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Afr. j . polit. sd. (2002), Vol 7 No. 1

Corruption, Politics, and Societal Valuesin Tanzania: An Evaluation of the MkapaAdministration's Anti-Corruption Efforts

Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro*

AbstractThis article traces the evolution of corruption as a political issue in Tanzaniaand evaluates the efforts of the Mkapa administration to control it. Corruptionis conceptualized as embedded in societal, economic and power relations.However, many of the anti-corruption efforts are part of liberal reforms that arebased on the assumption that corruption is an individual act or personal misuseof public office for private gain. These liberal reforms are, at best, of limitedvalue because they fail to take into account much of the dynamics that supportcorruption in Tanzania. While the Mkapa administration has taken partiallysuccessful steps to control corruption, these efforts have not fundamentallyundermined the supporting environment for corruption in the country.

IntroductionThis article attempts to gain a better understanding of corruption and efforts tocontrol it through a case study of Tanzania. Since the socialist era of the 1970s,policy makers have been concerned about corruption. During the Nyerere years,corruption was defined as a form of oppression that undermined egalitarian val-ues. However, reports of misuse of office, especially in the cooperatives andparastatals, grew with the expansion of the state's economic role. Under theeconomic liberalization policies of the second President, Ali Hassan Mwinyi(1985-1995), corruption spiraled out of control prompting donors to freeze aidin November 1994 (Kiley 1994). In 1995, during the first multi-party electionsin thirty years, opposition political parties attempted to transform popularresentment against corruption into electoral support. However, the ruling partyCCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi/Party of the Revolution) managed to manipulatethis issue as well. It chose a politician untainted by scandal as its presidentialcandidate, thereby undercutting the opposition's ability to gain political advan-tage. On the campaign trail, CCM's Benjamin Mkapa promised to wage awar on corruption. How successful has Mkapa's government been in reducing

• Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam

1027-0353 *>2002 African Association of Political Science

2 Dr. Bruce Heitman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro

corruption? In this article, we argue that progress has been made because cor-rupt activities are no longer tolerated as they were during the previous admin-istration. However, little change has taken place in the attitudes, social struc-tures, and power relations that contribute to widespread corruption inTanzanian society.

Individual Wrongdoing vs Socially Embedded CorruptionFor pedagogical purposes it is worthwhile acknowledging that corruption canoccur within two different types of social, political and economic milieu (Caidenand Caiden, 1977; Blunt and Popoola, 1990; Theobold, 1999).

The first is a situation where individuals misuse public office for personalgain. This type of corruption takes place in a modern, rational, Weberian-bureaucratic system, where there is a clear division between public and privatelife. Societal norms support bureaucratic procedures that emphasize equal treat-ment based on the unbiased application of laws. For example, merit criteria areused for hiring, promotion, and dispersing service. In such a system, corruptbehavior violates bureaucratic procedures, organizational norms, laws, andlarger societal expectations for the appropriate behavior of its public officials.

With the second situation the problem is not rogue individuals but, rather, asystem where corruption is embedded in society. In this situation, corruption isinstitutionalized and becomes the norm rather than the exception. The exten-sive literature on 'patronage' and 'big man' politics stands as testimony that, formany observers of Africa, corruption is a core element of the state and society.1

In patronage systems, while there is a legal fiction of the Weberian bureaucracy,nonetheless norms, expectations, and actions of the public and their officials arebased on differential application of rules, unequal access to services and pref-erential treatment. In short, the patronage networks - to which public officialsbelong - uphold the value of appropriating resources from the state to furtherthe collective interests of the family, clan, ethnic group, region, or religion. TheTanzanian situation fits the criteria of systemic corruption. Corruption hasbecome part and parcel of daily life and is tolerated, accepted, and institution-alized to the extent that both people who give and receive bribes have internal-ized that behavior.2

The reason for calling attention to the distinction between 'individual' and'systemic' corruption is to highlight the problem of a priori assumptions thatunderpin policies designed to reduce corruption. In countries where corruptionis systemic, anti-corruption efforts that start from the assumption that corrup-tion is a 'individual' problem will not produce significant results because theactors, values, norms, economic relations, and behaviors that uphold the exis-tence of patronage systems will actively seek to undermine reforms. This is thepoint that Reno (1998) makes when he notes that IMF and World Bank liberalreforms are inherently limited. Indeed, as with many African countries,

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 3

Tanzania's efforts to combat corruption are built on an atomized, individualis-tic, legalistic definition of corruption that focuses on the misuse of public officefor personal gain. This only captures part of what corruption is all about.Legalistic rational bureaucratic conceptions do not take into account the ana-lytical reality of corruption as a political, economic, and social process that oftenhas strong support from within the social networks to which a public servantbelongs. By ignoring this reality, legalistic solutions based on institutionalchanges and stricter enforcement of rules are unlikely to effectively contain thewidespread and systematic abuse of office supported by social networks. If legaland institutional reforms are not applied in tandem with fundamental societalchanges that alter power relations and raise civic competence in dealing withcorruption, then the prospects of making significant inroads into reducing cor-ruption will remain remote (Theobold, 1999).

