60 ARMY � September 2010

This article is part of ARMY Maga-zine’s ongoing commemoration ofthe Army’s service to Americaduring the Korean War, whichbegan 60 years ago and endedthree years later on July 27, 1953.The retrospective series coveringthe war and its aftermath will runthrough 2012. This article appearedin the January 1951 issue of ARMY.

By LTC James H. Lynch

60Korean

Warat

Task ForcePenetrationTask Force

Penetration

September 2010 � ARMY 61

Soldiers of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st CavalryDivision, move north of Chipyong-ni, Korea, onan M4A3 tank in late February 1951.

t 1700 on September 21, 1950, near Tabu-dong,

which is 12 miles north of Taegu, LTC

William A. Harris, commander of the 7th

Cavalry Regiment, issued a warning or-

der. As soon as the 1st Battalion had

taken Tabu-dong and joined with the

8th Cavalry about 2 miles south of it, the order

read, I would organize Task Force Lynch and

move my force in a motorized column to seize

and secure the river-crossing at Sonsan on the

Naktong, some 25 miles to the northeast.

The territory my force would move through

to get there was held by part of the North Ko-

rean 1st and 3rd Divisions. These elements

had been badly mauled by the 1st Cavalry

Division and the Republic of Korea (ROK)

1st Division in 10 days of recent fighting

around Waegwan, Tabu-dong and the walled

City of Kasan. The enemy appeared about

aaPhotographs: U.S. Army

To link up with the 31st Infantry Regiment, a task

force of the 7th Cavalry Regiment drove 178 miles

through enemy territory, engaging in a sharp skir-

mish at a river-crossing on the first night and a

remarkable tank-killing spree on the final night.

ready to collapse and pursuit to the Naktong River wouldfollow the breakthrough.To make up the task force, my 3rd Battalion was to be re-

inforced by two platoons with a total of seven M4 tanks;also, the regimental intelligence and reconnaissance (I&R)platoon, one engineer company with a bulldozer, a 4.2chemical mortar platoon and the 77th Field Artillery Bat-talion, less one battery. We would also have an air controlparty to furnish us air cover.By 1900, the 7th Cavalry took Tabu-dong and joined the

8th Cavalry to the south. I moved the battalion into aperimeter defense for the night of the 21st, just west of Tabu-dong, closing by 2200 hours. My staff at once went to workplanning the task force organization with the idea of settingout on the new mission at 0600. At 0200 LTC Harris and hisstaff came to our command post (CP) and confirmed hiswarning order with an execution time of 0630, September22. The planning was done by 0330, and I called for a meet-ing of all commanders for first light at 0530.But around 0400, some 2,000 North Koreans let loose.

They had been trapped between the 7th and 8th CavalryRegiments and now tried to break through and get away tothe north. Their supposed escape route included our battal-ion perimeter and the area just to the east of it. For the nexttwo hours we were busy. But repeated banzai attacks intothe CP and the area around it were all repelled, and theNorth Koreans finally shifted their escape effort to the west.I had decided that we couldn’t organize the task force

under fire, and the regimental commander approved theidea of holding up the commanders’ meeting until the lo-cal situation cleared. We held it at 0600 and set 0800 as thehour for Task Force Lynch to move out.At that hour the I&R platoon led out, followed in order by

the two tank platoons, the engineer company, my commandgroup, Company L, Company K, Battalion Headquarters

Company, Company M, Company Iand the field artillery battalion (minus).We went 5 miles without incidentthrough a devastated country. The AirForce had done a complete job of de-stroying enemy weapons, tanks andammunition along that route. About 5 miles out, the point came

under sporadic small-arms fire and de-ployed to return it. I went up and gotthem back in their vehicles with in-structions to push right through any-thing except determined resistance.Farther along, the point was againhalted several times by hand grenad-ing from the paddies on the right of theroad. With the assistance of the divi-

sion commander, GEN Gay, and assistant division comman-der, GEN Allen, this brief resistance was also eliminated,and the column moved on. Our pursuit had been so imme-diate and aggressive that the enemy had had no time tomine the road. After the hand-grenade fight, I decided thatthe tanks should lead the column and had the I&R platoonfollow them. The column now continued rapidly, and therewas little resistance.Throughout the move, the air patrol kept attacking the

fleeing enemy column 5 to 10 miles ahead of us with goodeffect.As the tanks rounded a bend of the road at Naksong-

Dong, the lead tank was hit by fire from two antitank gunsconcealed by the road about 200 yards ahead. On order, thetanks pushed forward and eliminated the two guns, allow-ing the column to keep on moving.

