The Changing Face of Eastern Europe

University of Northern Iowa

The Changing Face of Eastern EuropeAuthor(s): Senator Claiborne PellSource: The North American Review, Vol. 253, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1968), pp. 19-25Published by: University of Northern IowaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25116781 .

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filfiS

mm Senator Claiborne Pell

If there is any one issue, above all others, which is basic to international survival in the remainder of the twentieth century, I would say that it the need for a

realistic appraisal of the changing currents of political ideology, patterns, and loyalties in our modern world.

Are we up to date in our view of the world and its

challenges? And are our policies in step with the times and the demands of these changing challenges?

To put the matter in perspective, let us think back, to the polarity of the world in, let us say, 1939. Who

were our friends and who were our adversaries? Ger

many under Hitler, Italy under Mussolini, Japan under

Tojo, and Russia under Stalin were our nemeses. With in two years, there was a shift, and the Soviet Union, under heavy Nazi attacks, was our ally and friend, But within a scant decade the tides had changed again, and we

were in the icy grasp of an idealogical Cold War that

pitted us against the Soviet Union and her Communist

allies, and which literally split the Western World in two by barriers of cement and steel, throwing the Unit ed States, in the process, into close and cordial alliance

with the three nations?Germany, Japan, and Italy? which had been her strongest adversaries in World War II.

Today the winds of change are blowing once more, and we are becoming increasingly aware that the Com

munist world is no longer the monolithic block of ideo

logic solidarity which seemed to face us a decade ago. China and the Soviet Union have been at serious odds, and almost overnight we have become committed to a national policy of diversity in our treatment of the Communist world. We perceive not only that there are vast differences in ideology and practice among the various Communist nations, but that there has been a

subtle, but marked mutation in the nature of the Com munist system whenever it has been subjected to the erosive passage of time.

We are reminded that there are few things more transient in world history than the mutuality of nation al interests, and conversely, that there is nothing quite so imperishable as the self-interest of individual states.

Lord Palmerston, the mid-nineteenth century Prime Minister of Great Britain, expressed this phenomenon

in blunt terms when he said, "We have no eternal al

lies, we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our

duty to follow."

The particular problem which challenges us, it seems to me, is that kind of redefining our own national in terests in terms of the realities, and not the myths, of this last third of the twentieth century. The success with

which we meet this problem depends in large measure, I believe, on the accuracy with which we perceive and understand the world around us, particularly that part of the world which we still may be inclined to think of as hostile?however transient that term may be.

There is perhaps no better showcase of the shifting nature of the Communist world today than the hand ful of nations comprising what we know as Eastern

Europe. Here, on a broad band of territory stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, bordered on the West

by Germany and on the East by Russia, live 100 million

people who, for the last score of years, have been the

unhappy accomplices of the Soviet Union in an his toric experiment in radical socialism, imposed upon them by the brute force of World War II and its dis

ruptive aftermath. The people of Eastern Europe, oc

cupying as they do the buffer zone between East and

West, are by nature culturally independent and by heri

tage fiercely nationalistic. It is only to be expected, therefore, that the veneer of Communism should wear thin first in this historical volatile area.

I speak of this important part of the world with warm respect, and I hope some degree of understand

ing, born of a good many years of personal associa tion. In the years before World War II, while still a

student, I traveled through Poland, Slovakia, and Hun

gary, and, in fact, was at one point arrested briefly by the Nazi Gestapo in Danzig. Shortly before the war, my father became American Minister to Hungary, where he later was interned for a short period after deliver

ing declarations of war on behalf of the various British Commonwealth nations. After World War II, I return ed to Eastern Europe myself as a Foreign Service Offi cer and established the American Consulate General at

SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL is the junior senator from "Rhode

Island and a member of 7he foreign "Relations Committee.

May-June, 1968 19



Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. While I was there, the Communists came to power in a putsch, and I had the

very useful experience of dealing on a day-to-day basis with the Communist Government. It was during these

years, too, that my youngest son was born in Vienna.

Later, after leaving the Foreign Service, I returned to

Eastern Europe again as Vice President of the Inter

national Rescue Committee to assist refugees in Aus

tria at the time of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. In the ten years since that time, I have returned to

Eastern Europe several times to travel at my leisure

and to observe the changes that are taking place. What we see in Eastern Europe, I believe, is the

whole evolutionary spectrum of Communism from its

unhappy origins, through its development as an ascend ent system of radical social organization and control, and now to its decline as an ideology which can only survive by adopting many of the attributes of capital ism.

