The Body of Descartes

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Spectre Shapes: "The Body of Descartes?"Author(s): Andrzej WarminskiSource: Qui Parle, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 1992), pp. 93-112Published by: University of Nebraska PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20685967Accessed: 28-07-2015 18:07 UTC

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2/21

Spectre Shapes:

"The

Body

of

Descartes?"

Andrzej

Warminski

This title-"The

Body

of

Descartes?"-quite rightly

resses the

body

ofDescartes

with

a

question

mark.' The

question

mark is

most

fitting,

or,

indeed,

what

we

might

want

to

identify

nder its

garments

as

the

body

of

Descartes could

turn ut to

be

a

ghost

or

an

automaton-like

those hats

and

cloaks

at

the

end of the Second Meditation

that

we

judge

(by

the

"pure

inspection

of the

mind")

to

clothe

men

but

which

may

turn ut to

cover

only

"spectres

or

feigned

men"

(des

spectres

ou

des

hommes

feints).2

But

these

shapes

become all themore

questionable

ifwe remember that incontext

they

re

the

figures

for

still

more

famous

body

ofDescartes:

the

body

of

the

"piece

of wax."

In

the

same

way

that

ordinary

language

almost

deceives

us

into

saying

that

we see

the

same

wax

after

ithas

undergone

all

kinds of

changes

to

its

corporeal

nature-when,

in

reality,

what

we

do is

to

judge by

the

pure

inspection

of the

mind

that

it

is

the self-same

wax

so

itwould

deceive

us

into

saying

that

we see

men

when

we

look

out

the

window

at

hats

and cloaks

passing

in the

street-when,

in

reality,

what

we

do

is

to

judge

by

the

pure

inspection

of

the

mind that these hats

and cloaks

cover

the

odies

of

men

and

not

ghosts

or

automatons.

To

speak

of

the

ody

of the

wax,

then,

is

no

idle

figure,

and

Descartes

unfolds its

logic

quite

consistently

in

the

following paragraph

where

he

compares

the

analysis

of

the

piece

of

wax

to

having

removed its

garments

and

considering

it

all

naked:

But

when

I

distinguished

the

real

wax

from

its

superfi

cial

appearances,

and

when,

just

as

though

I

removed

its

garments,

I

consider it all

naked,

it is certain

that

although

here

ight

till e

some

rror

n

my

udgment,

I could not conceive it in this fashionwithout a human

mind.

Qui

Parle,

Vol.

6,

No.

1,

Fall/Winter,

1992

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/21

94

Andrzej

Warminski

But

if

the

logic

of Descartes'

argument

necessarily

leads

(no

doubt

according

to

the

order of

reasons)

to

the conclusion that

could

not

have

performed

the

analysis

of the

piece

of

wax

and

arrived

at

the

wax

itself,

the

"real

wax"

as

the translation

puts

it,

without

a

human

mind,

the

rhetoric

of

Descartes'

text

just

as

surely

leads

to at

least the

suspicion

that

could

not

have made the

argument

or

performed

the

analysis

of

the

wax

without

figuring

it

s

a

human

body

that

an

be

dressed

up

in,

nd then

stripped

of,

its not-so-human

garments.

That the

garmentsmay always

be

less-than

human-or

more-than-human?

or

other-than-human?-is

certainly

sug

gested by

the text's

own

figures.

For

if

the

body

of

a

man

is

always

the

body

of

a

man-and,

if

we are

not

certain,

we

have,

according

to

the iscourse

on

Method,

certain

reliable

tests to

determine that t is

indeed

the

body

of

a man

and

not

an

ingeniously

devised

automaton

or

the

body

of

an

animal3-the

garments,

hats and

cloaks,

may

always

cover

ghosts

or

automatons-that

is,

bodies without

souls

or

spirits

without

bodies

that

can

nevertheless

wear

clothing.

But let

us

not

hurry

to

conclude

that these

figures-i.e.,

hats

and cloaks that

may

cover not

men

but

ghosts

or

automatons-are in ny immediate sense a threatto theCogito argument.

As Descartes

says,

there

might

still

be

some error

in

my

judgment

even

after

I

have

removed

the

garments

of

the

wax

and

consider it

all naked.

Indeed,

I

could

be

wrong

both

about

my

seeing

the

garments

of

the

wax

in

the

first

place

and about

judging

it

to

be

wax

in

the second.

Descartes

writes:

"For it

might happen

thatwhat

I

see

is

not

really

wax;

it

might

also

happen

that

I

do

not

possess

eyes

to

see

anything

. . .

"

All

this

I

can

be

wrong

about:

thinking

that

perceive

wax

and

thinking

that hat

Iperceive

is

wax.

But

what

I

cannot

be

wrong

about is the xistence of

an

"I"

that

an

think it

perceives

and think it

judges

one

thing

or

another.

Descartes

continues:

...

but

it could

not

happen

that,

when

I

see,

or

what

amounts

to

the

same

thing,

when

I

think

I

see,

I

who

think

m

not

something.

For

a

similar

reason,

if

judge

that

the

wax

exists

because

I

touch

it,

the

same

conclu

sion

follows

once

more,

namely,

that

I

am."

In

other

words,

as

Descartes

never

tires

f

reminding

us

in his

Replies

to

the various objections tohis analysis of thepiece ofwax, thepoint of the

analysis

is

not at

all

to

gain

a

knowledge

of the

essence

of the

wax,

nor

is

it

even a

question

of

proving

thewax's existence.

Rather the

example

of

the

wax

would demonstrate

one

more

time that themind knows

itself,

its



4/21

Spectre

Shapes

95

own

nature

as

thinking

thing

(une

chose

qui

pense,

res

cogitans)

more

clearly

and

distinctly

than

itknows

any

body

like,

for

example,

a

piece

of

wax.

In

short,

the

analysis

would reduce the

wax

to

the

truth nd

certainty

of the

Cogito.

The

naked

wax

is

the

wax

of

the

Cogito,

as

though

the

thinking

I"

were

to

say:

"This

is

my

body."

The

"I"

could

be

wrong

about

"this"

and

about

the

"body"-about seeing

the

body

and about its

being

a

body-but

what

it

annot

be

wrong

about is

its

being

mine,

my

body,

which

I

could

not

conceive

in

this

fashion

(however wrong

or

right

I

may be)

without

a

human

mind,

as

Descartes

puts

it,

without

being

a

thing

that,

before

it

does

or

is

anything

else,

is

first f

all

a

thing

that

thinks.

All

this is familiar.

As

always

in

the

case

of

Descartes,

thinking

the

example

of the

wax

correctly

comes

down

to

remembering

its

place

and

function

in

the

order

of the

argument,

that

is,

according

to

the order of

reasons.

