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Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XI • no. 1 • 2011

The Avatars of Virtual Representation

Romanian Political Science Review

vol. XI, no. 12011

Acest volum a fost

publicat cu sprijinulfinanciar al FUNDAŢIEIKONRAD ADENAUER



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CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU

STUDIA POLITICARomanian Political Science Review

The end of the Cold War, and the extinction of communism both as an ideology anda practice of government, not only have made possible an unparalleled experimentin building a democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe, but have opened up amost extraordinary intellectual opportunity: to understand, compare and eventuallyappraise what had previously been neither understandable nor comparable. StudiaPolitica. Romanian Political Science Review was established in the realization that theproblems and con cerns of both new and old democracies are beginning to converge.The journal fosters the work of the first generations of Romanian political scientistspermeated by a sense of critical engagement with European and American intellectualand political traditions that inspired and explained the modern notions of democracy,pluralism, political liberty, individual freedom, and civil rights.

Believing that ideas do matter, the Editors share a common commitment as intellectualsand scholars to try to shed light on the major political problems facing Romania, acountry that has recently undergone unprecedented political and social changes. Theythink of Studia Politica. Romanian Politica Science Review as a challenge and a mandateto be involved in scholarly issues of fundamental importance, related not only to thedemocratization of Roma nian polity and politics, to the ”great transformation” that istaking place in Central and Eastern Europe, but also to the make-over of the assumptionsand prospects of their discipline. They hope to be joined in by those scholars in othercountries who feel that the demise of communism calls for a new political science ableto reassess the very foundations of democratic ideals and procedures.



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The Avatars of Virtual Representation

UNIVERSITY OF BUCHARESTDEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCEINSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH

Romanian Political Science Review

STUDIA POLITICAvol. XI, no. 1

2011

B U C U R EŞT I



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CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU

STUDIA POLITICA(ISSN 1582-4551)

Romanian Political Science Reviewis published quarterly by the Institute for Political Research

of the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharestand is printed and mailed by the C.H. Beck Publishing House

International Advisory BoardDaniel BARBU (Bucharest), Mauro CALISE (Napoli), Dominique COLAS (Paris)

Jean-Michel DE WAELE (Bruxelles), Jean-Michel EYMERI-DOUZANS (Toulouse)Raffaella GHERARDI (Bologna), Guy HERMET (Paris)

Hans-Dieter KLINGEMANN (Berlin), Marc LAZAR (Paris)Ronald H. LINDEN (Pittsburgh), Pierre MANENT (Paris)

Leonardo MORLINO (Roma), Gianfranco PASQUINO (Bologna)Cristian PREDA (Bucharest), Antoine ROGER (Bordeaux)

Giovanni SARTORI (New York), Daniel-Louis SEILER (Aix-en-Provence)

EditorAlexandra IONESCU

Editorial BoardAndrei NICULESCU, Mihai CHIOVEANU, Ruxandra IVAN

Caterina PREDA, Matei DEMETRESCU

Editorial StaffOana DIMITRIU (executive editor)

Cătălin MANTU (manuscript production), Anca VASILE (manuscript processing)

© Institutul de Cercetãri Politice



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Contents

ARGUMENTUM

DANIEL BARBU, Spiritul împotriva politicii. Despre intelectuali, Biserică şi integrareeuropeană .......................................................................................................................... 9

ARTICULI

ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU, Les élites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008.Les voies d’accès au pouvoir exécutif .............................................................................. 27

ION ENACHE, Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania..................... 51

DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN, Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict. The ”Ethnicisation” ofPublic Space in Romania .............................................................................................. 105

SONIA CATRINA, L’imaginaire paysan comme «mémoire historique». Patrimoine et

construction de l’identité nationale par le biais des musées centraux .......................... 123

ALEXANDRA ILIE, Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust? ..................................................... 137

RECENSIONES

IOAN STANOMIR, Apă rarea libertăţii. 1938-1947, Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2010(RADU CARP) .................................................................................................................................157

DAVID A. BLUMENTHAL, TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK (eds), The Legacy of Nuremberg: CivilizingInfluence or Institutionalized Vengeance?, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2008(CRISTINA MANOLACHE) ................................................................................................................159

NORMAN M. NAIMARK, Stalin’s Genocides, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,2010 (ALEXANDRA ILIE) .................................................................................................................162

BOGDAN MURGESCU, România si Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice, Editura Polirom, Iaşi,2010 (DAN-ALEXANDRU CHIŢĂ) ....................................................................................................167

SERGIU GHERGHINA, SERGIU MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă , Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010 (CODRIN TĂUT) ...............................................172




CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU6

NICOLETA IONESCU-GURĂ, Dimensiunea represiunii din România în regimul comunist. Dislocă ri de persoane şi fixă ri de domiciliu obligatoriu, Corint, Bucureşti, 2010 (MONICA ANDRIESCU) ......174

GIOVANNI SARTORI, Ingineria constitu ţională comparată . Structuri, stimulente şi rezultate, Romaniantransl. by Gabriela Tănăsescu and Irina Mihaela Stoica, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2008(DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN).................................................................................................................... 177

DANIELA PIANA, Construirea democra ţiei la frontiera spa ţiului public european, traducere de RalucaPopescu, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2009 (CORINA TURŞIE) .....................................................180

ABSTRACTS ......................................................................................................................185

AUTORES ........................................................................................................................... 189



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ARGUMENTUM



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Spiritul împotriva politicii

Spiritul împotriva politiciiDespre intelectuali, Biserică şi integrare europeană

DANIEL BARBU

Odată cu pr ă buşirea comunismului în 1989, „[a]şa cum prezisese […] ConstantinNoica, timpul în care Vestul Europei î şi va recunoaşte spiritul mai degrabă înpăstrătorii săi din Est decât în prezentul său cotidian venise“1. Extrasă dintr-un eseudespre valorile europene publicat de un renumit intelectual public în onoarea altuiintelectual public proeminent, această constatare poate servi drept început de r ăspunsla câteva întrebări menite să surprind ă natura şi modul de funcţionare a spaţiuluipublic românesc: cum se autoidentifică ast ăzi intelectualii români din mainstream,

care este genealogia intelectuală pe care o asum ă şi care sunt credinţele pe care leprofesează în raport cu procesul de modernizare a societ ăţii exprimat instituţionalde integrarea europeană. Aşa cum se întâmplă în cele mai multe contexte na ţionale,intelectualii români alcătuiesc o populaţie diversă de individualit ăţi care dispun în comun – în ochii media şi pentru o audienţă general ă – de o autoritate cultural ă generică, implicită şi de obicei necontestată, ce se întemeiază pe o performan ţă (real ă sau presupusă) obţinută în practica filosofiei, literaturii sau, mai rar, a ştiinţelor sociale.Printre ei se află un grup relativ coerent în formularea de pozi ţii publice, ce revendică o continuitate explicită cu via ţa culturală a anilor 1930. Membrii acestui grup tindsă frecventeze relativ regulat o platform ă metafizic ă pe care s-ar afla depozitat, la

adăpost de raţiunea individuală şi de mecanismele de producţie socială a cunoa şterii,un „spirit european“ ai cărui acţionari majoritari se consideră a fi chiar ei în şişi.Istoria recentă a acestui spirit este paradoxal ă: în timpul Războiului Rece, acesta ar

fi dispărut aproape cu desăvârşire din prospera Europă occidental ă, unde gânditoriiautentici au fost marginalizaţi, dacă nu de-a dreptul sufoca ţi de o societate orientată cu precădere către bunurile politice şi obsedată de bun ăstare şi de egalitate, în timpce ar fi reuşit să str ă bată neatins – este adev ărat că în clandestinitate şi într-o manieră profetică şi ne-politică – timpurile întunecate ale comunismului. C ăderea regimuluiar fi dezvăluit nu numai supravieţuirea acestui spirit, dar şi misiunea lui viitoare: să iradieze dinspre Est spre Vestul epuizat spiritual. Spre deosebire de intelectualii cehi

sau polonezi, care s-au adresat comunismului în limba dizidenţei politice, intelectualiiromâni au fost simultan tăcuţi şi publici. Au fost intelectuali „publici“ sub socialismulde stat în măsura în care au publicat cărţi şi eseuri, au conferenţiat pretutindeni înţară, în universităţi, case de cultură şi alte instituţii, au f ăcut lungi stagii de pregătire în universităţi occidentale şi au fost invitaţi (mai rar totuşi) în emisiuni de radio şiteleviziune. În toate împrejurările, au păstrat tăcerea asupra chestiunilor politice şide societate şi nu au invocat drepturile omului decât, incidental, în situaţia în careoamenii lipsiţi de drepturi au devenit ei înşişi. Ei au vorbit cu precădere limbajulculturii, idiomul înaltei tradiţii culturale europene. Unii dintre ei au mărturisit

1 Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, „Valorile Europei“, in Mihail NEAM ŢU, Bogdan TĂTARU-CAZABAN (ed.), O filosofie a intervalului. In honorem Andrei Pleşu, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2009,p. 245.



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DANIEL BARBU

ulterior că erau anima ţi de certitudinea că o discu ţie despre Platon sau un citat dinHeidegger constituiau, în ordine intelectuală, acte mai dăunătoare pentru regim decâtorice formă de protest politic f ăţiş şi explicit.

Dacă acesta poate fi un raccourci al zonei centrale a peisajului intelectual alRomâniei postcomuniste, unde se situează intelectualii în raport cu procesul deintegrare europeană? Punând la contribuţie o literatură influent ă, înrădăcinată înopera a două figuri iconice ale culturii române şti, Mircea Eliade şi Constantin Noica,vom constata că Europa a fost şi încă este privit ă, aproape canonic, ca fiind în acelaşitimp o utilitate în termeni economici, de libertate de mişcare şi de exprimare, dar şica un risc intelectual. Pe această linie de gândire, c ăreia îi fac ecou, cu unele inflexiuniparticulare ale vocii, şi purtătorii de cuvânt ai Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, prinintermediul garantismului constituţional, al practicilor democratice şi al afirmăriidrepturilor omului, Europa ar încuraja apariţia unui „om recent“ gata f ăcut, după cum ideologia socialismului de stat încercase cândva să impun ă modelul unui „omnou“ standardizat după regulile colectivismului.

Privind înapoi dinspre momentul fuziunii dintre democraţiile occidentale

şi celeaspirante din Europa Centrală într-o Uniune l ărgită, vom deconstrui în paginile care

urmează câteva din transform ările suferite de limbajul asentimentului intelectual datprocesului de europenizare de către intelectualii publici români. Şi o vom face plecândde la două observa ţii elementare şi, probabil, incontestabile. Vom remarca mai întâi înaltul grad de unanimitate al opiniei iniţiale potrivit cărei integrarea va face să circulemai liber o seamă de bunuri sociale de tipul prosperit ăţii şi pluralismului. Se poateapoi constata că procesul era v ăzut mai ales sub chipul unei tehnici istorice menită să extrag ă consensul unei societ ăţi caracterizate nu numai de o economie înapoiată,dar şi de o identitate anistorică ce traversase netulburat ă atât liberalismul secolului al

XIX-lea, cât şi comunismul veacului trecut.A doua zi după demisia socialismului de stat aceia şi experţi, intelectuali organicişi specialişti în ştiinţele sociale care obişnuiau în vremea Războiului Rece să calificeregimul comunist ca fiind opusul simetric al democraţiilor europene bazate peconstituţionalism, cetăţenie şi drepturile omului, şi-au închipuit că experien ţa lortrecută de competi ţie ideologică şi de confruntare politică era irelevant ă pentruprezenta transformare democratică, tratată mai degrab ă ca o colec ţie disparată deaşteptări instituţionale şi discursive1. Pe cale de consecinţă, o literatură mai mult saumai puţin academică consacrat ă Europei a ap ărut tot atât de spontan şi firesc pe cât înfloriseră cândva scrierile consacrate socialismului ştiinţific, autorii fiind în general

aceiaşi sau măcar proveniţi din aceleaşi centre de formare. Aproape inevitabil, Europaera concepută mai ales ca o surs ă de reglement ări literare (acquis communautaire) şimai puţin ca un nou tip de aranjament politic şi de structură de civiliza ţie pe careromânii trebuiau să şi-o însuşească şi, cu timpul, să o ajute s ă se consolideze 2.

Fapt deloc surprinzător într-un asemenea context, proza academică dedicat ă politicii şi politicilor europene este pur descriptivă şi adoptă fie o perspectiv ă împrumutată din studiul rela ţiilor internaţionale, socotind Uniunea o organizaţie

1 Daniel BARBU, „The State vs. Its Citizens. A Note on Romania, Europe and Corruption“,

Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VII, no. 1, 2007, pp. 9-12.2 Negociatorul şef mărturiseşte ca a fost interesat exclusiv de „aspectul formal“ alnegocierilor, Vasile PUŞCAŞ, România spre Uniunea Europeană . Negocierile de aderare, 2000-2004,Institutul European, Iaşi, 2007, p. 7.



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internaţională de tip interguvernamental 1, fie o perspectivă comparativ ă, explicândUniunea ca pe o entitate supranaţională dotat ă cu câteva tr ăsături federaliste2. Deşi aufost publicate zeci de manuale şi eseuri despre politica, politicile, dreptul şi lărgireaUniunii Europene, puţine dintre aceste lucrări conţin elemente de reflecţie originală. Şichiar atunci când se află într-o asemenea situa ţie, aşa cum se întâmplă cu propunereade reformă în cheie federalist ă a Uniunii avansat ă de un fost ministru de externe şide un militant civic3, astfel de întreprinderi ignoră r ădăcinile intelectuale româneştiale proiectului federal al Europei unite, sintetizate de George Ciorănescu4, membruactiv al Mişcării Europene şi al Nouvelles Equipes Internationales5 şi, în această calitate,participant marginal la fondarea Comunităţilor Europene alături de alţi proeminenţipoliticieni, universitari şi intelectuali în exil găzduiţi de cercurile democrat-creştine6.

Numai că acest efort al unor oameni politici şi universitari din prima jumătate asecolului al XX-lea de a schiţa, sub semnul federalismului, o teorie normativă asupraEuropei rămâne f ără mo ştenitori la nivelul discursului intelectual dominant. În anii1990, privirea politicienilor şi a experţilor a fost aproape exclusiv comandată deinteresul pragmatic pentru dezvoltare economică şi consolidarea statului de drept

într-o ţară post-socialist ă ce tânjea dup ă credit interna ţional, de ordin atât politic,cât şi financiar. Dacă Europa avea, pentru acest public, o tr ăsătură dominant ă, ea nutrebuia căutată într-o experien ţă intelectual ă consumat ă în trecut şi nu putea fi căutată altundeva decât în actualitatea abunden ţei:

„Această structur ă [Uniunea European ă] asigură unul dintre cele mairidicate niveluri de trai din lume. Şi, ceea ce e important, într-o lume democratică şi deschisă. Pentru o ţară care nu a cunoscut decât chinul şi strânsul curelei,abundenţa Uniunii Europene s-ar putea să fie chiar un şoc cultural şi material“,

observa în 2004, în timp ce negocia cu Comisia harta itinerariului integrării, primulministru Adrian Năstase7.

Sedusă într-o prim ă etap ă de promisiunea prosperit ăţii, opinia publică a începuttreptat să devin ă con ştientă de pericolele ce puteau sta ascunse în str ăfundurile

1 E.g. Iordan Gheorghe B ĂRBULESCU, Uniunea Europeană . Aprofundare şi Extindere.Cartea I. De la Comunităţile Europene la Uniunea Europeană , Editura Trei, Bucureşti, 2001. Înnomenclatorul oficial al specializărilor universitare există o diplom ă în „rela ţii internaţionaleşi studii europene“.

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E.g. Nicolae P ĂUN, Ciprian Adrian PĂUN, Georgiana CICEO, Radu ALBU-COMĂNESCU, Finalitatea Europei. Considera ţii asupra proiectului institu ţional şi politic al UniuniiEuropene, Editura Fundaţiei pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 2005.

3 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Adrian SEVERIN, „Un concept românesc al Europei federale“, inRenate WEBER (ed.), Un concept românesc privind viitorul Uniunii Europene, Polirom, Iaşi, 2001,pp. 17-54.

4 George CIOR ĂNESCU, L’Europe unie. De l’idée à la fondation, édition soignée par ŞtefanDelureanu, Paideia, Bucureşti, 2005, reeditare a tezei din 1946 Les Roumains el l’idée fédéraliste şia articolelor şi studiilor scrise în exil.

5 Ştefan DELUREANU, Le Nouvelles Equipes Internationales. Per una rifondazione dell’Europa(1947-1965), Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2006, mai ales pp. 181-240.

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IDEM, Uniunea Europeană a Federali ştilor şi promotorii români ai Europei Unite. Mă rturie şimemorie (1947-1957), Paideia, Bucureşti, 2007.7 Adrian N ĂSTASE, De la Karl Marx la Coca-Cola, dialog deschis cu Alin Teodorescu,

Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 114.



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proiectului integrării. Un studiu consacrat dezbaterilor publice având ca temă central ă Europa, aşa cum acestea s-au desf ăşurat mai ales în presă1, a stabilit că atitudinea fa ţă de Uniunea Europeană a avut ini ţial un public format din experţi, ulterior a devenito chestiune de identitate colectivă, pentru a se transforma în final într-o problemă de poziţionare politică. La început, în anii 1990, tonul îl dădeau experţii, birocraţii şipoliticienii care f ăceau exact portretul acelei Europe la care visaseră îndelung cet ăţeniiobişnuiţi: o societate a abundenţei, un „supermarché gigantic“ (cu vorbele ironice aleunui intelectual care încerca să rezume succint opinia general ă2) în care româniivor ajunge şi ei la un moment dat să-şi facă cump ărăturile, cu condiţia ca anumiteproceduri complexe să fie duse la bun sfâr şit de către cei în drept să o fac ă. Atunci când, în anul 2000, Parlamentul a decis să dezincrimineze homosexualitatea ca gest sinonimcu europenizarea culturii penale moştenite de la socialismul de stat, s-a deschis primadezbatere cu adevărat contradictorie asupra semnificaţiei proiectului european pentruo societate căreia părea să i se cear ă s ă renun ţe la ceva ce avea aerul că face parteindisolubilă din identitatea sa colectiv ă. Contururile discursive ale acestei identităţiau fost atunci creionate cu vigoare de arhiepiscopul Bartolomeu Anania. Învăţatulierarh al Clujului şi-a întrerupt lucrul la noua versiune românească a Bibliei pentrua-şi pune compatrioţii în gardă cu privire la preten ţiile reale ale Europei. Aceastale-ar fi cerut românilor, ca preţ al ader ării, să considere acceptabile social „sexul,homosexualitatea, viciile, drogurile, avorturile şi ingineria genetică“, din pricină c ă,fiind „sărăcită spiritual“ şi întemeiată „exclusiv pe politic ă şi economie“, Europei îilipseşte „orice urmă de spiritualitate, cultur ă sau religie“ 3. Deoarece avuţia afişată aEuropei ar putea fi doar o mască sub care risc ă s ă se ascund ă mizeria duhovniceasc ă,teologii români au ales să se ocupe relativ sistematic şi admonitoriu de „amneziaeuropeană“4, adică de relativism, secularizare şi înstrăinarea de tradiţie ca maladii înrădăcinate în reţeta de fabricaţie a Uniunii Europene, construită voluntar în a şa fel încât amnezia şi neutralitatea axiologică s ă prevaleze asupra culturii şi identităţii5.

Din acel moment, integrarea europeană a ţării a fost cântărită nu numai ca un faptrelevant doar pentru expertiza tehnică şi birocratică, dar şi ca o alegere de civilizaţiesau, cu formula unui distins cărturar de sensibilitate mărturisit conservatoare, ca otensiune între două tipuri de societate, unul ancorat în „solidarit ăţile organice“ alevieţii private, ţinând încă împreun ă familiile şi comunităţile locale, iar celălalt generatde „solidarităţile organizate“ de sus în jos de către puterea politică6. Desigur, tipologiacomunitară nu se potrive şte doar României, unde ar fi mai vizibilă decât în alte

1 Camelia BECIU, „L’espace publique des débats sur l’Europe. Traitements médiatiques etmodes de généralisation“, in Silvia MARTON (ed.), Europe in Its Making. A Unifying Perceptionon Europe, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2006, pp. 195-214.

2 Adrian MARINO, Pentru Europa. Integrarea României. Aspecte ideologice şi culturale, ediţiaa 2-a, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, p. 134.

3 Citat de Lavinia STAN, Lucian TURCESCU, Religion and Politics in Post-CommunistRomania, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2007, p. 177; evoluţia acestei dezbaterieste urmărită la pp. 171-198.

4 E.g. Radu PREDA, „Amnezia unui continent. Raportul Biseric ă-stat între laicism şirelativism“, in Miruna TĂTARU-CAZABAN (ed.), Teologie şi politică . De la Sfin ţii Pă rin ţi la

Europa unită , Anastasia, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 309-359.5 Radu PREDA, Semnele vremii. Lecturi social-teologice, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, p. 296.6 Alexandru DU ŢU, Ideea de Europa şi evolu ţia conştiin ţei europene, All Educational,

Bucureşti, 1999, p. 9.



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locuri de pe continent, ci poate servi drept model alternativ pentru întreaga Europă,pusă institu ţional în mişcare până acum doar de individualismul liberal 1. Filosofişi intelectuali publici, nu întotdeauna conservatori, tradiţionalişti sau creştini, dardeopotrivă suspicio şi faţă de autonomia politicului şi neîncrezători în exclusivitateanormativă a ra ţiunii, au formulat judecăţi similare. O astfel de poziţie intelectuală,destul de larg răspândită, nu trebuie însă interpretat ă ca o critic ă adresat ă Europeica atare, în versiunea sa instituţionalizată, ci are mai degrabă rostul de a aproxima,cu alte mijloace decât cele ale politicilor publice şi actelor administrative, care estepână la urm ă pozi ţia politică a României în Europa. Şi, mai important încă, de ahotărî cine este îndrept ăţit intelectual să dea seama despre aceast ă pozi ţie şi să-i fixezecoordonatele culturale. Aceste precizări pot servi drept cadru de contingenţe pentruo naraţiune ce ar putea dezvălui „autoritatea culturală“ ce spune istoria Europei şipovestea europenizării în beneficiul societăţii româneşti.

Pe 11 mai 2008, un sobor de episcopi ai Bisericii Ortodoxe Române a săvârşit unlung ritual solemn pe o câmpie din nord-estul Transilvaniei. În prezenţa a zeci demii de credincioşi, arhiereii au celebrat canonizarea a patru ţărani români executaţichiar în locul respectiv în anul 1763. În prealabil, Sfântul Sinod le atribuise calitateade martiri ai credinţei strămoşeşti. Cine au fost cei patru noi sfinţi şi ce au f ăcut eianume pentru a se învrednici de o asemenea recunoaştere publică şi, în al doilea rând,de ce a aşteptat Biserica atât de mult pentru a le valida meritele? Cu excepţia celuimai în vârstă dintre ei, un centenar ce c ălătorise până în Rusia în dubla sa calitate deostaş lefegiu şi de călugăr (poate doar improvizat), este vorba despre ţărani iobagianalfabeţi din partea locului, care se opuseseră îns ă violent militariz ării regiunii lorde graniţă. Operaţia, parte a unui vast proces de construcţie statală ( Einrichtungswerk ),includea scoaterea din iobăgie a locuitorilor din satele de la frontiera cu Moldovaotomană. În schimbul noului lor statut social, de oameni liberi, ţăranilor li se cerea să se lase înrolaţi în regimentele grănicereşti năsăudene. Numai că, aşa cum mărturiseacel mai înalt funcţionar al provinciei2, obligaţia de a sluji sub arme pentru a garantasecuritatea militară a teritoriului locuit de ei ( der Sicherheit des Landes) nu era primulobiectiv al autorităţilor imperiale: misiunea lor de căpătâi era mai degrabă una defactură politico-administrativ ă, şi anume aceea de a contribui la sporirea puteriiefective a statului (Vermehrung der wirklichen Macht des Staates) prin acceptarea unuiefort de Umbildung, prin transformarea comportamentelor lor individuale şi colectiveşi prin asumarea unui rol social diferenţiat, specializat şi cu vocaţia utilităţii publice.Guvernul le punea la dispoziţie drepturi civile, echipament militar, şcoli elementarecu învăţători fluenţi în latină şi germană şi o perspectivă clar ă de mobilitate social ă

ascendentă. Eliberaţi de cele mai multe legături feudale, ţăranii trebuiau să acceptesă-şi servească împ ăratul şi regele apostolic, fiind încurajaţi (deşi deloc obligaţi) să seunească cu Biserica acestuia, cea catolic ă, păstrându-şi însă ne ştirbit ritul bizantin.

Un aranjament echitabil, s-ar spune, cel puţin între limitele până la careluminatele Staatswissenschaften de la sfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea erau dispuse să meargă. Cei patru sfinţi retroactivi nu au acceptat însă tranzac ţia şi i-au instigat şi peceilalţi săteni să refuze s ă ias ă de sub jugul iob ăgiei, să poarte arme, s ă se comporteca supuşi loiali şi utili, să-şi trimită copiii la şcoală unde s ă înve ţe graiuri străine şi să

1 Ibidem, p. 138.2 Raportul baronului von Brukenthal citat de Carol GÖLLNER, Regimentele gră nicereşti din

Transilvania 1764-1851, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1973, pp. 26, 196.



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se împărtăşească în biserici în care numele pontifului roman era pomenit la liturghie.Ţăranii erau îndemnaţi să urmeze în continuare vechile obiceiuri tradi ţionale,să respecte ierarhiile locale, s ă st ăruie în religia lor populară, protejată de la maredistanţă de suveranul tuturor Rusiilor şi al tuturor pravoslavnicilor, să r ămână înafara oricăror repere oferite de cultura juridică a epocii Luminilor, închi şi ermetic înmicro-universul lor rural caracterizat de înapoiere, analfabetism, autarhie economică şi dominat de oligarhii rurale tradiţionale. Condamnaţi pentru sediţiune şi incitare larebeliune împotriva statului, cei patru au fost executaţi chiar pe locul în care porniseră răzvrătirea. Documentată am ănunţit de birocraţii monarhiei administrative1 – cetindea să se manifeste ca o putere de hârtie ( eine papierne Gewalt), cu formula unuiobservator contemporan din Ardeal2 – incidentul a fost ulterior uitat de toate p ărţilece ar fi putut fi interesate să-i pună în valoare posibilele semnifica ţii până în clipacând România a semnat hârtiile de aderare la Uniunea Europeană.

Această povestire poate p ărea prea lungă şi în orice caz deconectată de ladezbaterile zilelor noastre. Cu toate acestea, deşi evenimentele în cauză s-au petrecut în ultima parte a secolului al XVIII-lea, datarea lor politică trebuie f ăcută indubitabil înanul 2008. La urma urmelor, de ce ar fi ales Biserica dominantă dintr-un stat membrual Uniunii Europene să sanctifice o reac ţie împotriva modernizării şi a europenizăriice trecuse neobservată, în ochii istoricilor naţionalişti3 şi ai credincioşilor deopotrivă,vreme de aproape două veacuri şi jumătate? În plus invizibilitatea mişcării socialedin 1762-1763 pentru istoria ecleziastică pare pe deplin justificat ă de lipsa de relief adimensiunii confesionale a faptelor. Oficialii militari şi civili cu pregătire superioară înştiinţele statului care au avut de înfruntat, soluţionat şi evaluat criza nu au considerat-omai mult decât manifestarea incidentală a unui conservatorism popular şi reacţionar,stârnit de o măsură luminat ă de reformism social şi alimentat de ignoranţă, fanatismşi xenofobie.

Nu doar străinii î şi puteau însă forma o asemenea impresie. O parte din notabiliivalahi nutreau, chiar de la începutul secolului, sentimentul urgenţei unei alegeri decivilizaţie. Iată un exemplu. Întors de la Viena, unde se angajase în numele s ău şial românilor ardeleni să primeasc ă unirea cu Biserica Romei, episcopul Athanasieconvoacă în anul 1700 un sobor la Alba Iulia. Incita ţi de Constantin Brâncoveanu,popii, negustorii şi boierii braşoveni şi f ăgărăşeni nu acceptă s ă se uneasc ă cu„Înpăratul“, „Vlădica“ şi „Ţara“, adică cu românii care puteau avea, în temeiulmecanismelor reprezentative recunoscute de constituţiile transilvănene, o vocelegală. Athanasie ia act de refuzul lor cu aceste cuvinte: „Voi nu sănteţi din să borulnostru… să v ă duce ţi la ţara Turcului“4. Episodul nu este relevant doar pentru istoria

ecleziastică. Reperele elementare ale urgenţei intrării în modernitate erau deja limpezi în mintea ierarhului ardelean. Pe de o parte Roma, Viena, limbajul dreptului şi o serie

1 Relatarea evenimentelor pe baza actelor procesului p ăstrate în arhivele imperiale laMathias BERNATH, Habsburg und die Anfänge der Rumänischen Nationsbildung, E.J. Brill, Leiden,1972, pp. 158-160 şi la Carol GÖLLNER, Regimentele gră nicereşti...cit., pp. 44-46.

2 Mathias BERNATH, Habsburg...cit., p. 45.3 Silviu Dragomir, în a sa monumental ă, apologetică, patriotică şi anti-catolică Istorie

a desrobirii religioase a românilor din Ardeal în secolul XVIII (două volume de aproape 700 de

pagini, Editura şi Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, Sibiu, 1920, 1930) abia dacă men ţionează evenimentele.4 Nicolae IORGA, „Însemn ări de cronică ale clericilor din Şcheii Braşovului“, Buletinul

Comisiei Istorice a României, vol. XII, 1933, p. 75.



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de privilegii pentru elită ce promiteau s ă se transforme în drepturi universale. Pe dealtă parte, Ţara Turcului, Balcanii altfel spus, celebraţi ulterior de Mircea Eliade ca opunte între culturi, dar până la urm ă doar un t ărâm al dominaţiei din care dreptulera exclus şi în care drepturile, pe măsura apariţiei lor, vor fi exercitate sub formă deprivilegii ale elitei.

Cu toate acestea, revolta celor patru ţărani împotriva puterii impersonale dehârtie a statului modern în versiunea sa austriacă nu a interesat nici istoriografiaromantică şi nici cea comunistă, atât insuficient informate asupra faptelor, cât şiprobabil suspicioase faţă posibila lor inspira ţie rusească, dar deopotrivă înclinate s ă pună în valoare revoltele na ţionale împotriva stăpânirilor străine. Cei patru au trebuitsă a ştepte anul 2008 pentru a le fi recunoscută calitatea de sfin ţi martiri ai neamuluişi mărturisitori ai credinţei ortodoxe. Siluetele lor se profilează de fapt în filigranulunui manifest al Bisericii naţionale ortodoxe cu privire la integrarea statului naţionalal românilor în Uniunea Europeană.

Dar ce fel de credinţă putem spera s ă ştim că au m ărturisit cei patru ţărani de lasfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea dintr-un colţ îndep ărtat al unui imperiu ce ambiţiona să

administreze potrivit aceleiaşi ştiinţe a statului nu numai Transilvania, dar şi Bruxelles?Oricare ar fi fost intenţiile lor, observatorul educat din secolul al XXI-lea, indiferentde credinţele sale personale sau de orientările sale politice, ar ajunge probabil la oconcluzie asemănătoare celei trase de funcţionarii austrieci: ei s-au ridicat, cu preţulvieţii, în apărarea unei tradiţii locale şi rurale caracterizată de analfabetism, supersti ţii,suspiciune faţă de str ăini, neîncredere în productivitatea socială a normelor scrise, ca şi în capacitatea administraţiei statului de a pune în legătură oamenii şi lucrurile potrivitunor reguli raţionale şi impersonale. Dacă aceasta este situa ţia, înseamnă c ă Biserica aoferit susţinătorilor săi din anul 2008 o contra-naraţiune a integrării europene, ca şi unnumăr de indicaţii cu privire la felul în care românii ortodocşi ar trebui să se poarte în

faţa Europei, privită ca un imperiu de tip nou, care adun ă înc ă o dat ă laolalt ă, într-uncadru normativ comun, atât Transilvania, cât şi Bruxelles.Cât de semnificativ ar putea fi un asemenea manifest şi care ar fi audienţa vizată?

Nu cumva avem de-a face cu o întreprindere mai degrabă periferic ă şi anecdotică, f ără nici un fel de ecou într-o opinie publică ale c ărei valori sunt modelate de imperativelesecularizării ce au unificat şi lărgit Europa? Pentru a răspunde la aceste întrebări,ar trebui să cânt ărim mai întâi, luând în calcul profunzimea istorică a fenomenului,greutatea politică şi culturală a Bisericii în via ţa publică româneasc ă şi, pe cale deconsecinţă, să estim ăm şi ponderea pe care luările ei de poziţie ar putea-o avea înformarea unei imagini generale despre soarta, menirea şi locul românilor în Europa.

Unele anchete de teren oarecum confidenţiale păreau să indice c ă, chiar şi subcomunism, practica religioasă tradi ţională nu numai c ă nu disp ăruse, dar î şi păstraseun oarecare relief social1. Cum Biserica se afla într-o legătură vizibil ă cu statul (care îisalariza clerul, îi numea episcopii prin decret şi îi includea în reprezentanţa naţională şi în organizaţiile de masă şi obşteşti), apartenenţa la comunitatea ecleziastică dominant ă şi încă privilegiat ă institu ţional avea un caracter voluntar extrem de discret2 şi nutrecea decât în mod accidental şi numai printr-un cumul de factori exogeni drept oformă de diziden ţă fa ţă de socialismul devenit doctrin ă oficial ă a statului.

1

M ălina VOICU, România religioasă . Pe valul european sau în urma lui?, Institutul European,Iaşi, 2007, p. 27.2 Cf. Peter BERGER, „Orthodoxy and Global Pluralism“, Demokratsiya. The Journal of Post-

Soviet Democratization, vol. 13, no. 3, 2005, pp. 441-442.



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Societăţile postcomuniste s-au dovedit apoi reţinute în a-şi estima şi a-şi mărturisipropria laicitate, atâta vreme cât aceasta putea fi interpretată drept o dimensiuneinoportună şi indezirabilă a mo ştenirii ideologice a marxism-leninismului. Acesta estede altfel motivul pentru care fenomenul „lepădării“ publice de ateism pare să fi fostmai semnificativ statistic după 1989 decât cel al abandon ării formale a creştinismuluisub socialismul de stat1. Nimic surprinzător atunci în faptul că recens ămintele post-

comuniste indică, la rândul lor, că aproximativ 85% dintre români se identific ă caaparţinând Bisericii Ortodoxe. De asemenea, în toate sondajele, Biserica se bucură deun nivel de încredere nu numai în creştere constantă, dar şi mai înalt în comparaţiecu cel de care beneficiază institu ţii de tipul armatei, guvernului, Parlamentuluisau presei2. Aceste date aşează România în Europa al ături de Italia, unde cota de încredere în Biserică este invers propor ţională cu cea în institu ţiile politice, dar la maredepărtare de Germania, unde încrederea în instituţiile politice este mai mare decât cea în Biserici3. În plus, Biserica Ortodoxă pare s ă exercite o influen ţă suficient de mareasupra factorilor de decizie politică pentru ca, în anul 2007, Ministerul Educa ţiei să elimine din manualele de liceu orice referinţă la teoria evolu ţionistă. Cu toate acestea,

proporţia celor care frecventează regulat Biserica pare, la o privire capabil ă s ă treac ă de prima impresie, să nu fie spectaculos superioar ă mediei europene 4. La nivelulconduitelor individuale, aşa cum pot fi surprinse statistic, românii probabil că tr ăiesc într-un mediu relativ, deşi nemărturisit, secularizat.

De aceea, influenţa Bisericii în spaţiul public ar putea fi lămurită cel mai bine cuajutorul conceptului, greu traductibil, de vicarious religion, propus de Grace Davie5 pentru a descrie situaţia în care o minoritate organizată de profesioni şti ai cultului îndeplineşte acte şi gesturi religioase în numele şi în locul unei majorităţi care nuse comportă de obicei a şa cum este instruită de ace şti practicieni calificaţi, dar esteconştientă de activitatea desf ăşurată de ace ştia în contul comunităţii şi îi aprobă rostul.

Într-un asemenea cadru conceptual, angajamentul personal faţă de valori şi practicireligioase poate să fie lipsit de densitate statistic ă şi să devin ă socialmente irelevant.Într-adevăr, nu spre instituţie ca atare î şi îndreaptă aten ţia românii în căutare deinstrucţiuni cu privire la conduitele lor publice. De pildă, în alegerile prezidenţialedin anul 2000, candidatul Mugur Isărescu, susţinut pe faţă de înalta ierarhie ortodox ă (într-un spot electoral, mitropolitul de atunci al Moldovei îl prezenta pe candidat cu

1 „The lapsed Christians are being outnumbered by the lapsed atheists“ scrie cu mali ţieIvana NOBLE, Theological Interpretation of Culture in Post-Communist Context, Ashgate, Aldershot,

2010, p. 4.2 Dumitru SANDU, Spa ţiul social al tranzi ţiei, Polirom, Iaşi, 1999, pp. 74-84.3 M ălina VOICU, România religioasă ...cit., pp. 128-138.4 Sondajele realizate în România începând cu 1990, inclusiv Eurobarometrele, atunci

când sunt interesate de comportamentele religioase ale respondenţilor, încearcă s ă afle cât dedes au aceştia obiceiul de a „vizita“ o biserică (s ăptămânal, lunar, sezonier etc.), nefiind defapt curioase cu privire la „participarea“ regulată, pe baze duminicale, la serviciile religioase.Din această pricin ă, datele culese de aceste sondaje nu sunt comparabile cu cele produse decercetările efectuate în ale societăţi europene. cf. Grace DAVIE, Religion in Modern Europe. A Memory Mutates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 61-81. În schimb, runda a patra(2008/2009) a European Social Survey Data plasează participarea duminical ă la acela şi nivel cu

Grecia, puţin peste Franţa, dar mult sub Irlanda, Portugalia sau Italia.5 Grace DAVIE, „Vicarious Religion: A Methodological Challenge“, in Nancy T.AMMERMAN (ed.), Everyday Religion. Observing Modern Religious Lives, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford and New York, 2007, pp. 21-35.



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cuvintele „iată omul!”) nu a ob ţinut decât 9% din voturi, în vreme ce candidatul carea câştigat scrutinul din 2004 se remarcase printr-o răsunătoare (deşi de scurtă durat ă)apologie a drepturilor homosexualilor, ca şi printr-o opoziţie hotărâtă (dar nici eade lungă durat ă) faţă de proiectul construirii în Bucure şti a „catedralei mântuiriineamului“. În schimb, cele mai multe aspecte ale culturii politice par să poat ă fi cititecu ajutorul unui cod de lectură inspirat de ethosul ortodox. Sau, reluând cuvinteleunui reputat eseist şi administrator cultural,

„dacă prin Biseric ă în ţelegeţi instituţia cu clerul ei … eu am puţine legături cuBiserica […] Dacă îns ă prin Biseric ă în ţelegeţi comunitatea credincioşilor în jurul oficierii tainelor şi a păstrării acestei tradiţii […] atunci voi declara cu toată simplitatea că sunt în ea“ 1.

Stilul, uneori chiar şi conţinutul dezbaterilor post-comuniste pe teme politiceşi de societate, înţelegerea comună a responsabilit ăţii personale şi colective, aimputabilităţii actelor private ori publice, modelul vieţii de familie, căsătoria la biserică şi înmormântarea cu preoţi, percepţia asupra diviziunilor funcţionale dinsocietate, toate au fost plămădite într-un context religios încă fertil şi care nu şi-apierdut productivitatea nici măcar sub comunism2.

Şi din acest motiv, societatea românească pare s ă fi ie şit din comunism cu ungrad relativ înalt de omogenitate culturală3 şi lasă impresia c ă a r ămas in continuarerelativ coerentă şi consensuală în opiniile sale de-a lungul procesului de integrareeuropeană. Ca şi cum pră buşirea unei ideologii unanimiste şi necontestate ar fi ceruto nouă homonoia, o altă form ă de asentiment colectiv cu privire la norme şi valori. Prinsimpla, dar monumentala ei prezenţă (în media, în armat ă, în spitale şi închisori, înşcoli, cu toate ocaziile festive civile şi militare)4, aprobată formal sau tacit de c ătre stat,Biserica dominantă a oferit spontan oportunitatea consensului şi a satisf ăcut nevoiaunei autorităţi culturale de înlocuire. Politicienii şi experţii au fost neîndoielnicprotagoniştii integrării europene, dar nu au fost constrânşi de universitari sau deintelectuali să ac ţioneze în calitate de subiect al propriilor lor acţiuni. Ei au articulat în scris, în discurs şi în formularea deciziilor ceea ce nu erau pregătiţi nici să fac ă şinici să gândeasc ă. De aceea, Biserica Ortodoxă na ţională, privită ca un depozit desensuri, ca şi moştenirea intelectuală a lui Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran şi ConstantinNoica, gânditori reacţionari anti-moderni şi, pentru un timp, naţionalişti şi-au unitneprogramat forţele pentru a-şi impune dominaţia asupra discursului public.

Cum a fost oare posibilă o asemenea întâlnire, oarecum improbabil ă în cadre

seculare? Să l ămurim aici o singură posibil ă cauz ă. Procesul continuu de raţionalizarea sferei publice, considerat de Max Weber ca fiind principalul impuls pentrutransformarea societăţilor în timpurile moderne, poate fi anevoie observat în România,

1 Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Politice, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 241.2 Cea mai clar ă prezentare a rela ţiilor ambigue dintre Biserică şi statul communist la Olivier

GILLET, Religion et nationalisme. L’idéologie de l’Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine sous le communisme,Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1987.

3 Daniel BARBU, „The Burden of Politics. Public Space, Political Participation, and State

Socialism“, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. II, no. 2, 2002, pp. 329-346.4 O prezentare analitic ă a acestei prezen ţe publice la Iuliana CONOVICI, Ortodoxia înRomânia postcomunistă . Reconstruc ţia unei identităţi publice, vol. I-II, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2009-2010.



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chiar şi atunci când toate faptele şi cuvintele imaginabile sunt luate în calcul. Egalitateapolitică nu numai c ă a fost afirmat ă ca un principiu de import, pe care elitele dominantenu au ştiut să îl explice şi să îl garanteze, dar apari ţia democraţiei electorale în anii1920 şi 1930 a fost mai întâi amânată, apoi condiţionată de un stat liberal incapabilsă-şi imagineze cum reprezentarea egală a unor cet ăţeni incompetenţi politic (dindublul motiv al analfabetismului şi lipsei proprietăţii) ar putea fi organizată1. Maimult, o viaţă cultural ă oarecum original ă s-a înfiripat în perioada interbelic ă sub formaunei critici multiple a secularizării, democraţiei parlamentare, culturii occidentale,Luminilor, europenizării şi egalităţii politice2. De la sfârşitul anilor 1930, MirceaEliade3 este socotit a fi nu numai un martor de excep ţie al perioadei de înflorire şivitalitate a culturii româneşti interbelice, dar şi cel mai influent intelectual român dintoate timpurile. Opera sa, academică, eseistică şi literară, ca şi viziunea sa teoretică cuprivire la autonomia politicului dau încă tonul produc ţiei culturale româneşti.

De unde începe misiunea României? Un articol publicat în 1937 de Mircea Eliade4 a fixat termenii unei dezbateri ce nu şi-a pierdut încă suflul: istoricul debutant alreligiilor şi ziaristul de extremă dreapt ă observ ă în respectivul text c ă procesulde modernizare a României poate fi socotit un eşec tocmai pentru că a fost pus înoperă dintr-o perspectiv ă politic ă; „voga primatului politic“ în societăţile liberale şidemocratice şi, prin imitaţie, în România, s-a dovedit ineficientă atâta timp cât ţaraa rămas o periferie a Europei protestante şi catolice, o naţiune neînsemnată, animată de o cultură minor ă; numai printr-un „primat al spiritualului“, atât anti-democratic,cât şi religios, ar putea atât Ortodoxia, cât şi România să ajung ă „s ă domine întreagaEuropă“. Românii, locuiţi de o „colectivă sete de sfin ţenie“ vor aduce pe lume un „omnou“, dar nu pentru a „face politică“, ci pentru ca „să fac ă istorie prin valori supra-istorice“. Pe scurt, misiunea României ar fi aceea de a face istorie, nu de a face politică.Ce fel de istorie însă? Precizarea vine în 1943 de la Constantin Noica: „Nu mai putemtrăi într-o Românie patriarhală, sătească, anistorică. Nu ne mai mulţumeşte Româniaeternă; vrem o Românie actuală“5. Istoria care trebuie f ăcută este cea a prezentului. Aprezentului continuu al spiritului.

Când a coborât pentru prima oară în spa ţiul public, Eliade avea înclinaţia dea se considera un discipol indirect al lui René Guénon6. Cu acest titlu, pentru ellumea occidentală estompase identitatea real ă a societ ăţii, ce rezidă în tradi ţie.

1 Daniel BARBU, Cristian PREDA, „Building the State from the Roof Down. Varieties ofRomanian Liberal Nationalism“, in Iván Zoltán DÉNES (ed.), Liberty and the Search for Identity.

Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires, Central European University Press, Budapest andNew York, 2006, pp. 367-382.2 O introducere solid ă în aceast ă chestiune este ofiert ă de Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural

Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 , CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca and London, 1995.

3 De şi lipsită de cadru teoretic, este util ă biografia întocmit ă de Florin ŢURCANU, MirceaEliade. Le prisonnier de l’histoire, La Découverte, Paris, 2005.

4 Vremea, X, no. 477, 28 februarie 1937, p. 3, reluat in Mircea ELIADE, Texte „legionare“ şidespre „românism“, ediţie de Mircea Handoca, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, pp. 47-49.

5 Constantin NOICA, „Ce e etern şi ce e istoric în cultura românească“, Revista Funda ţiilorRegale, X, nr. 9, septembrie 1943, p. 528.

6

La crise du monde moderne a lui Guénon a fost publicat ă într-o edi ţie românească în 2008alături de alte scrieri ale autorului francez, scoase în mai multe tiraje, de Editura Humanitasal cărui animator este Gabriel Liiceanu, principalul depozitar al moştenirii intelectuale a luiMircea Eliade; prefaţa declară c ă „opera lui [René Guénon] are ast ăzi nu numai o valoare



19



Autonomia politicului şi invenţia Sinelui au pervertit natura umană ca atare, cel mai bine şi mai autentic definită de figura lui homo religious, un om nu numai organicataşat de comunitate, dar legat natural de o autoritate superioară, normativă şiexplicativă în acela şi timp. Atât proiectul Luminilor cât şi triumful ştiinţei politicede tip hobbesian s-ar cuveni de aceea considerate operaţiuni intelectuale înstrăinatede o ştiinţă autentic ă a spiritului, ce nu poate fi experimentat ă cu titlu individual şi

în condiţii de egalitate a celor implicaţi, ci trebuie întrupată în comunit ăţi naţionaleunificate, purificate, organizate ierarhic şi însufleţite de vocaţia universalului. Pe calede consecinţă, naţiunile au misiuni. Ele domină sau sunt dominate. Pentru motiveevidente, începând cu anii 1950, Eliade şi-a adăpostit doctrina în disciplina academică a istoriei religiilor, care l-a ajutat să ob ţină recunoa ştere internaţională. Dar mulţiintelectuali rămaşi acasă şi-au păstrat atenţia trează la aspectul holistic şi politic al întreprinderii intelectuale a lui Eliade.

În 1988, un membru al generaţiei lui Mircea Eliade, filosoful Constantin Noica1, apublicat în germană, la o editură socialist ă, o colecţie de eseuri traduse în româneştecinci ani mai târziu2. Volumul se deschide cu o foarte comentată ulterior Scrisoare că tre

un intelectual din Occident, ce cuprinde, printre multe alte consideraţii, o caracterizarea Europei ca o „bye-bye society“3, ca o civilizaţie caracterizată de multiple deconect ărişi partiţii. În 2003, când iminenţa integrării europene devenise o certitudine politică,arhiepiscopul Bartolomeu Anania a reformulat tema separării, afirmând că „NouaEuropă“ (adică Uniunea European ă) are doar două dimensiuni, politic ă şi economică,amândouă importante, dar insuficiente, deoarece atât economia, cât şi politica au încomun faptul că sunt menite s ă-i despartă pe oameni; Noii Europe i-ar lipsi tocmaiacele dimensiuni de natură s ă-i aducă împreun ă pe oameni, cea cultural ă şi ceareligioasă4.

În ceea ce-l priveşte pe Noica, acesta a continuat să caute o Europ ă a originilor

şi a autenticităţii şi a schiţat un „model cultural european“ ce ar fi rezumatul unuisoi de gramatică performativ ă a istoriei spiritului european: Evul Mediu ar fi fost operioadă a substantivului, interesată s ă numeasc ă substan ţa fiinţei; de la Renaştereşi Reformă pân ă la Romantism, Europa a trecut de la o cultur ă adverbial ă la una pronominală , explorând mai întâi modurile şi modalităţile mai degrabă decât esen ţeleşi sfârşind prin a inventa pronumele personal Eu rostit de individul solitar; Europacontemporană era pentru Noica o er ă a conjunc ţiei, preocupată s ă afirme rela ţii modalede tipul „şi, sau, dacă, atunci“; Noica î şi încheie argumentaţia prin chemarea la viaţă atimpului prepozi ţiei, un timp al unei corelaţii autentice între oameni şi între oameni şilucruri, timp ce ar putea deveni actual dacă ar fi bine preg ătit de heralzi competenţi5.

Pe scurt, tot ceea ce s-a întâmplat în Europa în vremurile recente, incluzând durataconstrucţiei europene, ar trebui considerat, în viziunea lui Constantin Noica, ca unproces de înstrăinare treptată de metafizic ă.

doctrinară, ci şi una profetică“, René GUÉNON, Criza lumii moderne, traducere şi prefaţă deAnca Manolescu, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 18.

1 Cea mai util ă monografie consacrat ă filosofiei lui Noica este Laura PAMFIL, Noicanecunoscut. De la uitarea fiin ţei la reamintirea ei, Biblioteca Apostrof & Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă, Cluj-Napoca, 2007.

2 Constantin NOICA, De dignitate Europae, Kriterion Verlag, Bukarest, 1988 şi IDEM,

Modelul cultural European, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1993.3 În englez ă în textul românesc, Constantin NOICA, Modelul cultural European, cit., p. 9.4 Citat de Lavinia STAN, Lucian TURCESCU, Religion and Politics...cit., p. 207.5 Constantin NOICA, Modelul cultural European, cit., p. 92 şi passim.



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DANIEL BARBU

O asemenea reflecţie a declanşat un efort intelectual de dez-raţionalizare, unfel de tur ghidat înspre „rădăcinile religioase“ ale omului modern, o încercare dea re-vră ji lumea (Wiederverzauberung der Welt)1 ca metode de a trata dezafectareametafizică a spiritului contemporan. De pild ă, Horia-Roman Patapievici, probabilcel mai bine vândut autor de non-ficţiune din anii 2000, cheamă la o reafirmare şichiar la o reinstituire a exploatării premoderne a spaţiului, ce ar fi fost trecută pe

planul doi de experienţa modernă a timpului: incitat de o lectur ă oarecum oblic ă a lui Carl Schmitt, el crede că tradi ţia creştină este dependent ă de materia solid ă auscatului şi de alte substanţe esenţiale2, în vreme ce „iudaismul pribeag şi lipsit deCentru“, citat în calitatea acestuia de ferment al lumii contemporane, se bizuieşte petimp şi pe fluiditatea politică a m ării, fiind astfel mai potrivit pentru modernitate,care înţelege existenţa nu ca pe un substantiv, un obiect şi o prezenţă, ci ca pe unmod al verbului, o trecere şi o pierdere3. Dacă entuzia ştii reîntoarcerii metafizicii ausperat să „fac ă istorie“ în anii 1930, participând la mi şcarea fascistă şi împărtăşindu-iplanurile pentru unificarea unui Raum european, în vremea comunismului şi după 1989 ei s-au angajat într-o critică a istoriei politice moderne în numele unor „valori

supra-istorice“. Ei se străduiesc să scape de rigorile vârstei democratice prin ac ţiuneculturală. „În folosul societăţii, votul universal trebuie, prin urmare, limitat: dar nuprin restrângerea dreptului de a vota, ci prin calificarea voturilor“4, mai precis printr-oclasificare ierarhică a voturilor în temeiul fluen ţei culturale a votanţilor, conchidePatapievici.

Cultura devine remediul pentru această îndep ărtare a Europei de nucleul săumetafizic originar şi atemporal, situat la mare distanţă de practica egalit ăţii. Dardespre ce cultură este vorba şi, mai ales, despre a cui cultur ă? Inspirat f ără echivoc deMircea Eliade, un membru de vază al cercului lui Noica definea cultura ca fiind caleacea mai recomandabilă c ătre ceva situat dincolo de ea şi altfel de neatins, ca fiind o

metodă optim ă de a subzista în timp, de a te a şeza în poziţia cea mai justă între via ţareală şi sacru5. Dacă cultura corespunde cel mai bine metaforei drumului, înseamn ă că ea are nevoie de c ălăuze. Trimiţând implicit către un răspuns deja formulat deEliade în 1937, filosoful şi eseistul Emil Cioran6 îi sugereaz ă lui Constantin Noica înaugust 1980 cine ar putea fi aceste călăuze: „Sleirea Occidentului este un fenomenindubitabil şi iremediabil“, în vreme ce oamenii din sud-estul Europei (ca şi dinAmerica Latină) sunt „mai interesanţi, mai complecşi, mai surprinzători şi au

1 Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Omul recent. O critică a modernit ăţii din perspective întrebă rii

„Ce se pierde atunci când ceva se câştigă ?“, ediţia a 5-a, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 7, îngermană în text. No ţiunea (re-enchantment) pare împrumutată din limbajul ortodoxiei radicaleşi al teoriei critice, unde este însă utilizat ă într-un sens contrar, de feti şizare a obiectelor deconsum, cf. Graham WARD, True Religion, Blackwell, Oxford, 2003, p. 129.

2 Patapievici este departe de a fi singur în în ţelegerea spaţiului ca o dimensiune maiimportantă decât timpul în re ţeta identităţii naţionale: Horia Bernea, important artist plastic şidirector fondator al Muzeului Ţăranului Român, nu numai că a pictat cu obstina ţie acelaşi dealmistic şi aceeaşi grădină paradiziac ă, dar şi-a conceput muzeul încredinţat spre administrare decătre autorităţile guvernamentale ca pe o recreare a unui spaţiu tradiţional, atemporal, omogen,continuu şi intens religios, populat de artefacte extrase din cronologia şi utilitatea iniţiale.

3 Ibidem, p. 196-197.4

Ibidem, p. 390.5 Andrei PLE ŞU, Minima moralia, Cartea Românească, Bucureşti, 1988, pp. 107-110.6 O analiz ă a scrierilor române şti ale lui Emil Cioran la Marta PETREU, An Infamous Past:

E.M. Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania, Ivan R. Dee Publisher, Chicago, 2005.



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mai multă vitalitate“, probabil pentru c ă nu sunt „stupid de politiza ţi“, asemeniintelectualilor occidentali1. În pofida (dacă nu chiar datorit ă) experienţei comuniste,România ar putea constitui un refugiu pentru esenţa culturii europene, aproapedispărută din Occident. Sub socialismul de stat, intelectualii grupa ţi în jurul lui Noicaau afirmat, într-o formulare din 1986 adresată deschis ideologiei totalitare, c ă sunt ei înşişi avocaţii unui „totalitarism cultural“, „unul al valorilor“, sinonim cu „ideologialucrului bine f ăcut“2.

Poate părea astăzi surprinzător că în decada ce a precedat demisia comunismuluio poziţie relativ centrală pe scena intelectual ă a fost ocupat ă de un filosof format înanii 1930, marcat de o istorie de asociere personală cu mi şcarea fascistă na ţională şiteoretician, în anii 1980, al contrastului între domeniul spiritului, pentru care Româniacontinua să depun ă m ărturie şi domeniul untului ce ar fi luat iremediabil în st ăpânireEuropa apuseană3. Într-o discuţie ce aparent a avut loc în 1983, Constantin Noica l-arfi întrebat pe un intelectual ce-i împărtăşise intenţia de a emigra în Occident „în ceGermanie vrei să pleci? În Germania untului sau în Germania culturii?“ ad ăugândimediat că, „paradoxal, [Germania culturii] o poate găsi mai lesne aici [i.e. în România

socialistă]“4. Printr-o distorsiune ulterioară a acestei interoga ţii formulată cu ironic ă precauţie, aluzia istoricistă a lui Noica la un faimos cli şeu din deceniul al patrulea alsecolului al XX-lea a trecut imediat în dialectul intelectual cel mai utilizat sub formastandardizată „Europa untului“, interpretat ă ca un diagnostic pus ambi ţiei statelormembre ale Uniunii de a fi societăţi ale prosperităţii. La această formul ă vor recurgeulterior atât partizanii cosmopolitismului şi europenismului5, cât şi tradiţionaliştiapropiaţi de ierarhia ortodoxă6.

Până la moartea sa în 1987, Constantin Noica reu şise să devin ă, în ochiidiscipolilor săi, o „instituţie naţională“7, o figură îndrept ăţită s ă „reprezint[e] cultura însăşi“8. Istoria transformării unui intelectual, fie acesta cu totul excepţional, într-o

instituţie s-a petrecut, cum se întâmplă adesea, chiar pe m ăsură ce aceast ă istorie eraconsemnată şi povestită în succesivele edi ţii ale Jurnalului de la Pă ltiniş, publicat mai întâi în 1983 cu aprobarea autorităţilor comuniste competente. Gabriel Liiceanu varelata ulterior că, în iarna în care povestea unui înţelept trăind pe un munte izolat şieducând pentru metafizică un num ăr de emuli mai tineri a ieşit de sub tipar pentruprima oară, bunurile de consum erau rare şi greu de procurat. Cu toate acestea, un

1 Emil CIORAN, Scrisori că tre cei de-acasă , editate de Gabriel Liiceanu şi Theodor Enescu,Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1995, p. 311.

2

Scrisoare a lui Gabriel Liiceanu c ătre Ion Ianoşi din noiembrie 1986, in Gabriel LIICEANU(ed.), Epistolar, Cartea Românească, Bucureşti, 1987, p. 291.3 O explica ţie parţială a acestui caz curios in Katherine VERDERY, National Ideology under

Socialism. Indentity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania, University of California Press,Berkley, Los Angeles and London, 1991, pp. 256-301.

4 Gabriel LIICEANU, Jurnalul de la Pă ltiniş. Un model paideic în cultura umanistă , CarteaRomânească, Bucureşti, 1983, p. 136.

5 E.g. Adrian MARINO, Pentru Europa...cit., p. 135.6 E.g. interven ţia teologului Costion Nicolescu, director de relaţii publice al Muzeului

Ţăranului Român, la o şcoală de var ă organizat ă de Departmentul pentru românii depretutindeni, reluată de un ziar local, Adevă rul Harghitei, XX, no. 2501, 23 august 2000, p. 4.

7

Gabriel LIICEANU, „În loc de prefa ţă – Ce înseamn ă a fi european în Estul postbelic?“,prefaţă la a doua edi ţie a Jurnalului de la Pă ltiniş, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1991, pp. 5-16; toatecitatele din acest paragraf sunt extrase de aici.

8 Andrei PLE ŞU, Minima moralia, cit., p. 97.



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DANIEL BARBU

exemplar al cărţii era schimbat pe piaţa neagră pentru patru pachete de unt. Cinevaar putea comenta că, sub socialismul de stat, suportul imprimat al culturii autenticevalora de patru ori greutatea sa în unt. În viaţa reală, spune Liiceanu, societăţiletotalitare sunt ne-politice. Prin urmare, cultura (dacă este bine f ăcută de persoaneselectate cu grijă şi atent formate) poate frânge monopolul pe care o îngustă minoritate îl are asupra politicii. În fapt, comparată cu ideologia socialismului ştiinţific, cultura înaltă european ă (în stare de extinc ţie în Europa însăşi) era un „scenariu alternativ“şi avea, cu acest titlu, o semnificaţie politică, era de-a dreptul o formă de rezisten ţă politică. Prin cultură, indivizi educaţi şi însinguraţi încercau mai puţin să evadezepe cont propriu din absurditatea şi mizeria discursului public, cât să „participe dinumbră“ la destinul comunităţii, la o atemporalitate culturală menit ă s ă dea sufletnaţiunii sau, mai heideggerian, să p ăstorească acest suflet.

Mircea Eliade spusese deja acest lucru cu alte cuvinte, dar cu acelaşi miez:naţiunile au misiuni. Şi pentru a le duce la bun sfârşit au nevoie de o îndrumareintelectuală de felul celei de care România a beneficiat în anii 1930 şi din nou în 1980când Eliade, Cioran şi Noica au funcţionat ca „instituţii naţionale“, proclamând mizeriapoliticului (deopotrivă a politicii democratice şi a celei comuniste) şi vestind primatulspiritualului şi al culturii. Astăzi, tocmai absenţa unei asemenea „autorităţi legitime“, bazată pe premise normative pre-moderne şi metafizice, poate fi considerată dreptcauză principal ă pentru „neputin ţa cea mai radicală a democra ţiei“, întemeiată pedrepturi şi indiferentă la datorii 1, insistă Patapievici. Cultura, continu ă el, este prinfirea lucrurilor o formă de inegalitate încrustat ă în vechea tradi ţie europeană a ierarhieivalorilor; de aici, riscul culturii de a fi distrusă de figura „omului recent“, conceputca o combinaţie între colectivismul chinez şi corectitudinea politică american ă, ca unprodus al unui egalitarism triumf ător2. Spre deosebire de „omul nou“ al spiritului,

însetat de sfinţenie ortodox

ă, anun

ţat cândva de Eliade, „omul recent“ occidental nuare decât o singură valoare, prosperitatea material ă urm ărită cu pre ţul sacrificării

libertăţii şi culturii3.Pusă în mi şcare de politică şi economie, Europa nu este numai un loc al

separărilor, aşa cum Noica şi Anania observaseră, dar şi unul din care au fost exclusereligia şi cultura, ca expresii ale unui spirit ne-politic, adaugă Patapievici. Dac ă a şastau lucrurile, cum s-ar situa România într-un asemenea peisaj geo-politic. TheodorBaconsky admite (f ără s ă-l citeze explicit) că viziunea lui Eliade potrivit c ăreia„ortodoxia va deveni […] alternativa spirituală a Occidentului excesiv secularizat“supravieţuieşte încă ca o „visare l ăuntrică“, ca un ideal sau o utopie pozitivă a

credincioşilor ortodocşi4

. Această geopolitic ă a spiritului, ce opune o Europ ă politizat ă şi secularizată unei Românii pasionat ortodox ă şi stăruitoare în excelenţa sa culturală reprezintă punctul de întâlnire dintre contra-nara ţiunea istoricistă a Europei creat ă de autorităţile bisericeşti în jurul unor martiri din secolul al XVIII-lea şi proiectul deresuscitare a metafizicii propus de intelectualii din mainstream care continu ă reflec ţialui Noica f ără a declina explicit o identitate confesional ă sau m ăcar o afiliere generică

1 Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, Omul recent...cit., pp. 94-95.2 Ibidem, pp. 254-246.3

Ibidem, p. 216.4 Theodor BACONSKY, „Decaden ţa etatismului şi renaşterea ortodoxă“, in Ioan I. ICĂ Jr.,Germano MARTINO (ed.), Doctrina socială a Bisericii. Fundamente, documente, analize, perspective ,Deisis, Sibiu, 2002, p. 355.



