Subjective Well-Being Is Essential to Well-Being

Subjective Well-Being Is Essential to Well-BeingAuthor(s): Ed Diener, Jeffrey J. Sapyta and Eunkook SuhSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), pp. 33-37Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449607 .

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Subjective Well-Being Is Essential to Well-Being

Ed Diener, Jeffrey J. Sapyta, and Eunkook Suh Department of Psychology

University of Illinois

Although the emphasis on positive health by Ryff and Singer is commendable, the absence of subjective well-being in their formulation of "health" and the good life is a conspicuous omission. Subjective well-being, people's evaluation of their lives, is an indispensable

component of positive psychological health, although is not a sufficient condition for it. In contrast to Ryff and Singer's approach, the study of subjective well-being pays more attention to people's values, emotions, and evaluations, and does not grant complete hegemony

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to the external judgments of behavioral experts. We further believe that the characteristics that are functional and lead to well-being, including those advanced by Ryff and Singer, may vary substantially between cultures and in different life circumstances. The vari- ables advanced in the target article appear to reflect their values. We would like to add another value to that list: subjective well-being. People wish to evaluate their lives in a positive manner, and we believe that the characteristics such as health and mastery listed by Ryff and Singer are some of the traits that may lead to this end. Thus, in the search for positive well-being, subjective well-being is essential.

Ryff and Singer follow in the humanistic psychology tradition of defining positive well-being and health as more than the absence of problems and disease. Diener (1984) and Myers and Diener (1995) reported that despite the humanistic commentary, psychology re- mains heavily skewed toward the study of negative states, and therefore Ryff and Singer's emphasis on positive conditions is most welcome. Ryff and Singer do not mean health in a narrow physical way when they discuss this topic, but instead refer to "human flourish- ing" and "wellness of mind and body,"-in other words, to the "good life," broadly defined. Ryff and Singer seem to mean by health a universally good life that can be objectively verified by scientists. Thus, they follow in the footsteps of Abraham Maslow in their search for universal and objective characteristics of mental health that are free of particular cultural values. Throughout the corpus of Ryff's writings, as well as in the target article, the value of subjective well-being is downplayed. We argue that subjective well-being is an essential component of positive well-being and health. In the following commentary, we respond to Carol Ryff s work as a whole rather than only focusing on the target article.

Subjective well-being is a person's evaluation of his or her life. This valuation can be in terms of cognitive states such as satisfaction with one's marriage, work, and life, and it can be in terms of ongoing affect (i.e., the presence of positive emotions and moods, and the absence of unpleasant affect). We believe that subjective well-being results from people having a feeling of mastery and making progress toward their goals, from one' s temperament, immersion in interesting and pleas- urable activities, and positive social relationships. The characteristics listed by Ryff and Singer such as purpose, connections, mastery, and positive self-regard are some of the paths to subjective well-being.

A concern with happiness has been in place since antiquity. If we examine the history of philosophy and religion, we find a strong emphasis on the importance of subjective well-being. Aristotle's eudaemonia, most

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often translated as "happiness," was considered by him to be the final and sufficient goal for which all other goals were sought. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the most renowned of Christian philosophers, believed that all choices are intended to increase happiness, and religious texts such as the Bible are replete with references to positive feelings such as joy. John Stuart Mill argued that happiness is a central good, and other utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham built their idea of the good society on the maximization of subjective well-being. Thus, the topic of subjective well-being has deep philo- sophical and religious roots.

When we query lay persons, we find that they place great importance on subjective well-being. Imagine, for example, people evaluating the life of someone who had mastery, health, and so forth, but who was terribly depressed and dissatisfied with his or her life. It is doubtful that most of us would see such a life as an unqualified success regardless of the person's physical health or contributions to society. King and Napa (1997) found that happy people are judged to be supe- rior, and are even thought to be more likely to go to heaven when they die! When we inquired about the importance of happiness and life satisfaction among college students in 41 nations, we found that they rated both concepts as extremely important. On a 7-point scale ranging from 7 (extraordinarily important and valuable) to 1 (of no importance whatsoever), they rated life satisfaction a 6.21 and happiness a 6.39. This high valuation of subjective well-being could be seen in the ratings not only of Westerners, but also in the ratings of students in less industrialized nations. For example, happiness was rated a 6.62 by respondents in Brazil, 6.27 in Ghana, and 6.63 in Indonesia. Thus, both lay persons and philosophers consider subjective well-being to be highly desirable.

