Summer 1981 Quarterly Review - Theological Resources for Ministry

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A Scholarly J o u r n a l for Reflection on Ministry

Q U A RT E R LY R E V I E W

Joseph C. Hough, Jr.

John Wesley on SlaveryWilliam E. Phipps

Exegesis of Old Testament Texts for PentecoslLloyd R. Bailey

Healing Through Solitude and CommunityFaith Cornwall

Plus book reviews


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Q U A R T E R LY R E V I E WA Scholarly journal for Reflection on Ministry

A publication of The United Methodist Publishing Hous eJ o h n E. Proc te r, President and Publisher

and the United Methodist B o a r d of Higher Education and MinistryF . Thomas Trot te r, General Secretary

Editorial Director, Ronald P. PattersonEdi tor, Charles E. ColeBook Review Edi tor, Carey J. Gifford

Edi tor ia l BoardF . Thomas Trot te r, ChairF r e d B. Craddock

Cand le r School of TheologyKeith R. Crim

Virginia Commonwealth University-L e a n d e r Keck

Yale Divinity SchoolSallie McFague

Vanderbilt Divinity School

Lloyd R. BaileyDuke Divinity School

Cornish RogersSchool of Theology at Clarem ont

Roy I. SanoPacific School of Religion

J o h n L. TopolewskiChr is t United Methodist ChurchMountaintop, Pennsylvania

Q u a r t e r l y Review (ISSN 0 2 7 0 - 9 2 8 7 ) provides continuing education resources forprofessional ministers in The United Methodist C h u r c h and other chu rches . A scholarlyjourna l for reflection on ministry. Quarte rly Review seeks to encour age discussion anddebat e on ma tte rs critical to the practice of minis try.

Falling within the purv iew o f the journal ar e articl es and rev iews o n biblical,theological, ethical, and ecclesiastical questions; homiletics, pastoral counseling, churcheducation, sacred music, worshi p, evangelism, mission, an d church manageme nt;ecumenical issues; cultural and social issues where their salience to the practice ofministry can be demonstrated; and the general ministry of Christians, as part of thechu rch ' s underst anding of its nature and mission.

Articles for consideration are welcome from lay and professional ministers. UnitedMethodists, and others, and should be mailed to the Edi tor, Quarterly Review, Box 8 7 1 ,Nashville, Tennessee 3 7 2 0 2 .Manuscripts should be approximately twelve to twenty-fivepages in length and should be in English and typed double-spaced, and the original and

one duplicate should be submitted. No se rmons , po ems, or devotional material areaccep t ed . Quer ies are wel come . A style shee t is available on request. Pa yment is by fee,depending on edited length.

Q u a r t e r l y Revi ew is published four times a year , in M a r c h , J u n e , September, andDecember, by the United Methodist Board of Higher Education and Ministry and TheUnited Met hodist Publishing Ho use . Edi torial offices are at Box 87 1, Nashvil le, TN3 7 2 0 2 . Circulation and business offices are at 201 Eighth Aven ue South, Nashville, TN3 7 2 0 2 .Second-class postage paid at Nashville, Tenness ee. Quart erly Review is availableat the following rates: S10 a year for member s of United Methodist annual conferencessubscribing thr ough the all-conference plan; S 1 5a year for members of United Methodistannual conferences subscribing thr ough the conference leadership plan; institutions andlibraries, S15 a year; and individual subscr ipti ons, $ 20 a year. Subscri ptions may beobtained by sending a money o rder or check to Quarterl y Revie w, Business Manager,201 Eighth Avenue South, Nashville, TN 3 7 2 0 2 .

P o s t m a s t e r : Addre ss chan ges should be sent to United Methodist Publishing Hous e,201 Eighth Avenue South, Nashville, TN 3 7 2 0 2 .Subscribers wishing to notify publisher of their change of addr ess should notify the

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An index is printed in the winter volume (number 4) of each year.

Quarterly Review: A Scholarly Journal for Reflection on MinistrySummer, 1981

Copyright C 1981 by Abingdon


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QUARTERLY REVIEW

CONTENTS

Editorial 2

The Care of the Earth: The Moral Basis for Land ConservationJoseph C. Hough , Jr 3

John Wesley on Slavery

William E. Phipps 23Homiletical Resources: Exegesis of Old Testament Lectionary

Texts for the Season After PentecostLloyd R. Bailey 32

Healing Through Solitude and CommunityFaith Cornwall 77

Book Reviews

Hones ty in Theological Reflection

W. RoyceClark 86Spirituality as Embodied Prayer : More Signs of LifeDo n E. Sailers 99


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T H E C A R E OF THE E A RT H : THE MORALBASIS FOR LAND CONSERVATION

JOSEPH C HOUGH, J R .

We are rapidly los ing the ground on which we stand. Thisstatement is literally true. Soil is our scarcest natural resource ,and there is no solution in sight for the problems created by therapid deterioration of existing land res ources and the depletion

o f land reserves.Oddly enough, most of us are aware of the fact that our rivers

have become sewers and that the ocean is a huge cesspoql forour industrial and domestic garbage, that our forests have beenstripped for lumber and firewood, 1 and that some half-millionspecies are endangered. 2 Moreover, especially those of us ^vholive in cities are keenly aware of the deteriorating quality of air.But until recently not much was made of the steadily increasingrate at which we are losing soil, the indirect basis of humansurvival for all of us, and the direct basis of economic well-beingfor more than half the world's population. 3

In the United States alone, every day twelve square miles offarmland vanishes forever. 4 In the last ten years alone, we navelost farmland area equivalent to the combined size of Vermont,New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,New Jersey, and Delaware. 5 This story can be duplicated aro undthe world, in some cases with even more startling dimensions ofloss.

The soil we are losing is the fruition of a long-term process.

Nature requires between 2 ,500 and 8,000 years to build a sejven-to eight-inch average cover of topsoil in the United States. Inmany places in this country, we are losing one inch of topsoilevery twelve years. A t that rate, of cours e, in less than onecentury we would lose the soil that was a product of from

Joseph C. Hough, J r. , is dean of the School of Theology at Claremont, California.

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twenty-five to eighty centuries of natural growth. 6 Theworldwide phenomenon of loss of soil because of variousimpacts upon it means that at the present time, then, the

resource that is obviously most l imited in supply is arable l and.7

Traditional economic theorists tend to downplay the seriousness of such resource depletion. In fact, most of them did nottake the Club of Rome Report by Jorgan Randers and DonellaMeadows with any great seriousness. For example, MITeconomist Robert Solow points out that the exhaustion ofessential resources need not even be a drag on economic growthif (and this is a big if) substitutability is available. Bysubstitutability is meant the capacity to substitute labor andcapital assets to develop alternatives for a given exhaustible

resource. Even if substitutability is not available, Solow arguesthat one must reasonably assume, based on past experience,that technological innovation will provide substitutability atsome point prior to the total exhaustion of necessary resources.Wha t happens is that the pricing mechanism slows down therate of consumptio n as resources become scarcer and moreexpensive to discover or to mine. At some point in the process,the cost of the natural resource reaches a point where it becomesprofitable for some supertechnological substitute to be developed. This is what Nordhaus and others call "backstoptechnologies," that is, technologies that provide substitutabilityfo r a given resource for a practically unlimited period of time.This means, according to Solow, that optimal market allocationswill tend to function as regulators of the rate of depletion ofexhaustible resources so that the economy is not seriouslydamaged. However, in contrast to Nordhaus, Solow is a bit morepessimistic because he does not believe the market always givesaccurate, concrete signals to resource owners so that an acceptablepace of resource exhaustion is prompted. In his opinion, thismeans that something like a long-term futures market isnecessary, and he does not think that anyone is prepared to saywhether that sort of thing is feasible at this point. 8

Aside from Solow' s caution, I think it is worth pointing outthat at present the scarcity of land is an even more seriousproblem than that of ore or oil because there is on the horizon nolong-term technological substitute for land as a resource. It is


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true that the highly touted "Green Revolution" raised hopesthat rising productivity through the transfer of technology andtechnological innovation could function effectively to overcome

the scarcity of land; but the most recent research on the effects oftechnological transfer and innovation, which were seen as thekeys to the extension of land use and productivity, are verydiscouraging. Not only are the increases in yields leveling off,there are considerable counter-intuitive effects of the use of newpetrochemical fertilizers and pesticides and the damage accruingto land from widespread use of irrigation techniques required fornew seed varieties. In the view of some experts, substitutes havecreated far more problems than they have solved. 9

Since land is a rapidly depleting resource, and since it is not

immediately apparent just how effective technological substitution can be developed, then what is necessary is conservationand restoration of the land. For most of us, the land is acommodity to be bought and sold. It is an economic factor inproduction, a depreciable capital asset. In other words, ourcurrent understanding and evaluation of land is entirely aneconomic one. What seems to be required is a change from thiseconomic perspective to a broader one. At least we need anexpansion of the understanding of economic value of land by thedevelopment of ecological sensitivity. This in turn might lead toa new ethos that could yield a land ethic, one that supportsconservation not merely as an economic, but as a moralnecessity. 1 0 As a modest contribution to the development of thatethos, what I propose to do in this essay is to outline briefly somemoral bases for conservation. The first of these will be anempirical natural law basis; the second will be a mystical basis;and then I shall conclude with a br ie f reference to a possiblebiblical base for conservation. I also suggest that there areproblems with the first two that can be addressed by a biblically

based land ethic, and in this sense the biblically bas ed ethic ismore adequate as a foundation for conservation ethics .

