WHY DO NEIGHBORS FIGHT? PROXIMITY, INTERACTION OR TERRITORIALITY of John A. Vasquez1.IntroductionA number of scholars underline how democratic countries don t start war against each other. But in this article Vasquez examine the fact that most wars occur between states that are neighbours. But democratic states do not fight against each other. The real question is why the neighbours fight. In this case, neighbours fight all states are incline to war. And in particular they fight between neighbours because only a few states have the opportunity to fight wars with non- neighbours. Most researches do not think in the relation between neighbours and war. For him it is a mistake.2.Contiguity, neighbours and warLewis Richardson analysed that of the 200 wars the found from 1480 to 1941, over half were involve two parties, 28 three parties and 12 had forth parts- For Lewis said that there are an empirical evidence that most wars are between states that are near (neighbours). Also Wallerstein said the same (important the factor if the territories are contiguous). Diehl showed that 12 of 13 wars started for territorial problem- Gochmnab said that 66% of the states involved in the conflicts are contiguous. Bremier said that there are 7 important factors and the contiguity is the most important. Contiguity effect the others 6 factors.We can see one analysis that describe that the 80% of the wars fought since 1815 were among neighbours. Another analysis said that from 1816 to 198, the wars started between neighbours were 88%... others analysis. Richardson underlines how in the modern system since 1945 the wars are between neighbours.3. Assessing Competing Explanations3.1. Proximity and interactions explanations The distance sometimes is the explanation how the parties don t have nothing to fight about. States is easier that use force near at home. In particular because the distance is a very disadvantages.But there is an important point: neighbours are neighbours for long time, but they don t fight all the time. So the real question is How can proximity cause war??First we have to said something important. In the last years the technologies extend the global opportunity and in the same way an opportunity to make a war also between states that are not contiguous. We can see a clear example as United States, Japan, UK (in the Falkland wars, etc). The technology shift also the war from the air power with the missile capability.Accroding to Goachman, as a number of interactions between two states increase the number of disagreements is increase. This one is one of the cause of the war. This idea contradict:1) The theorist of neoliberal (economic, cultural, exchanges, etc interactions reduce the probability of war)2) The notion that hostility leads a reception in interactions and a break in economic and diplomatic relations (as during the Cold War). (So a increase the idea of war). => Credoin the 20th century particularly in the post 1945 period, the relationship between contiguity and military confrontations should weaken in comparison to the earlier period. According to Goachman this one does not happen. Infact the Increased of technology increase interactions among non contiguous states. In this way non contiguous dyad should have as many wars as a contiguous dyad.

3.2. Territoriality ExplanationWe can see a rise of the war for territorial disputes between states that they can solve with other means. The proximity is an opportunity for war, territorial disputes provide willingness (volonta) to go to war. Wars are less frequent among non-neighbours because the don have economic, ideological or political disagreements. And also they don t have the problem of territories between them. Territorial issues are sources of conflict.For realists, war can and does occur for any issue, because any issue can give rise to a struggle for power. Important territory because provide spaces, food and resources for living- The issues of territory is a best situation by use of force and violence. The human tends to occupy and defend the territory. Wars arises not from territories, but because the states want to demark boundaries and/ or maintain and expand their territories. Wars in not inevitable and nor be persistent. When boundaries are accepted, peace can reign. These is really different from the realistic vie, that they sees conflict and war as a constant.We can see in the wars involving in the history how the territorial issues tend to be the most prone to war. Territorial issues dominated the war for almost 350 years. Only in post 1945 period the territorial issues not been in a majority of wars. There are some theorist that analyse that the state that have more borders should experience more wars. Or someone analyse that the post 1815 period have more states so this mean also more wars.

3.3. Evaluation1) Important is understand the sensitivity if the borders, and the concentration of war among neighbours.2) Also the proximity interactions explanation can offer a simple explanation of the concentration of warfare among neighbours3) Territorial factors become really relevant after the cold war=> with all the issue that can give rise to war, territorial issues are most prone to warThe thing that we have to underline is that they don t see the war as a inevitable as a realists. When the boundaries are establish, peaceful reign in the territories.

4. Specific crucial Tests1. the close distance provides an opportunity for wars. The wars are concentrated among neighbours because territorial provides a motivation for war and the willingness to go to war.Some important point:- When the both parts are satisfy probably there is not more reason to make a war. There is not constant wars among neighbours- Probably there are not conflicts if they don t have territorial problems. So if the accepted they borders we can see a period of peace2. The territorial explanation see the creation of buffer states to solve some territorial disputes. Difficult that buffer states produce peace.3. the proximity and interaction explanation see wars arising between neighbours from a variety of issues4. natural demarcation helped to divide the borders5. Neighbours are more prone to war because they interact more frequently than non-neighbours. Technology help that non contiguous countries have the same interaction than contiguous. In this way the non contiguous countries have the same opportunity to make a war as the neighbours. Also, technologies innovations should reduce the loss-of-strength gradient for a number of states, particularly with the spread of naval power, nuclear weapons, missiles, etc. This one cause also a was between non contiguous countries

5. Conclusion: some policy implicationswar and peace ae complex process. it is important to understand the complexity of the process. After the cold war we can see how territorial explanation are the most dangerous issues that any state will face. More states, more complex the situation. we can see the different between Europe and North America. There were more wars in Europe (more states). Scholars have to pay more attention to the effect about the territory have on war.Today the greatest threats to peace come from nationalist claims for new states (in particular with ethnic groups). There are two important problem: 1) raises of new territorial issues; 2) incresse the states in the system that want to demark their boundaries.=> the collapse of Urss and its sphere of influence has produced wars and conflict in part because of these two effects. Also the break of Yugoslavia, there were a creation of the new states with the idea of nationalism. New states, new border so new conflicts. The wanted the division basis of nationalism and self determination.There are a lot of ethnic minorities that do not have states, and many of this minorities are exploited or the victims of injustice. => the probability of war increases. One way to produce peace is de-territorialization. When the issue is linked to the territory, there is a problem. The problem is that the ethnic groups want their own territory (want dignity, language, standard living, etc).We need to developments the international laws to try to resolve some problems. there are always more conflicts in aprticular after the second world war because the people not consider the importance of centrality. If we understand the problem of territoriality and that the most wars start between neighbors we have the key of the peace.

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR AND THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE of Jack S. LevyThe end of the cold war, the nuclear revolution, the rise of antinational conflicts, and the spread of global capitalism and democracy have led to considerable speculation about a turning point in the history of warfare. Some saw the end of the history(Huntington) and other the clash of civilizations All are interested in the same topic: We have to understand what cause the war.This question started when Thucydides wrote his History of the Peloponnesian War. There was an important progress in the International relation after the WWII. Anyways there are no consensus (also the methodology) as what the causes of war are.THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIESThe dependent variableInternational relation theorists define was as large-scale organized violence between political units (1000 fatalities). Peace is defined by the absence of war. People also distinguish between civil wars, wars from imperial, colonial, and the other international wars that involve non-state actors.We need to understand what makes war is possible and the condition for war. Peace is more common than more, thought as a non event peace is difficult to measure. There were more states that have peace than war.So the real question is what cause war? why in one certain period, in some historical context, under some political leaders, etc. how do we explain the origins of a particular war?Waltz and the other neorealist said that the cause of the war is the anarchy structure of the international system. Anarchy defined as the absence of a legitimate governmental authority to regulate disputes and do agreement between states. So there is war because there are no government in the international system to prevent the wars. Other neorealist see other variables.Other feminist theorist see that the cause of the war are the woman (patriarchal system and gender relation are different in the history. So difficult support this idea).The levels of Analysis FrameworkWaltz classified the causes of war in terms of their origins in the individual, the nation-state and the international system.Following Waltz, most scholars use the level of analysis with a indipendet variables