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la creştinism1. Dacă, aşa cum crede Jürgen Habermas2, modelul post-secular europeanşi gândirea post-metafizică sunt inseparabile, atunci România ar trebui tratat ă ca uncaz deviant.

Ierarhia Bisericii poate fi, aşa cum a fost acuzată adesea de sus ţinătorii săi ceimai luminaţi, angajată în politici anti-intelectualiste, de felul canoniz ării mai multorsfinţi hotărât nefamiliari cu Platon şi Augustin şi oricum lipsiţi de orice capacitate dea contempla posibilitatea ca gânditori precum Hegel sau Heidegger să sar ă într-o zi înajutorul metafizicii. Intelectualii publici, prin definiţie „oameni de cultură“ au tocmairostul de a completa ceea ce clerul ignoră sau abhor ă. A spus-o Andrei Pleşu imediatdupă c ăderea comunismului:

„Într-o societate normală, Biserica are rol de direcţie de conştiinţă, iarcultura se hrăneşte din ea ca dintr-un temei sigur. Acum la noi situaţia e deaşa natură, încât cultura trebuie să-şi asume temporar rolul de a iradia pozitivasupra Bisericii din punct de vedere moral şi intelectual”3.

Păşunile alpine de la Salva, unde patru ţărani au contestat ştiinţa statului aşacum Europa Luminilor era dispusă s ă o practice şi muntele Păltiniş, de unde filosofulConstantin Noica a invalidat „Europa untului“ din a două jum ătate a secoluluial XX-lea, aparţin unei geografii spirituale complementare. Religia şi cultura suntmobilizate, fie împreună, fie pe rând, pentru a pune din nou pe harta continentuluispiritul european pe care numai românii s-ar încăpăţâna să îl ţină viu. În plus, religiaşi cultura mai au ceva în comun, în dimensiunea lor instituţionalizată. Şi Biserica şioamenii de cultură au t ăcut sub comunism. Şi Biserica şi cultura prezintă dup ă 1989această t ăcere ca pe o formă metafizic ă de rezisten ţă.

Într-adevăr, o asemenea complexă între ţesere a religiei şi culturii într-o ordine decivilizaţie în care se găsesc fuzionate o Biserică na ţională, un sens tradiţional al familiei,o respingere culturală a modernit ăţii şi o neîncredere vădită în egalitate seam ănă retrospectiv cu câteva din trăsăturile pe care Charles Taylor le-a atribuit „vârsteimobilizării“ ce a precedat „vârsta secularizării“4. Dacă secularizarea implic ă în chipnecesar îndreptăţirea egală a tuturor indivizilor de a formula şi reformula argumentelepublice f ără a recurge îns ă la alte resurse decât cele puse la dispozi ţie de raţiuneanaturală, cultura politică româneasc ă nu a fost niciodat ă secularizat ă, atâta timp câtautonomia politicului trebuie socotită drept pivotul seculariz ării. Parlamentarismulliberal din veacul al XIX-lea şi din prima parte a celui următor credea că politica esteo variabilă dependent ă de destinul na ţiunii, în vreme ce socialismul de stat a tratatpolitica ca un efect tranzitoriu de suprastructură dependent de sensul implacabil al

1 Un teolog cu frecvente contribu ţii în magazinele culturale îi reproşează lui Patapievicilipsa unei atitudini confesionale explicite: Mihail NEAMŢU, Bufni ţa printre dă râmă turi. Insomniiteologice în România postocmunistă , ediţia a 2-a, Polirom, Iaşi, 2008, pp. 185-215. Cât despreConstantin Noica, filosoful a fost de o discreţie aproape desăvârşită cu privire la pozi ţia sa faţă de credinţa creştină.

2 Jürgen HABERMAS, „Religion in the Public Sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy, XIV,no. 1, 2006, pp. 1-25.

3

Citat de Ioan I. IC Ă Jr., „Dilema social ă a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române: radiografia uneiprobleme“, in Ioan I. ICĂ Jr., Germano MARTINO (ed.), Doctrina socială a Bisericii ...cit., p. 550.4 Charles TAYLOR, A Secular Age, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,

Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2007, pp. 445-472.



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DANIEL BARBU

istoriei, cu putinţă de citit mai ales în procesele economice şi sociale. Postcomunismula tratat politicul într-un mod asemănător1. Întotdeauna rămânea ceva, o esenţă maiprofundă şi mai semnificativă, dincolo de politică, deşi acest altceva al politicii nua fost întotdeauna acelaşi. Prin urmare, spaţiul public românesc poate fi consideratpost-secular numai în măsura în care, în cursul integrării europene, comunitateapolitică româneasc ă a devenit contemporan ă cu ora european ă. Este un spaţiu post-secular şi pentru că intelectualii din mainstream şi-au organizat carierele şi şi-aucâştigat autoritatea culturală afirmând c ă Uniunea European ă poate fi un risc pentruEuropa.

Pentru ei şi pentru audienţele lor, Uniunea s-a arătat a fi, în lungul proces alfacerii ei instituţionale, o întreprindere politică şi birocratică post-modern ă construit ă la mare distanţă de spiritul european ce i-ar fi însufle ţit de fondatorii Comunităţilor,educaţi într-o tradiţie în care creştinismul şi umanismul erau încă împletite. Întretimp,

„repudierea umanismului, uitarea creştinismului şi relativismul ideologic potucide Europa: nu doar cultural, ci şi politic, şi economic, şi militar“2.

Desigur, intelectualii români nu sunt foarte originali în tratamentul critic lacare supun construcţia europeană, dar sunt probabil înclinaţi să simplifice şi să deaun plus de ascuţime unor poziţii formulate, cu nuanţe de sensuri uneori delicate,de puţinii autori contemporani pe care sunt dispuşi să-i citeze accidental (printre eiPierre Manent, Roger Scruton sau Joseph Weiler). Această abordare contondent ă aproiectului politic european este poate şi o metodă de a evita s ă produc ă o explica ţiecu privire la neasemănarea durabilă dintre societatea româneasc ă şi modelul social

european.Este probabil neîndoielnic că nara ţiunea integrării europene aşa cum esteelaborată de intelectualii români ar putea fi sintetizat ă dup ă cum urmeaz ă: îndomeniul spiritului, Europa supravieţuieşte mai ales în Est, îngrijită de intelectualiprecum cei români; în termeni economici şi politici, Uniunea Europeană este c ălăuzită de o birocraţie secularistă şi relativistă. Tot ceea ce s-a realizat în cursul construcţieieuropene şi al procesului de integrare a Românei nu este suficient de semnificativpentru intelectualii publici. Profesionişti ai culturii aparţinând clasei mijlocii subcomunism, ei au căpătat în 1989 o deplină liberate de expresie şi de mişcare. Ei seaflă acum angaja ţi într-o operaţiune ce ar fi trebuit să-i definească ca intelectuali sub

socialismul de stat: să

încurajeze non-conformismul în raport cu discursul publicdominant. Şi fac acest lucru cu aceleaşi mijloace narative pe care le folosiseră ca s ă păstreze tăcerea sub comunism: spun povestea preeminenţei culturii şi a spirituluiasupra politicului.

1

Exceptând entuziasmul electoral al anului 1990, rata particip ării la alegerile naţionale şilocale este mai apropiată de cea din America mai pu ţin secularizată decât de cifrele oferite deintens secularizata Europă occidental ă.

2 Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI, „Valorile Europei“, cit., p. 259.



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DANIEL BARBU



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Les élites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008

Les élites politiques en Roumaniepostcommuniste 1990-2008

Les voies d’accès au pouvoir exécutif

ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU

Loin d’être nouveau, le débat portant sur les élites au sommet de l’État s’inscritdans une longue tradition de la littérature scientifique. Contestées et disposant demoins de confiance de la part des électeurs1, les élites constituent, dans une perspectivetraditionnelle de la science politique, des miroirs de la représentativité du régimepolitique en place. Les carrières politiques, les voies d’accès vers une fonction publiquefurent ainsi considérées en tant que fondements dans l’analyse de la légitimité d’unrégime2 ou d’une organisation politique 3.

Certes, même dans les démocraties stables, les élites politiques ne présententpas de configurations uniques et l’importance de certaines ressources menantà des sélections successives dans des positions de pouvoir varie en fonction ducontexte historique ou de l’édifice institutionnel du pays4. Cependant, durant lesdernières décennies, le développement des médias, la polarisation des élections,la personnification croissante des campagnes électorales ont contribué, partout enEurope, à un phénomène de «convergence des formes de délibération et de décision»qui suggèrent un renforcement des exécutifs5. Dans ce contexte, la nomination dans

1 Mattei DOGAN, «Erosion of Confidence in Thirty European Democracies», dans IDEM(ed.), Political Mistrust and the Discrediting of Politicians, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2005, pp. 13,18-19.

2 Richard KATZ, «Party in Democratic Theory», dans Richard KATZ, William CROTTY(eds.), Handbook of Political Parties, Sage, London, 2006, pp. 34-47; Kenneth PREWITT, TheRecruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis and

New York, 1970, pp. 205-217.3 Gideon RAHAT, «Candidate Selection: The Choice Before the Choice», Journal ofDemocracy, vol. 18, no. 1, January 2007, pp. 157-170; Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT,«Candidate Selection Methods and Consequences», dans Richard KATZ, William CROTTY(eds.), Handbook …cit., pp. 109-122; Lars BILLIE «Democratizing A Democratic Procedure?Myth and Reality? Candidate Selection in Western European Parties», Party Politics, vol. 7,no. 3, 2001, pp. 363-380; Krister LUNDELL, «Determinants of Candidate Selection. The Degreeof Centralisation in Comparative Perspective», Party Politics, vol. 10, no. 1, 2004, pp. 25-47.

4 Mattei DOGAN, «Introduction. Diversity of Elite Configurations and Clusters of Power»,dans IDEM (ed.), Elite Configurations at the Apex of Power, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2003, pp. 1-17/p. 6.

5

Jean Michel DE WAELE, Paul MAGNETTE, «Introduction», dans IDEM (eds.),Les démocraties européennes. Une approche comparée des systèmes politiques nationaux, Armand Colin,Paris, 2008, pp. 3-9. V. également Thomas POGUNTKE, Paul WEBB (eds.), The Presidentialisationof Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.



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ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU

une position politique à l’intérieur de l’équipe gouvernementale1 a été considéréecomme un sommet d’une carrière politique2.

La concentration du pouvoir au sein des gouvernements aurait donc conduitles partis politiques vers la nomination dans ces fonctions publiques des acteurscentraux dans leur économie organisationnelle ayant aussi une vaste expérience auniveau de la prise de décision3. Visant, au moins d’un point de vue idéal typique,à la fois l’existence d’une compétence minimale de l’acteur témoignée à l’intérieurde l’organisation politique et une certaine loyauté par rapport à la politiquegénérale du parti4, le choix des acteurs gouvernementaux constitue un fondementdans l’articulation des mécanismes décisionnels et de la nature même du systèmepolitique en place5. De la sorte, l’étude de l’étape la plus importante de la promotion

1 Cette étude reprend une définition large de la notion «d’élite gouvernementale» enincluant les ministres, le premier échelon de pouvoir de l’exécutif, mais aussi la populationexécutive du second échelon de pouvoir, les secrétaires d’État qui sont nommés sur les critères

politiques. V. Jean BLONDEL, «Introduction», dans Jean BLONDEL, Maurizio COTTA (eds.),The Nature of Party Government – A Comparative European Perspective, Palgrave, Houndmills,Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, 2000, p. 14, or Alain ERALY, Le pouvoir enchaîné – Êtreministre en Belgique, Éd. Labor, Coll. «La Noria», Bruxelles, 2002. Cette définition plus largeest rencontrée dans l’étude des élites et elle a été consacrée par Mattei Dogan qui considèrecomme faisant partie du cabinet non seulement des ministres mais aussi les secrétaires et lessous-secrétaires d’État. V. Mattei DOGAN, «Sociologia elitelor politice», dans IDEM, Sociologie politică . Opere alese, Ed. Alternative, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 60.

2 Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministers in the Contemporary World, Sage Publication,London, 1986, pp. 16, 24 et aussi JEAN BLONDEL, Maurizio COTTA, «Conclusions», dansIDEM (eds.), Party Government. An Inquiry into the Relationship between Governments and

Supporting Parties in Liberal Democracies, MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 249, 252.3 Mattei DOGAN, Peter CAMPBELL, «Le personnel ministériel en France et en GrandeBretagne», Revue Française de Sciences Politiques, vol. VII, no. 2, avril-juin, octobre-décembre,1957 pp. 313-345, 793-824/p. 326.

4 Jean BLONDEL, Nick MANNING, «Do Ministers Do What They Say? MinisterialUnreliability, Collegial and Hierachical Governments», Political Studies, vol. 50, no. 3, 2002,pp. 455-476. V. aussi Rudy ANDEWEG, «Collegiality and Collectivity: Cabinets, CabinetCommittees, and Cabinet Ministers», dans P. WELLER, H. BAKVIS, R. RHODES, The HollowCrown: Countervailing Trends in the Core Executive, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1997; Rudy B.ANDEWEG, «Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process between Cabinet andMinisters», European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, no. 3, 2000, pp. 377-395.

5

Plusieurs études ont mis en avant les effets du recrutement des élites tant au niveaudu fonctionnement institutionnel, Thomas SAALFELD, «Members of the Parliament andGovernments in Western Europe: Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight», European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, no. 3, 2000, pp.353-376; Antoni Z. KAMINSKI, JoannaKURCZEWSKA, «Strategies of Post-Communist Transformations: Élites as Institution-Builders», dans Bruno GRANCELLI (ed.) Social Change and Modernization : Lessons from EasternEurope, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1995, pp. 131–152; tout comme au niveau des organisationsdes partis, Jean BLONDEL, «Party Government, Patronage and Party Decline in WesternEurope», dans Richard GUNTHER, Jose Ramon MONTERO, Juan J. LINZ, Political Parties. OldConcepts and New Challenges, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 233-257; Richard KATZ, «TheProblem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy», Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 3,

2001, pp. 277-296; R. MONTERO, «The Limits of Decentralization: Legislative Careers and theTerritorial Representation in Spain», West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 3, 2007, pp. 573-594;Pippa NORRIS, «Introduction : Theories of Recruitment», dans IDEM (ed.), Passages to Power.Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 1-15 etc.



29



en politique1 visant «le processus par lequel un parti décide qui parmi les personneslégalement éligibles pour obtenir une position élective sera désignée» (la sélectiondes candidats2) ou la question plus large concernant le décryptage «des processuspar lesquels les individus sont introduits dans des rôles politiques»3 ( le recrutement politique) dépassent les simples considérations visant la représentativité des acteurspour s’instituer comme possibles facteurs explicatifs de l’institutionnalisation dupouvoir4 ou encore de la professionnalisation politique.

Cette grille interprétative portant sur le rôle des élites politiques se trouvantau gouvernement semble être d’autant plus importante dans le cas des nouvellesdémocraties où les élites émergeantes ont bénéficié d’une importante marge deliberté décisionnelle5. Le centralisme démocratique et la politique de patronage quicaractérisent les pays de la région6, la séparation des pouvoirs favorisant nettementle volet exécutif 7 et un pouvoir administratif unifié et décrit par la politisationexcessive8 transforment les dirigeants gouvernementaux dans des acteurs clés dela démocratisation. Dans ce contexte, au delà des procédures classiques visant

l’investigation du profil des élites, l’étude du remplacement des anciens membres

1 Moshe CZUDNOWSKI, «Political Recruitment», dans Fred GREENSTEIN, NelsonPOLSBY (eds.) Handbook of Political Science, vol. 2, MicroPolitical Theory, Addison-WesleyPublishing Company, 1975, pp. 155-242/p. 219.

2 Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, «Candidate Selection Methods…cit.», p. 109.3 À différence des analyses portant sur la sélection des acteurs politiques (qui sont les

élites politiques, quels sont les critères de leur sélection et qui est le principal décideur dansla sélection) le processus de recrutement prend également en compte l’analyse des conditionsqui rendent possible la promotion en politique (les cadres institutionnels, la culture politique

ou d’autres facteurs de socialisation extérieurs à la politique sont de tels exemples), V. DwaineMARVICK, «Continuities in Recruitment Theory and Research: Towards a New Model», dansHeinz EULAU, Moshe CZUDNOZSKI (eds.), Elite Recruitment in Democratic Polities. ComparativeStudies Across Nations, Halsted Press, Sage, New York, 1976, p. 29.

4 Il n’existe pas beaucoup d’études mettant en relation d’une manière longitudinale lesprocessus de l’institutionnalisation d’une élite politique avec le processus d’institutionnalisationdu système politique dans un contexte de démocratisation. Pour un exemple assez singulier v.Robert ROBINS, Political Institutionalisation and the Integration of Elites, Sage Library of SocialResearch, Beverly Hills, London, 1977. V. aussi Lester G. SELIGMAN, «The Presidential Officeand The President as a Party Leader», Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 21, no. 4, 1956,pp. 724-734.

5

Anton STEEN, Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-CommunistCountries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Ashgate, Aldershot, Bookfield USA,Singapore, Sidney, 1997, p. 2.

6 Klaus H. GOERTZ, Helen Z. MARGETTS, «The Solitary Center: The Core Executive inCentral and Eastern Europe», Governance. An International Journal of Policy and Administration ,vol. 12, no. 4, October 1999, pp. 425-453/p. 445; Oleh PROTSYK, Andrew WILSON, «CentrePolitics in Russia and Ukraine: Patronage, Power and Virtuality», Party Politics, vol. 9, no. 6,2003, pp. 703-727/p. 708.

7 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, «Roumanie», dans Jean Michel DE WAELE, PaulMAGNETTE (eds.), Les démocraties européennes…cit., p. 356.

8 V. Anna GRZYMALA-BUSSE, «The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions. Post-

communist Party Competition and State Oversight», Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no. 3,2006, pp. 271-300/p. 273; Conor O’DWEYER, «Runaway State Building. How Political PartiesShape States in Post-communist Eastern Europe», World Politics, vol. 56, no. 4, 2004, pp. 520-553.



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ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU

de la nomenklatura et du profil des nouveaux acteurs ont été considérés comme desconditions nécessaires dans la compréhension des aléas de la transition1. La courtepériode démocratique de ces pays soulève d’une manière saillante la problématiquede l’existence d’une compétence décisionnelle minimale au niveau des leaderspolitiques, tout comme celle de la capacité des nouveaux dirigeants d’incorporer lespratiques européennes.

En considérant que la délimitation et l’explicitation des grandes filières d’accèsdans une fonction exécutive peuvent rendre compte des stratégies de valorisation desprivilèges déjà détenus par les acteurs politiques2 ainsi que des possibles freins dans leprocessus de démocratisation, on procédera donc à une investigation des trajectoiresgouvernementales des élites roumaines de la période 1990-20083. Dans ce qui suit, onessayera donc de fournir des réponses à la question portant sur l’origine et le profil deces acteurs politiques4, mais aussi nous esquisserons quelques remarques quant à lathèse de la professionnalisation des dirigeants roumains postcommunistes.

1 Michael G. BURTON, John HIGLEY, «Elites Settlements», American Sociological Review,vol. 52, no. 3, June.1987, pp 295-307/p. 297. V. aussi John HIGLEY, György LENGYEL, «EliteConfigurations after State Socialism», dans IDEM (eds.), Elites After State Socialism, Rowman &Littlefield, Lanham, 2000, pp. 1-21.

2 Gil EYAL, Ivan SZELENYI, Eleanor TOWNSLEY, Making Capitalism without Capitalists.Class Formation and Elite Struggles in PostCommunist Central Europe, Verso, London, NewYork, 1998, pp. 1-17, v. également David STARK, «Recombinant Property in East EuropeanCapitalism», American Journal of Sociology, vol. 101, no. 4, January 1996, pp. 993-1027.

3 La base de données résultante comprend 1544 nominations des acteurs politiquesportant sur 327 nominations ministérielles et 1218 nominations des secrétaires d’État (faisantréférence à 1032 gouvernants – 245 ministres et 787 secrétaires d’État), portant sur la périodedécembre 1989-septembre 2008. Les bornes temporelles choisies recoupent les gouvernementsayant fini leurs mandats.

4 Néanmoins, il faudrait préciser que la démarche de reconstruction des trajectoires desacteurs de la scène politique roumaine est loin d’être non problématique, car les informations

existantes quant au personnel gouvernemental sont fragmentaires et parfois contradictoires(notamment pour le cas des secrétaires d’État). Afin de reconstituer les filières exécutives, onavait procédé à l’entrecroisement de plusieurs sources et documents. Une liste non exhaustivede nos sources comprend: ROMPRES, Protagonişti ai vie ţii publice, 3 vol., Agenţia Naţională de Presă Rompres, Bucure şti, 1994; ***, Personalităţi publice, politice 1992-1994, Ed. HoldingReporter, Bucureşti, 1994; ***, Personalităţi publice, politice 1995-1996, 3e éd., Ed. Holding Reporter,Bucureşti, 1996; ***, Personalităţi publice, politice 1996-1997, Ed. Holding Reporter, Bucureşti,1997; Gheorghe CRIŞAN, Piramida puterii – Oameni politici şi de stat, generali şi ierarhi dinRomânia (decembrie 1989-10 martie 2004), vol I-II, Ed. Pro Historia, Bucureşti, 2004; ***, Who’sWho in Romania 2002, Pegasus Press, Bucureşti, 2002, mais aussi ***, Cartea albastră a democra ţiei.Un ghid al institu ţiilor publice centrale din România, Asociaţia Pro Democraţia, Bucureşti, 1997ainsi que le volume publié pour 2001. Les sources électroniques se sont aussi avérées utiles. Dessites comme celui de Who’s Who: http://romania-on-line.net/whoswho; le site de la Chambredes Députes www.cdep.ro; ou le site du gouvernement www.gov.ro etc.



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LES FONDEMENTS DES NOUVELLES CARRIÈRES POLITIQUES:LES ÉLITES POLITIQUES ET LES HÉRITAGES DU PASSÉ

La polysémie même qui accompagne le terme de révolution en Europe Centraleet Orientale sous-tend toute une série d’attributs1 impliquant une certaine vision

sur la configuration des élites émergentes et sur leur comportement. Le succès destransitions a été souvent associé à

«l’existence des groupements et des mouvements dissidents [avant 1989] quiétaient capables d’exprimer les aspirations populaires et proposer d’alternativespolitiques et économiques par rapport à l’ancienne politique défaillante»2.

Le passé communiste des leaders devenait ainsi une idiosyncrasie de la région quipourrait engendrer des freins dans l’autonomisation d’une prise de décision similaireaux démocraties stables. Dans le cas roumain, la cooptation dans des fonctions

politiques importantes d’anciens membres de la nomenklatura3 avait été considéréecomme le principal ressort dans l’explicitation des retards dans la démocratisationdu pays4. D’ailleurs, à différence d’autres pays de la région qui enregistrent unecirculation des élites par remplacement5, l’exemple roumain s’articule comme un casà part, suite à des taux très hauts de reproduction des anciennes élites communistesdans des fonctions publiques6.

1 Pour une discussion sur les diverses formules employées afin de décrire les événementsde l’année 1990, v. Dragoş PETRESCU, «The Collapse of Communism in Hungary and Romania:

A Comparative Analysis», Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 1, 2003,pp.163-183, Jacques BREILLAT, Du communisme au postcommunisme, les intellectuels interpellés par la politique, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Bruylant, Bruxelles, Athènes, 2002 , pp. 25-27.

2 V. Vladimir TISM ĂNEANU, Reinventarea politicului. Europa rasariteana de la Stalin la Havel, Polirom, Iaşi, 1999, p.162; John HIGLEY, Judith KULLBERG, Jan PAKULSKI, «The Persistenceof Postcommunist Elites», Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2, 1996, pp. 133-147.

3 Nous incluons dans les positions de nomenklatura les postes concernant la prise dedécision dans la société communiste tels qu’ils étaient établis par les hautes autorités du PartiCommuniste. V. Mihail VOZLENSKY, Nomenklatura , Doubleday&Co Inc., New York, 1984,p. 75.

4 Une telle explicitation aurait à la base la thèse de l’influence du passé dans le présent

à partir de la difficulté de penser la négociation et l’établissement du consensus lorsqu’on esten la présence des taux considérables d’acteurs politiques du passé qui gardent intacte leurcapacité d’influencer la politique. V. George SHOPFLIN, «Postcommunism: Constructing NewDemocracies in Central Europe», International Affaires (Royal Institute of International Affaires1944), vol. 67, no. 2, April 1991, pp. 235-250; V. également John HIGLEY, Judith KULLBERG, Jan PAKULSKI, «The Persistence of Post-communist Elites», cit., pp. 133-147.

5 Eva FODOR, Edmund WNUK-LIPINSKI, Natasha YERSHOVA, «The New Politicaland Cultural Elite», Theory and Society, vol. 24, no. 5, 1995, pp.783-800; Iván SZELÉNYI, SzonjaSZELÉNYI, «Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Post-communist Transformationof Eastern Europe», Theory and Society, vol. 24. no. 5, 1995, pp. 615-638.

6 Klaus VON BEYME, «Regime Transition and the Recruitment of Political Elites»,

Governance An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol. 6, no. 3, July 1993, pp. 409-425/p. 415. Si en 1993, 21,9% des élites politiques hongroises et 27,5% des élites polonaisesétaient des membres de l’ancienne élite communiste, le profil des acteurs postcommunistes enRoumanie se rapprochait plutôt de l’exemple de la Russie où au début des années 1990, 67,7%



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ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU

Résultat de la configuration politique qui prend naissance après les premièresélections libres, gagnées par le parti successeur (le FSN/PSD), mais aussi l’effetde l’absence des pépinières permettant l’émergence des nouvelles élites, au débutdes années ’90 la continuité des acteurs politiques décrit le premier plan de lascène gouvernementale en Roumanie. Au niveau des ministres, le pourcentaged’anciens membres du Parti Communiste Roumain varie ainsi entre 65,22% dans lecas du gouvernement de droite Isărescu (2000) et 95,65% pour l’exécutif dirigé parVăcăroiu (1992-1996) (ou encore 88,8% dans le cas de l’équipe Năstase [2000-2004])1.En contrepartie, une investigation visant la présence des anciens membres de lanomenklatura dans les équipes gouvernementales dévoile un processus graduelde diminution du poids de ces acteurs à la direction des ministères. Si le premiergouvernement formé en décembre 1989, le gouvernement provisoire, comptait enproportion de 64,5% des membres appartenant à l’ancienne nomenklatura, en 1992,dans le 44,2% des membres de l’équipe gouvernementale présentaient le mêmeprofil. Après la première alternance au pouvoir et la domination d’une coalition de

centre-droite, en 1996, les taux sont beaucoup plus diminués: car 7,9% des ministresdu gouvernement Victor Ciorbea (1996-1998) avaient occupé une fonction dirigeantedans l’ancien régime.

La préfiguration d’un déclin des ressources qui relèvent de la période communiste,qui commence durant la période 1996-2000, avait mené à un renouvellement des élitesministérielles et elle fut ultérieurement continuée, en 2001, par l’équipe d’AdrianNăstase (2000-2004) – 16,7%2. De plus, il faudrait noter que cette tendance s’accompagneaussi par une diminution encore plus rapide du rôle des leaders qui se trouvaient dansles positions de haute visibilité pendant le communisme. En 1989, immédiatementaprès la chute du régime, 22,9% des membres de l’équipe gouvernementale étaient

d’anciens ministres communistes et autres 28,6% du personnel ministériel avaientoccupé des positions de ministres adjoints ou secrétaires d’État avant 1989. Or, aprèscette date, toutes les autres équipes gouvernementales ont choisi d’exclure ces élites deleur composition. Dès lors, l’expérience exécutive «récupérée» au niveau ministérielest plutôt celle des échelons bas des gouvernements communistes, phénomène qui joue un rôle important jusqu’en 1996.

On pourrait donc affirmer que le grand enjeu du renouvellement des élites n’avaitpas visé l’élimination des anciens membres du PCR de la sphère publique, mais ilavait porté sur la marginalisation de ceux qui ont détenu des positions de pouvoirqui impliquaient l’avant scène du régime communiste. Sujets de contestation après

le changement de régime, beaucoup de nomenklaturistes ont quitté ainsi la scène

des élites provenaient de l’ancienne nomenklatura, v. Iván SZELÉNYI, Szonja SZELÉNYI,«Circulation or Reproduction of Elites…cit.», p. 626.

1 Marius TUDOR, Adrian GAVRILESCU, Democra ţia la pachet. Elita politică în România postcomunistă , Compania, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 152. Cette situation n’est pas une spécificité del’élite exécutive, une enquête menée sur les parlementaires de la législature 2000-2004 identifietoujours 83,6% des parlementaires en tant qu’anciens membres de parti. V. Laurenţiu ŞTEFANSCALAT, Patterns of Political Recruitment, Ziua, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 121.

2 Les taux pour les autres cabinets sont: 44,8% dans le cas du cabinet Petre Roman (1990-

1991), 38,1% le gouvernement Theodor Stolojan (1991-1992), 6,9% Radu Vasile (1998-1999) et8,7% le cabinet Mugur Isărescu (1999-2000). V. Raluca GROSESCU, «The Political Regroupingof the Romanian Nomenklatura during the 1989 Revolution», Romanian Journal of Society andPolitics, vol. 4, no. 2, May 2004, pp. 97-123/p. 120.



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exécutive. Cependant, lorsqu’on regarde les échelons inférieurs du pouvoir exécutif, laconclusion à laquelle on arrive est, au moins qu’on puisse dire, étonnante. En principe,le second échelon du pouvoir exécutif, décrit par une visibilité publique réduite, maisqui permet un réel pouvoir décisionnel, pouvait constituer «le refuge parfait» pour lesanciens membres de la nomenklatura. Or, en analysant les taux concernant la présencede cette catégorie à l’intérieur de la population des secrétaires d’État, on peut décelerplutôt un comportement similaire à celui de l’échelon ministériel. Les deux premiersgouvernements Petre Roman (1990-1991) présentent des taux quasi similaires quant aupoids des nomenklaturistes tant au niveau des ministres qu’au niveau des secrétairesd’État. C’est uniquement, après la première alternance gouvernementale (1997-1999)que le poids des personnes du second échelon de pouvoir ayant des relations au passécommuniste devient supérieur à celui rencontré au niveau ministériel et cette situationest plutôt le résultat de la faible représentation de cette catégorie à l’intérieur dupersonnel politique des exécutifs. De plus, lorsqu’on compare strictement l’expérienceexécutive communiste des acteurs gouvernementaux des deux échelons de pouvoir,la situation est pratiquement inversée par rapport à ce qu’on pouvait anticiper d’unpoint de vue théorique (v. Figure 1). Même si en valeurs absolues il existe un nombresupérieur des secrétaires d’État (par rapport aux ministres) ayant une relation avecl’ancienne nomenklatura, durant toute la période postcommuniste, sans exception, lepoids des secrétaires d’État présentant de telles ressources du passé reste inférieur àcelui des ministres présentant le même profil.

La différence entre la continuité des élites sur les divers échelons du pouvoirgouvernemental est surtout visible pour les gouvernements formés par le partisuccesseur PDSR-PSD qui ne procède pas à une stratégie de conservation des leadersdu passé sur des positions de secrétaire d’État. Au contraire, il paraît que mêmesi l’exposant par excellence de la politique de la reproduction des anciennes élitescommunistes au début des années ’90, le FSN/PDSR avait plutôt mené, d’un pointde vue quantitatif, une politique graduelle de remplacement des élites par le biaisd’une stratégie de marginalisation. De la sorte, les portefeuilles centraux1 dans lesgouvernements socio-démocrates ont été graduellement occupés par des personnesn’ayant pas de relation directe à l’ancienne nomenklatura (à l’exemple 76,3% desanciens nomenklaturistes «reconvertis» détenaient des portefeuilles centraux durantle gouvernement provisoire, mais après cette date le pourcentage est de plus enplus bas: 55,7% – pour le gouvernement Petre Roman II et 40,4% lors du mandat deTheodor Stolojan). De plus, un quart des secrétaires d’État du gouvernement Stolojan

1 Conformément à cette perspective, il existerait une hiérarchie des préférences constantesdes partis par rapport à certains portefeuilles clé. V. Mattei DOGAN, Peter CAMPBELL, «Lepersonnel ministériel…cit.», pp. 334, 314. De l’autre côte, Jean Blondel utilise 9 domaines:Affaires étrangères, Défense, Justice, Finances et Commerce (y compris les ministères pourla planification), l’Industrie et le Transport, l’Agriculture, la Santé publique et la ProtectionSociale, le Travail et l’Enseignement en tant que positions clés à l’intérieur des exécutifs. Ladifférenciation entre des portefeuilles centraux et marginaux des gouvernements a été reprise auniveau des théories portant sur les coalitions V. Michael LAVER, W. Ben HUNT, Policy and PartyCompetition, Routledge, New York, 1992, Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, Kaare STRØM, (eds.), Coalition

Governments in Western Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. Au niveau de notre étude,nous avons retenu suite à une série d’interviews menées avec le personnel gouvernemental entant que ministères centraux: Affaires Étrangères, Économie et Finances, Défense, Intérieur etAdministration, Justice, Industries, le Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement.



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(1991-1992) qui avaient bénéficié d’une expérience exécutive durant la périodecommuniste dirigeaient un ministère «important» tandis qu’un seul secrétaire d’Étatpendant le mandat de Mugur Isărescu disposait d’une expérience exécutive acquisedurant la période communiste.

Forts importants durant les premières années après la chute du communisme,les taux généraux d’anciens nomenklaturistes qu’on puisse remarquer au niveauministériel, mais surtout les comportements observés dans le cas des secrétairesd’État nous racontent plutôt l’histoire d’un échec d’un processus de conversion desressources politiques acquises durant le communisme. Décrivant d’ailleurs plutôt desstratégies individuelles de conversion qu’un phénomène systématique portant sur uneffort de recrutement1, les succès initiaux des élites politiques ayant à leur dispositionune expertise gouvernementale communiste furent remplacés par d’autres ressourcesqui relèvent de la trajectoire des acteurs politiques dans le postcommunisme. Mêmes’il est évident que ces résultats doivent être lus avec une certaine précaution, vue laprécarité des sources existantes mais aussi la possibilité d’une influence informelleque certains leaders ont au niveau de l’activité gouvernementale, il existe nettementdans le cas roumain un changement visible dans les logiques de recrutement desleaders politiques, toute comme une refonte des principes et des critères de sélectiondans les fonctions publiques. D’ailleurs il faudrait spécifier que la transformationdans le profil des élites ne doit pas être interprétée uniquement dans la perspectivede la volonté politique assumée de rompre avec le passé communiste, mais ellepeut être perçue aussi par rapport aux évolutions dans l’histoire du communismeroumain. Durant la dernière décennie de la période communiste en Roumanie l’accèsaux fonctions gouvernementales fut de plus en plus limité pour les jeunes du parti2.Cette politique engendra automatiquement un vieillissement accentué du personnelgouvernemental durant la dernière étape du communisme, menant par la suite à unremplacement plutôt naturel des élites après 19893.

1 Dans un autre article nous avons montré la pluralité des ressources qui se trouvent àl’origine des trajectoires des leaders politiques communistes reconvertis en suggérant plutôtl’existence des réseaux individuels de socialisation et d’amitié qui assurent leur promotionen politique. Pour plus de détails v. Alexandra IONAŞCU, «Le passe communiste entre

permanence et oubli. Les cabinets roumains postcommunistes et leurs élites», Transitions, vol. XLVII, no. 2 (12/2007), 2007, pp. 105-145.2 De la sorte si en Roumanie durant les années 1950-1965 les nouveaux ministres nommés

en fonction étaient en grande majorité âgés de moins de 50 ans, après cette période jusqu’audébut des années 1980 la balance tourna vers un équilibre entre les deux catégories. D’ailleursla Roumanie ne fait pas exception d’une tendance plus générale des pays communistes.À l’exception de l’URSS où ce processus est plus diminué, les autres pays de la région telsque la Bulgarie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne ou l’Yougoslavie présentent durant 1950-1965une tendance de nommer des personnes plutôt jeunes dans des fonctions gouvernementales,tandis qu’après 1965 cette tendance change. D’ailleurs le profil des ministres se plie ainsi sur lesmodifications des politiques des partis communistes de la région déjà mentionnées (Pour les

proportions exactes v. Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministers…cit., p. 39)3 Si on regarde le profil des membres du gouvernement qui intégrait aussi d’anciensministres communistes dans sa composition, on s’aperçoit que 52,9% des ministres nommésavaient plus de 60 ans.



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LE TABLEAU GÉNÉRAL DES ACTEURS GOUVERNEMENTAUX

L’influence directe du passé dans l’articulation des trajectoires gouvernementalessemble disparaître après les premières années du postcommunisme roumain. D’autreslogiques commencèrent à s’instaurer en tant que mécanismes de promotion des acteurs

en fonctions publiques. Certes, dans un contexte de transition, il est évident que lefacteur conjoncturel ou la chance jouent un rôle qu’on ne peut pas nier. Cependant,au-delà des «accidents» de trajectoire, de nouveaux mécanismes de promotion sontcensés d’apparaître, permettant la consécration des leaders politiques1 et soulevantà la fois, comme dans le cas d’autres démocraties stables, des interrogations quantà la représentativité et le savoir faire décisionnel de ces élites2. Si on connaît déjà lefait que dans la plupart des systèmes politiques la base sociale des acteurs politiquesn’est jamais très large3 et que la perméabilité des structures de pouvoir apparaîtsurtout dans des cas précis de reconfigurations sociales, politiques ou économiques4,il faudrait donc investiguer quels sont les modèles de promotion en politique qui

décrivent le cas roumain.En dépit du fait que les études menées visant d’établir une relation de convergenceentre le profil des élites et les représentations quant à la prise de décision ont fini dansune impasse5, car «très souvent, l’homme politique, dès qu’il parvient à des positionsélevées, cesse de partager les sentiments du groupe social d’où il sort»6, on soutientque cette difficulté analytique peut être dépassée lorsqu’on formule le questionnementportant sur l’influence des trajectoires des élites en termes de conditions de possibilitéd’accès à une fonction publique. Dans ce qui suit, on considère que l’âge des dirigeants,

1

Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministers…cit., pp. 11-13.2 Robert PUTNAM, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, PrenticeHall, New Jersey,1976, p. 44.

3 En partant des propos des pères fondateurs du domaine et indifféremment de l’approcheprise en compte le verdict est tout à fait clair. Les différences entre les diverses études visentplutôt l’identification quant au locus où les distorsions apparaissent. Par exemple Prewittidentifie dans son étude que la plupart des élites locales du cas analysé proviennent d’un couchesociale moyenne ou moyenne supérieure et non pas des catégories les plus avantagées ou lesmoins désavantagées. V. Kenneth J. PREWITT, The Recruitment of Political Leaders…cit., (chap. 2.«The Social Bias of Leadership Selection»), pp. 23-53. V également David BUTLER, HowardR. PENNIMAN, Austin RANNEY (eds.), Democracy at the Pools, American Entreprise Institute,

Washington SC, 1981; Gerhard LOEWENBERG, Samuel C. PATTERSON, Malcom E. JEWELL(eds.), Handbook of Legislative Research, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Ma, 1985.4 Lester SELIGMAN, «Presidency and Political Change», Annals of the American Academy

of Political Science, vol. 466, Implementing Governmental Change, 1983, pp. 179-187.5 Samuel J. EDERSVELD, Political Elites in Modern Societies. Empirical Research and Democratic

Theory, Empirical Research and Democratic Theory, (chap. 1), Michigan University Press, AnnArbor, 1986. D’ailleurs les études menées en Europe Centrale et Orientale semblent suggérer lamême disjonction qui apparaisse même plus accentuée, car ici on avait remarqué la tendanced’un schisme entre les représentations politiques en tant que telles des acteurs politiques et lamanière dans laquelle les élites envisagent les principales mesures gouvernementales à entamer.V. également Anton STEEN, Between Past and Future…cit., p. 318 ainsi que Bogdan MACH,

Wlodzimierz WESOLOWSKI, «Poland: The Political Elite’s Transformational Correctness»dans John HIGLEY, György LENGYEL (eds.), Elites…cit., pp. 87-102.6 Mattei DOGAN, «L’origine sociale du personnel parlementaire d’un pays essentiellement

agraire: la Roumanie», Revue de l’Institut de Sociologie, nos. 2-3, 1953, p. 179.



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leur représentativité territoriale, leur expérience politique ne sont pas censés permettred’estimer d’une manière directe des effets sur l’action politique en tant que telle, maisils se préfigurent en tant qu’éléments témoignant une certaine capacité décisionnelleet de la création d’un système d’opportunité menant à la fondation d’une nouvelleélite politique. Quelles sont donc ces ressources qui recommandent les nouveauxleaders politiques du postcommunisme roumain?

Un profil sociologique des acteurs ministériels

Tout comme dans les démocraties stables, le portrait du gouvernant roumaindévoile l’existence d’une logique inégalitaire dans la sélection, mais aussi desvariations importantes dans le profil sociologique de ces acteurs (selon la périodeprise en compte). Plusieurs principes dans la sélection peuvent ainsi être identifiésdurant les vingt dernières années:

1. Les élites ministérielles roumaines souffrent un changement de génération.Même si les valeurs moyennes de l’âge des dirigeants gravitent entre 42 ans durantle mandat de Tăriceanu (2004-2008) et 57 ans immédiatement après la chute ducommunisme, il existe une grande variation à l’intérieur de chaque cabinet. Au débutdes années 1990 environ 10% des ministres âgés moins de 40 ans faisaient partie del’équipe gouvernementale. Ultérieurement leur nombre fut doublé durant la période1996-2000, pour que durant 2000-2004 on arrive à un pourcentage «record» de 42% desmembres de cabinets qui ont moins de 40 ans. Le souci pour le «rajeunissement» dusommet décisionnel est conçu ainsi en tant qu’une pratique nécessitant la modificationdu visage des élites politiques. Cette pratique, identifiable pour tous les partis quiont formé des cabinets, mais caractérisant surtout les formations politiques de droite,constitue plutôt une réponse aux défis soulevés par le contexte politique internequ’une option inspirée du fonctionnement des partis d’autres pays européens.

2. Un autre point où le profil sociologique des acteurs subit d’importantestransmutations vise le milieu d’extraction des nouvelles élites. Au-delà du fait dela non-représentation croissante de la zone rurale, qu’on peut identifier aussi dansle cas de la population parlementaire1, il existe un changement de perspective dansle recrutement des élites originaires des diverses régions géographiques du pays. Letableau qui se dresse ainsi est un à géométrie variable. La capitale reste le principal basin de sélection durant toute la période, mais le nombre des bucarestois qui fontpartie des gouvernements varie de 19% dans la période Tăriceanu à 43% lors dumandat de Victor Ciorbea. En contrepartie, d’autres régions telles que l’Ouest dupays et la Moldavie semblent devenir des centres d’intérêt pour les gouvernantsà partir de 1999. Cette différenciation est d’autant plus importante, vu le fait qu’àdifférence des périodes précédentes la sélection visa des personnes qui vivent dansleurs régions d’origine. La reconfiguration des rapports à la territorialité peut avoirdes significations diverses portant sur la mobilité des acteurs politiques, mais ellepeut être vue aussi en tant que possible changement des rapports de force à l’intérieurdes partis avantageant certaines filiales locales.

1 Lauren ţiu ŞTEFAN SCALAT, Răzvan GRECU, «Cariere politice şi reprezentareparlamentară 1990-2004», Rapport de Recherche, Casp, Bucarest, Mars 2004.



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3. Être ministre nécessite, au moins dans l’imaginaire du public, toute une sériede compétences décisionnelles. Le profil non-politique des ministres renvoie souventà l’idée d’une personne très éduquée ayant non seulement un certain profil politique,mais disposant d’autres attributs qui relèvent de leur formation. Les ministresroumains postcommunistes ne s’éloignent pas de cette tendance générale, car plus dedeux tiers d’entre eux ont suivi au moins une forme d’enseignement postuniversitaire.Ce premier aspect témoigne d’ailleurs une tendance cvasi-générale d’accumulationdes diplômes. Soit qu’il s’agit d’une tendance de «reprofessionnalisation» – parl’octroi d’une autre formation universitaire (27,91% des ministres du gouvernementVăcăroiu, 15,63% des acteurs exécutif du cabinet Vasile ont opté pour une secondeformation initiale) ou encore de la valorisation d’un prestige «externe», les ministresroumains ont utilisé la ressource éducationnelle en tant qu’instrument de légitimationde leur compétence. D’ailleurs les simples accréditations nationales ne semblent pasêtre suffisantes pour la nomination dans un portefeuille gouvernemental, la référenceaux formations internationales s’institue comme une pratique à partir de l’année 2000:45,65% des ministres du cabinet Năstase et plus d’une moitié (64,15%) de l’équipegouvernementale du cabinet Tăriceanu ont poursuivi une forme de formation àl’étranger (le plus souvent des cours de courte durée).

De fait, l’apothéose de cette représentation portant sur la politique comme espacede la légitimation par les diplômes se situe au niveau des formations doctorales.Environ un tiers des ministres du postcommunisme roumain détiennent le titre dedocteur. Néanmoins, la recherche avancée ne constitue pas, comme l’on pourrait croire,un point de départ pour les ministres qui vont ultérieurement poursuivre une carrièrepolitique. Au contraire. Phénomène qui caractérise la période postcommuniste, maisqui revête un plus d’importance durant les dernières années, «la galopade forcenée»pour un titre de docteur touche même les ministres durant l’exercice de leurs fonctions

(vu qu’environ une cinquième des ministres roumains sont à considérer comme desministres doctorants). Ainsi, lorsqu’on cumule les taux des doctorants aux diplômés,le profil éducationnel du personnel ministériel semble étonnant. Moitié des ministresdu postcommunisme roumain ont suivi dans une mesure ou dans une autre desétudes doctorales. À l’exception de l’équipe Văcăroiu, où on retrouve les taux les plusdiminués de telles pratiques (37%), les pourcentages touchent à l’exemple 62% desministres du cabinet Adrian Năstase. Les trois quarts des ministres qui ont choisi desuivre ces formations à Bucarest ont opté principalement pour l’École Polytechnique,L’Académie des Sciences Économiques et la Faculté de Droit de Bucarest, mais aussivers l’Université Babes Boyai de Cluj (pour ce qui est l’étude des sciences sociales),

centres qui devinrent ainsi «les principaux fournisseurs» des dirigeants «ministrables»du postcommunisme roumain.4. Le fait que les ministres poursuivent des formations doctorales, surtout en

certains centres universitaires, certes leur fournit (en principe) un plus de compétencedans l’analyse des décisions à entamer, mais il suggère aussi le développement d’unerelation étroite entre l’espace universitaire et le monde politique. De la sorte, il n’est pasétonnant le fait qu’un quart des ministres roumains sont à la base des enseignants dansles universités ou des chercheurs. Les autres occupations surreprésentées au niveauministériel sont: les ingénieurs (28,9%) et tandis que 14% des ministres exercent avantl’entrée en politique des professions économiques. En dépit de la préférence pour les

spécialisations juridiques seulement 7% d’entre les principaux acteurs des exécutifsont exercé des professions dans ce domaine avant leur nomination. La prévalencede tels profils occupationnels ne constitue pas une exception, car elle recoupe dans



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une certaine mesure le profil général des ministres qu’on peut retrouver ailleurs1.Le droit, l’enseignement, ou encore les professions techniques constituent en généralles principales occupations de base des acteurs politiques européens. De cette façon,dans les démocraties occidentales, les professions juridiques constituent souvent lemétier de base pour les acteurs politiques, suivies par le domaine de l’enseignement(cependant à un pourcentage beaucoup moins important touchant que 16,2% descas).

D’ailleurs, il faudrait noter que même dans le cas roumain les ministres sontpourtant des personnes qui ont connu une ascension fulgurante dans le politique post-décembriste. En grande majorité et dans une proportion qui touche 70%, ces personnesont détenu des fonctions de direction dans la sphère non-politique. Loin de disparaître,ce modèle de promotion à la base des performances dans d’autres domaines d’activitésemble s’instituer en tant que règle d’accession dans les fonctions publiques. Les chefsd’instituts, les directeurs d’entreprises ou les dirigeants des universités arrivent àmobiliser leurs positions non-politiques et de les transférer en politique. En outre,l’hiérarchie des professions de base n’est pas le simple exemple de l’hasard. Au débutdu postcommunisme, la présence des ingénieurs dans des positions ministérielless’explique par un certain souci de légitimation du nouveau régime qui produit lamobilisation des professions qui en apparence étaient le moins politisées. Vers la findes années 1990, les professions universitaires sont surreprésentées dans l’espacepolitique roumain, car elles rendent possible, dans des degrés distincts, d’une part, lapréservation d’une activité professionnelle en parallèle aux fonctions politiques et del’autre, la continuité fonctionnelle des ressources qu’elle suppose. Ce modèle instituésemble s’effacer à partir de 1999 pour faire place aux ressources d’ordre économiqueet de l’entreprenariat. La tendance de renversement des priorités dans la sélectionest facilement discernable. Le développement des entreprises privées mène à unaccroissement appréciable dans l’exploitation des ressources économiques de l’acteurau détriment des ressources de prestige qui relevaient du milieu universitaire.

Les fondements politiques de la promotion en fonctions exécutives

La fonction ministérielle conçue en tant qu’aboutissement d’une longue carrièreen politique, supposant à la fois un enchaînement des fonctions dans les institutionsdémocratiques de l’État, mais aussi au niveau d’un parti, ne peut pas objectivementdécrire les premières années du postcommunisme roumain. Au-delà du phénomènede reproduction d’anciens dirigeants communistes, mais aussi de la tendance decooptation des nouveaux acteurs disposant des ressources dans l’espace non-politique,on assiste graduellement à l’émergence d’un principe politique dans la sélection desgouvernants. Le processus d’institutionnalisation des nouveaux modèles de sélectionqui perdurent caractérise surtout les étapes de changement majeur politique ou social etle temps qu’il nécessite pour sa consécration peut être considéré relativement court2.

1 On reprend dans ce qui suit les profils généraux décrits par Jean BLONDEL, Government

Ministers…cit., p. 48.2 Mattei Dogan estime pour le cas de l’Italie une période de six ou sept ans. V. MatteiDOGAN, «La sélection des ministres en Italie. Dix régles non-écrites», International PoliticalScience Review, vol. 2, no. 2, 1981, pp. 189-209/p. 189.



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De cette manière, les gouvernements roumains s’adaptèrent très rapidement àune logique différente dans la promotion dans les fonctions publiques. Si en 1997,durant le cabinet Victor Ciorbea, un acteur politique avait besoin d’environ 3,62 ansde carrière dans la politique avant qu’il soit nommé dans une fonction ministérielle,il aurait eu besoin en moyenne de 5,96 années d’expérience pour qu’il deviennemembre du cabinet Năstase et de 7,2 ans afin de faire partie de l’équipe Tăriceanu.Malgré la diversité des trajectoires individuelles et l’accumulation des ressources«de prestige individuel», le premier souci dans la sélection des élites vise cependantl’accumulation de l’expérience et d’un savoir faire politique suivant comme notreétude relèvera les voies classiques d’accès dans une fonction gouvernementale: lelocal, la filière parlementaire, la voie exécutive et le creuset administratif 1.

1. Le plan local est souvent perçu dans les débats publics en tant qu’un niveauinférieur au niveau national, présentant des logiques d’action qui lui sont spécifiques.En ce contexte, un hiatus entre les deux dimensions de la territorialité est censéd’apparaître. Cette perspective n’est cependant que partiellement vraie pour lesélites parlementaires. À peu près la moitié des parlementaires de la législature passéeavaient détenu des responsabilités au niveau local (la plupart d’entre eux étantd’anciens conseillers locaux ou départementaux (environ 44,6%)2. En même temps,lorsqu’on regarde la population ministérielle, la division entre le local et nationalinduit l’idée d’une séparation quasi-totale. Au total 13,3% des ministres avaientdétenu des fonctions décisionnelles dans le territoire, la plupart d’entre eux au niveaudes conseils départementaux (11%). Malgré, le fait qu’en moyenne 22% des ministresoccupent aussi des fonctions de direction au niveau des organisations locales du parti,très peu d’acteurs politiques présentent dans leur profil un attachement concret parrapport à la prise de décision dans le territoire.

Néanmoins, le rôle que le local joue dans la promotion en politique semble avoirdes statuts différents selon la période et le parti qu’on prend en compte. Si jusqu’en1996 les pourcentages des ministres impliqués dans le local sont infimes, la situationchangea à partir de 1996, quand on observe pour la première fois l’émergence parmiles membres des exécutifs des acteurs politiques qui avaient déroulé une activitépolitique dans le local. Changement de perspective institué principalement par leParti Démocrate qui privilégia la promotion politique des gens ayant des racines dansle territoire cette tendance fut préservée, lors de l’arrivée au pouvoir du Parti SocialDémocrate en 2004 (surtout à partir de 2003). Le point maximal de cette croissanceest visible durant le mandat Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu (26,4% des ministres avaientune expérience décisionnelle au niveau local tandis que 42% des ministres nommés

1 Lorsqu’on regarde les trajectoires en politique du personnel ministériel, on peut déceler àla base d’une analyse de la composante principale quatre grands facteurs structurant le processusde sélection (variance expliquée de 73%) qui recoupent d’ailleurs les modèles consacrés dansles démocraties stables. Les grandes dimensions orthogonales délimitant les trajectoires desacteurs sont les suivantes: (1) une composante visant l’extraction parlementaire et le rôle duparti (ancienneté et position de leadership dans la direction centrale du parti) expliquant 29%de la variance; (2) une composante portant sur les valeurs locales (intégrant des positions dedirection au niveau local ainsi que les fonctions dirigeantes au niveau du leadership local)

expliquant 20% de la variance; (3) un troisième facteur portant sur l’expérience exécutive auniveau politique et les fonctions de direction non-politiques (13%) de la variance (4) enfin, unecomposante visant l’expérience administrative (11% de la variance expliquée).

2 Lauren ţiu ŞTEFAN SCALAT, Patterns of Political Recruitment, cit., p. 179.





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qui vise la mise en balance de ces dynamiques, la reproduction du personnel exécutifs’instaura en tant que procédure menant à la création des noyaux décisionnels stablesau sein des gouvernements roumains1. Dans cette logique, on arrive dans le cas descabinets tels que Theodor Stolojan d’avoir plus d’une moitié des ministres qui ont étéégalement membres dans l’un des cabinets antérieurs. Des taux encore plus élevés,caractérisent les équipes dirigées par Radu Vasile, avec deux tiers de ses membresanciens ministres, ou par Mugur Isărescu avec 77,27%. Au total, lorsqu’on prend encompte les diverses formules de promotion à l’intérieur de l’exécutif (soit des anciensministres qui occupent de nouveaux portefeuilles ou encore des secrétaires d’Étatqui deviennent ministres) on arrive à la conclusion que 46,51% de la populationanalysée présente un certain type d’expertise de la même nature avant la nominationà l’intérieur du gouvernement.

De cette manière, même si la valeur moyenne de la durée des mandats d’unministre reste au dessous des valeurs identifiées dans les démocraties stables 2, nouspouvons isoler un facteur clair portant sur la valorisation de l’expérience exécutivepour la nomination dans des fonctions politiques. Dans cette perspective, l’exempleroumain semble obéir ainsi à une des dix règles non écrites que Mattei Dogan observaitpour le cas italien visant la nécessité d’un passage du futur ministre par une fonctionexécutive préalable (de sous-secrétaire d’État pour le cas italien)3. Si cette pratiquesemble décrire, suivant des logiques différentes, toute la période postcommuniste,un point de rupture qu’on puisse cependant observer est intervenu durant lemandat de Tăriceanu. Les partis gouvernants durant la période 2004-2008, malgréle fait qu’ils ont opté pour des taux très bas de promotion des anciens secrétairesd’État dans des portefeuilles ministériels (11,3%), ont décidé également à n’utiliserque partiellement le personnel ayant acquis une compétence décisionnelle dans leséquipes gouvernementales précédentes.

4. L’expérience exécutive semble constituer en soi un facteur de promotion enpolitique inaugurant des tendances de reproduction au niveau de la populationgouvernementale postcommuniste. Au-delà de ces taux de rotation politique, on

Dans ce contexte général, la Roumanie ne ferait pas de figure à part. À une moyenne de 1,8ans pour un mandant d’un ministre, le cas roumain s’intégrerait dans un tableau plus large. LaPologne (1,6 ans), la République Tchèque (2,5 ans), la Lituanie (1,57 ans) ou encore la Bulgarie(1,5 ans) décrivent également, dans des proportions différentes, de tels types de comportements.V. Ferdiand MULLER ROMMEL, Jean BLONDEL, Darina MALOVA, Governing New EuropeanDemocracies, Palgrave Macmillan, March 2007, pp. 78-79.

1 Pour plus de détails sur les taux d’instabilité du personnel gouvernemental tout commesur les niveaux de la reproduction des élites gouvernementales en Roumanie postcommuniste(l’application de la thèse de la stabilisation du fonctionnement des gouvernements suite à descontinuités du personnel précisée pour la première fois dans Mattei DOGAN, Peter CAMPBELL,«Le personnel ministériel…cit.», pp. 313-345, 793-824), v. Alexandra IONAŞCU, «Instabilité dupersonnel gouvernemental et continuité décisionnelle en Roumanie postcommuniste», Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VI, no. 2, 2006, pp. 319-356.

2 Cela représente d’ailleurs la principale critique dressée par John D. Huber et CeciliaMartinez par rapport à la thèse de la stabilisation décisionnelle à partir des expériences desacteurs, suite à un processus de rotation des cadres à l’intérieur des exécutifs. Pour plus de

détails v. John D. HUBER, Cecilia MARTINEZ, «Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation ofExperience in the Cabinet – the French Fourth and Fifth Republic in Comparative Perspective»,British Journal of Political Science, Ie partie, vol. 34, January 2004, pp. 41-46.

3 Mattei DOGAN, «La sélection des ministres en Italie…cit.», pp. 195-196.



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pourrait anticiper l’instauration d’un principe de sélection et de spécialisation centrésur l’échelon bureaucratique, visant une des plus anciennes méthodes de recrutement:la voie mandarinale. Cette méthode de promotion en politique a constitué la principalevoie de sélection dans les pays communistes, l’équivalent de la sélection de l’intérieurdu Parlement des démocraties occidentales1, mais elle peut être rencontrée égalementdans les démocraties consolidées, surtout dans le cas français. En Roumanie, 20% des

ministres présentent une certaine expérience dans les exécutifs postcommunistes surles échelons inférieurs, tels que ceux d’hautes fonctions publiques ou des conseillers.Néanmoins, ce qu’on appelle une filière mandarinale classique, décrite par la promotiondes hauts fonctionnaires dans des portefeuilles politiques, celle-ci est identifiabledans 12,6% des cas. Force de l’adoption tardive des réglementations quant à l’appareiladministratif, même la délimitation de ce que signifie «le mandarinat» s’avère difficiledans ce contexte. La dépolitisation de la haute fonction publique est un phénomèneplutôt récent et inachevé. Au-delà de ces difficultés interprétatives à part les cabinetsde la période 1996-2000 qui utilisent moins ce type de ressources (7,9% des ministresdu cabinet Ciorbea et 16,5% des ministres du cabinet Vasile présentaient un tel profil),

la tendance générale dans la sélection ministérielle tourne vers une valorisationde l’expérience accumulée sur des positions d’expertise dans le cadre des cabinets22,3% des ministres du cabinet Năstase et 28,3% du cabinet Tăriceanu exhibent un telprofil.

ADDENDA: UN PORTRAIT FUGITIF DES SECRÉTAIRES D’ÉTAT

Par contraste à la population ministérielle dont le profil reste assez connu, le niveaudes secrétaires d’État nous apparaît plutôt comme difficilement identifiable. L’absence

d’archives visant cette population durant les premières années du postcommunismefait qu’on ait accès uniquement à des listes informelles et fragmentées. Si au débutde la période postrévolutionnaire, les nominations de ces dignitaires avaient étépubliées dans les décisions gouvernementales parus dans le Journal Officiel du pays,très rapidement, au début des années 1990, ce personnel politique commence d’êtrenommé par un ordre du Premier ministre qui n’est plus accessible au grand public.C’est seulement à partir de l’année 2005 qu’on entame un processus de publicationen ligne de ces décisions du Premier ministre (mais l’initiative n’inclut pas de regardrétrospectif). Les trajectoires politiques complètes peuvent être «reconstruites»surtout par l’exclusion, en confrontant la liste des secrétaires d’État aux autres

«inventaires» des acteurs détenant des fonctions publiques (telles que les conseillersdépartementaux ou encore la population parlementaire). Malgré tous ces efforts et vula multitude des présences épisodiques de certains secrétaires d’État dans les cabinetspostcommunistes avant de disparaître de l’attention publique, très peu d’indicateursportant sur le profil de cette population présentent des taux d’analyse valides.