We must recognize at the outset that for Eastern

Europe?as indeed for most of the world?the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have virtually no

relevance to today's world. They are as out of date as

Ptolmey's Charts would be for the navigator of a jet aircraft. The history of Eastern Europe is a case study of the fact that social revolution in the industrial age

just does not happen according to the violent, Hegelian schedule propounded by the nineteenth century the orists.

To be sure, there was a Hegelian reaction at the

outset, and it came to some parts of Eastern Europe sooner than others. I myself can remember the spec tacle of peasants in the fields dropping to their knees to kiss the hands of the aristocracy in the late 1930's. I can remember staying at a house where the butler

was in the hospital as the result of being kicked down stairs by his employer following a petty dispute. So it

was clear to me that the pendulum of social justice was

going to swing sharply to the left in Eastern Europe. But what happened after the initial swing was not ac

cording to the script of Marx and Engels?or even of Lenin and Stalin.

The plain historic fact is that Marxism was conceiv ed almost exclusively as a negative ideology, designed as the antithesis of nineteenth century capitalism. It

had no real or rational internal theory of economics, other than the abolition of the concept of property as

we know it and the notion that the means of production should be communally or publiclyowned. But as an

economic theory, it was sadly lacking in detail as to

how such a communally owned society would operate, and, most important, what forces and motivations would keep it running.

Thus, in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet

Union itself, the motivation was supplied and impos ed artificially through the political system, during the era which we are coming to recognize as the second or

Stalinist phase of Communism. This era lasted nearly three decades in the Soviet Union and one in Eastern

Europe, drawing to a close, more or less, about 1956.

There is no doubt that the Stalinist period yielded

great results, at enormous human cost and only after

painful fits and starts and many miscalculations. But the undeniable proof is there to see: the Soviet Union and its satellite states did become, to varying degrees,

modern industrial nations, with independent capacities for meeting at least the primary requirements of a

specialized economy. There is clear evidence of this fact in the standard

measures of cumulative economic progress, notably growth in gross national product. Between 1938 and

1964, the countries of Eastern Europe recorded sub stantial progress in economic growth, particularly in view of their rather backward economic heritage. As

might be expected, progress was most pronounced in those nations which started from the lowest base, even

when we make allowances for the fact that pre-war statistics for these countries are sketchy at best. Ro

mania, for example, achieved a 16-fold increase in Gross National Product between the 1930's when her GNP was roughly only $770 million and 1964 when her GNP had grown to $12.9 billion. Gross National Product in Bulgaria increased by a factor of 8, Hun

gary's by 7, Czechoslovakia's by 9, Poland's by 5, and East Germany's by 4.

During the same period, 1938-1964, the Soviet Un

ion, with a 20-year lead time in socialist experimenta tion, increased her own GNP 14 times over, from 21 billion in 1938 to 290 billion in 1964. By contrast, the United States' GNP, while growing to the aston

ishingly high level of $628 billion, showed only a 7 fold increase over 1938, reflecting the fact that our

modern economic growth had begun much earlier and had progressed at a relatively more gradual pace. (All of these comparisons I might explain are based on ac

tual 1938 purchasing prices as opposed to 1964 pur chasing prices.)

These barren economic figures do not, of course, tell us much about the actual quality of life in the Com

munist satellite states. The figures suggest to us that there was a decided increase in economic activity and

probably a decided improvement also in opportunities to make a living in a modern industrialized society.

But since the nations involved were Communist states in the Stalinist era, we must also assume that there were

distinct limits to individual opportunity and that a

great deal of the work and resources represented by the GNP was devoted to the production of heavy goods and basic equipment for communications, transporta tion, and other primary services, with little left over

for the amenities of life.

In agriculture, the results of socialization are by no means as clear, reflecting undoubtedly the usual diffi culties which the Communist states have had in impos ing centralized economic plans on the agricultural sec

tor of the economy. It is interesting to note, in fact, the evidence of the varying degrees to which the Com

munist system has been imposed on agriculture in East ern Europe. In East Germany, which is apparently the least agriculturally self-sufficient of all the satellite

states, there has been the highest degree of socializa

tion, with 97 per cent of the arable land and 98 per

20 The North American Review



cent of the agricultural work force devoted to socialized

farming units such as collective state farms. The de

gree of socialization is quite high in several other sat ellite countries also, notably Romania where 95 per cent of the arable land and 90 per cent of the farm

work force are socialized and Czechoslovakia where 93

per cent of the work force are involved in state farm

ing.

