Ten strategic audit questions

Ten Strategic Audit Questions

Paul J, Gordon

I t would be erroneous to maintain that strategy as a concept is new. In fact, it is rooted historically in both military and political

usage. Thucydides was named a strutegos, or general of the armies, in about 424 B.C. at the time of the Peloponnesian wars between Athens and Sparta. More recently, the concept has been put to use in work on private sector positioning for competitive advantage, akhough it is no less significant for navigating any unit of enterprise toward a position as a long-term winner. This includes private, public, governmental, institutional, and not-for-profit organizations. The concept counts both at home and abroad, though accountability arrangements, criteria for evalua- tion, and who may be doing the evaluating may differ.

The intended contribution of this strategic audit format is to integrate extant but widely scattered approaches to overall strategy for any unit of enterprise. Though many of these approaches are already familiar, especially to aca- demics, they have been concentrated in one brief exposition here.’ Notwithstanding recent disenchantments with strategic planning, the perspec- tives that follow are meant to be especially useful for practitioners, who may be confounded by differing claims and claimants,

ON ‘IBUNKING STIWI-EGICALLY

A sking the “right” questions early on, based on thinking strategically, is critical to the well-being of any unit of

enterprise, no matter the absence of fully attainable answers. As with diagnosis in the clinical practice of medicine, the crux is to ask the life survival questions-even if answers and remedies are less than certain. Personal experience and public record, however, suggest that first-rate diagnosticians who ask the “right” questions are most difficult to find. And, as with medicine, there may be differences on the merits of various cures.

Similarly says Mintzberg (1994), thinking strategically is distinct from conventional concep-


tions of planning. Terms such as programmed and non-programmed, problem-finding versus problem-solving, and right and left hemi- sphere of the brain come to mind. Thinking strategically is not sol&y analytical, nor solely linear, nor solely deductive, nor solely extrapo- lative from past continuities, nor solely rational in a programmatic sense.

The head work involved in strategizing and that involved in planning differ. They need not be the same; they need not represent a conti- nuity of process; they may even represent a dis- continui~, In contrast to the emphasis on analysis as a hallmark of planning, the distinguishing characteristic of strategic thinking is ~~~t~e~~, commonly called integration.

The concept of strategy, let us concede, may seem somewhat nebulous and unstructured, especially at the outset of any early experience. Even for people considered bright, capacities to deal in the abstract (the strategic and frequently ill-structured) and the concrete (the operational and more likely structured or semi-structured) may vary. Capacities to span and reconcile both kinds of thinking may be less common than sup- posed. Precisely this elusiveness may suggest why even first-rate “strategizers” may not easily describe the workings of their minds even if they intend to be explicit-in helping others.

Some Misleading Conceptions

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s description of his fic- tional detective, Sherlock Holmes, as thinking deductively may have misled generations of readers. When Holmes gathered and tried to match bits of evidence, he was thinking not deductively

but inductively. Only as he proceeded with the process of induction was he in a position to speculate on possible interpretations (hypoth- esize) and apply his fabled deductive capacities. It took both induction ancl decluction-and possi- bly more-to clo what Holmes did.

Likewise, conceptions of scientific thinking and the scientific method as appropriately applied to all aspects of strdtegizing may not work. They do not necessarily reveal the reality of how scientists do science. Nor do subsequently pub

lished antiseptic and lean reports necessarily tell all. They are not so intendecl. Those that cto are exceptions. Are they systematic? For documenting pathways thought to be productive and unpro- ductive, sure. Systematic in reporting results others can replicate? Of course.

However, such reports need not provicle insight into what can often be the ~‘disorderly” process of doing science-or of doing strategy. Even the description of the “scientific method” as four sequential steps (or is it five?) may have greater utility as reconstructed logic for reporting to others after the fact rather than as rules not to

Figure The Ten Strategic Audit Questions

What is our current strategy?

be violated by inexperienced people in need of orientation. What about the joy of serendipity, discovery, surprise? Hunches and intuitions, though hard to diagram, surely have their place. The front eclges of so-callecl “harcl sciences,” like the front edges of strategy. can be “soft.”