I. The Empirical Natural Law Basis for a Land Ethic

One of the earl iest forces for ecological sensitivity, one thatpredates the science of the ecology, was George Perkins Marsh.


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Marsh was a nineteenth-century American writer who was nottrained specifically as a scientist. However , he was an avidreader and a keen observer of the world. Marsh strongly

believed that the world was an interlocking system of mutuallydependent parts , all of which played their role in the functioningof the system, and all of which were essential to the system'ssurvival. Marsh was appalled at the way human beings relatedto the natural world.

Man has too long forgotten that the earth was given to him forusufruct alone, not for consumption, still less for profligate waste.

Yet , Marsh continued,

man is everywhere a disturbing agent. Wherever he plants his foot, theharmonies of nature are turned to discords. The proportions andaccommodations which insured the stability of existing arrangementsare overthrown. . . . Of all organic beings, man alone is to be regardedas essentially a destructive power . 11

Marsh was , however, aware of legitimate human claims uponnature. U nlike some contempora ry ecologists, he did not elevatenature or nature's rights to a position equal to that of human

beings. As Marsh says , "A cer tain measure of transformation ofterrestrial surface, of suppression of natural, and stimulation ofartificially modified productivity beco mes neces sa ry. " Yet,Mars h goes on to point out that huma n beings have far exceededthe necessary alterations of nature. Th ey have destroyed theforests, they have broken up mountain reservoirs, killed speciesof birds that protected crops from insects, and committed othercrimes against their own interests. 1 2

Marsh's c h i e f concern, then, was to demonstrate that the

manner in which human beings cared for the earth workedagainst their own interests. In so doing, he felt that humanbeings were endangering their chances of survival at anyacceptable level of social organization. In order to enable anexistence conceivably to be called human, someth ing had to bedone. He concluded, "It is, therefore, a matter of the firstimportance, that, in commencing the process of fitting them for


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permanent civilized occupation, the transforming opera tionsshould be so conducted as not unnecessar ily to derange anddestroy what, in too many cases, it is beyond the power of manto rectify or restore." 1 3

Th ough Marsh 's writings display considerable understandingo f natural processes, and at points, a deep love for nature, hisbasic argument for a change in the way in which we care for theearth is that it would enhance the ch ances of human survival inthe long run. Thus, even though Marsh has been called byStewart Udall, "the beginning of land wisdom in thiscountry," 1 4 he does not go beyond the argument for ecologicalsensitivity based on anthropocentric interests. Essentially, mostof the arguments that we hear in the public discussion are of this

sort. T here is some appeal to our s ense that in the long run, if thehuman race is to survive, the manner in which we areconducting ourselves in the biosphere must be rather radicallyaltered.

Utilizing ideas developed by H. L. A. Hart in his book TheConcept of Law,15 I have labeled this type of argument anempirical natural law argument. Hart asserts that at its base,natural law is a teleological view, that is, it is bas ed on theassumption that human beings have an end that they ought topursue, a given natural end. T he empirical natural law to which

Hart points, however, is not based on any metaphysicalassumptions about nature or human nature. Rather, it refers forits ground to the tacit assumption that the proper end of humanactivity is survival. Following Hume and Hobbes , rather thanLocke, Hart argues that so-called right to life is based on nothingmore than the observat ion that human beings do indeed want tosurvive. Moreover, Hart argues that the aim to survive ispresupposed by the very discussion of society. He says, "O urconcern is with social arr angements for continual existence, notwith those of a suicide club." 1 6

Once survival is assumed as the natural aim in the sense thatHart has described it, then th e natural law argument proceedsquite simply to the content of natural law. Th e question leadingto the definition of content is that of the necessary minimalconditions for there to be social existence. In Hart 's words ,"There are certain rules of conduct which any social organiza-


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enough soil for everyone, then the land should be expropriatedwithout compensation from those who own too much. 2 1 EvenJohn Locke, who elevated the right to private property almost to

a sacred position, made it quite clear that proper ty rights were tobe limited by the necessity for everyone to have access to theland. Thus, the absolute right to property was reserved only forthat land on which a person could reasonably be expected to usehis or her own labor . 2 2 It is on similar bases that one could extendmoral arguments for conservation from empirical natural law.Since human beings have the right of access to land, we aremorally bound to conserve land so that the natural right tosurvive is not violated. In light of the rate at which land isdisappearing, we are morally bound to conserve and restore

land because the survival of half the human race is threatenednow. W hat is more, the right to survive is also the moral basis forland reform, since access to land is fundamental for humansurvival as well. The fundamental base of human propertyrights, then, rests on material necessities for survival. Propertyrights are derivatives of the right to survive, and necessities forsurvival override any and all property r ights if human survival isthreatened by any pattern of land distribution. It seems to followthat not only land conservation but also land reform could beclearly based on empirical natural law according to arguments

like Hart's. Therefore, land conservation and equitable landdistribution become the moral obligation of any rational andmorally serious human being.

As important as is the empirical natural law argument, thereare two major problems with it that should be noted. In the firstplace, so long as the will to survive, the will to life, is assumed tobe the basis of human behavior , the ethic that follows from thismeta-ethical base is by definition a self-interest or egoistic ethic.At least since Hobbes, most social and political writers haveassumed that human beings are self-interested, but they havedeployed various devices to avoid Hobbes' inexorable politico-moral alternatives of anarchy and tyranny. Both Hume andAdam Smith, for example, posited a natural human sympa thythat enabled human beings to feel in others the desire forsurvival that governed their own behavior. Natural sympa thymodified pure desire for survival to limit excessive brutality and


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exploitation. Similarly, Hart argues that the social character ofhuman existence necessita tes the expansion of the desire tosurvive to include the survival of others. This leads to a kind of

naturally limited altruism that acts as a modification of pureindividualistic egoism.

Even with this sort of modification of Hobbesian anthropology, however, one advances only from egoism to ethnocen-trism; that is, there is no clear evidence that any particularperson will extend her or his boundaries of limited altruismbeyond the social grouping that is the community of survival ofwhich he or she is a part. What is lacking is any empirical base fora universalistic sweep of human sympathy. In fact, empiricalobservat ion by some sociologists leads exactly in the opposite

direction toward in-group exclusivism.2 3

In light of this fact, itseems likely that such crucial questions as justice betweencultures and justice between generations will remain unanswered.

A s Robert Heilbroner has argued, there is really no rationalbasis for conserving resources so that others may survive, 24 andto be sure, there is no biological base for such conservation. Thisproblem becomes particularly acute when o ne addresses theissue of conservation for the sake of future generat ions, the issuethat Randers and Meadows have called the ethical question ofour times. 2 5 John Rawls saw this problem clearly in his Theory ofJustice, and he makes no attempt at a rational argument forjustice for future generations. Rather , he resorts to sentimentsderived from family ties as a foundation upon which he buildshis argument for justice between generations. 2 6 This is a curiousanomaly in what purports to be a rational theory of justice. Inany case, any of the various forms of corporate identificationthat might be proposed apparently span little more than onegeneration removed. Motivation for extensive conservation forthe sake of persons who will be born in the distant future simplydoes not exist.

One might argue that these questions could be addressedmore adequately by deploying the rational principle ofuniversalizability. This principle is based essentially on theargument that if one claims certa in rights for one's self as arational being, it follows that the same rights must be accorded


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to all other rational beings in circumstances that demonstra te norelevant dissimilaritiesrelevant dissimilarities of those different circumstances that would require different treatment. Forexample, one might argue that differences in age could justifydifferent rights, but race, national origin, and other suchcategories are not relevant dissimilarities. This argumentadvanced by moralists in various forms already carries with it animplicit meta-ethical assumption. 2 7 The foundation of theprinciple of universalizability rests on the bel ief that all humanbeings are equal, at least in the sense that they are potentiallyrational. Moreover, it is assumed that if one is rational, one willaccord to all other rational beings the same privileges that onewould claim for oneself. Such an extension surely is notself-evident, as both Hobbes and Nietzsche argued. To adoptthis sort of rationally objective principle, then, requiresmeta-ethical commitments that are not made plain. This sort ofcommon sense is not nearly so common as it seems in Oxford.

