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Survival Strategies of the Mugabe Regime in the Post-Cold War World Two distinct moments can be perceived in Zimbabwe’s international politics.

The first is marked by the attempt of a small state to insert itself in the international environment and successfully overcome the difficulties that put its safety at risk, managing to emerge as a prestigious actor. After that, the once celebrated President Robert Mugabe became a pariah for much of the international community, and Zimbabwe was considered a lost cause.1

The case has a complex history, and the hostility of the international community cannot simply be attributed to the fact that there are problems in Zimbabwe’s governance, as they have existed since 1980, the decade in which the state was considered the jewel of Africa. Not due to changes in the domestic situation in Zimbabwe, the criticism was motivated by a change in perception of the Mugabe regime by the West, a change in his image and that of his country.2

However, even under Western pressure since the mid-1990s, and sanctions from the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US) since 2002, President Robert Mugabe remained in power, guaranteeing the continuity of his regime and the sovereignty of Zimbabwe. The support granted to him by the community of political leaders from Africa and the South in general was crucial to this.

This article investigates these two phenomena. First, analyzing the changes in international relations of Zimbabwe alongside major changes in global conditions and in the Southern African region, the shift in Mugabe’s image to the North will be explained, showing how global and regional changes influenced on the western opinion of the Mugabe regime. Secondly, it will be shown how the type of relations established between Mugabe and the North and between Mugabe and the South were successfully manipulated by the political leader in his favor, ensuring the continuity of his government in the Post-Cold War World.

Zimbabwe in the 1980s: an example of post-colonial state and racial democracy in Southern Africa

When Zimbabwe became independent, its foreign policy was strongly

influenced by the history of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) as a liberation movement. The party was brought to the government by Mugabe’s victory in the Zimbabwe’s first election, and the government established in 1980 privileged values such as nationalism, non-alignment, anti-colonialism, anti-racism, socialism and, like other African states, sovereignty and equality among nations, emphasizing the principles of self-determination and independence.3

In the international bipolar context of Cold War, the stability and security of Zimbabwe and the Mugabe regime were favored by a number of reasons. First, one can emphasize the strength of the principle of formal sovereignty, which together with the

1 The Washington Post “Outposts of Tyranny: Zimbabwe” 12/04/2005 and The Times “From Africa’s bread basket to economic basket case, life in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe”15/05/2007. 2 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. “A dupla metamorfose do Robert Mugabe ou: as dimensões domésticas e internacionais das eleições em Zimbábue.” Meridiano 47, 2002, p. 18. 3 NKIWANE, S. M. “Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy”, in: Wright, St. (org.): African Foreign Policies, Boulder (Col.), Westview Press 1999. ENGEL, Ulf. The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe, Hamburg, Institut für Afrikakunde 1994. DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. “De babuínos, homossexuais e um Presidente – ou: o fracasso da política exterior do Zimbábue depois do fim da Guerra Fria”. In MARTINS, Estevão Chaves de Rezende (org.). Relações Internacionais: visões do Brasil e da América Latina. Brasília: FUNAG; IBRI, 2003, p. 6.

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self-determination of peoples had gained prominence in the 1960s making possible waves of independences in Africa and Asia.4 The defense of the juridical sovereignty of the new states coupled with the immobility inherent to the power balance of the bipolar world order and the separation between the domestic and international that it encouraged benefited the nascent African states.5 Interested in maintaining their areas of influence, the superpowers did not interfere in most of the post-colonial states in Africa, which were not strategically important to them, maintaining alliances without ideological commitment. The West had relationships with undemocratic governments, while the East established allies regardless of their socioeconomic regime. Thus was preserved the general stability of the international system and strengthened the legal sovereignty of the African states, which had great freedom of action in their foreign and domestic policies.6

In this context, in the first decade of independence the Zimbabwean foreign relations were developed in an optimistic and welcoming environment. Immediately after independence, Mugabe's government cooperated with more affluent countries to obtain needed external aid to rebuild the national infrastructure that was destroyed in the liberation war, recover the economy and manage land redistribution projects. The state adopted a non-alignment stance which translated into positive neutrality so, opposed to the concept of spheres of influence, it didn’t take part in the East-West conflict that dominated the international landscape during the Cold War years.7 Advocating peaceful coexistence among nations and different socio-economic systems and non-interference, the positive neutrality opened up a wide range of possibilities for Zimbabwe’s objectives to be developed, and the socialist rhetoric adopted by the government did not prevent it to cooperate or maintain relations with capitalist states.

Satisfied with Mugabe’s pragmatism, its close relations with the West, the respect for property rights defended in the Lancaster House agreement and the maintenance of much of the structure of the Rhodesian state, the West tightened its ties with the regime. At the same time, Zimbabwe remained an ally of China, with which ZANU had ties since the armed struggle for independence.8

Although being a small state it had little relevance in international disputes for power, Zimbabwe had a wide international projection, being the reference of a consolidated state in a volatile region, marred by weak states and endangered by destabilization attempts made by South Africa, then under the apartheid regime. This projection proved to be an important resource for state security to Zimbabwe.

Soon after Zimbabwe’s independence, several foreign delegations settled in the capital, demonstrating the importance attributed to the young state. The significance given to it by the international community, especially the Third World, is visible in its effective insertion in international multilateral forums.9 After it became independent, Zimbabwe automatically became a member of the Commonwealth, was accepted into the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and United Nations (UN) and joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Mugabe, elected the country’s first Prime Minister, was invited and attended a meeting of the Frontline States (FLS) before his inauguration.

4 CLAPHAM, C. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. JACKSON, Robert H. e ROSBERG, Carl G. “Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis” J. of Modern African Studies, Vol 24, No 1, 1986, pp 1-31 e 78. 5 CLAPHAM, C. Op. cit, 1996. p. 136. 6 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Op. cit. 2003. p. 14. 7 ENGEL, Ulf. Op. cit. 1994. pp. 63-69. NKIWANE, S. M. 1999. Op. cit. 1999. 8 ENGEL, Ulf. Op. cit. 1994. pp. 49-50. 9 Ibidem. pp. 70-86, 94-95.

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Zimbabwe was also a member of the United Nations’ Security Council in 1983 and Secretary General of the NAM from 1986 to 1989, hosting the General Assembly of the movement in Harare, served as vice-chair to the UN’s General Assembly in 1980 and 1989 and to the OAU in 1989 and 1993, and was Chair of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 1991 and of the FLS in 1992.

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was strongly marked by the state’s relationship with the apartheid regime, an association characterized by mistrust, threats and even acts of aggression by South Africa, so one of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy key objectives was to keep away from this neighbor. In the 1980s, South Africa started the Total National Strategy, where it sought to establish a foreign policy of regional hegemony trying to install a constellation of southern African states dependent on South Africa in the surrounding countries by cooperation and economic domination.10

The South African initiative failed because the surrounding states, noticeably Zimbabwe, the second economic power in the region due to the strength of its industry and agriculture, redirected the economic ties they had with South Africa to other states in the region through the organizations such as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which in 1991 would become the Southern African Development Community (SADC).11 This way economic cooperation between them achieved development and reduced their dependence on South Africa, enhancing their independence.12 Through the SADCC several bilateral agreements were made on trade, transport, energy and security between Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, thus causing the failure of the Total National Strategy.

South Africa also used destabilization tactics and military interventions, taking advantage of internal divisions in neighboring states and supporting secessionist movements. The purpose of this strategy was not to overthrow the neighboring governments, but make them vulnerable, preventing mobilizations against its interests, such as sanctions and support for anti-apartheid and liberation movements. In Zimbabwe, South Africa armed and trained dissidents, planted weapons strategically and orchestrated invasions, bombings, assassinations and sabotages.

The Zimbabwean government's domestic reaction was to repress the rebels, sending the 5th Brigade, composed of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) soldiers trained by North Korea, to destroy the centers of dissent. This action, known as Gukurahundi was disastrous in humanitarian terms, and killed and tortured thousands of rebels and civilians, only ceasing in 1987, when the Union Agreement was made between ZANU and ZAPU, uniting them as ZANU-PF and ending the strongest opposition group to the government in Zimbabwe, after which, the state seemed to be heading to become a single party state.13

At that time, international sanctions had been imposed on South Africa by the United Nations’ General Assembly and Security Council. For neighbors, and economically dependent countries on South Africa like Zimbabwe, supporting the sanctions was a hard decision, because it could lead to significant damage to their economic development. However, members of SADCC imposed sanctions and Zimbabwe led the pressure for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions and support for 10 NKIWANE, Tandeka C. “Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse”. International Political Science Review, Vol.22, No. 3. 2001, pp. 279-290. ENGEL, Ulf. Op. cit. 1994. pp. 78-80, 191-193. 11 ENGEL, Ulf. Op. cit. 1994. pp. 288-291. 12 van WYK, Jo-Ansie. “The Saga Continues...The Zimbabwe Issue in South Africa’s Foreign Policy.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2002. p.1. 13 KRIGER, Norma. “Robert Mugabe, Another Too-Long-Serving African Ruler: a Review Essay”.Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 118.No. 2. 2003.