A relevant analogy for what follows may be the process of turning :I child’s kaleicloscope over ancl over, with its multiple variations in colored pattern combinations. This image may approxi- mate visually the mental activity involved in positioning a unit of enterprise for strategic alignment and realignment.

ON USING THE QUESTIONS

F or putting to use the strategic audit questions. shown in the Figure, as well as others under these headings, there is no

fixed sequence. What is more clear is that cycling and recycling these questions and their exten- sions may leaci to inferences useful for cliagnosis or to questions not even contemplated here- spinoffs that come to mind for individual readers.

A What business are we in?

This question is all too often taken for granted or avoided. But once subjected to critical examination, it can be extremely difficult to answer. Peter F. Trucker has emphasized the importance of this question for many years. And though it is posed first in this sequence, it need not be answerecl first, as frequently prescribed. The reality is that practicing executives may have more sense of intended direction than they have clearly operd- tional specifics to be shared with others. For this exercise, it is conceivable that the question of what business we are in may be answered only belatedly as answers to other questions are tenta- tively pursued.

An important aspect of this question is whether the enterprise is in one line of business, a relatecl line of businesses. or an unrelatecl line of businesses. LJnbelievable as it may seem, established and apparently successful enterprises can slip into any one of the foregoing without full awareness of the implications. Each may call for differing technological, marketing, and managerial capacities. The core competence required for each might not match that which exists. Yet research has tied various degrees of differentia- tion of the kinci just suggested to differing levels of financial performance.

The role of statements. It should be evident that widely differing responses on what the enterprise is intended to be (its mission, its rea- son for being) can have considerable impact on any continuing effort to coalign external opportunities and internal resources. Statements of mis-

13usiness Horizons / September-October 1997

sion and objectives are sometimes couched in broad, even vague terms and may be dismissed as votes for virtue without any real use as guides in operational decisions. Breadth may be intended externally for public consumption and internally to avoid divisiveness. Granting these considerations, however, like the distinction between the broad construction of a constitution and the more specific construction of bylaws, it would seem essential for dealing with the enterprise that those designated to conduct its affairs know what business or businesses are at the core.

What business might we be in? Even more taxing is the question of what business (or businesses) we should exit. If we are in the wrong business altogether, then what’s next? One time- honored prompt is to ask: What business can we be in here and now as a function of present internal resources? What business might we be in as a function of foreseeable external and future resources? What business do we want to be in as a function of owner and managerial preferences? What business ought we to be in as a function of societal and personal values? and, What might it take to reconcile responses to these queries? Ideas that do not surface immediately may even- tually come to light as the questions that follow are recycled.

A What is our current strategy?

Among principals concerned with navigating an enterprise or any of its major subunits, consensus on strategic intent and direction must be shared. Energies need to be focused. On what basis do we seek to secure advantage? Lack of strategy and lack of consensus can be fatal, so the question bears asking. To adapt from George Leland Bach in the Carnegie Report (19591, in the end it is the responsibility qf the principals to see what decisions the future may require, to see that those decisions are made and implemented, to forge consensus, and to provide.for ongoing reappraisal and correction.

Some writers assert that mission and objectives should be settled, and that from these the consideration of “how” choices of strategy should follow. Others hold that strategy incorporates a more encompassing view that transcends the “how“ alone. When intended advantage is not seen, mission and objectives may be part of the whole mix to be reconsidered. Fixed linear se- quencing may thwart creative insight. Executives should try reversal, or more than one sequence, to avoid hang-up.