À part l’absence d’un certain sens de la mémoire institutionnelle, la pénuriedes données visant les secrétaires d’État comporte des raisons objectives. Lorsqu’onregarde le profil général de ces acteurs on peut observer que plus de moitié d’entreeux (53,1%) représentent de nouvelles entrées en politique. La plupart des membresdes exécutifs des seconds échelons n’ont occupé d’autres fonctions en politique niau niveau central, ni dans le local. Si cette première image peut infliger l’idée d’un

1 Jean BLONDEL, Government Ministers…cit., p. 58.



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manque de personnel politique ayant une expertise qui peut remplir toutes lespositions de l’État, une analyse en détail nous offre plutôt une image différente. Decette manière, contrairement aux pratiques décrivant le niveau ministériel, durant lapériode postcommuniste on remarque plutôt une institutionnalisation des pratiquesde cooptation au niveau du second échelon du pouvoir et non pas une stratégie devalorisation de l’expérience exécutive déjà acquise. La tendance croissance dans les

procédures de cooptation est constante: 43,08% des nouvelles entrées 1990, 56,49%en 1992, 75% en 1996. Les taux sont explicables au début des années 1990: le partisuccesseur héritant tout un patrimoine de personnel ayant une certaine expertise del’ancien régime a pu mobiliser ces acteurs dans le processus décisionnel, tandis quela coalition de droite arrivant pour la première fois au pouvoir en 1996 déploya lepersonnel ayant déjà acquis un profil politique dans des portefeuilles ayant un plusde visibilité. En revanche, les taux de cooptation qui s’ensuivent après cette date nes’intègrent pas dans une logique d’institutionnalisation des élites politiques. Tant lecabinet Adrian Năstase que le cabinet Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu ont choisi dans desproportions sensiblement égales d’environ 70% d’introduire sur ces échelons des

personnes n’ayant pas d’expérience politique préalable, en transformant les échelonssecondaires de l’exécutif dans une porte d’entrée en politique au lieu de constituer uncheminement d’une trajectoire de longue durée en politique.

Au-delà de cette image générique il y a bien évidemment toute une série destratégies des partis politiques gouvernants. L’idée que l’échelon secondaire del’exécutif constitue un endroit d’apprentissage en politique qui ultérieurementconstitua un tremplin vers une fonction ayant un plus de visibilité ne retrouve pasde fondement solide lorsqu’on regarde les trajectoires générales de ces acteurs. Sion superpose la population des secrétaires d’État à la population parlementaire ouministérielles les chiffres sont plutôt sans relevance dans l’économie générale de cetteélite politique. De la sorte, à part le cas des premières équipes gouvernementalesqui semblent avoir utilisé cette procédure d’une manière plus appliquée, les autresgouvernements ne récupèrent pas l’expertise acquise au niveau des secrétaires d’État.Valorisée au niveau de la sélection ministérielle constituant une des grandes voiesd’accès à un portefeuille ministériel, le passage par une fonction de secrétaire d’Étatest loin de s’instituer en tant que règle générale de promotion en politique.

Le profil politique des secrétaires d’État est, comme on l’avait déjà précisé,marqué par de faibles ressources décisionnelles des acteurs concernés. Les tauxsont révélateurs à cet égard. Malgré une certaine croissance dans l’importance desressources locales de ces élites durant les deux derniers cabinets pris en compte ainsique de l’importance de la trajectoire parlementaire, le profil politique des secrétaires

d’État reste très peu significatif 1. Ainsi, l’expérience politique joue un rôle marginaldans la promotion dans une position à l’intérieur du gouvernement et étonnamment,la fonction exécutive ne sert pas de tremplin que dans peu de cas pour d’autresfonctions politiques au niveau central. Ainsi la population des secrétaires d’Étatsemble être constituée, en grande partie, par des «marginaux», représentant souventdes fidèles des leaders politiques et illustrant plutôt l’application d’un principe de

1 À l’exemple, en ce qui concerne l’expérience locale on peut identifier uniquement quatresecrétaires d’État du gouvernement Ciorbea (3,96% du total) et 13 personnes de l’équipe Năstase

et de Tăriceanu ayant un tel profil). Des chiffres semblables sont à identifier dans le cas del’expérience parlementaire préalable: 11 secrétaires d’État du gouvernement Văcăroiu (7,14%),5 du gouvernement Ciorbea (4,95%) et 15 du gouvernement Năstase (7,14%) présentaient untel profil.



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ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU

patronage. Néanmoins, une infime partie de ces leaders réussit à s’instituer en tantqu’acteurs stables de la scène politique.

Cette perspective «trompe l’œil» est cependant outrepassée lorsqu’on prenden compte la tendance générale de reproduction de ces acteurs dans des fonctionspubliques. Toute comme la population ministérielle, la voie royale vers une nominationfuture dans une position exécutive à ce niveau constitue justement le fait d’avoir accédé

à un tel poste dans les gouvernements antérieurs. Même sans prendre en compte larotation interne des secrétaires d’État, moins de moitié d’entre ceux-ci (48%) on détenuun seul mandant. 25,9% autres secrétaires d’État sont présents au moins dans deuxgouvernements, et autres 14,8% ont détenu au moins trois mandants différents. Il estintéressant à spécifier également que 138 personnes, donc environ 10% de la populationtotale, réussissent d’additionner quatre mandants ou plus. Certes, cette caractéristiquedécrit plutôt les gouvernements formés suite à un changement du Premier ministre etnon pas les équipes résultantes d’une nouvelle échéance électorale.

Les secrétaires d’État semblent ne pas être des hommes politiques par professionétant donné le fait qu’ils ne présentent pas de continuité dans la sphère politique

décisionnelle. Représentants d’une section de la scène politique qui dans les meilleursdes cas s’autonomise, il existe très peu de ressources politiques menant à leur nomination.Alors comment arrivent-ils à devenir des secrétaires d’État? La réponse à cette questiontire forcement ses sources des formes de ressources non-politiques que ces acteursdétiennent. Trois grands types de ressources peuvent ainsi être identifiés. Tout d’abord,les secrétaires d’État disposent d’une expérience dans la haute administration publiqueau niveau exécutif. Au total 27,5% des secrétaires d’État ont parcouru une filièremandarinale qui leur a permis une cooptation ultérieure dans des fonctions publiques.Caractéristique originaire du comportement du PDSR avant 1996, cette tendance estretrouvable surtout dans les deux derniers cabinets analysés (2000-2008).

La carrière mandarinale est d’ailleurs le principal élément de convergence entrele profil de ces acteurs politiques gouvernementaux par rapport aux modèles instituésdans d’autres pays. Cependant cette filière n’épuise pas à expliciter la promotion enpolitique des nouveaux acteurs sur l’échelon second du pouvoir. D’autres ressourcess’ajouteront afin d’expliquer cela: la position de l’acteur dans le soi-disant «champde la société civile» (catégorie intégrative qui réunit l’activité dans les associations,instituts, mais aussi l’espace académique) ou les ressources économiques (qui durantles premières années visent les positions de direction dans l’économie d’État etultérieurement portent surtout sur l’économie privée). Les deux types de ressourcessemblent substantiellement importants indiquant un certain processus de conversiondes ressources non-politiques en atouts pour la promotion politique.

Pour ce qui est de la première forme de ressource, visant l’activité des acteursdans la sphère publique, on peut observer que 30,4% des secrétaires d’État disposaientd’une telle expérience avant leur nomination. Professeurs universitaires, chercheursou encore des membres des associations, fondations ou des divers centres de recherchesemblent être des personnages préférentiels pour la sélection dans une fonctionexécutive. Leur expérience qui porte sur les compétences détenues, mais égalementsur l’accès qui leur est offert à un savoir faire technique et à d’autres catégories depersonnes dans l’espace civique instituent ainsi la pratique de leur cooptation dansle monde politique. Aux ressources académiques qui peuvent justifier le choix decertains acteurs au détriment d’autres s’ajoute l’implication des élites dans l’espace

économique. Des patrons ou des managers trouvent leur chemin vers une promotionpolitique. Même si la présence des ressources économiques est plus réduite par rapportaux deux premiers types d’expériences (18,9%), elle présente une certaine constance



45



sur la scène politique roumaine postcommuniste. Les taux les plus importants reliésà l’économique sont décryptables aux extrémités temporelles des cas cités: ainsi lessecrétaires d’État des deux premiers cabinets Roman avaient détenu des fonctions dedirection dans le cadre des entreprises d’État (surtout durant la période communiste),tandis que l’autre cabinet qui présente d’ailleurs les plus hauts taux des gensprovenant des sphères économiques, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, valorise cette fois-ci

les entrepreneurs de la sphère privée.Des fonctionnaires publics, des figures emblématiques de la société civile ou encore

des entrepreneurs… tel est le profil qui se dresse lorsqu’on analyse les secrétairesd’État des cabinets roumains postcommunistes. Leurs ressources politiques sontplutôt limitées et leurs perspectives de poursuivre une carrière politique sont plutôtliées à une reproduction au même niveau de l’exécutif. De cette manière, le personnelpolitique du second échelon de pouvoir semble diverger par rapport au personnelministériel. À différence des ministres qui adoptent à peu près immédiatement uncomportement qu’on retrouve dans la plupart des démocraties parlementairesessayant à substituer l’absence d’une longue tradition politique par un recrutement

de l’académique ou des professions techniques, l’échelon secondaire souffre desreconfigurations continuelles introduisant de nouveaux acteurs en politique.La valeur attribuée aux ressources non-politiques ne constitue pas une

idiosyncrasie des premières années du postcommunisme mais un fondement constantdu recrutement. Ce fait ne serait pas exceptionnel si on n’était pas en la présenced’une ressource unique qui n’accompagne pas en parallèle un enchaînement desfonctions politiques comme c’est le cas des élites ministérielles. Il paraîtrait ainsi queles gouvernements roumains exhibent des comportements ayant des référentielspolitiques contradictoires. Les trajectoires ministérielles s’approchent du modèlefrançais ou du modèle italien qui favorisent la pépinière du parti ou le vivier de la

haute administration publique, tandis que le niveau des secrétaires d’État tend versune «américanisation» de la politique1. Les acteurs du second échelon de pouvoirsont ainsi plutôt recrutés parmi les gens ayant de belles carrières dans le privé où ilsrentreront une fois le mandat achevé.

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

La concentration du pouvoir au niveau des exécutifs roumains postcommunistes,ainsi que la grande diversité des stratégies adoptées par les cabinets en place quant

aux politiques adoptées, soulève en premier lieu un questionnement sur la capacitédécisionnelle des acteurs individuels. Élites instituées après la chute de l’ancienrégime, la population gouvernementale roumaine serait ainsi enclenchée entre lesparticularismes historiques et régionaux et aurait pu justement engendrer par sonprofil toute cette grande diversité au niveau des résultats visibles des politiques. Danscette perspective, la question portant sur les trajectoires des acteurs en politique, leurexpérience acquise dans les cadres démocratiques, constituent une pierre angulairepour la compréhension de l’activité gouvernementale.

Une analyse portée sur le profil des gouvernants nous offre parfois une imagecontre-intuitive par rapport à la perception publique. L’influence du communisme,

1 Pour la différence entre les divers modèles v. Mattei DOGAN, «Introduction: la sélectiondes ministres dans divers régimes politiques», cit., pp. 125-129.



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si importante durant les premiers moments de changement semble s’évanouir duportrait général des ministres et des secrétaires d’État. Certes, la présence du passédans le présent peut revêtir de nombreuses facettes plus subtiles que la simplereproduction des anciens leaders et elle peut mener à l’encombrement de l’actiongouvernementale. Néanmoins, la disparition de l’importance de cette ressourcedu passé dans la sélection des acteurs gouvernementaux est indéniable. À sa place

s’instaurent toute une série des logiques divergentes.La différence instituée entre les ministres et les secrétaires d’État postcommunistes,

qui en principe font référence à un même type de compétence décisionnelle, estincontestable. Au niveau ministériel les modèles de promotion certifient uneconvergence aux autres démocraties parlementaires européennes. Disposant desressources qui relèvent de l’activité dans le parti et dans le Parlement, petit à petit,les ministres deviennent d’hommes d’État. Il ne s’agit pas ici d’apprécier l’éthique desacteurs ou encore leur capacité d’entamer un projet politique éclairé. Cependant cesélites deviennent des acteurs centraux de la scène politique postcommuniste. Encontrepartie, le niveau des secrétaires d’État semble soumis à d’autres logiques visant

principalement la cooptation. La maximisation des ressources non politiques tout aulong du postcommunisme fait penser à un échelon technique qui se réclame plutôtd’une vision à l’américaine sur l’implication épisodique en politique des gens dont lapropre profession et performance constituent la principale ressource de promotion.

Cette différence entre les niveaux est tout à fait remarquable et elle acquiert plusde poids durant les dernières années. En fait d’une perspective longitudinale, il estclair que l’année 2000 représente un moment de scissure par rapport aux premières dixannées du postcommunisme. La rupture quant à une référence au passé est quasi-totale,les ministres nommés en fonction présentent d’habitude une longue expérience dansle politique post-décembriste. En outre, il s’agit aussi de la période où les ressources

locales commencent à jouer un rôle plus important dans la sélection aménageantainsi les possibles bases d’une reconfiguration des politiques gouvernementales.Malgré les hauts taux de promotion des secrétaires d’État en fonctions ministérielles,cette pratique ne touche cependant qu’une section réduite du total des dirigeantsdu second échelon constituant une caractéristique spécialement pour les partis degauche. La nomination des secrétaires d’État semble obéir à d’autres règles. Si pourêtre ministre, les acteurs présentent d’habitude à part des ressources sociales ouéconomiques, une biographie en politique qui les recommande, cela n’est forcementle cas des secrétaires d’État. Qu’une partie de ceux-ci réussissent à devenir ministresou des parlementaires, tandis qu’une section plus importante (mais toujours limitée)

de cette population réussit à acquérir un nouveau mandat de secrétaire d’État.La dualité des règles qui régissent les deux niveaux du pouvoir exécutif aurait

pu à la base instituer des modèles spécifiques: d’une part une professionnalisationqui se trouve sous le contrôle du parti et de l’autre, une logique opposée fondée surun principe de compétence. Cette interprétation générale est cependant partiellementinfirmée lorsqu’on essaie de décrypter les logiques sous-jacentes d’une stabilisationhypothétique d’une élite gouvernementale. Si au niveau des trajectoires la disjonctionest nette, en ce qui concerne la volatilité des portefeuilles, les degrés d’instabilitéen fonction ne présentent pas de différences notables. Ainsi on pourrait dire qu’enprincipe, les secrétaires d’État restent tributaires aux changements du premier échelon

de pouvoir et donc dépendants par rapport à celui-ci. La logique de dépendance ainsiinstituée suggère plutôt une dimension de récompense dans la nomination sur lesecond échelon du pouvoir et non pas une tendance vers un modèle technocratique.



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APPENDICE

Figure 1Les différences entre les ministres et les secrétaires d’État

dans la conversion des anciens nomenklaturistes

L'expérience exécutive communiste

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Le cabinetMinistres Sécretaires d'Etat

Figure 2Les taux d’expérience politique de parti et exécutive

des ministres avant leur nomination

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Roman Stolojan Vacaroiu Ciorbea Vasile Isarescu Nastase Tariceanu

Les Bases de la Professionnalisation des Ministes (années)

Exp Pol Exp Part Exp Exe



48


ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU

Table 1Les grands facteurs déterminants du processus de la sélection

Component

1 2 3 4

Ancienneté dans le parti avant le début du mandat ducabinet

-.701 -.523 .095 -.134

Fonction à la direction centrale du parti .777 -.049 -.022 .075

Fonction à la direction locale du parti .083 .878 -.056 -.023

Expérience parlementaire .737 -.010 .161 -.219

Expérience dans les fonctions publiques au niveau local -.106 .770 .347 -.144

Expérience dans l’administration gouvernementale -.031 -.091 -.013 .959

Fonction de direction dans le monde non politique .373 .083 .747 -.157

La durée de l’expérience exécutive dans les cabinetsantérieurs

-.453 .088 .622 .202

Méthode d’Extraction: Analyse en Composante Principale. Méthode d’Extraction: Varimaxavec Normalisation Kaiser.

Table 2

Tableau des ressources non-politiques des ministres 1990-2008LE GOUVERNEMENT

Roman Stolojan Văcăroiu Ciorbea Vasile Isărescu Năstase Tăriceanu

N 19 12 29 27 19 17 37 42Oui70.4% 60.0% 64.4% 69.2% 59.4% 65.4% 77.1% 79.2%

N 8 8 16 12 13 9 11 11

Fonction

direction Non

29.6% 40.0% 35.6% 30.8% 40.6% 34.6% 22.9% 20.8% N 1 1 4 5 3 4 11 20économique

5.0% 7.1% 13.3% 18.5% 15.8% 23.5% 28.2% 43.5% N 15 10 19 16 12 8 15 10académique

75.0% 71.4% 63.3% 59.3% 63.2% 47.1% 38.5% 21.7%

N 1 2 1 2 2 4 7 6administration5.0% 14.3% 3.3% 7.4% 10.5% 23.5% 17.9% 13.0%

N 1 0 3 4 2 1 2 6acteurs soc.5.0% .0% 10.0% 14.8% 10.5% 5.9% 5.1% 13.0%

N 2 1 2 0 0 0 4 0militaire10.0% 7.1% 6.7% .0% .0% .0% 10.3% .0%

N 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4

Profil non

politique

(lorsqu’il

existe)

autres.0% .0% 3.3% .0% .0% .0% .0% 8.7%



49



Table 3Tableau des ressources non-politiques des secrétaires d’État 1990-2008

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

N 39 33 18 44 17 26 13 58 56Oui% 30.71 27.27 19.78 30.56 18.48 24.53 19.12 32.40 33.14

N 88 88 73 100 75 80 55 121 87

Fonctionnaire

Non % 69.29 72.73 80.22 69.44 81.52 75.47 80.88 67.60 66.86 N 18 31 25 49 34 35 26 57 59Oui% 14.17 25.83 27.47 33.79 36.56 33.02 38.24 31.84 34.91 N 109 89 66 96 59 71 42 122 110

Sociétécivile

Non% 85.83 74.17 72.53 66.21 63.44 66.98 61.76 68.16 65.09 N 31 27 16 18 14 16 12 28 48Oui% 24.22 22.50 17.78 12.59 15.05 15.09 17.65 15.73 28.4 N 97 93 74 125 79 90 56 150 121

Économie Non

% 75.78 77.50 82.22 87.41 84.95 84.91 82.35 84.27 71.59

Note: Pour les trois derniers cabinets il existe un problème quant aux valeurs manquantes:les données couvrent 88% des secrétaires d’État du cabinet Isărescu ainsi que du cabinetTăriceanu et 85% des secrétaires d’État du cabinet Năstase.

Table 4Tableau général de la volatilité des portefeuilles du personnel gouvernemental

Ministres Secrétaires d’État

DuréeMoyenne Ecart-type

Rapp.Dur.

DuréeMoyenne Écart-type

Rapp.Dur

Provisoire 5.20 0.95 0,87 4.05 1.65 0.68Roman 13.27 4.32 0,83 8.71 5.05 0.54Stolojan 12.95 0 1,00 11.34 4.09 0.87Văcăroiu 27.71 16.72 0,57 23.21 16.92 0.47Ciorbea 10.54 5.52 0,66 11.71 4.55 0.73Vasile 13.44 6.47 0,67 12.66 11.56 0.58Isărescu 10.32 2.87 0,86 11.45 6.47 0.95Năstase 25.35 14.63 0,53 23.59 14.80 0.49Tăriceanu 22.85 15.08 0.49 22.40 13.05 0.48

TOTAL 15.74 7.40 0.72 14.35 8.68 0.64

Table 5Taux de reproduction du personnel gouvernemental 1990-2008

MinistérielSecrétairesd’État Promotion Promotion 1 EXP1

Roman II 26.92 46.15 25.11 36.12 48.15Stolojan 55 57.29 28,56 35 61.9

Vă

că

roiu 7.14 29.22 26.08 40.48 32.6Ciorbea 12.81 15.84 10.35 15.28 20.51Vasile 66.67 56.14 9.14 16.67 68.75



50


ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU

Isărescu 77.27 77.92 13.64 13.64 80.76Năstase 10.42 15.83 23.01 43.75 35.42Tăriceanu 15.1 11.22 24.53 34.12 24.53

Promotion=proportion des secrétaires d’État d’anciens gouvernements qui sont promus

en fonctions exécutives: Promotion 1: le poids des secrétaires d’État dans la populationministérielle; Exp1: expérience exécutive des ministres sur un des deux échelons du pouvoirexécutifs dans les cabinets précédents; Ministériel et Secrétaires d’État=les taux des ministres/des secrétaires d’État ayant détenu des fonctions analogues dans les cabinets précédents.



51


Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania

Independents in the Local Politics ofPost-Communist Romania

ION ENACHE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

It is an extensively accepted truth that parties are the main actors in modernliberal democracies1. However, the last twenty years have seen a number of significantindependent actors emerge in more than a few political systems worldwide. In an

attempt to investigate the rise of non-party actors we analyse the case of independentcompetitors in Central and Eastern Europe elections. More precisely, this paper aimsto scrutinize the issue of independent candidatures addressed in the specific setting ofpost-communist Romanian local politics. We intend to explore a topic which has beengreatly ignored by scholars, despite its obvious contribution to the modernization ofthe electoral pace of Eastern European countries. Independents represent more thanoccasional appearances at various electoral cycles, they offer a measure of the stateof the party system at large. This is specifically why an attempt at addressing thepresence of independent politicians in the particular situation of the third wave ofdemocratization might give us a better impression of the maturity of the electoral

system and also of the success of the democratic changes.Two decades after the breakdown of communist regimes, parties and party

systems throughout Eastern European polities still undergo extreme internaltransformations. During the period of post-communist transition, many of thesetraditionally dominant parties have seen their vote shares drop under the weightof accusation of unrepresentativeness and endemic corruption2. Public rejection ofparty politics created an opening in the electoral market for independent politicalentrepreneurs, whose points of access in local politics are not dependent on partyaffiliation, but rather on their ability to present themselves as viable alternatives tothe traditional parties by emphasizing local issues and their distinction from partyelites.

Independent politicians represent a particular manifestation of post-communistpolitics which deserves further investigation, especially due to their recurrence inthe local elections. Commonly, the local office is the first and decisive stepping-stoneto higher elected positions of public trust, with local elections profoundly alteringthe course of national politics; such was the case of the office of the general mayorof Bucharest which served as departing point for various positions in the central

1

Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-SixCountries, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 2000, p. 25.2 Tom GALLAGHER, The Balkans in the New Millennium – in the Shadow of War and Peace,

Routledge, London, pp. 186-187.



52


ION ENACHE

administration1. We believe this to be an additional argument for the importance oflocal level politics and for treating independent candidatures in this specific settingwith extensive attention, together with the observations that voters tend to form theirpolitical preference at the local level and to maintain it for mainstream elections andalso that local elections might be instrumented as barometers of national politicaltrends, because it helps politicians at large determine what matters most to voters2.

Despite the vivid importance of local elections in Romanian politics, the localvoting literature appears limited, while mostly integrating the national outlook.Similarly, the discipline seems excessively preoccupied with presidential electionsand leaves local politics largely untouched in the realm of party studies and electoralpolitics3. Compiling an orderly review of the literature led us to the identification ofonly a handful of studies that have attempted to question the elements of local electionsand of even fewer that scrutinize the particular place occupied by independents. Still,these studies are rather distant from the Eastern European region and we can hardlysay much about what motivates certain politicians to run as independents, or aboutthe value of incumbency over first-time independents, or about the importance of

financial support in winning votes, or whether personal qualifications of individualcandidates can compensate for the lack of party backing. Another issue we observedduring our attempt was represented by the insufficiency of studies which go beyondcasual partisan and socioeconomic features of the voting process, or of analyses thatfollow independent leaders which manage to capture office not only during theirelectoral effort, but all throughout their mandate. Thirdly, limited considerations existregarding the voting behaviour for local elections, keeping in mind the basic fact thatthis problematic has been recursively addressed especially in those studies in whichnational politics are scrutinized4. Most probably this has happened because of theinadequate amount of existing data and equally because of the preference of numerous

authors for solo cross-sectional analysis. Therefore, one purpose of this study would be to address these matters preponderantly from an Eastern European perspective.Namely, this would mean to analyse what motivates certain political actors to runas independents, in what way these types of independent candidatures are differentfrom partisan campaigning and to question how they manage to mobilize the neededsupport in this particular context. Our main question refers to what fuels independentcandidatures in party-controlled political systems? We intend to accomplish thisrather daunting task by analysing the recurrence of independent candidacies at localelections which have been organized in post-communist Romania between 1992and 2008. For that matter, we believe that post-communist Romania represents an

illustrative application of independent politics particularly because its particularelectoral setting is not directly conducive to independent candidacies. Nonetheless,despite this fact, independent entries have occurred with more or less success during

1 IDEM, Theft of a Nation. Romania since Communism, Hurst, London, 2005, p. 170.2 James D. KING, ”Comparing Local and Presidential Elections”, American Politics Research ,

vol. 9, no. 3, 1981, pp. 277-290.3 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, Oksana MALANCHUK, ”Schematic

Assessments of Presidential Candidates”, American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 2, 1986,

pp. 521-540.4 Craig GOODMAN, Gregg R. MURRAY, ”Do You See What I See? Perceptions ofParty Differences and Voting Behavior”, American Politics Research, vol. 35, no. 6, 2007,pp. 905-931.



53



the past two decades. Mayoral, local council and county council elections will be ourmain targets, with special attention reserved for those areas where most independentcandidatures were articulated. Similarly, we will not ignore the political trajectoriesof independents following their election, especially as we believe it to be decisive fordepicting the political performance of independent actors.

Segments of the population and demands usually excluded from consideration byhighly centralized and self-absorbed national parties identified an alternative means tovoice their grievances thanks to independent politicians. With questions about roads,schools and trash pickup dominating local elections, local notabilities found it possibleto have a say in an area usually monopolized by political parties. This particularsetting was intensely exploited by independents during the last two decades. And,despite constrains imposed against them by the party-dominated electoral system,these independent political actors managed to advance their candidatures againstparty competitors. Here, we need to identify what made this particular situationpossible. Was it the personal appeal of independents, the electorate’s desire for viablealternatives to party politics or it was more of an exceptional setting which favoured

independent standings? Essentially, the phenomenon of independent candidatureschallenges the commonly accepted concepts in party research and particularly, raisesquestions about the organizational advantages of parties and doubts the dominantrole of party structures as representation mediums. The widely spread belief thatparties as organizational vehicles represent the best means for individual actors toobtain electoral gains has increasingly become the subject of critique since both thedecline of the party identification model and the rise of anti-party sentiment leftestablished parties increasingly unpopular among electorates1. This is not to say thatpartisan politics is becoming redundant in the proximity of independence; instead,we plan to investigate what might encourage independents to challenge a political

setting otherwise uniformly subject to partisan supremacy.

Research Approach and Strategy

This paper sets out to explore and understand the peculiarities of independentcandidatures at local level, in an Eastern European post-communist setting. It focuseson the development of this particular type of politicians in societies that are movingaway from the communist derail, and soughs to analyse independents’ specificplace in the post-communist establishment. Through the research, the project aimsto highlight the dynamics of local independence by approaching its main actors, thepoliticians who ran as independents and, using this particular label, managed toget into office. The main objective, as well as providing an insight into the rationale behind the individuals which enter politics on their own, is to deliver an analysis ofthe local context where independents advance their candidatures and of the generallegal framework so as to better discriminate between the advantages and drawbacksof this particular political habitat for independent politicians.

For better understanding why politicians chose the independent path to office weinterviewed thirty independent politicians who participated in the last local electoral

1 Diana OWEN, Jack DENNIS, ”Anti-partyism in the USA and Support for Ross Perot”,European Journal of Political Research, vol. 29, no. 3, 1996, pp. 383-401.



54


ION ENACHE

moment organized in Romania, namely in the June 2008 elections. We believe suchan investigation might offer fundamental insight regarding independents’ motivationto get involved in local politics without any sort of party support and can provide uswith a more general impression on the dimension of political independence in post-communist Romania. Using political autobiography as main research method, a totalof thirty interviews were conducted with independent politicians elected for the officeof mayor, selected randomly from within the public database provided by the ElectoralAuthority. These interviews form the primary empirical data of the study. They tookplace from April 2010 to May 2010. Particularly, the interviews were open-ended,as this allowed for the interviewers to express their ideas, thoughts, and memoriesfreely, using their own words. The interviews were supplemented by many otherinformal discussions with those involved in local politics as independents, togetherwith consistent monitoring of existing official sources on independent candidatures.The interview material was thematically approached, the results being analysed inthe empirical part of our paper. Our analysis employed as dependent variable thetotal number of votes received by each candidate and generally his or hers politicalreach, whereas the independent ones consisted of candidate’s personal characteristics,political resources and endorsements as well as the political following. Ultimately,the control variables were represented by the number of candidates who run in eachelection together with numbers that stand for the voter turnout. Electoral campaignserved as unit of analysis, data being collected for each election year on the total votesreceived by independents and translated to the size of their political followershipwhich we measured by the comparing independents’ scores to the total numbers.Also we employed a variety of personal indicators obtained from the interviewsconducted with the candidates, their official profiling on their promotional materialsand in the local media. The data are drawn from observing five successive mayor,local council and county council elections between 1992 and 2008. During this periodnumerous independent candidates participated in local campaigning, with a total of1229 mayor nominations won, and almost 6000 councillors’ mandates accorded toindependents. A breakdown of these campaigns shows that, despite the decrease ofthe general scores obtained by independents, independent politicians managed toget re-elected on various occasions. We also met some exceptional situations whereindependents established a monopoly in those respective localities. In the next partsof our research we will attempt to advance various explanatory interpretations forthis precise situation.

Our analysis will focus on three different electoral levels with independence

occurrences – elections for the mayor’s office and for the local and county councils.Drawing from the existing literature a number of key questions were identified whichguided the structure of the interviews and the analysis that followed. Together withthe qualitative data we plan to obtain from the interviews, in order to demonstrate theempirical relevance of independents in Romanian local politics we refer to the detailson vote, seat and candidate share obtained by independents in local elections held between 1992 and 2008. Observing the often significant presence of independents,with several cases when they won over fifty percent of the vote, we can rightfullyasses the validity of our selection.

For the purpose of the present examination we start from the basic observation

that party supremacy is under serious revision especially at the local level, whereordinary citizens make up their electoral decision based on daily issues, rather thanon political platforms. Consequently, independents see their chance of success being



55



helped by both this relative decline of electoral parties, as well by the increasedelectoral volatility in modern party democracies1. It remains to verify to which extentthese presumptions apply as well to the polity under scrutiny here.

As architects of electoral system, the dominant political parties made their best to assure their prevalence in the party system. Due to the specific exigenciesof the electoral competition the monopoly of political parties is preserved, tothe disadvantage of independent interventions2. Nonetheless, despite the all-encompassing partisan framework in nowadays politics, independents manage tovoice their interests and some succeed to win sympathies of the electorate. In orderto take our investigation further, several questions are needed: How do independentsmanage to convince the voters of their trustworthiness? And what motivates thesecandidates to choose the independent path to getting in office in the first place? Whatmakes independent candidates prone to survive electoral quarrels, even as they mightseem disadvantaged by their initial lacking of a coherent party structure? Is therea direct relationship between non-partisanship and the negative views concerningthe parties’ role in democratic politics? Is winning elections in the particular case ofindependents more about contextual factors, than actually about attributes inherentto the political system? Similarly, should we expect younger generations to feel moreclose to independents? One puzzling question which first needs answering would bewhy do independents basically regard the parties as irrelevant in the search for publicoffice? Can it be because they fail to procure a party nomination or because theirpolitical career discriminates fundamentally against partisan affiliation? Certainlyindependent identifications are motivated by distinct features, but we believe that afocal point exists. Starting from these convergent traits of independent candidatureswe intend to identify also how do independents relate to party counter candidatesand what sort of rhetoric they employ against them. Another question should also be answered, namely why does the electorate show appetite for a virtually unknowncandidate who can hardly compete with the organizational advantages of candidatessupported by political parties? Subsequently, some authors argue that independentcandidacies seem to be mainly fuelled by party detachment, with voters expressingtheir grievances mainly against specific parties and not necessarily against the conceptof parties per se3. Might this mean that independents have limited electoral resonancein today’s politics of post-communist polities? Likewise, what could best explainthe variation in the electoral reach of independent candidates? Are independentcandidates habitually more circumstance-dependent than party actors? We willattempt to provide these questions with an answer starting from the observation that,

unquestionably, the ability of independents to win votes is not carved in stone, facingsignificant variations not only from one scrutiny to another in different electoraldistricts, but also within the same constituency. This is especially true as individualpoliticians don’t enjoy a party brand, and manage to obtain at best low scores ofthe so-called ”captive electorate”4. But despite this obvious drawback of political

1 Michael MARSH, ”Candidates or Parties? Objects of Electoral Choice”, Party Politics,vol. 13, no. 4, 2007, pp. 500-527.

2 Liam WEEKS, ”Independents: a case-study”, in Kris DESCHOUWER (ed.), New Parties

in Government: in Power for the First Time, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 143-144.3 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent CandidatesWorldwide”, Journal of Politics, vol. 70, no. 3, 2008, pp. 648–662.

4 Ibidem.



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ION ENACHE

independence, there are vivid examples of constituencies lost by political partiesin favour of independent contenders. Equally, the unpredictability encompassed inpolitical independence makes our scrutiny as necessary as it can serve as a test of thematurity of our political system.

Without the label and without any financial backing of political partiesindependents face numerous obstacles winning political office. The ability ofindependent candidates to gather votes varies from constituency to constituency andeven within the ranks of the same constituency1. Therefore, one problem would beidentifying what might explain this disparity in the electoral potency of independentcandidates. A first step in an attempt to address this problematic would be to identifythe relevant texts which try to scrutinize the issue of independent candidatures.

Studying independent candidatures turns us to reviewing a literature dominated by two-dimensional constructions afar from our region of interest. Most identifiedapproaches draw their conclusions from a biased understanding of independent elites,whose specific characteristics are identified by opposing them to political parties. Or,it is quite difficult to comprehend the true nature of political independence by simplycomparing it to its partisan counterpart and disregarding its intrinsic incentives. Forthat reason, our present attempt will depart from this party-centred understanding ofindependency so that to reach some appreciations on political independence from amore autonomous outlook.

Our attempt at approaching the issue of independent candidatures from acomparative perspective led us to identifying the existing case studies on Australianindependents by Elim Papadakis and Clive Bean2, analyses of the British acceptanceof independent candidatures, those focused on Canadian politics such as thatcompiled by Éric Bélanger3, the Japanese account of Robin Le Blanc4, a Norwegiancase5, or some limited examples investigating the Russian situation – here we chieflyrefer to the leading paper written by Robert Moser6. Many of our available literaturetargeted peculiarities of independent candidatures within the American presidentialcompetition7 and in the context of minor and third parties 8. There are importantstructural transformations going on in Eastern European politics particularly

1 Susan HERBST, Politics at the Margin: Historical Studies of Public Expression Outside the Mainstream, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 70-71.

2 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, ”Independents and Minor Parties: The ElectoralSystem”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no.1, 1995, pp. 97-110.

3

Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism and Third-party Vote Choice: A Comparison of Canada,Britain, and Australia”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 37, no. 9, 2004, pp. 1054-1078.4 Robin LE BLANC, ”Rebuilding the Electoral Connection: An Examination of the Origin

and Potential of Anti-Party Electoral Movements in Japanese Local Politics”. Paper presentedat the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004. http://allacademic.com/meta/p60767_index.html (accessed on 22.02.2010).

5 Jacob AARS, Hans-Erik RINGKJØB, ”Party Politicisation Reversed? Non-partisanAlternatives in Norwegian Local Politics”, Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005,pp. 161-181.

6 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an InterveningVariable in Russian Politics”, Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, 1999, pp. 147-165.

7

Steven J. ROSENSTONE, Roy L. BEHR, Edward H. LAZARUS, Third Parties in America.Citizen Response to Major Party Failure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996.8 William SCHNEIDER, ”Antipartisanship in America”, in Vernon BOGDANOR (ed.),

Parties and Democracy in Britain and America, Praeger, New York, 1984, pp. 103-144.



57



affecting local political leadership, but we can hardly assess these manifestations byreferring solely to the remote examples mentioned before. More than in other fieldsof political science, we believe that our investigation on the dynamics of independentcandidatures in local politics should foremost take into consideration the immediateenvironment, while make usage of the existing literature as a departing theoreticalframework. Reviewing the existing literature on political independence we stumbled

upon several approaches. Some scholars view independence from the behaviouralpoint of view, and address voters which ditch their partisan affiliation in order toeither split their ticket, or to switch from one party to another partisan formationor independent candidate1. These attempts view independent candidatures highlydependent on the structuring of the electorate, and put great emphasis on the personaltraits of independent leaders. Others focus on dispositional provisions influencingpolitical independence, and develop a typology of self-defined independents andindependent candidates2. Our present academic endeavour attempts to navigatethe elements of independence starting from the advantages presented by the latterapproach. We should also keep in mind that, subscribing to the common belief that

political parties are indispensable to modern democracy, most scholars considerindependents as redundant or even opposing democratic practice3. Some academicssuch as Robert Moser believe independent candidates are responsible for loweringvoter turnout because they fail to present voters with viable alternative policies; at thesame time, other authors consider that independents are prone to affect representationparticularly for poor and less educated strata4. In one of their common works, BrainSchaffner, Matthew Streb, and Gerald C. Wright agree that non-partisanship mightindeed depress turnout and take their argument forward in saying that independentcandidates are to be blamed for holding back challengers from defeating incumbents5.Conversely, other scholars think that independents contribute to the electoral success

of less preferred candidates and even that they increase the saliency of the electoralrace. On a more categorical tone, independent politicians are also accused by the sameacademics to interfere with the administration’s stability to the point that they caninduce deadlocks6. But, along with these less fortunate approaches, there is also theso-called ”half-full view”. Scholars which perceive in more bright colours the issue ofindependent candidates imply that they strengthen democracy by nurturing citizen’sinterest in politics and by voicing critiques, acutely needed for the restructuring ofthe establishment7. Nevertheless, despite these unilateral approaches on the issue of

1

Walter DeVRIES, V. Lance TARRANCE, The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in AmericanPolitics, Eerdmans, Michigan, 1972, pp. 67-72.2 Paul R. ABRAMSON, John H. ALDRICH, Phil PAOLINO, David W. RHODE, ”Third-

Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson and Perot”, PoliticalScience Quarterly, vol. 110, no. 3, 1995, pp. 349-367.

3 Ibidem.4 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.5 Brain F. SCHAFFNER, Matthew J. STREB, Gerald C. WRIGHT, ”Teams without Uniforms:

The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections”, Political Research Quarterly, vol. 54, no. 1,2001, pp. 17-30.

6 Arthur LUPIA, ”Busy Voters, Agenda Control and the Power of Information”, American

Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 2, 1992, pp. 390-403.7 Shanto IYENGAR, Adam F. SIMON, ”New Perspectives and Evidence on PoliticalCommunication and Campaign Effects”, Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 51, no. 1, 2000,pp. 149-169.



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ION ENACHE

political independency, we consider that in order to approach this particular subjectwe need to assume a less biased viewpoint.

On what concerns our particular area of interest, the rise of independentcandidates in recent politics of Eastern and Central European states has seldom beenaccompanied by the development of specific literature. Most contributions on thesubject are consumed by depictions of failing candidacies, while more optimisticpieces are hardly to be taken into consideration as they provide an exaggeratedaccount advocating independent politics. In most liberal democracies, almost all voterschoose one party or another, with independent candidates receiving minuscule levelsof support, if any1. This domination by parties is equally reflected in the literatureon voting behaviour, where there has been very little research on why some voterschoose to cast their ballot for independents2. Respectively, as independent politicshave become fairly frequent after 1989 a new question emerges – why do votersshow their support for independent candidates? This interrogation is to be addressed both for national politics and at sub-presidential level, precisely where independent

candidates have their most significant impact. A possible answer could be the factthat citizens are increasingly searching for alternatives to traditional politics in anotherwise less visible part of politics: independents. Still, what about the motivationsand behaviour of independent candidates – what makes them seek a highly riskyalternative route to office? Scholars such as Timothy Colton argue that, for theoverwhelming part of independents, their raison d’être is competing for the spoils ofoffice3. We will further attempt to apply these methodologies to the Romanian case inour analysis of the peculiarities of independent candidatures in local post-communistpolitics. Nevertheless, we expect that our particular case at hand not to entirelycorrespond to any of these endeavours, keeping in mind the specific structure and

the relative novelty of Eastern European democratic arrangements.

Voting for Independents

The term ”independent” is usually attributed to someone who is not affiliatedwith a political party4. Primarily, political independence encompasses the lack of the brand, the support and of the resources usually offered by a political party and, at thesame time, it means pursuing a political path using own material resources, networkof connections, know-how and political abilities5. Despite its underground position,

independence responds entirely to the founding values of liberal democracies as itpromotes political entrepreneurship and individual achievement to the best interestof the community. And contrarily to its accused centrifugal tendencies, political

1 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.2 Donald GREEN, Bradley PALMQUIST, Eric SCHICKLER, Partisan Hearts and Minds

Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 2002,p. 26.

3 Timothy J. COLTON, ”Transitional Citizens: Voters and Elections”, in IDEM (ed.), Post-

Soviet Russia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 43-59.4 Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism...cit.”, pp. 1054-1078.5 Allan G. JOHNSON, Frank BEALEY, The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science, Blackwell

Publishing, London, 1999, p. 163.



59



independence helps the renovation of the establishment and equally serves thereformation of partisan attitudes by highlighting the often unseen flaws within theestablishment. Likewise, independency might vary across circumscriptions, beingmotivated by numerous different political gains and stimuli, and producing dissimilarpolitical consequences. This is why identifying circumstantial traits of politicalindependence is crucial for better understanding the phenomenon at large within thespecific region selected for analysis.

From an ideological understanding, independents are not required to assumecentrist positions, but simply to develop their own system of political references,liberated from the strains of a political party. In the most basic understanding,independence removes the party label from the ballot, the candidate using hisor her name alone for identification, together with the appellative ”independentcandidate”1. For what concerns its qualitative attributes, the term independencemight be understood as the lack of correspondence with partisan directives andas alternative to party candidacy – here, we have to mention that our thesis doesexclude these so-called ”party mavericks” that act largely independently from theirparty machinery2. We consider these party-dependent actors to display a faux typeof independence, as it does involve neither the true attributes nor the strains of non-partisanship. Comparatively, genuine independence might surface as result of internalmotivations of the political actor, without much relying on influences coming fromthe political framework or from the partisan setting. Usually, politicians annoyed bythe current state of affairs get involved on their own in politics, attempting to bringtheir individual contribution to ameliorating the establishment3. Secondly, politicalindependence can be triggered by severe dissatisfaction with the management done by representatives of political parties and in response to the corrupt ways proffered bypartisan politicians. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the basic fact that independentscandidates can be also recruited from partisan politics. Correspondingly, the literaturesees former party members turned independent as representing quite scarce casesand being usually motivated by misunderstandings with former party colleagues4.Typically, these independency-motivating conflicts occur in the immediate periodpreceding elections being driven by the allocation of party nominations and bypersonal divergent interests5. It can equally be argued that the magnitude of theconflict helps the independency gather electoral momentum6. Conversely, we cannotoverlook these particular recurrences by simply separating from the bulk of per se independent candidatures. Thus, a separate analysis of these so-called ”recycledindependents” seems intensively necessary.

1 Art. 34 Align 5, Law No. 35/2008 on the Election of the Members of the RomanianParliament.

2 Liam WEEKS, ”When Parties Are Not the Only Party in Town: Independent Actorsin Ireland”, paper presented at the joint sessions of the European Consortium for PoliticalResearch, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 2006.

3 Liam WEEKS, ”Independents...cit.” , p. 149.4

Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, ”Independents and Minor Parties...cit”, pp. 97-110.5 James D. KING, ”Comparing Local and Presidential Elections”, cit ., pp. 277-290.6 Brain F. SCHAFFNER, Matthew J. STREB, Gerald C. WRIGHT, ”Teams without

Uniforms...cit.”, pp. 17-30.



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On the electorate side, a trend toward not claiming allegiance to a politicalparty is visible1. But we should also notice that measuring political independence by research institutes is only one way of tapping partisanship and we also must notignore the basic fact that partisanship can go hand in hand with non-partisanshipin the case of the same voter2. Or, in other words, partisanship is multidimensionaland, according to some scholars such as Richard Katz or Arthur Miller and MartinWattenberg, for a correct understanding of political independence we should employseveral partisanship measures and regard national surveys only as one of the neededinstruments for that particular affair3.

Issue voting is expected to bring independents to the top preferences of theelectorate. Together with partisan candidates’ positions on the broad issues such aseconomic development and environmental protection, independents often addressmore topical issues such as controversial reforms or support towards various actions4.It’s not simply enough to insulate the native effects of partisan politics such as bribery,inefficacies and rampant corruption in order to turn voter choice to independents.Nonetheless, managing to turn these particular issues into the centrepiece of the localrace is vital to independents. Another occurrence, highly visible in the more recentpost-communist elections in Romania, is that of the emergence of a significant blockof potential voters which are mostly disconnected from politics, and which treatparty organizations and party electioneering efforts with great indifference. Thesevoters may thus be less susceptible respond to traditional political mobilizationendeavours and, if they decide to get involved in any sort, end up being highlyvolatile in their electoral choice5. Structurally, this particular stratum of the electoraterepresents the main target for independents. Correspondingly, it can be argued thatstirring the imagination of a substantial number of voters represents a demanding

job for independents as compared to the easier path for party candidates who havethe entire support of their organization, but, be that as it may, one could ask whatmakes independent candidates stick even after voters got a close look at them?One explanation might be the fact that they challenge the classical and often grimyunderstanding of politics6.

Taking further the position presented by V.O. Key on the abandoning ofestablished partisanships by unsatisfied voters, we introduce the stance that electoralmobility favours the independent vote7. Especially younger voters seem prone to quittheir inherited partisan affiliation and to adopt independent electoral views. And,

1 Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism...cit.”, pp. 1054-1078.2 Richard KATZ, ”The Dimensionality of Party Identification: Cross-national

Perspectives”, Comparative Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, 1979, pp. 147-163.3 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, ”Measuring Party Identification:

Independent or No Partisan Preference?”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 1,1983, pp. 106-121.

4 Liam WEEKS, ”Independents...cit.” , p. 141.5 Elim PAPADAKIS, Clive BEAN, ”Independents and Minor Parties...cit”, pp. 97-110.6 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia,

1993, pp. 47-48.7 V.O. KEY, ”The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960”,Harvard University Press, 1966, in Pierre BRECHON, Partidele politice, Romanian transl. byMarta Nora Ţărnea and Adina Barvinschi, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, pp. 142-143.



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undeniably, conjecture plays a definitive role to all this1. Mainly because of the mobilecharacter of the preferences of the voters, independents are forced to convince theelectorate each time they present themselves at the polls. Therefore, winning theelections it’s more about occasional voters in the case of independents. Still, judgingafter another component of voting behaviour, such as social category and education,a clear-cut delimitation cannot be easily made. Voting for independent candidatesrepresents a highly volatile experience, which can be equally approached by low-income middle parts of the electorate as it can by higher-educated conservatives or even by older generations2. This is why voting independents might be rightfully cataloguedas a highly circumstantial experience, being not that much about political habits asit can be about incidental decisions. But what motivates less faithful partisan votersto give their vote to independents? Is the political appeal of a particular candidate?Is it some radical transformation of the identity of the voter himself which occurred between elections? Is it the Internet? Or might the answer rely in the influence exerted by the mass-media? Or maybe it’s more of a combination of all the above?

And what can be said the local independent voter? Firstly, we should noticethat, because of their critical attitude towards party politics, voters which usuallyreject independent candidates at the national level might become motivated by morecontextual reasoning at the local level – and turn to giving their vote to independentrunners. This would mean that the local level of politics offers the best chance forindependents to win, further potentiated by the legal provisions which make hardlyopen the national sphere of politics to independent competitors, by the insufficientdevelopment of the party system, the widespread distrust in political parties, andalso by the negative connotations of party membership maintained from the eraof communist dictatorship3. Similarly to other countries which use proportionalrepresentation, in Romania independent candidates can run successfully for office,at least theoretically. However, thus far independents have failed miserably to winnationwide elections and independent representatives surface only during the actualterm of the Parliament. This was possible for those leaving their original parliamentarygroup which got them elected in the first place and chose independent path becauseof different arguments they had with their former party’s leadership. Nevertheless,these recycled independents are highly susceptible to return to partisan politics, astheir profile is highly prone to become incorporated in one of the competing parties’ranks4. Comparatively, it remains a commonly accepted fact that voters are moreinclined towards political parties especially as party identification is one of thoseshortcuts heavily employed in elections. And in the particular case when independence

interferes with accessibility, we must expect people to be more resilient to changetheir habits. Current theory on the matter, however, considers that, in lack of partisancloseness, the electorate will seek out other, more encompassing information on which

1 Phillips W. SHIVELY, ”The Relationship between Age and Party Identification: A CohortAnalysis”, Political Methodology, no. 6, 1979, pp. 437-446.

2 Franco MATTEI, Richard G. NIEMI, “Unrealized Partisans, Realized Independents, andthe Intergenerational Transmission of Partisan Identification”, Journal of Politics, vol. 53, no. 1,

1991, pp. 161-174.3 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation…cit., pp. 74-79.4 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă – politic ă şi societate în România postcomunistă , Nemira,

Bucureşti, 1999 , p. 89.



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to base their decision1. Voter decision making is visibly more difficult to manage forindependents and in the case of less informed citizens this might even mean they losetheir greatest information shortcut for making a cultivated vote. Some electors areexpected to skip the election altogether, when they realise they are unable to determineclearly the differences between candidates or if they are little concerned to invest intime-consuming searches for pertinent information2. Those that eventually decide toexpress their political option might do that having in mind several other hints such asthe politicians’ familiarity, background and his or hers programme3. For that matter,electoral geography studies underline the strong importance of the social context forthe voting decision adopted locally4. Voters actually find out about their options byword of mouth, from their peers at the workplace or during other forms of socialinteraction. Interpersonal information transfers are complemented by the electoralcontamination by which voters match their voting preference to the characteristicsof an area, irrespective of their personal characteristics5. Working at a micro-scalesuch as that of local elections obliges us to better comprehend the basic fact that animportant effect is the closeness of voters to candidates. Namely, the nearer one livesto a candidate’s home or has met him or her personally before, the more likely is oneto vote for that candidate. This effect, which has been empirically proven by LiamWeeks and Aodh Quinlivan, might be extended in as much to affect those peoplethat know somebody that have met the candidate6. This behaviour is explainable byadmitting the fact that voters prefer someone they trust and from whom they hopeto receive support in their dealings with the authorities. Equally, the position of acandidate’s name on the ballot paper can have a significant effect in terms of thenumber of vote he or she receives. This is particularly true for low-profile electionswhere voters are less informed about the background of the contenders and for lower-placed positioned candidates such as independents. According to the provisions ofthe Romanian electoral law, independent candidates are placed at the bottom of the ballot following the order their candidatures were registered7.

The structuring of the electoral system, the personalization of voting and theparticular character of independent candidates contribute to the consolidation ofindependents as viable alternative to party politics. All the same, independents areconsidered to be context-driven, as it would be most unlikely for voters to stick toindependents the same way party supporters do. Nonetheless, it is hard to assesswhat does happen to independent preferences, if they fade away during the lifetimeof a generation or if they can be transmitted generically as family legacy. Whatever

1 Stuart ROTHENBERG, ”The Politics of Independents”, The American Enterprise, vol. 1,1990, pp. 13-15.

2 John ZALLER, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1992, p. 34.

3 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, cit., pp. 47-48.4 John Robert Victor PRESCOTT, Political Geography, Methuen and Co., London, 1972,

pp. 85-88.5 Kevin R. COX, ”The Neighbourhood Effect in Urban Voting Response Studies”, in David

SWEET (ed.), Models of Urban Structure, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1972, pp. 159-176.6

Liam WEEKS, Aodh QUINLIVAN, All Politics is Local. A Guide to Local Elections in Ireland,Collins Press, Cork, 2009, pp. 90-92.7 Art. 34 Align 5, Law No. 35/2008 on the Election of the Members of the Romanian

Parliament.



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might be the case, independent voting can be best understood as a deviant politicalattitude, an assumption recurrent in the literature1.

Partisanship versus IndependenceEssentially all governments that have called themselves democracies have

incorporated however limited the idea of partisan organization. Equally, whendemocracy is established, as was the case for Eastern European countries not long ago,what seems a normal initiative of the new regime was to reinstate party activity2. Theexistence of democracy is directly connected to free and fair elections, with politicalparties being inherent for a functional democracy. Limited to observance about thechanging place of political parties in the political systems of contemporary world,any debate on an eventual restructuring of party systems, even one to incorporate theindependent labelling, maintains nevertheless some sort of institutional embodimentsof the manifesting party logic. Continuing our argumentation on the idea of systematicinterpretation of partisanships, we must take in consideration the most visible featureof partisan change, namely the erosion of partisan attachments among large numbersof citizens. Explanations found in the literature either consider the shifts of votingpatterns, or adopt the attitudinal stance, insisting upon the decay of partisan feelings3.Both explanations stand, and both identify the growth of political independence asa reaction. The repercussions of such mounting independence are still under debate.Some authors consider that actually the escalading independence is rather superficial,meaning that many of those that would embrace the independent tag might even endup leaning towards one party or another4.

Given their centrality to modern democratic governance, the structuralism-dominated literature on transitions has tended to focus on the importance of partysystem consolidation, emphasizing the importance of the electoral system, that ofelections and party building5. In the particular setting of Eastern European countries,their communist rule produced a strong antiparty sentiment among the elites andvoters alike. The young Romanian party system makes no difference, as initialpartisanships lacked a coherent social base, a firm organizational form and thoroughideological programme6. Especially at local level, the parties penetrated more difficult,and this is highly visible in the enhanced electoral scores obtained by independentcandidates in the early years of the transition. On the one hand, parties are accusedthat they simply aim to increase their electoral score in order to get access to moreresources and to satisfy the interests of their supporters. These catch-all parties exhibit

1 Arthur H. MILLER, Martin P. WATTENBERG, ”Measuring Party Identification...cit.”,pp. 106-121.

2 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation…cit., p. 23.3 Timothy J. COLTON, ”Transitional Citizens...cit.”, pp. 43-59.4 Jack DENNIS, ”Changing Public Support for the American Party System”, in William J.

CROTTY (ed.), Paths to Political Reform, Heath, Lexington, 1980, pp. 35-66.5

Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. SouthernEurope, South Africa, South America and Post-Communist Europe, John Hopkins University Press,London, 1996, pp. 156-160.

6 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation…cit., p. 104.



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an obvious degree of professionalization and find it easy to participate in a highlycompetitive political market. And especially because political parties which manageto attain electoral relevancy gain access to a series of advantages assured by the statesuch as public financing, political parties try to incorporate any available electoralentrance1. However, following Georges Lavau’s rhetoric we are entitled to argue thatpolitical parties, however functional and inclusive, cannot represent and integrateevery particularity and social tensions existing within a society2. Here is whereindependents enter the scene, as they fulfil the need for political variety by speakingon behalf of those excluded by mainstream politics.

Despite the prevalence of several main national political parties, the partysystem does not replicate wholly at all levels of the political competition. Regionalspecificities are commonly encountered, with numerous regional players having asay in local politics. The level of local politics represents a niche prone to be exploited by independent candidates, especially as the electoral system offers them severalconcessions to engage in the electoral competition3. Comparatively, at a time when voterturnout continues to decline together with the widespread lack of civic involvement,

independent candidates offer the greatest personification of the resentment that manycitizens feel toward major parties4. If political parties are universally understoodas indispensable institutions for the functioning of democratic systems, one mightargue that candidatures of independent politicians diversify the political optionsand contribute decisively to the maturation of the polity. Going further with ourargumentation, dysfunctional parties might favour corruption and stagnation. Thisis why in any competitive democracy political independency is seen even more asrelevant the moment political parties stop acting as regulatory responsible institutionsand start affecting the very sanity of the political establishment. This negative approachtowards political parties has been challenged by Martin P. Wattenberg, who considers

that citizens do not immediately reject partisan structures, but rather they considerthem less relevant in solving their uttermost important issues5. Therefore, risinglevels of independence are not directly linked to sentiments of mistrust or scepticismexpressed by the electorate towards political parties, but rather they are motivated byhighly contextual reoccurrences6.

Distancing themselves from partisanships, independents are believed to faceseveral obstacles in their efforts of running for office as compared to the widely-acceptedadvantages enjoyed by party-supported candidates7. In the first place, independentslack any partisan support when they decide to forward their candidacy. Secondly, theyrely mainly on a scarce amount of resources originating mainly from own sources andfrom a handful of supporters. To a similar extent, the voting mechanisms, the electoralcontext and financial resources play an equally important role in determining how

1 Pierre BRECHON, Partidele politice, cit., p. 102.2 Georges LAVAU, ”Partis et systèmes politiques: interactions et fonctions”, Revue

canadienne de science politique, 1969, in Ibidem, pp. 125-127.3 Liam WEEKS, Aodh QUINLIVAN, All Politics is Local... cit., p. 112.4 David SEARS, Nicholas VALENTINO, ”Event-Driven Political Socialization and the

Preadult Socialization of Partisanship”, Political Behaviour, no. 20, 1998, pp. 127-154.5

Martin P. WATTENBERG, The Decline of American Political Parties: 1952-1980, HarvardUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1984, p. 89.6 Ibidem. 7 David GILLESPIE, Politics at the Periphery, cit., p .19.



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well an independent can do at the polls1. Authors such as Arnold Fleischmann andLana Stein which drew their conclusions from the national-level politics believeincumbency to be equally critical in local elections as well. Namely, those who haverun previously in local races have the first chance in as much as their mandate hassatisfied the expectations of their electorate2. But the system can be also forced bynew candidates, and one of the main facilitator for new politicians to successfully

advance their candidature is money. Spending cannot be ignored for local electionsaccording to a growing number of studies from various countries, which attest theimportance of local campaign funding as a determining factor of electoral outcomes,together with local canvassing and volunteer activities3. Though, since independentscannot rely on party funding for their political endeavours, their main sources forfinancial support are donations, which add to existing personal resources to financetheir campaigns and, if legalized, to state subsidies. For example, according to theexisting legislation on funding, Romanian independents do not enjoy public financingas they are not allowed to receive public budget subventions unlike political parties,their only source being donations4. At the local level the costs of running an electoral

campaign are expected to be lower than the sums spent on national campaigns, withthe similar predominance of political parties to be manifested. Within this particularsetting, independents are expected to have the advantage of a smaller electoralpopulation involving smaller costs. Nevertheless, who contributes financially to anindependent’s campaign, and more importantly, why? Local businesses are identifiedas the main contributors by most scholars, while small donations are rather limited5.Together with the direct costs of modern politics, so-called administrative resourcessuch as special treatment by the local government, funding provided illicitly fromthe state budget, free usage of state facilities, help political parties strengthen theirposition alongside indirect state subsidies such as free broadcasting and subsidies

for parliamentary groups. Hence, the lack of a clear set of rules and strict controlover political funding favours the incorporation of local political actors to centralizedpartisan structures and leaves little space for political independence to manifest6.

Party affiliation is a highly complex deal, and this was especially true in the firstdays of post-communism characterized by high scores in party volatility. Especiallythen the issue of truly admitting partisan status emerged, because not all candidateswho belonged to party structures were also formally members of those respectiveparties, especially in 1992. This situation appeared as some candidates were afraidthat openly assuming their party affiliation would alienate potential voters whichremembered the rotten nature of the socialist party-state. These candidates enjoyed the

support of various political formations, even they ran as independents, and, as soon

1 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.2 A. Clarke HAGENSICK , ”Influences of Partisanship and Incumbency on A Nonpartisan

Election”, Western Political Quarterly, vol. 24, 1964, pp. 719-730.3 Caty R. KENNETH, Munroe EAGLES, ”Do Local Campaigns Matter? Campaign

Spending, the Local Canvass and Party Support in Canada”, Electoral Studies, vol. 18, no. 1,1999, pp. 69-87.

4 Law No. 334 from 17 July 2006 on financing the activity of political parties and ofelectoral campaigns.

5

Caty R. KENNETH, Munroe EAGLES, ”Do Local Campaigns Matter?...cit.”, pp. 69-87.6 Steven D. ROPER, ”Campaign Finance in South East Europe: The Case of Romania”.Paper presented at the Workshop on Party Funding and Campaign Finance in Central andEastern Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2-3 November 2001.



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as they got elected, they admitted their partisanship by joining the political party whosupported them1. Therefore, we should be cautious when approaching independents’performance in the early days of post-communism, particularly because this wouldmean to overestimate the number of independents. The evidence to support thisview is quite impressive in present-day Eastern European post-communist politics.Strong partisans are fewer, spilt-ticket voting amplified, and parties lost much of theirappeal, while scarce numbers of independents made their presence felt in local andnational politics.

The Matter of the Electoral System

Independents face a hard time competing in a dysfunctional political framework,especially if the rules of the electoral technique were set to favour big politicalrunners. Equally, political tradition plays a crucial role, influencing the performanceof otherwise marginal contenders such as small parties and nonpartisan players.Because most partisan systems give an extra credit to large parties, the risk of under-representation of minor voices and that of affecting independents’ performances ishighly present and forces independent candidatures to adapt2. Every now and thena minor candidate can win the elections. But for most independent adventurers,experience shows that the electoral system in most democratic countries nowadaysfavours a party-centric competition for national elections combined with candidate-dominated elections occurring mostly at regional and local levels3. Of course,exceptions exist and confirm the fact that independent candidates are prone to makethe best of all those small opportunities the electoral system has to offer.

