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The Battle of the River Plate. 13 December 1939
Memorial dedicated 12 April 2014
The 75th Anniversary Year
Frequently-asked questions.
These notes written by Henry, Stephen (sons of Admiral Henry Harwood) and Jonathan Harwood
(grandson) and Malcolm Collis Archivist of the HMS Ajax & River Plate Veterans Association
primarily for the guides at the National Memorial Arboretum and HMS Ajax Website and for those
who wish to have ready access to the important facts.
Contents
1 Battle description
2 75th Anniversary events, 2014
3 Frequently-asked questions
FAQs A. Background.
1 What were Captain Langsdorff’s orders?
2 What were Commodore Harwood’s orders?
3 Why did Graf Spee head for the area off the River Plate?
4 Why did Commodore Harwood concentrate his force off the River Plate?
5 Why did Captain Langsdorff choose to attack the British warships?
6 What were the relative strengths of the two forces?
7 How did Harwood dispose his ships, and why?
8 Why did Graf Spee not use its superior gun range to destroy the British cruisers?
9 What logistic support did the two sides have?
FAQs B. The Battle.
10 Why did the British not fly air-reconnaissance on the morning of the 13th December?
11 What part did Graf Spee’s radar play in the battle?
12 Why did Graf Spee not finish off Exeter?
13 Why didn’t Graf Spee sink all three ships?
14 Damage - overview
15 Damage to Graf Spee.
16 Damage to HMS Exeter
17 Damage to HMS Ajax
18 Damage to HMS Achilles.
19 Why didn’t Graf Spee divide the fire from its two 11 inch guns and engage Exeter with one and
Ajax/Achilles with the other?
20 Ships’ capabilities remaining after the action.
21What happened in the battle after Exeter was ordered to withdraw?
22 Why did Captain Langsdorff decide to run for Montevideo? 23What part did the Uruguayan gunboat, Uruguay play in the action?
FAQs C. The Montevideo Phase.
24 How long could Graf Spee permitted to stay in Montevideo harbour?
25 Why did the British first try to persuade the Uruguayans to force Graf Spee out of Montevideo
and then tried to persuade them to keep her in?
26 What part did the cruiser HMS Cumberland play?
27 What were the Germans’ problems in Montevideo?
28 What were the British problems during this time?
29 What was Hitler’s reaction to the Graf Spee crisis?
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30 What happened to Graf Spee’s crew after the scuttling?
31 Why did Captain Langsdorff shoot himself after the scuttling?
32 How many people were killed or died of wounds in the battle?
33 How many honours and awards were bestowed on the British side?
FAQs D. Aftermath. 34 Why has the story lasted so long?
35 Attitudes of the British and German captains.
36 How has history treated Captain Langsdorff?
37 How did Rear Admiral Harwood’s subsequent career develop?
38 How did the careers of the three naval captains develop?
39 What is the significance of the flag (pennant) with the red cross on white seen covering the
memorial prior to its unveiling and depicted on Commodore Harwood’s bench?
40 What happened to the three Royal Navy ships after the battle?
Part 6
41 Bibliography. Suggest further reading.
42 Films, videos and websites.
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Part 1 Battle description.
“THIS GREAT ACTION WILL LONG BE TOLD IN SONG AND STORY”Winston Churchill –
First Lord of the Admiralty – February 1940.
The Battle of the River Plate
13th December 1939
This is a story about how 3 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers and 14 crusers in 7 Hunting Groups
searched for the GS and how the weakest force of 3 cruisers found her and the action which
led to her destruction.
The Second World War against Nazi Germany had been waged for three months. At sea Britain
had lost the passenger liner, Athenia, the armed merchant cruiser, HMS Rawalpindi, the battleship HMS Royal Oak and the aircraft carrier HMS
Courageous. There was very little good news for Britain and France.
In the South Atlantic Captain Langsdorff in the German pocket battleship, Admiral Graf Spee had
been sinking British merchant ships since September 1939. Commodore Harwood, commanding
Royal Navy Hunting Group G, had studied the area and knew the attraction to a German raider of
the rich pickings of British merchant ships leaving the River Plate estuary (between Argentina and
Uruguay in South America). The Germans claimed that their pocket battleships could out-gun any
ships faster than them and outrun any ship with heavier armament. In early December 1939
Harwood received enemy reports from the British freighters Doric Star and Tairoa as they were
captured and sunk. He calculated that if the raider chose to head for South America she would
probably arrive in the area off the River Plate on the morning of the 13th December. With this in
mind, Harwood ordered the cruisers, HMS Ajax, Achilles and Exeter to concentrate there the
previous day (12th December). They met at the pre-arranged time and exercised their action plan.
On the morning of 13th December HMS Exeter was ordered to investigate smoke that was spotted
on the horizon. She soon signaled, “I think it is a pocket battleship”. The three ships had finally
met Admiral Graf Spee and at 0617 they went into action, following Harwood’s orders, “Attack at
once, by day or night”. At first Graf Spee concentrated her fire on Exeter. Ajax and Achilles then
closed on Graf Spee at speed, drawing her fire and causing significant upper deck damage and loss
of morale. Graf Spee's Captain Langsdorff later said, “They came at me like destroyers”. At 0636
Graf Spee about-turned to the west, from where she started her retreat. With 66 of her crew killed,
Exeter later retired from the battle badly damaged.
By 0725 Ajax and Achilles had closed to within 4 miles from Graf Spee. Harwood then decided to
open the range and shadow her. However Graf Spee steadied and concentrated her fire again on
Ajax and Achilles. Ajax fired a salvo of torpedoes to encourage Graf Spee to maintain her westward
course, which she did, but shortly afterwards Graf Spee obtained a hit on Ajax which put her two
after-turrets out of action. Achilles also suffered severe damage to her director control tower from a
near-miss. This was Graf Spee's chance to turn on the pursuers and regain the initiative but it was
not taken. Captain Langsdorff chose to break off the action and head for port in Montevideo, the
capital of neutral Uruguay. Whether this was the result of a confused state because of wounds and
concussion, a sense of defeat or to preserve the lives of his men we do not know.
