The Blackwell Dictionary ofWestern Philosophy

NICHOLAS BUNNIN AND JIYUAN YU

The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy

For my grandson Louis BunninN.B.

In memory of my grandparentsJ.Y.

The Blackwell Dictionary ofWestern Philosophy

NICHOLAS BUNNIN AND JIYUAN YU

© 2004 by Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu

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Contents

Preface vii

Dictionary 1

References 745

Preface

Although the Dictionary covers a wide historicalrange and explores many subject areas, it focuseson terms and individuals at the center of currentphilosophical discussion. Many readers will consultthe Dictionary for help in understanding individualterms and the contributions of individual philo-sophers, but others will explore a given philosophicalissue or area by reading a range of related entries. Aphilosopher browsing through the text will learnmuch about the history and structure of Westernphilosophy and its sources of creative dispute. Wehope that the Dictionary will be an invitation tofurther thought and that it will not be taken as thelast word on any topic.

Entries for philosophical terms are intendedto provide clear and challenging expositions thatgive access to major philosophical issues. Queriesand objections are often included to capture theperplexity arising from philosophical questionsand to encourage readers to be active and criticalin their response to the Dictionary as a whole.Many entries give the derivations from Greek,Latin, French, or German. Entries for terms statethe areas of philosophy in which the terms havetheir main use, provide cross-references to entrieson philosophers and other terms, and concludewith illustrative quotations from a classical ormodern source. The reference section at the end ofthe book gives details of the works cited in thesequotations. Biographical entries discuss the philo-

sophical contributions and list at least some of themajor works of their subjects.

In preparing the Dictionary, we aimed to providea clear, balanced, and sophisticated picture of philo-sophy derived from primary works, leading scholarlyauthorities, and our own philosophical insights.Citations indicate the extensive range of primarysources consulted, but the entries themselves alsoreflect our gratitude to an excellent range of con-temporary philosophical encyclopedias, dictionaries,reference works, and textbooks, including PaulEdwards (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols.(Macmillan, 1967); J. O. Urmson and Jonathan Rée(eds.), The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophyand Philosophers (Routledge, 1989); Edward Craig(ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 10 vols.(Routledge, 1998); Stuart Brown et al. (eds.), Bio-graphical Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Philosophers(Routledge, 1996); Robert Audi (ed.), The CambridgeDictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press,1995); G. Vesey and P. Foulkes, Collins Dictionaryof Philosophy (Collins, 1990); Antony Flew (ed.), ADictionary of Philosophy (Pan, 1979); A. R. Lacey, ADictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edn. (Routledge, 1986);Thomas Mautner (ed.), A Dictionary of Philosophy(Blackwell, 1996); Peter A. Angeles, The HarperCollinsDictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edn. (HarperCollins,1992); Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionaryof Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1994);J. O. Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary

(Duckworth, 1990); A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy:A Guide Through the Subject (Oxford UniversityPress, 1995); Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui-James(eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy(Blackwell, 1996); Ted Honderich (ed.), The OxfordCompanion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press,1995); the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series;the Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries series; and theCambridge Companions to Philosophers series.

In addition to those mentioned above, wewish to thank the Leverhulme Trust and thePeople’s Publishing House, Beijing. A grant fromthe Leverhulme Trust supported our preparation ofthe Dictionary of Western Philosophy: English–Chinese(People’s Publishing House, Beijing, 2001). Thepresent Dictionary is a revised and augmented

version of that earlier work. The Philosophy Libraryand the Bodleian Library at the University ofOxford made their philosophical riches available tous. Edward Craig and Chad Hansen were refereesfor our Leverhulme Trust project, and Sir PeterStrawson assessed our initial list of headwords. Fin-ally, we thank Nick Bellorini and Kelvin Matthewsof Blackwell Publishing for their encouragementand support, and Valery Rose and Caroline Richardsfor their excellent editing. We both enjoyed ourintensive work in compiling this Dictionary, and eachlearned so much from the philosophical insights ofthe other.

Nicholas BunninJiyuan Yu

viii Preface

A

abandonmentModern European philosophy An experience gainedthrough realizing that there are no objective prin-ciples or authorities to guide one’s life. According toexistentialism, this experience helps us to recognizethat one cannot attain authenticity by appeal to Godor to philosophical systems. We should each under-stand our own unique existential condition, rejectbad faith, and assume full responsibility for life. Theconception of abandonment is hence related to theexistentialist account of the autonomy of the agent.

“When we speak of ‘abandonment’ – a favouriteword of Heidegger – we only mean to say thatGod does not exist, and that it is necessary to drawthe consequence of his absence right to the end.”Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism

abductionPhilosophy of science C. S. Peirce’s term for thelogic of discovery, a creative process that is one ofthe three fundamental types of reasoning in science,along with induction and deduction. When weencounter a new phenomenon that cannot be ex-plained through the application of a general law, weshould pick out certain characteristic features of thisnew phenomenon and attempt to find relationsamong these features. After forming several theoriesor hypotheses that might explain the phenomenon,we should select one of them to test against

experience. Such a process of reasoning to formempirical theories or hypotheses for testing is calledabduction. Peirce also called it retroduction, hypo-thesis or presumption, but other philosophers havenormally called it induction. Peirce distinguishedabduction from induction by defining induction asthe experimental testing of a theory. He held thatabduction is what Aristotle discussed as apagago(Greek, leading away, substituting a more likelypremise for a less acceptable one).

“Presumption, or more precisely, abduction . . .furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theorywhich induction verifies.” Peirce, The CollectedPapers, vol. II

Abelard, Peter (1079–1142)Medieval French philosopher, born near Nantes,Brittany. Abelard, whose main concern was logic,made valuable contributions to discussion of issuessuch as inference, negation, predicate-expressions,and transitivity. He sought to discuss theologicalproblems by analyzing the propositions used to statethese problems. He steered a middle course betweenrealism and nominalism and maintained that thereference of a universal term is not necessarily some-thing that exists. In ethics, he focused on the inten-tion of the agent rather than on the action itself andconsidered sin to be an intention to act against God’swill and virtue to be living in love with God. His

major works include Dialectica, Theologian Scholarium,Ethics (Scito te ipsum, or Know Thyself ) and Dialoguebetween a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew. He alsowrote commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge andAristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione. The storyof love between Abelard and Heloise has fascinatedmany later generations.

abortionEthics The intentional killing of a fetus or fertilizedhuman egg by causing its expulsion from themother’s womb before its birth. Whether abortionshould be morally permitted has been intensivelydebated in the past few decades and has become amajor political and legal issue in many industrializedcountries. One focus of the debate is on the moralstatus of a fetus. Is a fetus a person with a substant-ive right to life? The anti-abortion argument holdsthat a fetus is already a person and therefore shouldbe within the scope of the moral rule that “youshould not kill.” This view leads to a discussion con-cerning the concept of personhood, that is, at whatstage between conception and birth does a fetusbecomes a person? Another focus concerns the rightsof the pregnant woman. Does she have a right tobodily autonomy, including the right to decide whathappens to her own body? Even if a fetus is a person,how shall we balance its rights and the woman’srights? Still another problem concerns the extent towhich we should take into account the undesirableconsequences of the prohibition of abortion, such aspoverty and overpopulation. Different sides of thedebate hold different positions resulting in part fromthe moral principles they accept. There is currentlyno common basis to solve all the disagreement.Nevertheless, abortion, which was legally permittedonly in Sweden and Denmark until 1967, has becomeaccepted in the majority of Western countries.

“Induced abortion is the termination of unwantedpregnancy by destruction of the fetus.” Rita Simon,Abortion

Absolute, theMetaphysics [from Latin absolutus, in turn originat-ing from ab, away, from and solvere, free, loosen;free from limitations, qualifications or conditions]To call something absolute is to say that it is uncon-ditional or universal, in contrast to what is relative,

comparative or varying according to circumstances.In metaphysics, the Absolute, as a technical term,is a single entity that is ultimate, unchanging, over-riding and all-comprehensive. Nicholas of Cusauses this expression to refer to God. Subsequently,the Absolute is always associated with concepts suchas the one, the perfect, the eternal, the uncaused, andthe infinite and has been regarded as the real-ity underlying appearance and providing rationalground for appearance.

The revival of the notion of the Absolute inmodern philosophy derives from the debate inthe 1770s between Mendelssohn and Jacob aboutSpinoza’s definition of substance. Schelling, employ-ing Spinoza’s notion of substance, defines theAbsolute as a neutral identity that underlies bothsubject (mind) and object (nature). Everything thatis mental or physical is an attribute of the Absoluteor of “indefinite substance.” He further claims thatthe Absolute is a living force, an organism, and some-thing that is self-generating rather than mechanistic.Hegel claimed that the Absolute is the unity of sub-stance and its modes, of the infinite and the finite.Such an Absolute is both a substance and a subject,developing from the underlying reality to the phe-nomenal world and reaching absolute knowledgeas its highest phase. Thus, the Absolute is a self-determining activity, a spirit, and a concrete dynamictotality. Its development mirrors the developmentof knowledge. Hegel’s metaphysics sought to workout the process and implications of this development.

In the twentieth century, this term is particularlyassociated with Bradley, who conceives the Absoluteto be a single, self-differentiating whole. Anti-metaphysical thought argues for the elimination ofthe Absolute as an entity that cannot be observedand that performs no useful function in philosophy.