Whether strategies are to be in writing may depend on the intensity of rivalry-even piracy- that characterizes a given industry. Although se- crecy and time advantage may be of short dura- tion, a blanket policy of having everything in

writing may be less than prudent. Moreover, even though competitive strategies may be fathomable in time, lead time may be a critical advantage. This note of reality for exceptional circumstances, however, is not meant to suggest opposition to strategies in writing. They may often be prefer- able, especially for. say, internal consumption. Nevertheless, they probably should not be taken as fixed for all time.

Uses of well-known SWOT. A long recog- nized, elementary, but still useful start on strategic assessment is the SWOT approach. The acro- nym incorporates strengths (which may he more internal to the enterprise), weaknesses (also more internal), opportunities (more external), and threats (more external). Applications of SWOT that result only in listing and describing are a starting point, but one of limited use. More fruit- ful is analysis that pairs off, for example, opportunities related to strengths and threats related to weaknesses. However it is done, the search is for trade-offs that facilitate positives and hedge nega- tives, both current and future ones, considering present and alternative strategies. For this exercise, one might advocate getting at the external factors early enough so as not to get bogged down in the internals.

Examples of generic options. Generic strategies of being the low-cost leader, differenti- ating product or service. and segmenting the market on the basis of territory, clientele, and so forth have been widely publicized. Add to such choices those of being first or deliberately being a follower. One may place bets on being tops in research, getting R&D results early to market, distribution, or service. The idea of excelling on the basis of tOtd quality management (TQM) is widely known. Publicized strategies involving total quality, in the full value-added chain from initial source to ultimate consumers, may be less than consummated. The caveat would be to add value that can yield a return.

Timing and location are clearly potential, measurable strategies. Location is still a strategy in some settings, such as retailing (although real- time electronic access may override this). Strate- gic options also include, but are not limited to: horizontal, vertical, forward, and backward integration; outsourcing, licensing, and franchising; expanding or contracting; product development, market development, or both; strategic alliances with suppliers, distributors, and buyers-even competitors-on a selective basis; mergers and acquisitions; nichemanship; and various ways of thinking globally and operating locally.

A What forces are shaping competition?

The work of Michael Porter places the issue of strategic choice in the context of industry struc-


tures. In his well-publicized basic work (1980) and thereafter, he concentrates on five points: a model of forces that shape competition, discus- sion of generic strategies, identification of strategies at differing stages of industry development, the value-added chain noted above, and his later work on global strategies.

Porter’s five (six) forces. The five forces said by Porter to shape competition are:

1. relative ease of entry into an industry; 2. the possibility of substitute products, mate-

rials, or technologies; 3. relative bargaining power of resource sup-

pliers; 4. relative bargaining power of distributors

and consumers; and 5. intensity of rivalry within the industry. Further, Porter acknowledges the sixth force,

with potential impact on all the others, as gov- ernment. And for all six, there are variations both at home and abroad. Of major importance in a global market, the players, how they play, and the impact of competitive forces (including gov- ernment) may differ a great deal from those in the domestic sphere.

For the strategist, relative ease of entry might be an alert as to vulnerability when contemplat- ing entry into such an industry. For incumbents, there are options for raising barriers to entry for potential competitors. Consider patents on technologies, trademarks, and copyrights, or massive allocations to advertising, as in the case of the soft drink industry.

For threats of potential entrants as well as potential substitute products, materials, or technologies, setting the radar to pick up timely warnings from both readily anticipated and less anticipated sources is no easy matter. At a minimum, one gets mired in the trade-offs between the total cost of sufficient and timely information versus the total cost of insufficient or untimely information.

Relative dependence on supplier and dis- tributor networks ultimately translates into bar-

gaining power, potential ad- _ vantage. and potential vulner-

ability. Here, one may exam-

“Even successful ine the current and any alter-

enterprises do not native states of dependence

always correctly on current or other suppliers of inputs and distributors of

ascribe the reasons outputs. It should be clear

for their success. N that any switches in one set of relationships may result in necessary switches in others. The possible combinations are

too numerous to be elaborated upon here. Another of the forces that shape competition

is the intensity of rivalry within an industry. Par- ter has described rivalry among pharmaceutical

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companies as genteel, and that among airlines as severe. The impact of all these forces and, thus, preferred choice among potential alternative strategies may also differ at various stages of industry development, such as embryonic, growth, maturity, and decline.