THEORIES OF THE CAUSE OF WARSystemic-level theoriesSystemic level explain the system level that includes all states. It takes into account both position of the states: international system and interrelationships. The position of the states constitutes the systemic structural level of analysis. This mean the distribution of power; geopolitics; and the power of the state in land or sea. The interaction of state constitutes the process of the analysis: make alliances or negotiation between states (explanation of the WWI is the absent of the league of nation. An organism to prevent the war. The WW is the cause of the failure of this system so led to a new institution as the United Nations)The realists tradition has dominated the study of war since Thucydides (including Machiavelli, Hobbes balance of Power theorists, Waltzian neorealist and Hegemonic transition theorists). The important point is that the actors in the world polics are sovereign states that act to advance their security, power and wealth in a conflictual international system (because international system don t have an authority to regulate the conflicts or enforce agreements).So make a war to preserve their position than lost it. The state provides for their own security armaments a alliances to possible threats. This is a security dilemma: the action of the state to have security can cause the decrease of the security of the others, including itself.=> so security dilemma: It is a term used in international relations and refers to a situation in which actions by a state intended to increase its security, as increasing its military or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it.The key division in the realists theory is not between classical realism and neorealism but between balance of power and hegemonic theory. Balance of power includes numerous variation of classical realism of Morgenthau and more structural realism of Waltz.Balance of power theory said that the most important goal for the state it is maintenance the equilibrium of power in the system. Also is successfully against the hegemony (it is important formed the blocking coalition).The coalition have to eliminate the hegemon and return to a state of equilibrium (with the war hegemony: a war against the hegemony). All are agree that an equilibrium of the military capability increases the stability of the system.There is a discussion between classical relists, who said that multipolar system is more peaceful, and neorealist who argue that bipolarity is more stable than multi polarity. They was influence by the cold war (presence of nuclear weapons). But we have examples in the history where the bipolar system was not peaceful (Athens-Sparta / Hasburg-Valois in XVI century). Anyways this theory emphasizes the existence of the hierarchical system. There is also the idea of the preventive war to block the rise of the hegemony. The resulting hegemonic war generates a new hegemonic power, and the irregular hegemonic cycle begins.After that there is the question of the economic interdependence and war. It is an old question that has attracted new attention in the past few years. Ad example Montesquieu said that peace is the natural effect of trade. In the other way liberal economist as Smith and Ricardo said that free exchange of the international markets is the best guarantors of peace. They thing that trade generates economic advantages for both parties. Furthermore the war reduces the trade.The realistic think that the effect of the trade in the war or conflict is small relative to the military and diplomatic considerations.Some theorist underline how gains from trade create dependence. This dependence is often asymmetrical and one part can use economic coercion to exploit the adversary. These actions can lead to the war.societal-level TheoriesThis section focuses on different theories of war and theories of logrolling and coalition formation.Liberal and Marxist theorists suggest that mass public opinion is peaceful. If a state initiates a war it is usually because political leaders or the capitalist class choose war over the desires and interest of the public.But in the other way we can see as there are some case as American Civil or the WWI in Europe the people want to enter in the war. The enthusiasm of the people cause that the leader take more risk or adopting an aggressive strategy. Some times the states fight outside to resolve the problem inside.Some scholars see the economic cycles and electoral cycles. They said that there are a spread of military abroad during the period before the elections, during period of poor economics performance or when domestic political support is low. Many of these studies is concentrated in the democratic countries but also in non-democratic states (Argentina in the Malvinas, Germany in WWI, Russia in the Russo-japanese war, etc.) The use of force is also depends on the potential benefits, the probability of diplomatic victory, the domestic cost and risk, and so on.Galpi find the relation between the non democratic and democratic government. Usually the war is started by the non democratic.In particular the ethnic adversaries become a perfect scapegoats Most of the Theoretical and empirical studies analyse how there is a political elite that increase the support of mass and exalt the interest and the honour of the nation. The elites and the masse sometimes are not unified. And some times the elites are divide.It is important to understand why political elites engage in external scapegoating and explanation why scapegoating works to reinforce or maintain their domestic support.Lenin explanation of the WWI is that it was cause by the imperialist classes to move the attention of the labouring masses form the domestic political crisis. Marxist Lenin models of imperialism supports that the external expansion and use of force serve as a interest of the elite and not for the society. The benefit of the expansion go for the elite and the cost of the expansion are diffused in the society in the form of taxationIndividual-Level TheoriesThe individual level of analysis locates the causes of events in individual leaders or the circle of decision makers within particular country It is focuses of human actors (for example cause of WWI is from the particular leaders in power at that time). Levy said that the losses and gain lead to some behaviours: States leaders take more risk to maintain their international positions, reputations, and domestic political support; after suffering losses, political leaders do not accept losses and take excessive risk to cover this losses; after making gain the state leaders take excessive risk to protect those gains against the losses; it is more easy for states cooperate in the distribution of gains than in the distribution of losses.Conclusion=> to him to understand the international relation is not a single level. we have to analyse and consider multi methods to understand the causes of war

Interdependence and Conflict: An IntroductionMansfield and PollinsOver the past few decades, there are an interest in the relationship between economic interdependence and political conflict. This one help justify the formation of the European Economic Community.The concept Links between Interdependence and ConflictOpen International markets and heightened economic exchange inhibit interstate hostilitiesAt the level of the nation-state. Economic exchange and military conquest are means to promote economic growth. Another liberal argument is that economic intercourse increase and promotes the contact and promotes communication between private actors and different countries, as well as between governments. Rising contact means rising also the cooperation between countries.

As trade and foreign investment increase, there are fewer incentives to meet these needs through territorial expansion, imperialism and foreign conquest

Conversely, barriers to international economic activity stimulate conflicts of interest that can contribute to political-military discord

At the level of the country-pair or dyad- economic intercourse increases contact and promotes communication between private actors in different countries, as well as between government. Rising contact and communication, in turn, are expected to foster cooperative political relations

Commercial openness generates efficiency gains and privates and consumers become dependent on foreign markets. These actors have reason to press public officials to avoid military conflicts. Montesquie said that the natural effects of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade together become mutually dependent. one is interesting in buying and the other one is interesting is selling. and all unions are based on mutual needs. Liberal economy order makes and maintain the international security. (public officials - who rely on societal actors for political support and have an interest in bolstering their countrys economic performance - have reason to attend to such demands).

=> however the liberal has been criticized because the economic exchange can undermine national security. Also the gains of the state are not distributed in equal parts => these one affect power relationsWaltz talk about myth of the interdependence. More interaction with the other states mean more probability of disagreement and conflicts. So interdependence produce intolerance.Theoretical issues for Further ExplorationMicrofoundationsWe have to understand why and how economic exchange influences the outbreak of armed conflict. Three areas deserve attention in theoretical development: the identification of relevant actors, strategic interactions between these actors as they pursue their goals, and the role played by international economic in the process of conflict generation and conflict escalation.Albert O Hirschmann has pointed out that the gains from trade often do not accrue to states proportionatelyIdentification of relevant actors:subnational: firms and consumers (hostilities could rupture important economic ties)

national: Leaders hope to satisfy material needs via conquest rather than trade

Supranational: Globalization; Capital markets => trade organizations reduce the risk of armed conflict among members

- Connect actors to levels of analysis so you can get all these causal variables- Realist explanations tend to view the state as the only relevant actor- Liberal explanations tend to focus on sub/supra-national ()

Institutions through which interests are filtered:Democratic institutions and their associated constraints on national leaders may be a necessary condition for economic interdependence to inhibit conflict

Integration of the state into the global economy shapes the interests of varying coalitions (PACIFIC or aggressive)

-Wars happen in 2 stages:Outbreak of a dispute between states and escalation of this dispute to the point where force is applied.There are studies where consider how economic exchange influences the outbreak of conflict. However they don t explain how economic interdependence influence the escalation of disputesOne possibility is to said that (Escalation) armed conflict is a consequence of failed interstate bargaining (contrattazione) and to link economic ties between nations to the bargaining process. Interdependence as a signal, the cost are related to the extent of economic exchange.Gartze said that since the costs of war are prohibitive, the war is unlikely (use brinkmanship: politica del rischio calcolato). YES, low-intensity conflict but unlikely to escalate.