“Absolutes are the limits of explanation, and assuch they have been the main theme of traditionalphilosophy.” Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute

absolute conceptionMetaphysics A term introduced by Bernard Williamsin his study of Descartes for a conception of realityas it is independent of our experience and towhich all representations of reality can be related.To gain such a conception requires overcoming thelimitations of our enquiry and any systematic bias,

2 abortion

distortion, or partiality in our outlook. Such a con-ception may enable us to view our representationsas one set among others and to avoid assessing theviews of others from our own standpoint. Williamsclaims that our notion of knowledge implies thatsuch a conception is possible.

“This notion of an absolute conception can serveto make effective a distinction between ‘the worldas it is independent of our experience’ and ‘theworld as it seems to us’.” B. Williams, Ethics andthe Limits of Philosophy

absolute ideaMetaphysics The absolute idea, for Hegel, is equi-valent to absolute truth in his Phenomenology ofMind and to the absolute in his Logic. It is also calledabsolute spirit. For Hegel, an idea is not somethingmental or separate from particulars, but is thecategorical form of spirit. The absolute idea is theidea in and for itself, an infinite reality and anall-embracing whole. It exists in a process of self-development and self-actualization. As a metaphys-ical counterpart of the Christian God, it is the basisfor the teleological development of both the naturaland social worlds. Its determinate content constitutesreality. The absolute idea is what truly is, and thefinal realization of truth. For Hegel, the absoluteidea is a dynamic self, involving inner purposivenessand normative ideals. By characterizing reality asthe absolute idea, Hegel showed that his notion ofreality is fundamentally conceptual. It is a unity ofthe ideal of life with the life of cognition. The coreof Hegel’s idealism is the claim that the being of allfinite things is derived from the absolute idea. Interms of this notion, Hegel integrated ontology,metaphysics, logic, and ethics into one system.

“The defect of life lies in its being only the ideaimplicit or natural, whereas cognition is in anequally one-sided way the merely conscious idea,or the idea for itself. The unity and truth of thesetwo is the Absolute Idea, which is both in itselfand for itself.” Hegel, Logic

absolute identityLogic As traditionally understood, identity is arigorous notion that cannot have variant forms, andthe identity relation is taken absolutely. Accordingto Frege, this absolute notion of identity can be

expressed in two theorems: (1) reflexivity: x = x(everything is identical with itself ) and (2) theindiscernibility of identicals (or Leibniz’s law): ifa and b are identical, whatever is true of a is trueof b, and vice versa. Hence, “a is identical with b”means simply “a is the same as b.”

Peter Geach calls this account the classical theoryof identity and believes that it is mistaken. Instead,he claims that identity is always relative, so that a isnot simply the same as b, but rather that a can bethe same as b relative to one concept but not thesame as b relative to another concept. In response,some argue that relative identity is qualitative iden-tity, while numerical identity remains absolute.

“Absolute identity seems at first sight to be pre-supposed in the branch of logic called identitytheory.” Geach, Logic Matters

absolute rights, see rights, absolute

absolute spirit, another term for absolute idea

absolutismMetaphysics, ethics, political philosophy A termwith different references in different areas. In meta-physics, it is opposed to subjectivism and relativismand claims that there is an ultimate, eternal, andobjective principle that is the source and standardof truth and value. Ethical absolutism holds thatthere is a basic universal principle of morality thatevery rational being should follow, despite theirdifferent empirical circumstances. Moral absolutismis opposed to moral relativism, which denies thatany single moral principle has universal validity. Inpolitical theory, it is the view that the government’spower and rights are absolute and that they alwayshave priority when they come into conflict with therights, interests, needs, preferences, or desires ofcitizens or groups in society.

“In ethics, the rejection of absolutism leads initiallyto the recognition of multiple moral authorities,each claiming its own local validity.” Toulmin,Human Understanding

abstract/concreteEpistemology, metaphysics [from Latin abstrahere,to remove something from something else andconcrescere, to grow together] At the outset of aprocess of recognition our concepts are likely to be

abstract/concrete 3

vague or superficial. We must first abstract them inorder to understand their diverse determinations.Being abstract is the product of abstraction, that is,of drawing away something common from diverseperceptible or sensory items and disregarding theirrelatively inessential features. Concepts and univer-sals are thus formed. To say that something isabstract means that it is conceptual, universal, essen-tial, or a matter of principle, while to say thatsomething is concrete means that it is contextual,particular, personal, sensible. To be concrete isequivalent to being rich and vivid. Since what isabstract is drawn from what is concrete, to beabstract is equated with lacking the detail andindividuality of the concrete and is thought to bemeager, dependent, and lifeless. The existence andnature of abstract entities such as numbers anduniversals has long been a matter of dispute.

In another usage, which is especially prominentin Hegel’s philosophy, being abstract means beingcut off from thoughts or from other sensory items,while being concrete is to be relational. Hence, aparticular is abstract if it is isolated from otherparticulars, while a concept or universal is concreteif it is related to other concepts or universals and isone item in an organic system. Hegel called such aconcept a “concrete concept” or “concrete universal.”

“What we abstract from are the many otheraspects which together constitute concrete objectssuch as people, economies, nations, institutions,activities and so on.” Sayer, Method in Social Science

abstract entitiesMetaphysics Objects that are not actualized some-where in space and time, that is, non-particulars suchas numbers, properties, relations, proposition, andclasses. They stand in contrast to spatio-temporalphysical objects. Whether these entities actuallyexist – whether we should ascribe reality to them –is a question of persistent dispute in philosophy.Empiricists and nominalists try to conceive ofabstract entities as having merely a linguistic basis.However, if mathematics embodies general truthsabout the world and has abstract entities as its sub-ject matter, abstract entities would be objects ofreference and hence real existents. This is the claimof Platonism and is also a position admitted byQuine’s criterion of ontological commitment. The

discussion of abstract entities is related to theproblem of being, to the problem of universals, andalso to the theory of meaning.

“Empiricists are in general rather suspicious withrespect to any kind of abstract entities like prop-erties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions,etc.” Carnap, Meaning and Necessity

abstract ideasEpistemology, philosophy of language How canan idea stand for all individuals of a given kind eventhough the individuals vary in their properties? Howcan we form general statements about kinds of thingsand reason with regard to them? Locke introducedthe notion of abstract ideas, also called general ideas,and claimed that they are universal concepts gener-ated as a result of a process of abstraction from ourideas of individual exemplars of a kind, by leavingout their specific features and keeping what is com-mon to all. As an empiricist, Locke believed thatonly particulars exist in the world. An abstract ideadoes not refer to something individual or particular,but is a special kind of mental image. This image isthe meaning of the abstract general term. The func-tion of abstract ideas is to classify individuals intodifferent kinds for us. As classically understood inLocke, abstraction is something in the mind betweenreality and the way we classify it. He believed thatan abstract idea encompasses a whole kind of thing.This claim was rejected by Berkeley, who insistedthat all ideas are particular and only become generalthrough our use of them. Berkeley’s criticism ofLocke’s notion of abstract ideas, like his criticism ofLocke’s theory of real essence, has been very influen-tial, but it is a matter of dispute whether his criticismis sound.

“This is called abstraction, whereby ideas takenfrom particular beings become general represent-atives of all of the same kind; and their namegeneral names, applicable to whatever exists con-formable to such abstract ideas.” Locke, An EssayConcerning Human Understanding

abstract particularMetaphysics An individual property that is peculiarto the individual or particular possessing it, forexample the white color possessed only by Socratesand not shared by any other white things. A propertyis generally regarded as being universal, that is,

4 abstract entities

capable of being exemplified in many individuals orparticulars. But some philosophers believe that thereare also particularized qualities or property-instances.These are abstract particulars.

The issue can be traced to Aristotle. He classifiedall the realities into four kinds in his Categories: (1)that which is neither predicated of a subject norinherent in a subject, namely, primary substances;(2) that which is predicated of a subject but notinherent in a subject, namely, secondary substancessuch as species and genus; (3) that which is predic-ated of a subject and also inherent in a subject,namely, universal attributes or properties; and (4)that which is not predicated of a subject, but whichis inherent in a subject. For this last kind of reality,Aristotle’s example is a particular piece of grammat-ical knowledge. He seems to be distinguishinguniversal properties and particular properties. In con-temporary metaphysics, some philosophers claimthat individual properties are constitutive of con-crete particulars, that is, of events and physical objects,while others apply Ockham’s razor to deny theirexistence. Alternative terms for abstract particularsare perfect particulars, particularized qualities, unitof properties, tropes, cases, and property-instances.

“Stout calls particulars which he postulates ‘abstractparticulars’. In calling them ‘abstract’ it is notmeant that they are other-worldly . . . It is simplythat these particulars are ‘thin’ and thereforeabstract by comparison with the ‘thick’ or con-crete particulars which are constituted out of theabstract particulars.” D. Armstrong, Universals andScientific Realism, vol. 1

abstract termsPhilosophy of language, philosophy of science,

philosophy of mathematics The terms namingabstract entities, such as “natural number,” “realnumber,” “class,” or “property.” Different abstractterms can name the same abstract entity, and abstractterms can be either singular or general. Such termshave been used in mathematics and physics. In rela-tion to the problem of the ontological status ofabstract entities, it is also disputed whether the useof these terms will indicate the truth of Platonicrealism. For according to Quine’s theory, to admitnames of abstract entities commits us to the exist-ence of the abstract entities named by them.