At this point I received an air-dropped messagefrom 1st Cavalry Division headquarters. It wasunsigned and unauthenticated. It changed ourobjective to the ferry-crossing at Naktong-Ni,some 10 miles beyond our original objective.After a talk with GEN Gay, who was still with

us and didn’t know about this change, it was decided thatwe would keep on toward Sonsan, as originally ordered. Wewould verify the change of orders as we moved. Verificationwould probably come before we reached Sonsan.Several miles farther on, the I&R platoon got involved in

a grenade fight with a squad of North Koreans holed up ina culvert beside the road. It was a peculiar and amusingfight to watch. As I came up, I saw the I&R men dash up tothe ditch and drop grenades into it and then dash back. Atonce several enemy grenades came out of the culvert, andthe I&R platoon scattered away from them. One I&R jeepwas stalled in the road above the culvert. In trying to placea close one in the culvert, one scout missed and landed hisgrenade right under his own jeep. It caught fire andburned briskly. But after 10 minutes of the fight, the culvertbecame quiet and the column proceeded again. At 1530, we came in sight of Sonsan on the Naktong, and

62 ARMY � September 2010

LTC James H. Lynch, Infantry, was commanding officer, 3rdBattalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, at the time hewrote this article. He was a 1938 graduate of the MilitaryAcademy at West Point.

U.S. troops dig in against the communist-led North Korean invaders. Task ForceLynch endured repeated enemy attacksas it pushed forward.

still there was no verification of the changed mission. AnI&R scout came running back to report a large enemycounterattack coming across the river. I dismounted Com-pany L and started forward with them to block it. Whenwe reached the head of the column, we could find no resis-tance there. We did find a rather shamefaced lieutenant,who explained that his message must have been garbled.

It was 1600 now, and our immediate concern was secu-rity for the night. There was still no word on the changein our orders. We were 25 miles in enemy territory. Iknew nothing about the situation except in my own im-mediate area. I did have permission from the divisioncommander to hole up for the night on my original ob-

jective at least until the change was verified. So we pulled inthe two-hour-long column and organized a perimeter. Wehad just gotten this done, at 1800, when the orders camethrough to head immediately to Naktong-ni, 10 miles north,and secure the river-crossing there. The delay wasn’t entirelywasted. We had spent our time flushing out some 50 NorthKoreans hiding in the paddies and the surrounding hills.Just as the sun went down at 1900, the lead tank moved

out with infantrymen riding on it. The rest of the columnfollowed. A bright three-quarter moon helped out enoughto make our progress steady and smooth. About halfwayto the new objective, we began to pass some burning vil-lages. Soon we ran into the rear of a retreating North Ko-rean column.We followed a novel procedure. Instead of opening fire,

we merely kicked them in the pants and started them to therear with their hands on their heads and without any guards.After nearly 5 miles of this, the head of the column

halted for some reason, and I went forward to see what thetrouble was. I found the head of the column had reached abluff overlooking the river-crossing. Just as I arrived, atank opened fire and a tremendous fire flared up just infront of the lead tank. Then all hell broke loose. It was anenemy ammunition truck loaded with heavy stuff, and itbegan to blow up a part at a time. By the light of the fire itmade, we could see a column of about 400 enemy foottroops crossing the river on the sunken bridge below thebluff to our left. Our tanks commenced firing on them, butfor some reason word was shortly passed back to cease fir-ing. But in a few minutes the staff got both tanks and in-fantry to take up the fire again, and the resulting slaughterin the river was terrific.In all this confusion, word spread back to our own foot

soldiers that the big explosions up ahead (from the ammu-nition truck) were enemy infantry dropping grenades onus from the bluff above us on our right. I sent a platoon upon the bluff to end that rumor and secure that flank, andthen concentrated on the actual fight, which kept up foranother 10 minutes.By that time, the explosions from the ammunition truck