The second problem with the empirical natural law basis forland conservation is similar to all land ethics based purely on theinstrumental value of nature for human beings. Once it isconceded that human value is the only value upon which amoral foundation of conservation exists, then, the way isopened for the careless onslaught upon nature unless it is

"worth" something; that is, unless its value is value for humanbeings. When one attributes value to nonhuman objects purelyon the bas is of their relation to human beings, any sort of actioncan be justified, provided the consequences of that action can beconstrued to benefit human surviva l. 2 8

II . The Mystical Basis for the Care of the Earth

Lynn White's famous article has reminded us of the inherentdanger of such a perspective. 2 9 White argued that the focus on

the passage in Genesis where Yahweh gives human beingsdominion over the earth makes Christianity the prime malefactor in the development of our ecological crises. The dediviniza-tion of nature and the elevation of the dominance of humanbeings over nature characteristic of Christianity led to a ruthlessatt itude of exploitation that will finally destroy natural


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life systems. He proposes that we abandon this mainstreamChristian tendency and adopt Saint Francis as the patron saint ofthe ecological movement. He makes this proposal because h ebelieves that Saint Francis affirmed the equal value of all natural

life. Francis's attitude, White says, is directly contrary to theexploitative attitude arising from the Christian and Jewishtradition, which pictures humanity as the unaccountable ownerand ruler of nature. White, of course, overlooks the fact thatnature has been ruthlessly exploited by every conceivablereligio-cultural group since the earliest days o f human hi stor y. 3 0

His case, therefore, is beset with some historical inaccuracies.Sti l l , Wh ite 's argument has force in tha t it raises the possibility ofthe intrinsic value of nature and particularly the value of naturerelative to the value of human beings.

White really need not have lo oked quite so far into antiquity todiscover a standard-bearer for the view that nature has valueapart from its value for human beings. The ethical mysticism ofAlbert Schweitzer is based on the fundamental belief that allcreated beings have value in their own right; that is, they havean intrinsic value. He arrives at this posit ion by arguing that anyrational being knows that he or sh e has the will to live. FollowingDavid Hume, Schweit zer then states that because the humanbeing also is posses sed with the sentiment of sympathy, the

knowledge of one 's o wn will to live aro uses in us compass ion forothers who, we know, also possess the will to live. UnlikeNietzsche, by whom h e was influenced, Schweitzer did not seethe will to live being transformed into the will to power . Ratherthe will to live has a spiritual dimension that leads to a higherlife-affirmation. In other words, the spiritual aspect of the will tolive leads to a drive to fulfillment or to self-perfection. GeorgeSimmel, his teacher, convinced Schweitzer that his spiritualaspect of the will to live cons isted in the drive towardself-transcendence. The actual self was always striving to

become what it is potentially.The drive to self-overcoming, or perfection, in turn leads one

toward a mystical unity with the universal will to live, a cosmicforce that is purposive and acting in all things. 3 1

According to Schweitzer's view, then, the fulfillment of lifeconsists not in self-assertion but in the drive toward union with


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the all-pervasive creative will to live that enlivens living things.Thus, one does not seek fulfillment by an enlightened egoisticdrive to fulfill one's potential, but in the surrender of the self inunion with the universal spirit.

Since the union with spirit is the goal of life, life-affirmationcomes to mean not merely the affirmation of rational and humanlife but the affirmation of all life, sentient and nonsentient. Inthis way, Schweitzer arrives at his ethics of reverence for l i f e .3 2

Schweitzer believed that

ethics deals not only with people but also with crea tures . Even as we,they have the desire for well-being, the endurance of suffering, and thehor ror of annihilation. Those who have retained an unblunted moralsensibility find it natural enough to share concern with the fate of all

living crea tures . The thoughtful cannot help recognizing that kindlyconduct toward non-human life is a natural requirement of ethics. 33

It is not possible, according to Schweitzer, to make sharpdistinctions between higher and lower forms of life. Therefore,the ethics of reverence for life means that no life is to bedestroyed if such destruction can be avoided. This applies notonly to animal life but to plant life as well. Even plucking aflower without necessity is a sin against l i f e .3 4

In the view of Schweitzer, the whole springs from the unity ofthe one. All life is the work of the genius, if not the emanation ofthe one creative spirit that is the giver of all life. Therefore, theright to life cannot be attributed to human beings aloneitbelongs equally to all life, and one really has no basis for thedestruction of any life. With respect to my main concern here,morally one conserves land not merely because it is the basis ofhuman survival, but because it is the cradle of all life, sentient andnonsentient. T he foundation for moral obligation rests squarelyon the metaphysical assumption that all life is unified into one.

To destroy any part of it is to defile the mystery of the harmonyand the unity of being that is the root of the creative process.One assumes this obligation as a result of religious bel ief in theunity o f the whole and participation of all in the being of thewhole. There follows a simple extension of sympatheticidentification to include the whole community of life. As a


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result, one is morally obligated to extend survival concern to allcreatures. Since the earth is the source of life of all creatures, oneis morally obligated to conserve the earth to preserve the right tolife for all living beings.

Schweitzer's critics have been quick to point out that in hisattempt to overco me excessive anthropocentricism in ethics, hehas thrown the question of value into total confusion. If all valueis not value for human beings, but rather value for the whole orthe unity of the whole , then in what way does one determine therelative value of a butterfly, say, to that of a newborn child? Orhow could one even justify cutting down a tree to make way foragriculture, or for that matter even harvesting corn for food? Inother words, if Schweitzer were taken literally, there could be nodevelopment of huma n society as we know it. Such development requires some ordering of values so that one can make thehard moral choices posed when life is in conflict with life.Schweitzer gives no explicit guidance here. At points he doesindicate that human life is more important than other forms oflife. He acknowledges that even he destroys bacteria to savehuman lives, and he apparently feels no serious guilt about hisaction. However, wha t he insists upon is that those who destroyother forms of life so that human life may continue, do so in fullknowledge that that dest ruction is morally serious. Even though

it must be done, it is done only in the knowledge that the act isfull of ethical ambiguity. 3 5 All killing is evil, but so me of it isnecessary.

To the man who is truly ethical all life is sacred including that whichfrom the human point of view seems lower on the scale. He makesdistinctions only as each case comes before him, and under thepressure of necessity, as for example, when it falls to him to decidewhich two lives he must sacrifice in order to preserve the other. But allthrough this series of decisions he is conscious of acting on subjective

grounds and arbitrarily, and knows that he bears responsibility for thelife which is sacrificed. 36

Under necessity the moral person acts on alternatives short ofthe ideal, knowing that in so doing she or he has fallen short ofthe life-affirmation that is the path to true self-affirmation.


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How we are to order our choices still is not clear. There is someindication that next to aesthetic and rational beings one wouldplace those who obviously suffer, but the concrete hierarchy isnever developed. We are left with the admonition to be totally

concerned with the affirmation of all life even as we are forced bythe necessity of choosing less than absolute good. Thus, asHenry Clark says , reverence for life functions, not as an absolutemoral rule, but as a call for a new attitude toward all life: theattitude of universal compassion. 3 7

William Blackstone has po inted out tha t much o f thisexpanded sympathy, this reverence for all life, "reverberates inthe writings o f current ecological ethicists." 3 8 This is particularlytrue of the writings of Joel Feinberg, Herbert Speigelberg, andPeter Singer. 3 9 They, like Schweitzer, move in the direction of

the radical equality of certain forms of life within human life, andthey too inherit the problems of ordering moral choices in asimilar fashion.

There are a number of other problems with Schweitzer'sdevelopment of his ethic of rever ence for life, among which aresome profound theological ones . However, it is not my purposeto review Schweitzer here, and so I shall just mention oneadditional problem. Schweitzer's extreme individualism, whichled him to maintain a radical separation between his own lifeand the major political issues of his time, is a reflection of aninadequacy in his whole ethical program. The beautiful mysticalvision that he paints for us is one of the hearta purely internalmatter unrelated to laws. Therefore, the ethics of reverence forlife is not innately related to the pressing questions of publicpolicy. That we should love the land beca use it is the cradle of alllife would probably be obvious to Schweitzer , but apart fromteaching and iserving, Schweitzer saw no public or corporateimplications. He seemed to think that human beings are fullycapable of knowing the good and that when they know it theywill do it. He therefore views with disdain some of those whopush into the political arena in an attempt to affect a range ofchoices before human beings. 4 0 This is not to say that Schweitzershould be identified with the total preoccupation of being asopposed to doing that is characteristic of some classicalmysticism. For Schweitzer, being and doing are united in the


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care of life exhibited in concrete ac ts. But thes e acts spring frompersonal motivat ion alone, and in no way is the ethics ofreverence for life concerned with anything more than abstractjustice. The laws of justice are outside its ethical concerns.

III. The Biblical Basis for a Conservat ion Ethic

I have argued that while empirical natural law can provide uswith a basis for a conservationist ethic that includes concreterights and guidelines for public policy on the care of the ear th, itsfocus is so narrowly anthropocentric that there is a motivationalproblem. In other words, if the only foundation for moralbehavio r is human necessity, it is not likely that anything shortof ecological disaster will promote an ethos that would supportan adequate moral basis for conservation.