In Montevideo Langsdorff requested 14 days to repair Graf Spee’s damage but Uruguay, a neutral
country keeping strictly to the Hague Convention, allowed only 72 hours stay in harbour. Knowing
that escape was not an option, Admiral Graf Spee was scuttled on 17th December. Two days later,
after addressing the ship's company and spending the evening with his officers, Captain Langsdorff
shot himself. The ship's company were interned in Argentina and Uruguay.
On return home the men of HMS Ajax and HMS Exeter were feted in London by King George VI
and Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty at the time). HMS Achilles' crew were
similarly feted in their home town of Auckland, New Zealand. To the people of Britain, the Battle
of the River Plate brought the first victory of the Second World War and boosted the country's
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morale. As Winston Churchill said at the celebratory London Guildhall luncheon in February 1940,
“In a dark cold winter it warmed the cockles of the British hearts”.
The Battle of the River Plate is remembered as being the last of the old-style sea battles fought
without aircraft (other than Ajax’s Seafox spotter plane) or radar, where the speed of ships, their
firepower and the tactics employed won the day. For the Royal Navy this battle was an expression
of the centuries-old tradition of achieving mastery of the seas through the offensive spirit in battle
and a willingness to take risks.
As the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound said at the time, “It set a standard for the war, a matter of
great importance”.
Part 2 2014; events to commemorate 75th Anniversary of the Battle.
The memorial at the National Memorial Arboretum was dedicated and unveiled on 12 April 2014. It
was designed and constructed by H.L. Perfitt Ltd, Diss, Norfolk, in conjunction with The Battle of
the River Plate Memorial Committee. It is made of a single slab of black Indian granite, inscribed
on both sides, with a grey granite pavement depicting the relative shell sizes of the four ships to
convey the inequity of the firepower. Granite benches are dedicated to Commodore Harwood and
the three Captains of the British ships to allow visitors time to relax and reflect.
A buried time capsule has the inscription “Sealed herein are the names of those who served in
HMS Ajax, HMS Achilles, HMS Exeter and Admiral Graf Spee including those who gave
their lives whilst serving their country also those who, 75 years later, supported the
commissioning and dedication of this memorial on 12 April 2014.”
In June 2014 the HMS Ajax and River Plate Association visited the Town of Ajax in Ontario,
Canada where Admiral Harwood’s day uniform was presented to the town by his grandsons,
Jonathan and Ben Harwood. Ajax was originally developed as a munitions factory in 1941
supplying the war effort and grew into a community that chose to take its name from the plucky
cruiser, HMS Ajax. It was incorporated in 1955 and many of its streets are named after crew
members of the ships involved.
Commemorations were also held in Portsmouth and Exeter (UK), Auckland (New Zealand) and
Montevideo (Uruguay).
Portsmouth
The actual 75th anniversary of the Battle was marked with a lunch at the Royal Beach Hotel on 13th
December 2014 for 151 guests. John Garrard, Ted Wicks from HMS AJAX, together with Basil
Trott and Jim London from HMS EXETER, who fought at the Battle were present with their
families. Commodore Jeremy Rigby represented the First Sea Lord; the Lord Mayor of Exeter,
Councillor Percy Prowse, the Lord Mayor of Portsmouth, Councillor Steven Wylie; Mayor Steve
Parish, Mayor of Ajax, Ontario were present together with Commander Andrew McMillan,
representing the New Zealand High Commissioner; Captain Juan Retamoso, Defence Attache of
Uruguay. Also in attendance were Stephen and Henry Harwood, sons of Admiral Henry Harwood,
together with many members of families of those who fought at the Battle and Association Members.
Jonathan Harwood gave a presentation on the Battle and there followed a sherry reception and an
Up Spirits. A Mess Retreat by the Corps of Drums of HMS NELSON Volunteer Band preceded
lunch.
On completion of the speeches, Stephen Harwood showed newsreels of the day taken in
Montevideo and how the ship’s company of the three ships were welcomed in London, Plymouth
and Auckland.
A full report of the Portsmouth commemoration luncheon can be found on the HMS Ajax and River
Plate Association’s website, www.hmsajax.org .
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In Exeter, Devon, an honorary Freemanship was conferred on Admiral Harwood’s eldest grandson,
Ben, in recognition of the part played by HMS Exeter in the battle. There was also a dance, an
exhibition and a dinner to commemorate the Battle.
In Montevideo there were four days of commemoration including lectures, the laying of wreaths at
the British cemetery by HM Ambassador and Naval Attaches at the position where Graf Spee was
scuttled.
In Auckland, New Zealand, there was a ceremony at Achilles point, a service at the Naval
Memorial Chapel of St Christopher in HMNZS Philomel and a march past and wreath laying with
the salute taken by His Excellency Governor-General , Lieutenant General The Rt Hon Sir Jerry
Mateparae.
The open air screening of the 1956 film “The Battle of the River Plate” had to be cancelled because
of adverse weather conditions.
The commemorations were attended by four veterans of the Battle, Bob Batt, Roy Waide, John
Thomas and Harold Heffer.
A booklet was produced for the day by the Navy museum and a schools essay competition was held
on the subject “you are a sailor in HMS Achilles after the battle and are writing a letter home”. The
winning essays are of high quality.
In a letter from Commodore McDougall to Henry and Stephen he wrote “the commemoration was a
fitting tribute to the men who took part in the battle planned and executed by your father which was
a defining moment in the history of the Royal New Zealand Navy”.