The great variables occur in Poland and Yugoslavia where state farming has obviously been given low pri ority. In Poland, only 14 per cent of the arable land and 8 per cent of the farm labor force is involved in so cialized farming, which accounts for only about 7 per cent of agricultural output. In Yugoslavia the social ized share occupies 14 per cent of the land and 17 per cent of the work force and produces 24 per cent of the nation's farm output. In each case the balance of national farm activity is conducted on private plots by independent farmers.

All of this does not gainsay that Communism has

brought some substantial twentieth century benefits to the countryside in Eastern Europe. There has certain

ly been an increase in mechanization, particularly with the supplying of tractors to state farms, and substan tial increases in the use of chemical fertilizers?innova tions which are slow in coming to traditional family farm operations in that part of the world. But of even

more consecquence, it seems to me, is the fact that the

provinces, along with the cities, were caught up in the

sweeping social-welfare programs of the Communist

regimes, particularly in the field of health and educa tion. These programs are, to be sure, highly regiment ed and prone to all the usual flaws of bureaucratic ac

tivity. But they are in most cases vast improvements over the limited social services available a few decades

ago, and the fact that they now extend the basic guar antees of health and education to all segments of the

population is of enormous significance to a region which, as I have said, still bore many hallmarks of feudalism as late as the 1930's.

It is worth noting in the field of health, for example, that each of the satellite countries makes special pro vision for medical care as a matter of right for all citi zens and that the service is guaranteed by the basic law of the national constitutions. There are some variations in emphasis but the general intent of universal public care is clear. The constitution of the Peoples Repub lic of Bulgaria, for example, provides that "citizens have a right to pension, aid and compensation in the case of disease, accident, disablement, unemployment, and old age." The constitution of the German Demo cratic Republic guarantees health services for "mother hood . . . illness . . . disability, unemployment and other vicissitudes of life." And the Romanian consti tution stresses state grants in aid to mothers of large families and unwed mothers, and provides maternity leave with full pay, maternity homes and day nurseries.

The cost of these guaranteed health services are borne by so-called "social insurance" programs, but

they are unlike any insurance policy on this side of the Atlantic in that the "insured" person in nearly all

cases pays no direct contribution for the protection. The burden is borne primarily by payroll taxes on em

ployers ranging all the way from a low of 5 per cent in Bulgaria and Romania to 30 percent in Poland, and

with higher tax rates imposed on non-nationalized in dustries in each country. Only in Czechoslovakia, which

historically was a leader in social services, does the state bear the entire cost of the program out of gen eral revenue. And only in East Germany, which is in

many respects the most conservative of the satellites,

AT 30

I can't decipher the earth and its tiny statements of stone

weeds gossip and sing but are silent at my approach and seeds don't recognize my name

I don't have the key that unlocks the mind of the fox I don't have the lock that bolts the door of death and I can't relieve pain that chews at the lives of my friends

the great rocks buck under me but I hold on I ride I ride

RITUAL

The toothbrush laughs. I polish the Alps, adjust sky, blow winds from the passages.

Rain today. I don't control. Streams, rivers

riven by steel wakes. A pear dripping juice.

I point myself toward what I want to be, am.

Moon, love, earthquake.

Big winds and mountains.

Morton Marcus

MORTON MARCUS is hysterically prolific, and widely published. Oie lives in San francisco.

is the individual worker required to make a direct contribution amounting to 10 per cent of earnings.

In return for these substantial contributions, the

working citizens of Eastern Europe enjoy a high de

gree of protection and security. Not only do they re ceive virtually unlimited and free medical care and facilities but they are assured, during illness, of con

tinuing financial support of far greater magnitude than is offered in most capitalistic states. The cash pay

ments range from a low of 50 per cent of earnings in

May-June, 1968 21



East Germany to 90 percent in Czechoslovakia and Ro mania. In Bulgaria and Romania the payments con

tinue for unlimited periods; in the other satellites they are limited to times ranging from 39 weeks in East

Germany to two years in Czechoslovakia. Only in Hun

gary and Poland are patients required to pay a portion of the cost of medicines, 15 per cent and 30 per cent

of the total cost in the respective two countries.