What of Mill's famous pig? Recall that Mill asked rhetorically whether it is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied, or to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. Note, however, in Table 1 our redrawing of Mill's question in the standard 2 x 2 matrix of social psychology. Mill did not mention the cell with

Table 1. A 2 x 2 Analysis of Socrates and the Pleased Pig

Intellectual Perspicacity

Level of Subjective Well-Being Socrates (high) Swine (low)

Consummate Socrates satisfied Happy hog Satisfaction With Life

Utter Dissatisfaction Socrates dissatisfied Unhappy hog With Life & Despair



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the dissatisfied hog or the cell with satisfied Socrates because he was concerned with questions related to "higher" and "lower" pleasures. If we value intelligence and wisdom enough, we might choose to be an unhappy Socrates rather than a satisfied swine, although the correct choice is not self-evident to all of us. But what is equally clear is that most of us would prefer to be a happy sow rather than an unhappy one, and a happy Socrates rather than a depressed one. The 2 x 2 analysis makes clear that no matter how we might answer Mill' s original question, we do value subjective well-being. Although subjective well-being may not be everyone's highest value, it is likely to be a value that virtually all people hold dear.

Ryff and Singer turn to philosophers, psychologists, and other experts in terms of defining well-being. In contrast, we argue that we should also turn to people's own reactions in evaluating their lives. With the in- creasing democratization and equality in the world, it is no longer defensible to rely only on kings and man- darins to prescribe the desirable life. Instead, we believe that the concept of subjective well-being allows people to define well-being for themselves. Inherent in the concept of subjective well-being is that people have diverse values, goals, and strengths. Thus, we allow people to decide whether their lives are satisfying based on their individual values, goals, and life circumstances. Some people may value mastery above all, others might value connections, and others may go about life with an immense sense of purpose. Each of us would probably prefer, however, that we decide on the degree of importance of these characteristics in our own life, and that they are not dictated to us by experts. If a person is satisfied with her life, she probably has the characteristics that she deems important.

Some may think of happiness as shallow and frivo- lous, secondary to the serious business of life. They may be confusing subjective well-being with physical he- donism. For most people, however, happiness does not come solely from partying and entertainment. Oishi and his colleagues (Oishi, Diener, & Suh, 1997; Oishi, Diener, Suh, & Lucas, 1997) found that the causes of subjective well-being reflect people's values. Diener and Fujita (1995) showed that people are happier when they have resources needed to reach their particular goals. Therefore, it is likely that a long-lasting sense of happiness comes at least in part from achieving our values and goals. Thus, the concept of subjective well- being reflects more than simply having fun-it also recognizes what people believe is important in life.

Objections to Subjective Well-Being

Several reasons for not valuing subjective well-being have been advanced. One is that a happy person

could have undesirable characteristics. For example, he or she might be evil or seriously mentally ill. A related objection is that we do not want to gain happiness at the expense of our other values. For example, few people would choose to have their brain placed in a jar of joy juice that would give them pleasure for 50 years, but without any knowledge of the outside world. Although most of us do not envision Heaven as a drug-induced euphoria, subjective well-being is nevertheless a part of our conception of paradise.

Note too that a person who had only one of Ryff and Singer's qualities might not be necessarily a desirable person. For example, an evil person with great purpose but who was out of touch with reality is not someone to be idolized. Similarly, an individual with great levels of mastery and self-regard would be most unwelcome if she were a murderess. As far as we know, Hitler had purpose, mastery, social connections, and high self-regard, but we do not regard him as a model of health. He may also have been happy. Just as Ryff and Singer's values are not sufficient for us to judge a person in a positive way, subjective well-being is also not sufficient. We believe that subjective well-being is a neces- sary ingredient of the healthy life, but not a sufficient one. Just because subjective well-being is not the only value, however, does not mean that it is not an extremely important one.