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the FLS and liberation movements that opposed the apartheid regime in the NAM.14 This policy made Zimbabwe confront not only the apartheid regime, but also the United States’ policy of constructive engagement, rendering Zimbabwe as a prestigious actor in the Third World, an example in the fight against imperialism and racism.15

The regional destabilization strategy ended in 1991, after Frederik de Klerk was elected in 1989 and substantive changes began in South Africa.16 It was not easy for Zimbabwe to maintain its tough position in relation to the neighbor state, but while the transition to democracy was negotiated Mugabe officially maintained the diplomatic isolation and non-recognition of the apartheid regime. It was only in April 1994, after the first democratic election in South Africa was held, that the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the state.17

A Southern African state with a legitimate, democratically elected government, Zimbabwe was valued by the Western powers as an example of African state. Mugabe’s proposal of racial harmony and reconciliation between blacks and whites was appreciated, representing, before the end of apartheid, a possible model for South Africa to follow when it established a democratic government.18 Therefore, due to its pragmatism and its importance as a model state in Southern Africa, when Zimbabwe positioned itself against the North-American policy of constructive engagement with the apartheid regime, when it espoused a socialist rhetoric, or even when the state murdered thousands in the Gukurahundi campaign, the West didn’t stop supporting it, and the United States represented Zimbabwe’s main donor in the 1980s.19

Benefitted by the international Cold War order that emphasized the principle of formal sovereignty, as well as by the security situation in Southern Africa, Zimbabwe managed to enter the international arena with great freedom of action in its foreign and domestic policies. As well as its non alignment policies, which rendered it a reputation in the South, the Mugabe government was allowed, without interference or criticism of the great powers, to develop a project of one-party state while it desired to, as well as to violate the country’s population’s human rights, causing the deaths of thousands between 1982 and 1987 in the Gukurahundi massacre, and still be considered a model of political leadership.20

Effects of the end of the Cold War and of the apartheid regime to Zimbabwe’s image in the West

During the first years of its independence, Zimbabwe was cited in many studies

and the international media as a model of African democracy, characterized by reconciliation of the African population with the white settlers and being recognized by the West as a possible model for South Africa. Zimbabwe was also, because of its hard stance on the apartheid issue, regarded as a leader in the fight against racism and imperialism by African states and other members of the Third World, and President Mugabe was considered a liberation hero and a prestigious combatant of apartheid, being a prominent figure among African leaders.21

14 ENGEL, Ulf. Op. cit.1994. pp. 262-265 e 279-280. NAM NAC/CONF.8/Doc.12, 01/09/1986 15 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Op. Cit. 2003. pp. 8-9. 16 ENGEL, Ulf. Op. cit. 1994. pp. 194, 218-219, 272, 337. 17 van WYK, Jo-Ansie. Op. cit. 2002. p. 1. 18 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Op. Cit. 2003. p. 9. 19 ENGEL, Ulf. Op. cit. 1994. pp. 307-317. 20 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Op cit. 2003. p. 11. 21 LAAKSO, L. “The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000”. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3. 2002. pp. 437-464.

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Because of this widespread good opinion about Zimbabwe and its head of state, the government’s domestic problems, such as its attempt to install a one-party state and the repression and violence it inflicted against thousands of its civilians, although reported by some NGOs, were ignored by the international community of states. In the context of the Cold War, marked by the power dispute between the two superpowers, a securitized atmosphere predominated, indulging a culture of Raison d’etat, a radical realist logic according to which states do not condemn each other if they can be strategic allies.22 In this reasoning, human rights violations inside a state such as Zimbabwe, which did not represent a threat to any other state’s interest, but could be the model of stabilization for Southern Africa, did not attract much attention.23

One does not seek to affirm here that the international environment is amoral, on the contrary, Bull’s definition of international society as “a group of states conscious of certain common interests and common values, [that] form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” to ensure different goals of the state society, is accepted.24 During the Cold War, pressured by the bipolar global balance of power between the superpowers and fearing a nuclear disaster, the states favored a culture of security in their interactions, strengthening principles such as sovereignty and reifying the separation of the domestic and the international. In this context, the sovereignty of weak states was defended, and as long as Zimbabwe was acting in the interest of the great powers in its foreign policy and represented a possible model for South Africa, its government’s legitimacy was guaranteed regardless of its other domestic policies.25

The end of the Cold War brought great changes to the international structure. Along with the rise of West, democratic and human security values gained greater importance, and the possibility of non-ideological alignment and non interference on domestic issues thinned. There was a change in the culture prevalent in the international society, and the absolute sovereignty lost ground to the possibility of foreign intervention in domestic politics in the name of human rights, good governance and economic reforms, characteristics that begun to be demanded by the Northern powers as a condition for financial assistance and cooperation.26 In the liberal democratic order the legitimacy of established governments was no longer accepted simply because it was assigned to sovereign states, but only if the states responded to its societies’ demands.27

The liberal dogmatism, that is, the belief that the change from autocracies to democracies is desirable, inevitable and should be encouraged in developing countries, coupled with the appreciation of economic development, which was equated with a minimal state and trade and financial liberalization, now composed the dominant international culture.28 Sovereignty values were weakened and the donor powers

22 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Op. cit. 2003, p. 11. 23 MASHINGAIDZE, Terence M. “The Zimbabwean Entrapment: An Analysis of the Nexus between Domestic and Foreign Policies in a “Collapsing” Militant State, 1990s-2006”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No.4, Winter 2006 . p. 10. 24 BULL, Hedley. A Sociedade Anárquica. IBRI: Brasília, 2002, p. 19 25 MCCLELLAND, Cary. "Political capital deficits in Zimbabwean famine: national and international responsibility for prevention failure." Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 59 No. 2. 2006. 26 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Op. cit. 2003. p. 20. 27 KNUTSEN, Torbjorn L. A History of International Relations Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1992. pp. 259-286. ROSENAU, James. Global structural transformation: underpinnings and outcomes, 1993. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 28 KIRKPATRICK, Jeane. Dictatorships and Double Standards. Commentary Magazine. 1979. pp. 5-9.

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demanded economic reform programs and elections recognized as democratic in exchange for necessary assistance to weak states, overwhelming the African states.29

It should be noted that ethics are used politically in international relations and democratic values are applied inconsistently and sometimes contradictorily, the criteria for their application varying depending on the target to which they are directed and the interests involved.30 With end of the Cold War international interest in Africa waned, bringing about the weakening and decay of African States, and Zimbabwe was increasingly seen by the North, dominated by Western values, as a weak African state.

Another aspect that affected the international image of the Mugabe government was the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, which greatly reduced the concerns of great powers with Southern Africa and the importance of Zimbabwe. The struggle against apartheid was one of the most important agendas of the Zimbabwean foreign policy, and without it Mugabe’s moral authority on the West diminished, compared to that of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. Zimbabwe’s political importance declined and its external image deteriorated, while South Africa emerged as a democratic State and became the landmark of stability and development in the region.31

The end of apartheid regime transformed South Africa into the symbol of African democracy. Incorporating the experiences of the struggle against apartheid, Mandela's government devoted itself to developing a policy which met the idealistic expectations directed towards the country, emphasizing human rights, democratization and development.32 The new South Africa was suitable for the new international liberal and democratic order and Zimbabwe ceased to be the model state in southern Africa.33

The maintenance of Mugabe’s legitimacy among Africans and the South

It must, however, be noted that Mugabe's government remained a symbol of the

struggle against colonial rule to Africans, which also continued privileging the values of sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonintervention. In the continent, South Africa’s liberal and democratic policies were seen as a Western interference in Africa and at the regional level, the rise of South Africa was more a source of dynamic competition between this state and Zimbabwe than an unquestioned rise of a regional hegemon.34

Because much of their identity was shaped by colonialism and the subsequent fight for independence, African states share some interests that make it interesting for them to defend certain principles as a group.35 In most African states that became independent in the 20th century, components that characterize statehood, the apparatus traditionally assigned to states as independent political structures with authority and power to govern a population in a defined territory, did not exist or was not consolidated.36 Therefore, African states valued the external recognition of their 29 WOYACH, Robert et al. “International Relations Theory and the New World Order”. Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Oct., 1996), pp. 339-352 30 MKENDA, Adolf. “Why I refuse to condemn Mugabe”. Pambazuka, Issue 431. 31 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Uma hegemonia regional em movimento: a África do Sul. 2005. p. 14. BOOTH, Ken. VALE, Peter. “Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, beyond Realism”. International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2. 1995. p. 286. 32 ALDEN, Chris; Le PERE, Garth. “South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity?” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 100, 2004. p. 283-4. 33 EVANS, Graham. “South Africa in Remission: The Foreign Policy of an Altered State”. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2. 1996. p. 258-259. 34 NATHAN, Laurie. “SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992-2003”. Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3. 2006. pp. 605-622. 35 CLAPHAM, C. Op. cit. 1996. p. 107 36 DUNN, Kevin C. “Madlib #32: The (Blank) African State: Rethinking the Sovereign State in

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sovereignty, that is, juridical sovereignty, and fearing challenges to it, African states embraced sovereignty as a central value in their politics.37 Also, opposing themselves to colonialism and external interference, African international relations were imbued with rhetoric of solidarity, emphasizing the African states’ union as sovereign units with a common African identity defined by their shared race and colonial past.38 In the name of this common identity, African political leaders should act harmonically, especially against colonialism, imperialism and racist politics, and defending their and their neighbors’ sovereignty, the established governments and frontiers, even if their domestic structures were problematic or not democratic.39

These principles were forged during the Cold War, inspiring the creation of the OUA, in 1963, but continued to characterize African international relations after the bipolar order was extinguished. Differently from states of the North, who in the globalized world order emphasized liberal democratic values, motivated by the colonial exploitation past, Africa continued to defend sovereignty and non-interference, and African leaders continued to abstain from recriminating Mugabe.

Similarly, other members of the Global South also didn’t follow the emergence of Western liberal values. China, an old ally of Zimbabwe maintained its alliance with the country. The Chinese foreign policy defends sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference, non aggression, pacific coexistence and economic rights such as mutual and equivalent benefits, offering cooperation opportunities without demanding good governance and civil and political human rights.40

Africa and the South did not defend the liberal-democratic values as the North after the Cold War ended and, as they did not have the same interest the West had in South Africa, the end of the apartheid regime and the emergence of the democratic South Africa did not reduce Zimbabwe’s importance. Therefore, they did not see Mugabe differently and saw no more reasons to criticize his government than they did in the 1980s, believing domestic issues should be dealt with domestically.

