Statue of limitations? A replica of the Statue ofLiberty is dismantled in Paris in 1998.

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As befits a nation of immigrants, American nationalism is defined not by notions

of ethnic superiority, but by a belief in the supremacy of U.S. democratic ideals.

This disdain for Old World nationalism creates a dual paradox in the American

psyche: First, although the United States is highly nationalistic, it doesn’t see itself

as such. Second, despite this nationalistic fervor, U.S. policymakers generally fail

to appreciate the power of nationalism abroad. | By Minxin Pei

Nearly two years after the horrific ter-rorist attacks on the United States,international public opinion hasshifted from heartfelt sympathy for

Americans and their country to undisguised antipa-thy. The immediate catalyst for this shift is theUnited States’ hard-line policy toward and subse-quent war with Iraq. Yet today’s strident anti-Amer-icanism represents much more than a wimpy reac-tion to U.S. resolve or generic fears of a hegemonrunning amok. Rather, the growing unease withthe United States should be seen as a powerful glob-al backlash against the spirit of American nationalismthat shapes and animates U.S. foreign policy.

Any examination of the deeper sources of anti-Americanism should start with an introspective lookat American nationalism. But in the United States,this exercise, which hints at serious flaws in thenation’s character, generates little enthusiasm. More-

Minxin Pei is a senior associate and codirector of the China

Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

over, coming to terms with today’s growing ani-mosity toward the United States is intellectuallycontentious because of the two paradoxes of Ameri-can nationalism: First, although the United States isa highly nationalistic country, it genuinely does notsee itself as such. Second, despite the high level ofnationalism in American society, U.S. policymakershave a remarkably poor appreciation of the powerof nationalism in other societies and have demon-strated neither skill nor sensitivity in dealing with itsmanifestations abroad.

B L I N D T O O N E ’ S V I RT U E

Nationalism is a dirty word in the United States,viewed with disdain and associated with Old Worldparochialism and imagined supremacy. Yet thosewho discount the idea of American nationalism mayreadily admit that Americans, as a whole, areextremely patriotic. When pushed to explain thedifference between patriotism and nationalism, thosesame skeptics might concede, reluctantly, that there

The Paradoxes ofAmerican Nationalism

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is a distinction, but no real dif-ference. Political scientists havelabored to prove such a differ-ence, equating patriotism withallegiance to one’s country anddefining nationalism as sentimentsof ethno-national superiority. Inreality, however, the psychologicaland behavioral manifestations ofnationalism and patriotism areindistinguishable, as is the impactof such sentiments on policy.

Polling organizations rou-tinely find that Americans dis-play the highest degree of nation-al pride among Westerndemocracies. Researchers at theUniversity of Chicago reportedthat before the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks, 90 per-cent of the Americans surveyedagreed with the statement “Iwould rather be a citizen ofAmerica than of any other coun-try in the world”; 38 percentendorsed the view that “Theworld would be a better place ifpeople from other countries weremore like the Americans.” (Afterthe terrorist attacks, 97 and 49percent, respectively, agreed withthe same statements.) The WorldValues Survey reported similarresults, with more than 70 per-cent of those surveyed declaringthemselves “very proud” to beAmericans. By comparison, thesame survey revealed that less than half of the peo-ple in other Western democracies—includingFrance, Italy, Denmark, Great Britain, and theNetherlands—felt “very proud” of their national-ities [see chart above].

Americans not only take enormous pride intheir values but also regard them as universallyapplicable. According to the Pew Global Attitudessurvey, 79 percent of the Americans polled agreedthat “It’s good that American ideas and customs arespreading around the world”; 70 percent said they“like American ideas about democracy.” Theseviews, however, are not widely shared, even inWestern Europe, another bastion of liberalism anddemocracy. Pew found that, among the Western

European countries surveyed, lessthan 40 percent endorse thespread of American ideas andcustoms, and less than 50 per-cent like American ideas aboutdemocracy.

Such firmly held beliefs in thesuperiority of American politi-cal values and institutions read-ily find expression in Americansocial, cultural, and politicalpractices. It is almost impossi-ble to miss them: the daily ritu-al of the Pledge of Allegiance inthe nation’s schools, the cus-tomary performance of thenational anthem before sportingevents, and the ubiquitous Ameri-can flags. And in the UnitedStates, as in other countries,nationalist sentiments inevitablyinfuse politics. Candidates relyon hot-button issues such as flagburning and national security toattack their opponents as unpa-triotic and worse.

Why does a highly national-istic society consistently view itselfas anything but? The source ofthis paradox lies in the forces thatsustain nationalism in the UnitedStates. Achievements in scienceand technology, military strength,economic wealth, and unrivaledglobal political influence can nodoubt generate strong nationalpride. But what makes American

nationalism truly exceptional are the many ways inwhich it is naturally expressed in daily life.