Martial

Gueroult,

in

his

Descartes

selon

l'ordre des

raisons,

summarizes

it

concisely:

Let

us

recall

thatwhat

is

at

stake

in

the

analysis

of

the

piece ofwax isnot to seek inwhat theessence ofbody

consists and

even

less

to

establish

that

body

exists

both

things

that

e

cannot

actually

know-but

what

are

the

necessary

conditions

that

render

possible

its

repre

sentation

as

such.

I

then

perceive

that these conditions

reside

in

an

idea of

my

intellect

alone,

an

intellect that

must

be

posited

as

known

first.4

Remembering

what

we

knowfirst-in

order-is

also

what should

keep

us

from

attemptingany

kind of

overhasty

"rhetorical

reading"

ofDescartes'

text.

For

just

as

the

figure

of the

garments'

possibly covering

ghosts

or

automatons

(and

not

men)

is no

immediate

threat

to

the

certainty

of the

Cogito-in

fact,

it

rather corroborates

the

argument

that

we

can

be

deceived

about all

kinds

of

things

we see

or

think

e

see

but

that

we

cannot

be deceived

about

there

being

someone

there

to

think

he

is deceived

or

not-so

the

"rhetoric"

of Descartes'

text

oes

not

easily

interfere

ith

the

"logic"

of

his

argument,

or,

to

speak

a

more

Cartesian

language,

with the

methodical

analysis according

to

the

order of

reasons.

Indeed, "rhetoric,"

understood

in this

sense-i.e.,

as

symmetrical

metaphorical exchanges

and transfers etween intelligible and sensuous-can only corroborate

Descartes'

logic.

If

tropes

and

figures

deceive

us,

this is all the

more

proof

that the

senses

and the

imagination

(whose

language

is

the

language

of

tropes

and

figures)

cannot

give

us

anything

to

know

certainly

and

indubi



5/21

96

Andrzej

Warminski

tably.

And what

a

truly hilosophical

text

oes when it

ses

figures,

tropes,

metaphors,

is,

as

it

were,

to

use

them

up:

that

s,

to

render them

transparent

to

the truth nd

certainty

of its

argument,

in

short,

to

reduce

the rhetoric

of

the

text

to

the

logic

of

the

argument.

For

instance,

the

figure

f

the

dressed

or

naked

wax

is

part

of

an

entire

tropological

system

of

metaphorical

exchange

that

escartes'

method

of

analysis

constructs

in

order

to

doubt

everything

all thebetter

so

that it

may

know all the

better

whatever

is left

after this

doubt

is taken into

consideration.

In

the

First

Meditation,

for

example,

we

can

doubt

the

knowledge

of the

senses

thanks

to

the

possibil

ity

f

crossing

from

one

side

to

the other

in

a

chain of

polarities-one

of

whose

main links is

the naked/dressed

opposition.

I

may

think

that

I

am

sitting

here

"wearing

a

winter

dressing-gown,"

awake,

and

knowing;

but

I

may

in

fact be

lying

naked

in

bed,

asleep,

and

dreaming.

How

many

times

has

it

occurred that the

quiet

of the

night

made

me

dream of

my

usual habits: that

was

here,

clothed

in

a

dressing

gown,

and

sitting

by

the

fire,

although Iwas in fact lyingundressed inbed

Again,

I

can

dream that

am

dressed

or

awake and

knowing;

and Ican know

that

am

naked

or

asleep

and

dreaming

(like

the

slave

at

the

nd

of the

irst

Meditation

who dreams that

he is free

and

"fears

to

wake

up

and

conspires

with

his

pleasant

illusions

to

retain them

longer"):

the

chiasmic

crossings

are

symmetrical.5

Since

it

is

possible

to

cross

from

one

series-dressed,

awake,

knowing-to

the

other-naked,

asleep, dreaming-it

is

impos

sible

to

know whether

we

are

awake

or

asleep, dreaming

or

knowing,

dressed

or

naked. Our

possibility

of

deciding

is

suspended,

and

this

is the

state in

which the

I"

finds itself

t

the

beginning

of

the

econd Meditation:

"I

feel

as

if

were

suddenly

thrown into

deep

water,

being

so

disconcerted

that

can

neither

plant

my

feet

on

thebottom

nor

swim

on

the

surface."

This

suspension

is,

of

course,

the

crossing

up

of

the

hyperbolic

doubt-a

radical,

metaphysical

doubt made

possible

by

the

supposition

of

the

mauvais

genie

who,

no

matter

how

hyperbolic

the

doubt

his

ruses

make

possible,

is nevertheless recovered

(dialectically)

for

knowledge

and

for

the

tropological

system

of the

Cogito

argument

by being

taken

as

the

negation

of

knowing-and

it

is

what the

text

arranges

only

in

order

to

recover from it.The suspension is itself suspended by theCogito. "I am

convinced,

I

am

deceived,

I

am

dizzy,

therefore I am"-because all of

these

are

under the

governance

of the

"I think": "I think I

am

deceived,



6/21

Spectre

Shapes

97

therefore

am."

In

other

words,

the

vertigo

of the

language

of

the

senses

and

imagination-the

illusions, delusions,

and

aberrations

of

tropological

transfers nd

substitutions-is

not

only

no

threat

to

the

certainty

nd truth

of the

Cogito

but

also is the

very

guarantee

of

that

certainty

nd

truth.

he

greater

the

doubt,

the

more

absolute the

doubt,

then the

more

absolute

the

one

certain

thing

that is left

over

after

the

doubt has

been taken

into

consideration.

Again,

this

is all

too

familiar,

I

am

certain,

and what

it

amounts to

rhetorically speaking

is

a

philosophical

text

whose

logic

and

grammar

would

eat

up,

as

it

were,

its

rhetoric-an

argument

that

uses

tropes

and

figures

only

to

use

them

up

all

the

etter,

to

wear

them

way

and

wear

themdown

according

to

the rule of theoldest

metaphor

of

metaphor

in

the book of

philosophy:

usure-a

process

of

regular

loss

(of

the

sensuous

and

corporeal, say)

and

gain

(of

themental and

spiritual, say)

that

is

the

philosopheme

of

discourses

on

metaphor.6

In

short,

like all

philo

sophical

texts,

the

Meditations would be

just

one more

text

of "white

mythology"

in

which the

bodies,

colors,

and

flowers of rhetoric

are

submitted

to

the

rigors

of

a

stiffening,

fading,

and

cooling

machine

of

analysis thatspirits themaway. It's what happens to figures in the textof

philosophy,

and it

is

what

should

happen

in

the

case

of

thewax-for

example.

For

the

example

of the

piece

of

wax

is

not

only

the

example

of the

corporeal

in

the

text

of

philosophy,

but it is also the

example

of the

"corporeal"

of

the

text

of

philosophy.