The mystical basis of conservation avoids this narrowanthropocentrism and provides a motivation for conservationthat does not depend solely upon the raw will for biologicalsurvival. In the case of Schweitzer 's mysticism, I have arguedthat the ethics of reverence for life yields an attitude of universalcompassion for all life. Obviously, this is a conservationiststance. Wanton destruction of the bases for life, even the soil,would be morally prohibited under this view because it wouldbe indirect destruction of life. Schweitzer even intimates atpoints that nonliving matter should be held in reverence aswell. 4 1 Moreover, even though Schweitzer never specificallyaddresses the question of justice to the unborn, his ethicalproposals foreshadow an ethos in which nothing is wasted andself-indulgence is unknown. Th is being the case, the effectiveness of the ethics of reverence for life would ensure the maximalprovision for future generat ions as well. Thus , the mystical basisfor an ethic of conservation provides a motivational force for aconservation ethic; but as I have noted, it has not provided a

basis for the ordering of concrete moral choices. Therefore, inconclusion, I wish to suggest a biblical bas e for a conservationethic that I believe provides both a motivation for conservationand a ground for specific concrete rights.

The biblical foundation for an ethic of conservation must bederived both from creation and covenant because the covenant


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is for the sake of implementing God's justice in creation. Thuswe begin with the creation and establish this as the basis for anunderstanding of covenantal pro vis ions ."

The great Creation myth set in bold rel ief the relationship ofGod to all creatures . There it became clear that t hough God hadgiven humankind dominion over the earth, that dominion wasclearly limited. As Thomas Paine once said, "Man did not makethe earth, and though he had a natural right to occupy it, he hadno right to locate as his proper ty in perpetuity any part of it;neither did the creator of the ear th o pen a land office from whichthe first title deed should issue." 4 3 While it is true that theCreat ion was fully complete and good only when A dam and Evewere placed in the garden to live in abundance from the garden,there were limits to their use of it that clearly specified God'sclaim on it as well. The specific character of the limits does notinterest me here, but the fact that there were limits is a clearindication that the gift was conditional. Moreover, the violationso f these claims of God on the garden resulted in a radicalalterat ion of the human situation. The divine har mony o f God,human beings, and the garden was disrupted, and humanbeings were expelledalienated from the gardenby an act ofGod' s judgment. If the prohibitions on the use of the garden areunderstood as proceeding from the continuing claims of Godupon the garden, then the rights of humanity to use the gardenare limited by God's rights of ownership. These claims areabsolute and are experienced by human beings in the garden aslimits on their behavio r toward the inhabitants of the garden.They could not eat of the fruit of the tree. Operationally, then,God's claims on the garden function as rights of the tree not tohave its fruit eat en. In this way one can understand rights ofnature over against humanity. If one understands the conditions of the garden in this way, it is quite possible to develop theobligation for care of the earth as a cardinal tenet of biblical faith.

To respect the "rights of nature" is nothing less than to honorthe claims of God upon God's own creation. To do less would beto engage in an act of willful defiance of the divine sovereignty.

A second insight that appear s in the myth of the garden is thatcreation is an act of grace; tha t is , the pres entation of a fittingenviro nment for humanity is not an event instituted by contrac t.


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It is a gift. As such, it is to be used, to be sureGod is not onewho gives halfheartedly. In Jesus Christ we know God as theo n e who gives unreservedly and fully to humanity. However ,this gift is to humanity for the world. This means, as is so often

stated in the Bib le , that God's gift is one that is to be used for thebenefit of the whole world. The people of God are the onesthrough whom all nations will be blessed (Gen. 12:3) . They arethe ones on whom the whole creation waits in eager longing.(Rom. 8 :19-23) . The longing of creation for their coming is thusgrounded in natural teleology. Those who know that the worldis a gift and know that the gift is for the whole are the ones whogenuinely unders tand the purpose of creation and who arecommissioned to work with God for its total redemption. Thus itis a requirement of our faith that we work for the achievement ofharmonious relationships with the whole world. To dootherwise, to destroy and exploit wantonly, would be to workagainst God's redemptive purpose. Therefore, in the myths ofcreation it is clear that God values humanity more than the act ofcreation. It is also clear that the garden is for human beings, toprovide th em a living space of abundance and beauty. B ut God'sclaims on the garden mean that the human occupants there areconfronted with an obligation to be responsible to God for thegarden.

If one focuses the interest in God' s redemptive purpos e on theland itself, there are a number o f very important points that canbe suggested. 4 4 In the first place, the seal of the covenantbetween Yahweh and Israel was a gift of the land. Moreover,that gift was also a gift of grace. Israel had no claim whatsoeverto the title of the land, nor did any specific tribe or per son have aright to stake out possession of specific plots. The land wasapportioned by religious ritual, namely, the casting of lots by thepriests. In this way , it was c lear that even the right to use specificplots of land was determined by the divine decree. Human

ownership of the land is therefore derivative.Furthermore, there was a specific prohibition against selling

the land, based on the ownership of the land of Yahweh. "Theland shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine; for youare strangers and sojourners with me" (Lev. 25:23) . God clearlyretains ownership to the land in perpetuity, and the manner in


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N O T E S

1. Erik E c k h o l m , Losing Ground: Environmental Stress and World Prospects (New York:Norton, 1 9 7 6 ) .

2. Norman M y e r s , The Sinking Ark: A New Look at the Problem of Disappearing Species( O x f o r d : P e rg a m o n , 1 9 7 9 ) .

3 . Cf, E c k h o l m , Losing Ground, an d L e s t e r B r o w n ,"The Worldwide Loss of C r o p l a n d "( Wo r l d w a t c h P a p e r, no. 24, 1 9 7 8 ) .

4 . P e t e r J . Ognibene, "Vanishing F a r m l a n d s , Selling Out the Soil," Saturday Review,

M a y, 1 9 8 0 , p. 29.5 . Ibid.; cf. William R. van Dorsal, The American Land (New York: Oxford UniversityP r e s s , 1 9 4 3 ) , p. 181.

6 . van Dorsal, American Land, p. 184; J a m e s Risser art icle in Des Moines Register,September 11, 1978.

7. Jorgen R a n d e r s and Donella Meadows, "The Carry ing Capac i ty of Our GlobalE n v i r o n m e n t , " in Ian G. Barbour, ed, . Western Man and Environmental Ethics (Reading,Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 254.

20

teleological aspect of God's redemptive claim reaches out tofuture generations as well . We respect the rights of futuregenerations because God's covenant with us is also with them,and God's claim upon the world is a claim upon the world for

their redemption as much as it is for our own. We can thus avoidthe narrow anthropocentrism of the natural-law view.

Furthermore, this is not merely a matter of attitude or inwarddisposition. The divine claims form a theological foundation forspecific rights and obligations that will ensure the integrity ofnature and the fulfillment of our covenant to participate withGod in God's redemptive purpose for the world now and in thefuture. Th is in turn enables us to affirm the supreme importanceof human value without losing sight of the fact that the value ofnature is not s imply for us but also for God. On thes e bases, wecan construct an ethic of genuine and careful stewardship of theworld's resources while avoiding the confusing sentimentalityof the mystical view.

It is not possible here to spell out the practical implications of abiblically based conservation ethic. Suffice it to say that it seemsto render absolute private rights to land problematical andwould clearly view misuse of land not only as a moral wrong,but theologically would consider the failure to conserve the landa misuse of God's gift: a sin not only against huma ns and

animals but against God.


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8 . Robert Solow, "The Economics of Resources and the Resources of Econo mic s/' TheAmerican Economic Review, 64 (May, 1974); 1-14. See also his "Inter-Generational Equityand Exhaustible Resources," Review of Economic Studies, Summer Symposium (1974):2 9 - 4 5 .

9 . See my article "Land and People: The Eco-Justice Connection," Christian Century,October 1, 1980.

1 0 . This is Aldo Leopold's contention in his book A Sand County Almanac and OtherEssays (New Yo r k : Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 6 ) , pp. 217 ff.

1 1 . Marsh, Man and Nature, ed. David Lowenthal (1864; reprint ed., Cambridge:H a r v a r d University Press, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 36.

12 . Ibid., pp. 38, 39.13 . Ibid., p. 35.14. Stewart L. Udall, The Quiet Crisis (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1 9 6 3 ) ,

p . 82 .15. H. L. A. H a r t , The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) , pp .

181 ff.1 6 . Ibid., p. 188.17 . Ibid., p. 189.1 8. Ibid., pp. 1 9 0 - 9 2 .1 9. A. P. S. D'Entreves, Aquinas, Selected Political Writings (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,

1 9 4 8 ) , p. 171.2 0 . Herbert Spencer, Social Statics (London: John Chapman , 1 8 5 1 ) ,pp. 110 ff. See also

Spencer's book. Justice (Part IV of Ethics) (London: Williams and Norgate, 1 8 9 1 ) , pp.8 0 ff.

2 1 . Spencer, Social Statics, p. 110. Late r he repudiated this view. See Justice, p. 93.2 2 . John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government, book II, chap . 5. , paragr aph 26;

referred to in A. Whitn ey Griswold, Farming and Democracy (New Haven: Yale UniversityP r e s s , 1952) , p. 40.