“The distinction between meaning and naming isno less important at the level of abstract terms.”Quine, From a Logical Point of View

abstractaMetaphysics [plural of Latin abstractum] Abstractentities or objects, which are not perceptible andhave no spatio-temporal location. Because we cannotpoint to them, abstracta are not objects of ostensivedefinitions. It is generally thought that abstracta donot have causal powers, but this point is contro-versial in contemporary epistemology. Abstracta arecontrasted with concreta (plural of Latin concretum),which are the things that make up the observableworld. It is widely held that abstracta are dependenton concreta.

“Abstracta . . . are combinations of concreta andare not directly observable because they are com-prehensive totalities.” Reichenbach, The Rise ofScientific Philosophy

abstractionEpistemology [from Latin abs, away from + trahere,draw, draw away from] A mental operation thatforms a concept or idea (an abstract idea) by pick-ing out what is common to a variety of instancesand leaving out other irrelevant properties. This isa process of deriving universals and establishingclassifications. From this mental act we may formconcepts, and then build them up into judgmentsinvolving combinations of concepts, and further joinjudgments into inferences. In ancient philosophythere was a persistent problem about the ontologicalstatus of abstract things, and this is also the centralpoint in Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Theoryof Forms. Aristotle also refers to abstraction as amental analysis that separates form from matter.Locke takes abstraction as the means of making ideasrepresent all objects of the same kind by separatingideas from other existence. For him it is the capa-city for abstraction that distinguishes betweenhuman beings and animals. His theory of abstractideas is criticized by Berkeley.

“This is called abstraction, whereby ideas takenfrom particular beings become general represent-atives of all of the same kind; and their namesgeneral names, applicable to whatever exists

abstraction 5

conformable to such abstract ideas.” Locke, AnEssay Concerning Human Understanding

absurdityEpistemology, modern European philosophy [fromLatin absurdus, out of tone] Used as a synonym for“the irrational.” In epistemology, an obvious andundeniable contradiction or incoherence in a beliefor a proposition, such as “the square is a circle.”Absurdity is stronger than an error arising from amisapplication of a name to an object. The aim ofa reductio ad absurdum argument is to reveal theabsurdity of a proposition and by these means toshow the truth of its negation. Absurdity is associatedprimarily with language and hence with humanbeings. Philosophical absurdities can arise from usingterms belonging to one category as though theybelonged to another category. Gibert Ryle calledsuch absurdities “category mistakes.”

For existentialism, there are two other uses of“absurdity.” The first concerns the meaninglessnessof human existence that derives from its lack ofground or ultimate purpose. In the second use,absurdity transcends the limitations of the rationaland requires our whole power of conviction andfeeling to be embraced. As an equivalent of thetranscendental, the absurd is profound and valuable.Absurdity in this latter sense is derived fromexistentialist criticism of the absolute claims ofreason and displays the characteristic irrationalismof existentialism.

“This divorce between man and his life, the actorand his setting, is properly the feeling of absurd-ity.” Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus

academic freedomEthics The free performance of academic activities,especially research and teaching, without externallyimposed constraints. Academic freedom is a neces-sary condition for the pursuit of unknown truthsand for passing them on by teaching. Academicfreedom needs protection because the search for newideas and knowledge is crucial for the developmentof any society. Historically, academic activities,especially regarding controversial and unpopularsubjects, have always been interfered with byauthorities and other forces, who characteristicallyclaim that developing this kind of knowledge is

harmful to society. Various original and creativescholars in each generation have therefore beensuppressed and even prosecuted for the new ideasthey have developed. But history has repeatedlyproved that such interference is mistaken. Sincenobody and no organization can decide beforehandwhich knowledge is harmful, we have no reason tocensor any scholarly performance on the groundsthat it will produce harm. Academic freedom alsorequires justice in distributing research and teach-ing facilities, including job security for academics,research support, publication space, and appropriateways of evaluating teaching.

“The greatest external threats to academic freedomcome from ideologies and governments; andmost of all from governments in the service ofideologies.” Kenny, The Ivory Tower

AcademyAncient Greek philosophy The school that Platofounded around 385 bc, so named because it waslocated near a park with a gymnasium sacred to thehero Academus. The Academy was like a collegein an ancient university, with all members sharingthe same religious connections and the ideal of acommon life. It was a progenitor of European edu-cational institutions. The curriculum of the Academyis generally believed to have been similar to thescheme presented by Plato in the Republic for train-ing rulers.

“Academy” is a term also used to refer to thephilosophy of Plato and his followers. Historiansdiffer regarding the history of the Academy. Somedivide it into the Old Academy (Plato, 427–347 bc,Speusipus, 407–339 bc, and Xenocrates, 396–314 bc)and the New Academy (Arcesilaus of Pitane, 316–241 bc and Carneades, c.214–129 bc). Some preferto ascribe Arcesilaus to the Middle Academy, andCarneades to the New Academy. Others want to adda Fourth Academy (Philo of Larissa, 160–80 bc), anda Fifth Academy (Antiochus of Ascalo, 130–68 bc).The general position of the Academy was to explainand defend Plato’s doctrines. Plato’s successorsin the Old Academy were more interested in his“Unwritten Doctrines.” The leaders of the Middleand New Academies were skeptics. Philo tried toreconcile their position with that of the Old Aca-demy, and Antiochus is known for his eclecticism.

6 absurdity

Aristotle studied with Plato in the Academy for19 years and left only when Plato died in 347 bc.Much of our information about the Old Academycomes from his writings. The Academy should bedistinguished from Middle Platonism and Neopla-tonism, although it was one of the main pro-ponents of Neoplatonism. Along with other paganschools, the Academy was closed by the EasternRoman emperor, Justinian I, in 529.

During the Renaissance, the intellectual circle ledby Ficino in Florence was also called the PlatonicAcademy. Most of its activities involved comment-ing on Plato’s works. From the eighteenth century,all societies organized for advanced learning, andsubsequently all universities and colleges, have alsobeen called academies.

“The Academy that Aristotle joined in 367 wasdistinguished from other Athenian schools bytwo interests: mathematics . . . and dialectic, theSocratic examination of the assumptions of math-ematicians and cosmologists.” G. Owen, Logic,Science and Dialectic

accedieEthics, medieval philosophy [Latin, generally, butinadequately, translated as sloth; also spelled accidie]One of the “seven deadly sins,” a spiritual attitudethat rejects all the pleasures of life and turns awayfrom what is good. In accedie the mind is stagnantand the flesh a burden. Accedie resembles apathy,but they are not the same. Accedie concerns the lackof feeling and has a negative sense, while apathyconcerns mental states in which emotion is governedby reason and is regarded as a virtue.

“Accedia . . . is sadness over a spiritual value thattroubles the body’s ease.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

acceptabilityPhilosophy of science Philosophers of sciencedisagree about what it means for a theory to beacceptable and about what determines degrees ofacceptability. In this debate, the degree of accept-ability is closely associated with issues concerningthe degree of confirmation and the degree of prob-ability. Some hold that to be acceptable a theoryhas to be proven. Others claim that a theory isacceptable if it is rendered probable by the availableevidence. Others argue that the acceptability has

nothing to do with reliability, but is simply relatedto the fact that a theory performs more successfullythan its competitors when undergoing testing.

“If we mean by the degree of acceptability of atheory the degree to which it is satisfactory fromthe point of view of empirical knowledge – thatis, from the point of view of the aims of empiricalscience – then acceptability will have to becometopologically equivalent to corroboration.” Popper,Realism and the Aims of Science

accidentMetaphysics [from Latin accidens, something thathappens, related to the Greek sumbebekos, fromthe verb sumbainein, to come together, to happen,and better translated coincident or concomitant]For Aristotle, a technical term that contrasts withessence and has three major meanings: (1) the per-manent features of a thing that are inherent andinseparably bound up with it, but that do notconstitute part of its essence. Aristotle sometimescalled these features properties (Greek, idia); (2) thefeatures that belong to the subject only for a time,with their addition or loss not affecting whether thesubject remains the same thing. These correspondto the modern notion of accidental properties, whichcontrast with essential properties, the loss of whichwill change the identity of a thing; (3) the secondarycategories (categories other than substance) that areaccidents to substance. In another sense, they areessential, for example white is an accident to Soc-rates, but it is essentially a color. Accidents of thissort are more properly called attributes or properties,although they still do not contribute to the identityof individual substances. They can only inhere in asubstance and do not have independent existence.

Medieval philosophers distinguished accidentper se, which as an attribute is itself an entity, fromaccident per accidens, which is a way of talking aboutsomething inessential to an object. Modern philo-sophy has tended to reject the distinction betweensubstance and accident and has understood accid-ent, in a manner similar to Aristotle’s third sense,as an attribute, quality, or property. Accordingly,Descartes claimed that there is no science exceptthe accidental, Locke distinguished primary qualitiesfrom secondary qualities, and Berkeley claimed thatsubstance itself is nothing but a set of accidents.

accident 7

“Accident means that which attaches to somethingand can be truly asserted, but neither of necessitynor usually.” Aristotle, Metaphysics

accidental propertyMetaphysics A property that is not a defining oressential feature of a particular. The identity of aparticular is not affected by the change or loss of itsaccidental properties. For instance, the color of awall or roof is an accidental property of a house. Therelationship between an accidental property andthe particular of which it is a property is externalrather than internal. Accidental properties are con-trasted to “essential properties,” the change or lossof which alters the identity of the particular. Tradi-tionally, rationality has been taken to be an essentialproperty of being a human being. When peoplemention a particular, it is its essential propertiesrather than its accidental properties that are crucialin determining the identity of that particular andthe kind of thing that it is. Although the discussionof accidental and essential properties goes back toAristotle, the revival of essentialism in the workof Kripke and Putnam has renewed interest in thedistinction.