Though, opening the rigid partisan establishment to small players at the expense

of big political interests is not an easy thing to do. This is highly visible for post-communist politics – here, political institutions were designed by plagiarizingWestern political practice, but the transformations were accompanied by theincomplete adopting of political pluralism outside the party realm4. Nevertheless, because independents act in the same institutional environment as big parties do weshould not ignore the basic fact that institutional mechanisms that regulate politicalcompetition and influence the nature of the partisan system were designed with theparties in mind5. Then again, independents depend greatly on various characteristicsof the electoral system, such as seats allocation rules or ballot access requirements (e.g.deposits or lists of signatures). Within a highly competitive electoral system, lax ballot

access requirements permits independents and small parties to enter the race, whilein rigid polities, independents might even be banned altogether for entering certaintypes of elections6. Together with ballot access requirements, other intrinsic features

1 Frode BERGLUND, ”Party Identification...cit.,”, pp. 84-105.2 Hermann SCHMITT, Soren HOLMBERG, ”Political Parties in Decline?”, in Hans-Dieter

KLINGEMANN, Dieter FUCHS (eds.) Citizens and the State, cit., pp. 95-133.3 Stefano BIANCHINI, ”Political Culture and Democratization in the Balkans”, in Geoffrey

PRIDHAM, Tom GALLAGHER, Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans,Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 67-71.

4

Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation… cit., p.52.5 David C. VALENTINE, John R. VAN WINGEN, ”Partisanship, Independence, and thePartisan Identification Question” American Politics Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2, 1980, pp. 165-186.

6 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.



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of the electoral system which dominates certain electoral competitions influence theelectoral performance of independent candidates. Among these, the extent to whicha competition is candidate-centred or party driven is crucial for independents1. Weshould also notice that the dimension of the electoral district is vital for independents,as large circumscriptions are difficult to cover2.

Furthermore, the type of voting system constitutes a major factor in shaping the

configuration of any political system and represents one of the most vital institutionalfeatures to discriminate against small political actors. According to its design,mechanisms, effects at different levels, one can distinguish numerous variationsof electoral systems, each of them developing specific relationships with the largerinstitutional framework. The same variables which influence the competition betweenpolitical parties have significant repercussion for independents – namely, the electoralformula employed, the ballot structure (whether single or multiple choices can beexpressed for candidates or parties) and the district magnitude3. Electoral systemdesign is of critical importance because it influences the way in which constituenciesare drawn, the design of ballot papers, how votes are counted, and numerous otheraspects of the electoral process. With similar effects can be credited other administrativeaspects of elections such as the nomination of candidates or the registration of voters, but their influence is believed to be rather limited for independents. And particularly because the design of the voting system is often chosen at the discretion of establishedpolitical parties, electoral laws tend to be specially made so that they protect partisaninterests. This manipulation of the electoral system by an unscrupulous majorityusually encourages the performance of political parties and disadvantage individualcandidates. Likewise, despite the fact voting systems are de jure democratic, beingguided by key principles such as fair representation, transparency and inclusiveness,the practice shows they actually limit the chances of small political parties and ofindependents4.

Widely encountered throughout Europe, proportional representation systemstend to be more permissive and to encourage a greater diversity of parties and ofindividual political contenders5. Allowing multiple ballot choices, proportionalsystems are more likely to facilitate the success of small political formations, and henceopen electoral opportunities for independent candidates. This argument is highlycriticized by Russian-originating studies which argue that proportional representationsystems help party system further consolidate6. Comparatively, majority and pluralitysystems are expected to decrease the electoral strength of independent candidatesand small political formations, due to the way seats are being distributed favouringlarge competitors and making voters turn away from marginal candidates. Someauthors maintain the idea that, because it dampers the connection between partiesand voters, and makes voters more candidate-aware than label-dependent, majorityand plurality systems encourage independent candidates7. Nevertheless, it’s hard

1 Ibidem, pp. 147-165.2 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.3 Ibidem.4

Ibidem.5 Josep M. COLOMER, Political Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 44.6 Robert MOSER, ”Independents and Party Formation...cit.”, pp. 147-165.7 Arend LIJPHART, Patterns of Democracy… cit, pp. 141-146.



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to assess the recurrence of these theses, when only relying on single-case studies ofindependent candidatures. Certain commentaries regarding the confrontation betweenthe dynamics of independent candidatures and that of certain subtypes of electoralsystems are well-needed here. We presume that any electoral circumstance whichputs a great emphasis on the candidate itself and its personal attributes and neglectsthe party labelling is creating opportunities for independents. Similarly, thresholdis equally important for the electoral performance of independent candidates, withlower electoral threshold helping parties recuperate the disadvantage they face ascompared to members of political parties. In the case of local elections, the two-roundvoting system employs winner-takes-all voting method for the first round of voting,and, if no candidate is able to receive an absolute majority of votes, the two candidateswhich obtained the highest scores take part in the second round run-off ballot1. As thepractice shows it, ballotage has been affected by various practices of tactical voting:voters go for the most popular candidates or, au contraire; they rather support a weakcandidate in the first round of voting, so that their real preferred candidate has a better chance in the runoff 2. This latter practice might help independents credited by opinion polls with little chance to gain momentum and enter second round. Thepresence of a distinctive electoral system might provide an explanation for the successof independent candidates in a particular setting according to some scholars3. Butthis is not entirely true for our case, if we take into consideration the fact that theprovisions of the electoral system remained arguably the same since the first localelections, while the vote for independents diminished considerably over time4. Oneexplanation for this brutal decreasing might be the maturation of the partisan system,which managed to capture most of the voting preferences, while limiting the electoralperformance of small competitors.

We attempted to assess the electoral strength of independent candidates by comparing the percentage of candidates that present themselves using theindependent label in elections, the percentage of votes that independents receive andthe number of mandates captured by independents. Therefore, facing the numbersin the Romanian case, we end up with these numbers as an average for the past fiveelectoral cycles: out of the bulk successful candidatures, independents won 10.45%of the vote and about 9.58% of the available mandates. Comparing these figures withthose Dawn Brancati obtains in his comparative study on political independence wecan place Romania on the weaker spectrum of independent politics5. For Romanianlocal politics a proportional representation voting system was in place since the 1992elections in the case of local and county councils, while a two-tier majority votingsystem is used for electing mayors. This inconsistency between the types of electionsused at local level was further extended in 2008, when a new electoral law opened topublic will the function of president of county council, via a single tier majority vote.And precisely because of the nature of this varied arrangement highly dependent

1 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.2 William POUNDSTONE, Why Elections Aren’t Fair (and What We Can Do About It),

Macmillan, London, 2009, pp. 34-38.3 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.4 Paul G. LEWIS, Political Parties...cit., pp. 81-83.5 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.



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on the political colour of the centre majority, numerous vicious situations surfacedamong central and local authorities in the past two decades.

Independents by Law

According to the Romanian electoral laws, independents are seen as electoralcompetitors in legislative, presidential and local elections. Compared to the legalinstability which characterizes the concept of political party in post-communistRomania, the legal definition given to independent candidates was rather constantall throughout the period of transition. Nevertheless, political independence isinterpreted in legal terms as the monopoly of individuals which advance on theirown political candidacies and receive the support of a particular number of voters 1.Following this logic independence defines itself using the personal criteria combinedwith the popular dimension of political support.

In line with the Romanian standards, parliamentary mandates are accordedusing uninominal majoritarian vote distributed proportionally. At this particular levelof politics, independent candidates are allowed to enter legislative elections havingthem provide a minimal number of signatures from their supporters, number whichis decided for each uninominal college, but has to equal at least 4% of the number ofthe voters registered in their respective college, with no less than 2000 names for thelower chamber and double for the Senate2. Also, the law stipulates that independentsrunning for a legislative mandate, similarly to party-supported candidates, need tomake proof of a deposit consisting of the amount of five minimum national wages.If these independent candidates manage to get at least 20% of the total amount of

valid votes for the college where they competed, the deposit is returned to them.According to the same piece of law, independents have access to the public servicesof radio and television, proportionally with their electoral significance, the same being true about their possibility to use the special boards for electoral posters3. Inorder to obtain a mandate in the legislative, independents need to win the majorityof votes in their electoral college and do not benefit from any special treatment astheir partisan counter candidates do, such as redistribution bonuses. Despite the factlegislative elections do not represent the focus of our research, we cannot ignore some basic facts regarding the political performance of independent candidates at thatparticular level. Our first observation would be that independent candidatures were

advanced for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. All these independentattempts at winning a legislative seat failed especially as result of the exigent natureof the rules in place at this particular level of politics. With the requirements for bothregistering a candidature and for covering the circumscription rocketing as comparedto the state of thins at the local level, it is no wonder no actual independent candidate

1 Art. 26 Align 1 and Art. 30 Align 1 of Law No. 35/2008 on electing the representatives tothe Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of Romania, together with Law No. 67/2004 on electingthe Authorities of the Public Local Administration, the Law of Local Public Administration

No. 215/2001 and Law No. 393/2004 on the Statute of Local Representatives with subsequentmodifications.2 Art. 29 Align 7, Law No. 35/2008.3 Art 38 Align 1, Law No. 35/2008.



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managed to surpass the threshold and to get a mandate. At best, the scores obtained by independents managed to pass the average of three percent. One particulardetail not to be ignored is the presence of recycled independents in the Parliament,originating from failed partisanships. Their ranks vary accordingly to the stability ofthe legislative session, with more castoff independents surfacing in very combativepolitical setting.

For presidential competitions, independents need at least 200 000 signaturesin order to advance their candidatures, and enjoy similar provisions as membersof political parties and of alliances do1. What became highly visible in the past twodecades of post-communist politics is the very fact that independent candidaturesfor the supreme function in state were rare, and most of them can be categorized asfair exceptions. In 1992 and 2004 there was a single independent candidature, whilein 2009 we can easily spot no less than three independents running for president,the back-then mayor of Bucharest, a Roma ethnic and a businessman. Among thesecandidatures we encounter only one woman which presented herself to the polls asindependent, a lawyer which ran in the 2000 elections. Similarly, just one independentattempted to run for president more than once, in the 2000 and 2009 elections. Inthe case of presidential elections the situation for independents is somewhatameliorated to what we noticed at the parliamentary level. Still, for most occurrencesof independence in nationwide politics, these numbers are highly exceptional. Forexample, during the past two decades and over the past five electoral cycles onlyone presidential candidate forwarded his independent candidature twice. At the lastpresidential elections independents failed to raise the interest of the people, with allthree independents getting under four percent of the votes2.

On the other hand, in the case of the elections organized for the representatives tothe European Parliament, independents are permitted to run under the proportionalrepresentation formula, providing the fact they raise 100 000 signatures. This numberappears to be too exigent, as compared to the requirements parties need to meet inorder to forward their electoral lists3. Also, similarly to the other types of elections,independents are placed in the last part on the ballot, after candidatures from partiesrepresented in the European Parliament and other parties and alliances are satisfied.Likewise, independents’ presence in public media is also subject to party premiership.Nonetheless, independents might get one of the available European legislativemandates if they manage to surpass the national electoral coefficient, established by law as being the rapport between the total number of votes expressed nation-wide and the number of mandates attributed to Romania4. For the past Europeanparliamentary elections held in Romania, it was highly visible that independentscan hardly penetrate the partisan monopoly. But, similar to other Eastern Europeanpolities, Romania was confronted with scarce recurrences of independent playersmanaging to reach needed score, most of which usually emanate from high-profiletypecasts within the establishment. One of the most visible electoral settings remains

1 Law No. 370 on Electing the President of Romania from 20 September 2004.2 Stan STOICA, Dic ţionarul partidelor politice din România 1989-2004, Meronia, Bucureşti,

2004, p. 83.3

Art. 12, Law No. 33 from 16 January 2007 on Organizing the Elections for the EuropeanParliament.4 Art. 20 Align 2, Law No. 33/2007 on Organizing the Elections for the European

Parliament.



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Bucharest, retaining a symbolic importance for the state of the entire nation and withcapacity to irradiate the remainder of the electoral body. After the first four mayorsappointed by governmental decision, since march 1992 Bucharest experienced fivemayors belonging to one of the political parties, and an independent1. In 2004 the onlyindependent candidate for the office of general mayor managed to obtain a meagrescore of 0.15% of the total vote. Four years later, a former social democrat turnedindependent as result of internal quarrelling with his party colleagues decide to runas independent for this seat. He obtains 56, 55% of the votes, managing to defeat therepresentative of the most important political party in Bucharest over the previousyears2.

At local level, independent candidatures can be proposed for local and countrycouncils, and for the mayor’s office. Independents which wish to run for any of theavailable councillor position need to enjoy the support of at least 1% of the totalnumber of voters registered in their circumscription, but at least 50 for communes, 100for small towns and 1000 for counties, the capital city, Bucharest districts and largetowns3. Those who wish to run for mayor’s office, need to make proof of the support

of at least of 2% of the total number of voters registered in their circumscription, butno least than 200 for communes, 300 for cities, 1000 for large cities and districts ofBucharest, while 5000 signatures are needed for the Bucharest4. This particular aspectof the electoral legislation led to discriminatory practices against independents, suchwas the case of the only successful independent candidate to the office of mayor-general, which was confronted with the ultra-correctness of the Municipal ElectoralBureau5. Nonetheless, these numbers do not seem to represent a direct problem forindependents; they even appear to be provoking independency at the local level. Onthe other hand, on what concerns women’s participation as independents at localelections is highly dependent on each candidate’s strength to participate as no gender

quotas are in place. The proportion of women competing independently for officeis rising gradually, but remains very small up to the present as compared to theexperience of Western Europe on the matter. And, this seems especially visible at theregional level, where a more patriarchal understanding of politics seems to remainin place6. The law discriminates against independent candidates in the case whenno political formation or independent candidate has managed to pass the electoralthreshold, when the mandates are redistributed among these partisan groups, withindependents being excluded from the formula from the very beginning, accordingto the d’Hondt rules for redistributing unused votes7. Furthermore, according to the

1 Cristian PREDA, ”Al nou ălea primar postcomunist al Bucureştiului”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 2, no. 5, 2005, pp. 503-506.

2 Central Electoral Bureau, June 2008 elections for the authorities of the local public administration , http://beclocale2008.ro/ (accessed on 12.04.2010).

3 Art. 48 Align 1, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local publicadministration, republished.

4 Art. 48 Align 2, Law No. 67/2004 with subsequent modifications.5 Public Policy Institute, Alegerile locale 2008 – organizare iner ţială , candida ţi apatici, alegă tori

indiferen ţi, IPP, Bucureşti, 2008.6 Ionela B ĂLUŢĂ, ”Le Parlement roumain à l’épreuve du genre. Les femmes politiques

dans la législature 2004-2008”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 10, no. 1,2010, pp. 123-151.7 Art. 96 Align 8, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public

administration, republished.



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electoral laws for local elections, electoral publicity is permitted, with independentsenjoying free access to the public radio and TV stations as well as to private mediastation1. Unlike candidates of political parties which benefit of greater airing time fortheir electoral announcements, independents can dispose of only five minutes fortheir public broadcasts. Independents can also present their political offer on publicplaces specifically selected for electoral posters.

As noticed, independents face several obstacles in winning political office. Though,as we can easily observe, ballot access requirements are pretty permissive at locallevel, with signature requirements being rather easy to meet, and even without thelarge infrastructure of a political party independents are able to reach eligible voters.Monetary deposits are omitted for independents that participate in local electionsand therefore do not pose any obstacle to independents at this particular level ofRomanian politics. Still, compared to other Eastern European countries, ballot accessrequirements seem rather volatile in the area, ranging from quite burdensome depositrequirements and large signature requirements to exemptions targeting various ethnicor social groups. For example, Hungary, Moldova, Poland and Russia lack any sort of

deposit requirements for independent candidatures, while Estonia removed signaturerequirements as well2. Nonetheless, there are systematic differences in the contexts inwhich local contests are fought, differences that account for the relative success of anindependent candidate in one election and the failure of another candidate four yearslater. Among contextual factors contributing to the electoral success of independentcandidates we identified low levels of partisanships, dissatisfaction with major partycandidates, economic discontent, issue preoccupation, distrust towards mainstreampolitics3. Then again, we consider that electoral performance is not all about thecharacteristics carved within the electoral system and consequently, that an eccentriccandidate can obtain maximal electoral advantage by employing unorthodox

campaign tactics. For that reason, in the next parts of the present scrutiny, we intendto evaluate the systematic explanations for independent success in local politics byexamining contextual changes that occurred from 1992 until the latest elections of June 2008. We also intend to analyse the bases of independent candidates’ support,an average profile of the Romanian local independent candidate and the politicaloutcome of independent candidatures.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Local Politics in Romania

At a first glance the last two decades in the history of the Romanian party systemcan be characterized by great variance in the number of composing political parties, by the numerous alliances and splits which marked the transition from the single

1 Art 65, Law No. 67/2004 on electing the authorities of the local public administration,

republished.2 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.3 John CAREY, Matthey Soberg SHUGART, ”Incentives to Cultivate the Personal Vote:

A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas”, Electoral Studies, vol. 14, no. 4, 1995, pp. 417-439.



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party to multipartidism1. An obvious place of political volatility, the Romanianparty system has been greatly scrutinized by numerous authors, whom mainlyapproached its dynamics from an institutional perspective, either analysing theparties as organizations, or by approaching their relations to the electorate and to theact of governing2. Few studies have turned their attention to independents withinthe Romanian establishment, and those which did approach the subject were mostlytributary to the national level of politics3.

Manifested mainly through a growing sense of alienation from political parties,the erosion of partisan loyalties within the Romanian electorate represents one of themost obvious political developments characterizing the past two decades4. Fewercitizens identify with either of the major parties, more voters are splitting their ticketson the day of the elections, and generally there is a growing sense of alienation from thepolitical parties5. The capacity of political parties to serve as representative institutionsin democratic politics is hardly contested in its entirety; nevertheless the weakeningof party attachments is a reality of nowadays post-communist politics. For example,Richard Rose and William Mishler claimed that citizens of post-communist countriesapproach with scepticism party politics, scepticism caused by the dissatisfactionwith the economic situation and by their approval of the perceived benefits of theprevious non-democratic era6. Although economy is picking up as compared to thesituation at the beginning of the 1990s, trust in political parties remains low as thelast Eurobarometer survey shows7. Hence, we find it necessary to overcome Roseand Mishler thesis, and for this matter we suggest two elements which might affectthe performance of political parties in most post-communist countries: the limitedtransparency of the establishment and its reduced pace of incorporating contradictorysentiments. Additionally, we plan to integrate the warning forwarded by Daniel Barbuabout the fact that elections provide an incoherent mirroring between popular wishesand political representation, and, instead, each electoral scrutiny is in fact reproducingpartisan privileges8. Especially by assimilating this interpretation, we can betterunderstand that independents are severely affected by this inherent component of theRomanian political system and that their political performance is highly dependenton the electoral unattractiveness of the representatives of the main political parties.More precisely, this particular situation is best portrayed by the basic fact that, despitethe stigmatisation of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe as corrupt and

1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Nemira,

Bucureşti, 2008, p. 58.2 Tom GALLAGHER, Theft of a Nation… cit., p. 10.3 Alexandra IONA ŞCU, ”The Evolution of Parties Supporting Government Forms of

Patronage in Post-Communist Romania”, Sfera Politicii, no. 123-124, 2006, pp. 62-76.4 Dawn BRANCATI, ”Winning Alone...cit.”, pp. 648-662.5 Richard KATZ, ”The Dimensionality of Party Identification...cit.”, pp. 147-163.6 William MISHLER, Richard ROSE, ”Learning and Re-Learning Regime Support:

The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 41,no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-35.

7 According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey, political parties ranked next to last interms of public trust in institutions across most Eastern European countries. http://ec.europa.

eu/public_opinion/ (accessed on 15.03.2010).8 Daniel BARBU, ”Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy? The Intended Consequences of the2004 Romanian Elections”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005,pp. 9-17.



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unrepresentative bodies, independents scarcely managed to recuperate the lost groundin the last two decades of democratic transitioning. Correspondingly, the same authordefines the Romanian political system as “partidocracy”, cultivated by the list voteused until recently which rewarded political parties at the expense of small politicalactors1. At the level of the local administration this is highly visible, with little spaceleft to nonpartisan and opposition actors to exist, despite the variance of electoraltools used here. As already noticed, partisan pre-eminence is highly cherished withinthe establishment. Resulting from the preferential allocation of resources, this systemof patronage produced the migration of local elected representatives accordinglyto the best party in power – a system which at least formally was stopped by theemendation of the Law 393/2004 on the Statute of the Local Representatives2.

Nevertheless, the real power of local administration is given by decentralization;an imperfect one for the Romanian case, as it continues the administrative traditionset by communism which it tries to patch with local autonomy and public servicesdecentralization while neglecting the national setting3. This particular situation madelocal facilities such as education, public transport, roads, water, and sewerage, land-use planning, cultural and recreational facilities to be highly targeted by partisaninterests. Equally, local elections have become especially important in countries thatare experiencing, or have recently undergone, transition from authoritarian rule tomore open political systems, as the viability of local elections gives an impression onthe success of the general process of transitioning. However, how can we rightfullytest the efficacy local governance? Some authors propose we should check whetherthe issues of immediate relevance to citizens are debated and tackled. Equally,others believe minorities’ inclusion can rightfully serve as an indicator4. For thatmatter, we consider one indicator that should not be ignored for establishing theviability of local politics is the success of independent candidatures. But instead offormulating any hasty appreciation regarding the independents’ particular placewithin the Romanian local politics, we should keep in mind the basic fact that everyfour years the number of local administrative units increased5. This particular featurepromoted to the interests of political parties, helps as well independents competitorsin providing them with another chance to advance their candidatures. Yet, beforesystematically approaching the peculiarities of the Romanian political establishment,we consider utterly necessary to go through the general features of the system, allof which we believe to interfere with the political acceptance and performance ofindependent politicians. In Romania there are 41 administrative denominations, plusthe capital city. Bucharest has a distinct administrative arrangement, being divided

into six districts each with its own mayor and local council. The capital city is run bya general mayor and a general council. Each of the 41 counties has a governing body,the county council, with an average of 34 members which are being elected througha proportional representation system since 1996. Starting with the 2008 elections, the

1 Ibidem, pp. 148-150.2 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul…cit., p. 57.3 Ibidem, p. 54.4

Samuel HUMES, Eileen MARTIN, The Structure of Local Government: a Comparative Surveyof Eighty-one Countries, Internationa Unit of Local Authorities, The Hague, 1969, p. 34.5 Social-Democratic Institute, Raport supra alegerilor locale din România, SDI, Bucureşti,

2004, p. 4.



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president of the county council is elected as well throughout a uninominal scrutiny1.At the locality level, the local council is elected through a proportional representationsystem. Therefore, getting many votes is useless if not accompanied by belonging to themost significant coalition. Within this particular setting we might argue that politicalindependence is highly damaged, because of the rare occurrence of situations whereindependents win a majority of seats in the local councils. Consequently, winning aseat in the local council as independent requires significant bargaining skills in order toturn an individual position into that of an indispensible partner in coalitions. Anotherfair observation would be the basic fact that candidates for councillor positions arevisibly more obscure and face a low-profile position in the electoral campaign, despitethe importance of this office in forwarding local reforms.

Accordingly to the electoral law, the local public authorities which accomplishthe principles of local autonomy are the local councils as deliberative authoritiesand the mayoralties as forms of the executive power2. In each county a council isestablished with the purpose of cordoning the activities of the local authorities. Thevote expressed for local and county councils are considered to be highly politicaland the results of these particular levels of politics to be highly important for theresult of the parliamentary elections, as it provides the main political parties withtesting grounds for their electoral reach3. Within this particular setting, independentcandidatures are given little chance to occur, especially at the county level whereparties make tremendous efforts at pushing their candidates. For example, with themodifications brought to the electoral laws after 2004, the county level was hardlypenetrated by independents, with barely one mandate obtained at the last twoelections. The examples of the latest elections for county councils show us that onlya high-profile independent can successfully met the requirements for competing at

this level. Furthermore, the single independent county councillor elected for the 2008-2012 mandate decided to quit his independent coating and joined the ranks of themain political parties as a natural political move which best responds to his political beliefs4. So, we might rightfully ask why did he run as independent in the first place?According to his own statements independence was the only possible path for himat the time of the elections because his union affiliation interfered with his politicalcalling. In what concerns the recently introduced elected office of the president ofcounty council, it seemed to be virtually impossible for independents to accommodateon a short notice to such a demanding office. Therefore, independents which ran forthis seat in 2008 managed to get only 0.61% of the total number of votes and failed to

procure any mandate whatsoever. Comparatively, independence has occurred moresuccessfully within a particular local context: the mayoralties. As stated by the law,the head of the local administration is the mayor, which is elected through a popularvote. The local executive is being elected through a majority two-round system,similarly to that applied to presidential elections, with a vivid importance given to

1 Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina T ĂNĂSESCU, Drept constitu ţional şi institu ţii politice,C.H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 86.

2 Art. 21 Align 1, Law No. 215/ 2001 regarding the local public administration.3

Arnold FLEISCHMANN, Lana STEIN, ”Campaign Contributions...cit.”, pp. 673-689.4 ”Singurul independent din Consiliul Jude ţean Covasna s-a înscris în PSD”, Cotidianul,http://old.cotidianul.ro/singurul_independent_din_cj_covasna_s_a_inscris_in_psd-90608.html (accessed on 15.03.2010).



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individual characteristics such as the candidate’s background, social position andpersonal accomplishments to the disadvantage of political affiliation. These particularfeatures of mayoral competitions make room for smaller runners as compared to thosepermitted to successfully run in county and local councils.

Independency occurred throughout the past five electoral cycles in both urbanand rural communities, more developed or poorer localities, within ethnicallydivided and as well within more homogenous areas. Also, throughout the pasttwo decades, independence candidates running in local elections approached theirelectorates mentioning primarily some of the following issues on their electoralmaterials and in their public appearances: the necessity of administrative reforms,social issues, local economic development, and modernization of the infrastructure.Although designed with the immediate interests of the community in mind, the localelections were confronted during the past twenty year with a visible lowering ofthe electoral presence. With the exception of the first post-communist local electionswhen almost 65% of the total number of valid voters expressed their political will,

for the following four electoral cycles the presence stabilizes around 50%1

. At a firstsight, the low interest showed by the electorate as compared to the scores obtainedfor general elections would led us believe that the voters consider local polls to beless important than general elections and ignore that community-level politics mightdevelop unpredictable countless repercussions. But despite the marginalization oflocal elections, it became obvious after the June 2000 polls that the main politicalparties rely heavily on local level of politics to test their political strength. In the sameway, the enlarging of partisanships at the local level became even more poignantwith the stabilization of a few political parties which manage to get the majority oflocal mandates, at the expense of small political organizations and independents. For

example, for the last elections, 90% of the total number of mandates was granted tothe main parties, with barely 2 percent of the total number of candidates managingto win office independently. At this point, we consider that several characteristicsinherent within the establishment need to be highlighted in order to continue ourscrutiny on local independence. One of the most significant influencer was theintroduction of the electoral threshold of 5 percent right before the 2004 elections,which led to the reduction of the number of the represented parties at the local leveland also to an even more concentrated permeability for independent runner. Anequally important modification was the surfacing of the law on financing electoralendeavours and the reduction of the period reserved for campaigning from 45 to 30

days2

. We believe that these modifications posed further problems to smaller politicalactors and especially to non-parliamentary formations, because their reduced size andscarce resources makes it difficult to efficiently reach a vital segment of the electorate.Another highly common practice affecting independence is represented by the luring, blackmailing or even forcing elected officials to abandon their independent stance andto join a political party3. Independents might become subject to political constraining

1 Cf. data available on the webpage of Romanian Electoral Authority: http://roaep.ro/(accessed on 15.03.2010).

2

Ioan MURARU, Elena Simina T ĂNĂSESCU, Drept constitu ţional…cit., pp. 63-65.3 Sorina SOARE, ”Quels modèles partisans pour l’Europe Centrale et Orientale? Étudedes structures organisationnelles des partis politiques roumains”, Studia Politica. RomanianPolitical Science Review, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 21-48.



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especially in regions traditionally identified with partisan politics, where politicalformations are expected to pressure non-partisan mandate holders to join their ranksand to condition their access to public resources on their partisan adoption. Similarly,weak independent holders of mayoral office can be further affected by the oppositionof representatives of political parties, if the latter chose to back the partisan deputymayor to the disadvantage of non-partisan political actors. During their mandate,independents are highly expected to find themselves confronted with numerousother similar situations that will test the strength of their independence.

Several other aspects affecting the recurrence of independency within post-communist setting are to be discussed further. One of them would be the Hungarian-dominated regions in Romania. One might rightfully expect that in every localitywhere a majority of ethnic Hungarians is present, the representatives of DemocraticUnion of Hungarians in Romania to hold the monopoly. Without a clear-cut ideology,this political formation representing the interests of ethnic Hungarians in Romaniacontains numerous civic and cultural associations and organizations as well as severalChristian-democratic political parties. The Union passed all five post-communistelectoral tests and was co-opted in all governmental coalitions established after 1996,as result of its successful ethnic mobilization practices. Drawing its substance fromthe nationalist tensions of the beginning of the 1990s and with a faithful electorate,the Union managed to get about 150 mayor’s office, 2500 local councillor positionsand about 130 county councillors throughout the last five post-communist electoralpolls. At its first European scrutiny, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romaniagot 2 mandates and one of its most prominent members running as independentmanaged to get a nomination for the European Parliament1. With the county councilsvisibly dominated by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania in Harghitaand Covasna, it would seem equally true this control to be maintained for mayor’soffice2. Nevertheless, accordingly to the available figures one can rightfully saythat precisely in the regions inhabited predominantly by Magyar ethnic a highernumber of independent politicians managed to get into office as compared to theother parts of the country. This observation can equally be applied to other countieswhere Hungarians are present, such as Mureş, Satu Mare, Bihor, Sălaj, Cluj andArad3. Therefore, it is highly necessary to investigate these recurrences further andto find out precisely what motivates independency in this particular area. Anothercharacteristic of the Romanian political system which is present to a higher degree atthe local level is clearly the intersection of politics and Orthodoxy. With the clericalstructures intertwining with the modern state since the latter’s inception, the Easterninterpretation of Christianism is a significant public manifestation to be confused withthe democratic exigencies4. With structural traces originating in the Byzantine epoch,the Orthodox Church strengthened its administrative connections to the Romanianstate up to modern times and developed its institutional strength based on a collectivenational character5. During the communist era and afterwards, the Church treated

1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul…cit., pp. 223-224.2 Ibidem, pp. 165-166.3

Stan STOICA, Dic ţionarul partidelor politice...cit., pp. 105-108.4 Daniel BARBU, ”Can Democracy Be its Own Enemy?...cit.”, pp. 282-283.5 IDEM, ”Etica ortodox ă şi spiritul românesc”, in IDEM (coord.), Firea românilor, Nemira,

Bucureşti, 2000, p. 80.



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its followers’ religious intimacies as if they were of public and even of state interest 1.Denying the secular character of the Romanian state, the Romanian Orthodoxyadvances its practices in each and every corner of the society and this is highly visibleat the local level where the clergy represent one of the main focal points2. And exactlypolitical independence was targeted by the representatives of the Church, especiallyas they cannot find themselves in any partisan or confrontational circumstances whichwould lead to the secularization of the religious time and would risk the particularplace reserved to the Church within the social order. Precisely because in traditionallocal confines the priest represents not only a moral authority but also an importantlocal figure, political involvement of the church’s clergy seemed more than a naturaloutcome. Still, what motivates these priests’ political independent endeavours in thefirst place? Is simply a likely extension of the church entanglement with the state?Or is it more about personal motivations of the clergy itself? We will attempt tosatisfy these academic enquiries departing from the explanations provided by theprotagonists themselves. It is now time to evaluate the performances of independentpoliticians in the particular setting proposed by the recent local elections in Romaniaand to assess their evolution throughout the post-communist decades. In the followinganalysis, we will be guided by the considerations introduced previously, having inmind the theoretical framework proposed in the first part of our scrutiny. Therefore,we shall voice equally the importance of the votes won by independent contendersthroughout the past two decades, as well as individual analyses of the independentswhich engaged in the most recent local electoral competition that took place in post-communist Romania. A separate focus will be built around independent politicianswho ran and managed to win these elections, approached comparatively from theperspective of the previously announced themes.

Current Status of Political Independencein a Post-Communist Setting

Before starting with our analysis on the situation of independents at the locallevel of post-communist Romanian politics, we should take into considerationseveral aspects relating to the particular dynamics of our study. Firstly, we cannotsimply aggregate the available data as we would mistakenly be led to an improperunderstanding of independent politics. We also consider that a full evaluation of the

recurrences of independency should go beyond the strictly electoral phase and tacklethe need for separate approach in the competition for county councils, local councilsand mayoralties. Moreover, we should not overrate the predominance of politicalparties as well as we should escape the attraction towards a heroic interpretationof independent candidacy. And not last, an analysis focused on the local politics ishighly dependent on the particular arrangements that are in place at that level, whichshould be best understood by comparing them with similar institutions active all overEastern Europe. Having the above-mentioned observations in mind, we should start

1

IDEM, Republica absentă – politic ă şi societate în România postcomunistă , 2nd

ed., Nemira,Bucureşti, 2004, p. 287.2 Olivier GILLET, “Religion et politique dans les Balkans. Les enjeux contemporains”,

Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 269-277.



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our investigation from the crude picture implied by the popularity of independentsin local politics all throughout the country. The appended tables present the electoralperformance of independent candidates that won at least one mandate in any of the fivepost-communism polls organized locally in Romania. What we first observe is the factthat, with every new electoral cycle, fewer independents managed to fruitfully advancetheir candidature. In 2008 we reached a situation where only 56 mayor mandates wereobtained nationwide by independents, 358 independent candidates got a nominationas local councillor, and barely one independent became county councillor whereasno successful independent candidature was possible for the position of president ofthe county council1. This situation seems somewhat problematic if it were to compareit to the numbers of the first post-communist elections, when 22.4% of mayoraltiesand 6.54% of the local councils belonged to independents. Some explanations for thissituation were advanced previously, when we mainly referred to the certain settingspecific to the beginnings of the Romanian democracy and to scarce consolidation ofthe political parties. In the next segment of our examination we intend to offer further

clarifications on the abrupt declining of the magnitude of independence in the localpost-communist politics, especially by integrating the views independents themselveshave on the matter. Then again, by comparing the latest scores with the ones from theperiod of democratic stabilization, we can fully assess that independence is degradingwith each electoral cycle in Romania. We should now question what truly motivatesthose scarce numbers of independent to forward their candidacy, even within thisrestrictive electoral setting.

When studying independence at the local level, one has to bear in mind thatlocal elections are chiefly about small electoral competitions. But nevertheless, withinthis micro electoral setting, a visibly greater importance is given to bigger cities and

particularly to residence cities. Unlike smaller political units, independents competingfor the open positions in bigger localities need to mobilize a larger number of votersand are more exposed to media and partisan attacks. From our available data itwould seem that big local political units represent the most vulnerable spots for localindependency, with eight towns, four county residences and one of Bucharest sectorscaptured in 2004 and barely five cities, one county residence and the office of thegeneral-mayor in 20082. Even as we should expect a worsening of these scores withthe coming elections, we consider them being more about circumstantial occurring.By far, the most noticeable incidence of independence at the top tier of local politicsis represented by partisan derails. The most striking example of counterfeited

independence is that of a former social democrat which ran as independent candidatefor the office of mayor of one of the six Bucharest district after his exclusion from hisparty due to allegations of corruption. After winning the office from the first round, ata comfortable 27% margin he returned to his party3. This example does not entail thatin bigger communities independence is less articulate or truthful or that more visiblepolitical units might turn into favourable grounds for façade independence. Instead,what we can observe is the smaller penetration of independents in larger localities,

1 See Appendix: Table 1 – Mandates Won by Independents at the Local Elections (1992-2008).2

See Appendix: Map 1 – Political Independence across Romania after June 2008 LocalElections.3 Mihaela AVRAM, ”Marian Vanghelie se întoarce în PSD”, BBC Romanian, http://bbc.

co.uk/romanian/news/story/2004/06/040629_vanghelie_psd.shtml (accessed on 12.04.2010).



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which might be explainable by the difficulty of covering such a large circumscription.We now consider opportune to propose and test the validity of a differentiation between partisan, intermediate and non-partisan circumscriptions, defining thelatter as political places where independents gain from the first electoral turn. Highlypartisan circumscriptions can be defined as where either no independent candidaturewas ever advanced or no independent candidate manages to reach the second round.From observing the available data, we can easily argue that localities in the centre andNorthern part of the country are more open to independent candidatures, whereasthe Western and North-Eastern parts are generally sporadic hosts for independency,with communities situated in the South-West allowing little penetration. We considerthese situations as a measure of the local context and socio-economic attributes, withmore developed places showing an increased rate of approval for independents.Also the ethnic component plays an important role, with ethnically divided regionsallowing to a greater extent independency to happen. One major observation thatis mandatory to be made now would be that, despite its low scores, independencecan be characterized by continuity at the local stage of post-communist politics.Palpable manifestations of steady independence can be identified in those regionswhere the electorate prefers non-partisan actors with each election, no matter theirpersona. This is the case of several localities in the county of Covasna (Ilieni, Ojdula,and Sânzieni) and Harghita (Brădeşti, Păuleni-Ciuc). Offices repeatedly won by thesame independent candidate as is the case of two localities in the county of Satu Mare,Certeze and Livada represent another particular manifestation of interdependency-prone places.

There are a number of ways in which independents can be conceptualised andcategorized, some of clearly drawing upon and relating to classification of politicalplayers at national level such as ideology or electoral magnitude. We purposely

ignored such a classification because it little served the interest of our scrutiny ofindependence understood as purposed avoidance of party labels by politicians.Instead, we proposed a distinct categorization, namely one that would allow us todistinguish true independents, which propose their candidatures autonomous of anyexternal inferences and have no history of partisan activity. Secondly, we can identifyrecycled independents, a variety more commonly met in post-communist politics as theyusually emerge from failed partisanships being former members of political partieswhich decided to ditch partisan affiliation and pursue their political career solitarily.Another subtype of independence is represented by faux independents, which can be easily distinguished from the other two kinds due to its dependency on outside

support. This third variety largely represents a perverted type of independence, andrefers to any politician that publicly denies any connection to any political party, butin fact, he or she represents the interests of that party locally. Another variant, that belongs more to the partisan spectre, is represented by party members who distancethemselves severely from party line. This last category was essentially ignored by ourstudy, as its members essentially belong to a political party and have fallen out withthe party whether over a matter of principle or on other conjectural grounds for shortperiods of time. These breeds of independence are essentially visible in the Romanianlocal politics, with certain kinds being more represented than others depending uponthe characteristics of the corresponding electoral moment. For example, we might

consider that the highest degree of genuine independence occurred after the firstpost-communist electoral cycle, with more and more recycled independents makingtheir appearance with each new electoral moment. This general overview should



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permit us to advance our analysis to the next step. Our primary findings indicate thatindependent-driven politics is possible at local level for a variety of reasons. One ofthem would be the growing discontent with the major parties, manifested particularlythrough a sentiment that political parties prolong corruption and wastefulness. Morethan anywhere else in the establishment, voters are in search of more alternatives, asconsequence of their discontent in the mainstream parties coupled with a fundamental

erosion of faith in political parties themselves. The need to solve pressing issues bringsthe electorate closer to the person which is best fitted for that job, no matter his or herspolitical affiliation. Voting mechanisms, electoral conditions and a candidate’s financialresources play a large role in determining how well an independent candidate can doat the polls. Equally, frustration towards political parties can be observable on the sideof the politicians, which might turn to independency as their last resort. On the otherhand, independent attitudes can be also favoured by the intrinsic determination ofcertain political actors to help their community.

For distinguishing the impact of political followership we compared the totalnumber of votes expressed in local election with number of votes obtained by

independent candidates. We then compared this data with the nationwide performanceof independents during the past five electoral cycles. Several implications can bedrawn from the figures we analysed. Firstly, it becomes clear that the success ofindependent contenders diminishes with each election. Hence, there appears thequestion why this happened – and the most plausible explanations seem to be thefact that independence faces financial hardships coming from highly centralizedgovernance. Also determinant for the weakening of independents’ scores is the furthermaturing and strengthening of the partisan system. Second, the data at hand suggeststhat the independent tag has substantial effects on the structure of local vote, whichnevertheless remains dependent on the broader aspects populating the establishment.

In particular, there seems to be a significant voting bias in favour of medium educatedcandidates coming generally from technical backgrounds. This situation can be bestexplained by looking into the broader composition of the local administration, wherewe could easily observe the recurrence of similar profiles1. Before going furtherwith our analysis, it is necessary to say that exceptions are possible, and might befurthermore promoted by the importance accorded by the voters to the personalcriteria.

In our attempt to profile independents in local elections we selected severalvariables to represent personal characteristics (educational level, professional background etc.), political resources (the type of rhetoric employed, incumbency) and

political success of this type of political contenders. We further addressed the interviewmaterial and additionally available data through the lenses of certain main themes weconsidered helpful for answering our research questions. Among these themes, wereserved considerable space for clarifying what motivates independence at the locallevel, what might be the advantages and the disadvantages of independent politics,how independents approach their electorate and manage to sponsor their campaign,their particular situation in office, their relation with partisan politics and theirpropensity towards re-election. Analysing the data gathered we come to the followingcandidate profiling of independents in local elections for the period at hand. In terms ofpersonal characteristics, independents tend to be male (95%), mainly Orthodox (70%),

1 Şerban OLAH, Elitele locale, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 317.



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middle aged (mean of 54 years), both Romanian and Hungarian ethnics (one third),originating from rural areas of the country (9 out of 10), more likely not to be collegeeducated, nor to hold an advanced degree. By profession independents originategenerally from technical specialities, and usually have had their own business priorto advancing their candidacy. He or she is more likely to count the advantages ofincumbency, and to have a limited access to financial resources, most of which comefrom personal sources, and from business partners or close friends.

But let us take a closer look at a general profile of independence by going throughsome of the profiles of independents interviewed. We consider that the best meansfor approaching individual situations of independence which occurred at the lastelectoral cycle would be to integrate them within the general framework of thisexamination. In order to provide this study with the greatest possible perspectiveon the background of independence in post-communist times and at the same timeto better understand how does independence truly manifests itself nowadays, weinterviewed independent politicians in office, randomly selected from all over thecountry. In designing the selections needed for research, we made sure that our choice

to represent best how independence is currently distributed across Romania, withmore attention given to those spaces where independence is more visible. Firstly, asstated before, what could best motivate politicians to run as independents might betheir failure to procure a party nomination. Comparatively, as our findings show, mostindependent candidates previously did seek for party nomination, this being especiallytrue for politicians in counties controlled by the Democratic Union of Hungariansin Romania. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that independence can also bemotivated by the expulsion from partisan ranks. Secondly, as is the case for an equallysignificant part of independents, independence is expressly preferred in turn to partycandidacy. This is largely possible thanks to the electoral system which is in place at

local level, which permits independent candidatures. Nonetheless, in order to furtherapproach what motivates independence at the local level, we must turn our attentionto what independents themselves say about their particular situation. To begin with,independence can be triggered by the detachment from partisan politics. B.T. from alocality in Covasna said he chose to run as independent because he never felt closeto any political party. L.O., running for the first time as independent in 2008 in alocality in the Iasi County, said he sought for change within his community and alsowanted that corrupted politics which was proffered by a ”partisan clan” in the lasttwenty years to stop. The same mistrust in and dissatisfaction with partisan politicswas accused by the mayor of an important town in Maramureş, P.V., which advanced

his independent candidature for the first time in June 2008. Another independentvoice originating from the Braşov County told us he ran because ”[political parties]are all the same” (I.B.). Originating from a rural community in Satu Mare, C.P. says heseized the opportunity as he saw that the electorate in his locality is disappointed bypartisan politics and decided to run independently. Asked what he thinks about hiscounter-candidate which also assumed independency, he told us that his competitordid it as the last resort, being unable to mobilize the support of any political party.On the other hand, the mayor of a locality in the Covasna County, B.E., said he ran asindependent as a measure of his trust in politics: ”If politics is truly fair, it should notmatter if I belong to a party or not”. Other type of rhetoric we encountered among

independents was one that explains independence in terms of popular demand. Forexample, L.G. from the Vaslui County considers his independent candidacy to be theresult of the wishes expressed by the people in his community. A former member of



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a political party, F.C. agrees with this: ”It was not me; the community pushed me torun as independent”. M.M., after three mandates as mayor of an important city inHarghita, described himself as different from ”those independents which have passedthrough seven or eight parties”. M.M. also says he feels proud about the fact he neverwas member of a political party and it was the people that helped him decide tostand as independent. C.B., an independent from Cluj at his first mandate said thathis independent candidature was motivated by the annoyance he felt towards the backwardness of his locality. Another independent from Covasna County said hefelt he was capable to do something to help his locality, but did not want ”to workin the interest of the parties”. Previously identified as top motivators for politicalindependence, failed partisanships are also recurrent in practice. Several examplesare required. F.I. from Covasna ran as independent in June 2008 after previously beingvice-mayor of the locality on behalf of a political party. On the other hand, originatingfrom a locality in the Cluj County, another independent considers that unfair politicshe experienced during his previous four mandates as representative of a political partymade him engage independently (S.I.). He wished to measure his political performance

as compared to that of his former party, especially as he lost his support right beforethe elections. Another example of failed partisanship turned independence is that ofS.E., who after previously representing a political party, was not summoned to runagain in 2008. Therefore he had to stand as independent. A similar situation was met by M.A., which had two mandates on behalf of a political party before advancinghis candidature in 2008 as independent because of a misunderstanding with hisformer partisan supporters. With a quitted partisan adherence, A.B. thinks that whatmotivated his independence was the fact he did not wanted to be under the controlof a political party. During his partisan experience, A.B. admitted to have witnessedsome unfair happenings which provoked his independence. Oppositely, L.Z. from

Harghita held the office of mayor as representative of a political party, but decidedin 2008 to quit his partisan allegiance: ”I never dropped my ideological legacy” headded. After a failed candidature on behalf of a partisan structure, P.I. admitted hiscandidature as independent in June 2008 was motivated by the fact he could not getthe nomination from one of the political parties. L.S. ran as independent incidentally,as he decided to late in order to procure a party’s nomination. Running his campaignhe found out that was the best choice, especially as the voters seemed to manifesttheir disapproval with all political parties. Another frequent situation we met wasthat represented by politicians who continued to remain in office after the fall ofcommunism as independent mayors, especially because they already accumulated

certain renown in their locality and also developed all their needed local connections before 1990s. Ironically, one of them who won in June 2008 his fifth mandate asindependent said he was not interested to subsume himself to party politics as heknew what that means and it was the people who asked him to return.

”I have a bad opinion about partisan life, they [politicians] follow by allmeans the interests of the party and their own interests. The moment they getelected they forget what they’ve promised because the parties lack the strategiesneeded to develop local communities”



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continued this independent (A.C., Călăraşi County). Another case of communist-supported independence is that of P.R., who considers that, because he was a high-profile figure before 1989 in the locality, he won the mandate as vice-mayor in 2004and the mayor’s office in 2008.

Other politicians chose independence as their only available alternative – this being the case of B.D., a civil servant in Covasna, as the law does not allow civilservants to be part of political parties1. Similarly, following his participation in anon-governmental organization that mediated between centre politics and localadministration, B.B. decided to run as independent, especially as he was unableto identify a political party that could best answer his political plans. Then again,political independence seems to serve as an important political tool in ethnicallyheterogeneous areas, permitting otherwise marginal voices to successfully forwardtheir candidature. Independent mayor of a city in Satu Mare for the fourth time, S.I.said he chose the independent path as he did not want to hurt the feelings of any ofthe inhabitants of the locality, no matter their ethnic origin. In the same way, M.R.decided to run as independent in June 2008 because he saw it as the only possibilityto get into office in a community controlled by ethnic Magyars:

”The people told me that my only chance is to run independent becausethey were fed up with the promises they received from political parties”.

Orthodoxy and independence seems to be highly compatible, with numerouspriests and small local clergy getting involved in politics using the independent label.Asking G.B., a priest which got re-elected four times as independent in the Argeş County what motivates him to run, we received this blunt answer:

”After forty years of service as a priest, I decided in 1996 to continueto work for the people even as a retiree. Everybody asked me to do it and,without thinking, I got elected. Clearly the fact that I was the priest helped mycandidature”.

He then added that, if he were to run again, he will follow his independency, because he thinks ”as mayor I’m not allowed to get involved in any political party, I playgame of the people not that of the politicians”. Another priest that ran independentlyin 2008, N.G., said his clerical belonging does not permit him to participate in any

political party. Instead, he also acted as independent local councillor before advancinghis candidature for the mayor’s office. Reaching this point in our analysis, we canrightfully say that, for what concerns the local level of post-communist Romanianpolitics, independence has multiple motivations. For numerous independents, theirparticular profile came either because they never identified with a political party, eitheras reaction to the will of the people, either provoked by quitted partisan allegiance, by mistrust in the political system, either by the ethnical context, either because otheroptions were not possible or as particular manifestation for revamped communistorigins.

1 Art. 40 Align 3, The Constitution of Romania, http://cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339,(accessed on 15.03.2010).



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For what concerns their attitude towards partisan arrangements, independentpoliticians seem to share the opinion that the party politics are profoundly rotten.One candidate which now is at his fourth mandate considered that ”it’s hard, it’sextremely hard for us [independents], as the others [partisan politicians] know howto lie and steal” (G.B., Argeş County). Another one added ”let them fight in their ownway” (L.O., Iaşi). L.Z. said that the political system is a chaos at the present momentand the local administration is the worst affected by the lack of vision and improperorganization. Also, he believes that repeated conflicts among political parties havedeceived and estranged the electorate. On the other hand, P.V. thinks politicians are best examples of dilettantism. Comparatively, N.G. believes that first and foremostthe laws need to be respected, and, despite what should ideally happen, politicalparties attempt to evade the control of lawful institutions by all possible means. P.I.thinks that, in partisan politics, everybody cares about his own interest. M.R. believes”[partisan politicians] are all the same, they don’t wish to budge a thing”. Equally,independents see a minimal role for political parties. Some said political partiesshould mind their own business, other considered parties to lack clear-cut ideologiesleading to political derails. Another voice thinks political parties are cliques broughttogether by personal interests, where everybody expects something in return. A.C.from Călăraşi says he feels he doesn’t belong to partisan politics, as he despises beingcontrolled by and serving the interests of political parties. The same independent toldus that political parties are determined by vanity and he provided us with the exampleof the local council in his locality where an independent was chosen as vice-mayoronly because political parties could not agree whom to name from their own ranks.B.E., an independent from Covasna at his first mandate, considers political partiesshould rethink their role within the society because ”they’re getting more and moreirrelevant by the day”. Likewise, after a previous experience with a political partyand from his position as independent, F.I. considers that parties should reform theircurrent place within the society and start to promote in the first place correctness,Christian values, and morality. B.D., another independent from Covasna, said he seesthe main political parties as being extremely powerless and inefficient in their effortsto serve the citizens. Coming also from a Hungarian-dominated locality, A.B. said itmore bluntly:

”Present-day politics is a disaster, and this is why I believe the role of theindependents to grow with the passing of time, especially because of the weakpolitical performance generally displayed by the Romanian political class”.

A rare independent voice in the Sibiu County, B.B. considers that our politicalsystem is still in its infancy, as ”they [political parties] yet have to define their long-termintentions and values”. Similarly, S.E. thinks political parties should quit developingtheir clientele and instead support the growth of local communities. P.R. said thatpolitical parties grow interested only before electoral moments, and thereafter theyignore local politics until next elections. N.G. admits he is quite upset on the politicalparties because politicians are not taking their job seriously and they only criticize and blame one another without providing any solutions. Henceforth, because partisanpolitics is seen as corrupt, lacking long-term vision, being characterized by frailorganization, internal conflicts, clientelism, inefficiency, independents associate itwith a marginal role within the society. In the same way, sympathizing with political



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parties seems to remain generally a taboo for local independents. Among those whoagreed to convey their political preferences, one priest elected as independent saidhumorously that he does sympathize with other politicians, because ”I baptized themall” (G.B., Argeş). Another independent from Cluj admitted his sympathy for theecologist movement (C.B.). Similarly, one independent from a traditionally Magyarmajoritarian county, admitted straightforwardly his sympathies (F.I., Covasna).Another ethnic Magyar, S.E., admitted his partisan sympathy, but accuses thatparty to have ignored him. Most independents consider that electoral campaignsare highly problematic events for their independency, especially as they lack theprofessional and material contributions a party usually provides its candidates with.Nevertheless, some also accuse political parties of interfering with the electorate inan illegal manner, by attempting to change their political will via bribes, and variousother small gifts. In general, electoral campaigning at the local level poses smallerproblems, especially as the financial effort is expected to decrease accordingly to thesize of the circumscription. Mayor of a small city in Harghita, M.M. said he ran all histhree electoral campaigns without much effort, with just few banners and posters,despite the heavy mobilization of the political parties against him. Similarly, F.C. saidhis posters kept disappearing, and he believes political parties are to be blamed forthat. Also at his first mandate, N.C. admits to have faced a difficult campaign dueto the unfair fight waged by the former mayor. L.S. faced in the second tour of theelections the opposition of all local political parties. Similarly, P.I. said advancing hiscandidature was highly difficult because of the attacks coming from political parties.Then again, P.V. believes the attacks he was confronted with originating from politicalparties are natural, as everybody wishes to win.

Oppositely, C.B. admits he escaped any interference from the political parties basically because nobody expected him to represent a threat. He adds ”to be honest,my campaign was quite obscure, just a few posters. Nevertheless, I had a closerelation with most of the people here”. B.D. admits he underwent a similar path, ashe invested little in his campaign and relied greatly on his familiarity with the people.Others used their quitted ”political colouring” hoping to impress the electorate. Forexample, owing his fame to his former three mandates as representative of a politicalparty, one candidate did not even displayed electoral posters in June 2008 (S.I., SatuMare). M.R. admits he was known by many people in the community because hehad the advantage to have previously worked in the mayoralty since 1995 as a civilservant. Formerly a member of a political party, S.E. believes that the most difficult ofthe campaign was to raise the signatures. On the other hand, he enjoyed the support

of some small businesses which paid for his campaign materials. As a matter of fact,most rurally-based independents did not procure professional services for promotingtheir image during the electoral campaign and simply limited to printing theirown posters and leaflets. N.G., a priest from Maramureş, said he ran his campaignwithout telling any bad words about his counter candidates. N.G. further added thathe financed his campaign himself with the help of some close friends as he did notwish to become tributary to others. Nevertheless, during the 2008 electoral campaignhe spotted material bribes coming from political parties, especially targeting poorerpeople easily to persuade: ”The voters are selling their vote because they are hopelessabout their situation”.

A.B. acknowledges as well to have enjoyed the support of some local sponsors,specifically because ”the independent candidate has to do everything, nobody helpshim”. Enjoying the support of his friends, B.B. raised the needed signatures and



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distributed his electoral materials. Comparatively, B.B. considers that the greatest costof his campaign was the time spent meeting the electorate. P.I. said the highlights ofhis electoral campaign were represented by two gatherings, together with the classicalmeans of campaigning (banners, posters, leafleting etc.). Mainly, local electoralcampaigning in the case of independents is characterized by the little importanceaccorded to political label as compared to the personal traits of candidates, by the

reliance on private contributions, limited inference of professional techniques, togetherwith bonuses accorded by incumbency and by a previously established high-profilepresence. For independents, the problems involved with financing their electoralcampaigns differ accordingly to the independents’ personal material power and tothe level and magnitude of the circumscription; with larger ones being more difficultto cover and requiring added investments. One candidate previously supported by apolitical party said he feels the lack of party money, as ”nobody is willing to contributeto an independent’s campaign” (S.E., Satu Mare). On the other hand, F.I. adds thathe financed his campaign from half of his monthly salary. B.T. thinks that in smalllocalities independents are helped by the fact ”everybody knows everybody else” and

do not require large investments in the electoral campaign. F.C. said something similar,considering that money was not that important for his campaign, instead what he believes to have been crucial are the personal contacts he established with the voters.Most of the independents interviewed which originate from the business environmentface an easier challenge, as they can finance their campaign themselves. For example,L.O. said he financed his campaign from his own pocket. P.V. did the same, being anadministrator of a private business. B.E from the Covasna County identified closefriends with businesses as his main financial supporters, whom contributions addedto the money he invested personally. Especially those with numerous mandates wonas independents say they do not need an expensive campaign, as they proposal issimple, being centred on their familiarity: ”This is me; this is what I can do” saidproudly A.C. from Călăraşi. Being largely known in the locality, M.A. admits he onlycopied few of his old posters and distributed them. L.Z., a former mayor on behalf ofa political party now turned independent admits he continues to somewhat enjoy thesupport of that party, but the money needed for the electoral campaign were providedfrom his own personal savings. Hence, financing independents’ campaigns is largelycharacterized by the lack of public subsidies, which are compensated by donationsoriginating from private supporters such as friends, small businesses and businesspartners. Equally, we should notice that incumbency lowers the costs involved withrunning local campaigns, and also in the case of local independents money can be lessimportant than personal contacts.

Few independents seem to really understand the advantages of their position.Some consider themselves exceptions: I.B., an independent at his first mandatehaving scarce partisan background, thinks that, because of the instability of thegeneral establishment, independency offers added stability and autonomy duringparty reshuffling. ”Being in normal relations with everybody else” seems to be highlyneeded for the performance of independency as the same politician thinks, because”otherwise [belonging to a political party] might imperil the access to informationand funds at times“. Similarly, B.B., L.G., and C.P. consider that independents bear theadvantage of being able to address any institution and political party, as long as hepresents himself as somebody who wishes to do something for his community. ”Not

being under the control or at the command of anybody” is seen as the main advantage by one independent originating from partisan politics. Originating from Covasna,B.D. provided us with an extremely positive outlook on independence after two years



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of his first mandate as independent mayor, saying that he found no disadvantage toindependence and added he received all the needed funds, despite his lack of partisanallegiance: ”I cannot say that being independent is helping me as I can’t say it affects mymandate”. Still, it might be argued that this particular case, the independent benefitedfrom his ethnic common denominator with the representatives of the dominant partyin the county. With a similar optimist stance, M.M. considers that independents

are more credible in the eyes of the electorate. Additionally, L.Z. considers that inlocal politics, the party matters less, and the electorate is mostly interested in thepersonal traits of the candidate, and this particular situation helps independence. Allin all, independence offers politicians constancy no matter the partisan coating of thegoverning body, it gives the ability to equally address institutions indifferent of theirpolitical fidelities, and might proliferate electoral trustworthiness.

The political allocation of money is seen as one of the top disadvantages by ourinterviewed independents. This situation was radically described by one independentpreviously elected four times on behalf of a political party, as he compared his currentsituation with the period when he was aided by his party: ”If you don’t belong to a

political party, nobody takes you serious” (M.A., Timiş). But for other independents,this is hardly the case as they might find themselves under the spotlight; either asthis would mean accusations coming from partisan competitors. A conflicting countycouncil endangers even more independency, as it can interfere with the allocationof resources. P.V. believes that the main problem faced by independents is that theyhardly can make themselves heard, because administration is highly politicized.S.E. agrees to this position, as he believes independents are highly dependent on thewill of the governing party and that of the president of the county council. The lackof the support of a political party is accused by B.T. as one of the most importantshortcomings independents have to face, especially as he needs to accommodate the

interests of various representatives of political parties. M.M., a Romanian mayor inHarghita believes the disadvantages of independence are even worst in his case, asthe particular arrangements of the area act against him: ”It’s not easy to work with acouncil entirely subsumed politically, and it requires compromising, diplomacy andpatience”. On the other hand, another independent from Covasna considers that thelocal council poses little problem to independent as long as everybody acts to the bestinterest of the community (F.C.). An independent mayor from the Călăraşi Countysees no major advantages in assuming independence, but he believes “independentscontinue to be treated as pariah” (A.C.). C.B. accuses interference from top politicians,as he received numerous calls to mind his own business. Comparatively, S.I. from

the Cluj County remains confident about the disadvantages of independence as heconsiders good politicians can turn them to their own advantage. He tells us thatthe only problems he met when forwarding his projects were caused by incompletepapers, which he later remediate. Discriminated against when they need to receivepublic funds, more prone to partisan attacks and encountering difficulties in accessinghighly politicized structures are seen as the main disadvantages of independency –nevertheless, independents managed to survive them while, even more, being ableto complete their projects. The success of their projects depends on whether they areat their first mandate or they enjoyed re-election. In rural areas, most independentstake pride in their ability to complete projects such as water supply, ecologic trashmanagement and disposal, sewerage systems, infrastructure, tourist and leisure zones,modernization of roads, schools, gas supplies, control of pollution in agriculture andrehabilitation of green spaces, whereas independents which serve as mayors of both



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small towns and municipalities believe restoration of historic buildings, parkingspaces, expansion of touristic places, ameliorating of existing infrastructure to beamong their top achievements. Most of the independents we interviewed said theyrely greatly on attracting European funds for completing their projects, and equallyfeel the interference of parties which hope to control as much funds as possible forhelping their own members. G.B., an independent at his fourth mandate, said that

”I have too many projects to count, all totalizing about 30 million euros”. Also athis fourth mandate as independent, S.I. said he never asked for the help of politicalparties, but he nevertheless got numerous sponsorships through various sourcessuch as Sapard or Phare. In completing their assumed projects, independents usuallyare confronted with a partisan-dominated local council, with scarce cases when anindependent mayor is able to cooperate with an independently-driven local council.For example, M.A. said he feels the lack of independents in the local council, and he blames this situation on the electoral law which favours the candidates of politicalparties: ”Independents had 70-80 votes and those who won a mandate as localcouncillors on behalf of political parties had barely 30”. Others admitted bluntly the

fact that their independence is provoking the opposition of local councillors, whichrefuse to cooperate. P.V. says he believes that the difficulties he faced were provoked by the fact he lacks the party brand. M.R. highlights an aversive situation withinthe local council, with his opponent from the second round of the 2008 electionsprovoking numerous fights. He believes that with the next elections, people will electmore independent local councillors, in order to avoid such situations. In contrast, onemayor with a history of no less than five mandates told us he manages to limit the localcouncil by explaining each project in detail and making them realise it has to be madefor the interest of the people (A.C., Călăraşi). Similarly, F.I. considers that his relationswith the county and the local council were aided by his previous participation in

local partisan politics. Three of the interviewed mayors from Covasna told us thatthey equally enjoy the help of independents and that of partisan representatives inthe local council, especially thanks to the heterogeneous composition of the council.A.B. thinks that thanks to his previous experience as member of a political party hecollaborates quite well with the local and county institutions. N.G. said he did not feelto be put aside as independent, and he maintains a good relation with the presidentof the county council and with the central administration. Also, P. I. said that whatmatters most in developing good relations with the political parties is the way theproblems are being addressed: ”Talking nicely helps a lot”.