had set fire to several others, and shells, grenades andsmall-arms ammunition were bursting and popping andwhizzing all over the place. One shell came into the middleof the forward CP and wounded a tanker, so we immedi-ately backed the column off about a hundred yards. But areconnaissance of the fire up ahead did reveal that we hadcaught a large number of enemy field pieces and trucksand several tanks, all abandoned.At this stage, a quick estimate revealed: (1) It was 2300

hours. (2) There was a sizable fire block to reduce beforewe could proceed. (3) We still had to secure the far bank ofthe river to fulfill our mission. (4) I could only guess at thecontinuation of the road on the far bank to determine theobjective for a river-crossing. (5) The road was so narrowand so jammed that the assault boats back at the rear of thecolumn probably couldn’t be brought forward.The engineers (less their one bulldozer that had broken

through a bridge at the rear of the column) and the tanks,too, went to work on the block and got the six burning ve-hicles and guns off the road before the fire spread any fur-ther. This took several hours and involved many individ-ual acts of genuine heroism, when you consider theexplosive situation and the intense heat. During the sametime it was possible to pull the undamaged enemy equip-ment ahead of the fire out of the road, and there we foundsome 50 usable trucks of different sizes. Many still bore theunit markings of American outfits—equipment lost duringthe July withdrawal. Besides the trucks there were 20 ar-tillery pieces and two tanks. We picked up two other aban-doned tanks farther to the rear.This clearing operation continued for the rest of the

night. While it was going on, I sent an engineer reconnais-sance party across the river to investigate the crossing siteand also an I&R squad to reconnoiter the far bank. Theunit commanders were called together, and at 0200 they re-

64 ARMY � September 2010

Night Fight at Naktong-ni River-Crossing, September 22, 1950.

ceived a tentative order to begin crossing in column on thesunken bridge at 0430 with Company K in the lead, Com-pany I to follow and Company L securing the high groundon the near bank. This last was necessary because POWshad said that more than a battalion had dispersed into thehills on the near bank when our task force got there. Iknew, also, that the enemy behind us might come up onour rear, hoping to use the crossing as an escape route.I moved the mortars up, and the tanks also took position

on the bluff to support the crossing by fire. The machine-gun sections were attached to the crossing companies, andthe 75 mm recoilless rifle platoon took up blocking positionson the near bank on the road leading to the north.At 0300, the reconnaissance patrol reported back that

troops could cross the underwater bridge waist deep andgave the location of the road on the far side. They had noinformation on just how the road on the far side ranthrough the mountain, so I guessed about where it shouldgo and assigned objectives to I and K Companies based onthis guess. Guides from the I&R men who had alreadycrossed the river once on reconnaissance were assignedthose companies, and the attack was confirmed for 0430.At 0400, the attack companies picked up their forward ob-servers from the mortars and artillery, their guides fromI&R and wire teams from the battalion communicationsplatoon. At 0430, the lead element of Company I movedinto the icy water over the sunken bridge.The current was swift and the footing tricky. Men lost

their footing and had to be pulled out. And just as the leadcompany entered the river, another of the long list of unex-pected incidents occurred. Right at the exit of the sunkenbridge on the far side of the river, a pile of ammunition be-gan to burn and explode. What started it I don’t know. Itmay have been smouldering from our firefight and sud-denly fanned into flames by a breeze. Or North Korean sol-diers may have set it going for the very purpose it served.At any rate, the whole area of the bridge exit was nowlighted up and all the secrecy of our crossing lost. It was a

weird sight—the troops swarming outof the river and ducking fast aroundthe exploding ammunition pile. Butby 0530 as dawn broke, the two com-panies were across and moving on totheir objectives.As it grew brighter, I studied the

terrain from my observation post andsaw that the road veered to the rightfrom the direction I had thought ittook at the time of my original moon-light estimate. I called the companycommanders on the radio and shiftedtheir objectives. But half an hour laterby the time the morning mist raisedand full daylight had come, there wasthe road right where I had guessed itwas by moonlight. A second radio callgot the companies back on the right

track, and by 0730 we could radio the regimental comman-der “mission completed.”In 23 hours, the task force had penetrated 36 miles into

enemy territory; captured five tanks, 50 trucks and 20 fieldpieces; made a night river crossing; secured our divisionbridgehead; and killed or captured more than 500 of theenemy.