“P is an accidental property of members of classA, if ‘A’ is not defined in terms of ‘p’.” Pap, Elementsof Analytic Philosophy

achievement verbsPhilosophy of language, philosophy of action ForRyle, some verbs merely signify actions, such asreading or hunting. Ryle calls these task verbs. Otherverbs not merely signify actions, but also indicatethat the actions are suitable or correct. Not only hassome performance been gone through, but alsosomething has been brought off by the agent ingoing through it. These acts and operations, whichhave had certain positive results, are called achieve-ment verbs by Ryle. A mark of an achievement verbsuch as “see” is that as soon as it is correct to saythat a person sees something it is also correct to saythat he has seen it. Such verbs are also called successverbs or success words. Correspondingly, there arefailure verbs, such as lose or misspell. All perceptionverbs are achievement verbs since they involve anacquiring of knowledge about the physical world.

“There was another motive for desiderating a mis-take-proof brand of observation, namely that itwas half-realised that some observation words,such as ‘perceive’, ‘see’, ‘detect’, ‘hear’, and ‘observe’(in its ‘final’ sense) are what I have called ‘achieve-ment verbs’.” Ryle, The Concept of Mind

Achilles and the tortoiseLogic, metaphysics, ancient Greek philosophy Themost widely discussed of Zeno’s paradoxes, whichwere designed to show that the concept of motionis incoherent. Achilles, the Olympic champion inrunning, can never catch up with the slow-movingtortoise if the latter is given a head start. Achilleshas to take some time to reach the place where thetortoise started, but when he reaches that place,the tortoise will have moved to a further point. Thesame is true when Achilles reaches that further point,because the tortoise will again have moved on. Thisprocess will be repeated endlessly, and the gap,which may get smaller and smaller, will remain.So as long as the tortoise keeps moving forward,Achilles cannot possibly overtake it, yet the paradoxarises because we know that faster runners do over-take slower ones. The difficult problem is to explainthe concepts of space, time, and motion in a waythat shows what goes wrong in Zeno’s reasoning.This paradox, which is closely connected with thedichotomy paradox, depends on the assumptionthat space and time are continuous and infinitelydivisible. Our source for all of Zeno’s paradoxes isAristotle’s account in Physics.

“Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, such as his ‘Achillesand the Tortoise’, revealed grave and subtle diffi-culties in the notion of infinite divisibility.” Copi,The Theory of Logical Types

acosmismMetaphysics, philosophy of religion [from Greek,a, not + cosmos, world, order] Spinoza’s identificationof God and world has often been interpreted as anassertion of atheism, but Hegel interpreted Spinozaas claiming that God rather than the world reallyexists. He entitles this position “acosmism.” Thisposition does not mean that God and the world aretwo distinct entities, but Hegel believed that it left un-solved questions about the appearance of the worldand of the philosophizing metaphysical subject.

8 accidental property

“[T]he system of Spinoza was not Atheism butacosmism, defining the world to be an appearancelacking in true reality.” Hegel, Logic

acquaintanceEpistemology The way in which a knowing subjectis aware of an object by experiencing it directly andimmediately. Acquaintance contrasts with descrip-tion, where an object is known through an inter-mediary process of inference. There is controversyover what are the objects of acquaintance. Amongthe items proposed for this role are sense-data, mem-ories, and universals such as redness, roundness. Thenotion of acquaintance has been used to constrainwhat we can be said to experience. Russell calls theknowledge derived through acquaintance knowledgeby acquaintance, which is the direct knowledgeof things and is distinguished from knowledge bydescription, which reaches truth through inference.

“Acquaintance: an animal is said to be acquaintedwith an object when the object, or an image ofit, is part of the animal at the moment.” Russell,Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell

acroamaPhilosophical method [from Greek akroama, a thingheard] For Kant, a basic principle, especially of philo-sophy. In contrast, an axiom is a basic principle ofmathematics or science. This is a distinction betweenaxioms and discursive principles or between math-ematical and philosophical principles. An axiomrequires the intuition of objects and thus considersthe universal in the particular, while an acroamais discursive and considers the particular in theuniversal. All principles of pure understanding areacroama, for they are established by the analysis oflanguage and a discursive process of proof. Kantdrew this distinction to criticize the tendency intraditional metaphysics to apply mathematical prin-ciples to philosophy.

“I should therefore prefer to call the first kindacroamatic (discursive) proofs, since they maybe conducted by the agency of words alone (theobject in thought), rather than demonstrationswhich, as the term itself indicates, proceed in andthrough the intuition of the object.” Kant, Critiqueof Pure Reason

act, see action

act and omissionPhilosophy of action, ethics, philosophy of law

To act is to do something, while an omission isa failure to act in circumstances where one has theability and opportunity to act. In euthanasia, oneacts if one actively kills a patient, but this can bedistinguished from omitting to act, where notacting allows a death that intervention could haveprevented. In contrast to killing, an omission letsdie or does not strive to keep alive. To send poisonedfood to the starving is an act that kills them, whilefailing to aid them is an omission that lets them die.In these and other similar moral situations, objec-tionable acts are open to moral condemnation. Whatthen is the moral status of apparently parallel omis-sions? Are they equally wrong or are they permiss-ible? Are such omissions something that morallyought not to be allowed? This question gives rise toa complex debate regarding the moral significanceof the distinction between act and omission. Con-sequentialism denies the importance of the dis-tinction, while deontology holds on to it.

“It [the acts and omissions doctrine] holds thatthere is an important moral distinction betweenperforming an act that has certain consequences– say, the death of a disabled child – and omittingto do something that has the same consequences.”P. Singer, Practical Ethics

act-centered, see agent-centered morality

act-consequentialismEthics Consequentialism is generally divided intoact-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism.Act-consequentialism holds that an action is right ifit produces a better consequence than alternativeactions available to the agent. Rule-consequentialism,on the other hand, claims that the rightness of anaction depends not on its direct consequences buton whether it conforms to a set of rules that leadto better consequences than other alternative rules.Act-utilitarianism is the most typical and familiarform of act-consequentialism. But there are alsoother forms of act-consequentialism that hold thatpleasure or happiness are not the only factors bywhich we assess the goodness of the consequences.

act-consequentialism 9

Like act-utilitarianism, act-consequentialism is criti-cized for considering all things from an impersonalstandpoint.

“Different act-consequentialist theories incorporatedifferent conceptions of the overall good . . . butall such theories share the same conception of theright which requires each agent in all cases to pro-duce the best available outcome overall.” Scheffler,The Rejection of Consequentialism

act-object theoryTheory of knowledge An analysis of sensationintroduced by Moore and Russell in their sense-data theory, which suggests that sensation consistsof sense-data (objects) and the act of sensing.Sense-data are entities that are distinct from the actof seeing. A sensation is a genuine relation betweena subject and a really existent object. Objects existindependently of acts. Moore uses this distinctionin criticizing Berkeley ’s idealist thesis that esse estpercipi by saying that it fails to distinguish betweenthe object sense-datum and the act of consciousnessthat is directed upon it. “Yellow” is an object ofexperience, and the sensation of “yellow” is a feelingor experience. Russell claims that perceiving andother cognitive processes are acts of attention,directed at some object. But under the influence ofadverbial analysis, Russell later abandons this act-object analysis. For Broad, sensa-data cannot existindependent of the act of sensing, and he call them“sensa.”

“The sensum theory . . . holds that this [sensation]is a complex, and that within it there can be dis-tinguished two factors: X itself, which is the sensumand is an object, and a subjective factor, which iscalled the ‘act of sensing’.” Broad, Scientific Thought

act tokenPhilosophy of action, ethics Alvin Goldman hasdistinguished between act tokens and act types.An act type is a kind of action, such as driving a caror writing a paper. An act token is a particular actor action that is performed by a particular personin a particular circumstance: for instance, drivingmy Ford Escort yesterday afternoon or writing mypaper about Aristotle’s concept of substance. An acttype is an action property, while an act token is anexemplification of such a type. An act token is theperformance of an act. If an act type is wrong, all

act tokens that belong to it are wrong. There hasbeen a debate about the identity conditions foractions. Generally, two act tokens are thought to beidentical if and only if they involve the same agent,the same property, and the same place and time.

“A particular act, then, consists in the exemplify-ing of an act-property, by an agent at a particulartime. I shall call such particular acts ‘act tokens’.”Goldman, A Theory of Human Action

act type, see act token

actionPhilosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics

[from Latin agere, to do] Some philosophers draw adistinction between acts and actions and suggest thatwhile an act is the deed that is done, an action is thedoing of it. But most believe that this distinction ishard to maintain and take an act as a synonym foran action.