[Since this was written we have seen the 80th Anniversary and this was marked by a service at the
River Plate Memorial at the National Memorial Arboretum coinciding with the 75th Anniversary of
D-Day in which Ajax also took part. In the December of the 80th year 2019 members of the
Association visited South America and took part in a number of commemorative services, including
on the actual Battle day, the 13th, at the Holy Trinity Cathedral in Montevideo, Uruguay, the British
Cemetery, the German Cemetery and a sailing out on the River Plate to the Graf Spee scuttle site. A
service was held at Captain Langsdorff’s grave in Buenos Aires, Argentina and at the British
Cemetery.]
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Frequently-asked questions
A. Background
QA1. What were Captain Langsdorff’s orders?
Langsdorff was ordered to intercept and damage enemy supply routes in the South Atlantic and
southern Indian Oceans. Engagements with enemy naval forces, even if inferior, were only to be
undertaken if this furthered the main purpose of commerce raiding. Using their own judgement,
commanders had the right to independent action provided it fitted in with their operational
instructions. No blame would fall on commanders whose ships were sunk in combat or were run
until their operational possibilities were exhausted. On no account should ships fall into enemy
hands.
QA2. What were Commodore Harwood’s orders?
Commodore Harwood was ordered to protect allied shipping and intercept enemy shipping to the
east of South America; a distance of 4000 miles from the Falkland Islands northwards to
Pernambuco, Brazil. For this he had the cruisers HMS Exeter, HMS Ajax and HMS Cumberland,
comprising Hunting Group G, with the New Zealand-manned cruiser, HMS Achilles joining them
on 26th October 1939.
QA3. Why did Graf Spee head for the area off the River Plate?
Graf Spee was due for a refit in Germany in January 1940 and by November 1939 her period of
commerce raiding was coming to an end. Having initially operated against the shipping routes in
the South Atlantic and around the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) until 6th December,
Langsdorff had the choice of either returning straight home or operating against the hitherto
unexploited sea traffic coming out of the River Plate. He chose the latter.
QA4. Why did Commodore Harwood concentrate his force off the River Plate?
Graf Spee sank his first victim, the Clement on September 30. There followed five other victims
before the Doric Star on 2nd December 1939 and the Tairoa the following day. Both ships
transmitted raider reports which alerted Harwood to the probability that Graf Spee was heading
towards South America. However Graf Spee’s ninth and final victim, Streonshalh did not manage
to transmit a raider report when she was attacked. Harwood decided that Langsdorff had three likely
options if he was approaching South America. He would reach waters off Rio de Janiero (Brazil) by
12th December, off the River Plate (Argentina and Uruguay) by the 13th December or be at the
Falkland Islands by 14th December (the anniversary of the destruction of Admiral von Spee’s
squadron in 1914 during World War 1 fell on 8th December). Of these the most threatening to
British trade, and therefore the most likely, was the River Plate with its valuable grain and meat
trade carried on British merchant ships. On 3rd December Harwood ordered Ajax, Achilles and
Exeter to meet on 12th December, 200 miles east of the Plate estuary. Cumberland was to continue
with planned maintenance at the Falkland Islands. In order to confuse allied intelligence, Graf Spee
had been operating under the name Admiral Scheer (her sister ship), which was actually undergoing
a refit in Germany at the time. It was not until after the battle when she was in the River Plate estuary that Graf Spee used her own radio call sign and the British forces knew the true identity of
their opponent.
See Appendix A. Graf Spee in the Atlantic.
QA5. Why did Captain Langsdorff choose to attack the British warships?
Langsdorff received intelligence that a convoy was preparing to leave the River Plate and that HMS
Achilles was in Montevideo, presumably to escort it. In spite of problems with his main engines and
other defects, Langsdorff decided that the sinking of a convoy and its warship escort offered a
potential triumphant climax to a cruise that had so far yielded the sinking of only nine merchant
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ships. He considered he would be facing an inferior force and a sinking a convoy of merchant ships
would most certainly further the main purpose of his mission.
Graf Spee sighted the British force at 0556 on 13th December, identified it initially as a cruiser and
two destroyers and decided to attack. By the time Langsdorff realised he was up against three
cruisers (far from an inferior force), it is questionable whether he could have disengaged without
being spotted and shadowed. Had his Arado reconnaissance seaplane not have finally become
unserviceable the previous day he would have known the strength of the British force earlier and
probably would have been able to avoid action.
QA6. What were the relative strengths of the two forces?
Graf Spee was of 12,000 tons displacement. Her main armament was six 11 inch guns in two triple
turrets firing shells weighing 670 lbs to a maximum range of 40,000 yards but with a rate of fire of
only two to three rounds per gun per minute. She could not divide the fire of her main armament in
order to engage separate targets. Her secondary armament of eight single 5.9 inch guns, four on
each side, fired 100 lb shells to a maximum range of 24,000 yards. She also carried 4.1 inch AA
guns and eight 21 inch torpedo tubes. Her armoured belt was of 3 inch thickness which was
believed to have been capable of keeping out shells of 8 inch calibre and below. Her turrets were
protected by 5.5 inches of armour. She was powered by long range MAN diesel engines giving her
a designed speed of 28 knots though she never achieved more than 24 during the battle.
HMS Exeter was of 8,400 tons displacement and carried six 8 inch guns in twin turrets which fired
250 lb shells to a maximum range of 30,000 yards with a rate of fire of about 6 rounds per minute.
Her armoured belt was of similar thickness to Graf Spee’s but her turrets were only lightly
armoured. She carried three 21 inch torpedoes each side and two Walrus amphibious aircraft
designed for reconnaissance and spotting gunfire. HMS Ajax and Achilles were each armed with 8
six inch guns in four twin turrets firing shells of 100 lbs. Their maximum gun range was slightly
less than Exeter’s with a rate of fire of 8 to 9 rounds per minute. They carried four 21 inch
torpedoes each side. Ajax carried a single Seafox float plane but Achilles * was not carrying one.
The steam-powered turbines of all three cruisers gave them a maximum speed of about 30 knots but
it took time to work up to this.
