The Early Buddhist Notion of the Middle Path Kalupahana1

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The Early Buddhist Notion of the Middle PathBy David J. Kalupahana

Eastern Buddhist SocietyVol. 12, Issue 1, 1979

The relationship between the earliest form of Buddhism and the various traditions thatdeveloped later has been a perennial problem in the history of Buddhist thought. As iswell known to students of Buddhist philosophy, the different schools of the Abhidharmaor scholastic tradition, in spite of rather significant doctrinal variations amongthemselves, all claimed to preserve the Buddha-word in its pristine purity. The Mah ynaschools, adopting philosophical standpoints very different from those of scholasticism,upheld the view that theirs represent the true teachings of the Buddha. Many a modernscholar, after aligning himself with one or the other of these later philosophicaldevelopments, has endeavored to draw a close relationship between the school he hasaccepted and early Buddhism. In the present paper, I propose to show that earlyBuddhism, as embodied in the Pali Nikyas and the Chinese gamas, which arerecognized by all the different schools as representing the earliest sources for the study ofBuddhism, is radically different from all these schools, at least as far as theirphilosophical content is concerned.

Even though some of the later developed schools did not recognize all the discoursesincluded in the Nikyas and the gamas as being authoritative, fortunately there is atleast one discourse that carried the stamp of authority so much that all schools ofBuddhism, both Hnayna and Mahyna, studied it with veneration and respect. This isacknowledged by even a prominent Mahyna philosopher like Candrakrti.1 Moreover,this discourse deals with the most fundamental doctrine in Buddhism and, therefore, anydifference that can be noted with regard to the interpretation of the ideas embodied here

would indicate the difference subsisting between the early and later forms of Buddhism.The discourse is known as Kaccyanagotta-sutta (Ngrjuna calls it Ktyyanvavda-stra) and is included in the Sayutta-nikya2 and the Tsa A-han Ching .3 Thetext of this discourse, as found in the Pali Nikyas, is as follows:

While the Exalted One was at Svatthi the venerable Kaccyana of that clan came tovisit him, and saluting him sat down at one side. So seated he asked the Exalted One,saying: 'Lord, we hear the phrase right view, right view. Now how far is there a rightview?

This world, Kaccyana, usually bases [its view] on two things: on existence (atthit)and on nonexistence (ntatthit). Now he, who with right insight sees the uprising of theworld as it really is, does not hold with the nonexistence of the world. But he, who withright insight sees the passing away of the world as it really is, does not hold with theexistence of the world.

The world, for the most part, Kaccyana, is bound by approach, attachment andinclination. And the man who does not go after that approach and attachment,determination of mind, inclination and disposition, does not cling to or take up the stand,


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[does not think] : This is my soul! who thinks: That which arises is just suffering,that which passes away is suffering, this man is not in doubt, is not perplexed.Knowledge herein is his, not merely other-dependent. Thus far, Kaccyana, he has rightview.

Everything exists (sabba atthi): this is one extreme. Everything does not exist(sabbantatthi): this is the other extreme. Not approaching either extreme the Tathgatateaches you a doctrine by the middle [way]: Conditioned by ignorance dispositions cometo pass; conditioned by dispositions is consciousness; conditioned by consciousness is thepsychophysical personality; conditioned by the psychophysical personality are the sixsenses; conditioned by the six senses is contact; conditioned by contact is feeling;conditioned by feeling is craving; conditioned by craving is grasping; conditioned bygrasping is becoming; conditioned by becoming is birth; conditioned by birth is decay-and-death, grief, suffering . . . even such is the uprising of this entire mass of suffering,But from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance (arises) ceasing of dispositions.and thus comes ceasing of this entire mass of suffering.