On the next day, September 23, the 1st Battalion,7th Cavalry, passed through our 3rd Battalion,crossing the river and occupied Sangju, 10 milesfarther to the north. That night my task forcemarched to Sangju, closing by 0600 September24. At 1100 that day, Company K, commanded

by CPT John Flynn, with company attachments and a pla-toon of tanks, pushed forward to Poun, 30 miles northwest,and secured that town by 1730 with only minor opposition.On the 25th, the rest of the task force moved up to Poun andreconnoitered roads to the north. We found them impass-able and returned to Poun on the night of the 25th.At 1000 on September 26, I received orders to move the

task force north immediately to effect a junction with the 7thInfantry Division at Osan, 55 air miles (102 road miles) dis-tant. The head of the column—an I&R squad and three M4tanks—moved out at 1130. We went for many miles withoutopposition and with cheering crowds of liberated South Ko-reans greeting us along the way. At 1730, the column had tohalt temporarily. The tanks had run out of gas. The refueltruck that was supposed to be in the column had failed tojoin up. So we collected the gas cans from all the trucks inthe column which gave us enough to fill up three of our sixtanks. Then, just at the right moment, a North Korean main-tenance convoy of three trucks bumped into the head of ourcolumn. The drivers bailed out, and we looked over theirloads. There was enough gas to refuel our other three tanks,so we were soon on our way again.The regimental commander, COL Harris, who was with

us now had a bold idea. He authorized us to proceed with

66 ARMY � September 2010

Soldiers of the 9th Infantry Regiment man an M-26 tank to awaitan enemy attempt to cross the Naktong River in September 1950.

lights at my discretion. I gave this order and also instructedthe three lead tanks to move aggressively to Osan and thennorth to Suwon if the 7th Division was not at Osan. Thethree lead tanks were followed by the I&R squad, the engi-neer platoon, the command group, Company I, CompanyL, Headquarters Company, the artillery battery and Com-pany K. The remaining three tanks joined the tail.

The moon was up but clouds obscured our vi-sion. Behind us were miles of lights windingthrough enemy-held territory. Not long afterdark, I could tell by the lights that our threelead tanks were moving faster than the truckcolumn could, but all efforts to slow them down

by -300 radio failed. After riding point for several miles, webegan to see groups of 15 or 20 North Korean soldiers ineach village we passed, and they were apparently just assurprised to see us as we were to see them. The next vehiclebehind me was some distance back, so I decided that dis-cretion was in order rather than valor and held fire.About that time, a quick mental review of Field Manual

(FM) 7-20 revealed no situation in which the battalion com-mand group is supposed to act as point for a column in en-emy territory. So we pulled over and put a platoon of in-fantry in trucks out ahead as point, with a 3.5 rocket launcherand a .50-caliber machine gun.

We took up the march again and along the way shot upone truckload of North Korean soldiers who refused tosurrender. We were now 10 miles from Osan and continu-ing to encounter isolated groups of enemy whom we firedupon and killed or dispersed. Pretty soon we began to heartank or artillery fire and see sporadic small-arms tracer firesome distance ahead. I decided the parade was over andordered the lights turned off.Just short of Habang-ni, we bypassed a bridge and contin-

ued on through the village. To the right of us, 20 yards off theroad, we noticed an enemy tank with its tube pointed rightacross the road. I made some joke about it to the S-3, CPT Ce-cil Curles, thinking it was like the others we had passed thatthe Air Force had destroyed, but I ducked under the line offire of its tube.Just as we passed the tank, the solemn voice of CPT John-

ston, commanding the regimental mortar company, cameover the radio: “Don’t look now, but to our right is a T34.”Almost at that very moment, the tank opened up with ma-chine-gun and cannon fire. We pulled over and hit the ditchand so did the rest of the column. The tank, along with itsbrother also in ambush, continued to fire up and down theroad, over our heads in every direction.This kept up for several minutes while I said my prayers

and took stock. The S-2, LT John Hill, pushed ahead andpulled back the point (the platoon of infantry and their pre-