Graf Spee had overwhelming fire power which could cripple a cruiser with one or two direct hits
from her main armament in the right place, but her rate of fire was slow. The British ships had the
important advantage of speed but only Exeter’s shells were able to penetrate Graf Spee’s armour.
During the battle much depended on the skill and tactics of the two opposing commanders.
QA7. How did Harwood dispose his ships, and why?
Harwood planned to attack from two divergent bearings so as to split Graf Spee’s fire and enable
each division to mark the other’s fall of shot. Initially the three cruisers were in line ahead to
facilitate them opening out under various circumstances when the enemy was sighted. This
manoeuvre was practiced several times on 12th December. Exeter, the most powerful ship was on her own and the two light cruisers stayed together with Achilles following Ajax’s movements in
loose formation. This would allow the two ships to concentrate their gun fire as one unit co-
ordinated by Ajax and carry out a synchronised torpedo attack if opportunity offered.
QA8. Why did Graf Spee not use its superior gun range to destroy the cruisers?
Langsdorff made a conscious decision to close the range as soon as possible. He was probably
within Exeter’s gun range by the time he had evaluated the situation. (see para 13 below).
QA9. What logistic support did the two sides have?
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Langsdorff had a supply ship Altmark which carried provisions, ammunition and diesel fuel. She
acted as a prison ship for captured crews although was not equipped for this purpose.
The British force had fuel oil available at the Falkland Islands but otherwise had to rely on
refuelling from tankers in sheltered waters except when paying their infrequent visits to South
American ports, once in three months only were allowed to each country. The nearest ammunition
stocks were in South Africa. The Falkland Islands provided a secure anchorage where ships could
undertake periodic maintenance routines but had no dockyard facilities.
B. The Battle.
QB10 Why did the British not fly air-reconnaissance on the morning of 13th December?
Using the aircraft, Harwood had been tasked to carry out an important reconnaissance of the south
Brazilian coast where it was suspected that a German U Boat base was being prepared. Exeter’s
two Walrus amphibious aircraft were not sufficiently worked up to be recovered safely in the open
ocean sea state and so it was planned not to fly them due to the risk of them being damaged. This
left Ajax’s Seafox float plane, whose crew were well practiced in recovery during rough weather, as
the only aircraft available for reconnaissance, though its remaining engine hours available were
being tightly controlled. A flight with Ajax’s Seafox was planned for later in the day. The arrival of
the Graf Spee on the early morning of 13th December was an inspired and well calculated
prediction. Whilst Harwood planned for and rehearsed the forecast event the British did not have
confidence that Graf Spee would actually appear that very morning. Captain Woodhouse
summarised the thoughts by saying, “Even if you are looking for a needle in a haystack, you are still
surprised when you put your hand on it.”
QB11. What part did Graf Spee’s radar play in the Battle?
Graf Spee carried an early ship-borne Seetakt radar with limited range and accuracy. It has always
been generally accepted that her radar did not play any significant role in the battle. None of the
British ships carried radar.
QB12. Why did Graf Spee not finish off Exeter?
Graf Spee initially concentrated her main armament on Exeter, starting fires and causing very
severe damage. She then shifted target to the light cruisers who she then saw as her most dangerous
opponents. After scoring a damaging near-miss on Achilles, Graf Spee turned her fire back on
Exeter in an attempt to finish her off but obtained no further hits and was soon forced to concentrate
again on the light cruisers who were closing her fast and bringing the full force of their fire-power
to bear, causing much superficial damage and many casualties. Exeter, with all her guns out of
action, was ordered to disengage and head for the Falkland Islands.
QB13. Why didn’t Graf Spee sink all three ships?
At about 0628 Langsdorff was being straddled by the light cruisers and saw himself threatened by a
torpedo attack from them and so shifted his main armament to them, since he regarded Exeter as no
longer a threat to him. Later he did turn his main armament back to Exeter but obtained no hits. By this time his main fire control director was out of action and things were becoming confused,
especially due to the frequent hits from the light cruisers. This may have been the time Langsdorff
realised that he was defeated and so did not try to regain the initiative when Ajax’s two after-turrets
were put out of action at about 0735 and the advantage was very much his. In a letter to his wife,
Joan, Harwood made the point that right from the start he had seized the initiative and had attacked
when Langsdorff expected him to run. Hence Langsdorff lost the initiative early on and although
afterwards he may have identified several ways he could have done things better, at the time his
reaction to the unexpected aggression from the three smaller ships prompted him to eventually flee
the battlefield.
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QB14. Damage – overview
Splinter damage from high explosive shells that explode on impact have the potential to cause a lot
of damage. Even when they explode on impact with the water as near misses, splinters can easily
penetrate the sides of ships and allow water to enter. It is often not appreciated that some parts of
the sides of a ship are quite thin, constructed to be flexible, protect against the sea and reduce
weight. Armour-piercing shells, on the other hand, may pass straight through a lightly armoured
ship without exploding. It was near misses that finally put Exeter out of action when water ingress
through splinter holes damaged the electrical supply to Y-turret, the last one firing. While a single
hit from one of Graf Spee’s 11inch shells was able to cause major damage on several occasions,
Ajax and Achilles’ 6 inch shells were seen to bounce off Graf Spee’s armour, prompting Harwood
to comment, “We might just as well be bombarding her with a lot of bloody snowballs.” (quote
from the 1956 film).
Contrary to prediction, however, one of Exeter’s 8 inch shells did penetrate Graf Spee’s armour and
did major damage and missed an engine room by only a few feet.
Shortening the range allowed Ajax and Achilles to use their 6 inch guns to effect, but also brought
them within range of Graf Spee’s 5.9 inch guns.
QB15. Damage to Graf Spee
During the battle Langsdorff received conflicting reports on the damage his ship was sustaining.