This discourse refers to two philosophical theories, existence or Being (atthit, Sk.astit, Ch. yu ) and nonexistence or non-Being (natthit, Sk. nstit, Ch. wu yu). There is no difficulty in identifying these two theories,

4The former is the

traditional Upaniadic doctrine according to which everything in this world is filled with(pra) with a reality which is the ultimate ground of existence (astitva). It is thepermanent, eternal and substantial self, variously known as tman or Brahman. Hencethe Buddha's criticism that this theory of existence leads to the belief in permanence(sassata, Sk. avat, Ch. chang chu). The other is the doctrine of the Materialistswho, in spite of their doctrine of natural determinism (svabhva-vda), were consideredto be annihilationists (ucchedavdin) because they denied causality of moral behavior,

etc. Moreover, the Materialists also denied the existence of a reality of the sort theUpaniadic thinkers acknowledged, and hence were popularly known as nihilists(natthika-vda). The Buddha too, while refraining from criticizing their conception ofnatural determinism,

5rejected their theory as being, nihilistic primarily because of their

denial of free-will and moral responsibility. Buddhas reasons for rejecting both thesetheories seem to be extremely significant.

The two extremes of existence and nonexistence were rejected because they werecontrary to the perception of one who understands things as they are, namely, theperceptions of ceasing (nirodha) and arising (uppda) respectively. Arising and ceasing,no doubt, are empirical facts and, therefore, the argument for the rejection of the twoextremes is empirical. Not only did the Buddha resort to empirical arguments for therejection of the two metaphysical extremes, but also he replaced them with an empiricistview. Thus, the middle path (majjhim paipad, Sk. madhyam pratipat, Ch. chungtao) between the two extremes of existence and nonexistence is presented as

causation or dependent arising (paiccasamuppda) which explains the patternaccording to which things in the world arise and pass away. The conception ofdependence (prattya) enabled the Buddha to avoid the two metaphysical assumptionsregarding causation, namely, (a) the potential existence of the effect in the cause, hence


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the substantial connection between them or (b) the potential nonexistence of the effectand hence the absence of any connection between the cause and the effect.

There cannot be any controversy regarding the message of the discourse. It is astraightforward and unequivocal statement of an empiricist theory of causation which

steers clear of two metaphysical ideas of substantial permanence on the one hand, andnihilistic impermanence on the other. The theory of dependence, in such a context,explains the causal relationship among impermanent factors of existence.

This was the middle path the Buddha claimed he discovered under the Bodhi-tree.It was this philosophical middle position that was the basis of the ethical path ofmoderation between the two extremes of self-mortification and self-indulgence thatconstitute the subject of his first discourse theDhammacakkapavattana-sutta.6 In theearly discourses, this middle path was never explained as something indefinable(anirvacanya) or as indescribable (avcya) in any way. The only remark made is that itis beyond the sphere of logic (atakkvacara, Sk. atarkvacara), but for very specificreasons. It was a doctrine deep, difficult to perceive, difficult to comprehend, buttranquil, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible to the learned, yet a matter noteasily understood by those delighting in attachment, those rejoicing in attachment.7 Theargument seems to be that if a person is excessively attached to a certain theory, noamount of logic or dialectic could convince him of the truth of any other theory. Hence,to those recluses and brahmans deeply immersed in metaphysical views (dihi, Sk. di,Ch. chien ), dependent arising or causal happening (paiccasamuppda) was adifficult doctrine to accept. So much for the middle path in early Buddhism.

The scholastic traditions which developed theories of moments (kaa) and atoms(paramu) were faced with the rather difficult task of explaining causal continuity.8 Oneof the ways in which the scholiasts tried to resolve the problem of the continuity of the

discrete momentary phenomena (dharma) was by accepting the dualistic theory ofsubstance (svabhva) and qualities (lakaa). They upheld that the qualities were in astate of flux, changing every moment, while the substance remained unchangedthroughout the three periods of timepast, present and future. This came to be knownas the theory of everything exists (sarvam asti) which was upheld by theSarvstivdins. It may be noted that this very same theory constituted one of the extremesreferred to and criticized by the Buddha in the Kaccyanagotta-sutta. The Sautrntikascertainly spared no pains in refuting this doctrine of substance (svabhva) which theyequated with the idea of soul or self (tman).9

How did the Sarvstivdins counter this criticism? Naturally, by reinterpreting the

implications of the Kaccyanagotta-sutta. In the Vibhprabhvtti, a commentary ontheAbhidharmadpa that was written in order to explicate the genuine Sarvstivda pointof view in opposition to the ideas expressed in the Abhidharmakoa with its Sautrntikaleanings, we find this reevaluation of theKaccyanagotta-sutta.10 Here the author pointsout that in the discourse the Buddha taught a middle path according to which (1) allcomponent things (samskr) are empty (ny) of falsely conceived notions such asperson (puua) or receptacle consciousness (laya-vijna) and other suchimaginations, and (2) all component things are not empty and nonempty (any) of