Boundedness and ContingencyArgument about the relationship between interdependence and conflict are use by a lots of actors. some studies during these years complex the argument. Also someone said that the effects of economic exchange on the outbreak of hostilities depend on various domestic and international factors.Space-time both have changed. Economic exchange on the use of force changed over time. increase trade has decrease the conflict during the period since World War Two [and other scholars arrive a such conclusions for the 19th and 20th century]. Others studies focusing on the XVII and XVIII, and how the expansion of the commercial rivality and sometimes stimulated armed conflicts. Commerce has expanded in the last 4 centuries in 2 policy contexts: Mercantilist era ( state-directed and imperialist) and liberal economic regime. => this change the relation between interdependence and conflict. We have to understand how the effects of interdependence change over the time. Ad example also during the WWII we can said that the interdependence have a less influence on conflicts between major power than on dispute between weaker states

Recent research see that if the interdependence promotes or not promotes conflict depends on interaction between various domestic and international factors- one set of the study found strong evidence that heightened trade flows decrease the outbreak of military disputes between members of PTAs (institution designed to liberalize commercial among participants). Others found no evidence- domestic economic conditions influence the impact of interdependence on the probability of the conflict.- Etc=> in shortsthese studies indicates that if interdependence promotes or not conflicts depend on the interactions among various domestic and international factorsHe suggests various areas for more research to understand the correlation and understanding: market economies; politically relevant dyads; mercantile era; etcStatus quo vs revisionist power!East China Sea! Japan v China?

- The conceptualization and Measurement of interdependence and conflictImportant is how to define and measure both interdependence and conflict1) CONCEPTUALIZING INTERDEPENDECE1. A group of countries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are influence the condition of the other (inflation in one places put pressure an other prices) => SENSIBILITY interdependence2. Those countries where it is costly to rupture/ forego their relationship (OPEC and advanced industrial countries) => VULNERABILITY interdependence.The big difference it is the cost that countries would be support. This influence the point of break.2) OBSERVING INTERDEPENDENCE- Measurement for interdependence usually emphasize one of three themes:1. Openness: relation of trade to the total economic production (higher the trade crossing boundaries, greater cost of interruption)2. Vulnerability: do not share the same level of consensus about the measurement. However they have an asymetry indicators for the trade. Usually the indicators are constructed using the portion of trade (imports/exports) between a given pair of states (represented in their total trade). the more these two figures differ, the greater the asymmetry between a and b3. Gain: This measure relies on the counterfactual (what total product if no cross-border trade): economists rely on import (or export) price elasticity data- Openness is the most used (ratio of trade / output). Heightened global trade (as % of global output) inversely related to frequency of war throughout the international system during 19 and 20 century (oneal and russet- dyadic level; domke- unit level (those nation.))=> Caveats for vulnerability1. Size of the flow of trade between states (taken either by itself or as a percentage of national security) may not accurately reflect the costs to them of their economic relations were disrupted (eg. substitutes, little trade-vital trade)2. Raleation of trade flows between states to the national income can suffer from the independent effects of national income of each trade partner is that this value tends to be higly correlated with each partner economic size. It is well know that economically large states end to be politically powerful and that powerful states are disproportionately likely to become involved in military conflicts.3. Costs conception of vulnerability may be too restrictive since some claims regarding interdependence and conflict center not on the economic consequences of disrupting commerce but rather on the security implications of dependency or highly asymmetric trade relations (restraining only one party). Marxist and world system scholars view see the asymmetric trade relations as exploitation and a prospect for the conflict.- International trade flows, monetary relations, and the cross-border movement of capital, institutions such as PTAs (arrangement that can help the interdependence) should be included, increasingly. In particular they analyse the case of the IMF

- CONCEPTUALIZING CONFLICTThe influence of interdependence depend not only on the form and economic being analysed but also on the type of international conflict being explained. Economic interdependence affect low intensity conflict, high intensity conflict or both.What forms of interstates conflict should interdependence address?-The most ardent advocates of the liberal position would expect interdependence to eliminate political conflict at all levels of intensity , though much oft-cited work by Immanuel Kant, the Manchester liberals, and others on war (Doyle 1997, chaps. 7-8.-Others think that States may continue to voice their differences and perhaps even threaten sanctions or the use of armed force but domestic trade interests will restrain them from acting on such threats (thus preventing escalation to the highest levels of conflict) lest commerce be disrupted-Versus, Realists thinks that concede that trade could suppress less salient interstate conflicts, while denying any systematic effect as conflicts become more serious, placing core national interests at stake (e.g. Viner 1951; Waltz 197).- Future work should explicitly consider the likely effects of interdependence on lower- intensity conflict (trade disputes, sanctions, and threats of force), higher-intensity conflict (mobilization, the use of armed force, and full-blown wars), and the escalatory (allentare) and de-escalatory process in conflict.OBSERVING CONFLICTSome earlier statistical research on interdependence and hostilities relied exclusively on event data sets, such as the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) and the World Event Interaction Survey(WEIS). The major number of such studies conducted during the past ten years has focused on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), which are episode in which one state threatens, displays, or uses force against another state.The COPDAB, WEIS and MID data sets underlines different types of the foreign policy behaviour. COPDAB and WEIS record events over the broad-est spectrum of international interactions (cooperative as well as conflictual) from low intensity hostility. In contrast the MID data set only records the case that involving the threat, display or use of armed force. In the COPDAB tradition, conflict is conceived as a continuous flow marked at regular intervals. The MID tradition views conflict as a discrete episode whose time span may be very brief or sometimes quite prolonged.In sum, more attention needs to be paid to the aspects and type of political conflict that should be the focus of work on interdependence and hostilities. It is clear that the prevailing diplomatic climate, the occurence or absence of a militarized dispute, and war are only weakly linked.ConclusionThe relation between economic interdependence and hostilities started a decade ago. These recent studies have made considerable progress in take in consideration some key aspects of the influence of interdependence on political tensions.

12/03/2015STRUCTURAL REALISM:INTRODUCTIONThe great power pay attention to how much economic or military power the states have. It is important not only to have an important amount of power, but also make sure that no other state take the balance of power in favour. There are different among the realists. They try to answer to a question: Why do states want power?- Four questions: why do states want power? How much power do they want? What causes war? Can China rise peacefully (the thematic of the case study)?Realists = international politics = power politics- It is important not only to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the balance of power in its favour. For classical as Morgenthau the answer is human nature (human born and want the power).For structural realists human has little to do with why states want power.- Why do states want power?1. Classical realists = human nature = They want to be leader = the great power dominate2. Structural realists =/ human nature but = Ignore cultural difference among state as well as differences in regime type (autocratic or democratic) because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers. In the system where there is no higher authority that sits above great powers and in a system where there is not guarantee thta one will not attack another... has a god sense for each state have enough to protect itself in the event it is attacked.there are a significant division inside this structural realism:=> Defensive realists= structural factors limit how much power states can gain= in this way betters security competition. (as Waltz)=>Offensive realists = the structure of the system encourages states to maximize their share of world power (pursuing hegemony) = intensifies security competition (as Mersheimer)- For classical realists, power is and end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival.The state have two power: the military (Great power: need money, technology and personnel to build military forces and to fight wars ) and the socio economic (Latent power: wealth and size of the population => the raw potential to competitive with the rival states) that build the military power. The war is not the only way to gain power. We cans ee also states as china in las few decades: increase the size of the population and share the global wealtWHY DO STATES WANT POWER?it is for the international system.5 assumptions about the international system:Anarchic system (opposite of anarchy? hierarchy). There is not centralized authority or arbiter above states (not means that leave in chaos and disorder)

all states possess some offensive military capability (all states have the potentiality to damage the other)

states can never be certain about the intentions of other states (revisionist states versus status quo states; however intentions cannot be empirically verified)

main goal of states is survival (integrity of the territory and the autonomy of their domestic order)

states are rational actors (strategies to maximize their prospects for survival; however because states operate with imperfect information in a complicates world, they sometime make serious mistakes)

The live with the fear that another state have the capability and the same motive to attack them. When we have a problem, there is nobody in the international system to answer the call(in the national system: police, ambulance, military etc). So the best way to survive is to be powerfull. And they don t ant that the other states take more power. If you don t have power you don t have less possibility to survive. Important is the idea of the security dilemma.When all the assumptions are combined together = circumstances arise where states not only become preoccupied with the balance of power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each others expense.