It should be noted that, for some enterprises, the line of inquiry just elaborated might be applied more effectively at the business unit level than at the corporate level. This is especially true if the two levels are different and if the purpose is to gain accord with extant industrial classifica- tions. This point would hold in cases involving more than one line of business, more than one line of products and services, and more than one set of clients.

A Is there money to be. made?

This question is legitimate for both profit-seeking and not-for-profit units of enterprise. Neither unit enhances credibility among constituents by maxi- mizing losses over extended periods. Both need sufficient funding over time to replenish resources used in conducting activities and to sat- isfy the expectations of respective stakeholders. The core difference between the two rests in legal and tax considerations on what is to be done with profits or losses. So the more demand- ing question is to ask where and at what point money is or might be made (or lost).

Searching an input-output flow. The use of the concepts of TQM and the value-added chain at this point is to picture a kind of flow- process continuum across common business functions. The continuum might originate outside the unit of enterprise from the earliest extraction of raw materials or data (from whatever source) and proceed through varied stages of input, movement, storage, and processing, on through varied intervals of output, and out through one or more intermediate and subsequent distribution networks. At every identifiable interval in the flow, related aims would be to ensure built-in quality, verify where value is added, discover where money is made or lost, figure who benefits in any such gain or loss, and judge whether these activities constitute effective strategies.

Total quality and value-added need not be unrestrained ends in themselves if they do not result in &!SiId~k benefits for which intermediate and ultimate consumers are willing to pay, and if they do not result in satisfactory returns to the enterprise. Moreover, for entities that have de- clared total quality as their distinguishing strategy, at what point might this become the minimal price of entry but cease to be distinguishing as a Strategy?

A benchmarking comparison with others in the same or parts of the same industry might

shed light on the appropriate, attainable, accept- able, and feasible intervals at which money may be made, lost, and returned. Analogous to the classic make-or-buy decision, this examination might also help in deciding what elements of the business to retain, outsource, or exit. Again, however, benchmarking alone may place one along- side but not ahead of others who lead.

A Where is competitive advantage?

Up to this point, our audit may have provided preliminary insight into where competitive advantage may exist for a particular enterprise or sub- unit. Clear answers to such questions are not always self-evident. Even successful enterprises do not always correctly ascribe the reasons for their success. The point here is to ensure that principals seek out, recognize, and reinforce areas of competitive advantage as they may oper- ate presently and for the future.

Without repeating earlier discussions, has competitive advantage been secured or can it be secured among factors perceived more as internal, and over which executives have a greater degree of control? Would it be secured among factors perceived more as external, over which executives have a lesser degree of control but for which they can take initiatives in positioning? Or does present or potential advantage rest in the alignment of internal with external, such as technology with markets?

Information technology advantage. Have executives adapted their unit of enterprise better than others for a rapidly changing, high-tech, competitive, and much-altered demographic and global future? Does advantage rest in an intelli- gence (“radar”) system better attuned than others for environmental scanning? Is there recognition that technologies (including real-time, instant telecommunications) can cut across or render obsolete what might have been seen as national, institutional, and hierarchical boundaries?

Does advantage lie in the capacity to foresee, envision, create, enact, and choose contingent scenario-generated strategies for the future? Does it rest in any of the many possible alternative strategies named earlier? Does it rest as much or even more in implementation, including concen- tration, staffing, facilities, resource allocation, and follow-up (to be discussed shortly)? If competitive advantage cannot be identified, then why are we in this business?

A What is our distinctive competence?

In contrast to the point above, this has to do with the distinctive competence of executives, profes- sionals, scientists, creative people, technicians, and others most essential to competitive advan-


tage for the enterprise. This includes the effect of their joint efforts and the time it takes to build relationships and trust to achieve that effect.