One of the most powerful wellsprings of Ameri-can nationalism is civic voluntarism—the willing-ness of ordinary citizens to contribute to the pub-lic good, either through individual initiatives orcivic associations. Outside observers, starting withthe French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville in theearly 19th century, have never ceased to be amazedby this font of American dynamism. “Americansof all ages, all stations in life, and all types of dis-positions are forever forming associations,” notedTocqueville, who credited Americans for relying onthemselves, instead of government, to solve soci-ety’s problems.

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[ The Paradoxes of American Nationalism ]

National PridePercentage of people, by country, who saythey are “very proud” of their nationality

Country 1990 1999–2000Britain 53 49

Denmark 42 48

Egypt N/A 81*

France 35 40

India 75 71

Iran N/A 92*

Ireland 77 74

Italy 40 39

Mexico 56 80

Netherlands 23 20

Philippines N/A 85*

Poland 69 71

United States 75 72

Vietnam N/A 78*

* 2001 survey data Source: World Values Survey

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The same grass-roots activism that animates thecountry’s social life also makes American national-ism vibrant and alluring, for most of the institutionsand practices that promote and sustain Americannationalism are civic, not political; the rituals arevoluntary rather than imposed; and the values incul-cated are willingly embraced, not artificially indoc-trinated. Elsewhere in the world, the state plays anindispensable role in promoting nationalism, whichis frequently a product of political manipulation byelites and consequently has a manufactured qualityto it. But in the United States, although individualpoliticians often try to exploit nationalism for polit-ical gains, the state is conspicuously absent. Forinstance, no U.S. federal laws mandate reciting thePledge of Allegiance in public schools, require singingthe national anthem at sporting events, or enforceflying the flag on private buildings.

The history of the pledge is an exquisite exampleof the United States’ unique take on nationalism. Fran-cis Bellamy, a socialist Baptist minister, wrote the orig-

inal text in 1892; three major American civic associ-ations (the National Education Association, theAmerican Legion, and the Daughters of the AmericanRevolution) instituted, refined, and expanded the cer-emony of reciting it. The federal government was lategetting into the game. Congress didn’t officially endorsethe pledge until 1942, and it didn’t tamper with the lan-guage until 1954, when Congress inserted the phrase“under God” after being pressured by a religiousorganization, the Knights of Columbus.

Indeed, any blunt attempt to use the power of thestate to institutionalize U.S. nationalism has been metwith strong resistance because of popular suspicionthat the government may be encroaching on Ameri-cans’ individual liberties. In the 1930s, the Jeho-vah’s Witnesses mounted a legal challenge whensome school boards tried to make the Pledge ofAllegiance mandatory, arguing that the pledge com-pelled children to worship graven images. The flag-burning amendment has failed twice in the U.S.Congress during the last eight years.

The young and the nationalist: A kindergarten class at Mayfair Elementary School in Fresno, California, recites the Pledge of Allegiance in June 2002.

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American political institutions and ideals, coupledwith the practical achievements attributed to them,have firmly convinced Americans that their valuesought to be universal. Conversely, when Americansare threatened, they see attacks on them as prima-rily attacks on their values. Consider how Americanelites and the public interpreted the September 11 ter-rorist attacks. Most readily embraced the notionthat the attacks embodied an assault on U.S. dem-ocratic freedoms and institutions.

Second, American nationalism is triumphantrather than aggrieved. In most societies, national-

ism is fueled by past grievancescaused by external powers. Coun-tries once subjected to colonialrule, such as India and Egypt, areamong the most nationalistic soci-eties. But American nationalismis the polar opposite of suchaggrieved nationalism. Americannationalism derives its meaningfrom victories in peace and warsince the country’s founding. Tri-umphant nationalists celebrate the

positive and have little empathy for the whining ofaggrieved nationalists whose formative experienceconsisted of a succession of national humiliationsand defeats.

Finally, American nationalism is forward look-ing, while nationalism in most other countries is thereverse. Those who believe in the superiority ofAmerican values and institutions do not dwell ontheir historical glories (though such glories consti-tute the core of American national identity).Instead, they look forward to even better timesahead, not just at home but also abroad. Thisdynamism imbues American nationalism with amissionary spirit and a short collective memory.Unavoidably, such forward-looking and univer-salistic perspectives clash with the backward-look-ing and particularistic perspectives of ethno-nation-alism in other countries. Haunted by memories ofWestern military invasions since the time of theCrusades, the Middle East cannot help but lookwith suspicion upon U.S. plans to “liberate” theIraqi people. In the case of China, U.S. support forTaiwan, which the Chinese government and peo-ple alike regard as a breakaway province, is themost contentious issue in bilateral relations. Theloss of Taiwan—whether to the Japanese in 1895or to the nationalists in 1949—has long symbolizednational weakness and humiliation.