That

is,

it

is

an

example

of

what

happens

to

example-to figures,

tropes,

rhetoric-in the

text

f

philoso

phy.

And

if

it is all

too

clear

and

too

familiar what

happens

to

the

vivid

sensuous

corporeality

of the

wax-"This bit of

wax

which

has

just

been

taken

from

the hive" and

that

has

not

yet

completely

lost the

sweetness

of the

honey

it

contained"

and

"still

retains

something

of

the

odor of

two

flowers from

which it

was

collected" and whose

"color,

shape,

and size

are

apparent;

it

can

easily

be

touched;

and,

if

you

knock

on

it,

t

will

give

out

some

sound

..

."-namely,

its reduction

to

the truth nd

certainty

of

the

Cogito,

it

s

perhaps

less clear what

happens

to

the

example

of

the

wax,

the

example

of what

happens

to

example-the example,

in

short

(and

as

always),

of

example-in

this

text

of

first

philosophy.

For whereas the

analysis

of the

wax as a

figure

of the

corporeal

in the

text

leaves

no

remainder,

no

residue,

no

left-overs-except

for the

one,

first,

hing

that

thinks,theCogito-the analysis of thewax as a figure f thecorporeal of

the

text-again,

of what

happens

to

the

figures

of rhetoric in the

philo

sophical

text-leaves

a

remainder

or,

better,

remainders

that

are

not

just



7/21

98

Andrzej

Warminski

one

and

not

just

first nd

not

reducible

to

just

the

Cogito.

Rhetorically

speaking-as distinguished

from,

say,

"logically

speaking"-left

over are

the hats

and cloaks

that

may

cover

ghosts

or

automatons,

spectres

or

feigned

men.

But how

can we

say

this-especially

after

we

have

already

said

and

insisted thatthe

figures

of

ghosts

and

automatons

are

not

only

no

threat

to

the

Cogito argument

but also corroborate

it? nce

again,

let's

not

hurry:

in

this

case,

let's

not

hurry

to

conclude

that the

figure

of

the

garments,

the

hats and cloaks that

may

cover

ghosts

or

automatons,

is

a

figure

or

is

just

a

figure.

It is

more

(or less?)

than

just

a

figure

in

the

same

way

that

he

example

of the

wax

is

not

just

an

example

of

the

waxbut also

always, already, supplementarily

(en

suppliment)-an example

of

ex

ample.

This

is

true,

first f

all,

on

a

purely

formal

or even

thematic level

in

that the

figure

of

the

hats

and

cloaks

means

quite

explicitly

to

illustrate

how it

is

that

say

I

see

the self-same

wax

after ithas

undergone

all kinds

of

transformations

when,

in

reality,

I

judge

by

the

pure

inspection

of the

mind

that it is the self-same

wax.

As

such,

a

figure

that

s

added

on

to

the

analysis

of the

figure

of

the

wax,

the

figure

of

hats and

cloaks

is

explicitly

a figure of figure.And Descartes deems this (supplementary) figure

necessary

because

even

after

the

analysis

of

the

wax

I

am

still

apt

to

fall

into

error:

For

even

though

I

consider

all

this

n

my

mind

[apud

me]

without

speaking,

still words

impede

me,

and

I

am

nearly

deceived

by

the

terms

of

ordinary

language.

For

we

say

that

we see

the

same wax

if

it

is

present,

and

not

that

we

judge

that

t

s the

same

from the fact

that thas

the

same

color

or

shape.

Thus

I

might

be

tempted

to

conclude that

ne

knows the

wax

by

means

of

eyesight,

and

not

uniquely

by

the

inspection

of

the

mind. So

I

may

by

chance look

out

of

a

window

and

notice

some men

passing

in

the

street,

t

the

sight

ofwhom

I

do

not

fail

to

say

I

see

men,

just

as

I

say

that

see

wax;

and

neverthe

less what do

I

see

from thiswindow

except

hats and

cloaks

which

might

cover

ghosts

or

automatons

which

move

only by

springs?

But

Ijudge

that

they

re

men,

and

thus

comprehend,olely

y

the

aculty

f

udgment

which resides inmymind, thatwhich Ibelieved I saw

with

my

eyes.



8/21

Spectre

Shapes

99

In

other

words,

the

figure

f hats and

cloaks is

introducedbecause

ordinary

language-the

language

of

the

senses

and

of

the

imagination

which,

here,

is

clearly

identified

as

figurative

language

(that is,

saying

that

one

sees

is

really

only

a

figure

for

saying

that

ne

judges

by

the

pure

inspection

of the

mind)-because

ordinary language

still leads

us

astray,

into

error

(and

hence

may

be what is

responsible

for themind's

penchant

for

vagabondage,

wandering, erring-the

reason

Descartes has

given

it

the freest rein

by

introducing

the

example

of

the

wax,

but

only

in

order

to

pull

it

up

so

that

"it

may

the

more

easily

be

regulated

and

controlled").

But

rather

than

settling

the

matter

once

and

for

all,

and

ending

the

mind's

penchant

for

aberration

and

error,

this

figure

(of

figure)-which

also

amounts to

an

erring

(of

erring)-leaves

a

residue

and

an

excess,

a

remainder of

figure

(and

hence

of

errance).

How so?

The

figure

of hats and

cloaks

remains,

and will

not

be reduced

to

the

logic

of

the

Cogito

argument,

because,

first

f all

(and

still

quite

schemati

cally),

it

asymmetricalizes

the

tropological

system

of

symmetrical

ex

changes

and substitutions

that the first

two

Meditations

have

set

up.

The

figureof hats and cloaks possibly, always possibly, letus add, covering

ghosts

or

automatons

is

asymmetrical

to

the

(ultimately

recoverable)

play

of chiasmic

reversals

between

naked

and dressed

because

it

s the

example

not

of

someone,

some

I,

who thinkshe

(or

she)

is

dressed

but isdeceived

or,

vice

versa,

thinks

he

(or

she)*

is naked but is

deceived,

etc.

Rather this

example

introduces the

possibility-and,

as

always

a

possibility,

it

s

also

the

necessary

condition-of

someone,

some

I,

who

is

deceived

not

just

about

being

dressed

or

naked

but about

being

someone or

some

I.

That

is,

I

can

think

that

I

can

be

either naked

or

dressed-and

I

can

be deceived

*

What

about those

little

arenthetical

"(or he)"-'s?

Why

do

I

have the

feeling

hat

he

"I"

f the

Meditations

could

not

be

a

"she"without

inflecting

or

deflecting

the

rhetorical

figure

f

dressing/undressing

n

significantly

different

way?