The emergence of the Zimbabwean crisis in the international society between 1997 and 2000

In the 1990s, the Zimbabwean government initiated the liberal-oriented Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), whose measures did not succeed in reducing the budget deficit as expected, intensifying the shortage of capital, inflation, high interest rates and uncertainty that marked the economy of Zimbabwe and eventually deteriorated the social welfare in the country.41

Zimbabwe's problems became especially serious in 1997 and 1998 due to instabilities in the global economy and drought experienced throughout Southern Africa

International Relations”. In: DUNN, Kevin C.; SHAW, Timothy M. (eds.). Africa’s challenge to International Relations Theory. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. p. 50. CLAPHAM, C. “Review Article: Africa’s International Relations”. African Affaris, Vol. 86, No. 345. 1987, p. 611. JACKSON, Robert H.; ROSBERG, Carl G. Op. cit. 1986. pp. 1-3. 37 CLAPHAM, C. Op. cit. 1996. p. 109. 38 MAZRUI, Ali A. “On the Concept of "We are all Africans'', Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), chapter 3 apud CLAPHAM, C. Op. cit. 1996. p. 106. 39 CLAPHAM, C. Op. cit. 1996. pp. 107-115. 40 Taylor, Ian. Sino-african relations and the problem of Human Rights. African Affairs, Vol. 107 No. 426. 2002. pp. 63–87. 41 The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group Report, "Zimbabwe--Structural Adjustment Program," Report No. 14751, 1995.

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that, together with the lack of strategic planning of the government, reduced the agricultural production. Under pressure from the population, which suffering from the economic problems of the country provoked strikes and demonstrations, in 1997 the government reversed the liberal economic measures and designated 1471 farms to be acquired without compensation to their owners. The land issue had been addressed in redistribution projects by the government since the country's independence, but the majority of the people had not yet been benefited. Now, claiming lack of resources and blaming Britain for having originally stolen the land, President Mugabe threatened to compulsorily acquire the land, only paying compensation for it if the UK did it.42

“We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay for the soil. That is our set policy. Our land was never bought and there is no way we would buy back the land. (…) So, we are grabbing the land, but who started grabbing land from the other? (…) If you grab my property and I follow you up and demand my property back, could that be termed ‘grabbing’?”43 The illiberal economic policies and the land reform that was not based on

voluntary purchase and sale of land were not welcomed by the UK or Zimbabwe’s other European partners. Tony Blair’s government, which started in 1997, sent in November, a letter to the Minister of Agriculture of Zimbabwe affirming that Britain had no special responsibilities towards the land distribution in Zimbabwe. Emphasizing the need to respect voluntary sales and purchases, the United Kingdom was willing to aid the country in the issue only within a broader project for the eradication of poverty.

The UK canceled aid to Zimbabwe’s land reform program, an action that was perceived in Zimbabwe as a violation of the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, and the relations between the two governments deteriorated.44 Stressing the need for transparency, more dialogue and more concrete proposals linking the project to poverty reduction and treatment of gender inequality, the United Kingdom’s move was followed by the EU, the World Bank and IMF, which demanded as a condition to aid to the land reform, that it was made in a transparent manner, reduced poverty and increased Zimbabwe’s productive capacity. In practice, the land reform project was stalled.45

The intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict, since 1998, weighed heavily on Zimbabwe’s already scarce resources, settled an economic crisis in the country and reduced the chances of the state to receive international aid. Because of the resources spent in DRC, the IMF, which had already shown concern about government repression of popular manifestations in 1997, retained funds needed for Zimbabwe’s balance of payments.46 The US also revised its support to a World Bank loan to Zimbabwe after receiving reports indicating that the country spent in the DRC almost ten times what it had declared to the IMF ($ 3 million per month).47

Mugabe responded denouncing an Anglo-American conspiracy to destabilize his government and portrayed the IMF as a monstrous creature manipulated by Washington

42 VAN DEN BRINK, Rogier. “Zimbabwe Land Acquisition Update”. World Bank. Report, 19/05/1999. 43 Panafrican News Agency “Mugabe Wants More Land For The People”, 16/10/1997. 44 INGRAM, Derek. “Zimbabwe”, Round Table, April 1998, Vol. 346, No. 1. 45 Zimbabwe Independent, “Land reform in financial trouble”, 11/09/1998, Zimbabwe Independent, “Land conference exposes government neglect”, 13/09/1998, Zimbabwe Independent, “Land conference — eye openers”, 18/09/1998, The Insider, “Land: The Final Communiqué”, 24/09/1998, All Africa News Agency, “Zimbabwe's Human Rights Record Worsens”, 25/05/1998. Zimbabwe Independent, “Britain urges Zimbabwe to respect law on land”, 30/01/1998, The Insider, “Focus Of British Aid”, 26/05/1998, The Insider, “Land: The European Union Position”, 24/09/1998, The Insider, “Land: The British Position”, 24/09/1998, The Insider, “Land: The World Bank Position”, 24/09/1998. 46 IRIN, “IRIN Update for Southern Africa”, 13/05/1999. 47 Business Day, “US may block loan to Harare”, 05/10/1999.

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and London.48 China, an ally of ZANU-PF since the struggle for independence, secured in 1999, $ 1.1 billion for temporary relief for Zimbabwe and agreed to cooperate in technical and economic matters with the state.49 The support was praised by Mugabe, but it was not enough to solve the country’s problems.50

Popular discontent with government policies was made clear when the government's proposal of a new constitution was rejected by a majority of the population in the Constitutional Referendum of February 2000, marking ZANU-PF’s first electoral defeat since the independence of Zimbabwe.51 Fearing of its political weakness and a new rejection in the parliamentary elections that approached, after the referendum defeat the government began a campaign of violent repression of the Movement Democratic Change (MDC), the first party that had emerged as a strong opposition in over ten years. Days after the referendum result, farms begun to be systematically occupied with the use of violence by armed militias (War Veterans) which counted on government support.52 The land reform was resumed as a populist program of rapid land redistribution, based in the systematic illegal invasion of land.53

While these measures had effect, the government’s official slogan became “Land is the Economy, the Economy is the Land” and official speeches resumed the colonial and race issues, claiming the liberation war was not over and blaming the West, represented by the United Kingdom, for the country's problems and for the population’s lack of land because it had not financed the country's land reform. With this rhetoric, Mugabe tried to rescue the African nationalism, unifying the African rural population against the urban population and white farmers, who formed the MDC's support base, accusing the opposition of being an ally of the West, especially Britain.54

In response, the United Kingdom imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe, including aircraft it Hawks, which were used in the military campaign in the DRC.55 The international community also began to pressure Zimbabwe to invite observers to its approaching elections. At the Commonwealth meeting in May 2000, for example, the Ministers showed concern with the violence, political intimidation, land invasion and decline of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, fearing that the effects of this environment would prevent the 2000 elections being free and fair.56

Differently, accepting the discourse ZANU-PF and believing that Zimbabwe’s problems were related to the land issue and not the continuation of ZANU-PF

48 Africa Confidential, Diplomacy with Attitude, 30/04/1999 and IRIN, “IRIN Update for Southern Africa”, 13/05/1999. 49 Zimbabwe Independent, “Chinese take-away won't help Zimbabwe”, 28/05/1999, Panafrican News Agency, “Chinese Trade Team For Harare”, 28/07/1998, Panafrican News Agency “Zimbabwe To Recruit More Doctors From China”, 29/10/1997. 50 Panafrican News Agency, “Zimbabwe Govt Under Fire Over Chinese Loan”, 29/01/1998, Panafrican News Agency, “Zimbabwe, China Sign Deal”, 31/07/1998. 51 Africa Confidential, “Saying no to the yes-men”. 18/02/2000. Vol 41. No. 4. 52 Sokwanele. The Politics of Land. July 2004. Human Rights Watch. Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe. March 2002, vol. 14, no.1. p. 11. 53 ICG. Africa Report n. 22, Zimbabwe: at the Crossroads. 2000. p. 2. Panafrican News Agency, “Mugabe Unveils Land Reform Election Manifesto”, 04/05/2000. 54 RANGER, T. “Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: the struggle over the past in Zimbabwe”, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 30 No. 2, 2004, pp 215 – 234, NDLOVU-GATSHENI, S. J. “Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century”. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, 2003, p. 104. KRIGER, Norma. “From Patriotic Memories to ‘Patriotic History’ in Zimbabwe, 1990 – 2005”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 6. 2006. p. 13, 15. 55 Africa Confidential, “Hawks or Doves?”, 18/02/2000. Vol. 41. No. 4. 56 LAAKSO, L. Op. cit. 2002. pp. 437, 449. Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, “The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe 24-25 June 2000”, 30/06/2000. p. 11. BBC News. “Zimbabwe bars election monitors”, 20/06/2000.

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government, between 1997 and 2000 South Africa, counting on African support, sought to contribute to solving the crisis in Zimbabwe dealing with the "colonial problem", that is, requiring international assistance – specifically from the UK – for the land reform in the country to be developed according to the terms set out in the Lancaster House Conference. The state was also the author of several initiatives to prevent the collapse of the neighbor’s economy, and in February 2000 directed a package of $ 133 million to secure the stock of fuel and electricity in Zimbabwe.57

African and other members of the South also defended Mugabe. For example, in the 2000 EU-African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States’ summit, the United Kingdom asked the group to support its appeal to Zimbabwe to “reconsider its policy of fast track resettlement,” but the ACP states defended, instead, a South African motion asking the UK to finance Zimbabwe’s land reform program.58 The ACP states also prevented sanctions proposed by four European ministers against Zimbabwe for human rights abuses from being imposed.59

The international observation of Zimbabwe’s 2000 and 2002 elections and the deterioration on the domestic situation

Although election observers should not be biased towards national parties and

candidates, the observation of the June 2000 parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe was strongly influenced by the agenda of the states that sent observers and the Mugabe government. Western states pressured Mugabe to be invited to observe the elections expecting they would not be free or fair and fearing the consequences of the violence and land invasions that occurred in Zimbabwe. African states also worried about the domestic situation in Zimbabwe and feared that the effects of the crisis would spread in the region. They were, however, unwilling to compromise their relations with Mugabe and believed that isolating the ZANU-PF would not solve the crisis and could generate more instability.