2 3 . Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, Groups in Harmony and Tension (New York :H a r p e r , 1953) . This is a classic in the literature, and here the Sherifs demonstrate thatsimple identification of boys in camp with group nicknames led to rapid in-groupidentification and subsequently a high level of conflict.

2 4. Robert L . Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New Yo r k : Norton, 1974) ,p . 115.

2 5. Randers and Meadow s, "The Carrying Capacity of Our Global Enviro nment ,"Barbour, Western Man.

2 6 . John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambrid ge, Mass.: Harvard University P ress,1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 284 ff.

2 7 . Cf. R. M. Hare, "Rules of W ar and Moral Reasoning," Philosophy and Public Affairs1 (Winter 1972): 167 ff., where Hare argues that most rationally based ethics oper ate onsome form of the principle of universalizability.

2 8 . See H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York :H a r p e r and Brothers, 1 9 6 0 ) , pp. 24 ff.

2 9 . White, 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," Science, 55 (1967) :1205 ff.3 0 . See G. Z. Jacks and R. O. White , The Rape of the Earth (London: Faber and Faber,

1 9 3 9 ) , and H. Fairfield Osborn, Our Plundered Planet (Boston: Little Brown, 1948) , esp.c h a p . 6.

3 1 . Henry Clark, The Ethical Mysticism of Albert Schweitzer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) ,

p . 22 .3 2 . Ibid., pp. 22 ff.3 3 . Albert Schweitzer, The Teaching of Reverence for Life, trans. Richard and Clara

Winston (New Yo r k : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 9; as quoted by WilliamBlackstone, "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Matters of Life and Death, ed.Tom Regan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980) .

3 4 . Ibid., p. 16.3 5 . Clark, Ethical Mysticism, pp. 99 ff.

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3 6 . Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought (New York ; Henry Holt and Co.,1 9 3 3 ) , p. 81, quoted in Clark, p. 203.

3 7 . Clark, Ethical Mysticism, p. 104.3 8 . Blackstone, "The Search for an Environmental E t h i c , " in Matters of Life and Death,

ed. Tom Regan (Philadelphia; Temple University Press, 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 305.39 . Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in W. T.

Blackstone, ed.. Philosophy and Environmental Crisis (Athens: University of Georgia Press,1974) ; Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York : Random House, 1975) ; HerbertSpeigelb erg, "Ethi cs for Fellow s in the F a t e of Existence," and Peter Bertocci, ed.,Mid-Century American Philosophy (New York : Humanities Press, 1974) .

40 . Clark, Ethical Mysticism, pp. 134 ff.4 1 . Ibid., pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 .4 2 . I owe this insight to an unpublis hed pape r by Rolf Knierim, "God an d World in

Israel's Experience. " Here Knierim argues that the Creator-Sustainer God who relates tohumanity and the whole universe is neglected in the studies of Old Testament theologyin favor of the particularistic Yahweh of the convenantal l i terature. Arguing that the ideaof a univers al cre ator God is thorou ghly biblical, Kni erim goes on to show that in thePsalms and in select passages from the prophets, the universalistic God is givenherme neut ical priority over the particulari stic cove nan t God. (This theme is furtherdeveloped in Knierim's unpu blish ed pap er, "The Biblical Concep t of Justi ce").

43 . Paine, Agrarian Justice (London: Evans and Bone, 1 7 9 7 ) .4 4 . I originally sugges ted thes e ideas in a ser mon entitled "L and and Peop le,"

pre ache d in a chape l servic e at the School of Theol ogy at Cla remo nt in the fall of 1978.45 . (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977) .46 . If spac e permitt ed, this could be developed further. Evidence could be adduced

for the position from the Psalms. Cf. note 42 above.

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spilt would ascend to heaven against them. James 5: 1, 4 is aptlyquoted by Whitefield to give author ity to his bel ief that God willpunish those who deny economic justice to those who labor forthem. 8

The differing attitudes toward slaves held by Wesley andWhitefield are reflected in their main theological disagreement.Wesley had diverged from Whitefield's Calvinism by affirmingthat universal redemption was God's desire. 9 He was notconvinced that non-Christians, whether they lived in Africa orelsewhere, were eternally damned. In a letter to Wesley writtenfrom Bethesda, Whitefield harshly rebuked Wesley for his bel iefthat God might accept the unconverted in their natural state. 1 0

In 1772 Wesley read a book that renewed his admiration for

the black African and his hatred of slavery. Antho ny Benezet, aHuguenot refugee who had joined the Society of Friends,published in Philadelphia A Caution and Warning to Great Britainan d her Colonies in 1766 and Some Historical Account of Guinea in1771. Th ese books were based on accounts by men from Franceand England who had made voyages to West Africa and to theWest Indies on slave ships. Regarding one of these booksWesley commented: "I read a very different book, published byan honest Quaker, on that execrable sum of all villanies,commonly called the slave trade. I read o f nothing like it in the

heathen world, whether ancient or modern; and it infinitelyexceeds, in every instance of barbarity, wha tever Christianslaves suffer in Mahometan countries." 1 1 Wesley then studiedBenezet's other book about slavery and decided to publicize inEngland a digest of the contents of these two books along withhis own viewpoint on slavery. Evidently Wes ley realized thatScripture was effectively being quoted by defenders of slavery,for he avoided Benezet' s questionable attempt to prove that theBible has an antislavery stance. Rather, Wesley appealed totransethnic natural rights that he, like a number of eighteenth-century philosophers, presumed would be commonly acceptedby his readers. Unlike slaveholder Thomas Jefferson, whowould soon draft the Declaration of Independence, Wesleybelieved that the inalienable right of liberty was bestowed by theCreator on blacks as well as whites.

Wesley published his essay entitled Thoughts Upon Slavery in


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Go on, in the name of God and the power of His might, till evenAmerican slavery (the vilest that ever saw the sun) shall vanish awaybefore it. Reading this morning a tract written by a poor African, I wasparticularly struck by that circumstance, that a man who has a blackskin, being wronged or outraged by a white man, can have no redress;it being a law in our Colonies that the oath of a black against a white,goes for nothing. What villainy is this! 17

Wilberforce picked up the prophetic mantle and carriedWesley's abolitionist crusade to a triumph in nineteenth-centuryEngland. That evangelical member of Parliament lackedWesley's ability for original thought, but he operated skillfully inthe political arena. Owing in large part to his leadership, the bill

abolishing slave trade was passed in 1807, and the emancipationbill was passed in 1833, the year of Wilberforce's death.

The first two American Methodist bishops, Francis Asburyand Thomas Coke, were outspoken opponents of slavery in theUnited States, although the expression of such views wasespecially difficult because most Methodists lived in slavehold-ing areas. 1 8 A pronouncement of American Methodism in theyear the church was established expressed unequivocallyWesley's position on slavery: "We view it as contrary to theGolden L aw of God . . . and the unalienable Rights of

Mankind." 1 9 Novelist Alex Haley accurately reconstructed theearly social history of his own denominat ion when he put thesewords into the mouth of an eighteenth-century slave: "Methodists called a great big meet in' in Baltimore an' finally dey 'greedslavin' was 'gainst Gawd's laws an' dat anybody callin' hisselfChristian wouldn't have it did to deyselves, so it's mostly deMethodists an' Quakers makin' church fuss to git laws to freeniggers." 2 0

More than a century ago a biographer of Wesley wrote: "The

day has yet to come when the influence of his advanced views[on blacks] will be duly and gratefully recognised." 2 1 It isappalling to realize that the day has still not arrived whenWesley's contribution to racial equality is broadly recognized,although a few scholars are aware of his stand. David Davis, inhis excellent study of slavery in Western culture, has accordedWesley the significance he deserves, 2 2 and Wesley's Thoughts


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Upon Slavery has evoked this tribute from Wesley Bready;"Perhaps the most far-reaching treatise ever written againstslavery." 2 3 Likewise, Wellman Warner has sta ted that that essay

"was one of the most effective pieces of anti-slavery literatureproduced, and it was given the widest circulation for manyyears." 2 4 But few white Britishers or Americans living now haveas much accurate knowledge of African roots as Wes ley had twocenturies ago. Moreover, those publications in which the resultsof scholarship are widely disseminated, such as the Encyclopaedia Britannica, usually fail to mention Wesley's role as anabolitionist.

O f special importance is the recognition of Wesley's contribution to social change in a world pervaded with the theory ofMarxist economic determinism. At a time when the development of slavery was greatly to England's economic advantage,Wesley and his followers were motivated by religious ideologyto change the system, and their efforts were to have significantsocial effects. Religion was for Wesley, not an opiate making himinsensitive to inhumane acts of his English compatr iots , but adynamite for shattering institutions that violate the principlethat "liberty is the right of every human creature."