That's

not

altogether

rhetorical

uestion,

although

I

dmit

that have

a

few

notions about the

possible

answers.

Theymight

have

something

to

o,

for

xample,

with the iscourse

on

whether

or

not

one can

even

imagine

uch

a

thing

s

a

feminine

oul

and thuswhether woman's

body

can

be made available for

he

ame

rhetorical

perations

of

analogy

you

have described. And for he

ame or a

similar

reason,

the

undressed

feminine

ody

is

undecidably

more

and less than the

ouse

of

the

oul,

the

coveringfor ruth.t s theveiled

or

dressed body ofwoman that igures, n

a

certain rhetorical

ut

also

metaphysical

tradition,

he

truth.

know

this

s

very

thoroughly

xplored ground

elsewhere,

and

I'm

ertainly

ot

presum

ing

to remind

you

of what

you

know

better than

I.

But I

was

wondering



9/21

100

Andrzej

Warminski

about

being

naked

or

dressed

(believing

to

be

whethera

rhetorical

nalysis

of the

ogito

dressed

when

I

am

naked,

can

take these

other,

not

strictly

r not

believing

to

be

naked when

simply

rhetorical

oints

into ccount

with

out

getting

off ts

track,

r

ratherwhether

I

am

dressed,

etc.)-but

I

getting

ff

he

trackis the

necessary

fate

cannot

(just)

think

that

I

and

chance-of

a

rhetorical

reading?

Is

am

not

there

as

an

I

and

there

ota kindof

ssymetry

here-that

of

still

be dressed

or

naked.

sexual

difference-which

the

ymmetrical

Again,

better,

I

can

think

operationof the nalogy, includingventu

that

I

am

either dressed

or

ally,

in

theThird

Meditation,

the

nalogy

or

resemblance between God

and the

"/,"

naked,

but

I

cannot

think

tries

o

eep

atbayjustasittries

to

keep

the

me,

an

I,

as

at

the

same

logical

Cogito

safe from ts rhetorical

ar

time

something radically

ments?

What would

happen

if,

nstead

of

differentfromanI-aghost

just

automatons

or

ghosts,

Descartes

had

or

a

machine-and

yet

na-

mentioned

a

third

ossible

error:

that

the

or

clothes-cloak

and

hat-might disguise

a

ked

or

dressed:

in

short,

woman

rather han man?

Is this

ossibil

both

an

I and

something

ity

oraberration

ess

ormore

disruptive

f

differentfrom,other than, symmetryhan the theronesmentioned?

an

I,

simultaneously,

at

the

Less

ormore

disruptiveforDescartes'logi

same

time and

in

the

same

cal

argument

and

for

our

rhetorical ead

place,

wearing

the

ame

hat

ing?

The latterare

ot

rhetoricalquestions.

and the

same

coat.

The

-

ntko

mauvais

genie

may

indeed

not

be able

to

make

me

believe

that

am

nothing

as

long

as

I think

that

I

am

something-i.e.,

as

long

as

I

think

anything

at

all-but the

text,

a

still trickier

eceiver,

can

inscribe

he

ossibility

hat

am

neither

omething

or

nothing

and

yet

both) nthe igureor he ery elf-identityfthe ogito. hisghost-or

automatic-writer

of the

Cogito,

the

text,

would be

the real evil

genius:

one

who does

not

make

you

think hat

you

are

either

something

or

nothing

but

rathermakes

you

write

or

read

yourself,

the

text,

as

something

else.

That

would

be

one

way-still

preliminary

nd

too

chematic-to

ormu

late

he

ense

n

hich

he

igure

f

hats

nd loaks xceeds

he

ropological

sstem

of

symmetrical

exshange

(between

nake

d

n

d

ress,

for

-

toriculaehenatur

fotiealine

caefull-an

ots

et

all

becuseitaquetio ofartcultion

athr

thanbl

or:

nate

and

"contituion",fartiulai orabertin(nls of mo-rirupti anofs

joining.ht

i,agin,theyiguetr

fhaand

leoher

ossil coeriong



10/21

Spectre

Shapes

101

ghosts

or

automatons

is

in

itself

or

by

itself-i.e.,

as

figure-not

what

disarticulates the

tropological

system

of the

Cogito argument

and

"opens

it

up"

radically

to

an

endless

erring

or

errance,

to

the

endless,

mechanical

reproduction

of

figures

of

figure.

No,

if

this

"figure,"

which is simulta

neously

"other-than-figure,"

can

make

a

difference

to

the

argument,

to

thinking,

to

the

Cogito,

it

s

on

account

of

the

difference it

ntroduces

into

the fundamental

analogy

that

rograms

the

tropological

system

of

the

text:

namely,

the

analogy garments

are

to

body

as

body

is

to

soul,

which

yields

such

common

metaphors

as

"the

body

is the

garment

of

the soul"

(or,

more

weird,

"the

garment

is the

body

of

the

body").

The

"figure"

of hats and

cloaks

possibly covering ghosts

or

automatons

introduces

difference

into

this

programmatic analogy

insofar

as

it

introduces

the

ghosts

or

the

automatons in

the

"slot"

occupied by

the

body.

On the

one

hand,

this is of

course no

threat

to

the

Cogito argument

and its

tropological

system.

In

comparison

to

the

thinking

soul

or

the

mind,

the

body

is

a

mere

machine

and,

in

the order of

reasons,

is

as

non-existent

as a

ghost

(like

that

of

the

wax

reduced

to

nothing

...

nothing

but the

Cogito).

What could be

more

consistent andmore Cartesian But, on the otherhand, the introduction f

the

ghosts

or

automatons in

the slot

of the

analogy

occupied

by

the

body

as

in

garments

are

to

body,

which

would

now

read

garments

are

to

ghost

or

automaton-disrupts

the

metaphor

and the

Cogito

and

is

most

un- or

other-than-Cartesian. For the

ghosts

or

automatons

can

now

be the

figure

of,

for

example,

a

mechanical

or

a

ghostly

soul

or

spirit,

the

Cogito

as a

mechanical

ghost.

And,

as

always,

there

is

now

nothing

to

stop

us

from

taking

themind

or

soul

or

spirit

s

the

figure

for

a

spiritual

machine

or a

ghost

that is still all

too

bodily

or

too

mechanical

because

it

an

still

wear

a

coat

and

a

hat.And

there

s

nothing

tobe

done

about

it,

no

way

to

rid

the

text

of

these

ghastly-ghostly,

mechanical

figures

for

the

Cogito.

For

as

soon as

you

introduce

figures,

as soon as

you

figure

the

spiritual by

the

sensuous,

i.e.,

give

it

body,

you

also

necessarily

introduce the

possibility

thatthe

spirit

r

the

soul

or

themind

may

also be all

too

sensuous or

bodily

or

mechanical

and,

on

the other

hand,

that the

body

may,

as

it

were,

have

its

own

reasons,

may

be all

too

spiritual.