Graf Spee received 23 hits of which only 3 were from Exeter’s heavier 8 inch shells. The damage
she sustained as a result of these hits can be summarised;
Only three of the eight engines were in full working order
*There were two holes in the bows, the larger one 4m2.
*The main galley and bakery was out of action, the flour store was contaminated by sea water.
*The primary rangefinder was damaged beyond repair as was the forward high angle director.
*The fire control systems that controlled the guns were affected by the excessive vibration of the
diesel engines.
*The forward 11 inch turret was proving unreliable.
The auxiliary boiler which supplied steam both to the distilling plant for fresh water and to the
purifier to refine the fuel for the main engines was damaged and could not be repaired at sea. This
could be repaired in harbour but its position at the foot of the funnel above the armoured deck
meant that it would be equally vulnerable in any future action. The ship had capacity for sufficient
cleansed diesel for about 1200 miles steaming. (Source Naval Historical Branch). This is in contrast
to the signal sent to Germany by Kapitän Kay, Executive Officer (second-in-command) in January
1940 which gave the figure as only 16 hours steaming. This signal may have been sent to appease
Hitler and allow a design fault in the ship to cover up Langsdorff’s failings.
There were severe injuries to upper deck personnel and damage to the 5.9" open guns. These
casualties really shocked Langsdorff and caused morale problems with a crew that had been used to
just sinking merchant ships.
With the forward Anti-aircraft (AA) director out of action, the starboard 4.1-in gun mounting and the right barrel of the port mounting disabled and the starboard 4.1-in shell hoist no longer
functioning, the ship was more vulnerable to air attack or air spotting. This would have been a point
of importance should Graf Spee have come out from Montevideo and been threatened by Ark
Royal’s aircraft.
With damage to the functioning of both port and starboard torpedo tubes the ship was unable to
launch a torpedo attack.
On top of this were the wear and tear effects of 3 months at sea without shore support.
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Finally, Langsdorff was wounded twice; in the shoulder and later briefly knocked unconscious.
Oberleutnant Rasenak said that he was no longer the same after this.
The myth of the invincibility of a pocket battleship against anything but a battle cruiser had been
exploded.
QB16. Damage to HMS Exeter
*The two forward ‘A’ and ‘B’ 8 inch-turrets were out of action after direct hits.
*The aft 8 inch ‘Y’-turret was firing only one gun in local control and ceased firing at 0729 due to
loss of electrical power.
*The bridge, wheelhouse and transmitting station and main armament director were out of action.
*There were fires raging throughout the ship.
*The telephone communications throughout the ship and wireless transmission to the other ships
had broken down.
*There was 650 tons of sea water on board, the ship was 3 feet down by the bows and had a list of
10 degrees to starboard.
*66 crew members were dead out of a complement of 630. Captain Bell was among the wounded.
However since the engine room was undamaged and the ship was steaming at about 18 knots,
Captain Bell even considered trying to ram Graf Spee.
QB17 Damage to HMS Ajax.
*Both aft 6-in turrets were put out of action at about 0730 following an 11 inch shell hit that killed
or wounded 10 of ‘X’-turret’s crew.
*The main mast supporting the radio aerials was brought down at 0715 temporarily curtailing
Harwood’s communications.
QB18 Damage to HMS Achilles.
*In its elevated position the director control tower was peppered by splinters from an 11 inch near-
miss. This killed or wounded half of the gun director’s crew but the gunnery officer, Lieutenant
Washbourne, himself wounded, quickly cleared away the casualties, obtained replacements and got
his armament back into action. On the bridge Captain Parry was wounded.
QB19. Could Graf Spee not divide the fire from its two 11 inch guns and engage two targets
simultaneously?
Since there was only one system for controlling the main armament fire control data this was not
possible. This was one of the economies made to the pocket battleship design to save both money
and weight.
QB20. Ships’ capabilities remaining after the action:
Graf Spee; one 5.9” gun destroyed, unable to launch torpedo attacks. She was short of ammunition
for further prolonged fighting. Out of 186 11-in shells remaining, 170 were armour-piercing, best
designed for use against heavy armoured ships and were liable to pass straight through lightly armoured ships such as Ajax and Achilles without exploding.
HMS Exeter; all guns out of action.
HMS Ajax; four out of eight 6-in guns not working (at one point only 3 guns were working but this
was fixed).
HMS Achilles; all guns working.
QB21. What happened in the battle after Exeter was ordered to withdraw?
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At 0636 Graf Spee reversed her course and turned to the west behind smoke, allowing her a final
opportunity to engage Exeter. After that she never turned back to face the British ships but continue
to head west.
The light cruisers, who had now worked up to full speed, closed on Graf Spee, firing all sixteen of
their 6 inch guns at the rate of 8 or 9 rounds per minute per gun. At 0715 Ajax was straddled by
Graf Spee’s 11 inch guns which brought her mainmast down but otherwise did no serious damage.
By 0725 the light cruisers had closed to within the very close range of four nautical miles from Graf
Spee. Harwood was concerned about ammunition expenditure and decided to open the range and
shadow until nightfall when he would make a torpedo attack.
Ajax fired a salvo of torpedoes to deter Graf Spee from following as she turned away. At about the
same time Graf Spee achieved an 11 inch hit on Ajax which put her two after-turrets out of action.
Instead of taking this opportunity to turn back on her pursuers and regain the initiative, Graf Spee
continued westward towards Montevideo with the two cruisers turning again to pursue her. There
were sporadic exchanges of fire between the two forces during Graf Spee’s retreat but neither side
achieved a hit. Graf Spee entered Montevideo harbour just before midnight.
QB22. Why did Captain Langsdorff decide to run for Montevideo?