Realizing that its elections had gained unexpected international attention, the Zimbabwe government selected the observers it would accept, rejecting more than 200 foreign diplomats, members of regional or international NGOs, and specifically forbidding British participation.60 As was expected, emphasizing the unequal access of the parties to electoral campaign and the occurrence of coercion, intimidation and violence against the opposition during the campaign mainly but not only in rural areas, the observers from the European Union, the Commonwealth and Australia considered the election illegitimate.61

Stressing the calm that marked the days of voting, the observer missions of SADC and the OAU recognized the problems of the campaign as insufficient to impact on results, and the election, although not declared free or fair, was praised for being peaceful and organized.62 In addition, concerned about the influence of external forces

57 ADELMANN, Martin. “Quiet Diplomacy: the reasons behind Mbeki1s Zimbabwepolicy”. Africa Spectrum, Vol. 39.2004. p. 259. 58 MISSER, Francois, ANKOMAH, Baffour. Mugabe 1, Britain 0. New African, December 2000. 59 Panafrican News Agency, “Zimbabwe Escapes ACP-EU Sanctions”, 24/03/2000. 60 The Standard, “Commonwealth Denies Mugabe's Rejection Of Brit Observers”, 21/05/2000, The Telegraph, “Mugabe gets his ban on British poll observers”, 09/06/2000, The Standard, “EU Bows To Mugabe's Demands”, 04/06/2000. 61 Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Op. cit. 30/06/2000, CBC, “Observers say Zimbabwe election unfair”, 26/06/2000, IRIN, “IRIN Focus On EU Election Verdict”, 26/06/2000, Panafrican News Agency, “EU Cites Flaws In Zimbabwean Election”, 26/06/2000. 62 CHAN, S. “Endgame Or Gambit In Zimbabwe?”. Contemporary Review, July 2005.

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in the elections in Zimbabwe, African leaders supported Mugabe and Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa described the observers as vindictive, biased, aggressive, and full of misconceptions and prejudices.63

After the elections, at its annual meeting, the OAU accepted Mugabe’s version of the Zimbabwean crisis, affirming it was rooted in the land distribution and, recognizing the land issue as a legacy of the colonial period, it believed the responsibility for its solution lay with the United Kingdom. It encouraged, therefore, dialogue between Zimbabwe and the UK and asked the latter to honor its obligations under the Lancaster House treaty, guaranteeing financial resources necessary to solve Zimbabwe’s land issue.64 The SADC acted similarly and asked the presidents of South Africa and Malawi promote negotiations between Zimbabwe and Britain. In defense of Mugabe, the organization’s president, Joaquim Chissano, criticized the great powers for trying to conceal the history of the African struggle for independence portraying their heroes as anti-democratic or even dictators.65

The OAU also issued a statement about the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA), a bill proposed in the United States of America, to pressure the Mugabe government to put an end to the illegal land acquisition and its repression of opposition, prescribing an agrarian reform that followed the laws of the market, prohibiting assistance or debt suspension for Zimbabwe by the United States and international financial institutions in which the great power was a member and authorizing financial support for the Zimbabwean opposition. The OAU denounced the act as interference in domestic affairs of one of its member states, and discouraged the conversion of the proposal into law.66

Indeed, because of the increasing political use of violence, intimidation and the illegal land reform in the 2000 election campaign, the United States, emphasizing its concern about the Zimbabwe’s democracy, rule of law and human and property rights suspended technical assistance to Zimbabwe and proposed the ZDERA in Congress, suggesting the imposition of targeted sanctions to prohibit Mugabe, his ministers, military officers and their families from entering U.S., the end of bilateral aid for Zimbabwe and suggesting the multinational lending institutions to oppose themselves to loans, credits or other benefits to Zimbabwe. The possibility of comprehensive sanctions was rejected because it would cause more problems for ordinary citizens than for the political elite responsible for the country's problems.67 The superpower had also issued a safety alert to discourage American tourists from visiting Zimbabwe.68

In response, the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge affirmed “It's a bad Bill. It's really dangerous, it's horrible. The Americans want to recolonise Africa and make Zimbabwe their protectorate.” As well as the above mentioned support from the OAU, Zimbabwe was defended by the Non-Aligned Movement and the SADC, which in its 2000 summit recommended the suspension of ZDERA before it became an effective law, and sent diplomats to Washington for this purpose.69 In October 2000, the

63 LAAKSO, Lisa. Op. cit. 2002. p. 23. The Accra Daily Mail, “CDD Director Lauds Zimbabwe Election”, 31/07/2000. 64 CM/Dec.544 (LXXII) Rev.1, Decision On Developments In Zimbabwe. 65 Final Communiqué of the SADC Heads of State and Government Meeting, Windhoek, Namíbia, August 2000. 66 AHG/St.1 (XXXVI), Statement On Zimbabwe 67 Reuters, “US Sanctions Would Hurt Zimbabwe People-Opposition”, 08/06/2000. 68 Panafrican News Agency, “US Tour Operators Explore Tourism Opportunities”, 16/08/1998, African Eye News Service (Nelspruit), “US Warns Citizens Visiting Zimbabwe”, 24/08/2000. 69 Zimbabwe Independent, “Zimbabwe Fights US Sanctions”, 04/08/2000, Panafrican News Agency, “Zimbabwe in Diplomatic Offensive to Thwart US Sanctions”, 04/08/2000.

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U.S. Congress decided to temporarily shelve ZDERA but, deploring the violence of the election campaign, the superpower ended donations for the land reform in Zimbabwe.70

After acting bilaterally, ending its contributions to the land reform in Zimbabwe, applying an arms embargo on state and openly criticizing the policies of Mugabe, the United Kingdom pressured Zimbabwe within the Commonwealth, suggesting its suspension of the organization, and the European Union, gathering support for sanctions against the ZANU-PF.71 Some European states, as well the United States, the IMF and World Bank, had already cut off bilateral aid to Zimbabwe and, in October 2000, following the measures from the UK, the EU imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe and cut the budget and economic support it used to offer the state, threatening it with sanctions if its situation didn’t improve.72

The United Kingdom had also tried to obtain from the EU-ACP states Parliamentary Assembly a declaration that Zimbabwe’s elections were flawed because of the “high level of violence and intimidation” that preceded them, but the ACP states did not agree, stating, instead, that the election “constituted an expression of the genuine issues and aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe” and formalized a request to the EU to help “Zimbabwe strengthen its democratic institutions and tackle the challenging economic reform measures.”73

Mugabe responded to the pressures reaffirming Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and accusing the United Kingdom of intervening in his state’s domestic affairs, using the criticism he received to reaffirm that he was suffering an attempt of recolonization. However, Mugabe's refusal to cooperate in the Abuja Agreement framework showed that treating the distribution of land as the central issue in the crisis in Zimbabwe, as was being done by African states would not work because the heart of the problem was the continuity of the ZANU-PF government, and the land issue was a populist measure used instrumentally by Mugabe to ensure this.74

The Commonwealth sought, through the Abuja agreement and the mediation of South African President Thabo Mbeki, the resumption of land reform in accordance with the Zimbabwean constitution and within a partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in exchange for funding from the UK for compensating those displaced from farms and financing the construction of infrastructure on the reallocated land.75 However, although it accepted the agreement, Zimbabwe did not implement it, the fast-track land reform was approved by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court and the land invasions continued.76 Concluding that there was no improvement in the situation in Zimbabwe and under pressure from the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth raised the possibility of suspending Zimbabwe from its

70 The Associated Press, “Clinton Decries Zimbabwe Violence”, 08/05/2000, Reuters, “U.S. Talbott Says No Aid for Zimbabwe With Violence”, 09/05/2000. 71 TAYLOR, Ian e WILLIAMS, Paul. The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy and Crisis in Zimbabwe. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). Vol. 78, No. 3, 2002, pp. 553-555. Africa Confidential, “More of Mugabe”, 20/04/2001. 72 Financial Gazette, “EU States Slap Arms Embargo On Zimbabwe”, 05/10/2000, Panafrican News Agency, “Denmark Cuts Aid to Zimbabwe's Agriculture Sector”, 22/11/2000, Africa Confidential, “Hawks or Doves?”, 18/02/2000, Financial Gazette, “EU Withholds Aid Until Re-establishment of Rule of Law”, 21/09/2000, Financial Gazette, “EU 'Fed Up' With Mugabe”, 07/12/2000, The Guardian, “EU gives Mugabe deadline to avoid sanctions”, 30/10/2001, AFP, “Zimbabwe ready for EU consultations”, 30/10/2001, The Guardian, “Mugabe faces EU reprisal after snub”, 25/10/2001. 73 MISSER, Francois, ANKOMAH, Baffour. Op cit. 2000. 74 ICG Africa Report n. 85. Blood and Soil Land, Politics and Conflict Prevention in Zimbabwe and South Africa. 2004. pp. 61-63. ADELMANN, Martin. Op. cit. 2004. p. 261. 75 ICG Africa Report. “Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a Way Forward” . N°32, July 2001. p. 22. 76 Human Rights Monitor, The Abuja Agreement, No. 19 October 2001.