Although there are actions in nature, such as theaction of a river on its bank, an action is generallydefined as what is intentionally done by a humanrational agent. Natural action is described as a mereprocess, happening, or occurrence. Action has beenthe focus of much discussion in recent philosophyof mind, especially concerning human intention anddeliberation. Many theories have been developedto explain what it means to act intentionally and toshow how to distinguish actions from other eventsinvolving persons. On one standard account, anaction is an event by which an agent brings aboutchanges through bodily movement. A rival mentalaction theory argues that not all actions involvebodily movement and identifies actions with primarymental events in the causal chain between theagent and behavioral events. According to the causaltheory of action developed by Davidson, Searle,and Goodman among others, actions are the effectsof primary mental events. Other philosophers rejectsuch primary mental events and deny that actionsare events at all.

One bodily movement can bring about, directlyand indirectly, many changes and the consequencesof this for identifying and explaining actions areunclear. X moves his hand; by moving his hand, heturns the steering wheel; and by turning the steeringwheel, he drives his car; and so on. Is there oneaction in this case or are there many? When should

10 act-object theory

we distinguish an action from its consequences?Some philosophers suggest that we can deal withthese problems by identifying basic actions thatcause other actions but that are not themselvescaused by actions. But there is much dispute regard-ing how to identify basic action.

Actions can be discussed in isolation, but theyoften occur in a pattern of activity either in a singlelife or involving others. Social action was profoundlyexplored by Weber.

If we seek a causal account of action, are actionscaused by reason, desire, or both? Would anotherframework be more appropriate for explaining orunderstanding action either within a causal accountor as a rival to it? It is unclear whether an explanationby reasons that is not a form of causal explanationis coherent. Answering such questions requiresthe analysis of many key notions, such as motives,intentions, voluntary and involuntary action, prac-tical reason, wants, and desires. The question ofexplaining action is closely associated with the prob-lem of free will and determinism and the problemof responsibility.

Another much debated problem in philosophy oflaw and moral philosophy is the relation betweenaction and omission, inaction or negligence.

“The word ‘action’ does not very often occur inordinary speech, and when it does it is usuallyreserved for fairly portentous occasions. I followa useful philosophical practice in calling anythingan agent does intentionally an action, includingintentional omission.” Davidson, Essays on Actionsand Events

action (Aristotle)Ancient Greek philosophy, ethics [Greek, praxis,from the verb prattein, to do] Broadly, everythingthat an agent does intentionally, in contrast tospeech and to being acted upon. Humans, includingchildren, and some non-human animals are capableof this sort of action. More strictly, action is con-fined to carrying out rational choice, somethingthat non-humans cannot do. It is doing what is orcould be the outcome of deliberation on the part ofthe agent or for what the agent is held responsible.This sense, which is central to moral philosophy,is related to the problem of free will and respons-ibility. Only in this sense is action open to moralpraise and blame. Aristotle also used praxis narrowly

for rational action that is its own end, and thatis not done merely for the sake of some furtherend. This sense contrasts with production (Greek,poiesis), which is for the sake of some end pro-duct. According to this contrast, ethical actions,unlike technical performances, are done and valuedfor their own sake. Philosophers also discuss theconceptual relations between these sorts of actionand action in nature that does not involve inten-tion, reason, or purpose, such as the action of ariver on its bank.

“[An unconditional goal is] what we achieve inaction, since doing well in action is the goal.”Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics

action at a distanceMetaphysics, philosophy of physics Action at adistance is contrasted to action by contact or localaction. Whether one thing can act on another at adistance without postulating some kind of interven-ing medium as involved in the interaction has beena topic of debate in physics and philosophy sinceancient Greece. The dominant tendency is to rejectany such possibility. Atomism claims that atomscannot interact without contact. Aristotle believesthat every object in local motion must have a con-joined mover. This is also the main attitude inphysics and philosophy of the seventeenth and eigh-teenth centuries. Descartes, Newton, Locke, andLeibniz all reduce actions at a distance to actionsthrough a medium of some sort, yielding actions thatare continuous, although there is no agreement aboutwhat the medium is. In contemporary field theorythe question is still disputed. The problem of actionat a distance is related to the question of whethercausality is something more than correlation.

“The formula by which we determine what willhappen in a given region will contain referencesto distant regions, and it may be said that this is allwe can mean by ‘action at a distance’.” Russell,The Analysis of Matter

active intellectMetaphysics, philosophy of mind, ancient Greek

philosophy, medieval philosophy Aristotle claimedin De Anima III, 5 that, as with anything else, onecan draw a distinction between form and matterand between actuality and potentiality within thesoul. The formal and actual aspect of the soul is

active intellect 11

active intellect, and the material and potential aspectof the soul is passive intellect. Passive intellectamounts to ordinary apprehension that is receptiveof the sensible and intelligible forms of objects. Thiskind of knowing is only potential. Passive intellectwill perish at the death of an individual. Activeintellect is the agent that brings the passive intellect’spotential knowledge of objects to actuality. Activeintellect is separable, unmixed, and impassable. Thedistinction between active and passive intellectand the nature and function of active intellect areambiguous in Aristotle’s writings and gave rise tomany debates among commentators in the laterHellenistic and medieval periods and in contempor-ary Aristotelian scholarship as well. Controversialquestions include: Is the distinction between activeand passive intellect realized only within the humansoul, or does active intellect exist outside humanbeings? Is active reason identical with God asdescribed in the Metaphysics? If active intellect isentirely independent of body, how can we reconcileit with Aristotle’s standard view that soul is the formof body?

“Intellect in this sense of it is separable, impass-able, unmixed, since it is in its essential natureactivity (for always the active is superior to thepassive factor, the originating force to the matterwhich it forms).” Aristotle, De Anima

active reason, another name for active intellect

actual idealism, see actualism

actualismMetaphysics, philosophy of action, ethics Actual-ism has several senses. First, it is the actual idealismof the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile. Thistheory claims that the pure act of spirit (that is, thetranscendent subject as opposed to the empirical sub-ject) is the only real thing in the dialectical process.Such acts are acts of self-affirmation and constitutea synthesis of the self and the world.

Secondly, actualism (also called factualism) isthe view, proposed by Plantinga, Stalnaker, andArmstrong, that only the actual world exists. Theworld is wholly composed of actual entities, includingconcrete individuals and instantialized abstractions.All sorts of potentialities, tendencies, forces, and

unexampled essences are not admitted. This viewcontests those theories of possible worlds thataccept the existence of possible worlds and theircontents as well as the existence of the actual world.

Thirdly, actualism as a theory of choice claimsthat an agent should choose the best option that heor she will actually do, rather than the best optionthat he or she can do. This latter view is calledpossibilism.

“I assume the truth of what may be calledactualism. According to this view, we should notpostulate any particular except actual particulars,nor any properties and relations (universals) saveactual, or categorical, properties and relations.”D. Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature?

actuality/actualizationAncient Greek philosophy [Greek, energeia, actuality,from ergon, function or action, etymologicallyassociated with motion or activity; entelecheia, actual-ization (Greek), from enteles echein, having an endwithin, etymologically associated with the com-pletion of an action or a process] Aristotle used thesetwo terms interchangeably and ignored their dif-ferent etymologies. In many places, he contrastedenergeia with motion (kinesis) saying that motionis an incomplete activity that aims at some endbeyond itself, while energeia is a complete activitywhich is its own end. Both energeia and entelecheiaare used in contrast to potentiality for the fulfillmentor realization of different kinds of potentiality. InAristotle’s discussion of substantial change, actualityor actualization is identical with form, and some-times even with the composite of matter and form,that which has been shaped out of the matter.

“The word ‘actuality’ which we connect withactualisation has in the main been extended frommotion to other things; for actuality in the strictsense is thought to be identical with motion.”Aristotle, Metaphysics

actuality (Hegel)Metaphysics [German, Wirklichkeit, from wirken, tobe active, or effectual] In the preface to Philosophyof Right, Hegel claimed that “what is rational isactual, and what is actual is rational.” This has beencriticized as a conservative doctrine that allows no

12 active reason

attack on existing political systems and institutions,however tyrannical or perverse they might be. Butthis response is based on a mistaken understandingof Hegel’s notion of actuality. Hegel employed thestandard contrast between actuality and possibilityor potentiality, but also contrasted actuality to mereexistence or appearance, so that not everythingexisting is actual. In his Logic, actuality is the unityof existence and essence, of inward reality and out-ward reality. Something actual is fully developedaccording to the inner rationality of the species towhich it belongs. For Hegel, everything has its ownteleological necessity and can be said to be actualonly when this necessity has been fully worked out.Hence, an infant, although it exists, is not actual withrespect to the essence of human species.

“Actuality is the unity, become immediate, ofessence with existence, or of inward with out-ward.” Hegel, Logic

actualization, see actuality/actualization

actus reus, see mens rea

additive fallacy, an alternative expression of theadditivity assumption

additivity assumptionEthics Also called the additive fallacy. Utilitarianismargues that we can add individual utilities togetherto make up a total utility and that any action thatresults in a larger amount of total utility is morallymore acceptable than other actions that resultin less total utility. Here a working hypothesis isassumed that individual utilities can be quantitativelymeasured, compared, and combined into an overalloutcome. This is the additivity assumption. It is notonly central to utilitarianism, but is also active inmany other moral theories, insofar as they appealto notions such as “balancing,” “weighing,” and“simple-complex.” Critics, however, maintain thatindividual utilities are always qualitatively differ-ent and incommensurable and therefore that it isimpossible to compare and contrast them. Further-more, even if an aggregation is possible, this wouldnot be sufficient to establish the moral status of anaction, for a larger amount of utility does not entailan equal or just distribution.