Asked if they sought re-election, independents provided us with contrasting

answers. Some said they barely wait to finish their mandate and escape the pressuresof independency. For example, one independent said that he spends the greatest partof his mandate in courts and paying administrative penalties, as he is being sued bythe local councillors belonging to the political parties (G.B., Argeş County). L.O., anindependent which managed to obtain an office in a locality that belonged for thepast twenty years to various representatives of political parties, said that the formermayors have filled trials against him. Therefore, he added he barely wishes to finishhis mandate because he feels he cannot handle it anymore. Also disappointed withthe way independents are seen in Romania, several other independents (M.A., P.R.)confessed they will not attempt re-election. Faced with the burdens of independence,

one independent with deep partisan legacies admitted that he will most probablyreturn to party politics, but this time as part of another formation (M.A., Timiş). I.B.,an independent from Braşov County, said that depending upon the general situation



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near the time of the elections, he will decide if he maintains his independent labelor will go for a partisan ticket. Others said that, keeping in mind their success asindependents, they will most probably maintain their label. Confidents in theirpolitical future as independents, B.D. M.R. and P.I. said they will most probably runagain in 2012, particularly as they already have some finished projects to take pridein. We encountered this belief in the reconfirmation of their independence mostlyfrom politicians originating from Covasna, Harghita, Mureş. L.Z, A.B, and F.C. fromHarghita, and B.B. from Sibiu also believe they will ran again in the 2012 elections,as long as they manage to successfully finalize most of their political promises. Allthings considered, the label of political independence will most probably stick tothose politicians that were most successful in advancing their political programmes,and to those which will run in those places predisposed to independence, whereasfailed partisanships turned independent will most probably generate futurepartisanships. Partisan reconversion is therefore a matter of circumstantial occurring,with independence diminishing with each election its desirability.

Despite their dominance of the establishment, political parties seem tocontinuously make efforts to attract independents within their ranks. Several voices,especially those who failed to catch a party nomination in the first place and thosewho have encountered resilient partisan pressures during their mandate admit notto exclude the possibility to ultimately enter a political party. A.B., former memberof a political party, elected as independent in June 2008 admits that political partieshave made him some offers, and ”now after half of mandate has been consumedand thinking in perspective, it’s highly probable I will join their ranks again”. L.O.on the other hand admitted directly he wishes to join a certain party, especially ashe feels the need to ”receive protection from unfair attacks”. ”I sell myself for thecommunity – I don’t believe this would mean deceiving their belief in me especially

if this helps us reaching visible results” argued one independent from Cluj. B.E., anindependent at his first mandate from Covasna, P.V., mayor of an urban locality inMaramureş, P.I. from the rural parts of Maramureş, S.E. from Satu Mare and C.B.from Cluj say they were approached by several political parties, but they thought thatnone was tempting enough for them to make the move. F.I. admits that indirectly,through conditioning local funds, he was influenced by political parties to join them.An interesting observation came from one independent originating from Braşovcounty, which assumed independency for the June 2008 elections after reaching theconclusion that within the party he formerly belonged to ”he has no future”: I.B.feared that independents are forced to jump into the boat of political parties due to the

lack of resources, and added that ”political parties take advantage of this situation,and even they don’t need to invest much resources in that politician”. Then again,M.M. said that he was never approached by political parties because they knew hewould never agree to join their ranks. Similarly, independents such as B.B. and F.C.admitted they were never approached by political parties. On the other hand, S.I.declared he refused to join political parties as he did not want to offend nobody:”The people don’t care about political parties, as long as you do something for them”.Thus, maintaining political independence becomes a matter of resisting the conditionsimposed by political parties, a matter of personal belief, and also directly linked towhat serves best the immediate electoral interests of the political runner. For that

reason, comparing the available data with the observations made by independentsthemselves, independence seems to remain highly volatile at the local level.



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Faced with the decreasing of the scores obtained by independents nationwide,an overwhelming part of our interviewed politicians consider that one cause for thisis represented by the efforts made by political parties to dominate the establishmentand to integrate more and more political actors. N.G. believes than every politicalparty, whether in office or not, wishes to incorporate as many independents aspossible, and this particular situation leads to the declining of the scores obtained

by independents. Equally, he considers that, despite the formally assumedindependence, this category of politicians is highly dependent on those in power toreceive their funds. Correspondingly, I.B. considers that the most striking aspect of theRomanian establishment which affects independence is the allocation of public fundsdiscretionary, following a strict partisan command: ”The Governmental measureNo. 322 distributes the money coming from the European mainly on political terms”.C.B. agrees to this, saying that, despite his efforts to obtain highly needed Europeanmoney, he faced numerous obstacles during the first two years of his mandate,particularly because of the opposition of political parties. B.E. from a locality inCovasna and L.O. from Iaşi County had also problems with the Measure No. 322, as

their communities were denied the funds. Others see the dropping of independencyas consequence of the high cost it involves – ”if one wishes to candidate he is highlydependent on his own financial power, and nobody wishes to support him in anyway” (S.I.), ”it’s costly” adds another one (B.E.). A.B. considers that ”the politicalparties have certain advantages hard to compensate – the financial part, their powerto organize” adding that ”belonging to a political party which is in power you get the best chances to finance your projects”. L.Z. thinks that the political parties developeda greater capacity in attracting the electorate and that the individual is usually ignored because the system is controlled by partisan entities. In the same way, N.C. said thatone explanation for the decreasing of independents’ scores might the fact that some

independents which fail to advance their own interests through the mayor’s office join political parties or exit politics altogether. Other interpretations were providedas well: F.I accuses for the dropping of independents’ scores the fact that mayors are badly prepared and depend greatly on the party’s support while lacking any sortof political vision. On a similar tone, F.C. believes that politicians hide in the ranksof political parties as they lack motivation: ”They [partisan mayors] simply wait forgovernmental programmes and remain under the protective wing of their party”. M.R.considers that with a political party a candidate doesn’t need to raise the signaturesand receives with little effort whatever electoral material he or she needs. M.M. andB.B. take the idea even further, saying that our society is highly politicized and also

that the mayor’s office is not that attractive as it was before because of the struggles,vulnerabilities and responsibilities it encompasses. On the other hand, L.S. believesthat independents in Romania are affected by the mentalities that are active withinthe political system: ”Whenever someone gets into power, everybody else thinks howto get rid of him and nobody makes any effort to show support”. Furthermore, heconsiders that the scores obtained by independents are hampered especially of theeconomic situation and of the limited available public funds. Oppositely, B.D. offers usa more positive outlook on the matter, considering that, since starting 2008 the fundsare distributed differently according to a particular fiscal algorithm, independenceis susceptible to strengthen itself once more, as it should not be necessary anymoreto depend on the discretionary distribution of funds operated by the parties. Hence,in order to better understand why independency occurs with each election moreand more scarcely we came across several explanations: mostly giving credit to the



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growing consolidation of the establishment around political parties, to the financialpractices discriminating against independents, the poor administrative performanceof independents themselves, the political culture which favours high dependence ofpoliticians on organized partisan structures.

Running our interviews we stumbled upon several cases where politicianswhich initially got elected as independents in June 2008, through their secretary or

other staff, refused to answer our questions. As we considered this occurring ratherstrange, we insisted with our efforts and ended up learning that these politicians wererecruited by political parties in the meantime. Cross-referencing the data with theirdeclarations, we reached several observations on what motivates some independentsto quit their label in favour of a partisan coating, especially visible for those areaswhere the dominance of one of the main political parties is substantial. For somecases it’s about the material benefits and support of a party. Numerous examples arisethroughout the post-communist decades, with the most recent ones confirming thetendency of independents that assume a partisan coating to be mostly captured either by the party in power or by that one which controls regional politics. Also, we came

across cases where independence was assumed only for participating in elections bya former party member in order to return to his originating party soon after getting inoffice. This situation is highly recurrent in some parts of Moldavia and Transylvania.A particular situation is that of the counties controlled by representatives of theDemocratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, where independence occurs either asthe only viable alternative to the dominant party of the Hungarian minority, either asthe best chance for Romanians to advance their candidature in those areas intensivelyinhabited by Hungarians. For example, F.I., an independent which managed to wina mandate in a Magyar dominated region thinks the high scores of independents inthat particular region is a consequence of the particular internal atmosphere within

the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. Similarly, M.R. says that, despitethe fact that Magyars are united, their electorate is faced with the same faces againand again: ”The same actors distributed with different parts”. Moreover, A.B. thinksthat twenty years after the fall of communism ethnic Hungarians feel a certain tensiontowards the main party representing their interests: ”Little of what was expected wasachieved and the people became more sceptics towards them”. B.E., an independentin Covasna says this path was more about personal choice, adding that he will mostprobably run again, but he remains unsure if he will prolong his independence orchoose to join a political party. L.Z., an ethnic Magyar elected for the office of mayorin the Harghita County, considered that more than ever the issues of the minority

are less important than administrative ones and the electorate already started actingaccordingly. S.E. believes that independence is greatly cherished in these areas becauseit has the highest electoral efficiency – both Romanians and ethnic Hungarians can votefor independents. On the other hand, M.M., a Romanian mayor in Harghita believesthe high numbers of independence in that region are produced by a faked form ofindependence, as many running independently represent in fact the interests of theCivic Magyar Party, but refuse to assume their partisanship due to the problematicsituation of this political organisation in the region.

Often an overlooked phenomenon and treated in the footnotes of politicalscience papers, independent candidatures can provide an impressive account at howmodern politics are directly affected by individual political entities and how the latterchoose to manifest themselves. And especially because it offers estranged votersan open platform to voice their heterogeneous thoughts and expectations, political



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independence cannot easily be ignored. Even more, the political developmentsvisible in Central and Eastern Europe during the last two decades make the scrutinyof this phenomenon seem even more imperative. Besides, as current practice shows,independence has reached a critical point: fewer candidacies are being advanced,even fewer manage to get into office and, generally, the establishment seems to beforcing a monopolistic integration of outcasts. Therefore, treating independence at

the local level in the particular context of post-communist politics is not only a matterof academic outlook, but it represents a democratic urgency above all. Our attempt to better understand the specific characteristics of non-party actors in Eastern Europeanlocal politics represents only a first step. Nonetheless, in order to achieve a broaderapproach on independent candidatures, future research needs to expand the presentedframework to a cross-national level in order to assess the motivation and the activityof independent politicians throughout the area, and also to further investigate theresponse of the electorate towards the manifestations of local independence.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSThe present study began as an effort to understand the dynamics developed

by independent candidatures within the particular setting of post-communist localelections. Observing the lack of any similar approach and, moreover, the scarcityof examinations on the Eastern European space, our study was intended not onlyat filling a gap in the domain, but also at opening new paths for the study ofindependence within a previously-neglected space. We started our observations fromacknowledging that, in the case of Romania, the scores obtained by independentsdecrease with each electoral cycle and also that, despite this problematic situation

of independence in the past two decades, independents continue to advance theircandidatures. Therefore, our inquiry of the incentives which allow local politicalindependence to surface within an unfavourable political situation clearly subject topartisanships aimed to better understand what makes independents ignore politicalparties in their search for office and to explore the dynamics related to independence.Additionally, we attempted to provide some insight into the often contrasting profilesof independents, into the actual obstacles they face, the type of rhetoric they promote,their actual path to office and also regarding their political performance thereafter.Most importantly, despite the particularities of the subject analysed, this paper triedto provide a multidimensional outlook on the matter, severely limiting the heroic

interpretation of political independence. To address the above mentioned issuesrelated to independence we analysed the figures regarding independent candidaturesadvanced at local level in Romania between 1992 and 2008 and we interviewed thirtyindependent politicians which managed to get into office after the latest local polls.In applying existing theories on party systems, political independence, local politicsand voting behaviour to the available data we explicitly assumed that independentcandidatures and political performance are largely determined by several factors:independents’ social standing within the community, their incorporation of issuesstringent to the circumscription and the political mechanisms and processes thatlegitimate or limit this particular type of candidacies. Namely, independents are

favoured by the salience of interparty competition, by the liabilities encountered inthe organizational strength of parties, the characteristics of the electoral provisions, by electoral turnout and precedence.



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What about the immediate political profiles of independents? Many enter politicsas outsiders, with no previous experience in the administration. Others engageindependently in the electoral race being motivated by issues they feel passionatelyabout and that they find corresponding to their professional background. Still, othersdecide to run independently after previously having been members of political parties;following the failure to acquire an office as party representatives, controversies withother party members, or dissatisfaction with the direction of the party politiciansmight decide to pursue their political career independently. Approaching closelythe various backgrounds of local political independence, we also acknowledged thatindependence requires solid political determination in order to compensate for theabsence of partisan support. As noticed, independents have the flexibility to adapttheir political persona to the different situations which might arise and to adopt avariety of issues usually ignored by the representatives of the political parties. Alsoobserved during our study was the distinctive recurrence of independence amongseveral political backgrounds: the church, the minorities and the local inheritors ofcommunist benefits. By far, a particularly interesting occurrence of independencewas that noticed among Magyar-dominated areas, where it seemed to be driven by the wish of political actors for maximum gains, irrespective of their ethnic roots.For the most independents’ cases we have dealt with, overcoming their outcastsituation was realised thanks to previously accumulated professional and socialresources, which were further employed for gaining political support and raisingnecessary political funds. On the other hand, from our compilation of a generaltypology of independence we observed that local independents hardly differ frommainstream candidates representing political parties. If in general elections higherstatus candidates are most favoured, middle-educated candidates do fairly well inlocal elections. Also, similarly to nationwide politics, a bias against younger andfemale candidates is in place for the local level. Hence, rather than being a likelyemanation of the establishment, the politicians who assume the independent labelare decisively influenced by circumstantial impetuses, with a similar situation beingobservable on the voters’ side, whose propensity to go for independents seem to beless about longstanding enthusiasm. In our analysis we equally saw that it is clearlyeasier for independents to contest local polls than general elections, especially thanksto the lack of any substantial barrier to their candidatures. Among the benefits of localcandidacies we notice there is no need to forfeit a deposit, or to raise vast politicalresources. But, despite these positive outlooks on independence, the scores obtained by independents at the past five electoral movements made us question what might

affect their performance. We ended up identifying several characteristics that confirmthe manifesting marginalization of independence, among which we consider themost important to be the discriminatory allocation of political resources within theestablishment, low access to highly politicized structures, the maturing of the politicalsystem, the centrality of partisan structures, and the costs of independence itself.

We began our analysis with some basic numbers in order to assess the performanceof independents for the selected period. In terms of shares of votes, independents enjoydecent scores in the first electoral cycle, with visibly lower numbers of mandates beingcaptured with each new electoral cycle, with the most mandates won by independentsin the case of mayoralties and the local council. Respectively, due to the problems that

arise in covering large political units, independence has the lower representation in thecounty councils and no participation for the office of president of the county council.We have also identified that a geographic preference for independents is in place, with



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independence being more visible in the central and northern parts of the country. Inthe rural versus urban debate, we can easily observe that local independence mostlyoccurs in small communities. Equally, we saw independence to be little dependenton electoral campaigning, with word of mouth representing by far the most importelectoral activity at the local level. Classical campaigning techniques were also present, but their influence decreased the more the candidate was familiar to the electorate.Also, we further noted that money seems to be retaining a similarly low importanceover local independence, with spending being proportionally influenced by themagnitude of the circumscription. On the other hand, independents that manage toget into office face a similarly difficult task in convincing partisan-controlled councilsand higher structures of the necessity and usefulness of their projects. Particularly, theimplementation of their political programmes remains at the discretion of partisan bodies, and obtaining an approval or access to public funds require additional effortsto be made. Nevertheless, despite this uneasy situation, political independencemanaged to survive all five post-communist electoral cycles. The failure of nationalpolitical parties to respond to the demands of local constituents made room for theemergence of various independent outsiders. Independent politicians can be seen asproviding new channels of engagement and participation. Arguably, independentsfill the openings left by the major parties in their failure to completely reflect theviews of the public, and enable individuals which do not have a direct affiliation toa political party to engage politically. Nevertheless, political parties are recuperatingthe lost grounds with each election, either as consequence of the more rigid electoralprovisions favouring partisanships or as result of their numerous attempts atintegrating independent players into party politics.

Many states are experiencing a considerable growth of electoral activity outsidethe multi-party system that would make one believe that politics independent of partystructures will become a more common denominator in future politics. Independents,unlike party candidates, are not directly tied to the fate of other candidates and cannotdraw on party resources to run their electoral campaigns – but this does not mean thatthey will soon represent an equivalent alternative to political parties nor that they willwholly emulate partisanships as key organizational forms of modern democracies1.This trend is equally valid for Eastern European politics, and especially for the localpolitics of Romania, where we observed that independent politicians depend greatlyon circumstantial predispositions of the electorate and on the particular arrangementsof the establishment. In relation to such arguments, independent candidatures are aninteresting phenomenon. Although it has not resulted in any signi cant improvement

in the number of offices won, the recurrence of independent candidacies during thepost-communist transition suggests that the party system in Romania is expected tocontinue its internal restructuring and that it has a potential for such independentvoices in the future. For the time being, Romanian politics leaves little space forindependent political voices to manifest. Political parties make their best to assuretheir monopole over existing political offices and public finance sources, and theirstructures remain extremely competitive2. However, political independence representsa complex occurrence highly susceptible to further contest partisan politics, especiallyat the local level.

1 Éric BÉLANGER, ”Antipartyism...cit.”, pp. 1054-1078.2 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă …cit., p. 172.



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Keeping in mind its particular pioneering character, we believe that this studyserves only as a starting point in the investigation of political independence at thelocal level, within the particular confines of the post-communist space. Further debateshould be ignited regarding the characteristics of that part of the electorate whichmight become prone to support independence, concerning a broader view on politicalindependence throughout the rest of the Eastern Europe, and a further emphasis onthe actual contribution of local independence to the maturing of the post-communistsystem at large. In the same way, it remains to be seen to what extent the suppositionsadvanced within this paper will be matched in practice and, correspondingly, tofurther examine the strength of local independence with the next electoral cycles.



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APPENDIX

Table 1 Mandates Won by Independents at the Local Elections (1992-2008)*

Mayoralties Local Council County Council President of the County

CouncilMandates % of TMandates

% of TVotes

Mandates % of TMandates



1992 659 22.4 N/A 2684 6.54 N/A 1.36 N/A N/A

1996 251 15.79 16.48 1727 4.33 61 3.55 N/A N/A

2000 159 5.38 7.27 422 1.06 0 0 N/A N/A

2004 82 2.61 2.924 503 1.26 1 0.07 N/A N/A

2008 56 1.75 1.598 358 0.88 1 0.07 0 0

*Source: The Official Gazette of Romania

Figure 1Evolution of Local Independence between 1992 and 2008

Table 2Voter Turnout in the Romanian Legislative and Local Elections: 1992-2008

1992 1996 2000 2004 2008Local 65 56.47 50.85 54.23 48.99Legislative 76.29 76.01 65.31 58.93 39.26



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Table 3Distribution of Independent Candidatures after the June 2008 Elections

County Urban Rural Candidatures(U+R)

Mandateswon

Availablemandates

% ofMandate

Coef ficient*

AB 1 2 3 0 78 0 0

AR 0 6 6 2 78 0.025641 0.333333

AG 0 15 15 1 102 0.0098039 0.066667

BC 3 6 9 1 93 0.0107527 0.111111

BH 2 9 11 0 101 0 0

BN 1 4 5 0 62 0 0

BT 0 4 4 1 78 0.0128205 0.25

BV 1 4 5 1 58 0.0172414 0.2

BR 0 1 1 0 44 0 0

BZ 1 1 2 0 87 0 0

CS 3 1 4 1 77 0.012987 0.25

CL 0 4 4 1 55 0.0181818 0.25

CJ 1 12 13 3 81 0.037037 0.230769

CT 1 0 1 0 70 0 0

CV 3 16 19 7 45 0.1555556 0.368421

DB 1 10 11 1 89 0.011236 0.090909

DJ 1 3 4 0 111 0 0

GL 0 1 1 0 64 0 0

GR 0 4 4 0 54 0 0

GJ 0 0 0 0 70 0 0

HG 5 21 26 8 67 0.119403 0.307692

HD 2 5 7 0 69 0 0

IL 1 1 2 0 66 0 0

IS 0 6 6 1 98 0.0102041 0.166667

IF 0 3 3 0 40 0 0

MM 4 7 11 6 76 0.0789474 0.545455

MH 0 0 0 0 66 0 0

MS 2 19 21 3 102 0.0098039 0.125

NT 1 7 8 1 83 0.0120482 0.125

OT 0 5 5 0 112 0 0

PH 0 3 3 0 104 0 0

SM 1 6 7 3 64 0.046875 0.428571

SJ 0 3 3 1 61 0.0163934 0.333333

SB 1 5 6 2 64 0.03125 0.333333

SV 1 12 13 4 114 0.0350877 0.307692



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TR 0 0 0 0 97 0 0

TM 2 12 14 4 98 0.0408163 0.285714

TL 0 4 4 0 51 0 0

VS 0 7 7 2 86 0.0232558 0.285714

VL 0 3 3 1 89 0.011236 0.333333

VR 0 8 8 1 73 0.0136986 0.125

RO 39 240 279 56 3177 0.0176267 0.200717

B 1 0 1 1 6 0.1666667 1

*Coefficient obtained by dividing the number of mandates won by independents to thenumber of mandates available per county.

Figure 2

Independents after the June 2008 Elections



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Map 1Political Independence across Romania after June 2008 Local Elections



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Table 4Profiles of the Respondents

No. Name County Type ofLocality

Number ofmandates

Formerpartisan

allegiance

Occupation

1 G.B. Argeş rural 4 no Priest

2 I.B. Braşov rural 1 yes Businessman

5 A.C. Călăraşi rural 5 no Veterinary technician

3 C.B. Cluj rural 1 no Engineer

4 S.I. Cluj rural 4 no Salesperson

6 B.E. Covasna rural 1 no Computer specialist

7 F.I. Covasna rural 1 yes Professor

8 B.D Covasna rural 1 no Civil servant

9 B.T. Covasna rural 1 no Mechanic

10 N.I. Covasna urban 1 yes Businessman

11 M.M. Harghita urban 3 no Jurist

12 L.Z. Harghita rural 2 yes Engineer

13 F.C. Harghita rural 1 yes Economist

14 A.B. Harghita rural 1 yes Engineer

15 B.B. Harghita rural 2 yes Engineer

16 L.O. Iaşi rural 1 no Electrician17 P.V. Maramureş urban 1 yes Businessman

18 G.N. Maramureş rural 1 no Priest

19 P.I. Maramureş rural 1 yes Engineer

20 L.V. Mureş rural 1 no Social worker

21 M.R. Sălaj rural 1 no Civil servant

22 S.E. Satu Mare rural 2 no Civil servant

23 C.P. Satu Mare rural 1 no Economist

24 S.I. Satu Mare urban 4 no Topography technician

25 B.B. Sibiu rural 1 no Non-governmental

26 L.S. Timiş rural 1 no Mathematician

27 M.A. Timiş rural 3 yes Accountant

28 L.G. Vaslui rural 1 yes Teacher

29 P.R. Vaslui rural 1 no Engineer



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Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict

Ethnic Groups in Symbolic ConflictThe ”Ethnicisation” of Public Space in Romania

DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN

Following decades of communist rule and social atomization, Romania faces todaynumerous challenges in the process of rebirth of the public space. Whereas public spaceis defined as an autonomous space of dialogue, free of all kinds of constraints, a spaceof equality and commitment1, we try to assess the importance of an essential factorthat burdens the process of democratization in the region, namely ethnic nationalism.We are interested here in a special component of nationalism that is ethnic symbolism.The use of ethnic symbols by the two largest ethnic segments in the multiethnic

province of Transylvania, ethnic Romanians and ethnic Hungarians, ranges fromthe public use of Hungarian to the requirements for the Romanian citizenship andthe special ties between the Hungarian diaspora and the kin state. The most strikingsymbolic crises that influence on ethnic relations in Transylvania are related to thenaming of localities and the use of Hungarian in public local administration, to theeducation in Hungarian language, to the management of a multilingual universityand even the creation of a separate Hungarian language university in Transylvania.But the struggle to symbolically dominate the public space is also visible in mixedurban areas. Street names and statues in Transylvanian cities stand as ethnic markersin ethnically divided areas.

As we will underline below, although essential for the democratization processin Eastern Europe, ethnic conflict has been initially neglected by the early transitionliterature. By comparing Eastern Europe to Southern Europe and Latin America, itsoon become obvious that stateness and nationhood issues are to be added to the moreclassical earlier transitions that encompassed democratization and marketization2.Those factors could, in fact, more appropriately explain the slower democratizationprogress made by different societies in the region, especially emphasizing on theinchoate public space. In this respect, ethnic symbolism is a major obstacle in generatinga neutral public space. Whereas recurrent crises between ethnic Romanians andethnic Hungarians stand upon a widespread use of ethnic symbols, the subsequent”ethnicisation” of the public space undermines the efforts made in setting up limitedpower-sharing agreements and, as some optimist scholars expect, in fostering a trans-ethnical identity that enables a future peaceful cohabitation of ethnic Romanians andethnic Hungarians in Transylvania.

1

Jürgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into aCategory of Bourgeois Society, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., 1989.2 Taras KUZIO, ”Transition in Post-communist States: Triple or Quadruple”, Politics,

vol. 21, no. 3, 2001, pp. 168-177.



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ETHNIC CONFLICT, SYMBOLIC POWER AND THE PUBLIC SPACE

Despite their own definition of ethnicity, many researchers consider ethnicsegments to be constantly in competition1. Though some early scholars of nationalism believe that ethnicity is a natural, organic, perennial, unitarian and culturally definedcategory2, many other scholars contested this view and developed a ”constructivist”conception of the nation as it is the outcome of the modernization, and thereforeshould be defined as a modern, mechanical, divided, crafted by cultural elites,mainly through mass communication mechanisms3. However nations are defined4,they are competing entities. This is especially obvious in urban contexts5. AsBollens emphasizes, although we recently experienced an unprecedented economicintegration with globalization and ”mega-narratives” of modernization (hightechnology and education), we also bear witness to subversive ”micro-narratives”that fuel oppositional movements6. It seems that social fragmentation has been acommon companion alongside the economic integration, which is most visible in theinter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist urban fractures.

In disputed cities ethnic identity and nationalism combine to create pressures forgroup rights. Sharing the same urban space generally forces the ethnic segments toadopt different strategies of coexistence: to try to dominate the public space whenthey consider powerful enough or to negotiate the division of the public space andthe preservation of their community autonomy when they feel threatened by otherethnic groups. Though ethnic conflict and the effort to dominate the public space arenot confined to urban areas, we will mainly focus on urban settings because citiesare focal points of urban and regional economies dependent of multi-ethnic contacts,social and cultural centers and platforms for political expression, and potential centersof grievance and mobilization7.

1 Rogers BRUBAKER, David LAITIN, ”Ethnic and Nationalist Violence”, Annual Reviewof Sociology, vol. 24, 1998, pp. 423-452; M. BANTON, Racial and Ethnic Competition, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1983; Ernest GELLNER, Culture, Identity and Politics, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1987; David HOROWITZ, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University ofCalifornia Press, Berkeley, 1985.

2 Hans KOHN, The Idea of Nationalism, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1967; L. SNYDER,The Meaning of Nationalism, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1954.

3 Elie KEDOURIE, Nationalism, Hutchinson, London, 1960; Ernest GELLNER, Thoughtand Change, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964; Reinhard BENDIX, Nation-Building andCitizenship, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1964; Gabriel ALMOND, Lucian PYE

(eds.), Comparative Political Culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965; Karl DEUTSCH,Nationalism and Social Communication, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1953; Karl DEUTSCH, WillamFOLZ (eds.), Nation-Building, Atherton Press, New York, 1963.

4 Anthony D. SMITH, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories ofNations and Nationalism, Routledge, New York, 1998.

5 S.A. BOLLENS, Urban Peace-Building in Divided Societies: Belfast and Johannesburg,Westview Press, Boulder, 1999; IDEM, ”City and Soul: Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Jerusalem,Nicosia”, CITY: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, vol. 6, no. 1, 2001,pp. 169-178; IDEM, ”Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict”, in R. HAMBLETON, H.V. SAVITCH,M. STEWART (eds.), Globalism and Local Democracy: Challenge and Change in Europe and North America, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2002; IDEM, ”Urban Governance at the Nationalist

Divide: Coping with Group-based Claims”, Journal of Urban Affairs, vol. 29, no. 3, 2007,pp. 229-253.6 S.A. BOLLENS, ”Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict”, cit., p. 109.7 Ibidem, p. 109.



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The symbolic domination of the public space relates, as we conceive it, tomechanisms of differentiation and power1, as well as to banal nationalism2. In fact,those efforts of domination are banal nationalism, in the way it differs from hot, hardnationalism, based on violent and bloody conflicts3. In the same time, they are notmaterial, but symbolic conflicts, as they tend to spatially mark the dominance ofethnic groups and by that to strengthen their very identity in a perpetual manner4.

Our approach tends to combine these two perspectives as it takes into account themechanisms of differentiation and power, largely invested by ethnic groups’ elites, andsoft, everyday nationalism, backed up by banal items as road signs and street names.The domination of the public space could therefore range from street names and roadsigns to flags and more specific buildings, such as churches, museums or foreignembassies5. In this respect, we are close to Brubakers’ definition of ethnic groups aspractical categories, classificatory schemes and cognitive frames and would like tounravel the ”work” done by nations as competing actors in urban settings6. Therefore,the aim of our paper is twofold. First, we intend here to unravel the symbolic, non-material and power-marking elements of more broader conflicts in Transylvania, i.e.

those over territorial design, linguistic rights and education, and not only to focus onmore classical symbolic issues as buildings and statues. In fact, all of these symbolsare parts of the effort made by national elites to consolidate national identity and toclaim national hegemony in disputed territories7 and to generally ”invent a tradition”and elaborate a language of symbolic practice and communication8.

Second, we intend to broaden the framework of the symbolic conflict and tostress on a new approach, which is the consequence of ethno-symbolism, namelythe ”ethnicisation” of public space. According to Habermas9, the public sphere, or

1

Pierre BOURDIEU, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Routledge,London, 1984; IDEM, The Field of Cultural Production, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994.2 M. BILLIG, Banal Nationalism, Sage, London, 1995.3 M. IGNATIEFF, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, Verso, London,

1994.4 Anthony GIDDENS, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction.

Macmillan, London, 1979.5 J. BORNEMANN, Belonging to Two Berlins, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,

1992; M. AZARYAHU, ”The Power of Commemorative Street Names”, Environment andPlanning D: Society and Space, vol. 14, no. 3, 1996, pp. 311-330; B.S.A. YEOH, ”Street-naming andNation-building: Toponymic Inscriptions and Nationhood in Singapore”, Area, vol. 28, no. 3,

1996, pp. 298-307; M. AZARYAHU, ”German Reunification and the Politics of Street Names:The Case of East Berlin”, Political Geography, vol. 16, no. 6, 1997, pp. 479-493; Duncan LIGHT,”Political Change and Official Public Landscapes: Renaming Streets in Bucharest after 1989”,Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, 2003, pp. 106-131; R. JONES, P. MERRIMAN,”Hot, Banal and Everyday Nationalism: Bilingual Road Signs in Wales”, Political Geography,vol. 28, no. 3, 2009, pp. 164-173.

6 Rogers BRUBAKER, ”Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as an Institutionalized Form,Practical Category, Contingent Event”, Contention, vol. 4, no. 1, 1994, pp. 3-14.

7 B. GRAHAM, C. NASH, ”A Shared Future: Territoriality, Pluralism and Public Policy inNorthern Ireland”, Political Geography, vol. 25, no. 3, 2006, pp. 253-278; J. NAGLE, ”The Rightto Belfast City Centre: From Ethnocracy to Liberal Multiculturalism?”, Political Geography,

vol. 28, no. 2, 2009, pp. 132-141.8 Eric HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1870, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1990.

9 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere…cit.



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the public space, is the environment accepting the public political reasoning, anenvironment in which the individual can speak freely and where the arguments arenot influenced by any political or social power. It makes possible for everyone toexpress itself regardless of any constraints on time, resources, participation or themes.It is the space created by the discursive interactions between private people willing tolet arguments, not status or authority of tradition, to be decisive1. Thus, public sphereis a medium for political justification, for putting the decision-makers to account, aswell as for political initiative, the mobilizing of political support. The public spherenot only enables autonomous opinion formation, but also empowers the citizensto influence the decision-makers2. Although public sphere is an essential feature ofdemocratization, one of the main challenges is the definition of the community and ofthe public space itself. Deeply divided societies have, in this respect, greater difficultiesin assessing the common grounds for political institutions and practices that rulesociety. Even democracy, as one might define it as majority rule, is questionable inthese settings3.

Finally, our approach intends to integrate a spatial perspective into the analysis ofthe public sphere and to unify the range of ethnic symbolic domination mechanismsin Transylvania. The ”ethnicisation” of the public space that we unravel here is made by mechanisms of spatial domination that encompasses the use of spatial symbolicmarkers, but also by more subtle elements as citizenship and language. From a broaderperspective, the way citizenship is conceived or minority linguistic rights accepted alsodefines the public sphere. In fact, nation can be broadly viewed as primarily defined by culture or by territory. The cultural or ethnic nation has ethnicity as the basis ofmembership and emphasizes on culture as its cohesive component. By contrast, thecivic nation has territory as the basis of membership, while citizenship is the cohesivecomponent. The civic nation is therefore a community relating to a given territory,the universal law and the broad political participation turning the community intoa nation. In this respect, many new democracies have greater difficulties in bothpromoting equal rights and liberties and strengthening the ethnic cohesion of thedominant group4. These regimes are only selectively open regimes: they possess arange of partial democratic features that are political competition, free media andsignificant civil rights, although they fail to be universal or comprehensive in that thepolitical regime refrains from interfering with the ongoing ethnicisation project of theethnic dominant group. Defining nation and the use of ethnic symbolism in Romanialargely impact on the construction of the public space, on what we have called the

growing ”ethnicisation” of the public sphere.

1 P. JOHNSON, ”Habermas’s Search for the Public Sphere”, European Journal of SocialTheory, vol. 4, no. 2, 2001, pp. 215-236.

2 E.O. ERIKSEN, ”An Emerging European Public Sphere”, European Journal of Social Theory,vol. 8, no. 3, 2005, pp. 341-363.

3 Arend LIJPHART, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in theNetherlands, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968; IDEM, ”Consociational Democracy”,

World Politics, vol. 21, no. 2, 1969, pp. 207-225; IDEM, Democracy in Plural Societies: A ComparativeExploration, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977.4 Sammy SMOOHA, ”The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic

State”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, pp. 475-503.



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SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND THE ”ETHNICISATION”OF THE PUBLIC SPACE IN TRANSYLVANIA

Before focusing on symbolic conflict, let us briefly present the ethnic contextin Transylvania. Although it is a Romanian province today, Transylvania broke up

from the Habsburg Empire in 1918. Even when it was a former Habsburg province,Transylvania was numerically dominated by ethnic Romanians, their ethnic grouprepresenting in the 19th century more than half of the province’s population. At theage of the European nationalism, Romanian elites formed a strong political movementclaiming cultural and political rights for the Romanian community1. The one hundredyears struggle ended in Transylvania’s secession in 1918 and the subsequent unionwith the Romanian national state. On the other hand, Romania proclaimed earlierits independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1877 and obtained the recognition ofits independence and full sovereignty the following year, during the Peace Congressheld in Berlin2. Excepting the Jewish and Gipsy communities, Romania was at that

time almost ethnically homogeneous. The integration of Transylvania would revealmuch more difficult, because it brought in large ethnic and religious minorities, withtheir own active and well-organized elites3. This time the struggle for nation-buildingwas between Romanian rural background and Western urban modernity, since theprovince’s cities were largely dominated by ethnic Hungarians and Germans.

As Bollens emphasizes, cities are suppliers of important religious and culturalsymbols, zones of intergroup proximity and intimacy, and arenas where the size andconcentration of a subordinate population can present the most direct threat to thestate4. This is exactly the case of urban communities in Transylvania, after its unionwith Romania in 1918. These cities become the arena of harsh conflicts between local

German and Hungarian elites and Romanian elites, strongly backed by Romaniancentral state authorities. Whereas the latter tried to bring under control and culturallyhomogenize the urban areas, the former made huge efforts to preserve their culturalinstitutions and identity5. This contradiction is to be found during the entire 20th century, regardless of the political system that ruled Romania. During the 1930’s,the struggle between Romanian rural background and the Western-style urbanmodernity shaped the political activity and lead to the rise to power of the Romanianextreme-right6. Although the first decade of communist rule proclaimed itself asinternationalist, the last two decades of Romanian communism turned into a fiercenationalist regime, which resembled more to inter-war public discourse and political

1 Keith HITCHINS, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849, HarvardUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1969; IDEM, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movementin Transylvania, 1860-1914, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1999.

2 IDEM, Romania, 1866-1947, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.3 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and

Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995.4 S.A. BOLLENS, ”Managing Urban Ethnic Conflict”, cit, p. 112.5 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania…cit.6

Francisco VEIGA, La Mistica del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierro,Rumania, 1919-1941, Publicacions de la Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra 1989;Leon VOLOVICI, Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the1930s, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1991.



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activity that to internationalist communism1. Yet nationalism was a suitable politicalvehicle even after the fall of the communist regime in 1989, as it was used by itssuccessors in order to consolidate on power2. The claimed threat to state unity andsovereignty then was the ethnic conflict in Târgu-Mureş, where ethnic clashes couldhave triggered an ethnic disaster, more or less similar to those who have ravaged theformer Yugoslavia. Since these events, ethnic politics strongly marked the politicaldynamics of Romania3. Although Romania followed a different path of exit fromcommunism than Yugoslavia, post-communist transition did not exclude the use ofethnic tensions and of subsequent mechanisms of accommodation of ethnic segmentsin most of its heterogeneous urban contexts, like Cluj, for example. The economicand cultural capital of the Hungarians in Transylvania during the 19 th century, Clujwas among the largest and most important cities of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.After the First World War and the union of Transylvania with the kingdom of Romaniain 1918, Hungarians remained the majority of the city until the 1960’s, when ethnicRomanians began to outnumber ethnic Hungarians. This was mainly due to the

forced industrial and demographic policies of the communist regime that favoredRomanian population influx into the city. After 1989, the city was ruled for 12 years by a Romanian nationalist mayor that raised the tensions between ethnic Hungariansand ethnic Romanians by numerous acts of ethnic provocation4. But all major citiesin the region, like Târgu-Mureş, Oradea, Timişoara, Arad or Braşov turned intoethnically Romanian cities during communism and minorities’ demographic shareis still dropping5.

Street Names and Statues in Ethnically Polarized Towns

The domination of public space is mainly related to symbolic items as street namesand statues, but also to symbolic issues that can be analyzed from other perspectives, aslinguistic issues by linguistic nationalism. Items as street names and statues generallystand for identity markers and express the willingness of ethnic groups to appropriateurban space6. Additionally, street names evoke specific historical eras by expressing

1 Elemér ILLYÉS, National Minorities in Romania: Change in Transylvania, East EuropeanMonographs, Boulder, 1982; Catherine VERDERY, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity

and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s Romania, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995; Juan J. LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996.

2 Tom GALLAGHER, ”Nationalism and Political Culture in the 1990s”, in DuncanLIGHT, David PHINNEMORE (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition ,Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001.

3 M.E. MCINTOSH, M. ABELE MAC IVER, D.G. ABELE, D.B. NOLLE, ”Minority Rightsand Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria”, Social Forces, vol. 73, no. 3, 1995,pp. 939-967.

4 Rogers BRUBAKER, Margit FEISCHMIDT, John FOX, Liana GRANCEA, NationalistPolitics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town, Princeton University Press, Princeton,

2006.5 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Schimbă ri în harta etnică a României , Ethnocultural DiversityRessource Center Press, Cluj, 2005.

6 B.S.A. YEOH, ”Street-naming and Nation-building…cit.”.



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the ideological dominance of political rulership1. Moreover, street names and statuescommemorate past events and heroes, and therefore strengthen collective identity byconstructing and reconstructing history and tradition2. In particular settings, they helpstrengthen the feeling of belonging to the urban space, thus they are a key elementfor identity politics. As Transylvania moved from a given sovereignty to another andoften switched the main ideology, few streets kept their names during the 20th century.As soon as the regime has changed in 1989, Hungarian community expressed hiswillingness to restore lost symbols, including street names, in a period marked bya general process of renaming streets in Romania. Changing street names was not ageneral purpose of the Hungarian party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians inRomania (DAHR), participation in central government between 1996 and 2000, yetachieving this goal in various local settings had to follow a complicated negotiationmechanism between Hungarian and Romanian parties. In the case of Târgu-Mureş, anethnically mixed town in Transylvania, although DAHR councilors dominated localcouncil, renaming streets and putting in place statues evoking Hungarian culturalheritage was subject to negotiation and approval of Romanian political parties in thecity. On the other hand, putting in place the statue of the Romanian prince Michaelthe Brave, who conquered Transylvania for a short period of time at the end of 16 th century3, was conditioned by putting in place the statue of the Hungarian princeFrancis II Rákóczi, crowned in 1704 in the city as prince of Transylvania4.

The same symbolic conflict is to be noticed, on a larger scale, in Arad, anotherethnically mixed town. The willingness of the Hungarian community to restorean ancient statue in town triggered one of the most vehement disputes during thegovernmental cooperation between DAHR and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).The dispute concerned the renovation and public exhibition of the statuary raised bythe Hungarians in 1880 in order to commemorate the 1948-1849 Hungarian uprisingagainst the Habsburgs5. The monumental statuary, also known as the ”LibertyStatue”, represents the 13 Hungarian revolutionary generals executed for mutiny by the Austrian imperial army. Dismantled in 1924 by the Romanian authorities, itwas deposited for decades inside the local city fortress. The restoration of the statuewas paid by the Hungarian local community, yet the replacement was contested by the Romanian community, because during the 1848-1849 civil war there werenumerous clashes between Hungarian and Romanian nationalists in Transylvania,who generally remained faithful to the Austrian emperor. Although the Hungariancommunity demanded that the statuary be replaced in a city square, the Romanianauthorities refused as long as Romanian national symbols would not accompany

1 Duncan LIGHT, ”Political Change and Official Public Landscapes…cit”; M. AZARYAHU,”German Reunification and the Politics of Street Names…cit”; IDEM, “The Power ofCommemorative Street Names”, cit.

2 E. HOBSBAWM, T. RANGER (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 1983; J.R. GILLIS (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity,Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996.

3 P.F. SUGAR, P. HANÁK, T. FRANK, A History of Hungary, Indiana University Press,Bloomington, 1994.

4

Paul LENDVAI, The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, 2004.5 I. DEÁK, The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849, Columbia

University Press, New York, 1979.



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the restored Hungarian statuary. Following years of political negotiations betweenDAHR and SDP local branches and the intervention of central government run bySDP, the common solution was to place those ethnic symbols into a ”Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation Park” in the city, which was finally inaugurated in August2005. An arch of triumph now stands alongside generals’ statuary and symbolizesthe Romanian revolutionaries in Transylvania. Moreover, some of the Romanian localparties in Arad would love to expand and to turn the park into a ”Park of Ethnicities”,diluting further more Hungarian symbolism.

Ethnic Commemorations in Transylvania

One of the most striking symbolic issues in Transylvania are ethnic commemorations.Every March the 15th, the commemoration of the 1848 Hungarian revolutionariesin Transylvania reminds ethnic Hungarians of their natural ties with the wholeHungarian community in the Carpathians Basin and the Hungarian state. Thoughcommemorations are a special ingredient in recent Hungarian tradition and politics1,Hungarian commemorations in Transylvania are a very sensitive issue for ethnicRomanians, as they raise not only Hungarian flags, but symbolic questions of belonging, allegiance, solidarity and national unity, because commemorations arerituals that remember fundamental myths and symbols to a given community. Inreturn, Romanian parliament decided in 1990 to celebrate Romania’s national dayevery December the 1st, in symbolical remembrance of the secession of Transylvaniafrom Austria-Hungary at the end of the First World War and its subsequent integrationinto the Kingdom of Romania.

As emphasized by Schöpflin, the myth is one of the ways in which collectivities(e.g. nations) establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their ownsystem of values, as it is a set of beliefs, usually put forth as a narrative, held by acommunity about itself 2. Myth provides the means for the members of a communityto recognize that, broadly, they share a mindset. Through myth, boundaries areestablished within the community and also with respect to other communities,in a constant effort of ‘imagining’ the community3. The myth acts as means ofstandardization and of storage of information4 and, therefore, it is one of a number ofcrucial instruments in cultural reproduction5.

The endless question of nationhood, combined with daily nationalism andsymbolic struggle in urban areas, might affect the rebirth of the public space in termsof neutral political institutions and practices that rule society. In fact, in socially

1 B. FOWLER, ”Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politics:the Case of the Millennial Commemorations”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 2004,pp. 57-83.

2 G. SCHÖPFLIN, ”The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths”, in G. HOSKING,G. SCHÖPFLIN (eds.), Myths and Nationhood , Routledge, New York,1997, p. 19.

3 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism, Verso, London, 1983.

4

Norbert ELIAS, The Symbol Theory, Sage, London, 1991.5 Pierre BOURDIEU, ”Structures, Habitus, Power: Basis for a Theory of Symbolic Power”,in N. DIRKS, G. ELEY, S.B. ORTNER (eds.), A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory, PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, 1994.



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and particularly in ethnically divided societies, the use of myths almost invariablyenhances the division, unless there are myths that unite the groups across the divide.It is possible to conceptualize myths of citizenship that transcend ethnicity, underlinesSchöpflin1, but these are rare (e.g. the Swiss case). Generally the myths of collectiveexistence within the ethnic group are emphasized and a harder boundary is drawnagainst outsiders. This process is dynamic, imitative, and hard to break. If one groupfeels that it has to rely more and more heavily on myths of collective existence, theother will generally do the same. And on both sides symbolic politics fuel politicaldiscourse. The opposition between those two types of myths is best exemplified bythe debate over the Romanian territorial design.

Ethnic Identities and Regional Design in Transylvania

The current debate on regional design opposes two main arguments: a trans-ethnical regional identity and a clear-cut ethnic regional divide. The first argumentis strongly emphasized by the Romanian proponents of regionalization, a handful ofRomanian and Hungarian intellectuals from Transylvania who, back in 2000, triggeredthe debate on a new territorial design and new political relationship between centreand periphery. Their prior arguments are not economic, but political and cultural.According to them, the existing local political organization and centralization inRomania come from an ethnic Romanian definition of the state, which is strengthenedday-to-day by the Romanian-Hungarian conflict in Transylvania. Fearing theHungarian threat to Romanian statehood, Romanian nationalists and centralists,those who support the second argument, always invoke the conflict as the perfectargument for hard centralization. Therefore, the key for building up a peaceful andprosperous region of Transylvania would be a trans-ethnic party, composed by thepolitical elites of Romanian and Hungarian ethnic groups and motivated by a kind of”civic regionalism”2. Romanian regionalists strongly believe that assuming regionalidentities on a civic basis contributes, in a multi-ethnic region like Transylvania, tothe development of a trans-ethnical identity, through which it is possible to transcendextremist-nationalist nostalgia, fears or escalation, as well as the veiled nationalismsthat often make use of a civic and democratic phraseology3.

Regional design was, in fact, a key issue in ethnic relations between ethnicHungarians and Romanians in Transylvania during the past century. The integrationof new provinces in Greater Romania following the First World War brought in largeethnic and religious minorities. Thus organizing political space was a serious matterfor Romanian elites who aimed to consolidate the new national state and unify thenational culture4. The territory was then divided in 71 one counties that lasted until1948. During the Second World War, parts of Transylvania were attached back to theHungarian state, only to be recovered by Romania at the end of the war. In 1948,Romanian communists reformatted for the first time the territorial administration indistricts and oblasts, having in mind the soviet-type of organization. By this type of

1

G. SCHÖPFLIN, “The Functions of Myth…cit.”, p. 24.2 Gusztáv MOLNÁR, ”Regionalism civic”, Provincia, vol. I, no. 2, p. 7.3 Tom GALLAGHER, ”Nationalism and Political Culture in the 1990s”, cit.4 Irina LIVEZEANU, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania…cit.



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administrative organization, Hungarian minority in Transylvania enjoyed a certaindegree of autonomy in the general framework of an autonomous region. The 1968reform of Romanian administration, that still works today, eliminated such autonomyand tried to homogenize again the territory according to nationalistic purposes1.

The current regional design is today challenged by Hungarian nationalists inTransylvania. They oppose the Romanian unitary and centralized state by claiming therights to self-govern in the framework of an autonomous region called ”Szeklerland”.The Civic Hungarian Party (CHP), a political organization of ethnic Hungarians inTransylvania which opposes to the moderate DAHR that successfully represented theethnic community during the last two decades, settled a Szekler National Council asa representative body of Szeklers in Transylvania. Its goal is to define the autonomy ofthe Szeklerland, including the use of ethnic symbols like the anthem, the flag and thearms of the county. Szekler National Council also intends to propose a law regardingthe autonomous region of Szeklerland. Moreover, the Council already proclaimed adeclaration on the regional design, stating that Szeklerland is a distinct and indivisibleterritorial unit that can not be merged into another territorial unit. Therefore, stateauthorities should take care when it comes to reshape territorial design in Romaniaand fulfill the distinct Szeklerland with greater autonomy. The reaction of Romaniannationalists was instant. Romanian hard-line nationalists demanded a nationalreferendum with compulsory voting, which clearly shows the dominance and thewillingness of ethnic Romanians.

The opposition of those two political projects, the regionalist and the ethnicnationalist ones, clearly demonstrates the importance of ethnic symbolism. Theregionalists seem to conceive ethnic groups as largely constructed, while Romanian andHungarian nationalists take them as natural entities in conflict. We think regionalists’project rely more on idealistic political models, like the working consociationaldemocracies in place in Belgium or Switzerland, than on ground realities. The growingethnic symbolism in Romanian turned into a large ”ethnicisation” of the public space,since ethnic segments constantly struggle to dominate each other. Therefore, it seemsunlikely for Transylvania to build up a trans-national regional identity, since moremodest power-sharing arrangements are missing. In fact, there is no general legislativeframework for the status of ethnic minorities in Romania, and therefore ethnicsegments are forced to defend their interests in every separate area, ranging fromeducation to public administration. Moreover, extended rights and liberties largelydepend on political coalitions in Romanian parliament and government, forcingDAHR to strengthen its ethnic profile when it comes to negotiate with Romanian

parties. Yet painful negotiations tend to maximize ethnic opposition between groupsand to extend the ethnicisation of the public space on an unprecedented scale.

For a cross-national identity to arise on the basis of a civic regionalism, asTransylvanian regionalists dream to, it is first necessary for ethnic groups’ elites tosettle a pact on minorities’ rights and to refrain from the use of symbolic power.Otherwise, public space, especially in ethnically divided cities, will finally completelyturn into a battle ground marked by the imposing symbols of ethnic groups, likethe city of Cluj in the 1990s. The elected Romanian mayor, an outspoken nationalist,

1 C. CHEN, ”The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical InstitutionalistAnalysis of the Leninist Legacy”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2003, pp. 166-201; Catherine VERDERY, National Ideology under Socialism…cit.



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made then everything possible to assert the Romanian character of the city-centerand to neutralize the Hungarian and Habsburg past1. He has threatened to move thehistorical equestrian statue of a Renaissance-era king of Hungary that dominates thecentral square, sponsored archaeological excavations in the square, designed to assertRomanian priority in Cluj, and erected towering flagpoles and flying Romanian flagson either side of the equestrian statue. Later he would replace white benches in thesquare with new ones painted in the Romanian national colors, in an endless effortto symbolically dominate Cluj city-center. Multiplying such symbolic battle groundat a larger scale in Transylvania could be a threat not only to a still idealistic civicregionalism that encompasses and levels ethnic identities, but it could be a directthreat to the previous efforts made for the minimum trust and cooperation betweenethnic Hungarians and ethnic Romanians in the region.

ETHNIC STRUGGLE AND THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE

The issue of language is a key issue of a special kind of nationalism that islinguistic nationalism. This doctrine that originates in the late 18th century, states thatthe promotion, development, enrichment and standardization of national language isan essential political concern2. In the same time, language is a very sensitive symbolicissue. As national identity is an imagination of belonging to a larger community,as emphasized by Anderson3, the formation of language identity largely helps tostrengthen the sense of national identity in many parts of the world 4. As we areinterested here in focusing on symbolic dimension of nationalism, we will not stresson other features of linguistic nationalism. Because issues of language cannot beeasily accommodated within the standard framework adopted by western liberals

in dealing with diversity, there is not a proven solution for the question of language,emphasize Kymlicka and Grin5. Whether western liberals solved the religious conflict by separating state and church and by ”privatizing” religion, they have hoped to applythe same model to other areas of diversity, in particular to ethno-cultural diversity.There should be no official or established culture, no public support for the culture,practices or identity of any particular group; this is the liberal project of coping withethno-cultural diversity. While this is an attractive model in theory, it cannot work inpractice. There is no possibility of ”privatizing” language issues. Therefore the statewill always decide which will be the official language, which language will get theprimacy and which one will be relegated to private life, and this fact is obviously in

conflict with the liberal conception of freedom and equality6

.

1 Rogers BRUBAKER, Margit FEISCHMIDT, John FOX, Liana GRANCEA, NationalistPolitics and Everyday Ethnicity…cit., p. 3.

2 A. PATTEN, ”The Humanist Roots of Linguistic Nationalism”, paper delivered at theAnnual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004.

3 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities…cit.4 C. HARVIE, Scotland and Nationalism: 1707 to the Present, Routledge, London, 1994;

R. JONES, L. DESFORGES, ”Localities and the Reproduction of Welsh Nationalism”, PoliticalGeography, vol. 22, no. 3, 2003, pp. 271-292.

5

Will KYMLICKA, François GRIN, ”Assessing the Politics of Diversity in TransitionCountries”, in Farimah DAFTARY, François GRIN (eds.), Ethnicity and Language Politics inTransition Countries, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2003, pp. 1-28.

6 IDEM, ”Assessing the Politics of Diversity…cit.”, p. 9.



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The use of native language in Transylvania relates to public and road inscriptions,to teaching, as well as to the language to use when dealing to local administration. Theuse of native language is part of minorities’ cultural rights, yet the implementationof these rights unravels subsequent ethnic tensions. According to surveys on ethnicissues conducted in Transylvania and the whole Romania1, many ethnic Romaniansdisagree with the public use of Hungarian language. Though many of them considerthat those of their friends who decided to learn Hungarian in order to keep in touchwith ethnic Hungarian acquaintances are not to blame, they declare themselvesoffended by the public use of Hungarian and still believe that ethnic Hungarianswillfully refuse to speak Romanian, despite the fact that, as Romanians think, theyare fully capable to do so.

In early ’90s, the new Romanian constitution, the Local Administration Act andthe Act on Education clearly reaffirmed the official unilinguism in a period marked byethnic tensions2. The debate then concerned teaching in Hungarian and the restorationof educational establishments to the Hungarian minority, involving removingRomanian pupils from ethnically mixed schools. In fact, it was the reluctance of theRomanian government to negotiate a compromise with the Hungarian minority overeducation that contributed to a sharp polarization of both ethnic groups and theoutbreak of street violence in Târgu-Mureş on 18-19 March 1990 3. Despite high ethnictensions, concessions have been made only following 1996, when DAHR was part ofthe Romanian governing coalition. The linguistic policies then shifted from linguistichegemony to an accommodation model, allowing the expansion of minorities’language use, but keeping intact the primacy of the official language and statingthe use of minorities’ languages as acceptable exceptions4. Romania now allows fulleducation in minority languages, but also provides a minimum education in Romanian.Despite official unilinguism, the use of minority languages is allowed in local publicinstitutions where the concerned linguistic minorities surpass a 20% threshold andencompasses official communication in Hungarian between local institutions andcitizens and between elected officials themselves during local meetings, althoughofficial acts of those authorities continue to be issued in Romanian.

Language and Citizenship

Language is also related to citizenship, and citizenship shapes the way peopleconceive community, liberties and equality5. In a way, community is the object of

1 Gabriel B ĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (eds.), Barometrul rela ţiilor etnice1994-2002. O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnic din România , Ethnocultural DiversityRessource Center Press, Cluj, 2005.

2 Catherine KETTLEY, ”Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania: theHungarian Minority in Context”, in Farimah DAFTARY, François GRIN (eds.), Ethnicity andLanguage Politics…cit., pp. 243-266.

3 Ibidem, p. 251.4 István HORVÁTH, ”Evaluarea politicilor lingvistice din România”, in Levente SALAT

(ed.), Politici de integrare a minorit ăţilor na ţionale din România. Aspecte legale şi institu ţionale într-o perspectivă comparat ă , Ethnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2008.5 Charles TAYLOR, ”The Politics of Recognition”, in A. GUTMANN (ed.), Multiculturalism

and the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992; B. BARRY, Culture



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struggle in which different moral geographies are imagined, since community isnegotiated as particular constructions of citizenship are put forward1. In this respect,the Romanian Constitution reflects the ethnic tensions from the first years of post-communism by the willingness of the dominant group to express the dominantposition of the Romanian demographic majority and language. Kettley stresses thatsome disputed points in the text of the Constitution, namely the proclamation ofRomania as a national state, the subsequent sovereignty based on the unity of theRomanian people (as an ethnic definition of the community) and the mono-linguism,generated the protests of the Hungarian political elites2. In fact, the use of Romanianlanguage proves to be an essential requirement for citizenship in Romania. Whencompared to other requirements for citizenship in Europe, the Romanian peculiaritylies in the lack of distinctiveness between the origin, the ethnic aspect and thecivic aspect of citizenship and also in the emphasis on the language requirements3.Therefore, the claim of the Hungarian ethnic community to openly use Hungarianlanguage in state administration and education is one of the most sensitive issues forRomanian ethnic majority.

Hungarian-Romanian political and ethnic relations have been seriously challengedin 2001 by an incident that unraveled the symbolic stake of ethnic nationalism inTransylvania. That was the Hungarian law designed to give a series of rights (seasonalworking permits, social security provisions, travel, education and health benefits) inthe kin country to Hungarian minority abroad4. The Hungarian law was receivedwith fierce nationalist criticism by Hungary’s neighbors5. Although the law explicitlystated practical issues, it was considered by Hungary’s neighboring states rather asymbolic issue, an attempt to symbolically expand the boundaries of the Hungariannation6. The political motivations of the Hungarian law are questionable. On theone hand, political parties in Hungary exacerbated the references to the past in theirpolitical rhetoric, the emotional appeals and the use of political identity campaignsand therefore encouraged symbolic populism in government7. Using Rajacic’s

and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, Harvard University Press, Harvard,2001; Will KYMLICKA, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; G. VALENTINE, T. SKELTON, ”The Right to Be Heard:Citizenship and Language”, Political Geography, vol. 26, no. 2, 2007, pp. 121-140.

1 L.A. STAEHELI, ”Citizenship and the Problem of Community”, Political Geography,vol. 27, no. 1, 2008, pp. 5-21.

2

Catherine KETTLEY, ”Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania…cit.”.3 Drago ş DRAGOMAN, ”National Identity and Europeanization in Post-communistRomania. The Meaning of Citizenship in Sibiu: European Capital of Culture 2007”, Communistand Post-Communist Studies, vol. 41, no. 1, 2008, pp. 63-78.

4 L.J. KULCSÁR, C. BRADATAN, ”Politics without Frontiers: The Impact of HungarianDomestic Politics on the Minority Question in Romania”, Communist and Post-CommunistStudies, vol. 40, no. 3, 2007, pp. 301-314.

5 K. DEEGAN-KRAUSE, ”Uniting the Enemy: Politics and the Convergence of Nationalismsin Slovakia”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 18, no. 4, 2004, pp. 651-696.

6 S. DEETS, ”Reimagining the Boundaries of the Nation: Politics and the Development ofIdeas on Minority Rights”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20, no. 3, 2006, pp. 419-446.

7

B. FOWLER, ”Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politics…cit.”;A. RAJACIC, ”Populist Construction of the Past and Future: Emotional Campaigning inHungary between 2002 and 2006”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 21, no. 4, 2007,pp. 639-660.



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formula, this kind of national-populism was seeking the emotional mobilization ofthe electors by a cultural redefinition of the past1. On the other hand, contrary to theopinion that emphasizes on the symbolical willingness of the Hungarian political eliteto strengthen the ties with Hungarian diaspora and symbolically unify the nation,other scholars argue that Hungary’s decision was driven not by a growing ethnicnationalism in society, but by the party competition and especially by the party- building strategy of right-wing elites2. In fact, by creating and distributing Hungariancertificates, a sort of ethnic identity cards, the law made the Hungarians living outsidethe borders legal subjects of Hungarian legislation and authority. Yet the motivationof the law, despite the growing desire to protect the Hungarian diaspora fromassimilationist pressures, can be fully explained only by the willingness of politicalelites affiliated with the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) government (1998-2002) to utilize the Hungarian diaspora issue as a political resource to further theirown ideological, organizational and long-term strategical political goals3. Despite thecompromise between the Hungarian and Romanian governments that put an end toRomanian official criticism4, namely the application of the law to Hungarian stateterritory only, eliminating ethnic discrimination in granting the working permits andremoving visual highly symbolic items from the Hungarian certificates that couldremind of the special political ties between ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania andthe Hungarian state5, the incident fully reveals the ethnic symbolic tensions ongoingin Transylvania.