N O T E S

1. Cf. Ruth Sca rbo rough , Th e Opposition to Slavery in Georgia Prior to 1860 (Nashville,1 9 3 3 ) , p. 70.

2 . Oglethorpe to t r u s t ee s , 1 / 1 7 / 1 7 3 9 ;the Phillips Collec tion of E g m o n t M a n u s c r i p t s ,University of Georgia Library 14203: 380;cf. Elijah Hoole, Oglethorpe and the Wesleys inAmerica ( L o n d o n , 1 8 6 3 ) , pp. 6, 20.

3 . NehemiahCurnock,ed., The Journal of John Wesley ( L o n d o n : R . Culley, 1909) , 1 , 2 5 5 ,3 5 2 - 5 3 .

4. George Whitefield, Works ( L o n d o n , 1 7 7 2 ) , II, 105.5 . Ibid., p, 208.6. Ibid., p. 404.

7. Ibid., Ill, 496.8. Cf. L. Ty e r m a n , The Life of the Rev. George Whitefield (New York: Anson D. F.

Randolph Co. , 1877) , I, 3 5 3 - 5 4 .9. Journal, III, 8 5 - 8 6 .10 . Ty e r m a n , The Life of George Whitefield, I, 464, 475; George Whitefield's Journals

(London : Banne r of Tr u t h Tr u s t , 1 9 6 0 ) , pp. 575, 579.11 . Journal, V, 4 4 5 - 4 6 .12. This and the following quotations from Thoughts Upon Slavery refer to John

Wesley, Works ( L o n d o n , 1 8 7 2 ) , XI , 5 9 - 7 9 .

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1 3 . John Telford, ed. , The Letters ofthe Rev. John Wesley ( L o n d o n ; Epworth Press, 1931) ,V I, 126.

14. Anthony Benezet, Serious Considerations on Several Important Subjects (Philadelphia,1778) , p. 32.

15. Wesley, Works, XI, 145 .16 . Utters, VIII , 23 .17. Ibid., p. 265.18. Cf. James Brawley, Two Centuries of Methodist Concern (New Yo r k : Vantage Press

1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 28-29 .19. Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1785, p. 14.20. Alex Haley, Roots (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 353.2 1 . L. Tyerman, The Life and Times of Rev. John Wesley (New York: Harper and B r o s . ,

1 8 7 2 ) , III, 183.2 2 . David Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture ( I thaca , 1 9 6 6 ) , pp . 3 8 2 - 8 9 .2 3 . J . Wesley Bready, England: Beforeand After Wesley (London: Hodder & Stoughton,

1 9 3 8 ) , p. 336.24 . Wellman Wa r n e r , The Wesleyan Movement in the Industrial Revolution (London:

L o n g m a n s , Green, 1 9 3 0 ) , p. 241.

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H O M I L E T I C A L R E S O U R C E S :E X E G E S I S OF OLD TESTAMENT

L E C T I O N A RY T E X T SFOR THE SEASONA F T E R P E N T E C O S T

LLOYD R. BAILEY

Aids to guide the interpre ter wh o would transport themeaning of the biblical text from the ancient Near East to themodern Near Wes t are neither numerous nor comprehensive inscope. O n the one hand, commentarie s by biblical scholars often

focus upon one extreme of the journey to the neglect of theother. The author's expertise may be primarily in the area oftextual, literary, and historical problems, and thus a minimumof attention may be given to the more comprehensive questionof what it "meant" to those who first heard the text proclaimed.T h e further question of what it "means" is usually left to thosewith competence in theology or homiletics. O n the oth er hand,homileticians very often write brief "sermon starters" indenominational publications 1 or publish collections of theirsermons without including reflection upon how they have

trodden the treacherous path from "then" to "now."2

Indeed,preachers often resist producing a list of suggestions to guidethis crucial transition, saying that one must instead be intuitive,imaginative, and wil ling to be guided by the freedom of the HolySpirit. 3 And when the "hermeneutic problem" is discussed byscholars, it is often done in such compact philosophicallanguage that the average interpreter of Scripture finds itdifficult to understand. 4

M y goal in pres enting the fo llowing studies is at least twofold:

(1) to clarify the texts for thos e who would use them for dialoguewith the "believing communities" (church and synagogue) inthe present, and (2) to illustrate an approach whereby such textsmay be studied and to encourage the readers to be morereflective about the ways they interpret Scripture.

Lloyd R. Bailey is associate professor of Old Testament, Duke Divinity School.

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3 3

Prior to making my own suggestions about how a particulartext may address the community in the present, I have reflectedupon the suggestions that others have made concerning them,especially when the approach taken was problematic in view ofmy assumptions (previously outlined) about how the Bib le maybe used in the present. These "negative" examples I have takenmostly from The Interpreter 's Bible (Nashville: Abingdon Press,1952; 12 volumes) and from Proclamation: Aids for Interpreting theLessons of the Church Year (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 ; 26volumes). These sources were chosen, not because they aremore problematic than other homiletical resources (quite thecontrary!), but because they are well known and widely used.

Very often I speak o f how the text may address the synagogue

as well as the church. I do this, not because I presume it my taskas an ordained United Methodist clergyman to address thesynagogue (although I did spend five years of graduate study atthe feet of rabbis at Hebrew U nion College-Jewish Institute ofReligion), but because the church shares the Hebrew Bib le withthat branch of the "bel ieving community" and because there areprobl ems of interpretation that are common to both . 5 Th ere is nointrinsic reason why Christian clergy and rabbis should disagreeabout what a given text originally meant, or even about what itmay mean in the present. 6 Each may, of course, trace a given

theme beyond the Hebrew Bible to its possible reinterpretation,modification, supplementat ion, or rejection in the New Testament and rabbinic literature, respectively.

N O T E S

1. Some regional editions of the United Methodist C h u r c h ' s newspapers car ry ahalf-column "Sixty-Second Sermon," for example.

2. A helpful exception is J a m e s A. Sande r s , God Has a Story Too (Philadelphia: F o r t r e s s ,1 9 7 9 ) .The introduction, entitled "Con tex tua l Hermeneutics in Biblical P r e a c h i n g , " is anexpansion of the art icle "Hermeneutics," in The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible,

Supplementary Volume (Nashville: Abingdon, 1 9 7 6 ) , hereaf te r IDBS.3 . F or such a statement, critical of the belief tha t the meaning of the t ex t can be bestr e cove red through "scientific exege sis," see J e a n - P a u l Gabus, "Du t ex te au sermon: unbilan provisoire," in Etudes theologiques el religieuses, 48 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 7 - 3 3 . See also ClaudePeifer, O . S . B . , "The E x p e r i e n c e of Sin, Salvation, and the Spirit as Prerequisite for theUnderstanding of the S c r i p t u r e s , " in Daniel Durken, ed., Sin, Salvation, and the Spirit(Collegeville: Li turg ica l Press , 1 9 7 9 ) , pp. 3-20.

4. A comprehensive review of the discussion may be found in Anth ony C. Thiselton,The Two Horizons (Grand Rapids: E e r d m a n s , 1 9 8 0 ) .


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QUARTERLY REVIEW, SUMMER 19815. One might assume, from books tha t have been published, that the p r i m a r y

problem in interpreting the Bible within th e c h u r c h is: W h a t are we to do with the OldTe s t a m e n t ? See, e.g., B e r n h a r d W. Anderson, ed., The Old Testament and Christian Faith(New York: H e r d e r an d H e r d e r , 1 9 6 9 ) ; L a w r e n c e Toombs, "The Problemat ic ofP r e a c h i n g from the Old Testament," Interpretation, 23 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 3 0 2 - 1 4 . A m o r e basic

problem, it see ms to me , is: W h a t are we to do with the Bible, or any par t thereof? J a m e sBarr is surely r ight when he r e m a r k s , " T h e r e is no quite special problem of the OldTestament" (Old and New in Interpretation [New York: H a r p e r and Row, 1 9 6 6 ] ) .

6 . Barr (ibid., p. 154) points out, cor rec t ly in my opinion, tha t there is no intrinsicreason tha t a sermon from an Old Testament t ex t p reached in the synagogue shoulddiffer from on e p reached in the c h u r c h . This is not to s ta te tha t they can, or should,always be identical.

SUNDAY, JULY 5

Lections1

Zechariah 9:9-13 Romans 7 :15-8 :13 Matthew 11:25-30Exegesis and Exposition of Zechariah 9:9-13

That Zechariah is among the most difficult books to interprethas been commented upon at least since the time of Saint Jerome(fourth century A . D. ) . A number of factors have combined tocreate the difficulty. (1) Three once- independent collections ofprophetic material have been joined together within its bounds:chapters 1-8 (note the prose in R S V ) , 9-11 (poetry), and 12-14

(prose). (2) The material contains archaizing features that makeit difficult to date. For example, it refers to exiles in Egypt andAssyria (10:10) , which sounds like Israel's situation in the eighthcentury B . C .In actuality, however, it may refer to the Seleucid(Syrian) and Ptolemaic (Egyptian) states in the fourth century.(3) Its historical references are so vague that more than oneactual situation could be referred to, as the previous illustrationmakes clear. (4) The text has occasionally become corrupt intransmission or is grammatically obscure. As an illustration ofthe former, note that, whereas the Hebrew Bib le has "I"(namely, God) as the subject in 9:10 , the Septuagint (the earliestGreek version) has "he" (namely, the coming king). As anillustration of the latter problem, there is the word 'am in 9:9.Does it mean "humble" (RSV) , or is it a synonym for"triumphant" in the previous line? The nature of the comingking hangs in the balance!