During the action Langsdorff had fought his ship from an exposed position on the upper bridge and
had been twice wounded after which he appeared concussed. His officers later remarked that after
being wounded he was not his usual self. Once the cruisers had opened the range Langsdorff toured
the ship to assess the damage. There was a large hole in the bows, an 8-in shell had penetrated the
armoured belt and there was severe damage and many casualties on the upper deck. Most serious of
all was the fact that the apparatus for processing diesel fuel to the purity required by the ship’s
engines had suffered damage which could not be repaired at sea. He received varying estimates of
how much usable fuel remained and decided to head for Montevideo. We know, from the Naval
Historical Branch, that there was probably sufficient for him to have continued the action, had he
wished. However Langsdorff returned to the bridge and said “We must run into port. The ship is not
seaworthy for the North Atlantic”.
QB23. What part did the gunboat, Uruguay play in the action?
A small naval vessel of the Uruguayan navy, her duty was to enforce the integrity of territorial
waters claimed by Uruguay, and she bravely interposed herself between the two opposing forces as
Graf Spee entered the River Plate estuary. As Harwood later said “A very correct but very brave
gesture particularly, as at about that time the Graf Spee was handing out occasional 11 inch salvoes
against both Ajax and Achilles”.
C. The Montevideo Phase
QC24. How long was Graf Spee permitted to stay in Montevideo harbour?
The Hague Convention allowed a ship in a neutral port to carry out repairs to make her seaworthy but not to restore her fighting efficiency. The Germans asked for 14 days to do this but the
Uruguayans, after inspecting the damage, allowed only 72 hours and ordered Spee to sail by 8pm on
Sunday 17th December.
QC25. Why did the British first try to persuade the Uruguayans to force Graf Spee out of
Montevideo and then tried to persuade them to keep her in?
The British Minister in Montevideo, Eugen Millington-Drake, initially wanted to get Graf Spee
back to face the British force at sea. On the evening of Wednesday 13th December, before Graf Spee
arrived in Montevideo, Harwood sent a signal requesting that diplomatic action be taken to keep her
in Montevideo as he knew that the nearest reinforcements (the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal and
12
battlecruiser HMS Renown) could not arrive before Tuesday 19th December. He also suggested that
advantage should be taken of the international law that if a merchant ship left a port then a warship
of a hostile nation should not be allowed to sail from the same port for 24 hours. This signal did not
reach Millington-Drake until the morning of Friday 15th December because of routing delays caused
by the signalling system, messages had to go via the Falklands. Hence the embarrassing change of
policy which is well portrayed in the 1956 film, “Battle of the River Plate”.
QC26. What part did the cruiser HMS Cumberland play?
Prior to the battle she had been ordered to continue her planned maintenance period at the Falkland
Islands but intercepted signals about the battle and made a high speed dash to Montevideo where
she arrived at 2200 on Thursday 14th December. This restored Harwood’s squadron to its original
strength.
QC27. What were the Germans’ problems in Montevideo?
All were depressed by their defeat and Langsdorff realised he had sailed into a trap by entering
Montevideo in Uruguay. Although adhering strictly to international law in its treatment of Graf
Spee it was a country that was strongly pro-British.. He realised that in the ship’s present state, with
a large hole in the bows, his chances of reaching Germany through the north Atlantic winter storms
were low and he was not prepared to sacrifice his ship and a thousand men as a target for British
gunnery.
The local ship repairer refused to work for him. Dockyard labour had to be brought over from
Buenos Aires in neutral Argentina and the Montevideo harbour authorities were uncooperative. An
aircraft chartered by the Germans for a reconnaissance flight over the estuary refused to cross the
coast line on the pretext that visibility was not good enough.
On Friday 15th December Graf Spee’s gunnery officer, Fregattenkapitän Ascher, the ship’s official
recognition officer whose judgement was much respected, reported that he could see HMS Ark
Royal and three destroyers and it was assumed that HMS Renown with her 15 inch guns would soon
arrive. This was reported to Berlin who replied that they had already sunk Ark Royal and the Fuhrer
himself demanded photographs (German claims to have sunk Ark Royal became a British national
joke until she was truly sunk in November 1941). The German Admiralty intelligence doubted the
report but gave credence to the man on the spot.
On Saturday 16th December both the British Naval Attaché and his assistant made telephone calls to
the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires supposedly asking for fuel to be provided for Ark Royal
and Renown in the next day or two.
It was known that these telephone lines were tapped by the Germans and the news that major
British units were gathering appeared in the evening papers. For good dramatic effect these two
calls were combined into one and made a good scene in both the 1956 film and the 2006 Timewatch
programme. Millington-Drake has written that the details of the scenes in the Legation at
Montevideo are fictional.
It seems probable that by this time Langsdorff’s mind was already made up and that these calls did
not affect his judgment. By then he had accepted that scuttling was his only option left.
It seems probable that, by this time, Langsdorff’s mind was already made up and that these calls did
not affect his judgement. By then Langsdorff had accepted that scuttling was his only option left.
Reliable information on this ruse is difficult to find but while Millington-Drake regarded the Naval
Attaché’s phone call as fictional as far as the Legation in Montevideo was concerned, there was
undoubtedly wide coverage in the press.
Ascher had probably mistaken the oiler Olympus for Ark Royal and the three cruisers for destroyers.
QC28. What were the British problems during this time?
13
The possibility that Graf Spee was leading the British force into a trap could not be discounted.
There were three possible escape routes from Montevideo for her. However because of shallow
water the 15 mile gap on the northern side of the estuary which allowed an entirely safe depth of
water was anticipated to be the most likely route she would take. Initially Harwood had only
Achilles and the damaged Ajax with only two operational turrets. Neither ship was equipped with
radar to detect a break out by Graf Spee in the early morning mists. Once Cumberland had joined
the force and one of Ajax’s damaged turrets had been made operational, Harwood’s force was
restored to its original strength.
QC29. What was Hitler’s reaction to the Graf Spee crisis?