Public Inscriptions in Hungarian

Public inscriptions are, alongside street names, one of the most salient ethnicmarkers. And the language alone is not the main problem, but the specific contents,since the use of ethnic Hungarian geographical denominations symbolically questionthe Romanian domination of the public space. As soon as new regulations wereadopted in administration area following 1996 elections that brought DAHR intothe governing coalition, Hungarian community claimed for widespread publicinscriptions in Hungarian (road inscriptions, public institutions as schools, libraries,police departments), which triggered the response on nationalist Romanians whomade great efforts to suspend the regulations6. The effectiveness of posting bilingualinscriptions varies from one district to another. On the one hand, many on the roadinscriptions in Hungarian, for example, have been destroyed during night-time, but

1 Ibidem, p. 642.2 M.A. WATERBURY. ”Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion: Diaspora Politics and Party-

Building Strategies in Post-Communist Hungary”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 20,no. 3, 2006, pp. 483-515; A. BATORY, ”Kin-state Identity in the European Context: Citizenship,Nationalism and Constitutionalism in Hungary”, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 16, no. 1, 2010,pp. 31-48.

3 M.A. WATERBURY. ”Internal Exclusion, External Inclusion…cit.”, p. 484.4 C. IORDACHI, ”The Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation Process, 1994-2001: From

Conflict to Cooperation”, Romanian Journal of Political Science, vol. 1, no. 3-4, 2001, pp. 88-133.5 M. CHIRIAC, Provocă rile diversităţii. Politici publice privind minorităţile na ţionale şi religioaseîn România, Etnocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2005.

6 Gabriel ANDREESCU, Ruleta. Români şi maghiari, 1990-2000, Polirom, Iaşi, 2001.



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some Romanian inscriptions have been destroyed too. On the other hand, the lack ofcooperation of many local elites and inadequate funding remain constant pitfalls. Theresponsiveness of local leaders generally depends on their political affiliation and onthe degree of cooperation between Romanian and Hungarian political parties’ elitesand central leaderships1. The legal disposition was generally implemented only inthe areas where Hungarians formed a majority or which had DAHR mayors at thetime2. Local authorities refuse sometimes to put in place legal requirements, claimingthat minorities do not trespass (anymore) the 20% threshold, and do not replace the bilingual inscription that have been destroyed3.

Another highly symbolic issue in Transylvania are road touristic inscriptionsthat mark specific ethnic geographies. Covasna county-council, the governing bodyof Covasna county in Transylvania, decided to set up eight road touristic inscriptionsat the county borders, marking the entry into the so called Szeklerland (”Szekelyfold”in Hungarian and ”Ţinutul Secuiesc” in Romanian). The denomination recalls themedieval administrative organization of Transylvania, when Szeklers, a Hungarianpopulation defending the Eastern borders of the Hungarian kingdom, benefited of fullautonomy4. The decision of the county-council, dominated by ethnic Hungarian electedofficials, was criticized by local ethnic Romanian elites because of its symbolic ethnicconnotation and the advertising panel was quickly removed by the Romanian StateRoad Company. Subsequently, the road company refused to deliver the compulsorytechnical documentation for the advertising panels demanded by Covasna county-council and blocked any other attempt to set up similar advertising panels. Theofficial motivation of the state road company was largely symbolic, meaning that theadvertising panel was set against the principles of the Romanian unitary state.

The Use of Hungarian Language in Public Schoolsand Universities

Hungarian community’s willingness to benefit of separate schools after decadesof forced ethnic cohabitation during communist rule is not easy to accept by ethnicRomanian community in Transylvania. On the one hand, new schools have to be built, especially where old public buildings have been returned to one communityor another according to the property restitution act. This is often the case of old buildings in Transylvanian towns that have been returned to Hungarian churches.

They are generally situated at the center of historical towns like Timişoara, Cluj, Arad,Braşov, Oradea. Moving Romanian schools to city periphery would mean to acceptthe symbolic primacy of Hungarian education. This is so sensitive because ethnicRomanian elites in Transylvania struggled for centuries to promote Romanian culture

1 Catherine KETTLEY, ”Ethnicity, Language and Transition Politics in Romania…cit.”,p. 259.

2 D. CHIRIBUC Ă, T. MAGYARI, ”The Impact of Minority Participation in RomanianGovernment”, in Monica ROBOTIN, Levente SALAT (eds.), A New Balance: Democracy and

Minorities in Post-Communist Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2003, p. 84.3 István HORVÁTH, ”Evaluarea politicilor lingvistice din România”, cit.4 G. KRISTÓ, Histoire de la Hongrie médiévale, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes,

2000; Paul LENDVAI, The Hungarians…cit.



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and to equal other national cultures in the region, especially Austrian and Hungarianones1. On the other hand, ethnically separating the mixed schools is often seen byethnic Romanians as granting too much autonomy for the Hungarian educationin the overall framework of the unitary and national Romanian state, as well as aninadequate measure to support ”multiculturalism”. Thus, one could notice frequentprotests from Romanian teachers and pupils when it comes to start using separateschool buildings in various towns in the region. Yet the willingness to keep linguisticmixed universities often triggers the protests of Hungarian ethnic students andteachers, as it occurred at the bilingual state university ”Babeş-Bolyai” in Cluj.

This modern Transylvanian university was founded in Cluj by the Hungarianstate, following the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the formal politicalunification of Hungary with Transylvania. The end of the First World War led to thedismantling of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the unification of Transylvaniawith Romania. One of the top priorities for the new authorities was to take overcontrol of the university. When the university with Romanian language of instructionwas established in 1919, the Hungarian university was symbolically and officiallytransferred to Szeged, in the Republic of Hungary, but all the patrimonial goods of theformer remained in Cluj, at the disposal of the new Romanian University. After theSecond World War, as a testimony of friendship and cooperation between workers’parties from communist Romania and communist Hungary, a state university withHungarian language of instruction was established for a brief period of time underthe name of the illustrious Hungarian mathematician ”Janos Bolyai”. In the aftermathof the Hungarian anti-communist revolution in 1956, the Romanian communistregime decided to merge the Hungarian university with the Romanian university”Victor Babeş” in a mixed university called ”Babeş-Bolyai” University (BBU). Since

that institutional merger, the Hungarian speaking students and teachers benefit onlyof specific chairs inside mixed faculties, and not of fully autonomous departmentsand faculties.

The possibility of self-organization for Hungarian speaking faculties or eventhe creation of a separate university is a constant debate inside and outside ”Babeş-Bolyai” University. Despite political negotiations between DAHR and the Romanianpolitical party in government, the ruling body of the university, dominated byethnic Romanian professors, rejected the autonomous organization of two facultiesthat encompass the current Hungarian chairs. The main argument of BBU ruling body is, except the threat to the scientific competitiveness, the preservation of

”multiculturalism”, which is said to be better promoted by the current organization ofchairs and faculties. The institutional pitfall thus triggered the response of Hungarianteachers and students from BBU, who protested on the streets of the city. Moreover,in response to the official argument of BBU regarding its ”multicultural” identity,two young Hungarian professors demanded that bilingual plates be installed insideBBU buildings that really express the willingness of Romanian teachers and studentsto share the public space with their Hungarian fellows. After being dismissed by theuniversity’s governing body, the Hungarian teachers were symbolically awardeda prize by a Hungarian foundation for their particular contribution in keeping theidentity of Hungarians in Romania.

1 Keith HITCHINS, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania…cit.



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CONCLUSION

Ethnically mixed areas are generally subject of ethnic conflict. Despite theprogress made in the last two decades and the success in avoiding open conflict and bloodshed, ethnic struggle between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania lately became symbolic and non-material. It now uses mechanisms of differentiation andpower in order to spatially mark the dominance of ethnic groups by items as flags,road signs, street names, churches and statues. Yet there are new symbolic issues,like territorial design and linguistic nationalism that overpass this spatial frameworkand affect the overall ethnic climate. Although the symbolic weight of ethnic issuesin Transylvania is overlooked by scholars and the general public, it could actually bethe key in comprehending and (partially) solving the conflict. Moreover, the ongoingsymbolic struggle has important consequences for the democratization process inRomania in terms of the consolidation of an autonomous and neutral public space.As it is a space of freedom, equality and dialogue, the public space is an essentialfeature of democratization, because it enables ethnic communities and citizens tofind the common grounds for political institutions and practices. In this respect, theBalkans are marked by a slower democratic transition, as it is complicated by cultural,religious and linguistic pluralism that affects state-building and nationhood.

Despite the reconciliation process between Hungary and Romania followingtheir equal accession into NATO and the European Union, political relations are stillmarked by recurrent crises that relate rather on symbolic issues than on practicalmatter. The controversial Hungarian Status Law designed to give a series of rightsin the kin country to Hungarian minority abroad raised the question regarding thesymbolic relationship between language, citizenship and privileged ties betweenethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and the Hungarian state. Although ethnic relationsin Transylvania have made an important progress since 1989, a step forward would be to agree on an overall power-sharing arrangement that guarantees significantminority rights, but also undeniable minority integration and loyalty. Until today,Hungarian minority had to defend its rights in every specific area by negotiatingwith various Romanian parties on power, yet it has no guarantee that already grantedminorities’ rights will not be restricted for the future.

The Europeanization of Eastern Europe seems to signify for many optimisticscholars the end of ethnic conflict. Salat and Enache even raised the question if onecould compare the Romanian-Hungarian relations to the historical French-GermanReconciliation1. We think that this optimist perspective largely overlooks the powerof ethnic symbolism in the region and the current mechanisms of ”ethnicisation” ofthe public sphere that are generally kept in a long-term status-quo, only for breakingout from time to time and returning to a precarious standstill. Taking them intoaccount might help us to better estimate ethnic struggle and democratization in thiscomplicated region of Transylvania.

1 Levente SALAT, Smaranda ENACHE (eds.), Romanian-Hungarian Relations and theFrench-German Reconciliation, Ethocultural Diversity Ressource Center Press, Cluj, 2004.



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L’imaginaire paysan comme «mémoire historique»

L’imaginaire paysan comme«mémoire historique»

Patrimoine et construction de l’identité nationalepar le biais des musées centraux

SONIA CATRINA

Introduction

Nous proposons dans cette étude une analyse des formes d’institutionnalisation del’identité nationale1. Notre problématique interroge les actions patrimoniales relevantde la sphère savante et le sens que le patrimoine2 revêt selon la qualité des acteursqui détiennent la contrainte mémorielle, désignant, conservant et valorisant commepatrimoine ce qu’ils considèrent comme «bien commun». Nous nous proposons doncd’analyser les assises de la «mémoire» officielle/savante, ainsi que les fonctions dela sélection patrimoniale par rapport à la construction d’une identité nationale. Danscette perspective, nous saisissons le patrimoine dans ses attributs de «bien collectif»3,incarnant des attributs identitaires de l’État-nation.

Comment réalise-t-on la patrimonialisation en Roumanie à l’époque des idéologies

nationalistes4

? Que désignent les «catégories d’objets» et «mémoire» retenus? Quelle

1 On reprend l’idée formulée par Cristian PREDA, «La nation dans la constitution», inNation and National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects, New Europe College, Bucarest, 2001,pp. 390-445/p. 414, selon laquelle le concept d’identité participe «décisivement à la déterminationde l’État comme État national».

2 Dans la législation relative au patrimoine, la notion de patrimoine culturel se réfère à uninventaire de structures matérielles et immatérielles qui doivent être collectées, inventoriées,examinées, présentées au public, conservées dans des institutions spécialisées légiférées parl’État, telles les musées. Le patrimoine est ainsi assimilé aux objets du passé, conservés pour ne

pas être oubliés. Étant un instrument de reconstruction de la mémoire identitaire, il s’imposeune étude des «productions patrimoniales» en rapport avec les différentes temporalités (notrechoix méthodologique concerne le XIXe-XXe siècle qui correspond à l’époque de constitutionet consolidation de l’État-nation) et en fonction des différents territoires (conçus au niveaunational), mises en perspective avec le jeu d’acteurs, dans ce cas institutionnels et politiques.Notre approche s’avère fidèle à la conception de Michel RAUTENBERG, «L’émergencepatrimoniale de l’ethnologie: entre mémoire et politiques publiques», in Dominique POULOT(dir.), Patrimoine et modernité, Éd. Harmattan, Paris, 1998, pp. 279-289, selon laquelle le patrimoinerésulte de la relation que l’humain entretient avec le temps et l’ espace.

3 Michel RAUTENBERG, «L’émergence patrimoniale…cit.», p. 282.4 Le nationalisme est une idéologie née en Europe dans la première moitié du XIX e siècle. En

1882, Ernest RENAN, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation!?, et autres essais politiques, textes choisis et présentéspar Joël Roman, Presses Pocket, Paris, 1992 [1882], définit les normes de fonctionnement d’unenation constituée et consolidée. Selon lui, la Nation s’appuie sur le partage d’une langue et desvaleurs culturelles, la conscience d’une histoire commune. La Nation est «l’aboutissement d’un



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est la fonction du discours patrimonial à cette époque-là? Ces questions de la recherchenous encouragent à formuler notre hypothèse principale de travail: nous supposonsque les musées nationaux constituent des surfaces privilégiées d’inscription1 de la«mémoire-nation»2, révélant d’un certain genre d’accumulation qui fait sens pourl’État-nation sous laquelle une «mémoire» officielle prend corps.

Différents concepts nous ont permis d’appréhender le thème de la constructionidentitaire à l’aube de l’État-nation. Tout d’abord, Les lieux de mémoire ( 1997) de PierreNora nous ont aidé à concevoir le cadre théorique approprié à cette recherche. Le passagepar la notion de «mémoire-nation», marquant le moment de «prise de conscience» del’État (comme nation) d’une identité roumaine, est incontournable, de même que laréférence à un ouvrage tout aussi important selon lequel la longue durée est constituéede différents régimes d’historicité3. Ces références nous aident à interpréter la fonctionassurée à l’époque par les musées nationaux, un des «instruments d’exploration etde conservation de sa propre mémoire [il s’agit de la mémoire de l’État-Nation]»4.La «sélection patrimoniale» entreprise lors de l’avènement du nationalisme roumain,nous intéresse en tant que projet qui lie la «mémoire historique»5 à l’espace (conçu au

long passé»; ses membres possèdent en commun des souvenirs de solidarité: «avoir souffert, joui, espéré ensemble».

1 Nous avons repris le syntagme «surface d’inscription» de Françoise PAROUTY-DAVID, Mémoire et médiation paysagère. Nouveaux Actes Sémiotiques [en ligne]. Actes de colloques,2005, Paysages & valeurs: de la représentation à la simulation. Disponible sur: <http://revues.unilim.fr/nas/document.php?id=2384> (consulté le 13.01.2011).

2 Pierre NORA (dir.), «La nation-mémoire », in Les Lieux de mémoire, vol. 2, Gallimard,Paris, 1997, pp. 2207-2216/p. 2208.

3 Même s’il s’agit de l’idéaltype des régimes d’historicité au sens wébérien, la classification

de François HARTOG, Régimes d’historicité : Présentisme et expériences du temps, Seuil-La librairiedu XXe siècle, Paris, 2003, nous aide à extrapoler et couper la temporalité qui nous sert dansl’analyse: ce régime d’historicité correspond grosso modo à l’avènement du nationalisme roumain.La périodisation proposée s’oppose au «présentisme» débusqué par Hartog qui prend encompte le souvenir individuel comme forme d’invention de soi ou «la mémoire de la mémoire»(p. 138) en tant que manière de se définir et se raconter individuellement. Nous avons analysécertaines formes de cette mémoire de l’individu dans une étude des micro-musées relevantde la sphère privée (v. le chapitre consacré au paysan muséographe, intégré dans l’article«Les Musées: alternative démocratique à l’intolérance culturelle», in Georgeta GHEBREA(dir.), Şantiere de cercetare în ştiin ţele politice, Ed. Universităţii din Bucureşti, Bucureşti, 2010,pp. 11-48). Cette problématique, traitée aussi de façon transversale dans la thèse de doctorat

(Sonia CATRINA, «Nouveaux paysans» et pratiques touristiques dans les communautés rurales de Maramureş. Enjeux identitaires, recherche centrée sur l’étude du phénomène identitaire dans lecontexte des pratiques entreprises en présence du touriste, par la théâtralisation de la figuredu «paysan traditionnel», autrement dit par la récupération d’une identité mythologisée, etsa présentation mimétique devant les touristes) a récemment fait l’objet de la journée d’étude«Communication et identités: (en)jeux des représentations» organisé le 7 mai 2010 au sein dela FMSH d’Aquitaine, où nous avons présenté la communication: «Le „Paysan“-muséographe:le cas des micro-musées».

4 Pierre NORA, «La nation-mémoire…cit», p. 2209.5 L’usage de la notion de « mémoire historique » implique le rejet de la notion de «mémoire

sociale». Les deux termes sont utilisés par Michel RAUTENBERG, «L’émergence patrimoniale

de l’ethnologie…cit.», p. 282, qui, en ayant comme point de départ de sa réflexion le discours deMaurice Halbwachs, fait cette distinction et prend en compte à côté de l’idée du «patrimoine»comme «catégorie définie a priori par la science ou l’administration», le point de vue desindigènes (acteurs locaux) dans le choix des éléments à patrimonialiser. Pour cette analyse,



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niveau national) et aux objets (qui méritent d’entrer dans le champ patrimonial duà construire de l’identité collective), ensuite comme vision de l’histoire qui désigneles représentations officielles relatives à une identité commune aux Roumains àl’intérieur de leur État-nation1.

Notre choix concernant la circonscription de l’analyse des enjeux du patrimoinerelevant de la sphère savante dans des musées centraux repose principalement surl’idée que le patrimoine est une «ressource identitaire» qui suscite des «processusd’appropriation». Le choix des deux musées ancrés dans l’enceinte du cerveaupolitique et administratif du pays, donc dans la capitale (Bucarest), à savoir le Muséedu Paysan Roumain et le Musée du Village «Dimitrie Gusti», a été fait en fonction deleur caractère national et de leur ancienneté (les deux datent du début du XXe siècle),ainsi que de la construction d’un patrimoine autour d’un même symbole: le Paysan. Lerecentrage sur les musées en question, dont l’image commune puise dans l’imageriepaysanne, cependant recensée différemment selon les logiques patrimoniales dechacune de ces deux institutions de culture, va nous donner une image de la «mémoire

historique» retenue en Roumanie à l’époque de formation et consolidation de l’Étatroumain ayant comme base de fonctionnement une idéologie nationaliste.Notre analyse concernant la fabrication d’une identité nationale et sa «muséification»

s’appuie sur l’analyse des logiques patrimoniales «savantes» en fonction desquelleson procède à une sélection d’«objets patrimoniaux» censés représenter la Nation.Dans un premier temps, nous présentons quelques considérations générales autourdes critères de découpage identitaire des Roumains. Ensuite, nous examinons lescirconstances de la naissance des projets muséaux, de même que des réflexionssavantes autour de la culture populaire. On continue par un examen des assises dela «mémoire-nation» à travers une analyse des éléments de la sélection patrimoniale

entreprise par les deux musées en question. En fin de compte, nous explorons leslogiques de cette praxis patrimoniale s’étant inscrite dans la mémoire collective desRoumains et puisant ses références aux sources paysannes.

Considérations autour de la «construction nationale»des Roumains

Les critères selon lesquels on a réalisé la «construction nationale» des Roumainsdessinent les frontières d’un État-nation qui se cherche des racines et souhaite fonder

de l’unité. Un premier exemple de «construction nationale» qui nous vient à l’espritfait référence au domaine linguistique, la langue étant «l’un des facteurs essentielsautour desquels se construit le sentiment identitaire»2. Le latin, introduit dès le

c’est à l’échelle nationale que le patrimoine est reconstitué pour construire de l’identité, leslogiques individuelles n’étant pas prises en compte, ce qui nous permet d’utiliser la notion de« mémoire historique».

1 Les logiques qui président à la production de l’identité nationale roumaine ont fait l’objetde recherche de plusieurs chercheurs tels que: Şerban Angelescu, Horia Bernea, Bianca Botea,

Otilia Hedeşan, Claude Karnoouh, Szabo Levente, Marianne Mesnil, Vintilă Mih ăilescu, IrinaNicolau, Ioana Popescu, Anca Stere, Katherine Verdery (cités par ordre alphabétique) etc.2 Marianne MESNIL, «Anthropologie de l’Europe et les Balkans», in Maria BULGARU

(dir.), Elemente de antropologie, Chişinău, 2007, pp. 15-90/p. 26.



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XVIIe siècle, toutefois définitivement adopté au XIX e siècle, «suite aux mouvements deprise de conscience d’une identité culturelle et politique du peuple roumain (volontéde rattachement avec la latinité romaine)»1 est gage de l’unité nationale. Le rejet duslavon2 (en réalité ayant eu une influence considérable dans la religion orthodoxe pourles peuples de langues indo-européennes, tel les Principautés roumaines, la Moldavieet la Valachie, jusqu’à la fin du XVe siècle quand l’Église grecque de Constantinopleprend les relais) ne se justifie que dans la perspective de construction d’un État-nation pour lequel la «construction identitaire» passe par l’unification linguistique.Néanmoins, inculquer une «conscience nationale» renvoie non seulement à uneunité linguistique, mais aussi au partage d’une histoire commune. L’ethnogenèseroumaine, résultat de la synthèse daco-romaine et de l’assimilation des différentssubstrats migratoires (à noter l’influence de l’Empire byzantin dont les Roumainsont hérité la foi orthodoxe3, à plus de 85%, composante identitaire importante del’État-nation qui trouve souvent des assises dans la religion), est soutenue par despreuves archéologiques, ethnographiques et anthropologiques, de même que pardes mentions documentaires (il faut rappeler au XVe siècle l’apport des humanistesérudites occidentaux tels que Poggio Bracciolini et Enea Silvio Piccolomini, de mêmeque des chroniqueurs roumains tel Grigore Ureche au XVIIe siècle, Miron Costin,Constantin Cantacuzino et Dimitrie Cantemir vers le XVIIIe siècle, tous 4 engagés dansla défense de l’origine latine de la langue materne). Un autre exemple d’une telle«construction» nous renvoie aux vestiges archéologiques des forteresses daces desMonts Orăştie. Témoins de l’élément autochtone géto-dace (substrat fondamental del’ethnogenèse), ces vestiges vont dans ce sens de reconstitution des origines d’uneidentité roumaine. Le mythe des «Grands ancêtres», à l’exemple de Trajan, l’empereurromain ayant civilisé les géto-daces, fait référence à la fois à cet élément autochtone et«à „l’ancêtre fondateur“, un héros venu d’ailleurs, et qui apporte des biens et valeursculturelles qui en font un „héros civilisateur“»5.

Cette courte incursion dans les assises identitaires de l’État-nation roumainnous indique une «construction identitaire» vue comme un processus complexe. Ceprocessus repose grosso modo sur des critères de réflexion autour de la constitutiond’un territoire, des ascendants d’un peuple, des métamorphoses de sa langue, de sadimension transcendantale ou son «cachet spirituel»6.

1 Ibidem, p. 29.2 Selon Al. PIRU, Literatura română veche , Editura pentru literatură, Bucureşti, 1962, p. 6,

le slavon a été même la langue officielle dans la période feudale précoce «qui va du Xe

siècle,quand nous avons les premières attestations des maîtres feudaux sur le territoire roumain, jusqu’au XIVe siècle, quand se constituent les États féodaux de la Valachie et de la Moldavie».Vers la fin du XIVe siècle, le slavon «n’est pas seulement la langue de l’Église, mais aussi de lachancellerie des Voïvodes et des cours des boyards» (p. 7). Le slavon, utilisé comme langue dela littérature religieuse du XVe siècle (Filotei, Nicodim, Grigore Ţamblac) sera délaissé au profitde l’utilisation d’une langue roumaine d’origine latine vers la fin du XVIe siècle (les impressionsCoresi sont les premières attestations de l’usage de cette langue).

3 Selon Cristian PREDA, «La nation…cit.», p. 410, «l’image du peuple roumain comme„peuple né chrétien“» est un discours récurent de l’État national.

4 Auteurs cités par Maria CVASNÂI-C ĂTĂNESCU, Limba română . Origini şi dezvoltare,

Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1996, pp. 40-41.5 Marianne MESNIL, «Anthropologie de l’Europe…cit.», p. 31.6 Lucian BOIA, «La fin de la Nation», in Nation and National Ideology…cit., pp. 16-27/

p. 27.



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Préoccupations autour de la «question paysanne» et naissancedes projets muséaux

Ayant comme point de départ de notre analyse l’approche anthropologique du«principe nationaliste» proposé par Ernest Gellner1 selon lequel la constitution de

l’État-nation suppose la congruence de l’unité politique avec l’unité culturelle, nousnous intéressons aux formes roumaines de ce principe. Selon Alexandru Zub:

«Nation, culture et identité forment […] une triade mise toujours enquestion, quel que soit l’ordre des termes, car on peut partir du problème del’identité pour aboutir à la culture et à la nation, tout comme on peut prendre laculture pour arrière-plan afin d’investiguer l’identité nationale»2.

On envisage donc un des éléments de cette triade, son aspect culturel, sous laforme du patrimoine culturel national, car selon nous le «principe nationaliste» peut

être atteint au moment de mise au jour de ce patrimoine.Aller au rebours des réflexions autour de la constitution d’un patrimoine censéreprésenter l’État-nation signifie s’intéresser aux formes pionnières de ses articulations.Il est connu qu’en Roumanie, l’idée d’organiser un musée en plein air date depuis leXIXe siècle, quand on se rend compte de l’affaiblissement de l’art populaire et dessavoir-faire traditionnels. En effet, on doit le retour à la culture paysanne et auxsavoir-faire domestiques «concurrencés par des produits étrangers (à la mode et beaucoup moins chers étant obtenus de façon industrielle)», à Al.I. Cuza qui «donneen 1863 un décret pour l’organisation d’une exposition axée sur des produits del’industrie domestique paysanne»3. En réponse à ce décret, le 20 mai 1863, à Obor,

voit l’ouverture une exposition nationale sous la direction de Ion Ionescu de la Brad,qui englobe de tels éléments4. C’est toujours la réussite d’Al.I. Cuza d’avoir organiséle Musée National d’Antiquités par le décret de 25 novembre 1864, ancêtre du futurMusée National d’Art décoratif, lui-même descendant de «l’ancien Musée d’histoirenaturelle et d’archéologie qui a pris naissance le 3 novembre 1834 par un décret signépar le Voïévode Alexandru Ghica»5. En même temps, c’est la période d’affirmation

1 Dans la conception d’Ernest GELLNER, Na ţionalimul, trad. roum. Anton Lepădatu, Ed.Incitatus, Bucureşti, 2001[1997], p. 11: «Le nationalisme est un principe politique qui soutient

que la similarité de la culture est le liant social fondamental. Quelques soient les principesd’autorité qui existent entre les hommes pour être légitimes, ceux-ci dépendent du fait que lesmembres du groupe en cause appartiennent à la même culture (ou, selon l’idiome nationaliste,à la même „nation“). Dans sa version extrême, la similarité de la culture devient une conditiontant nécessaire que suffisante pour la légitimité de l’appartenance comme membre».

2 Alexandru ZUB, «Nation et identité ethnoculturelle à l’époque de la mondialisation», inNation and National Ideology…cit., pp. 50-61/p. 55.

3 http://www.muzeultaranuluiroman.ro/istoric.html (consulté le 25.01.2011).4 Renseignements recueillis sur le site de présentation du Musée du Paysan Roumain de

Bucarest (MTR): http://www.muzeultaranuluiroman.ro/istoric.html (consulté le 25.01.2011).5 http://www.scritube.com/istorie/Muzeul-National-de-Antichitati15182425.php

(consulté le 25.01.2011). Il faut toutefois rappeler la contribution de ses premiers donateurs, leBan Mihalache Ghica dont la collection comprenait en grande mesure des objets d’archéologie,de même que le Général Nicolae Mavros collectionnant de nombreuses pièces antiques (auteurscités sur le site ci-dessus).



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des premières collections privées, expositions nationales et internationales. En 1864,le Lieutenant-colonel Dimitrie Pappasoglu avait organisé un musée modeste dansun des pavillons de sa maison avec des objets qui vont entrer dans les collections duMusée National d’Art décoratif de Bucarest. Un an plus tard, en 1867, Al. Odobescu aparticipé à l’Exposition Internationale de Paris avec un habitat paysan pour illustrerla façon dont le paysan s’est adapté aux conditions du milieu et à l’histoire, «touten créant un espace confortable». Le Musée National d’Antiquités organisera en1875, à la proposition de Titu Maiorescu, une section «où sont exposés des élémentsd’art textile réalisés dans le pays: vêtements, tapis, tissus en lin etc.». Cette sectionenglobant des costumes populaires, de même que différents produits artisanaux,offre les prémisses d’un musée national d’ethnographie qui voit le jour en 1906 sousla direction de l’historien d’art Alexandre Tzigara-Samurcaş. Une maison paysanne etun ensemble d’objets domestiques paysans vont constituer l’exposition permanentedu Musée National d’Art décoratif de Bucarest, précurseur du Musée du PaysanRoumain d’aujourd’hui. Dans les années ’30 du même siècle, voit naissance un autreprojet muséal: Musée du Village «Dimitrie Gusti»,

«résultat des recherches [ ] théoriques et de terrain, de même qu’apport desexpériences muséographiques, de plus d’une décennie, coordonnées par leprofesseur Dimitrie Gusti, fondateur de l’École sociologique de Bucarest»1.

L’époque qui voit naître le projet des musées centraux se rattache donc aumoment suivant à la création de la État roumain en tant que Nation2, plus précisémentà la période qui va de la fin du XIXe siècle vers le début du XX e siècle, alors quedes articulations pionnières autour d’un patrimoine rural, ou bien des ancêtresconstituant l’«arbre généalogique»3 de tels musées nationaux, sont à situer au débutdu XIXe siècle.

Articulations savantes autour de la culture populaire

Dans la section précédente nous avons décrit le cheminement des projets muséauxdès formes naissantes (dont l’«objet d’étude» n’était pas clairement délimité), auxconfigurations muséales bien démarquées par rapport à la thématique retenue. Ils’ensuit maintenant d’analyser les formes savantes des réflexions autour de la culturepopulaire, dont l’intérêt n’est pas né du jour au lendemain.

Un panorama de cet intérêt à situer dans le temps, nous indique un premiermoment, pionnier, selon nous, pour les articulations suivantes de la culture populaire:la mise en forme d’une philosophie sociale qui contient des réflexions quant au rural4 vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle 5 allant jusqu’au début du XIX e. Ce genre de philosophieva donner naissance au «paşoptism» (1830-1860), courant idéologique qui désigne

1 http://www.muzeul-satului.ro/muzeu_istoric.php (consulté le 25.01.2011).2 La création de l’État roumain moderne (réalisée en deux étapes) date du XX e siècle

quand la Valachie et la Moldavie, anciennes Principautés médiévales réunies en 1859, se sont

rattachées à la Transylvanie en 1918.3 Selon l’expression d’Irina Nicolau citée sur le site de présentation du MTR.4 Traian VEDINA Ş, Introducere în sociologia rurală , Polirom, Iaşi, 2001, p. 9.5 C’est l’époque de la pénétration dans les Principautés roumaines des idées illuministes.



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le mouvement démocratique et révolutionnaire qui précède la Révolution de 1848et prépare l’Union des Principautés roumaines (1859). S’inspirant de l’époquefrançaise des Lumières1 et de ses idéaux d’émancipation et de progrès, cette périodede l’histoire roumaine est marquée par l’affirmation de l’esprit national, la confiancedans les valeurs traditionnelles populaires, dans l’histoire et le folklore roumain. Cemouvement de prise de conscience d’une nationalité roumaine s’étant alimentée aux

idées des Lumières en général et de la Révolution française en particulier s’inscritd’ailleurs dans le mouvement d’unité nationale en Europe, associé, dans le contextede l’époque, aux idées d’émancipation. Le «paşoptism», promoteur de telles idéesd’émancipation et de libération, est suivi par le «romantisme littéraire, scientifique etmilitant», moment indissociablement lié au processus d’édification de l’État modernefondé sur une Nation politique, mais aussi culturelle. La «question paysanne» seratraitée au niveau politique, dans le cadre d’une doctrine libérale. La figure prééminentede cette doctrine appelée à améliorer la situation des paysans fut Mihail Kogălniceanu.C’est le moment de consolidation des philosophies sociales et d’apparition desidéologies socialistes. Le libéralisme et les doctrines socialistes qui lui suivent,

telles que le «să

mănă

torism», construit au début du XX

e

siècle autour de la figurede Nicolae Iorga autour de la valorisation des traditions historiques et folkloriques,des valeurs nationales, de la lutte de libération nationale, et le «poporanism», édifiéen 1890 par Constantin Stere qui a fondé toute une idéologie autour du conceptd’unicité de la civilisation roumaine, qu’il exalte comme authentique, le peuple seconfondant avec sa classe la plus nombreuse la paysannerie, contribuent à la naissancedes réflexions sociologiques. L’intérêt pour le rural, la recherche de la culture et laspécificité des paysans du début du XXe siècle, l’époque du «Printemps des peuples»selon l’expression de Marianne Mesnil2, se concrétise au niveau de l’ethnographieet du folklore, réunis au début sous le chapeau de la «sociologie monographique».La fondation de l’École Sociologique de Bucarest sous la direction de Dimitrie

Gusti mène à la réalisation de nombreuses synthèses à caractère interdisciplinaire.L’approche de ces recherches est holiste, les communautés rurales étant vues comme«totalités humaines à spécifique local et régional»3. Les premières exégèses d’Henri H.Stahl, Traian Herseni et Mircea Vulcănescu ont comme principe de travail la méthodemonographique et les campagnes de recherche empirique4. Selon Gusti, la méthodede la monographie sociologique devait recueillir les caractéristiques nationales,fondement de la politique de la culture et d’un État culturel. L’ethnographie et lefolklore, sciences du peuple, ont eu un rôle important dans la production, la définitionet l’étiquetage d’une identité collective roumaine. Leur approche se superpose sur la«définition nationaliste des identités politiques comme identités culturelles»5 fondées

1 Certaines œuvres de Voltaire sont traduites et répandues en Moldavie et Valachie dès1772 (v. Al. PIRU, Literatura…cit., p. 541), tout comme le roman les Aventures de Télémaque (1699)dont Fénelon, son auteur, est considéré comme le précurseur des idées illuministes françaisesdu XVIIIe siècle par la tolérance et l’humanité promues dans les pages de cet ouvrage ( ibidem,p. 542). Enciclopedia, «l’œuvre fondamentale de la philosophie illuministe française» (ibidem,p. 543), ou la philosophie allemande de Baumeister, Wolff et Hellmuth sont répandues dans lesPrincipautés roumaines sous formes de traductions vers la fin du XVIIIe-le début du XIXe siècle.

2 Marianne MESNIL, «Anthropologie de l’Europe…cit.», p. 16.3 Traian VEDINA Ş, Introducere…cit., p. 11.4

V. à ce titre l’analyse élaborée par Traian VEDINA Ş, Introducere…cit.5 Alain BABADZAN, «Les usages sociaux du patrimoine» in Ethnologie comparée, no. 2- Miroirs identitaires, CERCE, printemps 2001, pp. 1-8/p. 3, http://alor.univ-montp3.fr/cerce/revue.htm (consulté le 15.01.2011)



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sur la «folklorisation» et la «patrimonialisation des cultures populaires». D’ailleurs,«le XXe siècle 1 abonde des recherches des ethnographes, ethnologues et folkloristes,tous cantonnés dans la réinvention du village traditionnel par le biais des ouvrages etdes musées»2. La patrimonialisation de la culture populaire (rurale) trouve des assisesscientifiques dans l’ethnographie et le folklore. On peut donc considérer que les deuxsciences sociales en question, tout comme des idéologies nationalistes de l’époque,

agissent dans cette direction de folklorisation des cultures populaires et muséificationdu Paysan, considéré comme dépôt d’authenticité et d’identité culturelle nationale. Enliaison avec cette idée, Vintilă Mih ăilescu considère que:

«L’ethnographie et le folklore appartiennent historiquement plutôt à lagrande famille des „ethnologies nationales“», voire des „sciences nationales“ auservice de la nation, ayant comme objet d’intérêt le Paysan»3.

Marianne Mesnil, quant à elle, considère que:

«Les traditions populaires, les croyances et pratiques liées à une culturepaysanne de type oral, n’ont été prises en considération qu’au moment où l’idéede culture populaire, de patrimoine oral propre à un peuple, est apparue commeune nécessité pour mobiliser au niveau politique les spécificités nationalessusceptibles de servir d’arguments aux revendications des nouveaux États-nations […] La recherche des racines (à travers les cultures populaires) fait alorspartie des préoccupations de l’époque»4.

1 En opposition, le XXI e siècle, marqué par l’avènement de l’anthropologie culturelle enRoumanie, donne lieu à des réflexions concernant les «productions culturelles» (expressionreprise de Maria GRAVARI BARBAS, Philippe VIOLIER, (dir.), Lieux de culture, culture deslieux. Production(s) culturelle(s) locale(s) et émergence des lieux: dynamiques, acteurs, enjeux, PressesUniversitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2003, p. 9) paysannes et leur «marketisation» par la «miseen scène» et le «jeu de se représenter» (Erving GOFFMAN, La mise en scène de la vie quotidienne,vol. 1-2, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris, 1973; IDEM, Les rites d’interaction, Les Éditions de Minuit,Paris, 1974) devant l’Autre (le touriste). De plus, l’intérêt pour le champ du patrimoine donnenaissance à des préoccupations scientifiques dans le domaine de l’anthropologie culturelle,pas encore très répandues dans l’espace roumain des recherches, le thème faisant l’objet dequelques études éparses de master ou de doctorat. Les appropriations du patrimoine restent

donc des territoires encore assez peu explorés. Représentatif pour l’anthropologie culturelleest l’anthropologue Vintilă Mih ăilescu qui a fait de l’identité l’une des thèmes de rechercheprivilégiés. Le projet «Patrimoine et identité locale» démarré dans le cadre du Musée du PaysanRoumain de Bucarest sous sa direction, de même que l’initiation des Conférences «de la Şosea»,dues à réaliser «une discussion sincère et réaliste par rapport à ce qui arrive présentementdans le village roumain au niveau social, économique, culturel, artistique» (Vintilă Mih ăilescu,entretien du 23 septembre 2005, http://www.zf.ro/ziarul-de-duminica/o-traditie-nu-moare-pentru-ca-este-prin-definitie-vie-2887380/, consulté le 9.09.2010), favorise l’entrée du patrimoinedans un débat publique.

2 Traian VEDINAS, Introducere…cit., p. 143.3 Vintil ă MIH ĂILESCU, «Quelle anthropologie pour quelle société? Société postpaysanne

et ethnologie postnationale en Roumanie», in Anthropologie et Sociétés: Mondes socialistes et (post)-socialistes, vol. 32, nos 1-2, 2008, pp. 217-239/p. 238, http://www.erudit.org/revue/as/2008/v32/n1-2/018890ar.html#re1no16 (consulté le 25.01.2011).

4 Marianne MESNIL, «Anthropologie de l’Europe…cit.», p. 16.



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La recherche d’une définition de son identité, entreprise par l’État-nation roumain,s’inscrit dans la marche générale de l’époque quand, les États, en quête d’une nouvelleforme de légitimité, trouvent une réponse dans les racines populaires, «productionà laquelle le Folklore a apporté une caution scientifique décisive»1. L’analyse desproductions des identités collectives amène Alain Babazdan à affirmer qu’il s’agissaitd’un phénomène ayant conquis toute l’Europe:

«Dans l’Europe entière, de l’Écosse aux Balkans, on part à la recherche de sesracines, celles du Volk ou de la nation. On les trouvera, comme chacun sait, chez lespaysans des contrées les plus reculées promus soudain au rang d’emblèmes vivantsde la nation, derniers dépositaires de l’authenticité et de l’identité culturelle nationale.Cette quête romantique, tout d’abord littéraire, puis scientifique et militante à la fois,est indissociable du processus d’édification d’un État moderne fondé sur la nationcomme communauté de culture, indissociable aussi de la volonté, politique, demontrer et de démontrer l’existence éternelle d’une nation culturelle déterminée par lapossession matérielle de traits culturels objectifs (au premier rang desquels la langue,mais aussi le costume, l’architecture) ou de pratiques chosifiables (danses, chants, etc.).

Des choses donc, et des symboles aussi, que des musées d’un nouveau genre vontdonner à voir, nouveaux temples où la nation se rendra un culte à elle-même»2.Inscrites dans ce courant idéologique européen, les actions de l’État roumain,

forgé en tant que nation politique et culturelle, font ainsi référence à un patrimoinenational construit autour de l’image du Paysan3 qui se constitue donc en racineidentitaire de toute une Roumanie. Le paysan, devenu figure emblématique de laculture nationale roumaine, sera «muséifié» afin que la Nation puisse faire son propreéloge. Le processus d’édification de l’État moderne fondé sur une Nation politique etculturelle, appuyée sur la patrimonialisation de la culture populaire rurale4, construitl’image de l’État roumain comme acteur principal du champ patrimonial. Il a investiavec de la valeur patrimoniale5 des objets paysans qu’il a «muséifiés» afin de rendre

compte de l’identité et de l’unité de la Nation.

1 Alain BABADZAN, «Les usages sociaux…cit.», p. 3.2 Ibidem, p. 3.3 Entre parenthèses, on se demande pourquoi les autres catégories sociales ne sont pas

retenues à l’époque comme enceinte de la «mémoire-nation»? En référence avec cette idée,l’anthropologue Vintilă Mih ăilescu, «Quelle anthropologie…cit.», p. 220, constate qu’«à l’aubede la construction nationale, les élites s’efforcent plutôt de gommer ou de réduire les différencesentre boyards et paysans libres pour renforcer ainsi l’image d’une culture nationale unitaire,plus proche d’un peuple rural générique».

4

À l’époque du régime communiste, socialiste, communiste ou totalitaire, selon les diversadjectifs en cours, le rapprochement entre Nation ou État et une culture paysanne renvoie àun jeu d’associations qui permet d’ancrer l’État-nation, par le biais d’une politique culturelle,dans une essence éternelle et inchangeable. Se profile alors en Roumanie l’affirmation d’unnationalisme qui, appuyé sur certaines dimensions de l’imagerie paysanne, celles qui n’étaientpas «obscurantisme et superstition» (Direction générale des Relations internationales duministère de la Culture, le Département pour l’intégration européenne, La politique culturelleen Roumanie, Rapport national inscrit dans le cadre du Programme «Évaluation des politiquesculturelles nationales» du Conseil de l’Europe, Division des politiques et de l’action culturelles,Conseil de la coopération culturelle, Strasbourg, 1999, p. 11), se recentre dans le culturalisme.Cela correspond à une conception de la nation et de l’identité nationale qui privilégie une

approche d’une culture «unifiée de l’homme nouveau» (ibidem) et façonnée comme interface detout un peuple.5 Cependant, il faut rappeler qu’il s’est à la fois investi dans la mise en valeur des monuments

comme témoin historique ou des édifices sacrés en tant que symbole de l’orthodoxie.



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Du paysan singulier au paysan universel:même symbole, double vision

Les collections rassemblées par le Musée d’art national, d’art décoratif etindustriel fondé par Alexandre Tzigara-Samurcaş (nommé à un moment donné de

son existence Musée d’ethnographie et d’art national, ensuite Musée d’ethnographieet d’art national Charles-Ier), seront organisées «en deux sections, d’ethnographieet d’art religieux»1. Alexandre Tzigara-Samurcaş accorde une importance accrueà la dimension religieuse de l’humain reflétée dans les objets y ramassés, de sortequ’«il demande même que les collections du musée des Antiquités nationales serattachant à la religion chrétienne soient reversées au musée qu’il dirige»2. AlexandreTzigara-Samurcaş construit donc une «idéologie autochtoniste» 3 autour des objetspatrimoniaux censés représenter l’identité nationale, qui s’organise sous deux paliers:on retient, d’un côté, des objets paysans faisant partie de l’espace domestique, del’autre côté, des objets en relation avec l’univers religieux du Paysan. La sélection des

objets patrimoniaux se réalise selon le critère principal de beauté. En se référant à lasélection patrimoniale entreprise dans cette période, Isabelle Longuet affirme que:

«L’intérêt pour la collecte d’objets de la vie rurale appuyée sur des élémentsayant constitué l’univers domestique paysan, ne reflète pas tant la volontéd’affirmer une culture populaire face à une culture savante que la recherche detraits culturels spécifiquement roumains pour affirmer la nation naissante»4.

En effet, les objets patrimoniaux y ramassés se constituent en «capital culturel»d’une Nation, alors que le Musée devient un espace privilégié d’inscription de la

«roumanité». Leur collecte se réalise en fonction des critères scientifiques tels que lesvaleurs esthétiques (car on distingue entre le beau et le laid, le musée recueillant desobjets d’art paysanne), l’ancienneté (l’ancien construit en opposition avec le moderne),ou les valeurs spirituelles (le Paysan de Tzigara-Samurcaş étant présenté, à travers lesobjets, comme un religieux).

Par rapport au Musée d’ethnographie et d’art national, le Musée du Villageroumain, résultat des campagnes5 de recherche organisées dans la période 1925-1935sous la direction de Gusti, chef de la Chaire de Sociologie de l’Université de Bucarest,

1

Isabelle LONGUET, «Le musée du Paysan roumain», Terrain, no. 21 - Liens de pouvoir , octobre 1993, mis en ligne le 15 juin 2007. URL: http://terrain.revues.org/index3078.html(Consulté le 25.01.2011), pp. 1-6/p. 2.

2 Ibidem, p. 2.3 Vintil ă MIH ĂILESCU, «Omul locului. Ideologie autohtonistă în cultura român ă», in

O. GROZA (dir.), Teritorii: scrieri şi descrieri, Paideia, Bucureşti, 2003, pp. 167-212.4 Isabelle LONGUET, «Le musée…cit.», p. 3.5 Les campagnes telles que les recherches menées dans les villages de: Goicea Mare,

Nerej, Fundu Moldovei, Drăguş, Runcu, Clopotiva, Şanţ, Dâmbovnic, Dragomireşti, Ruşeţu,se finalisaient avec des «expositions, certaines d’entre elles dans les villages étudiés, certainesd’autres dans les salles de cours de l’Université de Bucarest. À l’initiative de Gusti et de ses

collaborateurs, parmi lesquels H.H. Stahl, Mihai Pop, Traian Herseni, Anton Golopenţia,Mircea Vulcănescu, Gh. Focşa, ont été organisées deux expositions avec des intérieurs paysansornés avec des objets collectés dans les villages: l’une au siège de la Fondation Royale „lePrince Carol“ (1934), l’autre dans le Pavillon Royal du Parc Carol (1935), comme prélude du



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étant installé en plein air, la superficie plus large du terrain sur lequel il a été assembléa permis l’entier déplacement des foyers domestiques paysans, ainsi que leursannexes, leur intérieur intégralement reconstitué, et parfois leur accompagnementpar des églises, auberges (sorte de «crâşme»). Étant constitué selon le principe dumétavillage à identifier dans son aspect pavillonnaire, le Musée du Village roumain seveut une reconstitution de l’espace physique du village traditionnel roumain (d’ici et

d’ailleurs) regroupant les spécificités locales par régions. La question de la constructionpatrimoniale par l’intermédiaire de l’espace forge une image du patrimoine en tantque notion liée à des enjeux d’appropriation de l’espace. D’autre part, l’investissementidentitaire en référence au local permet l’ancrage dans un espace révélateur d’unstatus. Et le Paysan a été choisi encore une fois comme représentant d’une Nation.Et avec lui toute une imagerie associée à l’espace que le Paysan occupe (structurétantôt en fonction du statut des membres constituant une famille ou des générationsy abritées, tantôt en fonction de certaines croyances), de même que le poids statutaireauquel cette catégorie sociale fait référence. On est donc devant une même emblème,le Paysan, devenu symbole de la «roumanité», et une double vision: alors que le musée

fondé en 1906 met l’accent sur les valeurs étiques et esthétiques du Paysan roumain,le musée fondé en 1936 nous présente une image particularisante du Paysan roumainselon les différentes aires régionales. Aux valeurs universelles du Paysan de Tzigara-Samurcaş (beauté, religiosité) correspond la vision particularisante du Paysan deGusti (on restitue le particulier à l’unité). L’idéologie nationaliste de la fin du XIX e siècle correspond donc à une vision plus générale de l’unité: les choix patrimoniauxsont orientés de façon à effacer les particularités1. En tant que ressource identitaire,le patrimoine permet d’affirmer une spiritualité universelle, ce qui n’est pas le caspour l’autre discours muséographique du début du XXe siècle qui conçoit l’unitédans certaines de ses parties, bien que ce soit une unité réduite à une catégorie socialedominante. Et au-delà de toute cette image repose un symbole dominant: le Paysan!

Pourquoi localiser la mémoire collective dans le Paysan?

Arrivée à ce point de notre analyse du rôle des musées nationaux dans laconstruction d’une mémoire collective, nous sommes incitée à nous demanderpourquoi le récit identitaire muséal, tout comme celui des disciplines sociales, est-il orientée vers le Paysan? Et comment arrive-il que le Paysan soit-il érigé en figureemblématique du «roumanisme»?

Selon nous, les réponses à cette question se trouvent dans l’idée selon laquelleen Roumanie, la consolidation d’un passé collectif et son identification avec l’État-nation fait partie du processus d’acquisition d’une identité sociale. À l’heure où lesPrincipautés roumaines se cherchaient des racines identitaires communes, ce processusoffre la possibilité de «localiser» l’identité collective de la Roumanie naissante dans lacatégorie sociale des Paysans, représentative pour un pays majoritairement rural. Àce titre, Marianne Mesnil2 considère que:

futur musée en plein air de Bucarest» (cf. à http://www.muzeul-satului.ro/muzeu_istoric.php(consulté le 25.01.2011).

1

Référence aux particularités ethniques.2 Marianne MESNIL, «Histoire tourmentée d’un „lieu de mémoire“: le Musée du PaysanRoumain avant, pendant, après le communisme», Martor. Revue d’anthropologie du Musée du paysan Roumain, no. 11 - Musées et société, 2006, pp. 33-48/p. 35.



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«Dans la mesure où la paysannerie constitue encore la majeure partie de lapopulation du territoire à raison de 90%, c’est son image qui est mobilisée poursoutenir l’idée d’unité nationale».

Malgré cela, en ce qui nous concerne, la représentativité de cette catégorie socialene représente pas une réponse satisfaisante à la question du choix patrimonial dontla source est l’héritage paysan. L’explication doit être beaucoup plus complexe. Selonnous, l’imagerie paysanne conçue comme patrimoine national est une constructionidéologique exprimant le rôle d’une catégorie sociale (effectivement majoritaire),dans le tissu social du pays. L’identité paysanne affichée et revendiquée à travers lepatrimoine représente une forme de «capital social» qui permet son appropriationcollective. La reprise du concept de «capital social» de l’approche sociologique,que l’on utilise dans cette analyse, nous permet de considérer les Paysans commedétenteurs de valeurs similaires et stockeurs d’«éléments positifs institués par lacommunauté»1. Ces valeurs positives, constituées en «capital social» d’une catégoriesociale, entrent dans un enjeu national à travers le processus de «patrimonialisation»et érigent le Paysan en symbole d’une Nation, la Nation roumaine. Étendre lesvaleurs d’une catégorie sociale à la totalité s’inscrit dans une conception holiste selonlaquelle l’individuel est subordonné à la totalité sociale. Néanmoins, au-delà de cettevision théorisée comme holiste, on comprend bien les connotations associées auPaysan: intégré dans un projet de construction identitaire nationale, le Paysan se doitlocaliser la «mémoire-historique» de l’État-nation non pas dans un statut social, maisplutôt dans les valeurs associées à lui. Son univers domestique se métamorphoseen art paysan, dont les spécialistes de la patrimonialisation apprécient la beauté etl’authenticité, et son éthique, telle la religiosité, se constitue en valeur nationale.

Conclusion

Cet article est parti du constat que les politiques mémorielles savantes depuisl’époque de construction, ensuite de consolidation, de l’État-nation se concentrentsur les cultures populaires et l’image du Paysan. Il s’agissait d’étudier comment lesmusées nationaux bucarestois s’inscrivaient dans ce processus de construction d’uneidentité nationale, autrement ancrée dans l’histoire (nous rappelons le «mythe desgrands ancêtres»), la langue (d’origine latine, le substrat slavon étant rejeté dans lesthèses linguistiques qui soutiennent la pureté de la langue roumaine), la religion(majoritairement orthodoxe ce qui implique le négation des religions des groupesethniques), et contribuait à forger le récit identitaire roumain par le biais des projetspatrimoniaux. Nous avons cherché à répondre à la question: quelle représentation lesmusées appelés dans notre analyse contribuent-ils à diffuser dans un contexte d’uneconstruction identitaire?

Nous avons rattaché la naissance des projets muséaux à la fin du XIXe siècle-audébut du XXe siècle, plus précisément le Musée du Paysan Roumain s’inscrit dansla période qui suit à l’union des Principautés roumaines (bien que les prémisses desa fondation aient des racines dans le XIXe siècle), alors que le Musée National du

1 Dumitru SANDU, Dezvoltare comunitară : cercetare, practică , ideologie, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005,p. 12.



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Village, appartient plutôt à la période de consolidation de l’État-nation. Dans cettepériode de construction nationale, les projets patrimoniaux lient: identité, mémoireet territoire. La mise en forme des éléments constituant cette triade correspond à lacollecte d’objets appartenant à la culture matérielle des Paysans. L’imaginaire paysanse constitue en capital culturel de l’État-nation, dont la valeur est déterminée et validéepar l’institution muséale, de même que la recherche ethnographique. Le Paysandevient de la sorte référence centrale de l’identité roumaine, et les musées en question«surface d’inscription» de la «mémoire-nation». Cette opération d’inscription de lamémoire collective dans la mémoire sociale est le produit d’une praxis d’accumulationd’un patrimoine paysan constitué en référence identitaire à partager par tous lesmembres de l’État-nation, au-delà de l’existence des autres catégories sociales dontle rôle est minimisé dans le processus de construction identitaire. Et la sociologie,en tant que «science de la nation, ancrée dans la connaissance du village», tellequelle était nommée par Gusti1, y a contribué par son centrage autour des culturespopulaires rurales, orientant la construction de l’identité nationale et transformant «lespopulations rurales, qui couvraient l’essentiel de l’espace national, en paysannerie,tout en l’imaginant comme sujet unitaire et central de la nation»2. Le Paysan seradonc transposé au musée afin que l’État-nation puisse «rendre culte» à lui-même.La fondation des premiers musées ethnographiques et la construction du discoursmuséographique agissent dans cette direction de muséification du Paysan roumainplacé dans son univers (matériel et spirituel). Considéré comme dépôt d’authenticitéet d’identité culturelle nationale, le Paysan devient, ainsi, figure emblématique de laculture nationale roumaine. Passé d’un enjeu social à un enjeu national, le Paysanse positionne comme le représentant d’une culture nationale. La culture populairedont il est le dépositaire, est «représentative du peuple tout entier, qui devient ainsi,d’une manière déclarative identitaire, un peuple-paysan»3. Ainsi, l’État, bénéficiant delégitimité devant le peuple, a-t-il pu inventer une mémoire collective et transformerles musées nationaux en «mémoire localisante» d’une nation.

L’étude du triptyque: identité-mémoire-territoire associé à l’État-nation, détenteurà l’époque du monopole des politiques mémorielles, et à l’institution muséale, surfaceprivilégiée d’inscription du récit savant de la culture, vise donc à rendre comptede la «mémoire-historique» retenue par un État-nation en train de (s’)élaborerune mémoire officielle qui témoigne de son unité. L’analyse des représentationsrelatives à l’identité de la Nation par des mécanismes étatiques responsables de laconstruction patrimoniale en Roumanie nous permet de parler d’un «centralismemémoriel»4 dont l’acteur dominant est l’État 5. Notre analyse de sélection d’objets

1 Dimitrie GUSTI, La science de la réalité sociale. Introduction à un système de sociologie,d’éthique et de politique, Plon, Paris, 1941, p. 41.

2 Vintil ă MIH ĂILESCU, «Quelle anthropologie…cit.», pp. 220-221.3 Ibidem, p. 221.4 Michel JOHANN, Gouverner les mémoires. Les politiques mémorielles en France , Presses

Universitaires de France, Paris, 2010, p. 49.5 À présent, il arrive que l’État roumain, longtemps le seul acteur dans le champ

patrimonial, après la chute du mur du Berlin et l’effondrement du communisme, n’a plus le

monopole de la contrainte mémorielle qui est concurrencé par une irruption des mémoires auniveau local à travers les actions individuelles de «collecte de mémoire» ramassée dans desmicro-musées privés. Le régime d’historicité, surinvesti par l’État roumain, laisse présentementle champ ouvert à la logique de l’action individuelle dont les porteurs de projets s’engagent



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censés représenter l’État-nation nous a donc permis de révéler les constructions dontla patrimonialisation était l’occasion, ainsi que les enjeux qu’elle suscitait au niveaude l’État-nation. S’y intéresser nous a également permis de saisir la polysémie desphénomènes de qualification des projets «patrimoniaux» à l’heure de la constructiond’une identité nationale.

L’analyse des modalités de la sélection patrimoniale et des différentes réflexionsautour du patrimoine à l’intérieur des organismes qui en détiennent la responsabilité,nous a montré que l’individuel se substitue au collectif, et réciproquement, par un jeu complexe de références. Le Paysan se substitue au peuple roumain, et le peupledevient Paysan, «peuple-paysan» tel qu’il est nommé par Vintilă Mih ăilescu. Parconséquent, le processus de patrimonialisation fait état d’une construction identitaired’un «objet médiatique», le Paysan, grâce auquel la «mémoire-nation» prend corps auniveau de la réflexion savante.

dans une patrimonialisation privée. Ils réinvestissent ainsi l’histoire dans une perspectiveinterprétative personnelle ce qui, selon nous, ouvre l’ère de la responsabilisation de l’individuvis-à-vis du passé qui se construit au-delà du récit savant de la culture.



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Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust

Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust?

ALEXANDRA ILIE

The words Holodomor and Holocaust sound similar. They both translate tograve man made catastrophes in the XXth century. Holodomor took place in 1932/33and Holocaust followed almost 10 years later. The victims of the Holocaust have beenrecognized by the international community as being the victims of genocide; thepeople that died during the Holodomor are ”just” victims of a crime against humanity.Nevertheless, the Ukrainian community insists that Holodomor was genocide andshould be treated as such.

What would happen though, if one is to compare these two terrible tragedies?Would the similarities between them make matters clearer? Also, is Holodomor, in

this sense, ”the Ukrainian Holocaust”? Is the Great Famine a full blown genocide ordoes it have just a few genocidal characteristics?

Holodomor vs. the Holocaust: International Recognition

The term ”Holocaust” is commonly defined as:

”The Nazi German policy that sought the annihilation of European andNorth African Jews. It comes from the Greek, holókauton, meaning ’burnt

sacrifice’. More rarely, the term is also used to describe Nazi German violence ingeneral”1.

The Jewish community prefers the term ”Shoah”, meaning ”catastrophe”. Othersname it ”The Final Solution”.

The name Holodomor is explained as coming from the Ukrainian words ”holod”which means hunger, and ”mor” which means plague:

”In the Ukrainian language, the famine of 1932 and 1933 famine is called’holodomor’, which means extermination by starvation. It is also referred to asthe ’arti cial famine’, ’terror famine’ and ’terror-genocide’”2.

The two tragedies resulted in millions of deaths. Some have tried to link theHolodomor with the Holocaust in what concerns the number of the victims andthrough this to prove that the Ukrainian Famine is also genocide. The estimations forthe two mass killings do revolve around the same number, about 6 million victims, but this is not a valid argument.

1

Rudolph BINION, ”The Holocaust”, in Encyclopedia Of Genocide And Crimes Against Humanity, vol. 1, edited by Dinah L. Shelton, Macmillan Reference USA, 2005, p. 435.2 A.B. KASOZI, ”Ukraine (Famine)”, in Encyclopedia Of Genocide And Crimes Against

Humanity, vol. 3, cit., p. 1055.



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The theory that the Great Famine is genocide should focus more on the reasonsand intent of the perpetrators and on the course of actions and international contextof Holodomor. The comparison with the paradigmatic case of the Holocaust can givethe result more credibility.

The first logical step is to apply the UN Genocide Convention’s definition ofgenocide to the Holocaust and Holodomor. The definition states that:

”Genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aimsof the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world”1.

Holocaust is considered from a legal point of view to be genocide, because it had both the mental element, the intent to destroy, proved by signed documents, orders,public speeches etc., and the physical elements, ”killing members of the group”,proved by witness accounts, mass burial grounds and written execution orders. TheHolocaust incorporated all the five physical elements2 that make up genocidal acts.

Although Holodomor was ruled out as not being genocide because the mentalelement, the intent to kill, could not be clearly demonstrated, some of the physicalelements were nevertheless present: killing members of the group (approximately 6-7million Ukrainians died between 1932/1933 because of the famine and a significantpercentage of them were shot by the soviets under the accusation of being ”kulaks”),causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (most of theUkrainians in that period died a slow and painful death through starvation, somewere buried alive, others were shot, most of the survivors were mentally scarred forlife), deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring aboutits physical destruction in whole or in part (there is proof that Stalin at that time

knew about the situation in Ukraine but did nothing to help the people, moreover, heincreased the food quotas to the maximum point possible; he refused to help them; heput a blockade on Ukraine and then on the cities, he instituted internal passports sothat people could not escape by any means the famine; he refused external help eventhough the situation was desperate).

With regards to the measures taken against children, it is a well known fact thatStalin had a problem in the mid 1930’s with ”bezpeizornie”, which was the generationof orphaned children throughout the Soviet Union. When they became too numerous,they were usually shot3.

Despite all this, Holodomor was considered by the European Parliament not

genocide, like the Holocaust, but an ineffective economic policy of the Communistgovernments of the Republics of the Soviet Union and a crime against humanity.

1 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Approvedand proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A(III) of 9 December 1948 entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (consulted on 12.05.2009).

2 (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to membersof the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring aboutits physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births

within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.3 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film directed by Latvian director Edvins Snore,sponsored by the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) Group in the European Parliament,premiered in April, 2008 at the European Parliament.



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On Thursday, 23 October 2008, at Strasbourg, the European Parliament approveda resolution for the commemoration of the Holodomor, the artificial famine in Ukraine(1932-1933)1. In the resolution, the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide is mentioned, but the word ”genocide” is not attached to theHolodomor.