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midst. But the organization was divided between those who wanted to pressure Mugabe and those who defended him, so the decision was postponed until after the 2002 election, which the group would observe.77

In the period leading up to the 2002 presidential election the government committed even more abuses than in the 2000 election campaign and Zimbabwe’s human rights record got worse. Believing that the presidential election could not be free or fair because of the violence and intimidation against the opposition in the election campaign and the government's attempt to curtail the Western observation of the elections, the European Union and the United States threatened the government of Zimbabwe with the imposition of sanctions.78 Asserting that there was an international conspiracy to remove him from power and ensuring that “sanctions or no sanctions, we will not retreat from the progress in giving people the land back,” Mugabe rejected the EU’s and United States of America’s observers.79 Attributing this to an attempt to hide what happened in the country, the EU and U.S. imposed “smart sanctions” on members of the ZANU-PF political elite, freezing their funds and suspending financial assistance for development projects in Zimbabwe.80

In response, Mugabe accused the Western powers, led by Britain, of conspiring against his government and seeking to benefit from the MDC, their puppet.81 Exploring its advantages, the government managed to re-elect itself.82 According to Ranger, ZANU-PF’s campaign, was based on the retelling of the country's history emphasizing the liberation war and the brutal colonial exploitation, calling the population to defend Zimbabwe’s and Africa’s heritage using the armed struggle as a guiding spirit during and after the elections. In this scheme, the election wasn’t a democratic right, but part of Zimbabwe’s liberation, whose champion was the ZANU-PF, and the people should fight the opposition made of traitors without history, as indicated the phrase “Vote for Maturity, Experience and Wisdom,” part of the ZANU-PF campaign.83

With the exceptions of the SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission’s conclusion, which was that the atmosphere of insecurity that prevailed in Zimbabwe and the episodes of violence that occurred prevented the election from complying with the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC region, and the President of Senegal’s concerns, saying the elections did not conform with what he expected, the African response was favorable to the ZANU-PF victory.84

77 Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Op.cit. 30/06/2000. p. 14. 78 Africa Confidential, “Hanging in there”, 10/08/2001, Business Day, “Harare, EU to hold talks”, 17/12/2001. Europa World, “Ban Mugabe From European Union, Says MEP”, 14/12/2001, Europa World, “EU Heads of State statement on Zimbabwe”, 17/12/2001. 79 New York Times, “U.S. Warns Zimbabwe That Next Year's Election Must Be Fair”,12/12/2001. 80 The Times, “Zimbabwe threat to expel EU election observer”, 16/02/2002, The Guardian, “The EU and Zimbabwe: Why we did what we did”, 28/02/2002, AFP, “US in process of imposing Zimbabwe sanctions: Powell”, 07/02/2002, AFP, “US goes ahead with sanctions”, 08/02/2002, The Standard, “US and UK name targeted leaders”, 16/02/2002, MSNBC, “W. House imposes U.S. travel ban on Mugabe, aides”, 22/02/2002, Africa Confidential, BBC, “EU agrees Zimbabwe sanctions” 18/02/2002, All Africa, “EU Slaps 'Smart Sanctions' on Mugabe, Recalls Election Observers”, 19/02/2002. 81 BBC, “Zimbabwe attacks US sanctions”, 23/02/2002, ABC News, “Mugabe Backers Defiant After New U.S. Sanctions”, 23/02/2002. 82 O’DONOVAN, Michael, “Zimbabwe’s democracy: quantifying the impact of electoral mal administration 9 April 2003”, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), April 2003. 83 RANGER, Terence. “The Zimbabwe Elections: A personal experience.” Transformations 19/3, July 2002, p. 2. Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, “Zimbabwe 2002: Political Campaigning”, February, 2002. 84 BAKER, Bruce. When to Call Black White: Zimbabwe’s Electoral Reports. Third World Quarterly. Vol. 23, No. 6, 2002. pp. 1150-1152. SADC Parliamentary Forum Election Observation Mission To Zimbabwe Report, 2002, p. 14-15. SADC Parliamentary Forum, Norms and Standards for Elections in

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The South African government’s mission, while acknowledging there were some problems in the election, considered it legitimate and satisfactorily developed.85 The Nigerian and Namibian missions also found the election free and fair, reflecting the wishes of Zimbabwe’s people. The OAU declared the election “transparent, credible, free and fair,” affirming the problems it had, such as the number of polling stations, were Zimbabwe’s domestic issues, and not the business of international observers.86

The polarization of international the observers into two groups, one interested in identifying the flaws in the process and condemn the ZANU-PF government, and the other seeking to ensure the legitimacy of the election, accusing the first group of trying to interfere in the process, is not expected of observers, but the evaluation of the Zimbabwean elections was totally politicized due to the international repercussion of the election as an event which would test the legitimacy of the Mugabe government.87 The election was marred with problems such as the systematic coercion and intimidation of the opposition and the possibility of fraud, and the statements that legitimated it, overlooking its problems or believing they were not enough to compromise the results, caused more damage to their speakers’ credibility than improved that of Zimbabwe’s electoral process.88

The European and North-American sanctions

In 2001, the European Parliament suspended all development assistance to the

Zimbabwean government, but said such aid would be resumed when democracy and the rule of law were restored in the country.89 In 2002, after the head of the observer mission sent to Zimbabwe was expelled from the country, the EU imposed targeted sanctions freezing the assets and imposing travel bans on individuals considered responsible for government policies, as well as an arms embargo on Zimbabwe. 90 Because they were targeted at specific individuals, the sanctions were known as “smart sanctions” and it was hoped that pressure on Mugabe, his family and his inner circle would be more efficient than comprehensive sanctions, which would bring suffering to the population.91

The United States of America resumed implementing the ZDERA, which included sanctions directed at specific members of the Zimbabwean government similar to the European sanctions, restricted financial aid to the country by institutions like the IMF and encouraged the end of trade between the two states, excluding Zimbabwe from the benefits of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act, which guaranteed trade

the SADC Region, 25/03/2001. 85 Interim Statement by the SA Observer Mission on the Zimbabwean Presidential Elections of 9 and 10 March 2002, 13/03/2002. 86 CNN, “Africa 'damaged' by Mugabe poll”, 15/03/2002. 87 LAAKSO, Lisa. “Opposition politics in independent Zimbabwe.” African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7 No.2-3. 2003. pp. 4-7. 88CNN, “Africa 'damaged' by Mugabe poll”, 15/03/2002, SW Radio Africa, “SA newspaper fights for release of Zim 2002 election report”, 25/05/2010, Zimbabwe Situation, “No Zim poll violence report: Mbeki”, 09/08/2010. 89 UN Integrated Regional Information Network, “EU Parliament Condemns Mugabe”, 16/03/2001. 90 Melbourne Age, “Zimbabwe stands by EU accreditation limits”, 12/02/2002, MSNBC, “EU checking Zimbabwe refusal of Swedish observer”, 12/02/2002, MSNBC, “Sweden's Schori hits back after Zimbabwe expulsion”, 17/02/2002, MSNBC, “EU foreign ministers to weigh Zimbabwe sanctions”, 17/02/2002, MSNBC, “EU team in Zimbabwe confirms pullout – spokesman”, 18/02/2002, The Guardian, “The EU and Zimbabwe: Why we did what we did”, 28/02/2002. 91 The Scotsman, “EU in fresh showdown with Mugabe on observers”, 09/02/2002.

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benefits for Southern African states.92 The law was approved in Congress and was signed by President George W. Bush in December 2001 after Zimbabwe revoked a visa it had granted to U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, preventing him from observing the presidential election. 93

The European and North-American sanctions intended to put pressure on the Zimbabwean political elite, but there was no consensus in the EU as to how deal with situations like the European-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) summit in November 2002, which was canceled after two Zimbabwean ministers were not allowed in the European Parliament generating protests between representatives of the ACP States, which boycotted the meeting.94

There were times when the sanctions didn’t have the expected effect and the prohibitions of entry into certain territories were violated.95 Mugabe was allowed into Rome in June 2002 for the Conference of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), because the leader was going to the UN, and although this was criticized by EU and U.S. nothing could stop him.96 However, other episodes indicated the difficulty of maintaining the European sanctions consistently. Even the UK failed, as it was discovered in a UN report on illegal exploitation of mineral and other resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, British executives were involved and supplying Zimbabwe’s Defense Forces with military equipment and services.97

In January 2003, France invited Mugabe to a Franco-African summit to be held at Paris on the 19th of next month, a day after the expiration of sanctions against the Zimbabwe. The UK, Sweden, Holland and Germany criticized the invitation, but ultimately agreed to it when Paris threatened, if prevented from issuing the invitation, to block the renewal of sanctions against Zimbabwe, which required consensus.98 Immediately after the summit, the sanctions were renewed keeping open the possibility of dialogue if the situation improved, and the European Union issued a statement condemning the government's tyranny in Zimbabwe and demanded from it respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the end of the violence to which the opposition had been subjected.99

The United Kingdom sought to prevent Mugabe from coming to the second EU-Africa Summit that would take place in Portugal in 2003.100 Portugal, like France,

92 MSNBC, “W. House imposes U.S. travel ban on Mugabe, aides”, 22/02/2002, Africa Confidential, “The nomenklatura”, 22/03/2002. 93 ICG Africa Report n. 85. Op. cit. 2004. p. 98; The White House Archives - President George W. Bush, “President Signs Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act” 21/12/2001, The Heritage Foundation, “Zimbabwe's Stolen Presidential Election Demands a U.S. Response”, 14/03/2002, The Standard, “US and UK name targeted leaders”, 16/02/2002. 94 Africa Confidential, “Bad governance”, 06/12/2002, News24, “ Europe must save Africa summit”, 19/12/2002. 95 Africa Confidential, “The nomenklatura”, 22/03/2002. 96 Africa Confidential, “Fame and famine”, 28/06/2002. 97 Africa Confidential, “The British connection”, 25/10/2002. 98 The Guardian, “Several EU Nations Protest Mugabe Plans”, 27/01/2003, BBC, “EU to decide on Mugabe trip”, 27/01/2003, Reuters, “Four EU nations object to Mugabe's Paris visit”, 27/01/2003, Afrol, “EU fails to renew Zimbabwe sanctions”, 27/01/2003, Mail and Guardian, “France scuppers EU Zimbabwe sanctions”, 28/01/2003. 99 Macedonian Press Agency (Greece), “EU Presidency Statement On Restrictive Measures Against Zimbabwe”, 09/04/2003, Zim Independent, “France dismisses Zim claims”, 14/03/2003, EUROPEAN UNION 2005, "2640th Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations - Brussels", 21/02/2003, News24, “EU slams Zim government”, 07/06/2003, Daily News, “EU calls for dialogue to resolve Zimbabwe crisis”, 21/06/2003, EISA, “Zimbabwe: 2005 International statements”, 2005. 100 Reuters, “Blair braced for French row over Mugabe”, 22/01/2003, Mail and Guardian, “UK moves to limit damage over invitation to Mugabe”, 24/01/2003.