Intellectual talent performance. It is well established that venture capitalists and bankers, in contemplation of lending, will look at more than financial reports and projections. High on their consideration agenda will be the performance of incumbent executives, individually and as a team, as well as provisions for managerial succession. On whom are they betting? After all, they want their present income and money returned.

Particularly for high-tech, high-fashion, scientific, research, creative, and international enterprises, as- sessing incumbents and back- ups in key positions can be critical. Whether the commitment is to be first in actual discovery, or first in commer- cializing discovery, or early in generating successful copies, such talent can be a pool of distinctive competence, a source of competitive advantage, and an area of keen competition. Competition for intellectual talent across national boundaries has long since emerged in both public and private sectors. This may be the most critical area of resource competition for the future.

“Cornpe tition for in tel/eC tual talent across national boundaries may be the most critical area of resource compet#ion for the future. ”

A What about functional area indicators?

Returning to the earlier medical analogy, the so- called “complete” physical exam typically accu- mulates a number of subsystem measurements. These measurements, in the case of the patient, are rarely ends in themselves except that action will be taken if vital signs are beyond a so-called “normal” range. Taken in the aggregate, these measurements in general indicate the health of the patient and how all bodily systems are interacting and functioning.

Similarly, for the enterprise corpus, short of bottom-line alarms calling for drastic action, there are well-known subsystem health indicators. Any business or non-business unit, at a minimum, is likely to have counterparts of marketing, produc- tion, financing, and human resource functions. It might also have (conceivably by some other name) research and development and intelli- gence functions. For each of these, no matter their individual shortcomings in relating cause and effect, there are long-established and widely used measurements.

As with the medical analogy, several of the foregoing subsystems incorporate measures of

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the unit’s capacity to cope with its environment. In the flow from corporate or business unit strategies to functional activities to subsequent out- comes, ongoing auditing of specific indicators at critical points might signal desirable mid-course corrections without waiting for more conventional but less timely feedback, such as quarterly fiscal reports.

mentation may conflict with arrangements already in place.

PIMS of General Electric. Rooted in work begun at General Electric, PIMS-“profit impact of market strategies”-statistical models were developed to ascertain what allocations might yield the best return on investments. As reported by Schoeffler, Buzzell, and Heaney (1974), among 37 factors analyzed under differing competitive conditions for differing business units across differing industries, those found most significant were related to market share, product quality, and investment intensity.

The idea of priorities, which has to do with scaling activities from most to least important, may at times be operationally more important than beautifully crafted objectives. The idea of timing, which here has to do with scheduling what will be first, second, third, or sequential over a period of time, might be independent of or related to priorities and might also be a critical and distinguishing element of strategy.

Portfolio tied to marketing. Those familiar with the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) portfolio model may recall stars, question marks, cows,

and dogs, as well as a schematic devised for managing

- diversified companies with

“The idea of priorities more than one product line

Portfolio tied to resources. Recently, the resource-based view of the firm (still to be more fully developed) has begun to represent significant potential in the strategy area. As put forth by Wernerfelt (19841, the focus is on managing the enterprise resource position in both the short and long terms. Contrasted with the BCG portfolio, the idea is to analyze the firm from the resource side using a resource-product matrix. With regard to Porter‘s competitive forces, those barriers to entry and the present resource barriers are considered analogous, interacting but not the same.

may at times be operationally more important than

and likely more than one market served. In its sim-

beautifully crafted

plest form, a four-celled matrix shows industry

growth rate on the vertical axis and relative market

Resources here go beyond the older eco- nomic categories of labor, capital, and land. They include any tangible or intangible assets that might constitute a strength or weakness for the enterprise. Examples would include brand loy- alty, employment of skilled personnel, trade con- tracts, machinery, efficient procedures, capital, and in-house knowledge of technology.

objet tives. ” shareposition on the horizontal axis. Product lines with a HIGH on each axis are considered “stars” for

continued investment. Those with a LOW on each axis are “dogs,” to be considered for har- vesting or divestment. Those with high industry growth and low relative market share position are “question marks” to be monitored. And those with a high relative market share position com- bined with a low industry growth rate are cash cows.