HOW MUCH POWER IS ENOUGH?

=> Defensive Realists:1. It is better for states to try to maximize their share of world power, because the system will punish them = hegemony is dangerous.2. Kenneth Waltz: appropriate amount of power (not maximize).- Too powerful, balancing will occur;-And offence- defence balance (no central wars)Defensive realists emphasize if any state become powerful, balancing will occur. In particular the other great power build up their militaries and form a balancing coalition to eliminate or destroy the hegemon (it is happen in the Napoleon France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Gemrany)In sum, not only is conquest difficult but, even in those rare instances where great powers conquer another state, they get few benefits and lots of trouble. According to the defensive realism, these basic facts about life in the international system should be clear to all states and should limit their appetite for more power.=> Offensive realistsGood strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible= pursue hegemony (not because conquest or domination is good but to ensure ones own survival). It is important the power to guarantee the survival.Buck passing (not all members)

(for classical realists, power is and end in itself; for structure realists, power is a means to an end and ultimate end is survival).- They understand that threatened states usually balance against dangerous foes, but they maintain the balancing is often inefficient, especially when it comes to forming balancing coalition, and that this efficiency provides opportunities for a intelligent aggressor to take some advantages of its adversaries. Defender has a significant advantages over the attacker. They think also that is difficult to gain the hegemony (imperial Germany came close to achieving hegemony in Europe during the First World War, etc). Different is with the nuclear weapons. It is possible but no likely (in particular if both states have nuclear weapons. If the other doesnt t have it is sue for the offensive purpose). for all of these reason, offensive realists expect that the great power are constantly looking for opportunities to gain advantage over each other, to achieve the final step: hegemony

=> the HISTORY (OR THE PAST): the past have been more accordance with the predictions of offensive rather than defensive. During the fist half of the twentieth century, there were two world wars in which three great powers attempted and failed to gain the region hegemony: Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi Germany. the second half of the century was dominated by the Cold War, in which Usa and the Soviet Union engage in an intense security competition that came close to blows in the Cuban missile crisis (1962).Some defensive said that states that maximize power, they argue do not enhance their prospects for survival, they undermine it. [[[[[Defensive realists have to go beyond structural realism (fellback option) to explain how states act in the international system (instances where great powers act in non-strategic ways). They must combine domestic-level and system-level theories (foreign policy) to explain how the world works:]]]]]]]

WHAT CAUSE GREAT POWER WAR?Structural realists recognize that states can go to war for any number of reasons. But in particular for:1. Decrease their security2. Ideology or economic considerations

THE POLARITY OF THE SYSTEM,Polarity of the system (importunate the number of powers)=> bipolarity(two great powers); multipolarity (three or more great powers)=> bipolarity: After the second world war and ran until 1989; multipolarity: (state system was multipolar from its inception in 1648 until the second world war ended)>>>>>>>>>Peaceful? (20thcentury experience with cold war?).For Europe, the cold war was the more peaceful than the other period as multipolarity. But also in Europe there are period (1815-1853 / 1871-1915) of multipolarity and there were not wars. Realists who think bipolarity cause less wars offer three important points:1) more opportunity for the multipolarity (more powers); There are only two greta powers in the bipolarity2) bipolarity create an equal equilibrium (in multipolar system not);3) there is more potential for mistake in the multipolarity (greater potential for miscalculation in multipolarity, and miscalculation often contributes to the outbreak of war (identifying friends from foes as well as their relative strength is more difficult)).Balancing they said is more efficient in the bipolar system.Not all realists accept that the bipolarity facilitate the peace. Someone said multipolarity is more peaceful system. they based the idea in two considerations:1) deterrence (fear) is more easier in the mutipolarity. There are more states that can join together. In bipolarity there are not other balancing partners2) less hostility among the great powers in multipolarity, because the amount of attention they pay to each other is less than a bipolarityWith the end of the cold war some realistic think that there was a unipolar system. Other one think for a multipolar system with china, Russia and India (we can see also the terrorism).

- Post-Cold War system???1. Multipolar (Usa, China and China)2. Unipolar (Usa): neither security competition nor war; just 1Caveats: if the hegemon feels secure in the absence of other great powers and pulls most of its military forces back to its own region. Security competition and maybe even war is likely to break out in the regions it abandons> large scales social engineering: POLITICS OF DISTANT REGIONS

BALANCED OR INBALANCED POWER (important is not the number of power)
Number is less important; how much power each of them controls> better explanatory variable (preponderant power; number 1 and others)Peaceful:> little need to use force (war likely lesser greta powers)>>Period between Napoleaons defeat in 1815 and status quo, the outbreak of the First War in 1914 > five wars between thre great powers > and none was a central war > consequence of Britains commanding position in the international system (Naoleonic, France and Imperial Germany, respectively, were woughly equal in power to Britain)Conflict:preponderant= potential hegemon> it will not be satisfied with the > when there is rough equality among the great power, no state can make a erious run at hegemony X CENTRAL WARS> France in the earlier eg. was a potential HBALANCED OR IMBALANCED POWERPower can be distributed more or less in the great powers. Some realists underlines how a presence of an especially powerful state facilitate peace. Other one said that increase the chance of war (central wars is when there is an especially powerful country). They said that in Europe after the Napoleonic wars there was a long period of relative peace (not big wars). Anyways not balanced multipolarity increases the risk of great power wasPOWER SHIFTS AND WAR1. Focusing on static indicators like the number of great power or how much power each control XFocus should be on the dynamics of the balance of power (changes that take a place in the distribution of power)- the dominant state, knowing its days at the pinnacle of power are numbered, has strong incentives to launch a preventive war against the challenger to halt its rise. Of course, the declining state hast to act while it still enjoys a decided power advantages over its growing rival.The offence defence power: the rise of China according to offensive and defensive realismPOWER SHIFT AND WARThe dominant state has a strong incentives to do a preventive war who want to take the challenger to stop the rise. Germany in the two war worlds was the dominant power. But both times it faced a rising challenger to its east: Russiabefore 1914 and The Soviet Union before 1939. To prevent decline and maintain the commanding position in the Europe, the Germans launched the preventive wars in 1914 and 1939THE OFFENCE-DEFENCE BALANCESome defensive realists argue that there is an offence-defence balance which almost always favours the defence. As such, the balance is a force for peace. Some defensive realists are not agree. Ad example in the Second War War the tank and the dive bomber shifted the offence-defence balance in the offence. On the other hand, there was no shooting was between the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, because the coming of nuclear weapon shifted the balance in the defence. In sum, a variety of structural arguments attempts to explain when great power war is more or less likely.THE RISE OF CHINA ACCORDING TO OFFENSIVE REALISMThe ultimate goal of the great powers, according to offensive realism, is to gain hegemony, because that is the best guarantor of survival. But it is really difficult to achieve the global hegemony. The only that can hope is the regional hegemony. Today, US, the most powerful state in the system, it is not a global hegemon.Regional hegemon want to have the control in the region and control in the others areas. US has gone to great to control Asia and Europe.Also with the Imperial Germany (1900-18); Imperial Japan (1931-1945), Nazi Germany (1933-1945), and the Soviet Union (1945-89). In each case, USA played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemony.In offensive realism is correct that china become a regional hegemon in Asia. In particular, china, want to maximize the power (Japan and Russia). China want to increase the power to pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. China will make his own Monroe Doctrine. So China wants also a weak Japan and Russia in the same way that USA prefers a military weak Canada and Mexico on its border. The USA does not tolerate other competitors, as it demonstrated in the XX century. It is determined to remain the only regional hegemon. . In the other way USA will work hard to contain China.In the other way, it is clear how others states like India, Japan, Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about the rise of China. At the end, these countries will join US to balance the power in the region.THE RISE OF CHINA ACCORDING TO DEFENSIVE REALISMIn contrast to the offensive, the defensive are more optimistic about the rise of China. Defensive realism provides reason to think that China should be able to coexist peacefully with the neighbours and US. They will not make the same mistake of Bismarck, Hitler, etc.This mean that China will not try to take the power as hegemony by violence, but they will try to maximize its share of world power (more with cooperation and dialogue). Furthermore, the presence of Nuclear weapons is another cause of optimism. It is difficult for any power to expand when confronted by other powers with nuclear weapons.India, Russia and the US have nuclear arsenal, and Japan would quickly go nuclear if it felt threatened by china. These countries, which are likely to form the core of anti-China balancing coalition, will not be easy for China to push around as long as they have nuclear weapons. In shorts, nuclear weapons will be force for peace if China continues to rise.The US experience in Iraq hel to China to understand that the benefits of expansion in the age of nationalism are dangerous (costs and reputation).Others structural realists think that the rise of china will be not peaceful because it mean the end of the unipolarity. So the world became more dangerous. Furthermore Japan take nuclear weapons, Russia , India continues to rise there will be more great power in the system. So in this way increase the possibility of conflict.Other said that bipolarity is more pacific than the unipolarity. Not all structural realists accept the argument that bipolarity is more prone to peace than multipolarity. For them, a return to bipolarity would be a cause for pessimism.Other think that the situation would change if China will try to be powerful as Usa or maybe more. Anyways, there is no consensus among structural realists about whether China can rise peacefully. The only important point of agreement among them is that the structure of the international system forces great powers to compete among themselves for power.CONCLUSIONIn 1990s someone think that the world becoming more peaceful and the realism was dead. Others see as Western elites were for the first time thinking and talking about international politics in more cooperative and hopeful terms (new approach).After 11 September, the optimism disappeared and the realism come back again. Every realist opposed to Iraq war that was a strategic disaster for Usa and Uk. Bu tin particular how globalization undermined the role of the state. In particular with the born of nationalism (and religion and ethnic problems).Usa and Uk, the worlds two great liberal democracies have fought five wars together since the Cold War ended in 1989.In essence, the world remains a dangerous place, although the level of threat varies from place to place and time to time. States still worry about their survival. International politics is still synonymous power politics