A second objection to the study of well-being im- plied by Ryff and Singer is that the field is not theoretical enough. Indeed, researchers in the field have often proceeded in a bottom-up empirical way rather than from an overarching theory. In part, this reflects the belief among subjective well-being researchers that we must know some elementary facts before a large theory is created. Several decades ago so little was known about subjective well-being (e.g., see Wilson, 1967) that broad theories were premature. Nevertheless, the field is becoming increasingly theory based, although not theory driven. For example, concepts such as adaptation (Loewenstein & Frederick, in press), aspiration level (Campbell, Converse, & Rodgers, 1976), discrep- ancy from standards (Michalos, 1985), nonlinear inter- actions (Stones & Kozma, 1991) and dynamic equilibrium (Headey & Wearing, 1989) are being developed and tested by researchers. Current models often take into account inborn temperament, comparison standards, and the effects of recent events.

It is true that we need better theories, and hopefully they will be developed. But we do not look forward to the return of all-embracing grand theories that are created in the absence of programmatic research. After all, even a science such as physics that is much more advanced than psychology does not have a fully unified theory. It also seems evident that subjective well-being

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is important regardless of the rudimentary state of theories in this field. Thus, our approach is to develop better theories rather than to ignore the importance of subjective well-being.

Ryff and Singer's Values

We question whether a set of characteristics such as those listed by Ryff and Singer can be positive in all cultures and in all life circumstances. Of course, if the characteristics are abstract enough (e.g., "good" or "competent"), they may apply universally. At the same time, such characteristics are so abstract that they take on very different manifestations in various circumstances, and may include even diametrically opposite behaviors. At a more concrete level, a characteristic that is positive in one situation may not be beneficial in another setting. For example, it is good to be extroverted in many situations in modern America. Yet, an extro- vert is not likely to thrive in a cloistered nunnery with a vow of silence. Although we often think of neuroticism as a negative characteristic, it might be highly beneficial in a dangerous environment. A propensity to carry a large amount of body fat was probably beneficial in the Paleolithic period, but is much less salutary in nations with plentiful food supplies.

Ryff and Singer value mastery, purpose, connections, physical health and positive self-regard. This set of Puritan values indeed seems to include positive characteristics. Yet, we wonder about values that are not listed. For example, where are fun, humor, and enjoyment in their serious list designed for the Western go-getter? Although the Puritan Oliver Cromwell un- doubtedly valued purpose, mastery, and order, recall that he closed the Globe Theater. If we ask collectivist psychologists for their list of the prerequisites for mental health, we might learn of the importance of respect and duty, and hear little of positive self-regard. If we query a mystic, she would likely mention characteristics such as awe, reverence, and humility. And an intellectual might emphasize the importance of curiosity and intelligence. Although the characteristics listed by Ryff and Singer seem of universal importance to Westerners, it seems likely that others would generate a different list. Shalom Schwartz (1992) generated a list of 56 values that fall in a circular structure, and the four characteristics listed by Ryff and Singer approximate several of those values. Thus we conclude that, like subjective well-being, the characteristics listed by Ryff and Singer are a subset of the values held by humans, a subset that might be emphasized or de-emphasized in various cultures.

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Surprisingly, objective health is not a strong predic- tor of subjective well-being (e.g., Brief, Butcher, George, & Link, 1993; Okun & George, 1984). People are often happy despite seriously debilitating physical conditions because they learn to adapt to such circumstances. Furthermore, the presence of health is certainly no guarantee of happiness because healthy people take it for granted. In terms of the other values advanced by Ryff and Singer, Sapyta (1997), while working in our lab, found that people in Korea and the People's Repub- lic of China rated the characteristics measured on Ryff s scale to be less desirable than did respondents in Amer- ica. Diener and Diener (1995) found that self-esteem predicted life satisfaction more strongly in individual- istic cultures than in collectivistic ones. Staudinger, Fleeson, and Baltes (in press) found that personal life investment was more strongly related to global well-being in America than in Germany, suggesting that an emphasis on purpose and goals may be related to subjective well-being to the extent that they are cultural values. Thus, the characteristics listed by Ryff and Singer tend to vary in importance across cultures, and are not inevitably linked to happiness.

Conclusion

In the search for the universal precursors of positive health, Ryff and Singer describe four values among the many held by humans. We believe that these values are beneficial in some circumstances, in some situations, and when manifested to a degree that is functional. Similarly, we believe that subjective well-being is one value among many, but one that is widespread because it allows people to judge their own lives based on their own values and standards. Although people do not cherish subjective well-being to the exclusion of other values, most think it is important. Indeed, it is likely that subjective well-being is becoming increasingly central in a world where basic physical needs are met and greater respect is given to individuals. Progress has been made in understanding subjective well-being (e.g., see Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1997), although deeper conceptual analyses are certainly warranted.