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wanted to invite the leader fearing that if he did not, African states would boycott the meeting.101 And indeed, the meeting ended up being postponed because South Africa indicated that if Mugabe was not allowed at the event it would be boycotted by African states. According Nkosazana Dlamani-Zuma, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa“We as Africans are ready to go. The question is, are they ready to receive us? There is no Africa that can exist without Zimbabwe. Africa is indivisible”.102 The EU-Africa summit did not happen again due to disagreements over the Zimbabwe issue until 2007, when Mugabe was invited and the United Kingdom was absent.103

However, as Yeros argues, together with the targeted sanctions, informal sanctions also acted against Zimbabwe through the Western support for the opposition party, the MDC, the diversion of financial flows from Zimbabwe, withdrawal of financial aid and negative propaganda of the Mugabe government in criticisms from members of Western governments and even travel warnings to tourists to avoid the country.104 Zimbabwe became a high-risk country because of its political and economic instability and this, together with the ZDERA, which advised financial institutions to make no contributions to the Mugabe regime unless Zimbabwe’s conditions got better, led to a dramatic reduction in credit lines for Zimbabwean companies.105

The IMF, after declaring Zimbabwe ineligible to use its resources in 2001, ended all technical assistance and suspended loans to the state due to the accumulation of debt and took away its power to vote in the institution, refusing to resume talks with the state until its economy was stable.106 The World Bank continued its assistance to the country, but only channeled by NGOs, to avoid political use of resources by the government.107

Facing this, Mugabe said he was not concerned about the institutions because they were to blame for ruining Zimbabwe's economy. The President also said that the West was happy to see Zimbabwe’s economic decline, so it would be easier to promote a regime change, because the Western powers, led by Britain, were conspiring against his government, seeking to benefit the MDC, their puppet.108

In the name of democracy, the U.S. also pressured African leaders, imposing proof of the African commitment to good governance as condition for investments, trade and support for initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The super power stated that if the Zimbabwe’s situation improved aid would be resumed and it would contribute to the country’s reconstruction with financial and technical resources.109 101 Financial Times, “EU to assess Harare sanctions”, 25/01/2003. 102 SAPA, “EU Must Save Key EU/Africa Summit: SA”, 19/12/2002. CILLIERS, J. “From Durban to Maputo A review of 2003 Summit of the African Union”, Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 76, August 2003. PHIMISTER, Ian, RAFTOPOULOS, Brian. “Mugabe, Mbeki & the politics of anti-imperialism”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No.101. 2002. p. 8. 103 Europafrica.net, “Britain’s Voice Weakened at EU-Africa Summit”, 22/10/2010. 104 YEROS, P. “Evolução do Regime Internacional de Sanções Econômicas e o Caso do Zimbábue.” 2007. 105 Financial Times, “US bank tightens credit restrictions to Zimbabwe,” 12/12/2002, Zim Independent, “IMF blasts Zimbabwe again”, 08/08/2003. 106 Africa Confidential, “Not too smart”, 11/10/2002, Daily News, “IMF demands stability before resuming talks”,01/04/2003. International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 01/40, 25/09/2001, International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 02/28, 14/06/2002. International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 03/80, 06/06/2003. 107 Africa Confidential, “Not too smart”, 11/10/2002, Africa Confidential, “Hungry for change”, 31/05/2002. 108 BBC, “Zimbabwe attacks US sanctions”, 23/02/2002, ABC News, “Mugabe Backers Defiant After New U.S. Sanctions”, 23/02/2002. 109 World Socialist Web Site, “US and Britain in plans for "road map" for Zimbabwe”, 19/05/2003, Africa Confidential, “Votes and gaols”, 04/04/2003, Africa Confidential, “Both sides lose”, 13/06/2003.

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In mid 2003, the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell condemned President Mugabe and his government in an article in The New York Times talking about the terrible conditions in Zimbabwe and the suffering of those who opposed the government.110 The North-American sanctions were extended from 20 to 77 members of the Zimbabwean political elite in March 2003, blocking their assets and forbidding transactions between them and the United States.111 The U.S. government also distributed the booklet “Zimbabwe's Manmade Crisis,” said it would lead the campaign of condemnation of Zimbabwe for human rights abuses and continue pressuring African states so that they also pressured Mugabe.112 The belief that Africa could force Mugabe to change his policies became clear when on a visit to Africa, Bush demanded greater efforts by African leaders for a regime change and the resumption of democracy in Zimbabwe.113 Mugabe’s successful mobilization of the South’s support

The crisis in Zimbabwe generated instability in the Southern African region, created a regular flow of refugees to the neighboring countries and attracted negative international attention, repelling investments and foreign capital.114 However, despite disapproving of Mugabe's policies, the African political leaders did not approve the western sanctions, and showed themselves to be compelled by Mugabe’s anti-Western rhetoric, convinced that he was a victim of imperialism and refused to interfere in a crisis they believed was domestic.115

First, believing the land issue was the heart of the crisis, African leaders encouraged negotiations between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom, and later, after realizing the problem was related to the continuity of the ZANU-PF government, Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy treated the crisis as a domestic issue that should be resolved by Zimbabweans, offering to mediate or host meetings between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, but not supporting foreign intervention in the crisis.116

The diplomatic stance African states took on the crisis’ solution did not make the Northern powers happy, as they believed South Africa could, as a regional power, pressure Mugabe into making an agreement with the MDC. South Africa always rejected the possibility defended by U.S. and UK of imposing sanctions on the neighboring state.117 Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth in 2002, when 110 New York Times, “Freeing a Nation From a Tyrant's Grip”, 24/06/2003, CNN, “Powell denounces Zimbabwe's leader”, 24/06/2003. 111 The Guardian, “U.S. weighs sanctions against Zimbabwe”, 08/01/2003, Zim Standard, “US shuns Zimbabwe”, 12/01/2003, Reuters, “US imposes sanctions on Mugabe”, 09/03/2003, Zimbabwe Standard, “US freezes Mugabe and cronies' assets”,09/03/2003, US House of Representatives, “Blocking Property Of Persons Undermining Democratic Processes Or Institutions In Zimbabwe - Message From The President Of The United States (H. DOC. 108-45)”, 06/03/2003, Daily News, “US tightens screws”, 04/05/2003. 112 Press Release: US State Department, “The Situation in Zimbabwe & Implementing Sanctions - Joint Statement Philip Reeker Washington, DC March 12, 2003 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Mark Bellamy and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor J. Scott Carpenter on the Situation in Zimbabwe and Current Steps Towards Implementing U.S. Sanctions”, 14/03/2005, The Australian, “US steps up pressure on Mugabe”, 13/03/20003. 113 NYTimes, “Bush Calls for Changes in Africa to End Wars and Promote Trade”, 27/06/2003. 114 Africa Confidential, “Election Arithmetic”, 08/03/2002. 115 Africa Confidential, “Who's next?”, 16/05/2003, Africa Confidential, “Marching to Masvingo”, 21/11/2003. 116 News24, “No smart sanctions against Zim”, 26/03/2003, Africa Confidential, “Slow to go”, 25/07/2003. 117 The Australian, “US steps up pressure on Mugabe”, 13/03/20003.

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South Africa and Nigeria, which together with Australia composed the Commonwealth troika and decided to suspend Zimbabwe from the organization may seem to contradict the diplomatic posture that Africa had adopted, but this decision was made possible because the troika was basing its decision on the Commonwealth Observer Mission report of the 2002 presidential election, where the conditions in Zimbabwe were harshly criticized and also because South Africa and Nigeria were under Western pressure to show they defended democracy and good governance.118

Seeking to end the marginalization that marked Africa after the Cold War ended, Thabo Mbeki developed the African Renaissance project, and in its context, the NEPAD emerged as a development proposal highlighting the link between economic development and good governance, democracy and human rights and an African responsibility in ensuring this in the continent.119 Recognizing that “development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance,” the project recognized democracy as an African value and foresaw the improvement democracy and human rights in African States and, in return, they would receive foreign investments that would facilitate African integration in the globalized world.120

This project was well received internationally, but Zimbabwe’s presidential elections in 2002 were associated with it, and the African reaction to them, ignoring the election’s problems, was taken as a sample of the lack of African commitment to the good governance and democratic values defended in the NEPAD.121 That is why, before the Commonwealth decision, although South Africa declared Zimbabwe's elections as legitimate, and Nigerian observers said they did not see anything that could compromise the credibility of the electoral process, the Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo also sought to mediate an agreement between the ZANU-PF and MDC, without success.122 Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth was an attempt to restore some credibility to the NEPAD, which didn’t work as expected, and the initiative failed.123