It must be conceded, I believe, that these dramatic

advances in state-sponsored health services mark a ma

jor advance for the nations of Eastern Europe. But even more important are the advances which Com

munist rule has brought to the field of higher education. The most important single fact about higher educa

tion in Eastern Europe is that it, like medical service, is offered as a free service of the State. There is but one partial exception and that is the fact that in Hun

gary, a tuition fee must be paid by students whose aca

demic performance is lower than average. But for all

others throughout the satellite nations, college educa

tion is tuition free.

In addition, there are offered, in all of the Eastern

European nations, a remarkable array of student assist

ance programs to cover the additional costs of lodg

ing, food and books. In East Germany, approximately 90 percent of all students receive such assistance to some degree. In Bulgaria, there are special hostels

offering low-priced living accommodations and special state-run canteens offering cheap meals for student boarders. In nearly all of the countries there are extra

premium payments and performance bonuses for ex

ceptional work. In Poland, in addition to State grants, there are special "bursaries" or scholarships, awarded

by separate State industries, cooperatives and banks, to

students specializing in the particular field of the State

agency involved.

Clearly, such a remarkable extension of the concept of free public education is having a great effect on the nations of Eastern Europe. It is opening the doors of

knowledge and achievement to thousands of young people who a generation ago would have had little hope of transcending barriers of class and culture, whatever their inate ability.

It must be noted that the organization of student life has distinctly political overtones in some instances, but this fact should not be too surprising, particularly in view of the fact that our own government quite un

derstandably has established a special relationship with student groups in this country. In Eastern Europe the political overtones have been so strong that until

quite recently there was discrimination against so-called "class enemies" and the privileges of the State educa tional system were denied in some cases to children of

middle-class and professional people who were assum

ed to be in opposition to the Communist regimes. It is my impression that, with the possible exception of

East Germany, such discrimination is no longer prac ticed and that education is generally available to all.

So much, then, for the basic reforms and progress which stemmed from the second stage of Communism. I have described these advances in some detail because

our understanding of them is essential to our under

standing of the larger question of the future course of Communisim as an ideology and of our response to that

changing course. Having examined the evidence of achievement during the second stage in Eastern Eur

ope, let us now consider the apparent evolution of a third stage of Communism, which I believe is already upon us in the eastern satellite nations.

If we were to label this third stage, I suppose it

might be meaningful and accurate to call it the "con

verging" stage in the evolution of Communism. For

basically, what is happening is that the Communist na

tions, lacking their own internal motivating forces, are

drifting further and further away from the far left and back toward the center of the political spectrum in their

quest for guiding principles. The reasons for this drift to convergence are inter

esting to contemplate. Basically, they result from the fact that Communism has within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Having achieved the basic reforms which fill basic human needs for housing, food, and

health, it finds itself pressed by increasing demands for human comfort and fulfillment?for freedom to wor

ship and travel, to work where and as one chooses, and to accumulate a little property to leave for the next

generation?all of which are desires which conflict di

rectly with the political manipulation required hereto fore to keep the system going. Having created the edu cated citizenry it had to have to survive, Communism finds itself increasingly at odds with a populace which is less and less tolerant of regimentation as a way of life.

Increasingly, the regimes are finding themselves at odds with the young and the enlightened.

Just recently, the New York Times quoted a rather

poignant statement by a university professor in War

saw, himself obviously the product of another genera tion, who was surveying modern Polish youth with

wonder and some misgiving:

"They laugh at us and what we created for them," he said.

"They know only the advantages; we suffered to create them. Without us they would never have seen the uni

versity. We have opened for everybody what only the rich had before. They accept it, but they don't know what it cost us."

There was no better proof and confirmation of this alienation of the young than the Hungarian Revolu tion of 1956, an event which I had occasion to view at rather close quarters, actually from the Bridge at

Audau. For in that case it was the students and work ers?the traditional allies of earlier Communist upris ings?who in this case fought a Communist regime almost to a standstill. And, interestingly enough, it was

the shopkeepers and former middle classes?the tradi tional enemies of Communism?who in this case sat on their hands.

Thus we see that there are many internal forces at work today in the third stage of Communist develop ment which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels made no

provision for: alienation, impatience, economic and

spiritual discontent, and simply, the natural desires of man.