The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All by JohnMearsheimerWill China rise peacefully? My answer is no. The China continue with the impressive economic growth and also for the next few decades. Most of the neighbours of China, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam, will join with the US to contain China's power. He said that in the international politics the states try to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximise its world power and eventually dominate the system. The international system has some characteristics. The important actors are states that operate in anarchy. All great powers have some offensive military capability. Finally, no state can know the future intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals.Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon, the only great power in the system but it is too hard to project and sustain power around the globe. China (whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic) is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. Specifically, China will try to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. China will try to push the US out of Asia. We should expect the China with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the US prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept US military forces operating in its back yard? Why would China feel safe with US forces in ithe borders Why should we expect the Chinese to act any differently than the US did? Are they more principled than the Americans are? More ethical? Less nationalistic? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to imitate the US and become a regional hegemon.

[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[Structural realism differs for classical realism in one important aspect. The survival of the State, through the conservation of territory and autonomy, is the primary goal of the State. The ambitions of the State can only be released if the state survives. The Neo-realists see the power as a mean to an end (i.e. survival) instead an end in and of itself. There is nothing that states can do for prevent the threats, war and struggle for power.]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]]

KENNETH WALTZ=> Theory?=> [theory collections of statements that propose causal explanations of phenomena and meet the following three criteria 1) be internally consistent (the statements do not contradict one another); 2) be logically complete (i.e. the hypotheses deduce from the theory should follow logically form the assumption) of the theory; 3) must have falsifiable implications]=> Waltz:- theory cannot explain the accidental or account for unexpected eventsTheory is depiction of the organization of the domain and connections among the part so by defining the structure of international politics autonomy of the domain is made possible.- Neorealism retains the tenets of realpolitik (political realism or practical politics, specially policy based on power rather than on ideals).- Marxists for instance link the outbreak of war to internal qualities of the state(governmental forms, eco systems, social institutions, political ideologies).- states with widely divergent economic institutions social customs, and political ideologies, have all fought wars if an identified condition seems to have caused a given war, then why would wars occur when their causes vary differently = until level explanations are not enough;REJECT ANIMUS DOMINADI- Both Unit- level and structural level- but more important is placement of units the system and not by internal qualities of the units- why different units will behave similarly (despite their variations) and produce outcomes within expected ranges systems level understanding of theory / international politics- why different units behave differently despite their similar placement in the system Uniti-level / foreign policyISSUES??-Waltz sees international structure as an external joining of states as actors who have precisely the boundaries, end, and self understandings that theorists accord to them on the basis of unexamined common sense. Waltz grants this structure a life of its own independent of the parts, the states as actors; and he shows in countless ways how this structure limits and disposes action on the part of states such that, on balance, the structure is reproduced and actors are drawn into conformity with its requisites. But how is the independence of this structural whole established?> NOTHING MORE THAN THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PARTS TAKEN TOGETHER- Politics in neorealism becomes pure technique: the efficient achievement of whatever goals are set before the political actor. Political strategy is deprived of its artful and performative aspects, becoming instead the mere calculation of instruments of control. Absent from neorealist categories is any hint of politics as a creative, critical enterprise, an enterprise by which men and women might reflect on their goals and strive to shape freely their collective well.- SREUCTUAL LEVEL EXPLANATIONS- Are destabilizing conditions within international system managed better in multipolar or bipolar systems?- 1) more powers; flexibility of alignment (the country one is wooing may prefer anther suitor or on own alliance partner may defect)- limits a state options- 2) Common interest negative reasoning i.e. fear of other states (Waltz argue that divergence arises when positive interest are at stake; therefore in alliances among near equals strategies will always be the product of compromises since interest of all partners / possible partners are not alike)- 3) If competing blocs are seen to be closely balanced- if there is a nun- in to compete at time weakest link may determine the policy (even unwillingly you join war)- 4) In alliances among equals = greater threat of defection = security of others is threatened.Example: in 1956, the Suez Canal became the focus of a major world conflict. The Canal represents the only direct means of travel from between Asia, the middle East, Europe, and the U.S. Normally, free passage was granted to all who used the canal. but Britain and France desired control of it, not only for commercial shipping, but also for colonial interest. The Egyptian government had just been taken over by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who felt the canal should be under Egyptian controlThe United States and Britain had promised to give aid to Egypt in the construction of the Aswan High Dam in the Nile. This aid was retractedEgypt responded by sinking 40 ships in the canal, blocking all passage. The Unite Nations sought to resolve the conflict and pressured the two European powers to back down. The rest of the world shunned Britain and France for their actions in the crisis, and soon the UN salvage team moved in to clear the canal. Britain and France backed down.. etc.So for Kenneth WATZ:- BIPOLAR: alliances leaders can design strategies primarily to advance their own interests and to cope with their main adversary; less satisfy their allies- MULTIPOLA WORLD: dangers are diffused, responsibility are unclear, possibility of calculation, and son on.