In societies with systemic corruption, Tanzania included, corrupt practicesare embodied in existing power relations and therefore need to be analyzed inregard to their effect on the lives of people engaged in their daily struggle forsocial, economic and political existence. Anders (2001), in his study of corrup-tion in Malawi, notes that, in a situation of extreme national poverty, the statebecomes something like a welfare mechanism for those civil servants who canaccess its resources. While most accounts of systemic corruption note the plun-dering of state resources by its functionaries, it should also be recognized thatofficials use their positions in the state to extract resources directly from society.While, no doubt, some of the gains from corrupt activities are for the personalbenefit of individual public officials, these resources also feed social supportnetworks based on kinship and/or patronage ties, often of an ethnic nature(Anders, 2001; Joseph, 1998; Ekeh, 1998; Bayart, 1993). For many public offi-cials, the obligations to these social support networks outweigh any sense ofresponsibility to protect public resources for a larger general good. Membershipin kinship and patronage networks, fueled by material shortages and economichardship, force civil officials to disregard the notion of a public/private bound-ary line that makes possible the efficient performance of duties in westernWeberian bureaucracies. In short, African civil servants are under pressure toabide by an alternative moral code that stresses their social obligations to fam-ily, friends, and clients (Ekeh, 1998). Students of African politics (Munishi,1989; Bayart, 1993; Chabal, 1992; Anders, 2001) show how public officials inAfrica have misappropriated public resources to invest in their private busi-nesses to provide employment for family members; to provide basic needs totheir relatives such as food, clothing, shelter, and schooling for children; and tocontribute to the burials of friends, clients and family.

While, clearly, liberal solutions do not account for the context of embeddedcorruption, they should not, however, be disregarded. For example, micro-economic concepts, like 'externalities' can be a useful starting point for making

4 Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro

inroads against systemic corruption. For example, the notion of externality callsattention to the relationship of an individual or group to a corrupt act. When ithas a direct tangible negative impact on an identifiable groups or individuals,this means there is an existing interest to control that specific act. For example,when a traffic policeman extracts a bribe from a motorist, the driver may feelangry because she felt harassed. It is conceivable that those negatively affectedby this type of corruption could be a useful counterforce if empowered. Inessence, those who are forced to absorb the costs of other people's corrupt activ-ities have a ready interest to change that activity.

However, sometimes corruption can be beneficial for individuals and thecosts can be pushed on to an ill defined 'other'. This approximates what mightbe called 'abstract corruption' because it is difficult to discern a cause and effectrelationship; therefore, no readily identifiable group exists with an interest incontrolling it. In this way, corruption could be thought of as being similar to theeconomic idea of a negative externality. A noteworthy example of a corruptionexternality occurred under President Mwinyi in 1993.3 A businessperson namedV. G. Chavda and his brother P. G. Chavda, obtained a $3.5 million loan underDCP (Debt Conversion Program)4 promising to rehabilitate sisal plantations inTanga through upgrading and building workers' houses and dispensaries, buy-ing and repairing decorticator machines, and replanting neglected sisal farms.The Chavdas claimed that, within ten years, they would create 1 400 jobs andearn $42 million in foreign exchange. Instead, the Chavda family diverted DCPfunds\mtside the country by buying fictitious machines and spare parts.According to press reports, high ranking government officials, including thePermanent Secretary in the Office of the President, provided the Chavdas withpolitical cover. Augustine Mrema, who was then the Minister for Home Affairs,promised that Chavda would be brought to trial. However, Chavda escapedprosecution and the public, through its parastatal banks, absorbed the loss fromthe bad loan. It was difficult for Mrema to rally support, in part, because thecosts of the corrupt act were absorbed by the parastatal banks which could pushoff costs onto even more diffuse groups like the state and donors. In short, therewas little incentive for groups to counter the political forces protecting Chavda.

Thus, in situations of embedded corruption, altering corrupt behavior islikely to be problematic and require nothing short of fundamental societalchange that includes restructuring power and economic relations as well asdeveloping new norms. With abstract corruption, where the costs are trans-ferred to an ill defined general public, its control is problematic. However, inci-dents of corruption that transfer costs to an identifiable group that can under-stand a cause and effect relationship creates the possibility for their mobiliza-tion to counter specific practices where official positions in the state are mis-used. This suggests that empowering5 those groups that are forced to absorb thecosts could be an important step toward reducing some aspects of corruption.