The Communist regimes learned in the '50's through




the hard lessons of Poznan, Warsaw and Budapest, that these internal pressures cannot simply be met by con tinued or increased political regimentation. And so they have, slowly and gradually, begun, in effect, to rebuild the Communist world to take account of human nature.

Slowly and inexorably, the Communist states are be

ing forced to move away from the artificial controls of

political regimentation and substitute therefor the nor

mal interplay of human instincts and desires as the only sure criteria for public decisions. In the basic area of

economics, where these changes in viewpoint manifest themselves earliest, this means that there is to an in

creasing degree substitution of market demands and consumer choices for production quotas; of interest

payments as an incentive to investment and of merit

pay and bonuses to award talent and initiative. We might think, at first glance, that the result would

be something that looks surprisingly like a capitalistic society. This, of course, is not the case, but it is clear that the evolving system is a substantial mutation of the original Marxist economy. One very apt label be

ing applied to it is the term "Market Socialism." And note with intehest that economists from both sides of the Iron Curtain have met to discuss the theory of con

vergence of the two basic economic systems: the West ern market economy and the Eastern centrally planned economy. It is this concept which inspires my own label for the third stage of Communist evolution.

I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting that the

point of convergence is now at hand, or that the Com munist states have been totally reformed. In many

respects, in fact, the rigid authoritarian political system remains as strong as ever. But we are thinking here

tonight I hope in terms of long-range trends and evo

lutionary processes. And in that context I think there are some very interesting signs indeed of movement, from revolution to devolution to a form of evolution.

Consider if you will the very basic question of con sumer credit which has only recently made its appear ance as a part of the supply and demand system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This is a very sig nifient development, I believe, for it opens to the av

erage citizen the possibility of purchasing goods he pre viously could not dream of owning, and this in turn commits the State economy to producing more and

more of the sort of goods he wants to buy. Installment buying was first introduced in the Soviet

Union in 1959 and has spread since into all of Eastern

Europe. Under the Soviet system, the buyer is gen erally required to limit himself to credit equalling not

more than four months average wages. The payments are collected directly from his employer who acts as the

guarantor of the debt. The down payment must cov er not less than 25 per cent of the total price and ser vice charges are quite low, not exceeding 2 per cent for a debt extending over 12 months.

In Romania, which is in some respects the least lib eral of the satellites, down payments range up to 40 per cent and repayment is required in 6 months. In Poland, where even automobiles can be purchased on

credit, the terms are more liberal and average consum er debts are extended 19 months.

One notable result of these policies has been stimu lation of manufacture of consumer goods in each of the satellite nations. Televison sets, refrigerators, wash

ing machines and radios are being produced in increas

ing volume in each of the satellite nations, with East

Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland leading in vol ume of production.

As a very personal footnote on the matter of credit, I can report with satisfaction that an American can

buy dinner with his Diner's Club credit card in Brat islava, Czechoclovakia, reflecting the fact that thous ands of American tourists have penetrated the Iron

Curtain.

Tourism, with or without credit, is another big factor in both the economic and ideologic reorientation of the

Eastern European states. More than one million tour ists visited Bulgaria in 1966 and about half of them

were from the West. One and a half million Hungar ians traveled abroad last year, 100,000 of them to the

West. The contacts made and information exchanged and new interests aroused by such travel will contribute

immensely, I believe, to the gradual erosion of barriers between East and West.

On the heels of tourism comes trade, and there is much evidence that the countries of Eastern Europe want to increase their trade with the West. One sym bol of American commercial penetration to date which

particularly struck me was the availability of Coca Cola in Bulgaria. However, Coca Cola is really only a sym bol of what might be, because our trade with the satel lite nations is lamentably low. A major impediment in each case is the absence of non-discriminatory or so called-most-favored-nation tariff or trading treatment, by which we would assure each of the satellite nations that it could trade with us on the same terms we ex tend to our most-favored trading partners.

An interesting case in point is that of Romania which more than any other satellite nation is displaying a

policy of nationalistic independence which borders on

open defiance. Her trade with the Soviet Union has

steadily decreased, and she seeks new trading partners

May-June, 1968 23



in the West; already 30 per cent of her trade is with Western Europe. But Romania's trade with the United States is infinitesimal. As in other satellite countries, the lack of most-favored nation privileges is a serious

?if not fatal?barrier. There are other special prob lems in the case of Romania, for Romanian officials consider that they burnt their fingers badly in their ne

gotiations with the Firestone Company several years ago for the construction of two synthetic rubber plants.