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specific and general characteristics (svasmnyalakaa). This implies that therecognition of a reality such as person (purua) posited by the Skhya school or bythe personalists (pudgalavdin) of the Buddhist tradition or receptacle consciousness(laya-vijna) of the Yogcrins would contribute to a theory of permanent existence(astitva) and a denial of specific and general characteristics (svasmaanyalakaa) of

dharmas, as admitted by the Sarvstivdins, would lead to nihilistic nonexistence(nstitva).

Specific characteristic (svalakaa) of a dharma is identified with substance(dravya, svabhva) which was looked upon by the Sarvstivdins as ultimate reality(paramrtha sat).11 When the Mdhyamikas rejected substance (svabhva) as anultimate reality, they were certainly rejecting the Sarvstivda conception of dharma.12It is therefore easy to see that in the eyes of the Sarvstivdins the doctrine ofemptiness (nyat) of the Mdhyamikas was none other than a theory of nonexistenceor nihilism (nstitva). Thus, for the Sarvstivdins, the two extremes mentioned in theKaccyanagotta-sutta are the Yogcra theory of receptacle consciousness (laya-vijna) and the Mdhyamika conception of emptiness (nyat).

Although the Sarvstivdins made a determined attempt to distinguish their doctrinesfrom those of the Skhya, Yogcra and Mdhyamika, yet the recognition of anenduring substance (svabhva, dravya, svalakaa) as the ultimate reality of things(dharma) as opposed to their phenomenal characteristics (lakaa orsmnyalakaa)placed them on the side of the substantialists (sad-vad).13 For this reason, theirdoctrine of causation through substance (svabhva) was not at all different from theidentity theory of causation (satkryavda) of Skhya.14 True, the Sarvstivdinsrecognized the theory of causation with twelve factors, as is done in the Kaccyanagotta-sutta, but their theory is so closely associated with the conception of substance that it isno longer the empirical doctrine of causation in early Buddhism but a metaphysical view

of the extreme form.

In contrast, the Sautrntikas, while upholding a theory of moments (kaa),vehemently denied the existence of any substance or substratum (svbhva ordravya).The Sautrntikas, who refused to recognize two separate moments, static (sthiti) anddecay (jar), but considered them to be one characteristic (ekam eva lakaam),15certainly would not accept the concept of specific characteristic (svalakaa) whichwas identified with the permanent and eternal substance (svabhva, dravya). But asempiricists who recognized the nonconceptual grasp of the external objects at the firstmoment of perception (pratyaka), they upheld, or, at least, spoke of specificcharacteristics (svalakaa)16 without identifying them with substance (svabhva). (This

confirms our view, stated earlier, that for the Sarvstivdins, the nihilists nstikawere represented by the Mdhyamikas, and not the Sautrntikas.)

The Sautrntika denial of substance (svabhva) should have made them the faithfulrepresentatives of early Buddhism hence their claim to be the upholders of thetradition of the discourses (strapramik).17 They were, no doubt, nonsubstantialists.But, unfortunately, their theory of non-substantiality (antmavda, nisvabhvavda)was presented in the background of a metaphysical theory of moments and hence they


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were unable to account for causality (prattyasamutpda). This theory of discretemomentary phenomena compelled them to accept a causal principle which involvedmetaphysical assumptions. They maintained that a nonexistent phenomenon arises duringone moment and passes away into nonexistence during the next, without enduring evenfor one moment, because it has no substantial existence.

18This view shared all the salient

features of the nonidentity theory of causation (asatkryavda) of the Vaieika school.Not only did the theory fail to account for the momentary arising of the effect, but also itimplied the complete annihilation (vinaa) of the effect immediately after its arising.Thus, while the Sarvstivda attempt to explain causation in the background of a theoryof moments led them to a substantialist position, the Sautrntika doctrine ofnonsubstantiality (antma, nisvabhva) placed them in the position of annihilationists(ucchedavd).