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 5

This requires commitment on the part of top leadership and major actors insociety as well as conscious efforts to empower the general public to fight cor-ruption without fear. Such steps will not transform systems of embedded cor-ruption into ideal rational-bureaucratic systems. However, there is the possibil-ity of moving from situations of malignant corruption, where there is no expec-tation that work will get done or that minimum quality standards will be met,to productive corruption, where, in addition to the criteria of patronage, expec-tations of economic efficiency are also involved.6

Corruption as a Political Issue and Mkapa's Rise to PowerThe Arusha Declaration, which ushered in ujamaa7 in 1967, marked a rapidexpansion of the state and ruling party's economic role through nationalizingindustries and distribution networks. But state control over the economy did notincrease production or efficiency. Rather, by the 1970s, there were signs ofshortages of consumer and even essential goods that further intensified duringthe economic crisis years of the 1980s. The growth of a state sector economyalso reoriented power relations. Resources were transferred from the private tothe public sector and state employees, particularly at the managerial level ofparastatals, used their offices for private, gain. Parastatal Regional TradingCompanies (RTCs) and cooperative shops became the only legal source formany goods like foodstuffs, sugar, building materials, radios, and batteries.Because they controlled the allocation of scarce goods, RTC employees becamevery powerful. Consumers often had to pay bribes or give favors to theseemployees in order to obtain goods at the subsidized official prices (Ndumbaro,1993). In order to counter this graft the Nyerere government enacted a leader-ship code and tried to enforce socialist norms against the abuse of power.However, decreasing donor assistance during thel980s, stemming from a con-flict with the World Bank and IMF over structural adjustment policies, increasedeconomic problems. The state lost its ability to pay public servants a livingwage. Official salaries, even at managerial and executive levels, fell below sub-sistence needs, creating incentives to look for side incomes. As the state con-trolled economy declined, an informal one rose to take its place (Tripp, 1997).Smuggling was rampant. In the end, the harsh realities of scarcity and povertyoverwhelmed the dedication to socialist equality and corruption grew strongsocietal roots.

By 1985, Nyerere saw the futility of resisting the structural adjustment pro-grams and stepped down from power allowing the second President, Ali HassanMwinyi, to enter into an agreement with the Bretton Woods institutions. Inorder to combat public graft, neoliberal theories suggested reducing the size ofthe state controlled economy in order to decrease the opportunity for corruptionto influence the administrative allocation of resources. However, liberalizationcoincided with increased corruption and, toward the end of Mwirtyi's second

6 Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro

term, Transparency International was consistently listing Tanzania as one of themost corrupt nations in its annual rankings.8

In the early part of 1995, corruption became the central issue in Tanzaniaafter Mwinyi's government failed to take any significant steps against MohamedEnterprises, which was allegedly distributing food unfit for human consump-tion. Augustine Mrema, the powerful and popular Minister of Home Affairs,promised that this well connected company9 would be punished. However,efforts to do so resulted in Mrema being demoted to Minister of Youth andCulture. Exasperated, Mrema blasted the Mwinyi government for its complicitywith high level corruption, provoking his removal from the Cabinet [Majira,2/25/95). Mrema responded by quitting CCM and joining the political opposi-tion where he emerged as the Presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi. Mrema,due to his anti-corruption activities, earned a considerable degree of personalpopularity, making him the main electoral threat to CCM and its presidentialcandidate for the October 1995 elections.

In addition to the challenge from Mrema, CCM faced another populist test inthe form of the Reverend Christopher Mtikila of the unregistered DemocraticParty. Mtikila capitalized on a widespread belief that, under Mwinyi, briberywas used to access opportunities, property and power. Throughout 1993 and1994 Mtikila held popular political sermons where he painted a picture of richAsians amassing fortunes through bribing African political leaders. He chargedthat the country was controlled by one 181 magabacholi (wealthy non-Tanganyikans) who transferred the wealth of Tanzania abroad while the wakda-hoi (dispossessed Africans) lived in abject poverty.

By the election year of 1995, CCM was anxious to fend off the electoral chal-lenge from the newly legalized political parties, especially in the form of NCCR-Mageuzi's Presidential Candidate, Augustine Mrema. Mrema had the personalappeal to bring the corruption issue to the center stage of the campaign and hispast efforts to combat this vice gave the opposition the high moral ground onthis issue. Concerned about the vulnerability of CCM, Julius Nyerere, the stillhighly influential, retired first President, decided to act. In March 1995, Nyerereshocked the nation and the ruling party CCM by accusing CCM leaders of allow-ing corruption to get out of hand. In a phrase that became commonplace,Nyerere declared that the country "reeked of corruption".

It was against this backdrop that CCM met in Dodoma to select its presiden-tial candidate. There was a strong desire by top CCM officials, Julius Nyerere inparticular, to distance the party from the extensive corruption of the previousregime. This would not be an easy task because, of course, the former govern-ment was also CCM. In the end, the relatively unknown Benjamin Mkapa, acandidate untainted by a corruption scandal and who enjoyed strong supportfrom Julius Nyerere, won CCM's nomination (TEMCO, 1997: 66). Mkapa'sselection as the ruling party's presidential candidate was a shrewd tactical move

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 1

aimed at transforming the public's perception of CCM from that of a corruptparty to one interested in reform (Finnigan, 2000: 7).