Some have speculated that the EU has not labeled Holodomor as genocide inorder not to upset Russia. This happened unfortunately because, from the point ofview of independence, the European Union is not entirely autonomous from otheractors on the international stage.

On the basis of the same reasons, Nazism has always been labeled by the EU as avicious ideology, but communism, although it has also produced millions of innocentdeaths all over the world, is not as frowned upon. Being a Nazi fan or praising Hitleris a grave legal offence, but being a communist enthusiast or publicly expressing one’sadmiration for Stalin has no legal repercussions. This is also related to memory andhistorical conscience. Some people still see in the former USSR the savior of Europe,the vanquisher of Nazism, although this is hardly so. For example, after liberating the Jewish people, the soviets filled the former Jewish ghettos with their war prisoners2.

From a legal perspective, international law stipulates, through the UN GenocideConvention3, that ”genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spiritand aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world”4. Article 2 ofthe Convention describes what genocide is and what it is punishable for in five pointsof interest, meaning that ”any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy,in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”5 is considered byinternational law genocide:

(a) Killing members of the group;(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about

its physical destruction in whole or in part;(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another groupArticle 2 implies that genocide has two distinct dimensions in order to be

recognized as such, the mental element6 and the physical element 7. While the intentto kill can be easily identified when speaking about the Holocaust, in the case of theGreat Famine in Ukraine, it is more difficult to prove that there was a clear intent tokill.

1 The European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the commemoration of theHolodomor, the Ukraine artificial famine (1932-1933), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0523 (consulted on 31.05.2009)

2 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.3 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Approved

and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260A (III) of 9 December 1948 entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII,http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (consulted on 12.05.2009).

4 Ibidem.5

Ibidem.6 Meaning the before mentioned ”intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,racial or religious group, as such”.

7 The five instances mentioned above, points a, b, c, d and e.



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Article 3 of the same convention describes five punishable forms of genocidecrimes: genocide, conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity. Nevertheless, manyhave argued that this definition is too restrictive, limiting the victims of genocide to”national, ethnical or religious groups”1 although, as Benjamin Valentino notes:

”Many of the most infamous and important ‘genocidal’ events of thiscentury, including the deaths of between 9 million and 32 million people inthe Soviet Union, between 5 million and 35 million in China, and between 1million and 2 million in Cambodia, have not primarily involved a clash betweendifferent ethnic or national groups”2.

The UN Genocide Convention definition ”does not include groups defined by their political orientation or class background”3. This definition, without thementioned components, rules out some of the most extensive mass killings that wereever committed, including Holodomor. As Erick Weitz mentions in relation to thisdefinition:

”Nearly everyone who considers the definition finds it insufficient for onereason or another. It manages to be at the same time both too broad and toonarrow”4.

Michael Mann, the author of The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, also argues against the UN definition for genocide, because, he says, ”it includestoo much and too little”5. In his view, the definition is too broad because ”it adds asub-clause, allowing either ’total’ or ’partial’ destruction to count as genocide”6. The

concept of ”partial genocide” is rather difficult to grasp, not knowing whether it hasa geographical connotation or not.Weitz also speculates that:

”In the negotiations in the 1940s, the Soviet Union and its allies forced theexclusion of these categories for fear that its policies toward the peasantry andpolitical opponents could be considered genocide”7.

If these categories were added, then the forced famine imposed to the Ukrainians between 1932/1933 would be legally considered genocide.

1 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Approvedand proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A(III) of 9 December 1948 entry into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (consulted on 12.05.2009).

2 Benjamin VALENTINO, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20 th Century ,Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 15.

3 Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocide – Utopias of Race and Nation, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, 2005, p. 9.

4 Ibidem. 5

Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2004, p. 21.6 Ibidem.7 Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocide…cit., p. 9.



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Therefore, Holodomor is not considered genocide form the point of view of theUN Genocide Convention definition. The European Parliament also avoided the useof the term genocide and described Holodomor as ”a crime against humanity”1.

Nevertheless, the Great Famine has some undeniable genocidal characteristics.

Holodomor vs. the Holocaust: Ideology

In both cases, the Holocaust and Holodomor, there were some ideological reasonsunderlying the intention to kill. The Holocaust perpetrators had established theircreed on false biology and anti-Semitism, under a national-socialist view of the world.The people responsible for Holodomor, on the other hand, were communist fanatics, believing in false sociology, seeking to eliminate the kulak class but also to bring anation (Ukraine) to its knees in order to strengthen their influence over it. Althoughthe reasons for committing murder seem very different, the ideology that brought thisabout contains some common points.

Communism was a utopian view of the world, based on Karl Marx’s writings. Itlobbied for equality and unity for all, an idea which might not appear evil at first, butis clearly evil in the way in which it was implemented and understood. A fundamentalstep towards world harmony was, in Lenin’s view, the war of the classes which would be concluded with the victory of the proletariat. Ironically enough, the communiststhought the road towards achieving harmony had to start with destruction anddeath. The Bolshevik revolutions around the world ”initially killed about 10% of thepopulation”2 in order to restructure the basis of society. Their favorite targets were theelites. Of course, not everybody embraced Marxism form the start, so the people inthe resistance were usually killed as well. Michael Mann asserts that:

”The people were the proletariat, and classes opposed to the proletariatwere enemies of the people. Communists might be tempted to eliminate classesthrough murder. I term this classicide”3.

A little known fact is that Marx at some point advanced the idea of genocide.Literary historian at Cambridge University, George Watson, points out that: ”Marxand Engels called Basks, Bretons, and Serbs – ’racial trash’, Voelkerabfall”4. Marx andEngels even advanced the idea that, for example, a country like Poland has no reason toexist and that people and races that are too weak to acknowledge the new world order

and too backward economically will disappear in the ”revolutionary holocaust”.The terminology ”racial trash” immediately springs into mind Nazism though.

This is not as farfetched as it seems because Hitler mentioned in a number of occasionsthat he learned a lot from reading Marx’s works. His party was called ”The NationalSocial Germans Workers Party”, and was based on a socialist ideology as well, butwith a national emphasis.

1 The European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the commemoration of theHolodomor, the Ukraine artificial famine (1932-1933), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/

getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0523 (consulted on 31.05.2009).2 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.3 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 320.4 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.




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The type of socialism that Lenin and Stalin advocated was more international incharacter, although it sometimes had a few nationalist accents. Its internationalismwas advocated by Lenin who thought that:

”In the last analysis all nations must merge and lose their nationaldistinctions, including distinctions of culture and language”1.

This theory led to the belief that the state was entitled to forcefully deport peopleand to commit purges, in order to “merge” the different peoples that inhabited theUSSR.

On the other hand, at some point in the Soviet history, there was a clear idealizationof the Russian culture and an attempt to impose the Russian language and culturaltraits throughout the USSR. Weitz observes that, around the middle of the 1930s:

”The state […] also asserted the cultural and political superiority of Russia

[…] Cultural russification, marketed especially by the mandatory teaching ofRussian, became the watchword”2

and that:

”The Russian people and culture were seen as manifestations of primordial being and the model for other nationalities”3.

The concepts of nation and nationality have had many interpretations from theBolshevik leaders. Nevertheless, there has been a common policy of repression:

”The tactics of the Bolsheviks in regard to the nationality problem haveagain undergone changes […] but there has always been a return to the samepolicy of liquidating nations as such, a policy of deliberate genocide in variousforms and of various types”4.

Both the communists and the national-socialists had the goal of bringing aboutthe birth of the ”new man”. Communists believed that people are supposed to bedifferentiated according to classes and that the ”evil classes” will perish or be defeatedin the revolution. The proletariat class will prevail and through this social engineering,

the ”new man” will be born, according to Marxism.National-socialists believed in separating people according to race. After the

extermination of the inferior races will be finished, the Arians will prevail and the birth of the ”new man” will be possible. Both ideologies were ”at war with humannature”5 and looked forward to the birth of this new man. Both ideologies advocated

1 Andrei LEBED, ”Genocide as a Means of Creating a Unified Socialist Nation”, inNikolai K DEKER, Andrei LEBED (eds), Genocide in the USSR, Studies in Group Destruction , TheScarecrow Press Inc., New York, 1958, p. 4.

2

Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocide…cit., p. 77.3 Ibidem, p. 78.4 Andrei LEBED, ”Genocide as a Means of Creating a Unified Socialist Nation”, cit., p. 3.5 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.



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that it was not a question of whether to kill or not, but a question of who to kill, andthis is where the difference intervenes.

Both the communists and the national-socialists used very harsh anddehumanizing words when describing their enemies. For example, in the 1920’s:

”Lenin described enemies in terms eerily anticipating the SS: bloodsuckers,spiders, leeches, parasites, insects, bedbugs, fleas, the language suggestingthreatening and dehumanized enemies infecting the people, requiringcleansing”1.

Similar words were used by Hitler in his autobiographical work Mein Kampf inorder to describe the Jews:

”Jews were the maggots feeding on a rotting corpse, the parasites that hadto be surgically removed, the sexual predators preying on German women,a spider that sucks people’s blood, a plague worse than the Black Death, thesponger who spreads like a noxious bacillus and then kills it host”2.

Nevertheless, the communists had a constant problem in defining the kulak,the state enemy, because class is not as obvious as ethnicity or race. Michael Mannunderlines the fact that:

”During this phase the identity of the enemy broadened uncontrollably[…] Since no one knew exactly who the kulak was, official definitions keptchanging”3.

So from the rich peasants that were initially the ”state enemy”, the definition broadened to the intellectuals, poor peasants that were thought to be ”under thekulaks” and generally to anyone who opposed the regime.

Apart from these similarities that seem to have had an influence on bothperpetrators, making them believe mass killings were not only normal but alsonecessary, there are people who believe that Nazism was actually born as a reactionto communism. They also think that the Nazi crimes were a replica of soviet crimes.

Ernst Nolte, a famous German historiographer, put forward a mind bogglinghypothesis in his work The European Civil War:

”The present book starts from the hypothesis that, indeed, the reason forHitler’s feelings and ideology has its root in the relationship of fear and hateagainst communism, he expressed through this, with a high intensity, the feelingsof numerous German contemporaries and foreign people and that all thesefeelings and beliefs were understandable and up to some point justifiable”4.

1 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 322.2

Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocide…cit., p. 105.3 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 324.4 Ernst NOLTE, Ră zboiul civil European (1917-1945). Na ţional- Socialism şi Bolşevism, preface

by Ernst NOLTE, Romanian transl. by Irina Cristea, Editura Corint, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 24.




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Ernst Nolte explains the reactive character of fascism towards communism and based on it he defines fascism as ”a movement of reaction towards the theories andpractices of bolshevism”1.

According to Nolte, fascism could be defined as:

”Anti-Marxism which seeks to destroy the enemy by the evolvement of aradically opposed and yet related ideology and by use of almost identical and yettypically modified methods, always, however, within the unyielding frameworkof national self-assertion and autonomy”2.

No matter what the correct explanation is for describing the relationship betweencommunism and national-socialism, the undeniable fact is that both ideologiescontained the seeds of future genocides. These two ideologies advocated the need forpurges, the need to ”restructure society” and the need for a new world order.

These ideologies were flawed and ultimately failed, but before this happenedtheir adepts had already done irreparable damages to the word. The murders done

by the Nazis do not need to be justified, but by the same token, the world should notfeel the need to justify the Soviet killings. The Nazi symbols are considered illegal;the Soviet symbols are just a ”bad joke”. This kind of behavior from the internationalcommunity succeeds only in paving the way towards closing a blind eye to otherpolitical mass killings. Communist ideology included the same amount of deadlypotential as the national-socialist ideology.

Holodomor vs. the Holocaust:Ukraine – Reasons for Committing Genocide

There are several reasons because of which Stalin might have been inclined tocommit genocide against the Ukrainian nation, besides the ideological ones.

Ukraine, a country that had 80% of the population working in agriculture, wascalled Europe’s ”breadbasket” and was famous for its grains. The country also hada flourishing culture that slowly drifted them away from Russia. ”Mother” Russia,on the other hand, always thought of Ukraine as an inherent part of its sphere ofinfluence and in the 19th century the Soviets were afraid of losing this state:

”The idea that this great region which Russian imperialists had always

considered a part […] of Russia proper, might indeed wish to be free […] wasdevastating”3.

Ukraine was important for Russia mainly for its agricultural potential and it is awell known fact that ”Lenin […] regarded Ukrainian resources as vital”4.

1 François FURET, Ernst NOLTE, Fascism and Communism, Romanian transl. and prefaceMatei MARTIN, Univers, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 12.

2 Ernst NOLTE, Three Faces of Fascism, transl. from German to English by Leila Vennevitz,

Reinheart and Winston, Holt, 1999, pp. 20-21.3 Robert CONQUEST , The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-famine,Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 29.

4 Ibidem., p. 37.



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Attempts to ”Russify” Ukraine were made even before the Bolsheviks cameto power. For example, Russians always believed that the Ukrainian language wasnothing more than a dialect of Russian language, when in fact the two languageshad only a common root, like the Spanish and Portuguese languages. The Ukrainianlanguage was a clear sign of distinction, so for many years Russia had made attemptsto diminish its daily use. For instance, ”in 1883 an edict declared that there was noUkrainian language […] and banned works in Ukrainian”1. After that, a decree issuedin 1876 was put into practice ”forbidding Ukrainian theatrical or musical performances,and closing the main organs […] of the movement”2. All these measures led to ”anunprecedented increase in illiteracy, to some 80% of the population”3.

What happened after Ukraine claimed its independence in 1917 is not only alarge scale man-made famine, but also a full blown war against the Ukrainian elites.Robert Conquest asserts that the famine

”was combined with a devastating attack on the Ukrainian intelligentsia and theUkrainian Party itself. In fact, the campaign may be said to resemble the ’layingwaste’ of hostile subject territories practiced by Jenghiz Khan and other figuresof the past”4.

Ukraine hoped to regain its independence after the 1917 revolts and fall of tsaristrule and consequently: ”On 22 January, the Rada declared Ukraine an independentSoviet republic”5. Nevertheless, Lenin shattered their hopes after reclaiming all formertsarist territories. The 4 years of resisting the Red Army in war and their ”nationalisticclaims” have created tensions between Ukraine and Russia that have not been settledeven today. Ukraine was forcefully incorporated into the USSR in 1921 and the peoplesaw that ”the Bolshevik invaders were accompanied by ’food detachments’ […] toseize the grain in the villages, under Lenin’s instructions”6.

The first Soviet government ”suppressed Ukrainian schools, cultural institutionsand so forth. In fact, the Russianizing tendency in the early Ukrainian Soviet regimewas intensely anti-Ukrainian”7, as noted by Robert Conquest in his work The Harvestof Sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine.

After the war, a national revival began to take place in Soviet Ukraine. The cultural,political and religious life in Ukraine started to develop yet again. Culture was basedon western models, thanks to writers like Mykola Khvylovy that started to emerge.Also, the Ukrainian Church was re-established, Ukrainian language was re-introducedinto Church services and a Church Council was created. The Ukrainian AutocephalicChurch ”was one of the best organized and most cohesive non-communist centers inUkraine”8.

1 Ibidem, p. 29.2 Ibidem.3 Ibidem.4 Robert CONQUEST, The Great Terror – A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, 1991,

p. 51.5 IDEM, The Harvest of Sorrow …cit., p. 34.6

Ibidem, p. 35.7 Ibidem.8 Alexander V. YURCENKO, ”The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church”, in Nikolai K. DEKER,

Andrei LEBED (eds), Genocide in the USSR …cit., p. 173.




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The Bolsheviks were actually astonished by the level at which Ukrainiannationalism had grown and the complexity of their cultural life. After Lenin’s death,Stalin took over USSR, through the violent elimination of the other candidates.He also took over the task to ”tame” Ukraine and to put an end to its nationalisticmanifestations.

The national revival of the cultural, economic and political life of Ukrainians ledto the great fear of Stalin to lose Russia’s sphere of influence over Ukraine1 and mightconstitute the reason why he wished Ukraine’s ”Russfication”, even if it came at ahigh price like mass murder. In a famous letter to Kaganovich, Stalin said that:

”At this point the question of Ukraine is the most important. The situationin Ukraine is very bad. If we don’t take steps now to improve the situation, wemight lose Ukraine. The objective should be to transform Ukraine, in the shortestperiod of time, into a real fortress of the USSR”2.

This is an excerpt of Stalin’s letter to his close associate Lazar Kaganovich, senton 11th September 1932.

In fact, some say that Stalin was from the very beginning against Ukraine asa nation: ”Academician Sackharov writes of the ’Ukrainophobia’ characteristic ofStalin”3. Stalin also allegedly said that the great luck of Ukrainians is that they are toomany, which makes destroying the whole of them practically impossible:

”Of great significance is Khrushchev’s speech at the closed meeting of theTwentieth Party Congress, in which he declared that Stalin of course wouldhave liked to destroy all Ukrainians but could not because the size of the groupinvolved”4.

After that, Khrushcew went on to say, in the same speech and with the sameirony that:

”The Ukrainians escaped this fate only because there were too many ofthem and there was no place to which they could be sent”5.

All these possible reasons make plausible the theory of considering the Ukrainianfamine genocide. Lenin put communist ideology first, even if it meant wiping out

nations, and Stalin feared Ukrainian nationalism and saw in it a sign that Ukrainemight be drifting away from the USSR’s sphere of influence. Hypothetically, one

1 Harvest of Despair. The Unknown Holocaust The Great Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933,documentary, Director: Slavko Nowytski, Produced by: Slavko Nowytski, Yurij Luhovy, theUkrainian Canadian Research & Documentation Centre (UCRDC) in Toronto, Starring: JonGranik, Joan Karasevych, Eric Peterson (Documentary Film, 55 min., 1985).

2 http://www.faminegenocide.com/kuryliw/quotations_on_the_famine.htm (consultedon 31.05.2009).

3 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow…cit., p. 217.4

Alexander V. YURCENKO, ”Genocide through Destruction of National Culture andSense of Nationality”, in Nikolai K. DEKER, Andrei LEBED (eds), Genocide in the USSR …cit.,p. 18.

5 IDEM, ”The Ukrainians”, in ibidem, pp. 145-146.



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might assume that Stalin’s next logical step, combined with his open hate for Ukraine,would be to bring Ukrainians to their knees by destroying their national identity, theircultural and political life, their religion and their intellectual elite.

Holodomor vs. the Holocaust: Ukraine – Crushing Nationalismand Elites

Holodomor, much like the Holocaust, has a number of facts that demonstrate thatit had genocidal characteristics. While the history of the Holocaust is widely known,and the reasons why it is considered genocide have been enumerated on a wide rangeof occasions, the history of Holodomor and the reasons why it might be consideredgenocide are much less comprehended.

Killings in Ukraine have not been numerous only in the 1932-1933 famine. Thedeath roll in Ukraine after the Bolsheviks came to power was also quite high. In theyears before the famine, the Bolshevik regime tried to wipe out nationalistic feelingsfrom the Ukrainian people by undergoing purges of the intellectual elite, imposingRussian language and disbanding the national church.

The importance of maintaining each country’s national culture is crucial and thisaspect

”was stressed in the Preamble to the 1954 Hague Convention (paragraphs 2and 3), where it is stated that ’damage to cultural property belonging to anypeople whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, sinceeach people makes its contribution to the culture of the world’”1.

The fact that the Bolsheviks were trying to destroy the national identity ofUkrainians might also mean that the famine might not have been a failed attempt toforce collectivization, but a successful attempt to crush Ukraine as a whole.

After the end of the war with the Ukrainian resistance, the Bolsheviks realizedthat crushing the cultural life and russifying Ukraine was a complex and difficulttask. The first step towards achieving this was to increase the number of publicationsprinted in Russian. In fact, ”during the years of the consolidation of the Soviet regimein the Ukraine there was an increase in the proportion of publications in Russian”2 and sometimes the number of publications in Russian exceeded by far those inUkrainian.

The Ukrainian language was drastically modified after several attempts of theSoviets to ”harmonize” it with Russian language. Although the Ukrainian languagehad been recently revised by a Ukrainian commission of linguistic experts,

”a ’linguistic discussion’ was arranged by the Deputy Commissar for Educationof the Ukrainian SSR, who had been entrusted with the liquidation of nationalismin the system of national education and cultural life of Ukraine. The programwas aimed at removal of the entire Ukrainian terminology”3.

1

Encyclopedia Of Genocide And Crimes Against Humanity, vol. 1, cit., p. 312.2 Alexander V. YURCENKO, ”Genocide through Destruction of National Culture…cit.”,p. 11.

3 Ibidem, p. 12.




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The campaign was supervised by Portyshev, a special emissary from the part ofthe Party Central Committee.

The outcome of the ”linguistic discussion” was that Ukrainian lost many of itsunique features and was Russified to the maximum:

”The Ukrainian orthography […] was drastically altered in 1933, when anumber of the laws of Ukrainian phonetics and etymology were violated in orderto remove the ’artificial barriers’ between the Ukrainian and Russian languages.The result […] ended in the Ukrainian language being deprived of freedom toreflect its special feature […] The action taken against the Ukrainian languagewas […] ’systematic linguacide’, one of the methods of Communist genocide inthe field of culture”1.

The next step for the Soviets was to crush the resistance of the Ukrainian people by ”destroying the most active elements, particularly the Ukrainian intellectuals”2. Acomplex campaign of murder and repression was thus initiated by the Soviet leaders.Mass executions took place mainly in the capital on the country:

”The mass extermination of intellectuals in Kiev is also confirmed byHrushevsky, at one time chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada, who admittedthat ’thousands of Ukrainian intellectuals and young people’ were executed”3.

Apparently, the faith of the Ukrainian intellectuals was decided beforehand because:

”Stalin ordered the deaths of about 80% of Ukrainian intelligentsia by 1935.Some see his goal as ’re-Russifying’ Ukrainian cities and ’pastoralising’ theUkrainians, directly comparable to Hitler’s policy in Poland in 1939”4.

The repression against the intellectual strata was a long spanned action,comprising three different periods in time: the period of War communism and itscampaign against the Ukrainian national forces (1918-1921), the period of ”socialistreconstruction” (1929-1938) and the period following World War II5. The liquidationof the Ukrainian intellectuals has had serious repercussion for the cultural life butalso for other interrelated domains of Ukraine. It is also a grave fact because there was

no military situation to require it and it was a clear intention of the Soviets to crushopinion holders and elites.At the beginning of the 30’s a complex campaign was initiated against the

intellectuals. In March 1930, a staged trial was organized, which caused muchharm to the intellectuals and to the Church of Ukraine. The date of the trial of theUnion for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU) coincided with the beginning of theagricultural collectivization. This happened because it was a ”kill two birds with one

1 Ibidem.2

Alexander V. YURCENKO, ”The Ukrainians”, cit., p. 138.3 Ibidem, p. 139.4 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 327.5 Alexander V. YURCENKO, ”The Ukrainians”, cit., p. 138.



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stone” situation, from the Soviet point of view; crushing both the intellectuals and thepeasantry at the same time seemed more effective: ”At the same time that Stalin madehis move to crush the peasantry in 1929-30, he resumed the attack on the Ukraineand its national culture”1. The purpose of the trail was ”to weaken the leaders of theUkrainian non-communist intelligentsia”2. Officially, the trial was held because theSVU allegedly attempted to overthrow the Soviet regime. Robert Conquest also notes

that ”From 9 March to 20 April 1930, a whole cycle of faked cases against Ukrainianpersonalities began”3.

During the actual trial, only 45 persons were brought to be judged

”although in Kiev alone up to 600 persons were arrested […] One of the prisonersin the camps at Solovki during the 1930s stated that students from Kiev andEkaterinoslav who reached the camp reported that many SVU members had been executed”4.

The trial also served the purpose of liquidating the Ukrainian Autocephalic

Orthodox Church.The Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church had long been under the watchful

eye of the Soviets, receiving its first heavy blow in 1927 when ”Church leaders (were)accused of counter revolutionary activity and the head of the Church, MetropolitanLipkovsky, was forbidden to take part in religious work”5. After that, on 28th January1930, in an emergency council, the clergy was obliged to sign a document drafted bythe CPU, which provided ”the dissolution of the Church”6. Nevertheless, ”in 1935 the bishops still remaining at liberty were arrested”7.

The SVU trial also directly targeted the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Otherscientific institutes were also affected and became the direct target for repression:

”The most prominent actors, artists, musicians, etc., were declared to benationalist wreckers and were either executed or dispatched to dig canals orwork in the taiga forests”8.

Education, the core of any independent state, received a deadly blow when:

”In the last eleven months of 1933 […] 4 000 teachers were purged andremoved from the schools, as well as the entire staffs of the Ukrainian pedagogicalinstitutes, on grounds of nationalism”9.

The fact that they were targeted for their ”nationalism” was a clear sign that theSoviets were trying to bend Ukraine.

1 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow…cit., p. 217.2 Alexander V. YURCENKO, ”The Ukrainians”, cit., p. 142.3 Robert CONQUEST The Harvest of Sorrow…cit., p. 217.4 Alexander V. YURCENKO, ”The Ukrainians”, cit., p. 142.5 IDEM, ”The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church”, cit., p. 172.6

Ibidem, p. 174.7 Ibidem.8 Ibidem, p. 143.9 Ibidem.




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Some of the corpses of the intellectuals that were eliminated around these periodswere found when an investigation of communal graves was set up in the summer of1943 at Vinnitsa, a village near Kiev. There ”the bodies of 11-12 000 persons werefound who had been executed by the NKVD in 1937-1938. Of these it was estimatedthat 26% were intellectuals”1. The Soviets did not offer any explanation for them, orfor any other communal graves with suspiciously many intellectuals found in the

following years.Stalin was well aware of what he was doing. The campaign against Ukrainian

nationalism, directed against the Ukrainian language, religion and intellectuals,combined with the devastating effects of the famine, would make an interestingconspiracy theory aimed at discovering an evil plan behind Stalin’s actions. This isyet to be proven, but what is certain is that:

”Stalin clearly understood that the essence of Ukrainian nationhood wascontained in the intelligentsia who articulated it, but also in the peasant masseswho had sustained it over the centuries”2.

From this point of view, the campaign against the intellectual core of the groupmight be presumed intentional and thus analyzed within the UN definition ofgenocide.

Holodomor – The Great Famine

The decimation of the intellectual, political and religious elite of Ukraine wasfollowed by the task of crushing the peasantry. The peasantry accounted as the most

numerous group of the entire population of Ukraine. After a short period of relativeeconomic freedom, Stalin decided to implement his 5 year plan, starting with the forcedcollectivization. The famine was caused by the way in which the collectivization wasimplemented and it was made worse by the Soviet regime, through special measures:instituting internal passports, the interdiction to leave the country, the interdiction toleave famine affected areas (especially the villages), the law for the protection of stateproperty, refusing external help etc. The goal of the Soviets was well planned out fromthe beginning:

”In fact one of the aims of collectivization in the Ukraine had been officially

stated as ’the destruction of Ukrainian nationalism’s social base – the individualland-holdings”3.

Some believe that the idea of staging a famine through collectivization came ashort while after Stalin sent the famous letter to Kaganovich, on 11th September 1932,where he complained that the situation in Ukraine is very bad and something decisivemust be done or else there is the risk of losing Ukraine4. After a few meetings, a planof action was decided.

1

Ibidem, p. 144.2 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow…cit., p. 219.3 Ibidem.4 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.



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When the first measures of collectivization were imposed, the peasants refused tosell their grain: ”Not unexpectedly, the peasants, the mass of the population, resisted.At first they merely withheld grain, hoping to push up prices”1. The situation wasmade worse because party activists who hoped to be noticed welcomed the task ofconducting collectivization:

”There was such an enthusiastic response from party activists that the paceand violence of collectivization escalated into the more disorderly categories […]pogroms and wild deportation”2.

Deportation in this period escalated to numbers of a few hundred thousand:

”Ultimately, the regime deported in horrendous circumstances more than2 million peasants, accused of kulak status, from their villages into resettlementareas, while millions of others were herded into collective farms. As a consequenceof their brutal and radical uprooting in the early 1930s […] perhaps 300 000 died

in deportations”3.

The number of people that died is so high because of the horrendous circumstancesin which the deportations were made:

”The manner of deportations bears all the characteristics of other ethniccleansings in the twentieth century, including the Holocaust”4.

The deportations also had nationalistic accents, beginning with the year 1933when ”the regime deported Kuban Cossacks en masse, charging them not only with

resistance to socialism but with Ukrainian nationalism”5, according to historian TerryMartin.

The first year of great hardship for Ukraine was 1931, when the quotas were metwith great difficulty. The harvest that year was poor and the quotas irrationally high.In order to fulfill the quotas:

”Worker brigades extracted the grain by force, killing those who resisted.Peasants starved; others hoarded their grain, ate their animals, or stole collectivefarm produce”6.

The next year’s harvest was even poorer: ”The harvest of 1932 was thus evenworse, and the procurements worsened suffering”7. Stalin knew very well that theharvest was poor when he set the quota for the year 1932. The fact that the famine wasstaged and done with a clear intent can be deducted from the facts that surroundedStalin’s decision in 1932:

1 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit, p. 322.2 Ibidem, p. 324.3 Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocide…cit., p. 71.4

Ibidem, p. 81.5 Ibidem, p. 78.6 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit, p. 322.7 Ibidem.




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”So, on Stalin’s insistence, a decree went out which, if enforced, couldonly lead to starvation of the Ukrainian peasantry. This had been made clear toMoscow by the Ukrainian Communist authorities themselves”1.

The decree went out and its effects were devastating. The quota that Stalin setwas unreasonable:

”In July (1932) […] Stalin had again ordered a delivery target of 7.7 milliontons (after bargaining, he lowered it to 6.6 million) out of a harvest which theconditions of collectivization reduced to two thirds of that of 1930”2.

The first grain requisition was made in August and it left the countrysidecompletely exhausted. The only solution for the peasants was to steal grain formthe kolkhozes. The situation got even more desperate when the decree ”On thesafeguarding of state property”, drafted by Stalin himself, was enacted on 7th August

1932. The decree stated that:

”Offenders against such property (like cattle, standing crops and agriculturalproduce from kolkhozes) were to be considered enemies of the people, and either be shot or, in extenuating circumstances, imprisoned for not less than ten years,with total confiscation of property”3.

The decree was carried out with the outmost rigor and sometimes withunnecessary brutality.

Another measure that escalated the mortality rates was the decision to implement

an internal passport system on December 27, 1932. The passports were given to mostof the people living in towns but ”no passports were given to the peasants. Thestamp in the passport ( propiska) became a matter of life and death, a novel form ofpersecution”4. The absence of the stamp can be compared to the Jewish star band the Jewish people were forced to wear. The absence of the stamp and the presence of the band meant almost certain death. Many Ukrainians died right in the railway stations,not being able to flee from the famine affected areas. They were not allowed to crossthe border to Russia either.

What was even more ironical, in a morbid way, was the fact that while millionswere starving to death, the state granaries had plentiful reserves because:

”Not all grain was exported or sent to the cities or the army. Local granariesheld stock of ’state reserves’. These were for emergencies, such as war: the famineitself was not a sufficient occasion for their release. For example, the warehousesin the Poltava Province are described as ’almost bursting’ with grain”5.

1 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow…cit., p. 223.2 Ibidem, p. 222.3

Ibidem, p. 184.4 Robert GELLATELY, Lenin, Stalin and Hitler, The Age of Social Catastrophe, published byAlfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007, p. 232.

5 Ibidem, p. 235.



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Often, grain was piled up to rot in the middle of the streets, but was guardedunder strict surveillance by the OGPU men.

The children were also a target of merciless Soviet policies:

”A whole generation of rural children, in the USSR as a whole, but especiallyin Ukraine, was destroyed or maimed […] in the perspective of the country’s

future, both the shrinkage of a generation and the experiences of the survivorshave effects which are still felt”1.

Most children had become orphans because of the famine that claimed theirparents. They were called ”bezpeizornie”, wandered the streets of many big cities,including Moscow, and were not a pretty sight for ”foreign visitors”. In order to tacklethis problem, Stalin authorized the shooting of children from the age of twelve2. Therewere also ”children’s labor camps that is prison camps, to which a child might beformally sentenced”3.

The Soviet leaders, and even Stalin, knew very well what was happening in

Ukraine, but did nothing and even refused external help. For example:

”Mikhail Sholokhov, honored author of And Quiet Flows the Don, wrote toStalin to protest this treatment of ’the respected tillers of the soil’. Stalin riposted:’The respected tillers of the soil…have conducted sabotage and would not haveany qualms about leaving the working class and the Red Army without bread[…] a «quiet» war against the Soviet power, a war to starve us out, comradeSholokhov’”4.

Actually, this is another strategy of the perpetrators of genocide, to place the blame on their victims and claim that they are the ones being persecuted.

Extensive measures were taken in order for the word of the famine to not get out.It was forbidden to write in the press about it and:

”Doctors, who were state employees, put down all sorts of diseases asthe causes of death […] by the winter of 1932-33 death certificates no longerappear”5.

Because of these measures, the total number of the victims is very hard to beapproximated. Nevertheless, most people agree with Nicolas Werth’s numbers, who”estimates a total of six million deaths in the 1932-33 famine”6.

Michael Mann observes that:

”Killings also contained ethnic undercurrents. Famine and deportationswere unevenly distributed by region […] Famine and deportations also fell moreheavily on the Ukraine than elsewhere”7,

1 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow…cit, p. 283.2 The Soviet Story (2008), documentary film.3 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow…cit., p. 290.4

Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy… cit., p. 322.5 Robert CONQUEST, The Harvest of Sorrow …cit., p. 250.6 Robert GELLATELY, Lenin, Stalin and Hitler…cit., p. 235.7 Michael MANN The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 327.




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where the number of victims is estimated to be between 4-5 million. Also highly affected by the famine was the Kuban area, which has a large population of Ukrainians. Thefact that the most affected areas were inhabited by Ukrainians can also be consideredproof for the intent to crush Ukrainian nationalism through a large scale famine.

Kazakhstan lost approximately one million people in the famine, and anothermillion died in the North Caucasus and Black Earth area. Ukraine lost the most peopleand it is considered a ”special case” among the former Soviet republics.

Conclusion

It is very hard to draw a relevant conclusion on the whole case of whether or notHolodomor should also be considered genocide and should receive the same legalframework as the Holocaust, because there are many more aspects to be considered andmore evidence is needed. A proper conclusion on the matter can only be drawn afterRussia releases all the documents and statistics related to the 1932/1933 famine.

Nevertheless, there are undeniable facts that cannot be overlooked. The Ukrainianfamine has received considerably less attention from the international communitythan the Holocaust, although they have both been large scale catastrophes. The onlypressure on Russia to declassify information comes from Ukraine and the UkrainianDiaspora (notably Canada), and very little from international legal bodies.

Maybe it is time to review the UN definition of genocide so as to better reflect thetragedies that left millions upon millions of people dead in the XX th century and it isonly fair that Russia makes the first step.



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IOAN STANOMIRApărarea libertăţii. 1938-1947Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2010, 190 pp.

Volumul de faţă vine în continuarea

altor analize ale lui Ioan Stanomir dedi-cate istoriei mentalităţilor în spaţiulautohton care pentru autor are două ramificaţii: cea a evoluţiei instituţiilorpolitice şi cea a gânditorilor politici. Deregulă autorii care şi-au dezvoltat în timpun aparat critic referitor la analizainstituţiilor politice nu au ca obiect şiprezentarea gânditorilor, viceversa fiindla fel de valabilă. Ioan Stanomir repre-

zintă fericita excepţie, exersând instru-mentarul analitic în ambele direcţii, cuegală pricepere. Stau mărturie pentruprima direcţie Naşterea Constitu ţiei. Limbajşi drept în Principate până la 1866, Libertate,lege şi drept. O istorie a constitu ţionalismuluiromânesc, respectiv pentru cea din urmă Conştiin ţa conservatoare. Preliminarii la un profil intelectual, Eminescu: tradi ţia ca pro- fe ţie politică , Despre sunete şi memorie. Frag-

mente de istoria ideilor, pentru a amintidoar câteva din contribuţiile autoruluiapă rute în ultima vreme. Acest volumreprezintă o cotitură în tipul de reflecţiepracticat de Ioan Stanomir, o anumită perioadă istorică fiind simultan anali-zată atât din perspectiva evoluţiei insti-tuţiilor, cât şi a gânditorilor care aureflectat la evenimentele cuprinse încadrul perioadei studiate, o reflecţie care

porneşte de la cotidian pentru a-l des-chide înspre marile teme ale filosofieipolitice.

Întrebarea pe care şi-o pune autorulşi căreia reuşeşte să îi dea un răspunspe măsură este în ce fel raportarea latema libertăţii a început şi s-a dezvoltat în condiţii istorice precare, marcate deascensiunea unor regimuri nedemocraticecare culminează cu instaurarea unui

regim totalitar în 1947. Sunt folositescrieri publicate în acea perioadă, precumşi scrieri care au putut vedea lumina

tiparului abia după 1990. Ioan Stanomir

creionează patru portrete de atitudiniintelectuale, reunite sub chipul exemplaral refuzului tiraniei: Iuliu Maniu, NicolaeCarandino, Mihail Fărcăşanu şi Grigore T.Popa. Desigur, ne-am putea întreba cuma fost f ăcută această selecţie, de ce doaraceşti autori şi nu alţii, etc. Răspunsuleste chiar demersul folosit de IoanStanomir pentru a schiţa profilul uneiepoci: numai suma fragmentelor selectate

f ără a face o ordine auto-impusă poate să ofere imaginea în oglindă a trecutului.Istoria ideilor politice nu este astfelpentru Ioan Stanomir o sumă anodină de evenimente şi cărţi, ci o realitate vie,organică tocmai datorită fragmentarităţiisale. Volumul nu prezintă gânditorii înordinea cronologică strictă a scrierilorlor, ci intercalează prezentarea autorilorcu cea a momentelor decisive care au

punctat perioada supusă analizei. ÎntreIuliu Maniu şi ceilalţi autori există uncapitol intitulat „August 1944: Fantasmalibertăţii“. Moment decisiv care a creatiluzia restaurării democraţiei şi libertăţiide gândire antebelice, iluzie care nu acontaminat însă decât o minoritate şipentru o perioadă de timp limitată. Staumărturie cronicarii acelor vremi, dintrecare exemplificăm doar cu nume precum

Annie Bentoiu, Pericle Martinescu, VirgilGheorghiu.Lecturând capitolul dedicat lui Iuliu

Maniu, descoperim cu plăcută surpriză în omul politic un gânditor pe măsură.Ioan Stanomir a avut ră bdarea să seaplece asupra mai multor texte ale luiIuliu Maniu care au ca numitor comundenunţarea defectelor regimului auto-ritar al lui Carol al II-lea instituit prin

Constituţia din 1938. Descoperim unManiu profund ataşat democraţiei carecunoaşte şi foloseşte exemplar în scris



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diferenţele între democraţie şi un regimautoritar pe care îl etichetează cu inspiratadenumire de „stat patrimonial“. Reţine,de asemenea, atenţia felul în care IuliuManiu tratează problema autonomieilocale prin atacul la adresa centralismuluipromovat de noul pact constituţional.

Ioan Stanomir consideră că articolelepublicate de Nicolae Carandino înintervalul dintre 23 august 1944 şiinstaurarea regimului comunist relevă „tensiunea dintre două antifascisme care î şi dispută supremaţia în câmpul inte-lectual“: cel al comuniştilor şi cel demo-cratic. Carandino deplânge absenţa cul-turii politice pe care o vede ca fiindopusul politicianismului, o temă rarexploatată în epocă dar mai ales folo-seşte constant, în sensul lor universaladmis astăzi, noţiuni precum libertatesau democraţie; o virtute care pare învremurile noastre a fi demonetizată darcare în contextul epocii marca o noutatede limbaj. Reflecţiile despre democraţieale lui Carandino au fost la momentulrespectiv contra curentului şi rezistă trecerii timpului, căpătând o valoare de întrebuinţare mereu actuală. Referinţa luiCarandino la Benjamin Constant într-untext publicat în 1947 este pusă în valoarede Ioan Stanomir, marcând un destinintelectual singular, constant contra curen-tului prin afirmarea unor principii.

Mihail Fărcăşanu este analizat deIoan Stanomir mai ales din perspectivaScrisorilor că tre tineretul român publicate în

1946. O lucrare care „ilustrează vigoareanoului discurs antitotalitar“. O pledoariepentru libertate, contrapusă colectivis-mului, negării persoanei. Fărcăşanu dez-voltă o teorie a libertăţii care îl situează înaceeaşi linie de gândire cu autorii clasici,iar Ioan Stanomir are meritul de a fi scosla suprafaţă aceste scrieri şi de a le fi pus în contextul mai larg al perioadei istoricerespective, privită ca un laborator de

creaţie prin care istoria ideilor politiceajunge şi depăşeşte un moment de infle- xiune. Remarcabilă în acest texte este

şi despărţirea de totalitarism, într-operioadă în care acest termen nu aveaconotaţiile exclusiv negative de astăzi:Fărcăşanu nu ezită să afirme că „pos-tulatul real al totalitarismului este astfelinegalitatea de esenţă a oamenilor, supra-şi subordonarea lor potrivit unor criteriitribale“.

Ultimul autor care marchează sfâr-şitul acoladei ce premerge instaurarearegimului comunist este în viziunea luiIoan Stanomir profesorul de anatomieGrigore T. Popa. O alegere care ilustrează cel mai fidel intenţia autorului acesteicărţi de a creiona profilul unei epociprin raportări diversificate la tendinţelesociale şi istorice. Un gânditor pe nedreptignorat este repus în circuitul valorilorintelectuale care resping colectivismulde orice natură. Într-o perioadă a trans-formărilor radicale, Grigore T. Popa seridică împotriva revoluţiilor. În plin ascen-dent al stângii totalitare, acelaşi GrigoreT. Popa refuză explicit marxismul. IoanStanomir reface cu iscusită abilitatestilistică şi cu o desăvârşită rigoare ascriiturii portretul unui personaj care î şi face o deviză din felul de a se punecontra curentului, prin afirmarea unorvalori care transcend orizontul istoric, odovadă a acestui comportament demn şilucid fiind conferinţa „Morala creştină şitimpurile actuale“ din aprilie 1947. Într-operioadă în care rezultatul deformatal alegerilor din 1946 dovedise falsulataşament la democraţie practicat de

comunişti, Grigore T. Popa nu ezită să continue a promova aceleaşi valori pecare le-a afirmat f ără rezerve şi constant în spaţiul public.

Patru portrete de gânditori politicicare elogiază virtuţile libertăţii într-untimp istoric total nefavorabil. Patruposibilităţi diferite de a dovedi putereacuvântului în contra tiraniei de oriceculoare politică. Un număr finit care se

contrapune nelimitatelor posibilităţi de anega libertatea. Ioan Stanomir are meritulca prin această carte să fi reuşit să arate



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că perioada de tranziţie de la democraţiela totalitarism a fost marcată în spaţiulautohton de numeroase voci lucide careau f ăcut posibilă continuarea gândiriilibere în forme de exprimare pe care

altfel le-am fi ignorat, exacerbând eronattriumful, fie şi temporar, al „gândiriicaptive“.

RADU CARP

DAVID A. BLUMENTHAL, TIMOTHY L.H. McCORMACK (eds)The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institutionalized Vengeance?Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2008, 337 pp.

Winston Churchill once stated that

”the whole history of the world issummed up in the fact that, whennations are strong, they are not always just, and when they wish to be just, theyare no longer strong”. The case of post-World War II Germany seems to be anexcellent example in point of the formerBritish Prime-Minister’s hypothesis, withthe Nuremberg International MilitaryTribunal establishing itself as one of

the most significant milestones in thedevelopment of public international cri-minal law, as well as a case of a victoriouscamp imposing law and justice to thelosing camp. It is from this perspective,hence, that the extent to which thesecontributions can be considered to be entirely positive advancements inthe pursuit of justice and law whenapplied to different contexts than the

German one, is one on which some ofthe contributors to this book remainprecautious in assessing.

Published in 2008, The Legacy ofNuremberg: Civilizing Influence or Institu-tionalized Vengeance, originated from aseminar organized by the Asia PacificCentre for Military Law, held on theoccasion of the 60th anniversary of theNuremberg trials which, as all ”major

anniversaries, prompt(ed) particularpause for reflection” (p. xxi). Theseminar gathered both scholars and

practitioners of law with extensive

knowledge and experience in importanthumanitarian and international criminaltrials, such as those of East Timor, theInternational Criminal Tribunal for theFormer Yugoslavia or the trial ofSlobodan Milosevic. Therefore, thepapers submitted as parts of this volumeprovide the readers not only withhistorical background information onthe context and the implications of the

Nuremberg trials, but also with an in-depth analysis of its consequences to thesubsequent development of internationallaw, to the conceptualization of the warof aggression and to coming to termswith the past through collective memory,simultaneously putting these implicationsinto perspective ”with a determinationto ground [their] evaluations inthe present and the future” (p. xxii).

In order to do, the last two parts of the book are dedicated to examining theimpact of the new theoretical andinstitutional frameworks determined bythe Nuremberg International MilitaryTribunal on other significant casesthroughout the world, such as the oneof Timor Leste’s Reception, Truth andReconciliation Commission, East Timor’sInternational Tribunal, Sierra Leone’s

Special Court, the Iraqi High NationalTribunal, the International CriminalCourt after the entry into force of the



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Rome Statute of 2002 and finally, that ofthe Australian case of implementation ofinternational criminal law.

To begin with, The Legacy ofNuremberg: Civilizing Influence orInstitutionalized Vengeance proceeds byencompassing the Nuremberg Trial intoa special historical context, with WilliamMaley’s rather narrative and descriptivedepiction of ”The Atmospherics ofthe Nuremberg Trial” being one ofthe most interesting parts of the book,although perhaps disappointingly brief.The Australian political scientist anddiplomat not only introduces us to thelogics and mechanisms of the legalprocedures behind the setting of thetrial, but also successfully provides anovel and captivating portrayal of thepersonalities involved.

A second contribution to rootingthe Nuremberg trials in a historicalcontext – although more retrospectively– is this time made by a German author,Susanne Karstedt, who explains andexamines the psychological impact ofthe Nuremberg International MilitaryTribunal over the German public opinionand collective memory, with particularfocus on ”how reconciliation andrecovery can be achieved in post-warand post-conflict situation” (p. 15). Onthis note, an interesting remark is thatshe maintains that ”the German publicfound the ’victors’ justice’ just and fair,and supported the way it was done as

well as the final outcome” (p. 19), basingher assumption on the results of anopinion poll of April 1947, in a statementwhich is quite contrary to popular beliefthat the collective German memory afterthe Second World War may have beenresentful to the Nuremberg Tribunal.Finally, she concludes that ”internationaltribunals like the Nuremberg Tribunal areextraordinarily important in recovering

and clarifying the truth and changingperceptions of identities, in the shortas well as in the long run” (p. 34), thus

advocating for the positive, civilizinginfluence of those trials.

The second part of the book iscomprised of a series of contributionswhich all underline the fundamentalimportance of conceptualizing andinstitutionalizing criminal responsibility,particularly in and from the perspectiveof the Nuremberg events. On this note,chapter three focuses on the retributiveapproach to justice, by evaluatingthe extent to which reconciliation isactually achieved after a trial. Fromthis perspective, Graham Blewitt, theauthor, uses his practical experience atthe International Criminal Tribunal of

Yugoslavia and a brief analogy withthe International Criminal Tribunal ofRwanda in order to firmly advocate forthe positive legacy of the Nurembergtrials which ”have contributed to thedevelopment of the human race byachieving another step in becoming morecivilized” (p. 46 ) and thus pleading that”the retributive approach to violations ofhumanitarian international law [is not]

incompatible with a restorative approachto justice, but rather complementary toit” (p. 46).

Another interesting chapter of TheLegacy of Nuremberg: Civilizing Influenceor Institutional Vengeance is the fifth.Written by the Australian journalist,investigator and writer Mark Aarons andprovocatively entitled ”Justice Betrayed:Post-1945 Responses to Genocide” this

section portrays the attitude of thepublic opinion and of the internationalcommunity regarding the events of theHolocaust in rather cold tonalities. Theauthor argues that ”the immediate post-war discussion about the Holocausttended to focus on the administrativeand technological efficiency of the Nazistate in planning and carrying out thevast enterprise of locating, concentrating

and killing its millions of victims” (p. 78)while overlooking the responsibility andpassivity of the rest of the world. From



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this perspective of collective memory,he further analyzes the cases of EastTimor and Indonesia, which in the after-math of genocide determined the samepassive attitudes he even characterizes as”complicity” (p. 86) of the internationalcommunity. Separating himself fromthe previous stream of writings on thepositive legacies of the Nurembergtrials, Aarons states the past six decadeswere characterized by indifference onthe international arena, until the entryinto force of the Rome Statute, whichsubsequently established an InternationalCriminal Court. Nevertheless, in spite ofacknowledging the fundamental impactof the International Criminal Court,he identifies some of the weaknessesof the International Criminal Court inthe final part of his paper, such as itslack of independence, its limited powerof initiative, the veto power grantedto the Security Council which enablesthem to prevent any trials that would be inconvenient to the majority of itsmembers, as well as its rigorous view onthe nature of the crimes and criminalswhich may be brought in front of thiscourt and the ratione temporis regulationaccording to which all criminal chargesmust have been ”committed on or after July 1st, when the Statute came intoforce” (p. 94).

Consequently, ”Nuremberg representedthe end of the notion of unlimited nationalsovereignty, a new international set of

norms of conduct becoming applicable,compliance with superior orders ceasedto be a defense and after Nuremberg,the illegality of aggressive war was wellestablished” (p. xiii-xiv). These are buta few of the crucial changes that theNuremberg Tribunal brought about andwhich are further identified and explainedin the third section of the present volume,which focuses on the fundamental

legal principles that came into beingwith, and/or after the NurembergInternational Military Tribunal. One of

the most significant such contributionswas the ”fundamental principle ofindividual criminal responsibility[which] has since become an unassailablefoundation of international criminallaw” (p. 103). Quite interestingly, the

authors Michael J. Kelly and TimothyL.H. McCormack, also mention that theNuremberg Tribunal was neither the firstsuch attempt of establishing a specificinstitution to deal with war crimes – theidea was contemplated at the end of theFirst World War as well – nor was it theonly post-Second World War time thatwar criminals were brought to justice– the Tokyo Tribunal being a further

example in point. Moreover, the secondcontribution of the Nuremberg trialswas a conceptual one, as its Charter’sarticle 6 established and declared ”threecategories of international crime: warcrimes, crimes against humanity andcrimes against peace” (p. 105), as well asconspiracy and the crime of aggression,therefore making the war of aggressionillegal, as opposed to its previous neutral

status preserved by the WestphalianTreaty that promoted state sovereignty.Finally, a massive part of the book

is devoted to analyzing the Australianimplementation of International CriminalLaw and to what extent it has beeninfluenced by the procedural standardsand legislative conceptualization of theNuremberg model. Perhaps the mostrepresentative example in point is that

of the manner in which Australia triedits Japanese war criminals which began”in November 1945 and continued untilmid 1951” (p. 240). The author, MichaelCarrel argues that the Japanese warcriminals were guilty of murderingcivilians as well as over 8000 AustralianPOWs and they were prosecuted at aninternational level at the Tokyo Tribunalfor ”major crimes” and at a national level

for ”minor crimes”. The influence of theNuremberg Tribunal is obvious here,as the terminology was adopted from



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its Charter – the ”major crimes” werereferring to crimes against peace and thecrime of aggression, whereas the so-called”minor crimes” were the crimes againsthumanity, covering a wide range of”dreadful crimes” (p. 245). It is within thissecond category that ”Australia playeda significant role” conducting 300 trialsagainst 807 individuals, of which ”579were convicted on one or more chargesand 137 were sentenced to death andexecuted” (p. 245). A further interestingfragment deals with the allegations thatthese trials were imposed by the ones whowere victorious in the war against thosewho had lost, under the more commonlyreferred to syntagm of the ”victor’s justice” which also implies that justicewas militarily imposed and sometimesa mere excuse for institutionalizingvengeance. The Australian case is noexception, as it was also conducted bythe Australian Army which investigated,prosecuted and punished the war crimescommitted by the Japanese, without anycivilian supervision, granting numerousdeath sentences and suddenly declaring

that the obedience of superior orders wasno longer to be recognized as a defense towar criminal – a matter entirely inexistentand contrary to the Japanese militarydoctrine until that moment. Finally,and in spite of all these limitations andconstraints which may be applicableto many of the International CriminalTribunals established in the after-mathof war and/or genocide throughout theworld, the authors conclude that themost significant legacy of the NurembergTribunal was the ”establishment ofan international rule of law” (p. 325),institutionally embodied in the recentlyfounded International Criminal Court.

On the whole,The Legacy of Nuremberg:Civilizing Influence or InstitutionalizedVengeance stands out as a very thoroughlegal and scientific analysis, coveringa wide range of topics and cases in aneutral, reportorial style, rendering it asone of the most significant contributionsto the study of international criminallaw.

CRISTINA MANOLACHE

NORMAN M. NAIMARKStalin’s GenocidesPrinceton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2010, 163 pp.

Norman M. Naimark’s book, is a boldattempt, perhaps the boldest since RobertConquest’s ground breaking works, atlabeling soviet crimes ”genocides”.

Norman M. Naimark is the Robertand Florence McDonnell Professor of EastEuropean Studies at Stanford Universityand one of the most respected authoritieson the Soviet era.

His latest work, Stalin’s Genocides, isoften described as being a ”lucid analysis

of the Stalinist terrors”1, a ”simplyoutstanding” attempt at explaining ”themost significant aspect of Stalin’s rule-mass terror”2 and an overall eye-openingliterary experience.

1 Simon SEBAG MONTEFIORE, http://

press.princeton.edu/titles/9278.html (accesedon 14.02.2011).2 Jan T. GROSS, http://press.princeton.

edu/titles/9278.html (accessed on 14.02.2011)



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But even more than this, Naimark’s book is an undeniable proof that scholarswill continue to pressure the Russiannation and even push the internationalcommunity to acknowledge what has become evident in recent years: Stalincommitted genocide and there’s no wayaround it.

Nevertheless, the simple act ofaccepting this phrase as being true willinevitably bring about a whole newset of issues with which the Russiangovernment is not yet, I think, willing todeal with.

Why is an international recognitionof Stalin’s crimes as genocidal actsso important? Naimark answers thisquestion himself, in an interview forStanford University3, regarding Stalin’sGenocides: ”It’s extremely important,I think, for the health of the Russiannation, the Ukrainian nation, to come toterms with these things that happened inthe past so that they can go on and say’okay, we’re not going to those thingsanymore’”.

In a nutshell, Naimark strives to broaden Raphael Lemkin’s definitionof ”genocide”, as taken from the 1948United Nations Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of the Crimeof Genocide4, in order to include alsosocial and political groups.

He states that, although everybodyseems to agree that the term ”genocide”applies in the case of the Holocaust, in

the case of the mass murders perpetrated by Stalin, very few are keen to accept thesame. One of the difficulties comes fromthe fact that intent to kill a specific groupfrom Stalin’s part is extremely hard to

3 http://europe.stanford.edu/news/norman_naimark_redefines_genocide_20100928/ (accessed on 14.02.2011).

4

The UN convention defines genocideas ”acts committed with the intent to destroy,in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racialreligious group, as such”.

prove and by the fact that Stalin had arational motive for the murders5.

The first thing that stands out inNaimark’s most recent work is the title,Stalin’s Genocides. Why not ”SovietGenocides”? Well, as Naimark explainsin the introduction of the book, ”Toplace Stalin at the center of the genocidequestion is not meant as a way ofexcluding social, political, economic, andideological determinants of mass killingin the Soviet Union in the 1930s” (p. 14).

Placing Stalin in the position of themain perpetrator is a conscious effort thatdoes not exclude the theory of ”personaldictatorship” or the responsibility of thetens of thousands of ”accomplices ofgenocide”.

It does, however, make a statementon the extensive role that Stalin had inthe soviet mass murders: ”Stalin madea huge difference, and it is Stalin’s rolein mass killing that is essential inunderstanding the genocidal characterof his regime” (p. 14).

Moreover, ”As the result of Stalin’srule in the 1930s and early 1940s, manymillions of innocent people were shot,starved to death, or died in detention andexile. It is long since time to consider thisstory an important chapter in the historyof genocide” (p. 2).

In his attempt to demonstrate thatStalin’s crimes were ”genocide” and not”mass murder”, Naimark describes inthe first chapter of his book the events

leading up to coining the controversial6

5 ”Because Stalin killed in the name ofthe higher ideals of socialism and humanprogress, it is sometimes argued, his cannot be equated with the base motives of history’sother twentieth-century genocidaires, whokilled for no other reason than the perceived‘otherness’ of ethnic or religious groups”

(p. 5)6 Many scholars have argued at somepoint or other in time that the UN definitionof genocide has many flaws. As Erick D.



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definition of the term ”genocide” in1948.

The author argues that ”The specificlanguage of the UN Convention onthe Prevention and Punishment of theCrime of Genocide of December 1948is frequently cited as the reason whyStalin’s crimes cannot be consideredgenocide” (p. 15), meaning that Stalin’svictims were neither a national, ethnical,racial or religious group.

They were a ”political, social group”, but these groups are not mentioned inthe UN definition of genocide, and not because it would make the definitiontoo broad or untrue. The reason behindthe omission is that in the negotiationspreceding the Convention, the SovietUnion, its allies and some of the othercountries7 forced the exclusion of thesecategories. They feared that their policiestoward the peasantry and politicalopponents could be then consideredgenocide.

The ”omission” of these categoriesis somewhat ironical in the sense thatRaphael Lemkin, who first coined theterm ”genocide”, included in his firstdraft of the definition also ”crimes againstsocial or political entities” (p. 16).

In the second chapter of the book,”The Making of a Genocidaire”, Naimarkattempts to shed some light on how andwhy did Stalin become such a mercilessmurderer. He uses recent declassified

Weitz argues in A Century of Genocide-Utopiasof Race and Nation, Princeton University Press,2005, when speaking about this topic, ”Nearlyeveryone who considers the definition findsit insufficient for one reason or another.It manages to be at the same time both too broad and too narrow”.

7 ”According to the New York Times,countries like Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican

Republic, Iran, and South Africa were worriedthat they could be accused of genocide if theyfought against domestic political insurgencies by revolutionary groups” (p. 22).

documents from the Soviet party andCentral Committee and biographies ofStalin in order to explain ”his mentality,and his willingness to use mass killing toachieve his aims”8.

Stalin’s life seems to be markedwith grief and losses: he was beaten asa child by both his parents, his first wife,Ekaterina (Kato) Svanidze, died in 1908,soon after the birth of their son Iakov,his second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva,committed suicide in 1932 (p. 34) andhis close confederate Sergei Kirov wasassassinated in December 1934 (p. 34).

Nevertheless, ”there is no singlekey to understanding Stalin’s violence inthe 1930s, but rather – as is so often thecase in the history of genocide – a perfectstorm of factors intersected that broughtStalin to engage in the mass murder ofmillions” (p. 35). This ”perfect storm”was a dangerous mix made up by Stalin’sviolent character, his desire to succeedin the Bolshevik party, his belief in thecommunist utopia and the example hehad from Lenin, a violent leader himself.

As for the part of responsibility, thereis not doubt, in Naimark’s view, thatStalin knew, approved and encouragedmass killings, ”We now have scores ofdeclassified documents demonstratingthat Stalin himself signed hundreds ofarrest lists, checked off on the deathsentences in most of them, constantlyencouraged his underlings to carryout the ’highest penalty’ (death), and

criticized others for misplaced softnessand lack of vigilance against so-calledenemies of the people” (p. 30).

The third chapter is a detailedaccount of the ”dekulakization”campaign of Stalin that left hundreds ofthousands of people dead in death campsdisguised as ”forced labor camps”. The

8 http://www.rorotoko.com/index.php/article/norman_naimark_book_interview_stalin_genocides/P1/ (accessed on 13.02.2011).



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two ”major Bolshevik wars against thepeasantry” (the first in 1919-1922 and thesecond in 1928-1933) triggered by forcedcollectivization and expropriation, killedmany more.

”The primary means by which thecountryside would be transformed intocollective farms was a radical – one couldmaintain – genocidal attack on the so-called kulaks” (p. 55) because Stalin setout to eliminate them as a group ratherthan a class.

Also, knowledge about what washappening in the countryside waswidespread among soviet officials, asNaimark points out, ”Certainly at themiddle level of Soviet officialdom,conscientious observers understood thatsomething was seriously wrong. Kulaks– including their families – were dying by the tens of thousands from hunger,typhus, and a variety of diseases induced by inhuman living standards andwidespread famine” (p. 63).

As ”dekulakization” has beendescribed by the UN as an ”ineffectivepolicy of communist government”,the question is whether this inactionof the decision making officials can beconsidered genocidal or not.

Naimark suggests that it can, becauseStalin ”surely knew and understood thatthese conditions were ubiquitous andthat the kulak population of the specialsettlements was being decimated monthafter month by the horrid conditions in

which they lived […] His indifference tothis suffering and dying was certainlymurderous, if not genocidal” (p. 63).

The ”terror by quota”9, the Gulag,the infamous Order 0044710, the forced

9 Setting of quotas for arrests and killingsin the various regions.

10 ”Authorized the rounding up of any

remaining ’extraneous’ outsiders in Soviettowns and cities and ’socially harmfulelements’” (p. 67) meaning basically anyonewho opposed or hindered the system.

deportations, the inhuman conditionsin labor camps, they all led to full scalegenocide against the peasantry.

The forth chapter of Naimark’s bookdescribes another instance where Stalinmade himself responsible for genocide:the Holodomor (the Great Famine).

The Great Famine struck at the beginning of the 1930’s many areas of theSoviet Union, but fell more heavily onUkraine and the Kuban area (inhabitedalso by Ukrainians). This happened because, ”the Ukrainian peasantry wasalso ’doubly suspect’ to the center:as peasants, who were consideredinherently counterrevolutionary andhopelessly backward by the Bolsheviks,and as Ukrainians, whose nationalismand attachment to their distinctivenessgrated on Stalin and the Kremlinleadership” (p. 72).

Millions of people starved to deathin 1932-33 because of the high grainrequisition quotas imposed by theRussian government. The problem thatNaimark rightly identifies is whetherStalin crushed the Ukrainian pesantry because they were ”kulaks” or becausethey were Ukrainian?