“The view that the moral status of an act isthe sum of individual positive and negative con-tributions – the particular reasons for and againstperforming the act – is, as I suggested, a familiarand attractive one. Nonetheless, I believe that theadditive assumption should be rejected.” Kagan,“Additive Fallacy,” Ethics 99

adequacy conditions on definitions of truth,see material adequacy

adequate ideasEpistemology For Spinoza, adequate ideas are theideas from the second grade of cognition, reason,and from the third grade of cognition, intuitiveknowledge, in contrast to the ideas formed fromthe first grade of cognition, sense experience.Adequate ideas are wholly caused from withinindividual minds, either by seeing them to be self-evident or by deriving them from other ideas thatare self-evident. Adequate ideas are coextensive withtrue ideas, and bear all the internal marks of truth.In Leibniz, adequate ideas are those that are clearlyand distinctly conceived.

“By adequate idea I understand an idea which,in so far as it is considered in itself, withoutreference to the object, has all the properties orinternal marks of a true idea.” Spinoza, Ethics

ad hoc hypothesisEpistemology, philosophy of science [Latin, ad hoc,for this, to this] Something that is ad hoc is only forthe purpose at hand. A theory might be saved froma challenge that is inspired by contrary evidenceif we introduce an additional hypothesis. Such ahypothesis, if it has no independent rationale butis used merely to preserve the theory, is called anad hoc hypothesis. An ad hoc hypothesis is generallyrejected by a satisfactory scientific explanation, forit is not testable independently of the effect to beexplained, and hence does not have any theoreticalpower. In another sense, ad hoc also means anexplanation introduced to account for some factafter that fact had been established.

“A satisfactory explanation is one which is not adhoc.” Popper, Objective Knowledge

ad hoc hypothesis 13

Adorno, Theodor (1903–69)German philosopher, sociologist, and musicologist,born in Frankfurt, a leading member of the FrankfurtSchool of critical theory. Adorno joined the Institutefor Social Research before emigrating to the UnitedStates in 1934 following Hitler’s rise to power.He rejoined the Institute in 1938 in New York, butreturned to Frankfurt in 1953 and became directorof the Institute in 1959. His most important work,Negative Dialectics (1966), is a critique of thinkingbased on identity and the presentation of a negativedialectic of non-identity that has exerted great influ-ence on postmodern and post-structuralist thought.He was co-author of The Authoritarian Personality(1950), a study of the psychological origins of fas-cism and Nazism. With Horkheimer, he publishedDialectic of the Enlightenment (1947), which tracestotalitarianism and scientism in modern societyto the Enlightenment conception of reason. Hecriticized Husserl in Against Epistemology (1956) andHeidegger in The Jargon of Authenticity (1965). HisAesthetic Theory was left unfinished at his death.

adventitious ideasEpistemology [from Latin ad, to + venire, to come]Descartes’s term for those ideas that we get throughsenses and that are caused by things existing out-side one’s mind. Adventitious ideas contrast both toinnate ideas and to fictitious ideas. Innate ideas arenot obtained by experience, but are carried by themind from birth. Fictional ideas are created by mindin imagination. Descartes argued that it is impossiblefor all ideas to be adventitious. In contrast, Britishempiricists claimed that all ideas can be reduced toadventitious ideas and specifically denied the exist-ence of innate ideas. On their account, all universalsresult from the operation of mind on the basis ofadventitious ideas. The treatment of adventitiousand innate ideas became one of the major diver-gences between rationalism and empiricism.

“I marvel indeed at the train of reasoning by whichyou try to prove that all our ideas are adventiti-ous and none of them constructed by us, saying– because the mind has the power not only ofperceiving these very adventitious ideas, but,besides this, of bringing together, dividing, reduc-ing, enlarging, arranging, and everything similar tothis.” Descartes, Meditations, Reply to Objection V

adverbial materialismPhilosophy of mind A theory of mind that com-bines the adverbial analysis of sense-experiencewith materialism or physicalism, developed by theAmerican philosopher J. W. Cornman. In the spiritof adverbial analysis, the theory claims that whenpeople perceive something red in the appropriateconditions, they do not sense red sense-data, butrather they sense red-ly. It further takes this sensingevent to be identical with a brain event. Every sens-ing event is reduced to a physical event. The theoryis opposed to phenomenalism and is compatiblewith direct materialism. Critics suggest that thisanalysis leaves out the most central element of per-ception, the perceptual experience itself.

“This [theory of adverbial materialism] is thetheory that each sensory experience consists in anobjectless sensing event that is not only identicalwith but also nothing but some physical event,presumably a neuronal brain event.” Cornman,Perception, Common Sense, and Science

adverbial theoryEpistemology An analysis of sensing that intendsto convert the objects of sensation into sense-experience characterized in an adverbial way. Anadverb is introduced to describe the way a sensingactivity is taking place; thus, “I sense a red colorpatch” should be regarded as a statement of howI sense, that is “I sense red-ly.” The purpose of thisanalysis is to deny that sense-data are independententities; rather, it takes them as sense-contentsthat cannot exist independent of the act of sensingof them. Sense-data are considered as modes ofawareness instead of internal objects of awareness.The starting-point of this theory is the idea thatsensations cannot exist when not sensed. It elimin-ates mental objects by reducing all statements aboutsensations to statements about the way or mode inwhich a subject is sensing. The analysis influencedboth Moore and Russell with regard to their act-object theory of sensation and was later advocatedby C. J. Ducasse, Ayer, and Chisholm. The analysisbecomes difficult once a complex sensation isinvolved, such as, “I sense a red color patch to theleft of a blue color patch.” It is also challenged forits inability to distinguish sense-experience frompurely mental imaging.

14 Adorno, Theodor

“If the adverbial theory is right, it tells us howI am sensing and does not require for its truththat there be an object being sensed.” Jackson,Perception

aesthetic attitudeAesthetics A special attitude with which to approachart, nature, and other objects. First, it differs from apractical attitude and has no concern with practical(sensual, intellectual, or moral) utilities. An aestheticattitude takes nature or a work of art “for its ownsake.” In this sense it is “disinterested,” as Kantemphasized in his Critique of Judgement. Secondly,it does not involve personal desires, motives, orfeelings in dealing with an object. This freedomfrom desire or emotion is called “aesthetic distance”or “aesthetic detachment.” Thirdly, in contrast to acognitive or scientific attitude, it is indifferent to thereal existence, the content or the meaning of a thing.It does not appreciate an object through bringingit under concepts. Instead it is a pure appreciationor contemplation of the perceptual qualities of anobject as an object of sensation. It is claimed thatin this way we can live in the work of art as anembodiment of our feeling. Schopenhauer andHeidegger ascribe a metaphysical importance to theaesthetic attitude by saying that it can reveal theessence of reality more profoundly than conceptual-ization. The possible existence and role of a pureaesthetic attitude are topics of dispute.

“All appreciation of art – painting, architecture,music, dance, whatever the piece may be –requires a certain detachment, which has beenvariously called the ‘attitude of contemplation’,the ‘aesthetic attitude’, or the ‘objectivity’ of thebeholder.” Langer, Feeling and Form

aesthetic autonomyAesthetics The idea that art has its own spheredemarcated from other human activities and deter-mines its own principles or rules. Art cannot bereplaced by other activities without loss. Aestheticexperience should be explained by aesthetic termsor attributes, and art should be valued by itself alone.The idea is intended to protect art from beingassimilated to scientific, religious, or moral functionsand to insist that art has a different domain fromscience and morality. The position demands that

human beings should be liberated from variousinstrumental attitudes towards art and that thedevelopment of art should not be unjustifiably sub-jected to the service of extra-aesthetic concerns.In this century, aesthetic autonomy has gainedpopularity in the face of the danger of submergingthe aesthetic attitude into the cognitive attitude.

“The only answer, in short, is in terms ofaesthetic value beyond which we cannot go. Weassume the autonomy of aesthetics and all we cando is to see where this assumption will lead to.”Saw, Aesthetics

aesthetic detachment, see aesthetic attitude

aesthetic distance, see aesthetic attitude

aesthetic educationEthics, aesthetics Education directed at developinga person’s aesthetic capacities and experiences ofart. Its purpose is to educate a person’s feelingand to enhance the harmony between emotion andreason in order to elevate our character. Its functionregarding one’s soul is analogous to the functionof physical education for one’s body. As early asPlato’s Republic, there is a detailed discussion toshow that education should have an aesthetic con-cern. An account of this education is most system-atically developed in Schiller ’s Letters on the AestheticEducation of Man. There are contrasting views ofwhat such an education should be, according todifferent theories of art.