Applied to one or more products singly, con- currently, or in step fashion (such as domestic followed by international), how might the pres- ence, absence, or acquisition of resources lead to high returns over longer periods? With regard to merger and acquisition decisions, one might start with present resources to examine possibilities. or start with alternatives to see what resources might be required. Not least would be an emphasis on the technology factor.

A How do we best compete for the future?

It is up to strategists to arrive at a dynamic Without negating what has preceded in business investment portfolio mix with appropriate reallo- experience or in this article so far, Hamel and cations conceivably recycled over time. Even Prdhdlad (1994) have recently issued a Call to

though the “product life cycle” idea (let us say, refrain from becoming lost within thought struc- from question marks to stars to cash cows to tures and techniques useful as points of reference dogs) may be less popular today than earlier, the to date. Such referents need not be the sole or portfolio idea may still prove to be a productive even the main clues to seeking competitive ad- line of analysis. vantage for the future.

A What of priorities, timing, and resources?

Executives may be justifiably skeptical of strategies that incorporate little mention of priorities, timing, and from whence a flow of critical resources is to be assured, applied, and recovered. Any grand scheme that carries no hint of imple-

More than correcting the past. Hamel and Prahalad declare that becoming smaller (restruc- turing, downsizing, rightsizing), improving pro- cesses (TQM, reengineering), benchmarking (comparing to the industry’s best), empowerment (greater grass roots dispersion and encourdge- ment of decisions), and fitting existing industry structures better may be desirable-ven essential

for some enterprises-but not sufficient to be competitive for the future. These activities may represent overdue, even useful corrections of past mistakes and catching up for managements that have been asleep. However, in themselves, they do not guarantee getting ahead or even the ability to compete for the future.

Simply downsizing, in addition to frequently cited social consequences, may leave basic issues undiagnosed or result in giving up market share. It may not be a long-term cure. Ongoing process improvement may be essential as a way of life, but just not sufficient, especially if it is tied to an outdated strategy. Benchmarking and even fitting existing industry structures rooted in experience may yield to others the setting of rules on how competition will be conducted for the future. Again, these palliative actions taken alone may not necessarily define the next plateau-what it will take to be among the survivors, or who the players will be.

Staking out rules for the future. In a nut- shell, Hamel and Prahalad call for:

l regenerating core strategies geared toward opportunities for the future rather than market shares from the past;

l shaping industry architecture and success rules for the future rather than conforming to fast-changing industry structures of the past;

l competing for industry foresight as against vision, which may be more elusive;

l competing for intellectual and other resources beyond presently perceived boundaries and subunits; and

l providing for involvement in and commitment to such thinking widely throughout the firm.

A key to these is investing in and building on core competencies as they exist or as they can be created. This is critical to the never-ending chal- lenge of securing the future. Core competencies are that bundle of capabilities, skills, and techniques that enable an enterprise to provide a particular benefit to a customer. Not to be con- fused with distinctive competence (discussed earlier), they are an integrated and focused com- posite that may cut across functions, They need not be, and probably are not, contained within existing structures such as departments and business units. Examples would include Wal-Mart’s and L.L. Bean’s logistics systems, or Apple’s user- friendly computers.

Why not stake out space beyond fast-changing or dying structures, space where those who set the new rules are first for others to follow? Those who set the scoring system have improved the chances of winning the game. Why not compete for a future that need not, and likely cannot, be just an extension of the past? Envision a future and then enact it or create it. Emphasis may not be on arriving but on continually becoming.


A What provisions exist for implementation?