Efforts to Fight CorruptionAfter winning the election, Mkapa quickly took steps to fulfill his campaignpledge. On 17 January 1996, he established the Presidential Commission onCorruption, popularly known as the 'Warioba Commission'. The Commission'sterms of reference included: evaluating laws, regulations and procedures inorder to reduce corruption in tax collection, the issuing of licenses, and tender-ing. The commission also examined the capacity of various anti-corruptionagencies and offered suggestions on how they could be strengthened. The polit-ical significance of the Warioba report was that it signaled a new openness onthe part of the government regarding corruption. In the years following its pub-lication, the press has vigorously reported on corruption, including the IPTLelectricity supply scandal,10 corruption in the construction industry, and cor-ruption during CCM's 2000 primary elections.

The Mkapa government has taken a pragmatic approach to curbing corrup-tion that entails calling attention to the problem through a publicity campaign,trengthening anti-corruption institutions and purging in the 'public interest' a

number of state employees. Mkapa has urged professional bodies to becomemore involved in reducing corruption and overseeing the activities of theirmembers (Lyimo, 2000: l,3).u

Beginning in 1998, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) was revital-ized and its budget dramatically increased. It underwent a major expansion ofpersonnel, hiring investigators with advanced training in different professions,such as law and engineering. The PCB opened offices in all the mainlandregions and, in 2001, it underwent another major expansion of staff. Theincrease in staff has resulted in a jump in the number of complaints brought tothe PCB (256 in 1995 to 1 461 in 2000). Investigations have also drasticallyxpanded during the same period, from 168 to 1 128. The PCB, with its own

prosecutors, can investigate and bring to court corruption cases.In addition to the PCB, an Ethics Secretariat was created to curb the misuse of

public office. It was designed to deal with breaches of ethics by public officials,which may or may not be corruption related.12 All high ranking elected and nonelected officials have to fill out wealth declaration forms that are deposited at theEthics Secretariat. The Ethics Secretariat has six investigators and it can look intocomplaints that high ranking officials are misusing their offices. In 2001, the gov-ernment also established a Human Rights and Good Governance Commissionwith the ability to receive and act on anonymous complaints.

Since coming to power, Mkapa's government has taken steps against power-ful people thought to be engaged in corrupt activities. Examples include: thearrest and trial of the former Mwinyi government's Minister for Works, Nalaila

8 Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro

Kiula and the retirement of more than 20 upper level state officials in the 'pub-lic interest'. In order to reverse the dismal performance of the TRA (TanzaniaRevenue Authority), which was one of the main reasons why donors suspendedaid in 1994, tax collection was reformed and intensified. As part of the reforms,incompetent and corrupt staff were dismissed. After press reports of widespreadcorruption during the ruling party's 2000 primary election, CCM's NationalExecutive Committee overturned a number of election results because the can-didates had bought voters' support. At the grassroots level, the governmentinstituted opinion polls designed to yield information on corrupt civil servantsat the local, district, and regional levels.

A last area where the Mkapa government deserves credit is in revitalizing theeconomy. A commitment to controlling corruption is related to promoting eco-nomic growth.13 In places like Tanzania, an improvement in the economy isneeded to guarantee reasonable pay and retirement benefits for public workers.It is unrealistic to ask (or try to force) public officials to avoid corruption whentheir wages are not enough to cover daily subsistence, let alone allow savingsfor retirement and to educate family members. During the 1980s and into the1990s, pensions fell to ridiculously low amounts. Someone completing twentyor thirty years of service was lucky to receive $100 after retiring. Mkapa hasrestored outside confidence in the economy, attracted new foreign direct invest-ment and has worked with creditors to reduce Tanzania's external debt (inDecember 2001 donors erased US$3 billion, roughly half of Tanzania's externaldebt). Real economic growth in Tanzania has been fairly steady at around 3 to4 percent per year and salaries in the state sector are becoming more in linewith the cost of living. Economic growth has provided the government with anopportunity to implement some short run measures to reduce specific situationsthat encourage corrupt activities. National Social Security Fund payments, whilenot being enough to support retirees, nonetheless do provide enough resourcesto help start small businesses. Freeing up markets has also made it possible tostreamline the provision of some goods that are not really scarce but for whichan artificial shortage was created to benefit those who are in charge of allocat-ing the resource.

Evaluating Mkapa's Anti-Corruption EffortsDespite the above mentioned efforts, there is little consensus over whether theMkapa administration has actually reduced corruption. While many Tanzanianscomplained bitterly that not much changed since 'Mr. Clean' took office, donorsand foreign observers gave the Mkapa administration the benefit of the doubt.In many respects, the debate about corruption in Tanzania resembles that overwhether the glass of water is half full or half empty. For every positive exampleof an effort to reduce corruption, a counter example can be produced that illus-trates how the misuse of public office continues unabated.