“Aesthetic education is possible only if it involvescriticism; and edifies only when its mirror imagesare not merely produced or consumed, but whenthey are critically grasped and appropriated.”Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics

aesthetic imaginationAesthetics The imagination that plays a role in theproduction and appreciation of artworks. Aestheticimagination explores the possibilities suggested bythe connection of aesthetic experience. It accom-panies indispensably our interactions with art. Whilescientific imagination is bound by agreement withreality and is in the service of theoretical work, aes-thetic imagination is free and operates in the service

aesthetic imagination 15

of aesthetic feeling. Its purpose is the satisfaction ofthe feeling that inspires it. It broadens our under-standing, gives rise to emotional identification withthe object, and enables us to experience a widerrange of feelings than we can experience in actuallife. For Kant, aesthetic experience involves a freeplay of the imagination and the understanding.

“Aesthetic imagination can perceive the ennob-ling beauty and truth of past art produced inmore harmonious times.” Shusterman, PragmatistAesthetics

aesthetic judgmentAesthetics The ascription of an aesthetic propertyor value to an object, as distinguished from cognit-ive or logical judgment that gives us knowledge.The determining ground for such an ascription hasbeen hotly disputed. For objectivism, an aestheticjudgment attributes an objective property to a thingjudged and does not essentially involve the feelingsof the person who is judging. It is hence a universaljudgment. For subjectivism, the feelings, such asliking or disliking, of the person who judges are thedecisive ground, and hence aesthetic judgment isnot universal. The most influential frameworks ofanalysis of aesthetic judgments were developed byHume and Kant. According to Hume, although aes-thetic properties are not inherent in things, aestheticjudgments are not merely an expression of personalpleasure or displeasure. Like judgments of color,they are determined by contingent causal relationsbetween object and subject, although their ultimateground is the sensibility of human beings. Kantclaims that aesthetic judgments do not depend on aset of formulated rules or principles. Unlike object-ive knowledge claims, they rest on subjective re-sponse and personal acquaintance. He suggests thatin a broad sense aesthetic judgments include empir-ical aesthetic judgment and “judgments of taste.”An empirical aesthetic judgment judges the agree-able or the pleasant and concerns that which simplygratifies desire. A judgment of taste is an aestheticjudgment in its narrow sense. It is the judgment ofbeauty and is “disinterested,” in the sense that it isindependent of all personal desires and motivations.Hence, a person making such a judgment expectsother people to have similar responses under thesame circumstance. Hence, judgments of taste havea type of subjective validity or universality.

“Aesthetic judgements, just like theoretical (i.e.logical) ones, can be divided into empirical andpure. Aesthetic judgements are empirical if theyassert that an object or a way of presenting it isagreeable or disagreeable; they are pure if theyassert that it is beautiful. Empirical aesthetic judge-ments are judgements of science (material aestheticjudgements); only pure aesthetic judgements (sincethey are formal) are properly judgements of taste.”Kant, Critique of Judgement

aesthetic pleasureAesthetics Distinguished from both sensual pleasureand intellectual pleasure, aesthetic pleasure or aes-thetic enjoyment is the emotional element in ourresponse to works of art and natural beauty. It canvary from pleasure in its mildest form to rapturousenthusiasm. To characterize the peculiar nature ofaesthetic pleasure has been a challenging job foraesthetics. Since Kant, many theorists have acceptedthat aesthetic pleasure is a result of a disinterestedand non-conceptual engagement with an object. Butit is a point of dispute whether this pleasure arisesfrom apprehending the formal character of theobject, its content, or both. It is also unclear howmuch subjective elements contribute to this process.Other major issues concern the relation betweenaesthetic pleasure and the aesthetic attitude and thedistinction, if there is one, between aesthetic pleas-ure in response to nature and to art.

“Aesthetic pleasure is manifested in a desire to con-tinue or repeat the experience.” Sheppard, Aesthetics

aesthetic propertyAesthetics A quality that contributes to determiningthe aesthetic value of an artwork. Such propertiescan be subject either to positive evaluation, suchas being beautiful, charming, elegant, sublime,balanced, graceful, or majestic, or to negative evalu-ation, such as being ugly, boring, clumsy, garish, orlifeless. There can, of course, be beautiful depictionsof ugly objects or lifeless depictions of beautiful ones.Some aesthetic qualities, such as being sad or joyful,can be non-evaluative. It is widely agreed that werequire a special sensitivity, “taste,” to perceive them.Aesthetic properties are the ultimate sources of“aesthetic value,” and contribute to determining thenature of artworks. Positively aesthetic propertiesmake artifacts into works of art and figure in a

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subject’s account of why an artwork pleases him.Some philosophers argue that as emergent proper-ties aesthetic properties supervene on non-aestheticproperties, but others insist that aesthetic propertiesmust be seen as entirely independent of non-aesthetic properties.

“I imagined explaining my emotional response tothe painting by pointing out some of its aestheticproperties; the colours, although pastel, are warmrather than faded, the faces of the saints ‘sweetand gentle.’” Mothersill, Beauty Restored

aesthetic valueAesthetics The properties rendering a work of artgood or successful, such as balance, charm, elegance,grace, harmony, integrity, or unity. Aesthetic valueis whatever contributes to the “beauty” of a pieceof art, in contrast to that which contributes to itsusefulness, truth, or moral goodness. “Beauty” is thesupreme name for aesthetic value, and “ugliness”is the supreme name for aesthetic disvalue. Thehistory of aesthetics has been characterized by dis-putes about whether aesthetic value is waiting to bediscovered objectively in the objects, independentof the responses of observers, or exists subjectivelyin the experiences of human agents, or lies in theconnection between the object and the feelings ofits observers.

“Instead of saying that an aesthetic object is ‘good’,they [philosophers] would say that it has aestheticvalue. And correspondingly, instead of saying thatone object is better than another, but not becauseit has a higher cognitive or moral value, they wouldsay that it has a higher aesthetic value, or is aes-thetically more valuable.” Beardsley, Aesthetics

aestheticismAesthetics The position that art should be valuedonly according to its intrinsic aesthetic properties,such as beauty, harmony, unity, grace, or elegance.It maintains the supreme value of art over every-thing else. A work of art is nothing more than awork of art and should not be viewed as a means tofurther ends. Its internal aesthetic value is supreme.Pure beauty has nothing to do with utility. Thepursuit of such beauty is the supreme source ofhuman happiness and should not be constrained bymoral or other considerations. In its extreme form,aestheticism claims that any art that has external

functions or purposes is ugly. The slogan of aes-theticism is “art for art’s sake” (French, L’art pourl’art). An art critic should not be concerned with artfor the sake of citizenship, patriotism, or anythingelse. Aestheticism is rooted in Kantian aestheticformalism and flourished in the nineteenth century,first in French literature, represented by Flaubert,and then in English literature, represented by WalterPater and Oscar Wilde. Aestheticism opposes soci-ety’s interference with artistic creation, for artworkscharacterized by adventurousness are always sub-ject to criticism based on customs and establishedmodes of thought and feeling. But it is problematicwhether an artwork can be completely isolatedfrom its environment and social consequences. Theopposite view, which can be called “instrumental-ism,” proposes that art should serve the needs of thepeople and the community.

“[Aestheticism] is the view that aesthetic objectsare not subject to moral judgements, that only aes-thetic categories can be, or ought to be, appliedto them.” Beardsley, Aesthetics

aestheticsAesthetics Although many problems discussed incontemporary aesthetics as a branch of philosophycan be traced to Plato’s dialogues (especially Ion,Symposium, Phaedrus, Republic, and Philebus) andAristotle’s Poetics, aesthetics did not become anindependent discipline until the eighteenth century.The term was coined by the German philosopherAlexander Baumgarten in his Reflections in Poetry(1735), based on the Greek word aisthesis (sensation,perception). Baumgarten defines it as “the scienceof sensitive knowing,” which studies both art andsensible knowledge. Kant inherited these twosenses. The first part of Critique of Pure Reason, the“Transcendental Aesthetic,” deals with a priori sens-ible form; the first part of Critique of Judgement,called “Critique of Aesthetic Judgement,” is a critiqueof taste, concerning the judgment of beauty andthe sublime and the “autonomy of taste.”

Nowadays the word “aesthetics” is confined tothe study of experience arising from the apprecia-tion of artworks and covers topics such as thecharacter of aesthetic attitude, aesthetic emotions,and aesthetic value; the logical status of aestheticjudgments; the nature of beauty and its alliednotions; and the relation between moral education

aesthetics 17

and works of art. It also encompasses problems dealtwith by the “philosophy of art” such as the natureof art and the perception, interpretation, and evalu-ation of artworks. Philosophy of art is thus a partof aesthetics. The development of aesthetics in thetwentieth century has been deeply influenced bydevelopments in the philosophy of mind, theoriesof meaning, and hermeneutics.

“The Germans are the only people who currentlymake use of the word ‘aesthetic’ in order to signifywhat others call the critique of taste. This usageoriginated in the abortive attempt made byBaumgarten, that admirable analytical thinker, tobring the critical treatment of the beautiful underrational principles, and so to raise its rules to therank of a science.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

Aeterni Patris, see neo-scholasticism

aetherAncient Greek philosophy, philosophy of science

A rarified element believed to fill the heavens.Anaxagoras considered aether to be derived fromaithein (Greek, to ignite, to blaze) and identified itwith fire. Some other pre-Socratic philosophers con-sidered aether to be derived from aei thein (Greek,runs always), and took it to be a divine element,different from other basic elements. Aristotledeveloped their idea by arguing that aether is a fifthelement in addition to the usual four elements: fire,air, earth, and water. He divided the cosmos intotwo levels. While the lower world, which is withinthe sphere of the moon, is composed out of thefour elements, the upper world, from the moonupwards to the first heaven, is composed of aether.Aether has no property in common with the foursimple elements in the lower world and cannotbe transformed into them, and the four elementscannot go up to the outer region. Aether as a divinebody has no movement except uniform circularmotion and is indestructible. This cosmologybecame the foundation of the Ptolemaic system ofastronomy. Seventeenth-century science postulatedaether as the medium of interactions in the heavens.Nineteenth-century science postulated aether asthe medium of transmission in the wave theory oflight. This term is also retained in contemporaryquantum field theory.