Ideally, considerations of implementation do not follow only after those already noted. Through- out your audit, everything depends on the prospects of implementation, from early assumptions and concepts through all subsequent phases, to enhance the prob- abilities for desired attain- ment. The ideal and the prac- tical will entail involving people who can foresee snags as well as those responsible for correcting as implementation proceeds. It has been widely observed that “imper- fect” strategies with great implementation hold better prospects than “per- fect” strategies with faulty implementation,

“why not compete for a future that need not, and likely cannot, be just an extension of the past?”

What does implementation include? An illus- trative but not complete list would include: time schedules; human and material resource allocations; structure, staffing, information, and reward systems congruent with strategy: and moral, ethi- cal, and value considerations. Are the best people at the most strategic intersections of the enterprise where they can either implement or correct a given strategy and have the information, free- dom, and incentive to do so? How well are these people provided for and how are they working out in practice?

S trategic audits, almost by definition, have unpredictable results. The most important application of this exposition may rest not

only in what is presented but rather in the spinoff of relevant questions that come to the mind of the reader. Likewise, as others have observed, the most important residual may not be a beautiful strategic printout but rather the commitment shared among those who have taken part in and internalized the generation process.

We have already noted that disenchantments with strategic planning and frustration with the plethora of material designated as strategic should not blur the critical point of thinking strategically.

At the outset at least, thinking strategically differs from other thinking in being non-linear. More- over, readers will know that not everything said to be “strategy” is strategic.

As emphasized before, the strategic audit questions presented here are not intended to follow any sacred sequence. They necessitate an ongoing process of cycling and recycling, shaping and reshaping, learning and correcting. Whether the process is discontinuous, incremen- tal, synoptic, or has elements of all three is not a present concern. Yes, schematic flow diagrams with feedback loops and extended decision tree

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diagrams originating in each question might be set forth. In the end, though, such visual structures might be more inhibiting than facilitating for some readers. They might he suggestive of tidy continuities and neat flows in conventional ratio- nalizations unhampered by intuitive insights on the part of people capable of thinking otherwise. For our purpose, schematics are not likely to show intangibles or aspects of managing that are more art than science. It is not necessarily functional to be so guided by schematics that one bends the territory to fit the map. 0

Notes

1. The specific term “strategic audit” was proposed in 1994 by a fellow Advisory Board Member at Abbey Press at St. Meinrad Archabbey in Indiana. Professor Dan R. Dalton of Indiana University has recalled that the term was also used in Chapter 2, especially Appen- dix 2, of Thomas L.. Wheelen and J. David Hunger, Strategic Management (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1984, 1995).

References

George Leland Bach, “Managerial Decision Making As An Organizing Concept,” in Frank C. Pierson et al., me Education Of American Businessmen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); known as the Carnegie Report on Business Schools.

Jay R. Galbraith and Robert K. Kazangian, Strategy

Implementation: Structure, Systems, and Process, 2nd ed. (New York: West Publishing Co., 1986).

Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad, Competing For 7Re

Future: Breakthrough Strategies For Seizing Control Of

Your Zndustly And Creating 7be Markets Of Tomorroul

(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994).

Phillipe Haspeeslagh, “Portfolio Planning: Uses And Limits,” Haruard Business Review, January-February 1982, pp. 58-73.

Henry Mintzberg, 7’be Rise And Fall Of Strategic Plan-

ning (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques For

Ana@ing Industries And Competitor- (New York: The Free Press, 1980).

S. Schoeffler, R.D. Buzzell, and D.F. Heaney, “Impact Of Strategic Planning On Profit Performance,” Hanlard

Business Reuieuj. March-April 1974, pp. 51-6X.

Birger Wernerfelt, “A Resource-Based View Of The Firm,” Strategic Management Journal, April-June 1984, pp. 171-180.

Paul J. Gordon is Professor Emeritus of Management at the Indiana University School of Business, Bloomington, Indiana, and a 1997 Fulbright-FLAD Distinguished

~ Professor of Strategic Management at the Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal.

Documents

Ten strategic audit questions