Stalin is believed to be responsiblefor the gravity of the Ukrainian faminenot only because he knew about itand did nothing to help, but also, asNaimark points out, because he imposedmeasures to make it worse: he sealed the borders between Russia and Ukraine so

that people were not able to flee fromfamine affected areas. He also imposeda law that forbid the Ukrainian peasantsto go to the cities, where some food stillavailable.

”There is not a lot of evidence thatStalin himself ordered the Ukrainiankiller famine, but there is every reasonto believe he knew about it, understoodwhat was happening, and was completely

indifferent to the fate of the victims. Thismay not be enough evidence to convicthim in an international court of justice



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as a genocidaire, but that does not meanthe event itself cannot be judged asgenocide”, concludes Naimark.

The Ukrainians were not the onlypeople that would have to suffer becauseof Stalin. In the fifth chapter of the book, ”Removing Nations”, Naimarkdescribes the Soviet attack and forcedresettlement of several nationalities,like the Poles, Germans and Koreans.These attacks also have some genocidalcharacteristics. Naimark mentions alsothe Katyn massacre, when 21 857 Polishofficers and men were murdered at theorders of Stalin and Beria. He calls theKatyn massacre ”the most unambiguouscases of genocide in the history of thetwentieth century” (p. 92).

In the case of Stalin’s attack onthe Chechens-Ingush and the CrimeanTatars, Naimark suggests that it should be called, at the very least, a case ofcultural genocide.

The Great Purge of 1936-1938,detailed in the 6th chapter, is the weakestcase for being classified as an act ofgenocide because ”no particular ethnic,social, or political groups were attacked”(p. 100). Repression was chaoticallyand sporadically aimed at basicallyanybody who was considered a real orpotential threat to Stalin and thereforeto the USSR. Nevertheless, ”the arrestsand mass killing during the purges weredriven less by the real threats to Sovietsecurity than by Stalin’s xenophobia and

paranoia. Without Stalin, the genocidaire,it is hard to imagine the Great Terror”(p. 120).

”The Crimes of Stalin and Hitler”,the 7th chapter, is perhaps the mostilluminating, and from which theinternational community should takenotes. Naimark calls upon a new visionof perceiving and labeling genocide, byseeing beyond the UN definition and

letting go of the ”Holocaust uniqueness”syndrome.

”But perhaps it is time to stop askingthe question whether the group that is being murdered ‘in whole or in part’ isa national, ethnic, and religious group,or whether it is a social, political, oreconomic group. What is, after all, thedifference when it comes to human life?”(p. 125) says Naimark.

As a conclusion Naimark points outwhat many think but few have had thecourage to say: Hitler and Stalin are alikein more than one way.

”Stalin’s culpability for mass murderis not unlike that of Hitler’s […] Bothdestroyed their countries and societies,as well as vast numbers of people insideand outside their own states. Both –in the end – were genocidaires”, saysNaimark, paving the way, hopefully, fora new understanding of genocide and itsmakers.

Naimark’s book is first and foremosta sign that the time might have come torevise the definition of genocide in orderto include the soviet crimes.

Incidentally or not, a short whileafter this book was published, theRussian Parliament admitted thatStalin was directly responsible for theexecution of approximately 22 000 Polishnationals in the Katyn massacre of April-May 1940. As Naimark observes, in acover interview on November 3rd, 2010,”Even the President of Russia, DmitriMedvedev, has called for an end to makingexcuses for Stalin’s mass killing of Soviet

citizens”11. Is it enough? No. Is step in theright direction? Yes, definitely.

ALEXANDRA ILIE

11 http://www.rorotoko.com/index.php/article/norman_naimark_book_interview_stalin_genocides/P1/ (accessed on 14.02.2011).



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BOGDAN MURGESCURomânia si Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economiceEditura Polirom, Iaşi, 2010, 524 pp.

It is always difficult to surmise on

what will be a great book judging only by the rumors about it, but BogdanMurgescu’s proves the point excellently:not surprisingly, the book we have beforeour years, and which took twelve of hardwork to complete, is perhaps the bestRomanian academic writing for 2010.

What strikes one first is the sheerscope and seeming broadness of theacademic task: to put down on paper the

economic history of Romania (or the areasknown today under this label) in the lastfive centuries in a comparative analysis.Although collecting data is sometimesmore difficult than statistically handlingit, one should give credit to BogdanMurgescu’s painstaking effort given thefact that two great economic historians,Paul Bairoch and Angus Maddison,have tried the same quantitative scheme

on the whole of Europe for the sameperiod studied by Professor Murgescu.However, the clear hindsight on everyparticular economic detail is clearlyset out from the beginning and highlytrustworthy only for the last two hundredyears, ever since the unfettered surge ofthe Industrial Revolution had begun. Ihave mentioned above the soundnessof the comparative analysis: ProfessorMurgescu pinpoints a number of otherstates at the periphery of Europe, small-sized in terms of territory and populationand none of them ever constituted ina ruling empire, similar to Romania,to offer a good case of comparison:Denmark, Ireland and Serbia. All four ofthem were basically agricultural societiesat the onset of the nineteenth century, allpassed through a phase of small-scaleindustrialization and none of them wasmassively industrial prior to First World

War. What is Bogan Murgescu’s trying

to achieve in this lengthy book has beenmentioned en passant in the very title: howcome that, with the advent of modernityand onward, there has been an increasein development levels between a smallnumber of countries, coming mainly fromEurope and the Anglo-Saxon world, andthe rest of the world, the ”downtrodden”many which were not able to piercethrough the industrial age and deliver

its overt benefits to their whole societies?To this web of queries Bogdan Murgescusets his analysis as a future examplefor further interests in the same overallassessment.

Before delving into the book, thereis one more thing worth articulating:Professor Murgescu’s neutral andconfident-looking style is based on amountain heap of data, which took adecade to thread together in the fabricof his latest work. This informationmakes the text look inexpugnable sinceevery line of it carries not a personalreflection or a rhetorical pirouette (whichis the case for many other historians), but a solid down to earth analysis whichlooks mainly at the economic efficiency,the social layers, the educationaldevelopment of each study-case, mostlyusing the hermeneutical tools provided by the historians hinted to in the secondparagraph.

The books is mainly structuredin five sections, each taking a quarterof the overall book: the early modernperiod, that is before the 1800s, the longnineteenth century (1815-1914), theinterwar period, the post-1945 age and

the time which flowed after the fall ofcommunism (this last section is briefly



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seen through, although extremely wellwritten).

The first section is covered in charts,tables and a myriad of other statisticalaccoutrement, mainly designed to suitany reluctant mindsets. Hence, how didthe four countries look like shortly after1800? Professor Murgescu highlights firstand foremost the importance of a ready-made state apparatus as a necessaryprerequisite of a good developmentvariable. Unfortunately, only Denmarkpossessed a state apparatus and was notpolitical subject to any overwhelmingnearby neighbor. At the same time, the

Weberian religious confession is notconsidered by Bogdan Murgescu as beingtantamount to necessary development:the Protestant ethic might have existed, but the Danish large landholders were notcapitalist before the nineteenth century.As for the Catholics in Transylvania orthe Anglicans in the North of Ireland(Ulster), we should not forget thatthey benefited from special political

protection from the Habsburg Empireand the British one, respectively. Even ifreligion does play a significant part in theprocess of development, there are otherkey issues to be taken into consideration.Among these, the most important isthe agricultural productivity, whichlies behind the doubling of Europe’spopulation between the fifteenth andeighteenth centuries. Although the

extensive character of the developmentprocess stood in the way of major breakthroughs, the new agriculturaltechniques benefited tremendously to thegeneral progress. The population densityincreased to about 30 or 40 inhabitantson a square kilometer, preparing theway for the future industrial highproductivity. Out of the three historicalregions of modern day Romania, the

most developed was Walachia, whileTransylvania, despite being part of aCentral European Empire, was one of its

backward areas, with a city life stuck inthe fifteenth century. The Ottoman Empiredid not lag much behind the economicefficiency of Western counterparts.

As we move on into the nineteenthcentury, the social landscape changes beyond recognition. The populationmore than doubles in a century, thetechnological progress is astounding,new trade routes on the hinterlandare opened because of the cobweb ofrailways eating up time and space acrossunseen distances, the city life flourishes,while the gross domestic product ofEurope was at its highest in the world before 1914.

Political independence and theestablishment of the nation-state areresponsible partly for the success, yetother social institutions, such as privatefunded universities and technicalschools, professional associates and bodies are to be taken seriously as well.Trade is also an important element,while the accumulation of capital dueto the increased rates of exports is

an adamant condition for the futurereshaping of different industrial brachescorresponding to the changes on thelarger world market (Denmark’s caseis, again, the best possible scenario fora good development). However, as forIreland, which lost millions of its folk inemigration “leakages” to America afterthe Great Famine of the 1840s, this meantstagnation for many decades to come. ”In

conclusion, the historical determinantsaccumulated in time had a decisiveeffect for maintaining Romania, Serbiaand Ireland at the economic peripheryof Europe; on the other hand, however,the political elites have understoodlately and in one perspective the realeconomic troubles of these countries,while the policies they supported have been in most cases anachronic (too late),

inadequate and inefficient” (p. 204).After the onslaught of the First WorldWar, which hit most of the countries



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analyzed by Professor Murgescu (withthe exception of Ireland) and especiallyRomania (in terms of resources wastedor human losses), the prospects seemed bleak for Romania and Serbia, promisingfor Ireland and good for Denmark. The

accumulation of development gaps wassoon to take its toll on the future courseof events. After twenty years of economicdevelopment, most of which are wronglydepicted as the golden age in Romania’shistory, the GDP/per capita of Romaniancitizens was twice below the Europeanaverage and four times lower than theDanish one, making Romania sit at the bottom of the list concerning the level

of economic and social developmentacross the European continent. Whatare possible explanations to this drearyoutput? The dismal effects are not to be blamed on religious heritages, accordingto Professor Murgescu, given the fact thatthe secular tide which pervaded mostEuropean societies of the time didn’t leavemuch room for religious traditions. Theonly positive effect of religious beliefs,

which can be computed reasonably by now, is the growing importance oferadicating illiteracy, but this purportedto the Protestants strongholds, includingDenmark. Otherwise, the state playsmuch a share in the success or failure ofmany economic systems. The schoolingsystem together with the openness toworld markets are better proofs to anefficient and developed society that the

religious variable. Romania scores poorlyin many respects: low industrialization, anationalistic policy of preventing foreigncapital into the domestic market (theliberal policy of Vintilă Brătianu in the1920s forced Romania to produce andsell small quantities of cereals whenthe world prices were going high and,in the years of the Great Depression,when oil and cereals were cheapworldwide Romania was exportinghuge amounts, without accumulatingmuch capital), an agricultural system

with low rates of productivity (becauseof low technological input), an urbanpopulation below the European averagerate of urban dwellers (not more than21% of the entire population), an infantmortality rate which was the highest

on the continent (179/1000 infants diedin the first year) and an illiteracy rateof 43% of the Romanian populationas of 1930. The services sector was beyond anyone’s reckoning, since ithardly existed. However, in spite of allthese grievances, Romania managed todevelop significantly from what was before 1914. Nonetheless, the samesituation is to be observed in the rest

of countries analyzed by ProfessorMurgescu, enlarging the economic anddevelopmental discrepancies in theaftermath of the war. One importantpopular myth debunked by BogdanMurgescu is the so-called ”granary ofEurope” hypotheses, a nickname for theGreat Romania of 1918-1939. Not onlydid Romania produce around 10% of thetotal agricultural exports of Europe at that

time, but its dependency on agriculturalproducts testifies to the existence of a backward agrarian economy and society.This was far from being the case in Irelandand Denmark, but was quite similar tothe situation in the more industrializedYugoslavia (although with differencesfrom the Romania case). Romania waslagging behind in terms of economicdevelopment rates even in comparison

to the world average of the time.Professor Murgescu’s overall assessmentof the interwar period busts anothernationalistic myth which portrays theperiod in exhilarating rosy colors.

As for the long stretch of time whichseparates our contemporary period from1945, the economic analysis of the ”dark”totalitarian regimes, Professor Murgescuemphasizes both positive and negative

aspects. There was a certain catch-upgrowth in Eastern Europe due to themassive process of industrialization and



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basic displacements of populations fromthe rural to the urban areas, as well as anincrease in the level of living, but, after1970s, the economic rates began to waneand rapidly plummet into recessionin the 1980s. The technical progresswas essential to the enhancement ofproductivity rates in all industries.Consequently, the importance of humancapital, in terms of the level of educationand professionalization, had becomemore and more significant. As for eachcountry taken separately, there are aspectswhich are worth considering: Denmark,already above the European developmentaverage before 1939, took advantageover its massive literate populationand, in the period after World War Two,focused on services as much as on theindustrial output. Technology, especiallyin the industry of wind energy, turnedinto an essential component of the typeof Danish welfare state provided duringthe first three decades to its population.The naval industry was one of the pillarsof Denmark’s economy as well. All inall, its performance was at the end betterthan the European average and Denmarkis still today one of the most developedcountries in the world, ranking amongthe highest in the HDI chart. Ireland, onthe other hand, was rather stagnatingin the first two decades after 1945, but, soon after joining the EuropeanCommunity in 1973, new exports vistasmade the balance sheet look promising

for the country in the period to come.However, considering the small taxesof the Irish state, as well as its opennessto the world markets (especially theUnited States), Ireland started to developat an unprecedented rate by the end ofthe 1980s. Many American grand scalecorporations had their headquarters inIreland. The free exchange of goods withthe mature markets of the European

Community played also an importantpart. The services sector skyrocketed between 1987 and 2001, making Ireland

deserve its title of ”the tiger economy”in Europe. Its annual growth, althoughnot sustainable, was well over 5% in theperiod. Therefore, Ireland progressedinto the small elite of highly developedcountries in the world.

As for the Communist states, thesituation is totally different. Yugoslavia,which represented an apparent middleway between communism and liberalcapitalism, increasingly developed in the1950s and 1960s only to stagnate later,facing the prospects of paying back itshuge foreign debts, and in the menacing1980s to fall, like many other statesin the region, into its final recession.The civil wars which dismantled theYugoslav Federation (which was onlyheld together by the tight hand of Tito),although Yugoslavia was above therate of development of most socialistcountries, including Romania, as far asthe tourist industry, overall educationand consumption habits are concerned.The services industry was somewherearound 30% before 1989, while most ofthe economy was industrial. During the1990s, there was a frightening drop inthe level of living of Serbia, mainly dueto the war, while other former membercountries of the Socialist Federation, suchas Slovenia or Croatia, were economicallyoutpacing the others from the distance.

Romania, nonetheless, developedafter 1945 by means of forcedindustrialization and it even went

upwards in terms of GDP/ inhabitantin the period 1959-1973. Illiteracy almostdisappeared, healthcare was distributedwidely, the urban population grew by20-30% in the period (although 15%less than the European average in1989) and there was a truly reshapingof the backward agrarian society of theinterwar period, although at the cost ofhectic state economic policies and human

losses. Tourism, the car industry, evenconsumption habits were trademarksof a modernizing society in the 1960s



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and 1970s landscape. Most Romaniansnaturally felt they were better off thanany other previous generation. After theoil crisis of 1973, the economic prospects began to shift. As the 1980s approached,Nicolae Ceauşescu’s responsibility forerratic decision-making in the economicpolicies was more and more evident.The energy crises was translated into adiminishing of the overall level of livingof most Romanians, which, along with thestate-funded policy to pay back all foreigndebts, led to an aggravating economicrecession. The political inefficiency andideological blindness were mixed in thefabric of things. At the onset of the 1990s,Romania’s GDP per capita was threefold lower than the European averageand six times lower than the Danishone. The discrepancies increased andthere no hopes for a stable convergenceon the horizon. What the communist brought to the Romanian society wasfinally a mixture of nineteenth centuryindustrialization (Daniel Chirot’s famoustheory) with a harsh period of economicdownturn which dealt a fatal blow to thewhole system. Although Romania wasa massive exporter of raw material andmanufactured goods as well (but of littletechnology), the society at large didn’t benefit (or wasn’t supposed to benefit)from the chaotic economic whims of thesingle party’s top echelons. After 150 ofyears of modernization the Romaniansociety was significantly behind the

accomplishments of the highly developedWestern societies of Europe, althoughmany efforts have been made to erase theexisting gaps.

Unfortunately, the opening upof the market and the series of stateprivatizations didn’t allow for a seriousdevelopment of Romania before the2000s (and not even shortly afterwards).The former nomenklatura members turnedinto self-appointed businessmen, who became prosperous from illicit takeoversof formerly state-owned companies, whilea primitive type of capitalism blossomedunder hard circumstances, whereas theoverall population was passing throughtimes of financial hardships. BogdanMurgescu ends his book in the hope thatit may be the task (and perhaps crowningachievement) of the European Union tocope with all the legacies of backwardnessof the Eastern Europe periphery.

Our final remark is that ProfessorMurgescu goes brilliantly at length toshow statistically the visible effects offaulty decision-making and the shabbyroots of genuine development, but attimes there is this feeling that the samehistorian who pays great attentionto every minor demographic detailperhaps underestimates the “cultural”understanding, not necessarily goingalong religious lines, of the major chasmsand gaps between the developed Westernworld and the still developing East.

All in all, Bogdan Murgescu’s latest book paves the way for future quantitativeanalysis but, however it may turn out to be in the end, the true historian at heartdoes a great work here. România şi Europa

is, without exaggerating a bit, the bestmirror on Europe our national historyever had.

DAN-ALEXANDRU CHIŢĂ



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SERGIU GHERGHINA, SERGIU MIŞCOIU (eds.)Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistăInstitutul European, Iaşi, 2010, 319 pp.

Une étude sur le populisme enRoumanie doit répondre, entre autres,à trois questions cardinales. En premierlieu, quelle stratégie théorique faut-il adopter pour définir ce phénomènepolitique à manifestation polymorphe?Deuxièmement, où placer le populismesur la scène politique? Et enfin, commentrapporter le populisme à la questionde la démocratie? Le volume Partide şi personalităţi populiste în România post-comunistă , édité par Sergiu Gherghinaet Sergiu Mişcoiu assume le pari derépondre à toutes ces questions dans unmoment où l’étiquette de populisme estutilisée le plus souvent pour diaboliserl’adversaire. Le livre réunit neufs textesqui explorent la question populistesous quatre aspect: le plan théorique,l’évolution des partis politiques après1989, les stratégies électorales et lamécanique des opinions

Dans son chapitre introductif(pp. 11-54), Sergiu Mişcoiu montre quele populisme est un objet qui résiste à lathéorisation. Du point de vue historique,la généalogie de la notion remonte àla tradition politique de l’Antiquité etsemble accompagner, de près ou de loin,toute son évolution ultérieure. Du pointde vue géographique, le phénomène estdevenu, dans les années ’60, une marquespécifique de l’Amérique latine, maisaujourd’hui il a colonisé aussi l’espaceeuropéen. Du point de vue conceptuel, lepopulisme peut s’inscrire à toute syntaxe,faisant l’objet d’une combinatoire, oud’une relation hégémonique qui articuledes éléments divers dans une structurepolitique parfois instable. Il y a biensur des éléments grâce auxquelles onpeut reconnaître le populisme et SergiuMişcoiu les énumère: l’exaltation du

peuple, l’anti-élitisme et la propensionà la démocratie directe, mais l’auteurmanifeste une distance par rapport à latentation d’essentialiser les termes et detransformer les notions politiques dansdes espèces naturelles. Cella ne veutpas dire qu’il faut aborder les questionsen postmoderniste vulgaire qui fait del’absence des essences un drapeau, maisde suivre l’intuition hégélienne descatégories de reflet, notions qui n’ont pasde sens en dehors du champ conceptueldont ils appartient. C’est pour celaque Sergiu Mişcoiu plaide en guise deconclusion de son introduction pour uneapproche méthodologique qui s’inspirede la théorie du discours tel qu’elle a étéformulée par Ernesto Laclau, ChantalMouffe ou Norman Fairclough.

Le caractère volatile du populismeest confirmé aussi par Sergiu Gherghinaqui dans son article intitulé: «L’orga-nisation des partis populistes et leursuccès électoral dans la Roumanie post-communiste» (pp. 233-267) ajoute à laliste des signifiants dressée par Mişcoiul’usage des dichotomies simplificatriceset le penchant pour l’irrationnel, commemarques du populisme. L’auteurconstate, après une analyse de l’évolutionélectorale des partis parlementaires,que le populisme ne peut être identifiéd’un point de vue formel. Les variablesétudiées par Sergiu Gherghina montrentqu’il n’y a pas de différence entre lespartis qu’on nomme populistes et lesautres. Donc, conclut l’auteur, le critèrepour définir le populisme se trouvedans le message politique et dans laconstruction du leadership à l’intérieurde ces partis.

George Jiglău reprend l’effort dedéfinir le populisme d’une manière



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rigoureuse. Dans le chapitre intitulé«Savons-nous de ce qu’on parle? Uneperspective théorique sur le populisme»(pp. 55-85), il établit deux éléments

distinctifs du populisme: le contactdirect avec une masse de citoyens et lacontestation du status quo. Mais le styleanalytique de l’auteur entre en collisionavec la réalité politique roumaine quil’oblige de constater que presque tousles partis importants qui ont marquéela scène politique et tous les leaders ontconnu la tentation populiste.

C’est presque la même position quel’on retrouve dans la contribution deMihail Chiru (pp. 159-190) qui constateque le discours populiste s’est diffusédans tout le corps politique roumain.Les études classiques sur le phénomèneattachent habituellement le populisme àla montée de l’extrémisme. Mais, commele constate Mihail Chiru, en Roumanie,tous les partis politiques importants – leParti Social-Démocrate, le Parti NationalLibéral ou le Parti Démocrate-Libéral– ont usé, en toute modération, de larhétorique populiste

Mais si tous les partis ontexpérimenté cette tentation ce n’est pasle même populisme qu’ils ont invoqué.Dans «Genre et espèces du populismeroumain» (pp. 87-118), Sorina Soareen distingue cinq types: le populismepaternaliste du Front du Salut National, lepopulisme anarchique des «minériades»,le populisme extrémiste du Parti dela Grande Roumanie, le populismenationaliste du Parti de l’Unité NationaleRoumaine, et le populisme messianiquedu Parti de la Nouvelle Génération.Selon Sorin Soare, un autre populismea commencé récemment à se manifester,c’est le populisme discursif du présidentTraian Băsescu.

Lucian Vesalon consacre son chapitre«Populisme et néoliberalisme dans lediscours de la modernisation de l’État»

(pp. 191-231) à l’analyse du populismeprésidentiel en montrant que la réformede l’État qui est devenue la constanterhétorique de Traian Băsescu fonctionne

en tant qu’opération populiste. D’unepart, ce discours fonctionne par dépoliti-sation – la reforme de l’État est au-delàde tout intérêt politique – d’autre part,il ne cesse pas de politiser tous lescompartiments de la vie publique, cartous les adversaires et opposants despolitiques présidentielles deviennent desadversaires de la modernisation.

Mais d’où vient ce populisme quidomine la politique roumaine? Lesauteurs du volume proposent deuxréponses: l’une généalogique, l’autre quiregarde l’histoire du présent. AdrianaMarinescu affirme dans son étudeintitulé «Du mythe à la réalité: le discourspopuliste en Roumanie» (pp. 119-158)que celui-ci se nourrit de l’inconscientcollectif propre aux structures del’Europe orientale. C’est pour cela queAdriana Marinescu pense que le popu-lisme représente une irruption du socialdans la politique. D’autre part Dragoş Dragoman considère dans son étudeintitulée«Populisme, autoritarisme etvaleurs démocratiques dans l’opinionpublique roumaine» (pp. 269-309) quele populisme est le résultat de la démo- bilisation générale qui est survenue aprèsqu’on a accompli les grands objectifsde la politique etrangère: l’intégration

européenne et la participation dansles structures militaires de l’OTAN. Siles auteurs cités jusqu’ici analysent lepopulisme en termes de partis ou deleaders. Dragoş Dragoman démontreque la montée du populisme n’auraitpas eu lieu s’il n’y avait pas déjà unedisponibilité dans la population enversle populisme. Étudiant et interprétant lesdonnés des sondages d’opinion, l’auteur

montre que l’espace publique est marquéde plus en plus par l’intolérance sociale



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et par les manifestations du nationalismetraditionaliste.

Dans les conclusions du volume,Loredana Nabăr (pp. 311-315) affirmequ’il y a trois explications pour lamontée du populisme. En premier lieu,la Roumanie a traversé une transitionincomplète, donc le populisme peutêtre analysé en tant que contre-courantsouterrain du passage vers la démocratie.En outre, après l’époque communiste quia paralysé l’intérêt des citoyens pour lapolitique, il est explicable que l’exercice

civique des roumains est encore faible.Troisième élément, peut être le plusimportant, est qu’après 1989 la politiqueroumaine ne s’est pas structurée sur leclivage fondateur gauche-droite, maissur un antagonisme de tous contre tous.Là devient peut-être visible l’échec dela politique roumaine de transition quin’a pas su gérer la figure du perdant, cegrand interlocuteur muet du populisme.

CODRIN TĂUT

NICOLETA IONESCU-GURĂ Dimensiunea represiunii din România în regimul comunist.Dislocări de persoane şi fixări de domiciliu obligatoriuCorint, Bucureşti, 2010, 447 pp.

Part of a comprehensive seriesof volumes addressing the repressivedimension of the Romanian communistregime, the reviewed volume tackles therelocation and forced residence measurestaken during the 1948-1989 time frame.The second volume of the series intendsto focus on forced labour, while the thirdaims to center on the victims of politicaldetention in communist Romania. Onthe basis of extensive archival research,the reviewed volume investigates thecauses, mechanisms, operations, actors,procedural abuses and misdemeanor

involved in the relocation and forcedresidence procedures, as well as theconcrete consequences for the livesof those targeted by the communistrepressive apparatus.

Throughout its eight chapters, thevolume investigates the specifics of theafore-mentioned process while identi-fying a variety of social categories affec-ted by it at different stages in the regime’s

evolution: the expropriated landowners,whose estates were confiscated in March1949 on the basis of Decree no. 83; the

peasants who took part in collectiveprotests against the regulations regardingthe requisitioning of agricultural productsin 1949 (specifically in Arad, Bihor andTimiş-Torontal) and in 1950 (in Vlaşca andIlfov counties); the persons residing nearthe Yugoslav border, who were relocatedin the Bărăgan region for securityreasons during the Soviet-Yugoslavcrisis (1951-1956); the “class enemies” ofthe communist regime (former businessenterprisers, political or bureaucraticfigures, former military officers etc.);persons released from prisons and work

colonies.Furthermore, the volume includes

a chapter on the activity of the Unitresponsible for relocations and forcedresidence distribution – active within theMinistry for Internal Affairs – whcih wasoperational during 1954-1956. This unitwas responsible for tracking the activityof the relocated persons. The chapteranalyzing the – in fact – illegal basis of

relocation and forced residence orders isalso notable, as it provides the descriptionof the inner workings of the system. The



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chapter dealing with the consequencesof the 1977 miners’ strike in Valea Jiuluiand the 1987 workers’ protest in Braşovalso invites reflection, as it presents thelater stage of regime paranoia and thederivative actions against its citizens. The

concluding section addresses the post-1989 measures taken by the Romanianauthorities in support of the categories ofcitizens that were exposed to the above-mentioned repressive mechanisms.

Forced residence was standardpractice for the communist authoritieson various grounds, such as the needto keep record of persons released fromprison or those whom the regime did

not imprison. ”Hostile elements” wereconstantly seen as pervasive by theRomanian communists. Their removalwas seen as a stepping stone to regime-consolidation. To this end, the authoritiesemployed a variety of measures andmechanisms, among which prominentwere also relocation and forcedresidence. The overall purpose was theisolation, submission or even removalfrom society of those considered asperilous to the regime’s stability.Lacking a legal grounding for years,this procedure altered the life course ofthose whom it targeted: their freedomof movement was restricted to a fewkilometers surrounding the residencelocation (trespassing was punished asa criminal offence), they were carryingout unskilled work, their children’seducation was severely affected etc. This

– as well as the other forms of repressionthe communists drew on – sought toclearly mark out the consequences ofdisobedience and therefore prevent anyform of opposition.

As this was one of the markeddimensions of Romanian communism,the institutions that were created andconsolidated bore the mark of regimedevelopment stages. Repression became

structural, as it was delivered by the party,the judicial mechanisms, the police and themilitary, and ultimately, by the Securitate.

The development of these institutionsand the different phases of repressionwere strongly interrelated throughout theentire time span of the regime.

Although the costs of noncompliancewere high, on a number of occasions the

authorities were faced with individual orcollective protests against the status quo.Albeit none of them presented a severechallenge to the establishment itself, theweight they carried was not withouteffect. Illustrating are the examples of theopposition of the largest social categorywhose traditional lifestyle the communistregime attempted (and largely succeeded)in breaking: the peasantry. The Plenary

meeting of 3-5 March 1949 identified thereorganization of agriculture according tosocialist standards as one of the key tasksof regime-building. At that moment,emphasis lay on persuading the peasantsto join the newly created institutions (i.e.collective agricultural households) as partof what was to become the collectivization process. Throughout the official length ofthis process (1949-1962), the agriculturalpolicies and procedures oscillated toa significant extent. This included thetype of pressures put on the peasants tocomply with the official directives, whichranged from persuasion tactics to threats,imprisonment, forced labour, deportationsand even on-the-spot executions.

The rebellions analysed in thereviewed volume are telling in thisrespect. Occurring at the onset of thecommunist takeover, these instances of

collective protest exposed, in fact, criticalstructural weaknesses in the regime’sconfiguration. The peasant rebellionsuncovered the poor capacity of theregime to carry out policy directivesand effective surveillance operationson the local level. It was, however, alsoas a reaction to these rebellions that theregime increased its repressive efforts,granting more attention to the local-level

regime representatives as surveillanceagents. Therefore, while at the ideologicaland normative level it was clear what



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the regime was aiming at, the pragmaticlevel was far from being consolidated.

As a result of the fact that the regime’sintentions were inherently anti-social,the implementation of profoundly ille-gitimate measures was overwhel-

mingly aided by the use of repre-ssive mechanisms. As follows, institu-tional violence (physical and/or psycho-logical) against the peasants as wellas against the other social categoriestargeted by the regime as perilous forits stability became a marker of thecommunization process of the Romaniansociety. The repressive dimension grewprogressively stronger as it turned into

the most effective method of controllingsociety and masking regime illegitimacy.The fluctuating intensity of the repressivemeasures attested the incapacity of theregime to meet the challenges of its self-proclaimed omnipotence. Illustrating isagain an example of the consequencesof communist retaliation against peasantdisobedience in the 1950s: the considerablenumber of arrests carried out until 1952

by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime led to anovercrowding of prisons and also tothe drastic decrease in the number ofpeasants that could carry out the nece-ssary agricultural works. Repressive mea-sures therefore became counter-produc-tive to the effectiveness of regime policiesthemselves.

Almost forty years later, duringthe 1987 Braşov workers’ protest, the

regime was showing restraint in usingrepressive measures on a wide scale.Instead, only some of those that werepart of the protest were put on trial andwere singled out as ”hooligans” (p. 271).The author’s analysis – backed by archivaldocuments – substantiates the claim thatrepression underwent various cyclesof development, which were largelydetermined by variables such as theconsolidation and stability of the regime.

These are only a few of the aspectstackled in the volume under review, which

comprehensively reconstructs some of thecommunist regime’s control mechanismsover the Romanian society in its bidfor counteracting any real or perceivedthreat to its stability. Identifying someof the key events that are explanatory

for the regime’s anti-societal policies,the volume actually indicates the criticalphases in its evolution – particularlyin its repressive dimension. Relocationand forced residence are repressivemechanism distinct is their use to isolatethose against whom the authoritiescould not deliver sufficient evidence in judicial proceedings. The volume laysemphasis on the fact that the regulations

approving the use of these measures werekept secret due to their illegal character.The regulations were in fact prescribingmeasures taken to deprive citizens oftheir freedom, which contradicted theofficial provisions of the Constitution.Exemplifying to this end is the followingarchival reference: ”[In the cases when]we do not possess valid and concreteevidence, there is a law that allows ourministry to detain all those who incite,conduct hostile activities against ourregime which cannot be placed underlegal regulations […] Let us send them[in places] where they grow accustomedto labour, to a different life” (p. 373).

For reasons pertaining to faultyand selective statistical proceduresundertaken by the communist authorities,the documents preserved in the archivesdo not provide a precise image of the

total number of persons that wererelocated and forcefully allocated tonew households in other regions of thecountry. However, they are a key part ofthe puzzle that is still being put together by researchers interested in Romania’srecent past and more precisely in theevolution of the repressive dimensionof the communist regime. To this end,Nicoleta Ionescu-Gură’s volume brings a

meaningful and refreshing contribution.MONICA ANDRIESCU



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GIOVANNI SARTORIIngineria constituţională comparată. Structuri, stimulente şi rezultateRomanian transl. by Gabriela Tănăsescu and Irina Mihaela StoicaInstitutul European, Iaşi 2008, 326 pp.

The Romanian translations of seminalworks, as I already mentioned on otheroccasions, are to be acknowledged asessential efforts of bringing the politicalscience up-to-date in Romania. This isalso the case with the much awaitedtranslation of Sartori’s ComparativeConstitutional Engineering1. Yet I cannot begin discussing about Sartori’s bookwithout briefly underlying another

essential feature, namely the propertranslation. It is worth publishing muchawaited books, nonetheless you haveto provide readers with appropriatetranslations. And, unfortunately, thisis not the case. In too many occasionsthe translators seem not to have fullyunderstood the logic of the argumentand in too many occasions they lackappropriate Romanian terms, though

they are already widespread in politicalscience literature in Romania. In fact,many technical terms pertaining toelectoral systems and political regimes,for example, have awkward Romaniancorrespondents that make the lectureabrupt and ridiculous in many ways.

Back to Sartori’s work, it is worth tostate that, despite many technical details,this is far from being a technical book,

a practical guideline for constitutionalengineering. In the same time, this isnot necessarily a scholarly book, as itmakes proof of its utility by discussing both general frameworks for analysisand subsequent details in a fullycomparative manner. It aims at updatingvarious theories concerning institutional

1

Giovanni SARTORI, ComparativeConstitutional Engineering: An inquiry intostructures, incentives and outcomes, Macmillan,Basingstoke, 1997.

engineering and at providing meaningfulinsights and solutions for complicatedissues. Though institutional engineeringmainly refers to the division and balanceof power, Sartori’s book begins with anecessary update of the discussion aboutthe political consequences of electorallaws. In fact, many early scholars of thepolitical systems have fully understoodthe political consequences of electoral

engineering2

. Beginning with Duverger3

,they acknowledge that electoral systemsare important factors for the overallfunctioning of the political systems.According to Duverger, electoral systemsinfluence party systems and, throughthis, governance performance in termsof stability and coherence. Despite manyearly refutations and critiques, it seemsthat Duverger was somehow right.

Majoritarian electoral systems largelyfavor bi-party systems, which favors inturn stable single-party governments,whereas proportional representationfavors multi-party systems and, bythat, coalition governments that bringpolitical instability into action. This

2 Jean BLONDEL, ”Party Systems and

Patterns of Government in WesternDemocracies”, Canadian Journal of PoliticalScience, vol. 1, no. 2, 1968, pp. 180-203; DouglasW. RAE, The Political Consequences of ElectoralLaws, Yale University Press, New Haven,1971; Giovanni SARTORI, Parties and PartySystems: A Framework for Analysis, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1976; ArendLIJPHART, ”The Political Consequencesof Electoral Laws, 1945-1985”, AmericanPolitical Science Review, vol. 84, no. 2, 1990,

pp. 481-496.3 Maurice DUVERGER, Political Parties:Their Organization and Activity in the ModernWorld, Wiley, New York, 1963.



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direct causality, on the one hand, and thevagueness of Duverger’s predictions, onthe other hand, caused an ongoing debate.Regarding this two-step of causality forpolitical instability, Lijphart underlines,one has to make a clear distinction betweengovernmental instability and politicalinstability, since governmental instabilitymay go hand in hand with fair politicalstability of the overall political regime4.A posteriori, this is the argument we canuse when we look to post-communisttransition. Despite varying degrees ofgovernmental instability5, most of thepost-communist countries managedto consolidate democracy and to fulfillimportant political goals, as NATO andEU membership. Nonetheless, Sartori’sclear choice when it comes to choose between types of electoral systems ismajority rule, presented as a fair rulefor designating responsible, stable andresponsive governments. According toSartori, majoritarian electoral systemsreduce the number of relevant partiesin the system and thus provide a betterchance for a stable government, whichmay find a strong support into Parliamentin order to pass its legislative initiatives.

At this point, Sartori feels somehownecessary to emphasize on importantdevelopments regarding how one shouldcount parties and define party-systemsand to defend its well-known definitionstated in his previous book, Parties andParty Systems. For Sartori, a relevant

party is a party that has coalition or blackmail potential, in other words, aparty that really counts in the formation

4 Arend LIJPHART,Democracies: Patternsof Majoritarian and Consensus Government inTwenty-One Countries, Yale University Press,New Haven, 1984.

5 C.R. CONRAD, S.N. GOLDER,

”Measuring Government Duration andStability in Central Eastern EuropeanDemocracies”, European Journal of PoliticalResearch, vol. 49, no. 1, 2010, pp. 119-150.

of governing coalitions or a party thatcan stand alone in government. In fact,the question of counting parties in notan easy task. There are few alternativesto Sartori’s solution. On the one hand,Blondel takes into account the numberand the size of parties and tries tofigure out how combinations of partiesand party-sizes work in various party-systems6. Unfortunately, the labels used by Blondel, such as ”dominant” party or”half” party, when he tries to establisha typology of party-systems are stillrather imprecise7. On the other hand,the only option left is to stick to Rae andTaylor”s index of fragmentation8, and onthe subsequent Laakso and Taagepera’smeasure of the ”effective” number ofparties9. Despite some merits, both ofthem emphasize too much on numericalmeasures, become elusive and seem toignore the reality they are supposed toexpress. This could be seen as a widercritique or contemporary politicalscience that largely favors quantitativeresearch methods. Sticking solely to thenumbers, which is a general default ofour times10, researchers may lose the verylogic of the processes they try to describeand explain. In this peculiar case of howone should count parties, it is unclear ifthis effective number of parties, in facta quantitative adaptation of Duverger’s

6

Jean BLONDEL, ”Party Systems andPatterns of Government…cit.”.7 Arend LIJPHART,Democracies: Patterns

of Majoritarian and Consensus Government…cit.,p. 120.

8 Douglas W. RAE, Michael TAYLOR,The Analysis of Political Cleavages, New Haven,Yale University Press, 1970.

9 Markku LAAKSO, Rein TAAGEPERA,”Effective Number of Parties: A Measure withApplication to West Europe”, Comparative

Political Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, 1979, pp. 3-27.10 René GUÉNON, The Reign of Quantityand the Signs of the Times, Penguin, Baltimore,1972.



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laws, is itself a law, a hypothesis or purelyan adaptation to empirical data, takinginto account that its predictive power isno greater than other attempts.

The rest of the book relates tomore classical issues in constitutionalengineering, namely to regime types.Once again, Sartori’s preference whencomparing benefices of presidentialand parliamentarian systems is semi-presidentialism. Due to its inner logicof alternative governance between thepresident, when he is from the same partywith the prime-minister, and the prime-minister, when he is the president’s rival,

the semi-presidential system may offera suitable solution for deadlock. Suchpolitical deadlock can occur in bothpresidential and parliamentary systems.In the first instance, the president may bein trouble when he lacks the support ofinchoate parties in Parliament and feels betrayed by his own deputies, moreeager to work in the benefit of their ownlocal constituencies than in the benefit

of the country as a whole. When it turnsalmost impossible for him to put inpractice the electoral programme he wonwith, the president most often abusesof its powers and produces deadlock orpure dictatorship, as it occurred manytimes in Latin America11. In the secondinstance, weak governments may feelpowerless in overpass parliamentaryfrequent crises and take to an end their

political programmes.Regarding the functioning of thesemi-presidential system, I think this is avery insightful discussion when we takeinto account Romania’s own systemicvices and failures. This discussion isin line with the third part of the book,

11 David COLLIER (ed.), The New

Authoritarianism in Latin America, PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, 1979; Juan J.LINZ, ”The Perils of Presidentialism”, Journalof Democracy, vol. 1, no. 1, 1990, pp. 51-69.

which focuses on important proposalsfor making various political systemswork, and especially with the texts inthe appendix. One of the appendicesis a public address on the Romanianconstitutional system Sartori made inBucharest back in 2001 when accepting thehonorific title of Doctor from BucharestUniversity. Despite widespread beliefthat Romania’s constitutional systemis based on the functioning of the semi-presidential system, Sartori unravels arather parliamentarian mechanism putto work by the Romanian constitution.Sticking to its provisions, Sartori statesthat Romanian parliamentary systemmakes an effort to create a presidentenough powerful, but not too powerful tochange its parliamentary features, despitethe popular election of the president.According to Sartori, those features derivefrom several constitutional provisions(p. 316). In theory, the President worksas ”mediator” between state institutions,which really makes him a presidentfrom a typical parliamentary system.Additionally, the president does not holdstrong powers as he always has to consultparliamentary parties when he appointsa new prime-minister, the Parliamentwhen he intends to dissolve Parliamentor to appoint a referendum. Sartoriconcludes that Romanian president isnot powerful enough in order to label theRomanian system as a semi-presidentialone, i.e. he has not strong powers (as the

veto power) and all significant legislativepowers are those of the government. Yetone should not limit his analysis onlyto the constitutional text. In practice,for example, the current president veryquickly abandoned his mediator statusand acted much more like a de facto party leader, negotiating with parties forsecuring its former party (PDL) a safemajority into Parliament and openly

attacking opposition parties. His practiceof frequently heading PDL meetingsis even acknowledged as ”customary”



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by PDL leaders12. Subsequently, he alsoabandoned his constitutional obligationof consulting parliamentary parties andtaking their positions into account whenappointing a new candidate for prime-minister. Back in October 2009, he refusedto appoint the prime-minister candidatesupported by opposition parties, themayor of Sibiu city Klaus Johannis,though the previous PDL cabinet wasdropped by the Parliament for the firsttime since the 1989 political change13.

12 ”Top-level Meeting between Băsescu,

Boc and PDL MPs”, Nine O’Clock, 28.01.2011,http://www.nineoclock.ro/index.php?issue=4856&page=detalii&categorie=politics&id=20110128-512855 (accessed on 01.02.2011).

13 Victor LUPU, ”Many Things Hardto Understand”, Nine O’Clock, 21.10.2009,http://www.nineoclock.ro/index.php?issue=4856&page=detalii&categorie=frontpage&id=20091021-501531 (accessed on 01.02.2011).

The president ignored the parliamentarymajority, unusually demanding thatsuch an ad-hoc majority be sanctioned by a court decision, and wished tohave it his own way by renaming thesame prime-minister from PDL. By bending constitutional provisions, thepresident may turn the system in asemi-presidential one, but the questionremains if unconstitutional acts should be taken into account in order to labela constitutional system. In the end,Sartori’s proposals for redefining balanceof power, the shift from monocameralismto bicameralism, the timing of elections,the re-elections of presidents, are all to be seriously put under scrutiny whendiscussing about future constitutionalengineering.

DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN

DANIELA PIANAConstruirea democraţiei la frontiera spaţiului public europeanTraducere de Raluca PopescuInstitutul European, Iaşi, 2009, 257 pp.

Care este modelul de democraţie pecare Uniunea Europeană îl promovează?Cum a fost construit acest model şi care

este plus-valoarea pe care acesta o aducelegitimităţii politice a Uniunii Europene?Sunt întrebările principale pe care carteaDanielei Piana le lansează. Publicată pentru prima dată în 2006 în limba ita-liană, cartea devine accesibilă publiculuiromân odată cu traducerea în limbaromână în anul 2009, an ce coincide curatificarea Tratatului de la Lisabona care,după cum vom vedea, vine să confirme

trendul trasat de autoare cu privire laconstruirea democraţiei europene.

Pe parcursul celor cinci capitole,autoarea expune ideile şi argumentaţiilecare stau la baza politicii de democratizare

pe care Uniunea Europeană a deschis-o lasfârşitul anilor `80, atât în interiorul, câtşi în exteriorul graniţelor sale. În primulcapitol, autoarea î şi conturează cadrulde cercetare şi defineşte concepteleprincipale cu care lucrează: democraţiaşi spaţiul public. Sarcina asumată deautoare, de a defini democraţia cu referirela UE, este una dificilă datorită utilizăriila nivel european a unui concept –

democraţie – creat pentru realităţi politicediferite. Chiar şi aplicat statelor naţionale,democraţia nu s-a arătat a fi un concept



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lipsit de ambiguitate, istoria ideii dedemocraţie fiind complexă şi marcată deconcepţii contradictorii. Tipologia clasică a lui Robert Dahl1,14introducea pe lângă conceptele democraţiei directe ateniene şiale democraţiei reprezentative moderne,posibilitatea unei „a treia transformări ademocraţiei“ care s-ar fi referit la apariţiaunei guvernan ţe democratice la nivelsuprana ţional, iar acesta este nivelul vizatde cartea Danielei Piana. De asemenea,nici conceptul de spaţiu public europeannu este mai uşor de definit. „Construireademocraţiei se face în strânsă corelaţiecu participarea la sfera publică; aceastadin urmă, în consecinţă, este locul delegitimare a conţinutului procesuluideli berativ. Astfel, procesul deliberativlegitimează utilizarea puterii politice în interiorul unui sistem de governance democratică“ (p. 22). Daniela Pianaconsideră că sfera publică este centrală pentru legitimitatea democratică, întru-cât forţează decidenţii să pătrundă înaceasta pentru a-şi justifica acţiunile.La nivelul studiilor europene, deficituldemocratic a fost fundamentat pe lipsaunui demos european215iar sfera publică afost interpretată drept locul în interiorulcăruia este posibil să se creeze condiţiipentru construirea unei identităţi colective,element indispensabil pentru legitimareademocratică a Uniunii Europene.

Ataşând semnificaţia „transnaţională“democraţiei sui generis concepută deUniunea Europeană (p. 97), cartea DanieleiPiana dezvăluite, în capitolul doi, o puter-nică ancorare în viziunea democraţieidiscursive, conform căreia, interacţiunile bazate pe proceduri deliberative sunt înmăsură să rezolve deficitul democraticde care suferă Uniunea. Accentul pus

114Robert DAHL, Democra ţia şi criticii ei,

Institutul European, Iaşi, 2002.215 Jürgen HABERMAS, The PostnationalConstellation. Political Essays, Polity Press,Cambridge, 2001.

pe dimensiunea discursivă a legitimăriidemocratice a UE este evident dindemersul autoarei de a reconstrui pro-cesul de definire a unui model legitimde democraţie europeană prin analizadiscursurilor şi documentelor oficialeeuropene. Construirea democraţiei în sineeste văzută de autoare drept o pro blemă de policy, iar legitimitatea modeluluieuropean de democraţie este recon-struită prin raportare la trei politicipublice: extindere, relaţii externe şi poli-tici constituţionale. Elementul de ori-ginalitate al cărţii este dat de faptul că Daniela Piana nu se limitează la a eticheta

democraţia europeană drept o democraţietransnaţională, sau şi mai vag, democraţiesui generis, ci re-construieşte, utilizândanaliza de conţinut, specificitatea aces-teia, ca fiind bazată pe trei clustereconceptuale:rule of law, drepturile omului, good governance. Daniela Piana ne oferă astfel sinteza vocabularului europeanasociat democraţiei transnaţionale. Siste-matizând discursul european asupra

rule of law, Piana identifică concepteasociate precum: dreptul la un procescorect, independenţa şi eficienţamagistraturii, accesul egal la justiţie,absenţa corupţiei, prezenţa societăţiicivile. Clusterul de concepte generatde dimensiunea drepturilor omuluicuprinde: demnitatea umană, egalitatea în faţa legii, egalitatea în tratamentulmuncii, egalitatea în condiţii de risc şi

de dezavantaj social. Discursul europeanasupra good governance face referiri laopeness, participation, accountability, effec-tiveness, coherence – considerate ancore alelegitimării democratice a guvernanţei UE.

Capitolul al treilea dezvoltă con-struirea modelului de democraţie euro-peană analizând cele trei domenii de policy. Autoarea disecă discursul UEşi reconstruieşte modelul european de

democraţie cu referire la tipul acţiunilorlegitime pe care UE le întreprinde atât îninterior, cât mai ales dincolo de graniţele



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UE, ca model de democraţie exportatcătre alte ţări în vederea democratizăriiacestora. UE este catalogată dreptactor al democratizării, preocupată de promovarea democraţiei în ţăriterţe, precum fostele ţări comuniste.Perspectiva teoretică asupra procesuluide democratizare a ţărilor terţe esteuna constructivistă. Daniela Piana pune în centrul strategiei de democratizarepromovată de UE în exterior conceptulde capacity building, care îmbină clasicacondiţionalitate (alocarea de fonduri pe baza îndeplinirii unor criterii juridice saupolitice) cu „socializarea“ (implicareasocietăţii civile cu funcţia de participareşi control politic, de unde şi importanţa think-tanks, advocacy coalitions). În plus,societatea civilă organizată la nivelnaţional şi transnaţional este văzută drepto sursă de legitimare a normelor utilizatede UE pentru construirea democraţiei înexterior, dar şi ca sursă de legitimare înoglindă, a regulilor cu care UE intervine în viaţa propriilor cetăţeni.

Construirea „capacităţilor demo-cratice“ la nivelul UE, ca relaţie stat-societate civilă-cetăţeni reprezintă temacapitolului patru. Plecând de la asumpţiacă „modelul de democraţie promovat deUE este legitimat nu numai de faptul că este fondat pe o ordine constituţională care răspunde preferinţelor statelor, câtpentru că este creat prin dialogul întrecetăţeni şi instituţii“ (p. 163), DanielaPiana se plasează definitiv în viziunea

strategiei de legitimare discursivă ademocraţiei europene.

Rule of law, drepturile omului şi good governance ancorează semanticdiscursul asupra democraţiei europene;aceste concepte corespund a trei zone de policy, care conturează ceea ce DanielaPiana numeşte „modelul de democraţiepromovat de UE“: dimensiunea supra-naţională a puterii, dimensiunea dis-

cursivă a proceselor democratice, untradeoff între dimensiunea participativă şi cea reprezentativă în favoarea celui

dintâi (p. 165). Autoarea consideră că UEpropune o nouă versiune de guvernanţă, în care structurile statelor naţionalesunt controlate de societatea civilă transnaţională, oferind astfel o legitimarebottom-up alegerilor de politici publice.Discursul european asupra democraţieianalizat de Piana relevă o versiuneasupra responsabilităţii democratice(accountability) conforme cu concepţiadeliberativă asupra democraţiei: ONG-urile supranaţionale sunt actori decontrol al instituţiilor politice, dreptcompensare a lipsei unei legitimăriderivate din delegare şi reprezentarepartinică. Din această perspectivă,capacităţile democratice ale UE ar consta în deschiderea de arene în care cetăţeniisă poată participa la politica europeană,să aibă loc schimbul de idei şi argumenteşi să se construiască o identitateeuropeană.

Concluzia Danielei Piana este că spaţiul public european este doar un„spaţiu de acţiune posibilă“ (p. 220), şi varămâne astfel, dacă nu este pus în legătură cu acţiunile care permit organizaţiilorsocietăţii civile să interacţioneze. Mer-gând dincolo de concluzia DanieleiPiana de la momentul redactării cărţii„spaţiul european nu există (încă...)“aş adăuga că, odată cu Tratatul de laLisabona, spaţiul public european începesă capete contur. Introducerea Iniţiativeicetăţeneşti (articolul 11 al Tratatului pri-vind Uniunea Europeană) creează o

arenă de participare, dând posibilitateacetăţenilor europeni şi societăţii civileorganizate să joace rolul de agenda setters ai Uniunii. De asemenea, acest instrumentparticipativ vine să confirme perspectivadescrisă de Daniela Piana, a construiriigraduale a unui model de democraţieeuropeană legitimată prin mecanismedeliberative. În prezent Iniţiativa Cetă-ţenească nu este aplicabilă încă, dar

este în curs de adoptare la începutullui 2011 un Regulament european caresă operaţionalizeze principiul schi-



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ţat în articolul din Tratat. Rămâne devăzut dacă Iniţiativa Cetăţenească va democratiza şi dinamiza procesuldecizional al UE, dacă va deveni uninstrument participativ utilizat cu succesde către societatea civilă transnaţională

şi dacă UE va dobândi un spaţiu publicfuncţional dincolo de contururile trasatede Tratatul de la Lisabona.

CORINA TURŞIE



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ABSTRACTS

DANIEL BARBU, Spiritul împotriva politicii. Despre intelectuali, Biserică şi integrareeuropeană (The Spiritual Against the Political. On Intellectuals, the Church,and European Integration).The paper provides the ideal-typical narrative of European integrationmanufactured by Romanian intellectuals and the official national Church (Greek-

orthodox), that could be summarized as follows: in the realm of the spirit, Europewould have survived mainly in the East, shepherded by such intellectuals as theRomanian ones and by the spiritual legacy of the Orthodox Church; in politicaland economic terms, European Union is monitored according to secularist andrelativist guidelines by the bureaucracy in Brussels. Whatever the latter, togetherwith their Romanian counterparts, may have realized in the course of Europeanenlargement is of little concern for the former. Both the Church and the mainstreamintellectuals are engaged now in an operation that should have defined them long before the fall of state socialism: to boost intellectual non-conformity with respectto the political dominant discourse as a way of refusing the debate by taking it

seriously. And they do it by means of the same narrative device that kept themsilent under communism: they tell the story of the prevalence of culture and thespiritual over everything political.

Keywords: European spirit, European integration, intellectuals, Church, post-secularism.

ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU, Les élites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008:Les voies d’accès au pouvoir exécutif (Political Elites in Post-communist Romania1990-2008: Pathways to the Executive Power).The political regime change that occurred in Romania, along with the dismissalof communism, elicited a process of emergence of new political elites and of newpatterns in the functioning of the country’s political institutions. But new politicalelites do not emerge ex nihilo and institutional changes are slower in practicethan the ambition of change. Given the extensive absence of decision-makingor technical expertise among the political actors, the new parties in governmentconducted a policy of cooption of personnel instituting new patterns of selection.The paper will emphasize the fact that, in the Romanian case, the process ofprofessionalization of governmental personnel took the form of a long process,and that the protocols of the reconfiguration implied divergent strategies inwhat concerns the governments’ ministers and the secretaries of state. It will beshown that although the ministerial careers suggest the institutionalization ofrecruitment procedures similar to other European parliamentary democracies,



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the junior ministers’ level remained dominated by forms of cooption from outsidethe political realm.

Keywords: governmental elites, political recruitment, professionalisation,nomenklatura, postcommunism.

DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN, Ethnic Groups in Symbolic Conflict. The ”Ethnicisation”of Public Space in Romania.Although Romanian-Hungarian ethnic relations have been improved duringthe last two decades, they are still marked by recurrent crises that are rathersymbolic. They range from the public use of Hungarian to the requirements forthe Romanian citizenship and the special ties between the Hungarian diasporaand the kin state, but they encompass other issues, as the naming of localitiesin Transylvania, statues evoking national heroes and street names. Althoughgenerally overlooked, ethnic symbolism is a major obstacle in generating a neutralpublic space and a threat for a complete ethnic reconciliation in Transylvania for

the decades to come.Keywords: ethnic conflict, symbolic power, public space, post-communism,Transylvania, Romania.

ION ENACHE, Independents in the Local Politics of Post-Communist Romania.Aiming at filling a gap in the existing literature, this paper advances theanalysis of available alternatives to party representation, namely independentcandidatures. For that reason, we consider the context of Eastern Europe,and particularly the last decade when a considerable number of independent

candidatures have been advanced. Particularly, the Romanian political systemprovides one viable example for the examination of independent candidacies,with numerous independents running in the national and local elections whichwere held after 1989. Therefore, the focal objectives of this text are to identify thepeculiarities of this particular breed of politicians, what stimulates them to runindependently in elections, and also why certain parts of the electorate choose tovote for independent candidates.

Keywords: independent politicians, post-communist elections, local-levelpolitics, party systems, Romanian politics.

SONIA CATRINA, L’imaginaire paysan comme «mémoire historique». Patrimoineet construction de l’identité nationale par le biais des musées centraux(Peasant Imaginary as ”Historical Memory”. Patrimony and National IdentityConstruction through the Central Museums).In this paper, we analyze the relation between the museum and the notion ofidentity through a study of patrimonial logics which aim at forging an officialcollective memory. We rely on a study of the mediation function of centralmuseums in building a national identity through an endeavor to shape a ”nation-memory” (”mémoire-nation”, Pierre Nora) which draws on peasant sources.The stake of this study lies in its ability to bring to light institutional forms of

patrimony in the era of nationalist ideologies, of the formation and consolidationof the nation state. In which ways is the relationship between patrimony andnational identity embodied in the scientific patrimonial projects of the museums?



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ABSTRACTS

In trying to answer this question, we set out to explore how the patrimony isexploited in order to foster political projects. Addressing the issue of centralmuseums as a kind of ”surface” where the collective identity is ”scratched” willhelp us shed lights on the metamorphoses of a ”localizing memory” (”mémoirelocalisante”, M.M. Carruthers) mobilized to build a shared identity.

Keywords: peasant, patrimony, identity, ”historical memory”, Nation-State.

ALEXANDRA ILIE, Holodomor, the Ukrainian Holocaust?The Holocaust and the Great Famine in Ukraine are two man made catastrophesset in the XXth century. While the first is the most documented genocide inhistory, the latter tends to be dismissed by the international community as an”ineffective policy” of the Soviet Union. Having managed to exclude politicalkillings from the UN’s definition of genocide, Russia continues to deny theUkrainian people access to information about the famine that left 6 millionpeople dead of starvation. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian community insists that

Holodomor was genocide and should be treated as such. By comparing thesetwo grave tragedies, similarities inevitably surface. These similarities, along withother facts, like the ”cleansing” of the elites in the years preceding and duringthe famine, Stalin’s letter to Kaganovich (in which Stalin mentions his fear oflosing Ukraine), the differential treatment Ukraine received as opposed to theother Soviet republics, the measures taken to worsen the famine and confine it tospecific areas, paint a much clearer picture of what really happened in Ukraineduring the Holodomor.

Keywords: genocide, famine, communism, fascism, mass killings, crimes againsthumanity.



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RECENSIONES



189


RECENSIONES

AUTORES

DANIEL BARBU Professor of Political Science and Director of the Graduate School of PoliticalScience at the University of Bucharest. Recent books: Die abwesende Republik , Frank& Timme, Berlin, 2009 and Politica pentru barbari, Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, 2005.([email protected])

SONIA CATRINA Associate Researcher at the Institute of Sociology (Bucharest) at the RomanianAcademy, Researcher in Francophone network: ”Savoirs en partage”, and”Labforculture” from the European Cultural Foundation, networking platformfor European arts and culture. Ph.D. (2004-2008) in Anthropology, ”VictorSegalen” University of Bordeaux – Doctoral school in Social Science: society,health, decision, and Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Bucharest – Faculty ofSociology. MA (2003-2004) in Francophone Doctoral School of Social Sciences,

Bucharest. Her current project analyses the process of patrimony (re)constructionin Romania. He is interested in both the construction of identity and ethnicity(interactions, contact situations), dealing with migration issues (social andcultural transfers between generations). ([email protected])

DRAGOŞ DRAGOMAN Ph.D. in Sociology, and Lecturer of Political Science with the Departmentof Political Science, International Relations and European Studies, ”LucianBlaga” University of Sibiu. His research interests focus on social capital, ethnic

relations, political participation and electoral behavior. Recent book: Capitalsocial şi valori democratice în România, Editura Institutul European, Iaşi, 2010.([email protected])

ION ENACHE MA in Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science, University ofBucharest, BA in Political Science with the same school. His main politicalresearch interests are political communication, discourse analysis, party systems,and political anthropology. ([email protected])



190


AUTORES

ALEXANDRA ILIE BA in Political Science, University of Bucharest, MA in ComparativePolitics, University of Bucharest. Three years of journalistic experience withpublications like Gândul, Ziare.com. Research interests: genocides in the XXth century, the Great Famine in Ukraine, the Holocaust, fascism and communism.([email protected])

ALEXANDRA IONAŞCU Ph.D. in Political Science, Université Libre de Bruxelles/University ofBucharest. Lecturer with the Department of Political Science at the Universityof Bucharest. Main research interests: governmental and parliamentary elites,party organisational development in CEE countries, political communication.([email protected])



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University of BucharestDepartment of Political ScienceInstitute for Political Research

The Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest was founded in 1991 withthe purpose to act as a focal point for training and research in political science. The Departmentoffers its over one thousand undergraduate students a full curriculum in three languages: Eng-lish, French and Romanian. The Department fosters the highest standards of scholarly inquirywhile addressing issues of major political and social concern in the fields of political theory,comparative politics, Romanian politics, international relations and European governmentands policies. The Department benefits from an exchange of students, and, occasionally, facultywith numerous universities in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the United States.Several members of the faculty went on to serve as high officials and policy advisors for differ-ent post-communist administrations, whereas others helped transform the scope and methodsof political science in Romanian academia.

The Institute for Political Research was established within the Department of Political Sciencein 1995, in order to provide faculty and students with the opportunity to get rigorous trainingwhile focusing their research on a set of broad theoretical themes and empirical topics. Fouryears latter, in 1999, the Institute became a graduate school and received authorization to of-fer M.A. and Ph.D. degrees on behalf of the University of Bucharest. To this end, the Institutehas mounted a number of innovative programs that build on the interests of both faculty andstudents. The M.A. programs in Political Theory, Romanian Politics, Comparative Politics, In-ternational Relations, and the Government, Politics and Policies of the European Union, as wellas a Ph.D. program in political science enroll over two hundred graduate students. The Instituteoffers students the opportunity to work with scholars from Western Europe and North America.In this international setting, those interested in studying Romanian politics and society do soin a comparative perspective. By editing its own journal, Studia Politica. Romanian PoliticalScience Review, the Institute tries to facilitate and promote more extensive cooperation amongscholars interested in Romanian polity, post-communist transition and the study of democracy.



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