- Miscalculation in multipolarityv/s- Overreaction in bipolarityWhich is worse?[=> size of great power increase > lowers dependence > uninvolved in each others economic affairs > this separation of interest reduces occasion for disputes]

Characteristic of Great Powers:
- Multipolar world:1. interdependence of parties;2. diffusion of dangers;3. confusion of responses;- Bipolar wordl:1. self dependence of parties;2. clarity of dangers;3. certainty of whos to face them

UNIT LEVEL- Bipolar world- competition is keen but manageable (US-SU long peace)- Is that enough? (given the depth and extent of distrust- why werent they drawn into war)- > Nuclear Weapons- (self help is to provide security; why do states use force? => for security; then what if the latter can be achieved without using force? i.e. by raising the costs of war nuclear weapons make the implications of even victory too horrible to contemplate) => UNIT LEVEL CHANGE HAS DRAMATICALLY REDUCED A STRUCTURAL EFFECTISSUES?- Nuclear weapons are not relative but absolute weapons (conventional weapons are relative; keep on comparing)- Uneasy peace (how much is enough)- Overlooks competence model = the power of an actor, and event its status as an agent competent to act, is not in any sense attributable to the inherent qualities or possessions of a given entity. Rather, the power and status of an actor depends on and is limited by the conditions of its recognition within a community as a whole. To have power, an agent must first secure its recognition as an agent capable of having power= by which the community confers meaning and organizes collective expectations.

Waltz and neorealism=> He created the neorealism (or structural realism, as he calls it), a theory of International Relations which underlines the interaction of sovereign states can be explained by the pressures exerted on them by the anarchic structure of the international system, which limits their choices (the international system influence the behaviours of the countries). Neorealism thus tries to explain recurring patterns in international relations, such as why relations between Sparta and Athens are similar between the U.S. and the USSR in some important ways.Waltz emphasizes a lots of time in this book and elsewhere that he doesnt t want to create a theory of foreign policy, which tries to explain the behaviour or actions of a particular state at a specific time or throughout a period.Waltz argues that the world exists in a state of perpetual international anarchy. Waltz distinguishes the anarchy of the international environment from the order of the domestic one. In the domestic realm, all actors may appeal to, and be compelled by, a central authority 'the state' or 'the government' but in the international realm, no such source of order exists.The anarchy of international politics (its lack of a central enforcer) means that states must act in a way that ensures their security above all, or else risk falling behind. This is a fundamental fact of political life faced by democracies and dictatorships alike: except in rare cases, they cannot count on the good will of others to help them, so they must always be ready to protect themselves.Like most neorealist, Waltz accepts that globalization is posing new challenges to states, but he does not believe states are being replaced, because no other non-state actor can equal the capabilities of the state. Waltz has suggested that globalization is a mode of the 1990s and if anything the role of the state has expanded its functions in response to global transformations.Neorealism was Waltz's response to what he saw as the deficiencies of classical realism. Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, neorealism and realism have a number of fundamental differences. The main distinction between the two theories is that classical realism puts human nature, or the will to dominate, at the center of its explanation for war. While neorealism does not consider a human nature the most important consequence of the behaviour of the states but the pressures of anarchy (limit of the structure) tend to shape the result more directly than the human nature of statesmen and diplomats or domestic governmental preferences.=> Neorealism underlines that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system). The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal central authority; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. These states act according to the logic of self-help, meaning states see their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states.States want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals.This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and ensures states develop offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and as a means to increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their survival.States don t trust each other, also for make alliances.There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances.Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system. A unipolar system contains only one great power, a bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than two great powers.Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances. Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar system, rather than external balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations and therefore less chance of great power war. That is a simplification and a theoretical ideal.

NEW CLASSES-The relationship between economics and political interaction at the state-level is far more complex than any linear relationship can capture- Interdependence is defined by the costs incurred by each state in a dyad to remove itself form bilateral economic ties- These costs of exit are in turn a function of the market in terms of the availability of substitutable goods and buyers of goods, as well as adaptation costs associated with restructuring the transactions required to satisfy economic demand.- economic interdependence: function of the potential exit costs state incur by breaking economies ties. These exit costs set apart interdependence for the other qualities of interstate economic relations> Factors governing exit costs can be found in the international system as well as internally with each state> systemic level: states are engaged in bilateral economic relationships within a global marketplace. The available opportunities for states to pursue alternate sources for goods and resources characterize the structure if the market# A market than contains many suppliers and consumers for a good (grain)> highly competitive environment, neutralizing the reliance of states upon each other# A market with one of few suppliers of a good.

- This structural dimensions is complimented by and internal source of exit costs:asset specificity-Asset specificity> the degree to which an asset can redeployed to alternative users without sacrifice of production value (williamson). As the assets that are involved in an economic relationship become more specific to that relationship, the costs of terminating or altering the terms of the relationship increase- EXIT COSTS represent the difference between interdependence and more fungible economic interaction- mobility or resources- Rigid immobile resources make states vulnerable to trading partners. Resources that are more fungible enable states to adapt to potential changes that other states may threaten to impose.- Market structure also determines the extent to which economic exit generates the need to alter these factors of production. A states that incurs economic exit may have other potential partners with which to establish new ties. s these alternative become scarce, current relationships become more costly to break- Exit costs are a function of market structure, asset specificity, and the level of economic activity.

- Assets specify has reference to the degree t which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value. This has a relation to the notion of sunk costs (BOEING)..

- Market structure dictates a states ability new market for its imports and exports. As alternate trading partners become scarce, current relationships become more costly to break.=> market structure that provides easily accessible substitutes will ameliorate any potential costs of economic exit from trading partners- (OPEC in the 1970s, asset specify explain why the US was forced to pay higher oil prices, market structure explains why the US could not turn to other countries for its oil need; EQUALITY trues for the MONOPSONY expected future markets / consumer demand. Us largest single consumer market in the world)

- High levels of economic activity may not signal interdependence of both parties are able to access new markets at home and abroad in the event of a disruption in trade. On the other hand, low levels of economic activity may mask the existence of interdepence that driven by monopoly or monopsony power- Interdependence is distinguished form interconnectedness because it involves a mutual dependence between states. If State A begins to trade with States B and begins importing oil, ties of interconnectedness emerge. If States A begins to rely on the imported oil as a source of energy to run its industrial economy, it..

- Economic interdependence exists when there are exit costs for any to states vis a vis their economic relationship. These costs are a function of market structure..

- Hirschman & Keohane and Nye relative economic power asymmetry in interdependence provides bargaining power in politics- the blackmailers Fallancy: if a nation (nation B) would rather give in to a demand by another nation (nation A) than suffer some form of punishment, then it is possible for a nation A to successfully extract this demand by merely threatening nation B with the punishment.

- An exit cots threshold is the level of exit costs beyond which a player cannot endure the exit. It sets a states limit fo the costs it is willing to bear in order to get (or hold onto) something that another states has (or wants).- This exit costs threshold..

- The relationship between a states actual costs and its exit cost threshold that determines whether economic interdependence affects its strategy with respect to political conflict.Three equilibrium emerge in his study, viz:- When Chs exit costs are greater than its exit costs threshold but Ts exit costs are less than its threshold then Ch is deterred from making a demand. This is theconstraint equilibrium, because Ch here is constrained by the economic relationship, and this argument is compatible with the argument that economic interdependence reduces it from initiating a demand that leads to conflict.- When Ts exit costs are less than their exit costs threshold, Ch makes a demand and T complies. This is thebargaining power equilibrium, as Ts level of interdependence affords Ch bargaining power. Here the costs of exit for the Target allow the Challenger to induce the Target t agree to its demands.- When both players exit costs are less than their exit costs thresholds, then the conflict escalates (thecrisis/escalation equilibrium). Here, the use of economic tools of persuasion fails and militarized conflict ensues.