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 9

Arguments supporting that the glass is half full highlight Tanzania's improve-vien n Transparency International's annual corruption rankings and increasedefforts to bring corruption under control. The viewpoint that the glass is halfempty is advanced in the press and by opposition politicians, who charge thatMkapa has not been serious about stemming official malpractice. Daily, paperscarry articles covering the latest corruption allegations, while the public's inter-actions with state officials still center around the game of kutoa kitu kidogo.14

For example, an expatriate general manager of a gold mine provided anecdotalevidence of widespread high level corruption in April 2001, wherr he toldParliament that a never ending stream of government officials flock to the minesseeking payoffs. Despite the steps to control corruption, many Tanzaniansbelieve that it is just as prevalent under Mkapa as it was under his predecessor.Critics maintain that, aside from rhetorical condemnations and perfunctorychanges, there has been a marked absence of commitment on the part of topleaders to radically change the system or to empower the public so that they canhold accountable those who misuse positions of public trust.

What explains these different evaluations of the Mkapa government's com-mitment and ability to fight corruption? In part, the dichotomy reflects the in-herent difficulties of gaining reliable information on a concealed, highlyadaptable, and sometimes complex activity. Measuring the extent of corrup-tion poses a problem because those involved try to keep their activities secret(Robertson, 1999: 589). The inability to gain concrete data on corruptionmakes it difficult to reach definitive conclusions about its impact or efforts tocontrol it. Therefore, any examination of corruption is bound to be highly sub-jective.

Another reason for the conflicting interpretations is the different vantagepoints of the expatriate donor community, and average Tanzanians. Mkapa'sgovernment has proven to be a reliable development partner, making a sincereeffort to work with the donor community to implement economic reforms. Also,on a personal level, official representatives of foreign nations with their spe-cially licensed cars and identification cards are not subject to the same treat-ment at the hands of public officials as are Tanzanian citizens' who have nodiplomatic protections. There can be little argument that Mkapa has succeededin creating the impression that serious efforts are under way to fight corruption,especially in comparison to the previous 'rtiksa' administration.15 However,even some donors have expressed reservations. At the end of Mkapa's first termthe outgoing Head of the European Union in Tanzania encouraged greater effortby the government to purge the state of corrupt officials.16 One year later, at thethird Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Tanzania wasplaced on a list of countries that did not use Japanese aid profitably (African,2001: 5). Despite these reservations, outside perceptions of the Mkapa govern-ment have been relatively favorable. But, for many living in Tanzania, it is

10 Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaw

difficult to square the perceptions of reduced corruption with the reality of deal-ing with public officials who brazenly demand payoffs.

In order to better evaluate the efficacy of the Mkapa administration's fightagainst corruption, we have developed an ideal type foursquare schema thatfocuses on the relationship between societal values and state institutions.

Public Interests

Weberiain EthicalStandards

Patron and ClientEthical Standards

Private Network Interests

Zone A represents situations approximating the ideal type Weberian bureau-cracy, where the boundary between the public and private is clearly defined andthe norms governing public and private property are highly internalized. Thiszone also represents an ideal type of civic competence where citizens knowtheir rights and obligations. Citizens know what constitutes public property,they understand the linkage between their taxes and public property, and thepublic feels that it has a responsibility to discourage public officials from usingtheir offices for private gain. Legal and social sanctions are effective, in largepart because they operate in a supportive moral and political environment. Insituation A, citizens have a variety of formal and informal means to control thebehavior of public officials, including socially ostracizing and shaming corruptofficials and legal methods such as suing. Stated differently, societal groups areempowered to fight against the misuse of public office and resources. In thiszone, values and institutions reinforce each other and enhance the ability ofpeople to hold their leaders accountable. Examples would include the Nordiccountries like Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and theNetherlands, which were all in the top ten of Transparency Internationals Indexfor least corrupt countries for 2000.

Zone B strongly resembles Richburg's (1992) idea of 'productive corruption'.In this ideal-type situation there is a tendency for personal interests to dominatepublic interests, especially in the absence of institutional mechanisms to checkor control this trend. In zone B the boundary between public and private is clearly

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 11

defined. Citizens know the linkage between public and private resources, how-ever, the institutionalization and enforcement of ethical standards is very low.While corruption is a problem in zone B, the state can still accomplish its goalsin terms of completing public works and providing services. For example, whilecontracts may be awarded through corrupt practices, the contractor is still ex-pected to accomplish the task in a professional manner. This represents an ex-ample where institutional practices are out of line with societal ethical standards.That is, there is a lack of institutional mechanisms to empower people to hold so-cietal leaders accountable and there is a lack of top level political commitment totransforming popular values into state policy. Examples of these countries wouldinclude the 'Asian tigers' of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, which wereranked 15th, 28th, and 48th on Transparency International's Index 2000. In someof the Asian countries, people have demonstrated against corrupt officials, in-cluding presidents, who have been forced to resign by public pressure and takento court for corruption while in office.