“They [natural philosophers], believing that theprimary body was something different from earthand fire and air and water, gave the name aether tothe uppermost region, choosing its title from thefact that it ‘runs always’ and eternally.” Aristotle,De Caelo

affirmative methodPhilosophy of religion [from Latin via affirmativaor via positiva] A Christian theological method forobtaining knowledge of God, in contrast to negativemethod (via negativa). The affirmative methodrejects the claim of the via negativa that God cannotbe apprehended by human concepts and discourse.On the basis of the doctrine that man is made in theimage of God, it claims that the highest human qual-ities are pointers and signs of the perfection of God.We can, therefore, deduce divine attributes throughanalogy to these qualities. The basic procedure isto start with the highest human categories and toproceed through intermediate terms to particulardivine titles. In this way we can indicate how humanterms such as goodness, wisdom, and power areapplicable to God in a manner that transcends ourexperience. Because knowledge obtained in this wayis pre-eminent, the via positiva is also called thevia eminentiae. Some theologians, such as Aquinas,claim that the via negativa cannot be used in isola-tion, but is a necessary preliminary step to the viapositiva. There are difficulties in applying a methodof analogy like the affirmative method beyond thepossibility of our experience.

“The affirmative method means ascribing toGod the perfections found in creatures, that is, theperfections which are compatible with the spir-itual nature of God, though not existing in Himin the same manner as they exist in creatures.”Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. II

affirming mode, another term for modus ponens

affirming the consequentLogic A logical fallacy of the form “If p then q; q;therefore p,” that is, the categorical premise affirmsthe consequent of the conditional premise, whilethe conclusion affirms its antecedent. For instance,“if he is sick, he does not come to work; he does notcome to work; therefore he is sick.” This is invalid

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because in the conditional premise the truth of theconsequent does not entail the truth of the ante-cedent. The correct form should infer from the ante-cedent of a true implication to its consequent; thatis, it should be of the form “If p then q; p; thereforeq.” This was called modus ponens by the medievallogicians and is also called the affirming mood.

“ ‘P ⊃ Q, Q, therefore P’ bears a superficialresemblance to the valid argument form modusponens and was labelled the fallacy of affirmingthe consequent.” Copi, Introduction to Logic

a fortioriLogic [Latin: for a stronger reason, even more so orwith more certainty] An argument that if everythingthat possesses A will possess B, then if a given thingpossesses A to a greater degree, it has a strongerreason (a fortiori) to possess B. For example, if allold men who are healthy can run, then a fortiori ayoung man who has greater health than old mencan run.

“All the so-called relational (or a fortiori) syllog-isms depend on the transitivity of the relations.”Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic andScientific Method

afterlife, see disembodiment

agapeAncient Greek philosophy, ethics [Greek, love; itsLatin translation, caritas: hence charity] In contrastto other terms for love, such as eros and philia, agapeis used for Christian love and is one of the primaryvirtues in Christian ethics. Its content is expressedin two biblical injunctions: “Love the lord yourGod with all your heart, and all your soul, and allyour mind” (Matthew 22: 9, but adapted from Levit-icus 19:18) and “Love your neighbor as yourself ”(Matthew 22:37, but previously Deuteronomy 6:5).Agape is wholly unselfish, but there has been somedispute whether it includes rational self-love. Therelationship of agape to justice is also problematic.In comparative religion, agape has been comparedwith Confucian jen, humanity.

“Agape is that form of love in which God loves us,and in which we are to love our neighbour, especi-ally if we do not like him.” Tillich, Ultimate Concern

age of adventure, another name for theRenaissance

age of reason, another name for the Enlightenment

agentPhilosophy of action, ethics [from Latin agens,what is acting, referring to a rational human beingwho is the subject of action] An agent can decideto act or not. Having decided to act, an agent candeliberate how to act. Once the means of acting arechosen, an agent can apply the means to bring aboutcertain changes. The kind of capacity intrinsic toan agent is called agency. The change caused by anagent is called agent-causation, in contrast to event-causation in which one thing is caused externallyby another. In ethics, only agents are members of amoral community and bearers of moral responsibility.

“The way a cause operates is often compared tothe operation of an agent, which is held responsiblefor what he does.” von Wright, Explanation andUnderstanding

agent-centered moralityEthics Also called agent-related ethics. It demandsthat moral consideration should be given to moralagents rather than merely to the consequencesof the agent’s acts. It is a thesis opposed to con-sequentialism, in particular to utilitarianism, whichit labels outcome-centered ethics. It accuses con-sequentialism of ignoring the integrity of the char-acters of moral agents, for consequentialist ethicsrequires that what an agent is permitted to do inany situation is limited strictly to what would havethe best overall outcome impersonally judged. Incontrast, agent-centered morality focuses on theagent’s rights, duties, or obligations. It holds thatour primary responsibility as agents is to guaranteethat our actions conform to moral rules and do notviolate our obligations towards others. Agents shouldperform such actions even if they know that theconsequences of what they do would be better ifthey were willing to compromise their principles.Major issues for this view are to classify the formsof agent-relativity, to justify agent-relative principles,and to offer an adequate rationale for agent-centeredrestrictions.

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“Agent-centred morality gives primacy to thequestion of what to do, a question asked bythe individual agent, and does not assume that theonly way to answer it is to say what it would bebest if he did.” T. Nagel, Mortal Questions

agent-neutral reasonEthics The evaluation of something objectively,independently of one’s own interests. This is in con-trast to “agent-relative reason,” which values thingsby taking one’s situations into consideration. Agent-neutral reason cares about everyone, while an agent-relative reason cares more particularly about oneself.The introduction of this dichotomy of reasonsfor acting is credited to Derek Parfit, but ThomasNagel borrows it (using the terms objective reasonand subjective reason) and uses it widely. It playsa great role in the contemporary debate between“consequentialism” and “agent-related ethics.”Consequentialism is generally characterized as“agent-neutral,” for it requires that everyone shouldact so as to maximize the amount of happiness forall involved. Some philosophers therefore claim thatit asks moral agents to consider their actions froman impersonal point of view and is thus in conflictwith common sense. On the other hand, agent-related ethics is believed to be based on “agent-relative reason” because it allows moral agents tobase their moral aims on their moral characters. Con-sequentialism is also called “agent-neutral morality”or “act-centered ethics,” and its opposite is called“agent-related ethics” or “agent-centered morality.”

“Nagel calls a reason objective if it is not tied downto any point of view. Suppose we claim that thereis a reason to relieve some person’s suffering. Thisreason is objective if it is a reason for everyone –for anyone who could relieve this person’s suffer-ing. I call such reasons agent-neutral. Nagel’ssubjective reasons are reasons only for the agent. Icall these agent-relative.” Parfit, Reasons and Persons

agent-related ethics, another expression for agent-centered morality

agent-relative reason, see agent-neutral reason

agglomeration principleEthics, logic A term introduced by BernardWilliams and now used as a rule of inference in

deontic logic. According to the principle, if one hasa duty to do a and if one also has a duty to do b,then one has a duty to do a and b. The principlealso extends to cover all situations in which a prop-erty can be conjoined out of two other properties.The validity of the principle has been a matter ofcontroversy because it needs to be reconciled withthe principle that ought implies can. In some cases,a person can do a and can do b separately, but can-not do both of them and will therefore not have aduty to do both.

There is a converse to the principle of agglom-eration, called the division principle, which statesthat if one has a duty to do both a and b, then onehas a duty to do a and has a duty to do b.

“. . . that ‘I ought to do a’ and ‘I ought to do b’together imply ‘I ought to do a and b’ (which I shallcall the agglomeration principle) . . .” B. Williams,Problems of the Self

agnosticismPhilosophy of religion [from Greek a, not +gnostikos, one who knows] A term used by T. H.Huxley for a position that neither believes thatGod exists nor believes that God does not exist anddenies that we can have any knowledge about thenature of God. Agnosticism is contrasted both totheism, which holds that we can know the existenceand nature of God, and to atheism, which deniesthe existence of God. Many agnostics argue thathuman reason has inherent and insuperable limita-tions, as shown by Hume and Kant. Therefore, wecannot justify any claims supporting either theismor atheism and should suspend our judgment overthese issues. The attitude of agnosticism has persistedin many periods, but it became important philo-sophically in nineteenth-century debates concerningscience and religious belief. Agnosticism is also usedmore generally for the suspension of judgment aboutthe truth or falsity of claims going beyond what wedirectly sense or commonly experience.

“Agnosticism: this is the theory that we haveno means of telling what are the characteristicsof those relatively permanent things and pro-cesses which manifest themselves partially tous by the interrelated sensa which we from timeto time sense.” Broad, The Mind and its Place inNature

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