In the United States, promoting nationalism is aprivate enterprise. In other societies, especially thoseruled by authoritarian regimes, the state deploys itsresources, from government-controlled media to thepolice, to propagate “patriotic values.” The cele-bration of national days in such countries featureshuge government-orchestrated parades that showcasecrack troops and the latest weaponry. (The hugemilitary parade held in Beijing in 1999 to celebratethe 50th anniversary of China allegedly cost hundredsof millions of dollars.) Yet despite its awesome high-tech arsenal, such orgiastic displays of state-sponsored

nationalism are notably absent on Independence Dayin the United States. Of course, Americans holdparades and watch fireworks on the Fourth of July,but those events are largely organized by civic asso-ciations and partly paid for by local business groups.

Herein lies the secret of the vitality and durabilityof American nationalism: The dominance of civic vol-untarism—and not state coercion—has made nation-alist sentiments more genuine, attractive, and legitimateto the general public. These expressions of Americannationalism have become so commonplace that theyare virtually imperceptible, except to outsiders.

A P O L I T I C A L C R E E D

American nationalism is hidden in plain sight. Buteven if Americans saw it, they wouldn’t recognize itas nationalism. That’s because American national-ism is a different breed from its foreign cousins andexhibits three unique characteristics.

First, American nationalism is based on politicalideals, not those of cultural or ethnic superiority.That conception is entirely fitting for a society thatstill sees itself as a cultural and ethnic melting pot.As President George W. Bush said in his Fourth ofJuly speech last year: “There is no American race;there’s only an American creed.” And in Americaneyes, the superiority of that creed is self-evident.

In the United States, promoting nationalism is a

private enterprise. In other societies, the state

deploys its resources, from government-controlled

media to the police, to propagate “patriotic values.”

May | June 2003 35

I N N O C E N T S A B R O A D

The unique characteristics of American nationalismexplain why one of the most nationalist countriesin the world is so inept at dealing with nationalismabroad. The best example of this second paradoxof American nationalism is the Vietnam War. Thecombination of the United States’ universalisticpolitical values (in this case, anticommunism), tri-umphalist beliefs in U.S. power, and short nation-al memory led to a disastrous policy that clashedwith the nationalism of the Vietnamese, a peoplewhose national experience was defined by resistanceagainst foreign domination (the Chinese and theFrench) and whose overriding goal was independ-ence and unity, not the spread of communism inSoutheast Asia.

In its dealings with several other highly national-istic societies, the United States has paid little attentionto the role nationalism played in legitimizing and sus-taining those regimes the country regarded as hostile.U.S. policy toward these nations has either disre-garded strong nationalist sentiments (as in the Philip-pines and Mexico) or consistently allowed the ideo-logical, free-market bias of American nationalism toexaggerate the antagonism of communist ideologieschampioned by rival governments (as in China andCuba). Former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nass-er’s brand of postcolonial Arab nationalism, whichrejected a strategic alliance with either the U.S.-led Westor the Soviet camp, baffled Washington officials, whocould not conceive of any country remaining neutralin the struggle against communist expansionism.Echoes of that mind-set are heard today in the Unit-ed States’ “you’re either with us or against us” ulti-matum in the war against terrorism.

This ongoing inability to deal with nationalismabroad has three immediate consequences. The first,and relatively minor, is the high level of resentment thatU.S. insensitivity generates, both among foreign gov-ernments and their people. The second, and definite-ly more serious, is that such insensitive policies tendto backfire on the United States, especially when it triesto undermine hostile regimes abroad. After all, nation-alism is one of the few crude ideologies that can rivalthe power of democratic liberalism. Look, for exam-ple, at the unfolding nuclear drama on the Koreanpeninsula. The rising nationalism of South Korea’syounger generation—which sees its troublesome neigh-bor to the north as kin, not monsters—hasn’t yet fig-ured in Washington’s calculations concerningPyongyang’s brinkmanship. In these cases, as in pre-vious similar instances, U.S. policies frequently have

Different Visions

Based on universalistic ideals(democracy, rule of law, freemarketplace) and institutions(separation of powers)

Product of grass-roots voluntarism; values and rituals are willingly embracednot artificially indoctrinated

Triumphalist; derives itsmeaning from victories inpeace and war

Forward looking, with a shortcollective memory and missionary spirit

Based on ethnicity, religion,language, and geography

Fostered by government elitesand promoted by the apparatusof the state (police, military,state-run media)

Aggrieved; often derives itsmeaning from national humiliations and defeats

Backward looking, dwelling onancient glories and historicgrudges

U.S. NATIONALISM OTHER NATIONALISMS

National Day in China

Independence Day in the United States

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espouse with the parochial national interests the U.S.government appears determined to pursue abroad.Over time, such behavior can erode the United States’international credibility and legitimacy.