Zone C consists of situations where the boundary between public and privateis unstable and barely exists. For many citizens there is no clear connectionbetween their contribution to building up public sector resources and taxes. Inother words, their sense of 'ownership' over public resources is not strong.Personal interests or kinship and patronage networks seek to challenge theWeberian model but are kept in check by an authoritarian state. Controlling cor-ruption centers on the state giving harsh punishments to deter official graft.Under these conditions, corruption is minimized by a top down approach of dis-pensing punishments rather than through higher levels of civic competence orinternalized values and norms. Corruption of the type where the costs aredirectly pushed onto an identifiable group, such as was the case with the trafficpolice cited earlier, could be controlled with a commitment to rule enforcement.However, abstract corruption where costs are pushed off onto an ill definedgroup - like taxpayers, donors, or the state - is less likely to be effectively dealtwith. Given such circumstances, when top officials lack the will to punish theirsubordinates, it will likely trigger high levels of corruption because officiallystated standards of bureaucratic behavior do not reflect underlying socialnorms, which are more tolerant of corruption. An example of this situationmight be colonized countries or China (ranked 63rd in Transparency Interna-tional's Index 2000) which imposes harsh sentences up to the death penalty forcorruption related offences.

Zone D represents a condition where the separation between the public andprivate is fluid, unstable and perhaps non existent. The level of citizen compe-tence is low and the public often encourages, or at least accepts, corrupt behav-ior. Corruption can take the form of outright pillage of state resources throughsuch devices as paper contracts for which no services or goods are provided. Inthis situation, societal norms match state practice in that the boundary between

12 Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro

personal and private is intentionally blurred. Usually, the states in a zone D sit-uation are thought of as weak, unable to provide public services or to effectivelyimplement their policies. Patronage and kinship networks permeate weak statesand appropriate the state's resources. All forms of corruption, those that have adirect negative impact on an identifiable group as well as abstract corruptionwhere costs are pushed off onto a diffuse public, are encouraged by socialand/or patronage networks. Under such conditions, the approach adopted bythe World Bank that puts more emphasis on creating a working legal systemand effective anti-corruption institutions as well as building democratic gover-nance to enforce accountability and transparency for public officials and gov-ernment bodies, is not enough to counter the social networks that support cor-ruption. The values of state officials and the public also need to be changed.This might be brought about by economic development and a sincere campaignof consciousness raising. Citizens who bear the brunt of the costs of corruptionneed to be empowered for any anti-corruption efforts to bear fruit. The coun-tries in this zone are at the bottom of Transparency's International Index for2000 and come from the third world and former socialist bloc.

In locating Tanzania in our foursquare model, before Mkapa took power (interms of the enforcement of anti-corruption regulations and a supportive ethi-cal environment to reduce the misuse of public office) the country was in aZone D situation. Corruption was widespread and there was little, if any, effortto curb such practices within the workplace or on the part of the police.Confidence in the police was so low that vigilante groups called sungusunguwere formed all over the country to deter crime. People widely believed that, ifa case was brought into the judicial system, the likelihood of a fair trial was slimas bribes could be utilized to undermine the process at a number of links in thelegal chain of the police, court officials, prosecutor, witnesses, and judge/mag-istrate. This created an uncertain environment for business, as contractenforcement was highly problematic. Fraudulent land title deeds were issuedtaxes were avoided, and the inspections of goods leaving and entering the coun-try were easily circumvented.

A combination of economic growth, poverty reduction, citizen education anda commitment on the part of top government officials to anti-corruption insti-tutions is the proper path to reach in Zone A. If the Mkapa government placedan emphasis on legal solutions it would likely shift the country to Zone C. In theabsence of strictly enforced anti-corruption measures, if the public and elitesambivalent attitudes toward corruption could be changed, then the countrywould move to Zone B. We argue that Mkapa has marginally improved theenforcement of some anti-corruption measures allowing for the country to movetoward a Zone C situation, though it is still in Zone D.

The Mkapa administration has taken steps to rectify a number of the problemareas identified by the Warioba Commission, including implementation problems

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 13

of law and order, administrative laxity and lack of accountability, lengthy and dif-ficult procedures of obtaining public services, and managerial weaknesses of stateorgans. Control mechanisms and oversight have been strengthened, meaningthat, in some institutions, fear of penalties is reducing corrupt activities. Generallyspeaking, enforcement of anti-corruption laws is stricter than under Mwinyi.However, there are many areas where additional institutional reforms could helpreduce corrupt practices. Currently there is an enabling environment for corrup-tion in many state institutions that have been overlooked. For example, in regardto the much maligned traffic police, the procedures for paying fines for traffic vi-olations are very cumbersome. They entail leaving your vehicle at the nearest po-lice post, finding your own transport to the central police station, paying a 20 000tsh. fine and then finding your own transport (taxi or daladala) back to the po-lice post where your car was impounded to produce a receipt to reclaim your ve-hicle. Given the costs in time (not less than an hour), money and effort to pay atraffic fine legally, it would be illogical not to give kitu kidogo (5 000 tsh. or less).