cious 3.5-inch rocket launcher). Wecould not tell, but we felt sure thetanks had some infantry with them. SoLT Nicholas, the artillery liaison officer(FM says nothing about this for ar-tillery liaison officers or S-2s, either) or-ganized an attack on the tank area withthe platoon and the bazooka team.Meantime, CPT Curles, the S-3, was

trying to make contact on the -608 withthe regimental commander, or S-3—anybody—without success. The tankkept on firing down the road andacross the fields. CPT Curles and Iworked our way across the road as thetank hunters moved toward their tar-get. As they moved up, the enemytanks started their engines and gunnedthem, but didn’t move away. The ba-zooka team then knocked out one ofthe tanks, but before it could get theother, it moved out and started downthe column. After running over severalof our own vehicles, it went off into thepaddies on the right side of the road forseveral hundred yards and from thereopened fire on the column. MAJ Hall-den, my executive officer, had orga-nized the antitank action in the middleof the column. A 75 mm recoilless riflereturned the enemy fire, and this halted

68 ARMY � September 2010

Tank Killing at Habang-ni, September 26, 1950.

the tank but didn’t stop its fire. But now a bazooka team withCPT James Webel, regimental S-3, and LT Woodside, com-mander of Company L, closed with the other tank and de-stroyed it. CPT Webel administered the coup de grâce with acan of gasoline into the engine. The gas exploded and blewhim off the tank, but he suffered only minor burns.While this battle with the tanks was going on, the situation

was still confused up at the head of the column. The villageand several of our trucks were burning. This cast a strangelight over the whole scene. And at this juncture we couldhear the roar of tank engines and the clank of tracks comingfrom the north. The first optimistic thought I had was thatthey were the three point tanks that had run away from usearlier in the evening. But then the clank of the tracks gotclearer as they came over the hill some 800 yards ahead, andI began to feel less cheerful about them. I told CPL Howard,my driver, to get up forward quick and throw the lead 2 1/2-ton truck across the road to block it. He dashed out and jock-eyed the truck into position. The brakes failed to hold, butHoward deliberately stayed right with it until he had it accu-rately placed, with the North Korean tanks coming downupon him less than a hundred yards away.Finally the tanks—two of them—pulled up less than 10

yards from the truck (Howard had bailed out by this time).The commander inquired in Korean the equivalent of, “Whatthe hell goes on here?” This settled all doubt in the minds ofAmerican bystanders (an inaccurate term: we were still lowin the ditch), and we opened with rifle fire to make the tanksbutton up. The reaction was immediate and positive. Ma-chine guns and cannon opened up, and the truck burst intoflames. This was a most lucky break because it delayed thetanks for 10 minutes—while our three remaining tanks weremoving up and engaging in battle and the bazooka teamsdown the column were organizing for action.Then followed a strange and fascinating sight. Our three

M4s moved up in column into the fire-lit battle area andexchanged shots with the enemy tanks. They closed finallyto a range of 10 yards, both still firing. But then it became

obvious that our M4s were defeated after accounting forone of the T34s. The enemy tanks then moved on downour column and into the paddies on its flank. By this time,the total of enemy tanks that had come up was 10.One enemy tank carefully picked its way down the col-

umn after running over several jeeps, and as it went it firedbursts of machine-gun fire into the radiators of each vehicle.About this time, CPT Robert B. McBride, headquarters

commandant, not fully understanding the situation andthinking the tank to be friendly, got out in the road andgave the North Korean tanker hell for overrunning his jeepand told him not to be so careless. The answer was a burstof machine-gun fire. It creased CPT McBride, and, at a cer-emony next day, he was awarded the “Order of the PurplePants.” He at once gave up directing traffic, and the tankmoved on. But a 105 mm howitzer of Battery C, 77th FieldArtillery Battalion, commanded by CPT Wardlow, whichhad gone into hasty position, blew the turret off the tank ata range of 30 yards.