Firestone later withdrew from the negotiations because of pressure from a competitor, pressure which was ex

erted through a campaign which appealed to emotion al anticommunism. As a result, Romania will be chary of such negotiations in the future.

Turning briefly away from the field of economics, I should like to conclude this survey of the new era in the evolution of Communism by taking note of some other

changes in orientation which strike me as particularly significant.

One general observation derived from my most re

cent tour of the area is that political oppression has

significantly declined. Even in Hungary, where the abortive revolt of 1956 is still a very real memory, the

reign of terror is over. The police no longer knock on

the door at midnight to arrest and torture citizens who run afoul of the regime. And political opponents no

longer fear execution and exile. Repression is still a

fact of life, but it is less obvious, less direct and less brutal. As Communism in Eastern Europe mellows

and enters the era of convergence, the most obvious

techniques of regimentation are falling into disuse.

Another very significant fact, I believe, is that the

Catholic Church is retaining its strength in Eastern

Europe and in some cases even improving its position. It is an interesting fact that in many of the Com

munist countries of Eastern Europe the churches and the clergy are directly supported and subsidized by the state. This results from the fact that the Com

munist regime, in the first instance, deprived the church es of the lands and properties which for so long had been their source of support and financial independ ence. Subsequently, the Communist governments in

several instances launched on a clear policy of caesaro

papism, which simply means using the church for pur

poses of the state. The process has also been describ

ed as a kind of onesided separation of church and

state, in which the churches have no right to interfere

with the political life of the country, but there is no

prohibition against government intervention with the

affairs of the church.

My impression is that this process has been carried to greater extremes, as we might expect, in those coun

tries which historically had a greater commitment to

national Orthodox churches than to Roman Catholi

cism and allegiance to the Pope. In the Socialist Re

public of Romania, for example, the salaries and sub sidies paid by the government may be suspended if there is eveidence of "undemocratic attitudes" on the

part of the clergy. Also, the government may simply annul the appointment of clergymen and teachers at

religious institutions "in the interest of public order or

UNE VILLANELLE ANCIENNE

Like the bright fishes from water, my heart

Leaps in its net at his footsteps, and it seems With hidden birds in a thicket, my tongue

Grows still at his speaking, forgets its art. What time have I to wonder what love means? Like the bright fishes from water, my heart

Comes swift in his coming, spangled with sun. Do not ask me even what words he speaks; With hidden birds in a thicket, my tongue

Sings a full eloquence that none may mark.

Together we touch. As we touch and meet, Like the bright fishes from water, our hearts,

Our fingers like butterflies, wriggling sums, Our bodies slick snakes, from old skins set free, Hidden with birds in a thicket, our tongues.

Soon, all things being done, after we part, I doze at his still side still, where I dream

Like the bright fishes from water, my heart, With hidden birds in a thicket, my tongue.

State security." It is worth noting, too, that the salaries

paid the clergy in Romania are non-competitive, with salaries for parish clergy in the range of $28 a month,

which is less than the pay of a construction worker. A

bishop might make as much as $70 a month. In Bulgaria, the national Orthodox church received

government subsidy until the early 1950's when the

payments were suspended and the government appar ently launched on a course designed to virtually elimi nate the practice of religion. The Holy Synod of the

Bulgarian Orthodox Church subsequently reported that its support was based almost wholly on the sale of candles. In 1963 the government added an administra tive blow by decreeing that Sunday was to be a regular

workday and that different days of the week were to be designated as days of rest in the different adminis trative districts of the country. Bulgaria is thus the ex treme example of state domination of religious activ

ity in Eastern Europe. In the Roman Catholic countries of Eastern Europe,

the evidence seems to be that the practice of state

subsidy has been resorted to as a necessity because the Church fulfilled such an important role, but that the

imposition of caesaropapism has been much less com

plete and much less effective. In Poland, for example, the clergy received stipends paid from the income ob tained from confiscated church property. They also are

paid fees for the performance of religious services in state facilities, such as hospitals, prisons and sanatori ums. But when the Church attempts to collect its tri bute in return, in the form of bureaucratic interference in the training of the clergy, it encounters the contin

uing outspoken opposition of the Church's heroic lead

er, Cardinal Wyszynski. In Czechoslovakia, the state has succeeded perhaps




A SUNDAY DRIVE

The cattails are blown. Leaves cry in the vent, Let me in! Let me in! Or else let me out?