Another problem with efforts to reduce corruption is that they rely on thevery government officials who are thought to be intimately involved in corrup-tion networks. This was evident in a 1999 incident when government officialswere instructed to conduct a survey to identify corrupt public servants. Theresults were going to be used to provide information to anti-corruption officialsand heads of departments (concerning the amount of corruption in their organ-izations) . In Nzega District, the divisional secretary forced people to write theirnames on what were supposed to be anonymous responses. People became sus-picious but, nonetheless, filled out the forms with less than candid responses.Many felt that the divisional secretary wanted to discover who would name himas corrupt so that he could launch reprisals against them. One week later, thedistrict divisional secretary called the people together to redo the exercise, onlythis time they were told to leave their names off the lists of corrupt people.Disgusted and fearing a trap, people refused to participate. The Nzega incidentraised serious questions about an approach to fighting corruption that relies onthe commitment, good will and ability of the state, the very institution thatneeds to be reformed.

The 2000 general elections contributed to doubts about the commitment of toppolitical leaders to fighting corruption. The outright use of money by candidatesto attract political support was widely practiced in the effort to win the elections.The CCM primaries, in late July and early August of 2000, were marred by nu-merous press accounts of candidates carrying vimba vya pesa (plastic bags full ofmoney) and fights breaking out among campaign staff and supporters over the al-location of that money. At the conclusion of the primaries, President Mkapa sup-ported the nullification of three constituency results in which wealthy business-people were said to have used money to influence primary voters. Mkapa vowedthat, "we cannot accept CCM being bought by a person or a group of people"

14 Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro

(Lyimo, 2000b: 1,3). However, the overall lesson learned from the elections wasequivocal. While the party nullified three results, there were reports that corrup-tion was more widespread and disqualified candidates were later asked to be thecampaign managers of the newly selected contestants (TEMCO, 2001). DespiteMkapa's statements and a public relations campaign by the government and NGOsurging people to avoid bribes (or at least to take the money and vote 'their con-science'), the general public expected candidates to give them gifts and money inreturn for attending rallies or, sometimes more directly, for their votes. While cor-ruption was still a campaign issue during the 2000 elections, it ceased to be a cen-tral concern. The electorate was justifiably cynical about CCM leading efforts tocontrol corruption and with the mismanagement of funds that left the then lead-ing opposition party NCCR-Mageuzi bankrupt in 1999. There was also little faithin the ability of the opposition to deal effectively with this problem.

While the need to empower citizens has been stressed since the days of uja-maa, the actions of state officials continue to demonstrate that this remains arhetorical rather than a practical goal. Despite speeches, newspaper articles, edi-torials, and conferences that stress the need to fight corruption, the actions ofleading members of society send a message that is equally clear: those who raisequestions about corrupt behavior or try to hold leaders accountable will su%consequences. There does not exist in Tanzania any means to protect those whouncover or take legal action against people suspected of engaging in corruptactivities. In a number of ways people have been discouraged and disappointedby how leaders and the government handle reported corruption cases. For exam-ple, within the PCB, the decision to take action against people suspected of cor-ruption is heavily influenced by the political power of the individual or theirpolitical connections. The PCB has complained of interference by high rankingofficials in their investigations and, off the record, questioned the commitmentof many such officials to combating graft.

Finally, even where reforms are implemented, corruption can change its formto adapt to the new circumstances. Institutional reforms of TANESCO (TanzaniaElectricity Supply Company) and the TRA may have increased efficiency butthey also created new avenues for corruption. Many TRA employees who weredismissed for corruption became clearing and forwarding agents for busing,people, utilizing their connections to the remaining staff to facilitate the un{jet.payment of taxes. In the case of TANESCO, retrenched employees served as cor-ruption agents for their still employed colleagues. They demanded bribes fromcustomers to expedite electrical hook ups from three to six months to one week.In both cases, the use of retrenched workers to solicit bribes added another layerto the corruption system making it more difficult for the PCB to identify corruptelements in both of the organizations.

As the Warioba report indicated, a key question facing Tanzania concernsthe commitment of societal leaders to a campaign to reshape societal values

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 15

Do leading state officials really want to restructure behavior (including theirown) in a way that is likely to adversely affect the interests of some of the mostpowerful actors in the society? A frequent criticism of the government's anti-corruption efforts is that the only casualties in the war against corruptionseem to be a few sacrificial lambs in the form of lower level officials and peo-ple out of power. Without basic changes in the nature of the relationship be-tween the governed and those who govern, it is difficult to imagine serious in-roads being taken to curb corruption. Many of those who engage in corrup-tion are powerful. On the most benign level, accusations of corruption causetensions in the relationship between the accuser and the accused. In a coun-try where living in harmony with family, friends, neighbors and colleagues ishighly valued, the social pressures to remain silent and not disrupt existingrelationships are strong. However, even more serious is the problem that thosereporting corrupt activities are more likely to suffer penalties for their actionsthan those engaging in corrupt activities. People understand the costs of ac-cusing the powerful and well connected of corruption. Mechanisms need to beput in place so that, if a group or individual is forced to bear the costs of a cor-rupt act, they have the institutional means to take action. While strict en-forcement of rules and regulations may deter corrupt practices in the shortrun, this strategy needs to be accompanied by a sustained and meaningful re-duction in the misuse of public authority based on the internalization of newnorms to guide public behavior, backed by a fear that even powerful officialscan be held accountable by the public.