Ryff and Singer propose that there are universal psychological characteristics that influence health in all cultures and situations. If this proposal is true in a scientific sense it must be potentially falsifiable. Therefore, research that could potentially falsify this claim should be con- ducted by the authors. We wonder whether it will be possible, for example, in actual fact to find compelling evidence that would falsify the proposition that "purpose" is important to "psychological health?" Nevertheless, if Ryff and Singer have been able to identify the universal



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characteristics that lead to human well-being, they will have made an enormous contribution.

We believe that the positive characteristics listed by Ryff and Singer are values that are held by many people because they are likely to lead to subjective well-being. Although physical health is valued by most of us, we would argue that we want it primarily because we hope that it will enhance our subjective well-being. A view of well-being that downplays the importance of subjective well-being is, in our view, seriously lacking. Al- though Ryff and Singer would like to use health as the ultimate criterion for well-being, we suggest that a more compelling criterion is subjective well-being because it allows individuals rather than experts (us) to decide what is important to them. Purpose, mastery, connections, and self-regard are without worth unless they help individuals to create more satisfying lives for themselves and others.

Note

Ed Diener, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 East Daniel Street, Champaign, IL 61821. E-mail: [email protected]

References

Brief, A. P., Butcher, A. H., George, J. M., & Link, K. E. (1993). Integrating bottom-up and top-down theories of subjective well- being: The case of health. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 646-653.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., & Rodgers, W. L. (1976). The quality of American life. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Diener, E. (1984). Subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 542-575.

Diener, E., & Diener, M. (1995). Cross-cultural correlates of life satisfaction and self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 653-663.

Diener, E., & Fujita, F. (1995). Resources, personal strivings, and

subjective well-being: A nomothetic and ideographic approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 926-935.

Diener, E., Suh, E., Lucas, R., & Smith, H. (1997). Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress-1967-1997. Manu- script in preparation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Headey, B., & Wearing, A. (1989). Personality, life events, and subjective well-being: Toward a dynamic equilibrium model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 731-739.

King, L., & Napa, C. K. (1997, May). What makes a life good? Paper presented at the 69th meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago.

Loewenstein, G., & Frederick, S. (in press). Hedonic adaptation: From the bright side to the dark side. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), Understanding quality of life: Scientific perspectives on enjoyment and suffering. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Michalos, A. (1985). Multiple discrepancies theory (MTD). Social Indicators Research, 16, 347-413.

Myers, D., & Diener, E. (1995). Who is happy? Psychological Science, 6, 10-19.

Oishi, S., Diener, E., & Suh, E. (1997). Cross-national variations in predictors of global life satisfaction. Manuscript in preparation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Oishi, S., Diener, E., Suh, E., & Lucas, R. (1997). Values as a mediator model in subjective well-being. Manuscript in preparation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Okun, M. A., & George, L. K. (1984). Physician- and self-ratings of health, neuroticism and subjective well-being among men and women. Personality and Individual Differences, 5, 533-539.

Sapyta, J. J. (1997). Conceptions of well-being in independent and interdependent cultures: Shall the twain ever meet? Unpub- lished honors thesis, University of Illinois.

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1-65). Orlando, FL: Academic.

Staudinger, U. M., Fleeson, W., & Baltes, P. B. (1997). Predictors of subjective physical health and global well-being during midlife: Similarities and differences between the U.S. and Germany. Unpublished manuscript, Max Planck Institute for Human De- velopment, Berlin, Germany.

Stones, M. J., & Kozma, A. (1991). Magical model of happiness. Social Indicators Research, 25, 31-50.

Wilson, W. (1967). Correlates of avowed happiness. Psychological Bulletin, 67, 294-306.

Defining Wellness: Stress, Illness, and the Application of Existing Knowledge

Jana Brittain Drew and Janice K. Kiecolt-Glaser Department of Psychiatry

College of Medicine, The Ohio State University

That scientists and clinicians should focus greater attention on the nature of positive health is an appealing idea. After all, as it is reasoned in the target article,

well-being is more than just a lack of physical illness. Ryff and Singer offer compelling arguments for the study of positive health. We discuss some relevant areas

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Subjective Well-Being Is Essential to Well-Being