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Such difficulties are especia lly evident in chapters 9 - 1 4 , whichcontain our passage. It will be precarious, therefore, to bedogmatic about interpretation and to tie the passage too closely

to any one historical context.

I. Background Information: What the Text Said to Its OriginalSituation

A. The literary context for interpretation1. Chapters 1-8 ("First Zechariah"). When the exiles returned

from Babylon (following Cyrus' edict in 539 B . C . ) , they found thatreality did not accord with the high expectations that had beenso lyrically expressed in Isaiah 4 0 - 5 5 . Th e disappointment is

evident in Isaiah 5 5 - 6 6 , in Haggai, and in these initial chapters ofZechariah . Despite the difficulties, however, the prophet doesnot lose hope: he looks forward to the completion of the templeand to the inward renewal of the people, and he holds up avision of a time of security and prosper ity. Th is message beginsaround 519 B . C . (1:1) .

2. Chapters 9-14 ("Second Zechariah"). Alth ough modernscholars have dated this material anywhere from 722 to 160 B . C . ,the consensus is that it is later than chapters 1-8 and that chapter9 reflects the situation in the late fourth century B . C . , whenAlexander the Great has conquered the entire Near East. Notethe reference to Greece as the political power in the area (9:13) .

3 . Which verses belong together as thought-units? Thelectionaries are divided on the boundaries of our unit. Is it 9:9-13(COCU; Seasons of the Gospel), or is it 9:9-10 (Episcopal, RomanCatholic, and Lutheran lectionaries)? Th e former unit seemsindicated by the textual arrangement in R SV and N E B , the latterby N A B . The issue at stake here is more than an academic one.The longer reading sets the anticipation of the coming king inthe context of God's actions with respect to Judah and itsneighbors. God is thus the major actor; the deity's faithfulactivity in behalf of the people is the theme. But the shorterreading strips the king of a theological and historical context andfocuses instead upon his nature. The coming one thus becomesthe hero of the story. (This may account for the change ofpronoun from " I " (God) to "h e" (the king) in the Greek version


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as mentioned above.) The text is thus dehistoricized, and itbecomes much easier for the modern Christian reader to ignoreZechariah's word to his own time and to move directly to an

understanding of Jesus in the light of this text.Verses 1-8 are directed against cities in Syro-Palestine and

refer to God in the third person ("he ": w . 1-4; note the space inRSV thereafter) and in the first person ( " I " : w . 5-8) . We seem toreach a conclusion at v. 8, where the L ord dwells in the midst ofthe people.

Verses 9-10 are addressed directly to Zion-Jer usalem, usingthe second person ("you"), and the deity speaks in the firstperson ( " I " ) . We seem to reach a conclusion in v. 10, wherepeace and dominion extend from sea to sea.

Verses 11 ff. depict the deity ("I ") as address ing someone(feminine singular: Hebrew "y ou"). Presumably it is thepeople of Judah personified as a maiden. Note that Judah as awhole is addressed (v. 13) , and not the Zion-Jerusalem nucleusof verses 9-10. This thought-unit extends through v. 15 and has amilitaristic tone, whereas verses 16-17, a fitting conclus ion to theseries of portra its, speaks of a time of security and prosper ity.Hence J B places w . 11-17 together, but RSV has 11-15 separatedfrom 16-17 .

Most interpreters, therefore, propose three (if not four)thought-units in chapter 9. How they are related to each otherwe will discuss below.

B . What situation was addressed by the text? The reader mustbear in mind that this is a difficult, much-discussed problem,and that tentativeness on the part of the interpreter is in order.

Verses 1-8 seem to anticipate Alexander's conquest of thesurrounding city-states and to identify it with the judgment ofGod. Th e date would thus be approximately 333 B . C .The prophetassumes that this event will usher in an age of independenceand security for the Judean people.

Verses 11-15 (11-17?) express dissatisfaction with Greekdomination and suggest that God will defeat the Greeks throughthe intermediacy of the Judeo-Ephraimite army. Therefore,some time seems to have elapsed between this oracle and that ofverses 1-8. The tension between the two factions was most


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intense during the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes ( 1 7 3 - 1 6 4B.C.) and gave rise to the book of Daniel

Verses 9-10 contain no specific reference to h istoric events.But those who preserved Zechariah's oracles have placed ithere, amidst materials referring to Judah's fate and hopes at thetime of Greek political domination ( 3 3 3 - 1 6 5 B.C.). The originalsituation to which it applied is beyond our ability to recover.That it has been editorially placed here reflects a bel ie f that it canapply to a later or to a more general situation.

That we cannot determine the specific historical context forverses 9-10 need not lead us to abandon a search for its"meaning/' however. To that we will turn in "Assumptions ofthe Interpreter."

C. Comment on details in the textVerse 9c: "humble." At first glance, this might seem to be an

appropriate designation for someone who rides a lowly (?) ass ,in contrast to a horse. Yet such a description does not accordentirely with the context. Th e king is also said to be "triumphantand victorious" (RSV) , and these are military terms in keepingwith ridding the nation of weapons of war and with"co mmanding" and exercising "dominatio n." Further more, theass is not such a lowly, unpretentious animal, as we shall see.Hence a few scholars have translated the term (ant) as

"triumphant," a fitting parallel to the previous line.2

Usually it istranslated "poor."

Verse 9c: "a ss ." Throughout the Near East the ass wasregarded as a royal animal (Judg. 5:10; 10:4; I Kings 1:38; Gen.49 :10 -11 ) , especially in contrast to barbarians (nomads) whorode horses. 3 Hence the action would be an overt claim topower, not a sign of humility. It signifies office, not demeanor.

Verse 10a: " I . " God is the speaker and actor . Emphasis is uponthe divine saving activity, not upon the activity of the comingking, and least of all upon his attitude.

Verse 10b: "peac e to the nations. " Th is hope, echoed in otherprophetic oracles (Isa. 9:7; 11:6-9; Mic. 4:1-4) , is essentially areturn to the ideal of creation. The end duplicates the beginning.

Verse 10c: "sea to sea ." From the Mediterranean to the Gulf ofAqabah?

Verse 10c: "R ive r. " Possibly the Euphrates , as in Isa. 7:20?


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Apparently the boundaries of the Davidic-Solomonic state arebeing referred to, rather than worldwide domination in themodern sense of the term.

D , What word is announced to the situation? Presumably, thequestion in the mind of the initial audience* was: "What hopehave we for the future? God, we have always assumed, wouldkeep his promises to us: promises at the time of Abraham (Gen.12) , at the time of Moses (Exod. 1 9 - 2 0 ) , and at the time of David(II Sam. 7) . Moreover, we have recently been reassured, throughthe word of a prophet, that those promises still hold (Zech.9:1-8) . Yet ther e has been abundant evidence to undermine ourfaith: the Exi le (587-539) , then domination by the Persians( 5 3 9 - 3 3 3 ) , and now the Greeks, with attendant internal strife.How long can we be expected to believe, and thus give anycoherence to the community?"

In the face of these apparent repeated negations of theco mmunity's independe nce and self- understa nding, theprophet continues to proclaim the validity of the ancientexpectations. There will yet be a time of peace and security, notmerely for Israel and Judah, but for their neighbors as well. Andthe earthly instrument for that heavenly plan will be a membero f the royal house: triumphant, banishing weapons, commanding peace. It is a different future from the one that commonsense and present data might dictate, 5 but it is not a subjectiveinnovation. It arises out of the ancient stories that the peoplehave confessed as their own and that have given them life in thepast.