Conclusion: Actions without ChangeThe best way to conceptualize corruption is as a process in socioeconomic andpolitical development that is more than a problem of individual morality ormarket imperfections. Understanding corruption requires a focus on power re-lations and the morals, values, ethics, and material conditions that upholdthem. Consequently, by analyzing corruption in Tanzania as part of a broaderprocess in socioeconomic and political development, societal power relationsthat sustain the process can be better understood and more effective anti-corruption tactics can be devised which will compliment social, political andeconomic reforms. In other words, a holistic approach to fighting corruptionhas a better chance of success than populist or legalistic solutions that targetindividual wrongdoers. There is a need to consciously transform social valuesas well as state institutions that work as enabling environments for corrup-tion. This requires sensitizing people about the bad effects of corruption aswell as empowering them with the means to take actions against those whomisuse their authority. Thus, despite the efforts of the Mkapa government,corruption remains deeply embedded into the country's social, economic andpolitical system.

16 Dr. Bruce Heilman and Dr. Laurean Ndumbaro

Notes1. See Berman (1998), Jackson and Rosberg (1984), Joseph (1998), and Bayart (1993).2. In one incident that is fairly typical, a traffic policeman stopped a pick up truck

because it had bald tires. The officer demanded a 10,000 tsh. bribe claiming that thiswas half the amount of a fine. When only 2,000 tsh. was offered the officer loudlyasserted that it was not a secret that he needed money and demanded 3,000 tsh. Asmore motorists were stopped, the officer accepted the 2,000 tsh. and went to solicitbribes from other drivers.

3. Information on the Chavda Scandal was gathered from: Business Times, 23 July1993; Business Times 15-21 October 1993; Sunday News, 24 October 1993; BusinessTimes, 29 October-4 November 1993; Family Mirror, December 1993; Mrema 1994.

4. The Bank of Tanzania, the Co-operative and Rural Development Bank, and theNational Bank of Commerce administered the DCP with the aim of reducingTanzania's foreign debt by converting it to local currency loans for investment proj-ects. In the late 1980s and early 1990s there were rumors of widespread misuse ofthese funds with payoffs from business people to government and bank officials.

5. Empowering includes consciousness raising and eliminating the ability of corruptelements to launch punitive retributions against groups that bring to light officialgraft.

6. See Richburg (1992) and Moran (1999) for explanations of malignant and produc-tive corruption.

7. Ujamaa is the Kiswahili term for the policy of African Socialism.8. During liberalization CCM was referred to as 'chukua chako mapema' or "take yours

early" reflecting the perception that party members were excessively abusing theircontrol over state resources out of the fear that the "good times" could quickly end.

9. Mohamed Dewji - son of Ghulmabbas Fazal Hassanal Dewji of MohamedEnterprises - won the CCM primary (2000) for the Singida Urban Parliamentary seatdefeating the incumbent Minister of Water, Alhaji Mussa Nkhanga. CCM's NationalExecutive Committee initially rejected Mohamed Dewji as its candidate for the gen-eral election on the grounds of widespread corruption during the primary. However,CCM later decided that Dewji had not been a member of the party for requiredamount of time to contest for a parliamentary seat, thus opening the possibility forhim to run in 2005.

10. The IPTL scandal involved a contract by the state-owned Tanzania Electricity SupplyCompany to buy electricity at above market rates from the privately ownedIndependent Power Tanzania Ltd.

11. For example, the government held a special seminar in response to accusations ofwidespread corruption in road construction that brought together state officials andprivate contractors in order to address problems of kickbacks, bribes and poor qual-ity work (Ibrahim April 12, 2001: 1,2).

12. An example of non-corrupt ethical breaches would be failing to carry out officialduties due to alcohol abuse.

13. Situations of scarcity, however, are not the only adequate explanation for the exis-tence and persistence of corruption. It is possible that corruption can continue evenafter salaries are improved. There are also places of work where corruption has not

Corruption, politics and social values in Tanzania 17

found a breeding ground but the pay is low. It is clear that building societal normsagainst the misuse of public resources coupled with strict anti-corruption enforce-ment measures need to accompany economic growth.

14. "Kutoa kitu kidogo" means to produce a small gift to make things work right.15. Ali Hassan Mwinyi was popularly referred to as 'Mzee Ruksa' (with my permission),

alluding to the idea that his administration made no effort to discourage corruption.16. Peter Beck Christiansen, outgoing Head of the European Union in Tanzania, warned

that "feeble anti-corruption measures" would have a serious adverse affect on eco-nomic development [Sunday Observer July 30, 2000: 6).

InterviewsHead of the Ethics Commission in the Ministry of State, Office of the President, 21 March2001.Official, Prevention of Corruption Bureau, 4 March 2001.Retrenched TRA and TENESCO employees, March and April 2001.

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