Do not let me die As I am. The earth turns killer.

Who has given

All summer, all spring Gives no more?

Only these days Of illusion,

These dry turns In a golden vise.

Kate Franks

KATE FRANKS, born in Lisbon, Iowa, attended Vassar Col

lege and Stanford University, before enrolling in the Writers

Workshop at 7he University of Iowa.

to a slightly greater extent. It has made the Church

depend almost wholly on the government for economic

support and in return the state controls the number of persons permitted to study for the priesthood and exercises veto power over clerical appointments. But there has been a relaxation of state regimentation in re

cent years to the extent that some of the Czech bish

ops were permitted to attend the Vatican Council. A

Czechoslovakian Cardinal, Dr. Josef Beran, and sev eral other bishops and clergymen have been freed from

long political imprisonment, and the government has concluded a protocol with the Vatican in which it form

ally acknowledges the role of the Church.

In Hungary, which is the most eastern country in

Europe with a Catholic majority, the Church suffered renewed oppression following the abortive revolution of 1956, in which the clergy were accused of playing an important role. Now, however, the position of the

Church has improved since the signing of a protocol with the Vatican in 1964. Although Cardinal Mind

zenty is still a fugitive in the United States Embassy, the govenment permitted 14 clerics, including several

bishops, to leave the country to attend the Vatican Council. And I believe Cardinal Mindzenty would have been permitted to leave, too, if he had promised not to return. There is no overt oppression, although there is no question but the Church still must be responsive to State control. But, on balance, it seems to me the

Church has not lost ground, and in some cases, it has

clearly gained. These then are the high points of Eastern Europe

today: a Communist satellite zone in a condition of flux and change, as it enters a distinctly new phase of

idealogical evolution. Old techniques of repression have been abandoned, new recognition has been given to

normal aspirations and desires, new opportunities for trade and tourism present themselves, and an older

generation of doctrinaire Communists is yielding to a new wave of youth and experimentation.

How do we in the West react to these changes and what are their implications for the long-range evolu tion of East-West relations? It seems plain to me that

we have a great opportunity and that if we conduct ourselves with wisdom, imagination and restraint, we

perhaps will go a long way toward resolving the great ideological cold war of the twentieth century.

We have heard of the revolution of rising expecta tions in the developing countries of the world. The

Communist countries of Eastern Europe are caught, it seems to me, in a counter-revolution of rising expec tations.

All men have certain natural drives which, as we

have seen, in the political and economic spheres, in clude the desire for political expression, for human contact and for property. As standards of living im

prove in Eastern Europe, as adeqate housing, health care and education become generally available, as com

munication and direct exposure with Western societies increases through tourists who visit from the West, these drives become stronger. They force Communist

governments to change to adjust to these drives. The first demand may be freedom to choose one's work. The inevitable next step is freedom to choose how to

dispose of the gains of work?more choice, in other

words, in what to buy and where to travel. And event

ually, although this end is certainly not yet in sight, there will undoubtedly be a demand for freedom of choice in politics.

I am convinced, therefore, that time is on our side in Eastern Europe. The trend there is toward free dom?and not away from it. Communism is changing to accommodate this trend, changing more slowly in some countries?and more rapidly in others. It seems

obvious to me that we can best hasten this erosion within the Communist world by increasing contact at

every level, and in every sphere of activity, between the countries of the West and those of Eastern Europe.

Hopefully, we can and should pursue this policy with out being divertd too much by events in Asia.

There are some definite political steps which we

should be prepared to take in response to the situation. We already have taken one by ratifying the Soviet Con

vention, which might in time be a model for similar

agreements with the nations of Eastern Europe. And now we should enact legislation to promote East-West

trade, granting to the nations of Eastern Europe the

non-discriminatory, or so-called most-favored nation tariff treatment they so much desire.

There may be other clear opportunities for political and diplomatic action on our part as time goes on, par

ticularly if we are fortunate enough to be able to take

steps in such areas as arms control. But the essential,

continuing challenge is a philosophical one and it is one we will have learned to anticipate and respond to

effectively if we fully appreciate what is now trans

piring in Eastern Europe.

May-June, 1968 25



Documents

The Changing Face of Eastern Europe