Exit Costs and Equilibrium BehaviourEquilibrium strategy for challenger strategy for target Exit cost thresesoldcase 1: constrained No Demand, Exit if Target Reject Reject if Challenger e*ch> echDemands, Reject If e*r > erChallenges Exitscase 2: Barganing powe Demand, Exit of target Reject Comply if Challenger e*rechReject if Challenger Exits er>er

I. neither state sufficiently interdependent (no bargaining influence, escalated conflict)II. Target state sufficiently interdependent but not challenger(limited conflict)III. Both states sufficiently interdependent (limited conflict)IV. Challenger state sufficiently interdependent, but not Target, (no bargaining Influence, Status Quo)

Actual Exit costs for target (er)| || II | III| ||----------------------------|------------------------------------| || I | IV| |__________________|________________________ Actual Exit Costs for Challenger (ech)e*ch

- Case study: United states and South Africa during the apartheid era.- United States never threatened to exit.

2. bargaining Power (Challneger can safety successfully make demads) / low level, non militarized conflict challenger, Target acquiesces / Targets exit costs exceed its exit cost threshold / China and US : technology transfer to china 1989 to present : challenger: China target US / China is able to demand and get dual-use technology transfers from the US despite a ban on military technology transfers imposed after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1898. China uses .

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND CONFLICT- WWI is not a particular compelling case example of failure for liberal trade theory, and it may even indicate the strength of the liberal perspective- WWI has been broadly misinterpreted, that interdependence did not really fail in 1914:1. States that initiated the war were not interdependent2. interdependent states were in most cases tepid joiners to an ongoing contest3. Economic linkages served an important role in averting escalation to warfare- Economic interdependence appears to have succeeded I averting war where nations were integrated, but it was incapable of forestalling conflict where economic integration had yet to occur- Military alliance commitments-----[[[[[[[[ ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND CONFLICTinterdependence theories:third image:- opportunity cost of war achieve gains more efficiently through economic means rather than through warfare- open financial and goods marketssecond image:-commercial peace or capitalist peace: interdependence mollifies the effects of states security dilemmas by creating common interests and reducing uncertainty

=> interdependence defined as including trade, development, open financial markets and monetary policy coordination- reduces conflcits by:-aligning states interest, which gives them lesss to fight over;- providing a mean of peacefully securing resources; and- allowing states to foresee the costs of fighting, which facilitates bargaining and compromise

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDECE AND CONFLICT- for interdependence to promote peace, economic processes must either remove incentives for states to engage in conflict or reduce the uncertainty states face when bargaining in the shadow of costly contests- interdependence makes it easier to substitute nonviolent contests for militarized disputes in signalling resolve. States that process a range of methods of conflict resolution have less need to resort to the most destructive (and costly) techniques- Liberal dyads can damage mutually valuable linkages to communicate credibly. States without linkages must choose between a very limited set of options, including more often- war

- Measurement and conceptualization1. A groupd of coutnries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are contingent on those found in others (inflation in one places upwards pressure on others prices) > sensitivity2. Those countries where it is constly to rupture/forego their relationship (OPEC and advanced industrial countries) > VULNERABILITY- (Difference lies in the costs borne BEST MEASURE WOULD BE INFORMATION ON COUNTERFACTUAL SITUATION; e.g.: maybe sensitive; counterfactual can explain est)

- Asset specificity has reference to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to altenative uses by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value. This has a relation to the notion of sunk cost (boeing: costs are so intense precisely because the capital and labor assets that go into the operation of building planes are not fungible v/s SOYBEAN)- Resources that are rigid in their relation to an international economic relationship make states vulnerable to its trading partners. Resources that are more mobile or fungible enable states to adopt to potential changes than other states may threat to impose.

- Markets structure dictates a states ability to find new markets for its imports and exports. As alternate trading partners become scarce, current relanthioship become more costly to break. Market structure that provides easily accessible substitutes will ameliorate potential costs of economic exit from trading partners- [OPEC in the 1970s; Assets specifity explains why the USA was forced to pay hugher oil prices, markets structure explains why the USA could not turn to the other countries oil needs; EQIALLY true for MONOPSONY expected future markets / consumer demand US largest single consumer market in the world]]]]]]]]]- WWI is the example of the failure of economic integration to maintain international peace.- Crisis of the interdependent states of West Europe lead to the WWI.- The WWI go against the theory that economic integration maintain peace- The WWI has been big misunderstanding, that interdependence did not really fail in 1914:1. States that initiated the war were not interdependent2. interdependent states were not really interdependent (who started the war not were really interdependent)3. Economic linkages served an important role in averting escalation to warfare (who were interdependence did not have the war).- We argue that the relationship between economic interdependence and the outbreak of World War I has been not good interpreted and that interdependence did not really fail in 1914 (war start with the less integrated states).- The small crisis that lead to the war, created an incentive formore integrated countries, most importantly Germany and Russia, to show an increasing resolve to support their weaker, less interdependent, allies, Austria-Hungary and Serbia.- Military alliance problems: the power of alliances fell to the country that it were less integrated into the world economy. Economic integration was not capable to prevent the conflicts where integration had yet to occur.1. War and InterdependenceTheories of interdependence argue that economic relationships influence the conflict propensity of states. Critics of interdependence argue that economic ties do not have powerful pacifying effects on world politics. And other things that the interaction between statesSomeone underline the interdependence create common interest, other underlines how interdependence created security, but other underlines how war create an important resource to increase the internal production (as Marx that see how the capitalism bring to the war => the imperialism need to conquest). The ecnonomies interdependece create trade where one take more than the other.2 World War I as a Test of Liberal TheoryIn the four decades prior to the Great War, Europe experienced a dramatic increase in the levels of interdependence, especially among several of the major powers. Anyways Europe in 1914 was not uniformly interdependence, but consisted of several highly interdependent powers, other states that were minimally integrated into this system.

Existing uses of WWI to falsify the pacific effects of interdependence are methodologically flawed for two reasons> First, the fact that war occurred between interdependent states in one important case only demonstrates that interdependence is not sufficient by itself to guarantee interstate peace; interdependence could still reduce the overall likelihood of war> Second, focusing on the outbreak WWI to test this theory is also problematic post hoc erg propter hoc fallacy (also selection bias, using one case to test a general hypothesis about factors that tend to lead to particular outomes, rela life exmaples?)(when it is concluded that one event causes another simply because the proposed cause occurred before the proposed effect > a causes or caused B because A occurs before B. I sneezed at the exact same time an earthquake started in California ( there is no reason to suspect any causal connection between the two events)