After that episode, Africa resumed its stance on Zimbabwe, portraying the issue as domestic and refusing to pressure Mugabe, a sovereign head of state. When, a year after suspending Zimbabwe, the Commonwealth discussed if the suspension was to be renewed, South Africa and Nigeria were against it, defending the state’s readmission in the organization, because this way it would be easier to negotiate gradual measures with

118 Commonwealth Observer Group, “Final report on the Presidential Election in Zimbabwe March 9 - 11, 2002”, March 2002, Telegraph, “Zimbabwe suspended from Commonwealth”, 19/03/2002. 119 DOPCKE, Wolfgang. “Há salvação para a África? Thabo Mbeki e seu New Partnership for African development.” Rev. bras. polít. int. [online]. 2002, vol.45, n.1. DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. “A inserção internacional da África sob o signo da globalização e do fim da bipolaridade – teses e idéias.” University of Brasília. 120 New Economic Partnership for African Development, October 2001, p. 17, available at http://www.nepad.org/system/files/framework_0.pdf. Thabo Mbeki, “Statement by Deputy President Mbeki at the African Renaissance Conference”, Johannesburg, 28 Sept. 1998, available at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/I998/tmo928.html. 121 DÖPCKE, Wolfgang. Op. cit. 2002 (a). p. 44. International Crisis Group Africa Report N°47. “Zimbabwe: What Next?”. June 2002. Africa Confidential, “Part of the union”, 12/07/2002. TAYLOR, Ian, “Commentary: the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the Zimbabwe Elections: Implications and Prospects for the Future.” African Affairs. No. 101. 403-412. 2002. TAYLOR, Ian. "Africa's leaders and the crisis in Zimbabwe." Contemporary Review. Vol, 344, No.5. June 2002. 122 ICG Africa Report No. 47, Op. cit. 2002. pp. 7-9, 15-17. HAMILL, J. "South Africa and Zimbabwe." Contemporary Review. July 2002. Africa Confidential, “Will the real Thabo Mbeki stand up?”, 17/05/2002. ALDEN, Chris; SOKO, Mills. South Africa’s economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents. J. of Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2005, pp. 370-373. 123 Africa Confidential, “Will the real Thabo Mbeki stand up?”, 17/05/2002.

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Mugabe to deal with the crisis.124 In the end, after much impasse, the Commonwealth decided to suspend Zimbabwe indefinitely, and a special committee was appointed to monitor the country’s situation and decide when, reaching the organization’s democracy standards, it could be readmitted.125 Unhappy with the outcome, Mugabe decided, alone, to withdraw Zimbabwe from the organization.126

The African leaders supported Thabo Mbeki’s mediation initiative between ZANU-PF and the MDC, and the South-African President tried to facilitate talks, but he never pressured Mugabe. This strategy was adopted by South Africa and the other African states because the Mugabe managed to mobilize the principles that inspired African international relations and thus prevented the African leaders from criticizing and pressuring him.

Attributing the country’s problems to the land issue, a vestige of colonialism, and portraying Britain as the cause of its problems Mugabe made it difficult for African and South states to criticize him. The frequent criticisms of Mugabe were used by the leader to denounce a Western conspiracy against him, using the criticism he received to show he was suffering an attempt of recolonization and all who opposed his policies, especially the MDC, where manipulated by Washington and London. This was also important in guaranteeing the Southern support for the leader, as no developing state wanted to be seen as a Western puppet.

Recognizing the crisis within the terms proposed by Mugabe, as the attempt to end a residual condition of the colonial system, it was impossible to address the issue of Zimbabwe out of racial references, making it difficult for Africa to criticize the leader. Mugabe’s land reform represented an attempt to deal with what was, in Mbeki’s words, “one of the enduring legacies of colonialism”, that is, the possession of most of the land by white farmers at the expense of the majority of the population, black Africans.127

In addition, Mugabe is a hero of African independence. When Zimbabwe became independent, its government defended the sovereignty and equality among nations, emphasizing the principles of self-determination and independence, anti-racism and anti-colonialism, and started a foreign policy strongly influenced by the ideology of armed struggle for decolonization and the values defended by the OAU. Therefore, although some voices, such as Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela stood up against Mugabe, the African political leaders, if not supported the President of Zimbabwe, remained silent, favoring a policy of quiet diplomacy led by South Africa as the means to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe, respecting Mugabe’s sovereignty. It is possible to realize the influence of Mugabe's prestige and solidarity among African States in supporting the AU to the initiative of Mbeki and the rare mentions of the crisis made within the organization.

The OAU accepted Mugabe’s claim that the land was the central issue of crisis, and the survival of his political regime, not considered a legitimate basis for political action, was not addressed by the organization, which raised issues such as development, nationalism, liberation and unity between states and peoples of Africa and the solution of the unequal distribution of land that Zimbabwe inherited from its colonial past.128 In

124 The East African Standard, “Exclusion of Zimbabwe Triggers Racism Claims", 06/12/2003, Reuters, “Troika stings Mugabe”, 18/03/2003. 125 Reuters, “Commonwealth extends Zimbabwe suspension indefinitely”, 07/12/20003. 126 IOL, “Mugabe pulls Zim out of Commonwealth”, 08/12/2003, Human Rights First: “Zimbabwe Suspended Indefinitely from Commonwealth”, Royal African Society, “Zimbabwe's Commonwealth Suspension Extended”. 127 MCKINLEY, Dale T. “South African Foreign Policy Towards Zimbabwe under Mbeki”. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 31, No. 100, 2004, p. 357. 128 CLAPHAM, C. Op.cit. 1996. p. 5.

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the 2001 OAU meeting, the Council of Ministers reaffirmed that the land distribution “has always been at the core of the political, economic and social struggle in Zimbabwe” and saw the Western concern about the country’s democracy as “the introduction of extraneous political issues into the land question aimed at shifting focus away from Britain’s responsibilities,” and an attempt to isolate and vilify Zimbabwe, treating the crisis as a bilateral dispute between Zimbabwe and Britain.129

When it became clear that the Zimbabwean crisis was a matter of regime continuity, the issue was avoided by the AU because no member state was interested in proposing the discussion of the issue. Therefore, the theme was avoided between 2002 and 2007, and the organization rejected the African Commission on Human and People's Rights’ (ACHPR) reports on Zimbabwe without discussing them and supported South Africa’s diplomatic mediation of the state’s reconciliation process through the promotion of negotiations between the parties.130

Unlike the AU, the SADC expressed concern about the 2002 presidential election campaign in Zimbabwe and, although respecting Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, in 2002 the organization called on Zimbabwe to respect human rights and organize a free election.131 But when addressing the issue, the organization stressed its solidarity towards Mugabe, declaring the elections as substantially free and fair despite the problems it had and criticizing the Commonwealth suspension and the European and North-American sanctions because they “hurt not only ordinary Zimbabweans but also have profound social and economic implications on the region as a whole,” although how this happened was never explained.132

In 2004, SADC adopted a protocol on principles and guidelines for democratic elections in the region Southern Africa, the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, demanding member states to guarantee regular elections, participation of all its citizens in the democratic processes, political tolerance and freedom of association, equal access in the media for all parties, a judiciary and an impartial electoral system and voter education.133 It is understandable that being a community of Southern African states, SADC members are more concerned about Zimbabwe’s crisis, because its members are the most affected by it. But even after it adopted the principles for democratic elections, SADC didn’t act on the Zimbabwe issue, and after Mugabe assured the organization his government was going to apply the principles to Zimbabwe’s future elections, the organization did not monitor this, accepting his word and delegating any dealings with the crisis to South Africa’s mediation.134

Trying to avoid Zimbabwe’s collapse, South Africa’s moves to contain the crisis were opposite to the West’s public exposure of the country’s problems, criticism of the government and imposition of sanctions, and Mbeki acted diplomatically and secretly,

129 CM/Dec.46 (LXXIV), Draft Decision On The Land Question In Zimbabwe 130 CILLIERS, J. Op. cit. 2003. RAFTOPOULOS, B e SAVAGE, T. (Eds.) Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation. Institute for Justice and reconciliation, Cape Town. 2004. p. 286. The New York Times, “African Leaders Failing Zimbabwe, Prelate Says”, 08/07/2004. 131 Final Communiqué of the extraordinary SADC Heads of State and Government Meeting, Blantyre, Malawi, January 2002. 132 SADC Today, Vol. 6 No. 4, October 2003, EISA, “Zimbabwe: Excerpts from 2002 African observer mission reports”, March 2002. 133 KAGWANJA, Peter. “Zimbabwe’s March 2005 Elections: Dangers And Opportunities”. African Security Review , Vol. 14, No. 3. 2005. pp. 12-13. 134 Final Communiqué of the SADC Heads of State and Government Meeting, Grand Baie, Mauritius, August 2004. Africa Confidential , “On and on and on”, 21/07/2004.

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maintaining open a channel of communication with Mugabe and trying to, through it, negotiate gradual measures. This stance was taken because, there were no guarantees that drastic measures would make Mugabe change his ways, in fact, the history of the leader’s relations with the West showed the opposite, that Mugabe would not be pressured and would see his country destroyed before he gave up the government.