Everyone on the German side knew that scuttling was the best option and Hitler was persuaded to
accept this on the basis that Graf Spee should first consider attempting a break out to Buenos Aires
(across the River Plate estuary in neutral Argentina which was not possible due to the shallow
water) and that the ship should be scuttled if this was considered impossible. He commented that
Graf Spee might sink something on the way to Buenos Aires and was critical that she had not sunk
Exeter.
QC30. What happened to Graf Spee’s crew after the scuttling?
They were taken to Buenos Aires in chartered craft and interned. Some of the wounded who were
still in hospital in Montevideo were interned in Uruguay. Later many of the officers escaped back to
Germany and continued the war. A substantial number of ratings remained in Argentina and
Uruguay and became citizens of those countries. Many married locally and form part of the
German community today.
QC31. Why did Captain Langsdorff shoot himself after the scuttling?
There is a longstanding tradition that a captain should go down with his ship. Langsdorff wanted to
do this but was persuaded that he still had responsibilities to look after his crew in Buenos Aires.
When his men were safely settled in internment he thought honour required him to shoot himself.
QC32. How many people were killed or died of wounds in the Battle?
HMS Ajax: 7
HMS Achilles: 4
HMS Exeter: 66 (10% of her ship’s company)
Admiral Graf Spee: 38 (3.7% out of ships company of approximately 1000)
QC33. How many honours and awards were bestowed on the British Side?
Command and Staff:
Knight Commander of the Bath (KCB) and promotion to Rear Admiral to Commodore Harwood.
HMS AJAX:
Companion of the Bath (CB) to Captain Woodhouse.
2 Distinguished Service Orders (DSO) 6 Distinguished Service Cross’ (DSC)
14 Distinguished Service Medals (DSM)
1 British Empire Medal (BEM)
14 Mentions in Despatches
HMS ACHILLES:
Companion of the Bath (CB) to Captain Parry
2 Distinguished Service Orders (DSO)
4 Distinguished Service Cross’ (DSC)
1 Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM)
14
14 Distinguished Service Medals (DSM)
24 Mentions in Despatches
HMS EXETER:
Companion of the Bath (CB) to Captain Bell
2 Distinguished Service Orders (DSO)
7 Distinguished Service Cross’ (DSC)
1 Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM)
17 Distinguished Service Medals (DSM)
18 Mentions in Despatches
D. The Aftermath
QD34. Why has the story lasted so long?
It was the first British victory of the war and as the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound said, it set the
standard for the Royal Navy for the rest of the war. Winston Churchill saw the immense benefits
from the success and, with speeches and march-pasts, he used it to raise morale throughout Britain
and confidence in the allied cause among the neutral countries, especially in South America. The
battle also provides an easily comprehensible package combining successful interception of the
enemy, a hard-fought battle won by a well-thought-out offensive action, better ships and well-
trained men. Finally there follows an intriguing diplomatic battle in Montevideo with its finale the
spectacular scuttling of Graf Spee.
QD35. Attitudes of the British and German Captains.
During the battle, with all his guns disabled but his engines intact Captain Bell (HMS Exeter) said
that he intended to “ram the bugger” (Graf Spee) if he had the chance. He admitted later that “It
would have meant the end of us but also of the Graf Spee as a raider”.
Bell was working to Commodore Harwood's orders "Attack at once by day or night". From
December 1936 Harwood had been captain of Exeter as well as Division Commodore until sailed
from UK in September 1939 with basically the same hips company with Bell as Captain of the ship
which would allow the Commodore to command the squadron from any of his ships as occasion
required. The crew was basically the same. Harwood had trained them as a fighting unit. He later
said “Our ships had exercised a possible action against a pocket battleship and they knew what to
do”; “We were all in action together”
In a letter home in January 1940 to his wife, Joan, Harwood said, “It is the old story, the offensive,
he expected us to run away and when we attacked and chased him instead he lost the initiative….”
Captain Langsdorff (Graf Spee), quoted after the scuttling, “Better a thousand live heroes that a
thousand dead men”.
QD36. How has history treated Captain Langsdorff?
He was a known to be professional naval officer first and foremost, and a man of honour. He was
proud of the fact that, although he had quite legally fired on the merchant ships which continued to
transmit on their radios after being told to cease, his campaign against merchant ships had been
conducted without the loss of a single life. As Professor Eric Grove has written. “Langsdorff was a
good man fighting for a bad cause. Harwood was a good man fighting for a good cause”.
QD37. How did Rear Admiral Harwood’s subsequent career develop?
15
His personal image was high in South America and the Foreign Office requested that he remained
on station off South America which he did until September 1940 flying his flag in the old cruiser
HMS Hawkins. He then served for 16 months at the Admiralty before taking up the appointment of
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean as an acting-full (4 star) admiral to relieve Admiral
Cunningham while he went the USA in May 1942 to set up Operation Torch, the invasion of French
North Africa. On Cunningham’s return Harwood was appointed Commander-in-Chief Levant,
responsible for the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. After promotion to the substantive rank of
Vice Admiral he was appointed as second-in-command of the Eastern fleet in March 1943 but
before he could take up this appointment he had a heart attack and was invalided home. He was
later certified fit for shore service in a low stress appointment Admiral Commanding Orkney and
Shetland. He was placed on the retired list after the war in the rank of full admiral and died on 9th
June 1950 aged 62.
QD38. How did the careers of the three naval captains develop?
Admiral Sir Charles Woodhouse KCB, Captain of HMS Ajax.
In October 1940 he became Director of the Local Division at the Admiralty and in April 1942 he
assumed command of HMS Howe. In March 1944 he was appointed as Director of Naval Ordnance
at the Admiralty. After the War he became Second-in-Command of the Carrier Fleet and in 1948 he
became Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station. He retired in 1950 and died in 1978.
Admiral Sir Edward Parry KCB, Captain of HMS Achilles.