In

short,

s soon

as

you

construct

a

house of

tropes, you

necessarily

introduce

not

only

figures

for

the

literal-like the

body

in

the relation

body-is-to-soul-but

also

figures

for

figure-like

the

body

in

gannents-are-to-body.

It

is

this

necessity

that

the

ghosts and automatonswearing hats and cloaks rendervisible-or, better,

readable-in the

text

f Descartes.

His

house

of

tropes

contains not

only

garments

of

bodies

or

bodies

of

souls but also

garments

of

garments,



11/21

102

Andrzej

Warminski

soulful bodies

or

bodily

souls,

thinking

bodies

or

bodily thoughts.

It is

a

haunted house

full

of

ghosts,

automatons,

zombies.

That's what the

"figure"

of

hats

and cloaks

covering ghosts

or

automatons

makes

possible

(and

necessary)-or,

again,

readable-whereas,

say,

a

naked

ghost

or

a

naked

automaton

would

only

confirm

the

tropological

system

by

leaving

the

spiritual

and themind

on

the

ne

side and

the

mechanical

and the

bodily

on

the other.

(As

in

the

case

of

Wordsworth's

drowned

man,

it's

only

a

machine

or

a

corpse

with

clothes that

will

hurt

you-for

it introduces

the

possibility

that

the

soul

too

can

die,

be

a

dead

soul,

and

yet

live

on

like

a

ghost wearing

clothes.7)

In

other

words

and

again,

it's

not

so

much what

is

under

the

hats

and

cloaks-naked

ghosts

or

naked

automatons-that

disarticulates

the

tropological

system

but

rather

the

very

possibility

of

ghosts

and

automatons

wearing

clothes.

For

it is

their

arments

that

ender

their

constitution,

i.e.,

their

essence

(and

even

their

existence),

less

important

than their

function

as

place-holders,

stand-ins,mannikins,

not

just

for

human

bodies

but for

"human"

souls,

"human"

minds,

and

"human"

thoughts.

Their

garments

render the

ghosts

or

automatons

not

just

carriers of

meaning

but

"syntactical

plugs,"

place-holders in or

markers

of

an

order that

make

meaning

possible

but

that

re

themselves

not

necessarily

meaningful.

As

Wordsworth

well

knew,

words

that

re

to

the

thoughts

they

express

not

like the

body

is

to

the

soul but rather

like

what

the

garments

are

to

the

body-such

words

kill,

they

kill

thoughts,

they

make

it

possible

for

the

mind

to

die

and

for

the

spirit

to

be

dead

spirit.

I

quote

from

the

third

f

the

Essays

upon

Epitaphs:

If

words

be

not

[recurring

o

ametaphor

before

used]

an

incarnation

of the

thought

ut

only

a

clothing

for

it,

then

surely

will

they

prove

an

ill

gift;

such

a one

as

those

poisoned

vestments,

read of

in

the stories of

supersti

tious

times,

which

had the

power

to

consume

and

to

alienate

fromhis

right

ind thevictimwho

put

them

n.

Language,

if

it

do

not

uphold,

and

feed,

and

leave

in

quiet,

like

the

power

of

gravitation

or

the ir

we

breathe,

is

a

counter-spirit, unremittingly

and

noiselessly

at

work to

derange,

to

subvert,

to

lay

waste,

to

vitiate,

and

to

dissolve.8

Even

without

really

beginning

to

read

this rich

passage,

one can

still

see

quite clearly

how

it

s

that

words, garment-words,

kill

thoughts:

if

thought



12/21

Spectre

Shapes

103

is

like the

body

in

relation

to

the

garments

(and

not

like

the

soul is

to

the

body),

then

thought

is

being

analogized

to

the

body,

to

something

corpo

real and

mortal.

If

thoughts

re

like the

body,

then

thoughts

can

die.

In

the

analogy,

garments

are

to

body

as

words

are

to

thoughts,

something

spiritual

and

presumably immortal-thoughts-is being

analogized

to

something

corporeal

and

mortal-the

body-and

therefore

the

analogy

opens

up

the

possibility

of

figures

of

figure

that

dis-figure

and

disarticulate

the

tropological system

based

on

the

"garments

are

to

body

as

body

is

to

soul"

analogy:

figures/other-than-figures

ike

spiritual,

immortal

corpses

or

bodily

thoughts

and

dead

spirits.

This

happens-and

has

to

happen

as

soon as

there

re

physical,

carnal,

corporeal

figures

for the

spiritual

and

intelligible.

And

there

always

are

such

figures-for,

without

them,

there

is

neither

thought

nor

spirit.

As

soon

as

the first

ncarnate

thought

ppears,

there

ppears

along

with

it

parasitically, supplementarily,

etc.)

a

thought

dressed

up

in

hat and coat-like

a

ghost

or

an

automaton.

Indeed,

it

would

be

more

correct

to

say

that the

"first" incarnate

thought

does

not,

and

cannot,

appear

"in

the

first

place"

without

at

the

same

(divided)

time

appearing as a thoughtwearing clothes.Rhetorically speaking, there isno

difference

between

words

as

the

bodies

of

thought

and

words

as

the

garments

of

thought.9

But

let

us

not

end there-with the

dead

spirit

or

the

mechanical

Cogito.

Let

us

rather

go

back

to

the

body

of Descartes' naked

wax.

For

if

our

no

doubt

overhasty

attempt

to

read the

way

in

which

the

figures/other

than-figures

of hats

and

cloaks

possibly covering

ghosts

or

automatons

introduces,

or

leaves,

a

remainder-an

indigestible

left-over,

s

Derrida

might

say

in

his seminar

on

"Eating

the

ther"-10in

(and

"outside"

of)

the

tropological

system

of

the

Cogito

argument

is,

if

not

"correct,"

not

just

"wrong,"

then this

reading

cannot

help

but

have

implications

forDescartes'

analysis

(by striptease

1)

of the

wax.

A

good

way

to

re-articulate

this

remainder,

or,

better,

the

remaindering-the

restance-of the

text

f

the

Cogito

is

by

way

of

Gassendi's

objections

to

the

analysis

of the

wax

in

the

Fifth

Objections. Although

on

the

one

hand

Gassendi does

not

really

understand

the

logic

of Descartes'

Cogito argument

(and

its

radicality)

very

well,

nevertheless,

on

the

other

hand,

he reads

the

rhetoric of

Descartes' text ll too

well-at least all

too

well

for

the

good

of the

ogito.