So, trying to maintain some economic opportunities Zimbabwe represented for South African enterprises, Mbeki feared effects of the total disintegration of Zimbabwe, such as the cessation of economic opportunities in the country, the creation of a intense wave of refugees and serious security problems in the region.135 South Africa also didn’t want to be seen as a western stooge, trying to spread its hegemony in Africa but, most importantly, wanted to improve its relations within the continent and be seen as a equal by the other African states, something that was made difficult because of the state’s past marked by the apartheid regime and a foreign policy led by western democratic values instead of African ones that it espoused in the Mandela regime exemplified by the handling of the Nigerian crisis in 1995.136

Therefore, alternating between the characterization of the Zimbabwean problems as a post-colonial problem or a domestic issue, African states maintained their soft stance on the crisis, ignoring serious problems such as the ones generated by the Operation Murambatsvina, which generated serious human rights violations and was actively ignored by African states which, together with Russia and China, prevented it from being dealt with at the UN Security Council.137

Obtaining the South’s support through the mobilization of a anti-western and anti-imperialist ideology that divided the world between the colonized and the colonizers, Mugabe managed to gain power in the midst of the African and Southern states, and, even being weak in terms of material power, the leader gained political strength from their solidarity that allowed him to guarantee the survival of his regime, even under Western sanctions.138

Because of Mugabe’s prestige as a symbol of African liberation and anti-imperialism, he counted on the support from the South, support that was not made vocally, but came in the shape of financial aid to Zimbabwe, cooperation agreements and the general refusal to talk about the crisis, seen at the AU, the SADC and even in African, Chinese and Russian actions to not allow it to be discussed in the UN.

It was only in 2007, after the deterioration of the conditions in Zimbabwe increased dramatically and a series of extraordinary SADC summits where convened to encourage negotiations between Mugabe and Tsvangirai that the President gave in and made a political agreement with Tsvangirai which led to the 2008 elections.139

135 PHIMISTER, Ian; RAFTOPOULOS, Brian. Op. cit. 2004, p. 6. ADELMANN, Martin. Op. cit. 2004. pp. 266-271. 136 SCHOEMAN, M; ALDEN, C. “The hegemon that wasn’t: South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe”, Strategic Review for Southern Africa 9, 2003, pp 18–19. GRAHAM, Victoria. “How firm the handshake? South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006”. African Security Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2006, p. 119, 121. 137 International Crisis Group Africa Report N°97, “Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point?”. 2005. p. 16-17. SABC News, “African food crisis spurs UN debate on Zimbabwe”,01/07/2005, IOL, “Mugabe says no to UN housing offer”, 03/11/2005. 138 MAHMUD, Sakah. “Controlling African States’ Behavior: International Relations Theory and International Sanctions against Libya and Nigeria”. In DUNN, Kevin C.; SHAW, Timothy M. [eds]. Op. cit. pp. 129-145. 139 International Crisis Group Africa Report N°132. “Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?”. September 2007. Crisis Group Africa Report N°138, “Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election”, March 2008. p. 2. Final Communiqué of the extraordinary SADC Heads of State and Government Meeting, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, March 2007, Voice of America, “Despite last-ditch Harare demarche, accord eludes S. Africa’s

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These elections were marked by the government withholding the results of the first round for five weeks and by unprecedented levels of violence against the opposition before the second round for President between Mugabe and Tsvangirai.140 The elections were received by the traditional Western rejection and, if not for the Russian and Chinese veto, would have been discussed at the UN Security Council.

The problems of the election were so great that SADC concluded it didn’t comply with its Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections or with the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region and the AU asked Mugabe to negotiate with Tsvangirai and establish a Government of National Unity.141

Facing the worst economic and social conditions in its history and under such international pressure, the Zimbabwean government settled on September 2008 a Global Political Agreement (GPA), dividing the Executive in two between President Mugabe e the new Prime Minister, Tsvangirai, but it was marked from the beginning by ZANU-PF's efforts to prevent any real transfer of power to the MDC.142 The Zimbabwean economy’s conditions improved, but there was no advance on the country’s political situation, the new Constitution wasn’t formulated, farms continued to be invaded, the law was applied selectively, the media controlled, and the ZANU-PF was reluctant to hand power to the MDC, continuing to persecute its members, lawyers and journalists that supported it.143

Noticing this, the Western powers kept their sanctions in place, affirming they would be lifted only when the GPA was fully implemented and the human rights abuses ceased.144 Tsvangirai appealed, on many occasions to the SADC and the AU, who where the guarantors of the GPA, to help solve the outstanding issues of the GPA, only to be faced by a general refusal to pressure Mugabe.145

Mbeki”, 17/01/2008, Zimbabwe Independent, “Zimbabwe: ZANU-PF, MDC sign new constitution”, 19/10/2007. 140 ZESN, “Pre-election update no. 5”, 2008. EISA, “Interim Statement: EISA Regional Election Observer Mission to the 2008 Harmonized Elections in Zimbabwe”, 31/03/2008. EISA, “Zimbabwe: 2008 Presidential Run-off”, 14/07/2008. 141 SADC Election Observer Mission, “Preliminary Statement on the Presidential Run-off and House of National Assembly By-elections held on 27 June 2008”. Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries, “The Observation Statement submitted to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission”, Africa Confidential, “Deaths and deals”,04/07/2008. Assembly/AU/Res.1 (XI) 142 NewZimbabwe, “Memorandum of understanding between ZANU-PF and MDC”, 21/07/2008, EISA, “Zimbabwe: 2008 Peace Negociations”, setembro 2008, NYTimes, “Zimbabwe: South African Leader to Press for Deal”, 09/08/2008, Africa Confidential, “Political theatre”, 19/09/2008. 143 Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°70, “Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition”, 2010, p. 2. Associated Press, “Zimbabwe inflation falls, survival battle goes on”, 09/04/2009, Africa Confidential, “A new federation”, 06/03/2009, Africa Confidential, “The hard road to a new constitution”, 26/06/2009, Africa Confidential, “Greed, gold and grit”, 28/08/2009, Africa Confidential, “Parliamentary prosecutions”, 07/08/2009. 144 International Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°59, “Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government”, 20/04/2009, Financial Gazette, “Zimbabwe: Delegation to IMF Returns Empty-Handed”, 30/04/2009, Pambazuka, “Donors won’t cough up without change”, 14/05/2009. 145 The Herald, “Zimbabwe: MDC-T Turns to SADC, AU”, 18/05/2009, VOA, “Zimbabwe's MDC Formally Requests Southern African, AU Intervention in Unity Dispute”, 18/05/2009, SW Radio Africa, “Zimbabwe: MDC Calls for Urgent SADC Summit”, 01/06/2009, SW Radio Africa, “Zimbabwe: SADC Will Not Convene Full Summit to Discuss Issues in GPA”, 02/06/2009, 31/08/2009, SW Radio Africa, “Southern Africa: SADC Agrees to Convene Special Summit On Zimbabwe”, 07/09/2009, SW Radio Africa, “SADC in U-Turn over Special Summit”, 08/09/2009, The Herald, “SADC snubs MDC-T”, 09/09/2009, SW Radio Africa, “SADC Want 'Sanctions' Against Mugabe And Cronies Lifted”, 09/09/2009, Communiqué of the 29th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, 10/09/2009.

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All the deadlines given by SADC expired and the problems were not solved, and the organization responded giving Mugabe more time. Mugabe knew that, in John Makumbe’s words, Africa “has always supported Mugabe, and he could afford to be stubborn and resistant to democracy,” because he knew he would not be pressured.146

In the SADC’s 2010 summit, the organization accepted Mugabe’s conditions that he wouldn’t respond to Tsvangirai’s demands until the Western sanctions were suspended. Therefore, instead of pressuring the leader, the African leaders recognized the Western sanctions as a reason why Zimbabwe’s crisis deepened, increasing the country's economic problems and political contradictions, and designated the South African, Zambian and Namibian Presidents to ask the Western powers to end their sanctions.147

Conclusion

Against all expectations, Mugabe remained as Zimbabwe’s head of state for

three decades, dodging the pressure from the North. This is because while the North has privileged Western liberal democratic values, the South, fearing the weakness of its states’ structures, favored the principles of juridical sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference and did not use public criticism to pressure Mugabe or threatened the head of state with sanctions. They encouraged South Africa’s policy of quiet diplomacy mediating the crisis, first between Zimbabwe and Britain, and later between the ruling ZANU-PF and the MDC, always respecting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty.

When the African political leaders broke the traditional silence about Zimbabwe’s problems, they spoke favorably about Mugabe and recognized external factors as the source of the crisis. The vocal support was not all, and states such as South Africa and China periodically sent funds to Zimbabwe to prevent its collapse. These dynamics continued to be repeated over the years until present days, being a determinant factor for the continuation of the regime of Robert Mugabe.

This doesn’t mean Africa and the South support the repression and violence the Zimbabwean government submits its people to. The destruction of Zimbabwe, which Mugabe showed could happen to guarantee the continuity of his regime, threatened Chinese businesses in the country and African initiatives such as the NEPAD. The South supported Mugabe because the African leader managed to build, through his rhetoric and actions, an image of the Zimbabwean crisis as part of the fight for independence and against colonialism, and of himself as a political hero who fought for his country’s independence and for the right of his people to land.

Already respected in the South as the champion of Zimbabwe’s independence and a ruthless combatant of the apartheid regime, when Mugabe begun to be criticized by the North, he manipulated the criticism and actions against him to prove his version of the origin of Zimbabwe’s problems. The issues the leader raised such as the land distribution and the ties the opposition had with the West made it difficult for Southern political leaders to criticize him, because the land distribution is a real issue in Africa and much of the developing world and no leader wanted to be seen as a Western stooge.

Due to Mugabe’s cunning strategies, the pressure put against him by the world’s great powers backfired and instead of forcing a regime change in Zimbabwe, ended up

146 Los Angeles Times, “Zimbabwe opposition agrees to a unity government with Mugabe”, 31/01/2009. 147 SW Radio Africa, “Mugabe Says Poverty Remains High Because of Targeted Sanctions”, 22/09/2010, SW Radio Africa, “Mugabe Reneges On GPA Implementation”, 20/08/2010, Zimbabwe Independent, “SADC Sets Up Presidential Team On Sanctions”, 30/09/2010.

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strengthening the support he had from the South, which allowed the ZANU-PF orchestrated crisis to continue to this day.

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