He assumed command of HMS Renown in 1943. He took part in the Normandy landings and served
on the staff of Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force in 1944. After the war
he became Deputy Head of the Naval Division at the Allied Control Commission in Germany. Parry
was appointed the second Chief of Naval Staff (Commander-in-Chief) of the Royal Indian Navy in
August 1948. He retired in 1951 and died in 1972.
Captain Frederick Secker Bell CB. Captain of HMS Exeter.
Bell later became Flag Captain to Flag Officer Malaya, escaping from Singapore to Sumatra in a 6
metre yacht. He commanded HMS Anson in 1945. He developed TB and retired from the Navy
owing to ill health in January 1948 and died in 1973.
QD39. What is the significance of the flag (pennant) with the red cross on white seen covering
the memorial prior to its unveiling and depicted on Commodore Harwood’s bench?
Admirals and Commodores have distinguishing flags which they fly at the masthead of the ships
they are in. The flag shown covering the memorial prior to its unveiling and on his bench is
Commodore Harwood’s Broad Pennant which was flown by HMS Ajax at the battle.
QB40. What happened to the three Royal Navy ships after the battle?
HMS Ajax returned to Britain at the end of January 1940 for a refit and was recommissioned in
July 1940. She spent most of the rest of the Second World War in the Mediterranean where she saw
much action and was also involved in the D-Day landings. Following the war she was paid off on
16 February 1948 at Chatham and preparations were made for her sale to Chile. This was blocked by Churchill who thought her memory would be better served if she were scrapped. In November
1949 she was towed to Newport and dismantled by John Cashmore Ltd.
The name Ajax lived on when the frigate HMS Ajax was launched in 1963 and served until 1985
when she became a training ship. She was finally broken-up in 1988.
HMS Ajax has also been proposed for the name of the 7th Astute class nuclear-powered submarine
of the Royal Navy. If the order is confirmed, she will be the ninth vessel of the Royal Navy to bear
the name, Ajax, named after the Greek hero. [Not progressed]
HMS Achilles was a Royal Navy ship manned with RN Officers and a largely New Zealand ship’s
company. With the formation of the Royal New Zealand Navy in 1st October 1941 she became
HMNZS Achilles. She transferred to the Indian Navy as INS Delhi after the war as flagship of her
3 0
16
former Captain, now Admiral, Parry. She played herself in the 1956 film, “Battle of the River
Plate”.
At Port Stanley, in preparation for the journey home, Exeter’s crew plugged and patched holes
using locally-sourced steel from SS Great Britain and local sheds also using old pieces of railway to
reinforce damaged bulkheads. They rigged jury aerials, repaired equipment and made the ship
ready for sea. ‘Y’-turret was put into working order and all ammunition transferred to it while the
non-working forward turrets were man-handled into fore and aft positions.
There was a rumour that HMS Exeter would be abandoned as a rusting hulk alongside the iron
steamship Great Britain but, as he wrote later, Winston Churchill, ‘Was most anxious about the
Exeter, and would not accept proposals made to leave her unrepaired in the Falkland Islands till the
end of the war’.
On 21 January 1940, leaving behind her wounded, Exeter began her long voyage home, first
escorted by the cruisers HMS Dorsetshire and Shropshire, then by Force H and then by nine
destroyers. On 15 February, to an enormous welcome, Exeter sailed into Devonport, past cheering
crowds of people, past the men who built her, banging their hammers and dipping their cranes in
salute. There, they were given a triumphal welcome by Churchill and the Admiralty Board.
Winston Churchill had come to, “Pay my tribute to her brave officers and men from her shattered
deck in Plymouth harbour”.
In February 1942, during the Battle of the Java Sea off Bawean Island, HMS Exeter was sunk by
the Japanese. 53 crew members were killed and a further 156 were to die in captivity in Japanese
prisoner-of-war camps.
Part 6
41 Bibliography. Suggested further reading.
Books.
Sir Eugen Millington-Drake KCMG: “The Drama of GRAF SPEE and the Battle of the Plate”
(1964).
Dudley Pope: “The Battle of the River Plate” (1956).
Eric J. Grove: "The Price of Disobedience- the Battle of the River Plate reconsidered” (2000)
(ISBN 0 7509 0927 7).
David Miller: "Langsdorff and the Battle of the River Plate” (2013) (ISBN 978-1-84884-490-2).
Richard Woodman: “The Battle of the River Plate: a grand delusion” (2008) (ISBN
9781844156894)
Joseph Gilbey: “Kriegsmarine; Admiral Raeder’s Navy: a broken dream” (2005) (ISBN 0-9685994-
1-9).
Joseph Gilbey: “Langsdorff of the Graf Spee: Prince of Honor” (1999) (ISBN 9780968599402).
Jack Harker: “HMNZS Achilles” (1981) (ISBN-10: 0002169614)
Gordon Landsborough: “The Battle of the River Plate”
Patrick Dove: “I was Graf Spee’s prisoner” (1956)
Lord Strabolgi RN: “The Battle of the River Plate (1940 approx).
Michael Powell: “Graf Spee” (1956) (book of the film). Henry and Stephen Harwood: "Harwood and the Battle of the River Plate." Privately published.
Available on line in from [email protected] including at the IWM and NMA.
42. Films, DVD and websites.
“The Battle of the River Plate” (1956); produced and directed by Michael Powell & Emeric
Pressburger. This film gives some misleading impressions for dramatic effect such as the spoof
telephone calls.. On the whole though, the film is remarkably accurate.
BBC 2, Timewatch: “The Battle of the River Plate” (2006).
Graf Spee BBC, by David Howarth
17
The Battle of the River Plate for the Harwood family. Privately circulated but available on request
from [email protected]
A number of other programmes over the years, some good others not accurate. (Details available
from [email protected])
Websites.
www.hmsajax.org – the website of the HMS Ajax and River Plate Veterans Association.
www.orlopdeck.net – a website that displays a useful timeline of the battle.
www.grafspee.com – Joseph Gilbey’s website