In

so

doing,

Gassendi'

s

reading

also makes it

ossible

for

us to

understand

a bit better thenecessity of such reading--why it oes and has tohappen

whether it

be

a

reading

of Descartes'

text

by

Gassendi's

or

Descartes'

by

Descartes.

Gassendi's

misunderstanding requires

little

omment:

he

would



13/21

104

Andrzej

Warminski

persist

in

thinking

f

Descartes'

analysis

of

the

piece

of

wax

in

the

terms

of

medieval,

scholastic

philosophy-as

though

what

Descartes had done

were

to

"abstract the

concept

of the

wax

from

the

concept

of its

ccidents."

As

Descartes

writes

in

his rather

curt

reply:

Here,

as

frequentlyelsewhere, you merely

show

that

you

do

not

have

an

adequate

understanding

of

what

you

are

trying

to

criticize.

I

did

not

abstract the

concept

of

the

wax

from the

concept

of

its

accidents.

Rather,

I

wanted

to

show how the

substance of the

wax

is

re

vealed

by

means

of

its

accidents,

and

how

a

reflective

and distinct

perception

of it

(the

kind of

perception

which

you,

0

Flesh,

seem never

to

have

had)

differs

from the

ordinary

confused

perception.12

But getting the rgumentwrong nevertheless putsGassendi on the trackof

Descartes'

figures,

in

particular

that f the

ressed and

thennaked

wax.

He

begins

by putting

the

question

in terms

of

accident

and

substance

or

subject:

Besides the

olor,

the

shape,

the

fact that t

an

melt,

etc.

we

conceive thatthere s

something

which

is

the

subject

of the

accidents and

changes

we

observe;

but

what this

subject

is,

or

what its

nature

is,

we

do

not

know. This

always

eludes

us;

and it s

only

a

kind of

conjecture

that

leads

us

to

think that there

must

be

something

under

neath the accidents.

In

calling

what

we

do when

we are

led

to

think

that

there

must

be

"something

underneath the accidents"

a

"conjecture,"

Gassendi's

objec

tion is

already

shading

into

reading

of

Descartes'

rhetoric-for

"conjec

ture,"

from

con-

plus

iacere,

is,

after

all,

virtually

a

Latin

transcription

f

theGreek

symbol,

from

sym-

plus

ballein,

to

throw

together-suggesting

thatwhat

we

do when

we

thus

conjecture

is

not to

judge by

the

pure

inspection of themind but to read a symbol. And his reference to the

"something

underneath the accidents"

necessarily

leads

him

to

read



14/21

Spectre Shapes

105

Descartes'

figure

of

garments:

"So

I

am

amazed,"

he

continues,

...

at

how

you

can

say

that

once

the forms

have been

stripped

off like

clothes,

you

perceive

more

perfectly

and

evidently

what the

wax

is.

Admittedly,

you

per

ceive that the

wax

or

its

substance

must

be

something

over

and above

such

forms;

but what

this

something

is

you do notperceive, unless you aremisleading us. For

this

"something"

is

not

revealed

to

you

in

the

way

in

which

a

man

can

be revealed

when,

after firstof

all

seeing

just

his hat and

garments,

we

then

remove

the

clothes

so

as

to

find

out

who and what he is.

Although

Gassendi's

objection

as

objection

again

misses

Descartes'

point-in

this

case,

that

escartes

at

this

point

in

theorder of

reasons

did

not

at

all

mean

to

discuss what

the

"something"

of

the

wax

is-his

reading

of

the

figure

of

garments

is

on

the

mark,

forwhat it

mounts

to

is

his

noting

that escartes'

analogy

between dressed wax and dressedmen on theone

hand,

and

naked

wax

and

naked

men on

the

other,

breaks

down. This is

as

clear

as

could

be: when

we

strip

the

men

of their

clothing,

presumably

we

see

the

bodies

of

men;

whereas when

we

strip

the

wax

of

its

garments,

we

see

...

what?

Certainly

not

the

"body"

of the

wax,

for the

garments

we

have

stripped

it

f

were

its

body.

And

certainly

not

the "soul"

of the

wax,

since

that,

whatever it

may

be,

is

not

visible

in

the

way

that the

bodies of

men are

visible.

How

can

you,

then, Mind,

say

that

you

perceive

the

wax

more

perfectly

after

it

has

been

stripped

of

its

garments?

The

naked

wax

or,

as

Gassendi

puts

it

ater

in

this

objection,

"the

alleged naked,

or

rather

hidden" wax-is

precisely

not

like the

body

underneath the

garments.

It

is

like the

body

only

insofar

as

the

body

is

like

the soul

or

mind-i.e.,

only

within the

tropological

system

of

the

analogy

garments

are

to

body

as

body

is

to

soul.

In

short,

nd

again,

the

analogy

breaks

down.

Although,

on

the

level of the

argument,

Descartes

could

quite

easily

reply

that

the

break

down

of the

analogy

was

precisely

his

point-namely,

that

the

soul

or

mind

is

not

like the

ody-he

would

have

a

little

ore

trouble

eplying

o

Gassendi'

s

reading

of

his

figures.

For

this

reading

leaves

Descartes' naked

wax-and

the

ogito

that

he

wax

is

reduced

to

nd

a

figure

for-with

only

two ratherbleak choices. On theone hand,Descartes can tellus how it is

that e

perceives

the

wax

better after its

arments

have been

stripped

way.

But there is

no

way

for him

to

do so-to

say

anything

at

all

about

soul,



15/21

106

Andrzej

Warminski

spirit,

mind,

thought-without

employing

the

language

of the

senses

and

the

imagination,

the

language

of

figures,

nd

thereby

ithoutcorporealizing

the naked

wax,

without

saying

that

it

is indeed like the

body.

Gassendi

continues:

Moreover,

when

you

think

you

somehow

perceive

this

underlying "something,"

how,

may

I

ask,

do

you

do

so?

Do

you

not

perceive

it

as

something

spread

out

and

extended?

For

you

do not conceive of it as a

point,

although

it s the

kind

of

thing

whose extension

expands

and

contracts.

And since this kind of extension is

not

infinite ut has

limits,

o

you

not

conceive of the

thing

as

having

some

kind of

shape

[ne

la

concevez-vous

pas

aussi

en

quelquefagonfigurie]?

And when

you

seem as

it

were

to

see

it,

o

you

not

attach

to

it

ome

sort

of

color,

albeit

not

a

distinct

one?

You

certainly

take it

to

be

something

more

solid,

and

so

more

visible,

than

mere

void. Hence even your "understanding" turns ut tobe

some

sort

of

imagination.

That would be the

ne

hand:

as

soon

as

you

say

anything,

you

turn

oul

into

body

and contaminate

thought

with

imagination.