If American society had been less insulated fromthe rest of the world by geography and distance,these conflicting perspectives on nationalism mightbe less severe. To be sure, physical insularity has notdiminished Americans’ belief in the universalisticappeals of their political ideas. The nation was found-ed on the principle that all people (not just Ameri-cans) are endowed with “certain inalienable rights.”That sentiment has been passed down through suc-cessive generations—from former President Franklin

the perverse effects of alienating people in allied coun-tries and driving them to support the very regimes tar-geted by U.S. policy.

Finally, given the nationalism that animates U.S.policies, American behavior abroad inevitablyappears hypocritical to others. This hypocrisy isespecially glaring when the United States underminesglobal institutions in the name of defending Ameri-can sovereignty (such as in the cases of the Kyoto Pro-tocol, the International Criminal Court, and theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The rejection ofsuch multilateral agreements may score points athome, but non-Americans have difficulty reconcilingthe universalistic rhetoric and ideals Americans

Image is everything: An Iranian woman passes by a mural at the shuttered U.S. Embassy in Tehran in January 2002.BE

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the Pew Research Center in early 2002, only about26 percent of the Americans surveyed said theywere following foreign news “very closely,” and 45percent of Americans said that international eventsdid not affect them.

An amalgam of political idealism, national pride,and relative insularity, American nationalism evokesmixed feelings abroad. Many admire its idealism,universalism, and optimism and recognize the indis-pensability of American power and leadership topeace and prosperity around the world. Othersreject American nationalism as merely the expres-sion of an overbearing, self-righteous, and mis-guided bully. In ordinary times, such internationalambivalence produces little more than idle chatter.But when American nationalism drives the country’sforeign policy, it galvanizes broad-based anti-Amer-icanism. And at such times, it becomes impossibleto ignore the inconsistencies and tensions within Amer-ican nationalism—or the harm they inflict on theUnited States’ legitimacy abroad.

D. Roosevelt’s vision of a world based upon “fourfreedoms” to President George W. Bush’s “non-nego-tiable demands of human dignity.”

But the United States’ relative isolation, whichunavoidably leads to inadequate knowledge aboutother countries, has created a huge communica-tions barrier between Americans and other soci-eties. According to a recent survey by the PewGlobal Attitudes Project, only 22 percent of Amer-icans have traveled to another country in the lastfive years, compared with 66 percent of Canadi-ans, 73 percent of Britons, 60 percent of theFrench, and 77 percent of Germans. Lack of directcontact with foreign societies has not been offsetby the information revolution. In the years lead-ing up to September 11, 2001, only 30 percent ofAmericans claimed to be “very interested” in“news about other countries.” Even after the Sep-tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, average Amer-icans did not sustain a strong interest in interna-tional affairs. According to polls conducted by

For classic works on the evolution of nationalism, see Eric J. Hobsbawm’s Nations and NationalismSince 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and BenedictAnderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York:Verso, 1991). For insights into the political thought underlying nationalism in the United States, see LouisHartz’s The Liberal Tradition in American Thought: An Interpretation of American Political ThoughtSince the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955).

In their study “National Pride: A Cross-National Analysis” (Chicago: National Opinion ResearchCenter, 1998), Tom W. Smith and Lars Jarkko measure nationalism in 23 countries and find that the Unit-ed States ranks number one. Steven Kull reveals what average Americans really think about their role inthe world in his virtual interview “Vox Americani” (Foreign Policy, September/October 2001). Fora survey of national pride in the United States since September 11, 2001, see Tom W. Smith, Kenneth A.Rasinski, and Marianna Toce’s “America Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the Sep-tember 11th Terrorist Attacks” (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 2001). For a comprehensivesurvey comparing public opinion in the United States and Europe, see the Worldviews 2002 Web site, ajoint project of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund. The Pew Glob-al Attitudes Project charts the rise of anti-American sentiments worldwide in its report “What the WorldThinks in 2002” (Washington: The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2002).

David Rothkopf argues the United States should dominate the world's information flows as GreatBritain once ruled the seas in “In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?” (Foreign Policy, Summer 1997).Robert Kagan argues in “The Benevolent Empire” (Foreign Policy, Summer 1998) that even as theworld decries U.S. arrogance, it relies on America as a guarantor of stability and prosperity.

»For links to relevant Web sites, access to the FP Archive, and a comprehensive index of related Foreign Policy articles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

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