From the head of the column I moved back to re-join the lead rifle company and find COL Harris.I located both and also found that the tank fight-ers were still active. For the next hour, thebazookas went after tanks under the personal di-rection of CPT Webel, regimental S-3, LT Hill, my

S-2, and LT Nicholas, artillery liaison officer with the battal-ion. The tank fighters stopped them with their 3.5-inchlaunchers and finished them with grenades and gasoline.The regimental commander decided we had better hole

up on position and reorganize before going any farther. Inthe dark, we rounded up the scattered groups of riflemen,got the company commanders together, organized aperimeter defense, and took stock of the damage on bothsides. On the enemy side, we had destroyed seven T34tanks; three had withdrawn. On our own side, we had losttwo tanks, about 15 vehicles, two men killed and 28wounded. The battle had lasted about two hours.By 0200 on September 27, the position was secure. I sent

out a tank-killer reconnaissance patrol to look for the otherenemy tanks. They reported back at 0530 with no success.At 0700 on September 27, the battalion was organized

for a foot approach march to Osan, now 4 miles distant.Just as Company L, the advance-guard company, was leav-ing its position, a burp gun opened up from somewherewithin its area. Without hesitation the nearest platoon, un-der LT Woodside, closed in with marching fire and si-lenced the gun. It didn’t take two minutes.The column moved out. And once more we heard tank

engines just over the hill and tank-cannon fire began to fallto our right. The point, armed with a 3.5 bazooka, closed inand accounted for tank number eight. The rest of themarch was without incident. We linked up with the 31stInfantry (7th Division) at Osan at 0830 on September 27.This time, Task Force Penetration had covered 102 miles,

destroyed or overrun 13 tanks, and killed or capturedabout 200 of the enemy—in 21 hours.

70 ARMY � September 2010

A North Korean tank was destroyed by a napalm bomb alongthe main road to Waegwan, Korea, September 20, 1950.

James H. Lynch graduated from the U.S. Mil-itary Academy at West Point, Class of 1938.He retired as a U.S. Army Brigadier General.

T he President of the United States ofAmerica, under the provisions of theAct of Congress approved July 9,

1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Dis-tinguished Service Cross to LieutenantColonel (Field Artillery) William AllenHarris (ASN: 0-18976), United StatesArmy, for extraordinary heroism inconnection with military operationsagainst an armed enemy of the UnitedNations while serving as Commanding Officerof the 7th Cavalry Regiment (Task Force 777), 1stCavalry Division. Lieutenant Colonel Harris distin-guished himself by extraordinary heroism in actionagainst enemy aggressor forces in the vicinity ofHambung-ni, Korea, on the night of 26–27 September1950. Task Force 777, a regimental combat team, was proceedingon a combat mission when it was ambushed by a hostile force often tanks, supported by infantry. The tanks moved directly intothe friendly column, firing rapidly, smashing vehicles and equip-ment and disorganizing the friendly troops. Colonel Harris, real-izing the perilous situation of his unit, immediately went towardthe head of the column, completely disregarding the intense en-emy fire. He quickly evaluated the situation, then personally reor-ganized his men and led them in a counterattack. Inspired by thedauntless actions of their commander, the men overwhelmed theenemy force, knocked out the ten tanks, destroyed five artillerypieces, and captured twelve enemy trucks. The extraordinaryheroism and fearless leadership of Colonel Harris were directlyresponsible for the annihilation of the enemy force. �

T he President of the United States of America, under theprovisions of the Act of Congress approved July 9, 1918,takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service

Cross to Lieutenant Colonel (Infantry) James Henry Lynch (ASN: 0-21237), United States Army, for extraordinary heroism in connectionwith military operations against an armed enemy of the United Na-tions while serving as Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion, 7thCavalry Regiment (Infantry), 1st Cavalry Division. LieutenantColonel Lynch distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism inaction against enemy aggressor forces in the Republic of Korea on21 and 22 September 1950. As commander of Task Force LYNCH,Colonel Lynch was assigned the mission of organizing, coordinat-

ing, and directing the tactical operations ofa task force to drive through enemy terri-tory to a junction with Allied Forces nearSeoul. Though faced by a confident en-emy flush from recent victories, ColonelLynch so skillfully maneuvered and em-ployed his force that he confused andcompletely demoralized an enemy whohad tremendous numerical superiority. In-spired by his courage and aggressive leader-ship, the men of Task Force LYNCH, in their

drive northward, annihilated over nine hun-dred enemy troops and destroyed great quantities

of enemy weapons, vehicles, and ordnance stores.

September 2010 � ARMY 71

William A. Harris graduated from the U.S. Mil-itary Academy at West Point, Class of 1933.He retired as a U.S. Army Major General.