On the

other

hand,

Descartes

can

not

tell

us

how it

is that

he

perceives

the

wax

better

after its

garments

have been

stripped

away.

He

can,

in

other

words,

keep

insisting

that thenaked

wax

is

not

like the

body

at

all,

thatwhat is

left

s

only

the soul

or

spirit

or

mind

stripped

of the

body,

etc.

But then

he

can

have

nothing

at

all

to

say

about

it,

forhe

thereby

renders

his

wax

notmore

naked but

more

hidden. Gassendi continues: "If

you say you

conceive of thewax

apart

from

any

extension,

shape

(sans

figure)

or

color,

then

you

must in all

honesty

tell

us

what

sortof

conception

you

do have

of

it."

hese

are

the

two

possibilities-the

only

two

possibilities

once

you

dress

the

wax

in

cloth

ing-and

it is

most

fitting

that

they

are

very

precisely

and

very

neatly

inscribed

in

Descartes'

own

text in

the

uncanny

figures

of hats

and cloaks

that

may

cover

ghosts

or automatons.

The latter-the "automatons"

or

"feigned

men"

(as

theFrench translation

puts

it)-is

a

figure

for the

all

too-mechanical and

all-too-corporeal

Cogito

that

lways

gets

produced

as

soon as you dress it ingarments and thenstrip itnaked. The former-the

"ghosts"

or

"spectres"

(which

are

not

there

n

the

atin but

are

something

found,

as

it

were,

in

theFrench

translation "authorized"

by

Descartes)



16/21

Spectre

Shapes

107

is

a

figure

for

the

all-too-ghostly

and

all-too-spectral

Cogito

that

always

gets

produced

when

you say

that it is not

a

body

and

not

like

a

body

and

yet

nevertheless

insist that

t

can wear

garments

and

be

stripped

naked.

In

the

one

case,

you

have

too

much

to

say

and

the

Cogito

is

too

bodily;

in the

other,

you

have

nothing

to

say

and the

Cogito

is

too

ghostly.

In

both

cases,

it

becomes

a

figment

a

figure,

fiction)

of

your

imagination.

And,

in

any

case,

it's

always

too

much,

in

excess,

a

remainder.

In

his

own

reading

of the

figure

of

hats

and

cloaks,

Gassendi

may

be

an

erratic

thinker, ut,

again,

he is

aquite

consistentrhetorical reader.

Once

he has

picked

up

the

scent

of

the

imagination

and

its

too-corporeal

figures-no

doubt

by sniffing

t

the

garments

of the

fugitive

Cogito-he

hunts

itdown

to

its lair:

What

you

have

to

say

about

"men whom

we

see,

or

perceive

with

the

mind,

when

we

make

out

only

their

hats or cloaks" does not show that it is themind rather

than

the

imagination

that

makes

judgments.

A

dog,

which

you

will

not

allow

to

possess

a

mind

like

yours,

certainly

makes

a

similar

kind

of

judgment

when it

ees

not

its

master

but

simply

his

hat

or

clothes.

Indeed,

even

if

the

master

is

standing

or

sitting

or

lying

down

or

reclining

or

crouching

down

or

stretched

out,

the

dog

still

always

recognizes

the

master who

can

exist

under

all

these

forms,

even

though

like

the

wax,

he

does

not

keep

the

same

proportions

or

always

appear

under

one

formratherthan nother.And when a

dog

chases a hare

that is

running

away,

and

sees

it first

ntact,

then

dead,

and

afterwards

skinned

and

chopped

up,

do

you

suppose

thathe does

not

think t

is

the

same

hare?When

you go

on

to

say

that the

perception

of

color

and hardness

and

so

on

is "not vision

or

touch

but is

purely

mental

scrutiny,"

I

accept

this,

provided

themind is

not

taken

to

be

really

distinct from

the

imaginative

faculty.

Much-too much-is going on here. The dog whom Descartes will

not

allow

to

possess

a

mind like

his,

the

dog

incapable

of the

Cogito,

is



17/21

108

Andrzej

Warminski

nevertheless

able

to

perform

a

process

of

analysis

like

Descartes'

analysis

of

the

wax

or

make

a

judgment

like

we

do

when

we

look

out

the

window

at

hats and cloaks.

Gassendi's

passage

also

captures

some

of the

violence

implied

but

muted

in

Descartes'

Cogito

argument

and its

process

of

analysis

and

judgment

which

always

entails the

dis-figuration

or

disfigure

ment

of

figure-like

the

piece

of

wax

looked

at,

touched, licked,

smelled,

knocked

on,

and then

brought

close

to

the firewhose heat is then turned

p.

The

dog

who

dutifully recognizes

his

master

under

myriad

forms and

underneath

many

costumes

is

also

a

dog

that

may

not

recognize

the

difference between that

aster

and

thehare he hunts down and

kills,

seeing

it first

ntact,

then

ead.13

Such

a

dog

clearly

thinks

too

much

and

too

little

for

Descartes'

taste.

Just

give

him

a

hat

or

a

cloak,

any

piece

of

clothing,

to

sniff

n,

he

will

always

find

his

prey,

and

bring

it

back-if

not

dead

or

alive,

than

s

a

ghost

or an

automaton.

It

is

no

wonder, then,

that

n

his

reply

Descartes

is

especially

hard

on

this

hunting-or reading--dog:

I

do

not

see

what

argument

you

are

relying

on

when

you

lay itdown as certain that dog makes discriminating

judgments

in

the

same

way

as

we

do.

Seeing

that

dog

is made

of flesh

you

perhaps

think

that

everything

which

is in

you

also exists

in

the

dog.

But

I

observe

no

mind

at

all

in

the

dog,

and hence believe there

s

nothing

to

be found

in

adog

that esembles

the

things

recognize

in

a

mind.

The

dog

is all

flesh-just

as

Gassendi

is all Flesh

when

his

thinking

is

so

dogged-and

Descartes

will

allow neither

to

possess

a

mind

like his

own.

But

even

though

escartes would

seem to

be able

to

rid his

language

of

flesh

easily enough-both

dog-flesh

and

Gassendi,

whom Descartes

addresses

in his

reply

as

"0

Flesh "

(0

caro

0

chair )

in

retaliation for

Gassendi's

having

addressed

Descartes

as

"0

Mind "

(0

anima

0

ame )-he

would have

a

little

more

trouble

stripping

itof

garments,

hats

and

cloaks,

the colors and

figures

of rhetoric thatmake such

an

exchange

of

compliments-0

Flesh /O

Mind -and

the

tropological

system

of

metaphorical exchange

between

body

and soul

possible

in

the first

place.

Here Descartes

sees,

thinks,

reads

and

writes,

clearly. Reading

Gassendi,

he writes: "Then you beginwith apleasantenough figure f rhetoric, alled

prosopopoeia,

to

question

me no

longer

as

a

whole

man

but

as

a

mind

[or

soull

separated

from

the

ody

..