II. Bridging the Gap between Then and Now: Assumptions of theInterpreter

The nature of the transition from what the text originally"said" to what it may "s ay " to readers in the present depends, in

large measure, upon the assumptions of the interpreter. Everymovement of the text from "t he n" to "no w" must pass throughthe human mind, which will decide not only what was "said"but whether and how it applies to the hear er. And that mind,with its accumulation of prior knowledge, needs (emotional,social, economic, political), and ass umptions about how the


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world (biblical and modern) operates, serves as a set of "gla ss es"through which the text is filtered. Th at we inevitably have such"glasses" is both a blessing and a curse. They enable us to seethe text (share in its wor ld), but they also distort what we see (we

read our values and needs into it).We may guard against the negative side of this reality in at

least the following ways: (1) By being aware of its existence. Wecannot hear the text as the original audience did, given the vastlinguistic and cultural gap that separates us from the time of theBib le . At most, we can recover only a fraction of what acontemporary would have heard. Thus the text cannot merelybe read and its intended meaning automat ically bec ome clear.Thus our mind must, and will, supply "meaning," and we needto be aware of our fallibility as it does so, (2) By trying to outlineour assumptions as we interpret Scripture. They are there by thedozens every time we read the text, but most of them are sounconscious that we cannot recall them at first effort. Indeed,most persons (including preachers) when they are asked to doso seem not to unders tand the question! (3) By trying to beconsistent in the way that we interpret texts. A rule ofinterpretation used in one text cannot be violated when we turnto another, unless the differing natures of the texts themselvesdemand it, (4) By discussing interpretation in community, sothat the aberrant subjectivity of the individual is called into

question by the accumulated wisdom of the group.As illustrations of the as sumptions that I bring to the text

("glasses" through which I read it) , and in obedience to my callfor outlining one' s assumptions, I list here, however briefly andshortsightedly, the following:

A. The text is not merely an archaic report of what individuals or agroup (Israel) did, at least for those who would accept it as"scripture." If it were, it could have little, if any, relevance forus, and in any case it would most likely not have been preservedand handed down in the way that it was . It was s een as having asignificance that transcended its original situation. 6 Thus notonly would Zech. 9:9-10 have been intended for a specificcircumstance that is now beyond our recovery, but it hasapparently been reapplied as a general word of encouragementduring the age of Greek domination. 7 Because of its very


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vagueness , it could hold up a vision of a better age that had thecontinuing potential of arriving. And thus I have a warrant, inthe text i tself and in the very purpose for which the widercollection of Scr ipture was preserved, for seeing significance for

our own time in this text.B . The Bible is the property of the ' 'believing communities," i.e., of

the synagogue and church as the heirs of the ancient Israel towho m it was originally addressed. As such, it must beinterpreted by those communities, and not by individualswithin or by outsiders. It was not intended to answer thequestions of outsiders (such as, How can I know that there is aGod? since the communities already assume the deity'sexistence), nor was it intended to describe human existence (butrather, life under the covenant), nor was it intended as an

imperialistic code to be imposed upon those who do not accept itfreely. I thus cannot automatically use it to condemn anyonewho violates its directives, since those directives are for thosewho wish to res pond to the divine initiatives ("I brought you upout of the land of Egypt; [therefore] you owe allegiance to meo n l y ; . . . do not do thus-and-so"). Israel is usually condemnedfor forgetting its identity, for going back on its loyalty oaths,rather than for action or failure to act, within itself.

Since the material was addressed to the community and wasmost often concerned with communal destiny, it should not

automat ically be transformed into spiritual guidance forindividuals.

C. A biblical thought-unit (or literary unit: pericope) has,usually, one major thought , a central idea, although it may havecorollaries, support data, images, and so on. I should seek torecover that central point and inquire of its relevance, ratherthan focusing upon issues that are at the periphery. Muchmodern preaching, in my opinion, goes astray precisely at thispoint. S ome word or phrase in the text that "I can do somethingwith" is seized upon and developed, very likely to the neglect of

the entire unit. For example, a preacher in a university chapelwas discussing Isaiah 7, which has to do with the prophet 'sgrounds for hope amidst a political crisis. The preacher focusedupon a part of verse 14: "shall call his name. . . . " W e were told,as the point of the sermon, that God calls all of our names! "We


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are all called!" In response I can only say: So I also presume, butit has nothing to do with Isaiah's point, so why bother dragginghim into it? Again, endless were the sermons I heard as a childabout Queen Jezebel's preparation for death by "painting hereyes and adorning her hea d" (II Kings 9:30) . Thus, said thepreachers, God condemns "painted Jezzy-belles" in thepresent. Unfortunately for such preaching, although the queenwas co ndemned for a number of things, such grooming was notone of them. A n incidental event in the text has provided thepreacher with a hobbyhorse upon which to saddle his or herprejudices.

D. I may dist inguish the meaning of a thought-unit from that of its

larger literary context. What a prophet "really meant" may differfrom wha t the disciples unders tood him to be saying and fromthe meaning that emerges when the oracle is placed in sequencewith others. For example, what is the situation to which Isaiah9:2-7 is addressed, and who is the prince who will be called"Wonderful Couns elor " (v. 6)? Whil e those questions may bedebated, we note that Isaiah's disciples (and editors) haveplaced verse 1 (Hebrew text 8:23) as a prose introduction, thussetting this poetic oracle in the context of the loss of Zebulon andNaphtali to the Assyrians in 733 B . C .That limits the candidates

fo r "Wonderful Counselor" considerably, and also defines thenature of his task to include ending the Assyrian domination.Even if I cannot know the original setting of this text, I must beattentive to the opinion of its earliest interpreters, who placed itin its present context.

E. The message of an Old Testament text has an integrity of its own,apart from whatever differing interpreta tion the New Tes tamentor the church (or the synagogue, for that matter ) may have givento it. That is, the material had been found to be life giving, to beidentity forming and identity sustaining, 8 long before the time of

Christianity. It became "scripture" on its own terms and by itsown power, apart from any sanction of the New Testament. Tocall the Old Testament "scripture," therefore, is axiomatically tobe open to its message for the communities in the present. Thetheological stance of the original author (or storyteller) has anintegrity of its own, and the Word was preserved; thetheological stance of the editorial arranger (tradition-gatherer)


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about being psychologically "in the pits" 1 4 ; hearing how Davidovercame the giant Goliath helps us not to be discouraged whenwe are confronted with the overwhelming power of sin.

H. The interpreter should be cautious about anthropologizingt5

thetext, thereby transforming it from a story about what God hasdone and can do into an assertion of what humans can do forthemselves. Such an approach often leads to workshop-preaching in which the congregation is advised about "how todo so and so." It encourages us to "think positively" and to useour innate abilities. (Such advice has considerable appeal toAmericans with their "rugged individualism" mentality.) Thetraditional three steps in a Protestant sermon become threesuccessive steps to take on the road to spiritual success. Thus

we, following Elijah at the cave, may be exhorted to "Getup. . . . Look up. . . . Link up." 1 6 A good question to ask,before indulging in such an approach, is: Am I using this text inthe same way that it was used within the biblical period itself, sothat its life-giving power will be released now as it was then?

I. The interpreter should not begin by using the text as a source formoral examples, unless the original "point" was to hold up thebiblical characters as "positive" or "negative" models to follow.One should learn to look beyond the morality of the persons inthe text to the overall reason the story was preserved. Thus it isnot so much that Abraham is hero (Gen. 15:6) or villain (Gen.12:10-16, where he gives his wife to the Pharaoh), as that Godpreserves him regardless of how well he responds to thepromise.

The moralizing17 sermon usually is based upon the text that isselected in accordance with the preconceived values of theselecter. Whatever those values may be, an appropr iate modelcan be found in the biblical text, and one not necessarily laudedor condemned in the Scriptures themselves. In such a case, the

"po int" of the sermon originates in the mind of the interpreterand not in the text itself. Its authority is the preacher's moralvalues, rather than the Bib le .

J . Growth comes th rough challenge more than through confirmationof the status quo. Thus the Scriptures were preserved not onlybecause they gave the community an identity, but because theycorrected and judged. To acknowledge the text to be Scripture is


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thus to submit to it, to listen carefully, to allow it to challengeand correct me, rather than for me automatically to seek toescape it by passing judgment on it. Thus I should be wary of anapproach that begins by characterizing a text as "legalistic,""nationalistic," "chauvinistic," pre-Christian, or "old" Testament. Those materials, therefore, that I think I least need tohear , that I might cho ose last as a source for preaching, for whichI resent the lectionary because they have been included, may bethe very passages I most need to hear.

III. The Present: Possibilities for Addressing the "BelievingCommunities" (Churchand Synagogue)A , Possible false directions

1. "A meditation on the humiliation of the incarnation would

be in order," suggests Reginald H. Fuller,1 8

seeking to drawtogether the "humble" king of Zech . 9:9 and the "gentle andlowly" Jesus of Matt. 11:29. But such an approach should beundertaken in my opinion only after the following limitationsand cautions have been considered.

a) The New Testament lesson (Matt. 11:25-30) has not onlybecome the focus of the sermon, but it has been allowed tobecome the lens through which the Old Testament lesson will beinterpreted. Zechariah's message to his own time, and thereasons for which it was subsequently preserved, have been

ignored. (See Assumption E.)b) The demeanor of the coming king is not the point of the text

in Zechariah, which has to do with the fact that the chosenpeople can rejoice in view of what God intends to do. God is thefocus, not the king. Those modern interpreters who will acceptAssumption C above will seek the main thrust of a text ratherthan emphasize subordinate information. (Part of the problemhas been caused by the shortness of the passage in theEpiscopalian lectionary, which Fuller very likely used.)

c) It is not entirely clear that the king in our text is evendescribed as "humble." Indeed, the portrait may be the exactopposite!

2 . As exemplified by the coming king, post-exilic Judahlearned that in "the suffering of the poor and wretched is God'spurpose in history most clearly manifest. . . . The poor areblessed insofar as they are more human and humane than the


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rich. . . . Of course, the rich and secure . . . are not judged andfound wanting because of their r iches . . . (but) becau

Documents

Summer 1981 Quarterly Review - Theological Resources for Ministry