- What makes the outbreak of World War I relevant to theories of interdependence is not just that it was a war, but that is was a war that involved several powers that were formerly highly interdependent. The war did not begin among the most interdependent states in Europe but instead among their less interdependent allies.=> there was not a direct war between Germany and Russia or France. The war started in the Balkans (Austria-Hungary and Serbia) but supported with the others countriesAs we demonstrate, crises among the highly interdependent powers, most importantly Britain, France, Germany and Russia, were generally resolved peacefully during this era, despite important differences among these powers. By contrast, crises among the less interdependent powers of Europe in this period often led to war.3. Interdependence in Pre-World War I EuropeIt is possible to think of Europe during this era as consisting of two distinct economic subsystems. The first is a highly interdependent group consisting mostly of Western powers, most importantly Germany, France and the United Kingdom, but also Russia. The second subsystem is a significantly less interdependent group of Eastern European states, including the Ottoman Empire, its successor states and again Russia.Scholars generally agree that between 1871 and the beginning of World War I many European powers became increasingly economically interdependent, particularly in terms of increased trade and capital mobility. The highly interdependent states in Europe were mostly in the West, including France, Britain, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Other powers, such as Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia were significantly less developed economically and less integrated into the global economy, although Russia was heavily dependent in economic terms on the Western powers.The less economically integrated and developed of the European powers at the time were the Ottoman Empire and its various successor states, as well as the Iberian states. The key Western powers of Britain, France and Germany constituted a highly economically interdependent group to which Russia was also attached. Austria-Hungary was connected to this group, largely via its economic relations with Germany, but its economic ties to other Western nations were far less significant.4. European Crises 1871-1913Wars often appear inevitable in retrospect, but few wars seemed more unlikely to contemporaries in the preceeding years than World War I. It is still important to remember that the Great War did begin in the Balkans. But the war became large with the enter of the major European powers. But if someon ewant to understand why started the war they have to see on Serbia and Austria-Hungary. In the same era that disputes tended to be peacefully resolved in the West.4.1 The Highly Interdependent SubsystemThe late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe were marked by considerable tensions and a number of crises, including crises both between states that were highly economically interdependent and between those that were not economically interdependent.Three major sources of tension were at the root of these crises, and each was characterized by changes in the balance of power.1. The first source of tension was Germanys occupation of Lorraine and (to a lesser degree) Alsace, both captured from France during the Franco-Prussian War.2. A second source of tension involved the competing colonial ambitions of the major powers. Few territories were left to conquer, even as Germany increased its drive for colonial expansion after unification.3.Finally, after decades of decline, the Ottoman Empire not have the capacity to maintain dominance over its European possessions. This, and the accompanying rise of Balkan nationalism, threatened not only Turkeys interests but also those of the other powers in the region, especially Austria-Hungary and Russia.=> Changes in the balance of power, and the competing ambitions associated with them, led to frequent clashes among European states, but these disputes generally did not escalate to war when conflicts involved states that were economically interdependent.The tension of the three power (France, Germany and Grain Britain) a were in many field (economic, territorial, colonial, etc.). But no one of them caused a war. The controversy were resolved in a pacific way. There are all possibilities for a clash with the great powers (from 1870 to 1914) => but all resolved in a pacific way.4.2 The Weakly Interdependent SubsystemIn the other way we can see how as weakly the interdependent subsystem. We analysed before the question about Balkan(decline o Ottoman, etc.). Furthermore Russia generally supported the rise of Balkan nationalism because (1) Russia had a long-time rivalry with Turkey and ambitions for access to the Mediterranean; and (2) pan Slavism was increasingly influential in Moscow. The multi-national Austria-Hungary, however, was threatened by rising Balkan nationalism, and faced a security dilemma especially with respect to Serbia.Lacking the commercial incentives to cooperate as the relations in the West, the Eastern nations have nothing to loose with not economic relations. As we discuss after that, the strategic game between the integrated powers became increasingly like Chicken rather than the more traditional Prisoners Dilemma.

Game theory: Chicken?Games of chicken: example missile of CubaSiam and France- Highly interdependent (west) France, Britain, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark1. Germany and France remained peace for over forty years after the treaty of Frankfurt, despite specific plans for invading each other Germany, the Schlieffen Plan, and France Plan XVII; Germany finance of iron mining in the French region of Longwy-Briey; France-Britain overs siam; Russian-Britain; Britain-Germany2. Significantly less interdependent (East)- Russia, newly unfiled Italy, ad Austria-Hungary even less so3. Iberian and Balkan Peninsula were minimally interdependent (rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, which, accompanied by the rise of nationalism in the region, led many Balkan nations to seek interdependence)4. General absence of a positive motive for peace. Lacking the commercial incentives to cooperate- Tightening alliance commitments > foreign policy was increasingly, handed over to local officials> under the alliance system- WW1 does not demonstrate that interdependence failed, but rather demonstrates that other variables (also operating in a probabilistic manner) can increase and put in dangerous the interdependence.- There is the variables of the system of European alliances, the incentives of leaders to limit their options during crisis situations, and the decisions of individual leaders to honour their alliance commitments (Russia and Germany decided to defend their alliances commitments, which bring to a interdependent states into a conflict begun by the non-interdependent states) - European states that remained neutral, it is worth noting that among these were Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, all highly interdependent states.- Concluding remark:1. If interdependence did not reduce conflict, where would we have expected conflict during the era leading up to the war??2. War spread to the interdependence powers because of intervening factors that nullified the pacifying effects of interdependence=> As the analysis the rivalries among Germany, Britain and France were the most intense of the period. During the period of greatest commercial expansion, interdependent powers were less likely to go to war, also when they had the means and the motives to do soWe must ask why World War I began among the minimally interdependent powers and not in the West...

09/04/2015- Existing argument about economics and peace. They show how capital interdependence contributes to peace independent of the effects of trade, democracy, interest, and other variables.We survey work in four areas: the democratic peace, and trade, capital, and monetary interdependence.- THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: liberal policies rarely fight each other though appearing about as likely to engage in disputes generally. Democracies behave differently toward each other than toward non-democracies (democratic institutions may constrain leaders, domestic audience or opposition groups force the revelation of private information, etc)- TRADE INTERDEPENNCE: Trade Interdependence Democratic peace research was inspired by the Kantian prophesy of a perpetual peace,but Kants recipe(often calledtheliberal peace) consists of much broader conditions, including republican government, a league of nations, and common markets. Many believe thta Interdependence has a greater effect than democracy, growth, or alliances for the conflicts. In particular because they don t want to lose the interest and the benefit that they have- MONETARY INTERDEPENDECE: monetary interactions can be a source of interdependence. interstate monetary relations can be characterized by intermittent cooperation, competition, and coercion. Although they reduce state autonomy in monetary policy making, higher levels of monetary dependence raise the incentives to cooperate- CAPITAL INTERDEPENDENCE: trade is only one manifestation of the global spread of capitalism. Since capital markets dwarf (schiacciano) the exchange of goods and services, firms should weigh the risks of investment much more heavily than trade. Globalization has increased capital mobility and monetary cooperation even as its redefines the terms on which state compete (interdependence may even transmit economic crises- thus, the literature suggest that interdependence could increase conflict between states while decreasing the chances of violent, militarized behaviour).- Opportunity costs associated with economic benefits generally cannot deter disputes. Instead, interdependence create means for states to demonstrate resolve without resorting to military violence- Notion of interdependence SHOULD involve aspects of economic activity besides trade- Other macro-political aspects of international economics- such as the need for monetary policy coordination are also omitted in previous studies of interdependenceTheory: economic interdependence and peaceWhy states fight: a theory of costly contestExplanations for war are legion. However, work by James Fearon underlined how theories of war they do not account for the behaviour of interest - Costly contest involve at least two elements.First, there is zero sum competition for an excludable good. States differ over issued or territory that each cannot possess simultaneously.Second, states choose a settlements method. The choice of method is non zero sum. Transaction costs deprive winners of benefits and increase the burden for losers so that all are better off selecting methods that minimize costs. Since war expensive, fighting makes sense only if equivalent settlements cannot be obtained using cheaper methods. A theory of war, then, explains why efficient settlements are at times unobtainable ex ante- States posses private information about strategic variables (capabilities, resolve, and so on). If states could credibly share private information, efficient ex ante bargains could be identified- Instead, uncertainly provides weak or unresolved state an opportunity to conceal weakness even as competition creates incentives to bluff. States pool, claiming to be resolved and capable regardless off their trues nature. Such cheap talk claims do not allow observes to differentiate resolved or capable opponents from the weak or unresolved- Only by imposing costly contest by fighting or similar acts- can states distinguish resolute opponents from those seeking to bluff. States fight largely because they cannot agree or bargains that each prefers to what each expects to obtain from fighting. If states can agree about the nature of eventual settlements, then there is always some mutually preferable bargain- Why some states do not fight: contributions of interdependence to Peace-Uncertainty about the allocation of spoils from the contest accounts for the contest itself- Conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponents reticence to fight. If an opponents(B) is reluctant, then state A can make larger demands without risking war

- Imagine that two states compete over a sum of money (say 100$; assuming that states have equal chances of victory)- COSTS for fighting (20$); winner gets all the money (- costs) and the loses gets nothing (- costs)- EXPECTED value of fighting = (0.5 (100$) + 0.5 (0$) 20$)= 30$- If states are risk neutral, then any offer yielding (cedendo) each side at least 30$ is at least as valuable as fighting. Negotiated settlements form (31$, 69$) to (69$, 31$) are available and pr