."In other

words,

when Gassendi

objects



18/21

Spectre

Shapes

109

"O Mind " and Descartes

replies

"O

Flesh ,"

their ouble address

ismade

possible

(and

impossible) by

a

third,

till

other address-that

of

a

'figure

de

rhitorique

assez

agriable,"

prosopopoeia-which

always,

relent

lessly, noiselessly,

undecidably,

reads and writes

along

with them: "O

Garments "

(O

vestes

O

vitements ).

It

is

this

third, ther,

address that

makes

it

possible

to

give

a

face

or

a

mask,

a

face and/or

(undecidably)

a

mask,

both

to

the

mind and

to

the

body,

and makes

it

impossible

ever

to

know what

will

be

left

ver once

it-face

or

mask?-is

strippedaway.14

The

"O"

of "O

Garments "

articulates and

dis-articulates,

joints

and dis

joints,

the

"O" of

"O Mind " and the

O"

of "O

Flesh " It

rewrites and

re

reads their ouble

"O "/"O "

as

"Uh,

oh "15

The

Editors

thank

Peggy

Kamuf

for

permission

to

print

part

of

her

formal

response

to

this

essay.

1 This paper was firstdelivered at the 1990IAPL conference in Irvine

at

a

session

organized

by

Georges

Van Den Abbeele and entitled

"The

Body

of

Descartes?"

My

thanks

to

Georges

and

to

Peggy

Kamuf for

helpful

and

enjoyable

discussion of Descartes

and others

on

that

occasion.

2 All

quotations

in

English

from the

second

Meditation

are

from: Ren?

Descartes,

Meditations

on

First

Philosophy,

trans.

aurence

J.

afleur

(New

York:

Bobbs-Merrill,

1960).

Where

necessary,

I

have

corrected

the translation

slightly.

Quotations

of

or

references

to

the atin

and

French

are

from

Volume

II of:

Descartes,

Oeuvres

philosophiques,

ed.

Ferdinand

Alqui?

(Paris:

Gamier, 1967).

3

See

Part

V

of the

iscourse

on

Method.

4

Martial

Gueroult,

Descartes'

Philosophy

Interpreted

According

to

theOrder

of

Reasons,

Volume

I "The

Soul and

God,"

trans.

Roger

Ariew

(Minneapolis:

University

of

Minnesota

Press,

1984),

97.

5

Or,

as

Kevin

Newmark has

pointed

out to

me,

they

t

least

seem

to

be

symmetrical.

Actually,

thedream

argument

already

crosses

them

up.

But

in

order

to

demonstrate

this,

it

is

necessary

to

read dream

as

radically

rhetorical

"representation"

and

not

as sensuous

image

(still

within the tropological system of exchange between sensuous and

intelligible).

In

other

words,

my

reading

of hats

and cloaks

in

this

paper

could be read back into the dream

argument.

On

a

related



19/21

110

Andrzej

Warminski

question,

see

Kevin Newmark's

reading

of

Schein

in

"Nietzsche,

Deconstruction,

History,"

Graduate

Faculty Philosophy

Journal

15:2(1991).

6

The

locus

classicus of this

question

is,

of

course,

Jacques

Derrida's

"La

mythologie

blanche"

in

Marges

(Paris:

Minuit,

1972),

but

see

also

his "La

langue

et

le discours de

la

m?thode,"

Recherches

sur

la

philosophie

et

le

langage

3

(1983),

35-51.

Also instructive and

therapeutic

in

this

regard

is

Paul de Man's

essay

on

Nietzsche,

"Rhetoric of

Tropes,"

In

Allegories

of Reading

(New

Haven:

Yale

University

Press,

1979).

See

also

my

"Prefatory

Postscript"

in

Read

ings

in

Interpretation:

H?lderlin,

Hegel, Heidegger

(Minneapolis:

University

of

Minnesota

Press,

1987)

and

"Towards

a

Fabulous

Reading:

Nietzsche's On

Truth and Lie

in

the

Extra-moral

Sense,'"

Graduate

Faculty

Philosophy

Journal 15:2

(1991),

93-120.

7

See

my

"Facing Language:

Wordsworth's First

Poetic

Spirits,"

Di

acritics

17:4

(Winter 1987),

18-31.

Reprinted

inRomantic

Revolu

tions,

ed. Kenneth

Johnston

t.

al.

(Bloomington:

Indiana

University

Press, 1990).

8 W.J.B.

Owen, ed.,

Wordsworth's

Literary

Criticism

(London:

Routledge

&

Kegan

Paul,

1974),

154.

9

In

his fine

essay

on

de Man's

"Autobiography

as

De-facement,"

Hans-Jost

Frey

seems

to

miss this

as

the

point

of

de Man's

reading.

See Hans-Jost

Frey, "Undecidability,"

in

Yale

French Studies 69

(1985).

10 Presented

at

the

University

of

California,

Irvine

(Spring

1990 and

1991).

11 For

a

different,

though

related,

reading

of

Descartes'

figures

in other

texts,

see

Ralph

Flores,

"Cartesian

Striptease"

in

his

The

Rhetoric

of

Doubtful

Authority:

Deconstructive

Readings of

Self-questioning

Narratives,

St.

Augustine

to

Faulkner

(Ithaca:

Cornell

University

Press,

1984).

12

I

quote

the

exchange

between Gassendi

and

Descartes

in the Fifth

Objections

and Fifth

eplies

from

the

handy

elections

n

John

Cottingham's

translation of

the

Meditations

on

First

Philosophy

(London:

Cambridge University

Press, 1986),

76-7.

13

The

point

is

not

just

the

contingent

possibility

that

the

dog

may

confuse themaster and thehare but rather the (tropological) necessity

of

his

"turning

on" the

master. In

brief,

the

master"

to

be

master

needs

to

figure

himself in

trope,

that

is,

he needs

to

perform

the

same



20/21

Spectre Shapes

111

Operation

of

(self^identification

as

the

dog's

identifying

hehare. But

in

doing

so,

the

master

enters

a

tropological

system

which

opens

up,

which can't

be closed off?and

which

creates

figures

of

figure

(and

not

just figures

for

a

self-same

self)

and

thereby

dismembers

him,

turns

him into

not

just

dog

but also

hare,

not

just

master

but also

victim,

prey.

14 In

other

words,

"0

garments

"

would be

a

"third

thing,"

symmetrical

to

the

body/mind opposition

and

yet

that

hich

makes

this

opposition

possible:

that

is,

makes

it

possible

to

figure

soul,

spirit,

mind,

in

the

first

place.

Documents

The Body of Descartes