It is now possible to examine the middle path as enunciated in the Mdhyamikaschool of Buddhism. The doctrines of the two Abhidharma schools, Sarvstivda andSautrntika, undoubtedly served as the immediate philosophical background ofMdhyamika thought. Although these two schools with their theories of causationprovided the setting necessary for the Mdhyamika dialectic, Mdhyamika philosophyshould not be considered a mere reaction to these two schools. On the contrary, thisschool at least in its undeveloped form, had independent existence before Ngrjunaorganized it into a coherent system. This undeveloped stage is represented by thePrajpramit literature, and especially by the Vajracchedik-prajpramit.

Here we need to digress a little from the discussion of the middle path. The conceptof Buddha is the most important topic of discussion in the Prajpramit literature.Buddha Gotama was a historical person. The discourses of the Pali Nikyas and theChinese gamas afford us ample evidence of that.19 He influenced the life and thought ofthe people of India during his time to such an extent that superhuman qualities came to be

attributed to him, not only after his death but even while he was alive. These qualities intellectual, moral and even physicalsoon raised him to the position of a divine being(deva) in the eyes of his followers. The result was that the followers themselves becamepuzzled as to the real nature of the Buddha's personality. When the question regarding theBuddha's personality was raised, the Buddha himself answered that he was neither a man(manussa), nor a water spirit (gandhabba), not a powerful demoniac spirit (yakkha), noreven a god (deva) or a Brahma, but that he was only a Buddha.

20Similar questions were

being raised even two centuries after his death, during the reign of Aoka, the Maurya, inthe third century B.C.

21Thus, it became one of the most important and relevant topics of

discussion in the history of Buddhist thought.

The passing away of the Buddha created a big vacuum in the lives of his followersand admirers. The Mahparinibbnasuttanta which relates the incidents in the last daysof the Buddha's life seems to indicate this. To perpetuate the memory of the Buddha, theBuddha himself recommended to his followers four places of pilgrimage.

22The desire of

the faithful followers to have the Buddha as an object of worship contributed to thedevelopment of the conception of an eternal spiritual body (dharmakya) of the Buddha.


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In the Pali Nikyas and the Chinese gamas, the question whether the Buddha existsafter death was regarded as a metaphysical question and was left unanswered. It was leftunanswered not because, as some Buddhist scholars seem to think, the Buddha continuedafter death in a transcendental form, hence indefinable and indescribable, but becausethere was no way of knowing (na pamam atthi) on the basis of personal experience

whether he continues or not.

23

But in the Mahyna tradition, especially as embodied intexts like Mahvastu, Lalitavistara and Saddharmapuarka-stra, Buddha came to belooked upon as one who remained forever (sad sthita),24 and hisparinirva came to beconsidered a mere illusion.

25The Buddha became a supramundane and immortal person.

His body (rupakya) could not represent his real nature. Therefore, the Vajracchedikmaintains: The Tathgata is not tobe recognized by means of the marks on his body.26The real body of the Buddha is the spiritual body (dharmakya). The Buddha's real bodyis not only spiritual but cosmic as well. While the spiritual body is identified with all the

constituents of the universe (sarva-dharma), it is also considered to be the same as theultimate (tathat). Running through the entire Prajpramit literature is the conflictbetween the nondual (advaya) absolute reality, the dharmakya, and the pluralisticphenomenality. To resolve this conflict we find the Vajracchedik adopting the allimportant standpoint that ultimate reality is beyond description.

This digression from the discussion of the middle path is necessary to understand theMdhyamika position. The Mdhyamikas, as their name implies, claim to follow themiddle path. But the first Mahyna text which refers to the middle path and which isoften quoted by the Mdhyamikas themselves is theKyapaparivarta of theRatnaka-stra. It is a formative text of the Mahyna school that came to be looked upon withgreat respect by most Mahyna teachers and represents, according to our understanding,a statement of the transition from early Buddhism to Mdhyamika. Here we come acrosswhat appears to be two versions of the Kaccyanagotta-sutta, but with a differentinterlocutor. Kyapa. One of these versions is more faithful to the originalKaccyanagotta-sutta. It reads:

[Everything] exists. Kyapa, is one extreme. [Everything] does not exist,Kyapa, is the second extreme. In between these two extremes, Kyapa, is the middlepath, because it is the correct perception of things ....

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The middle path is further defined in terms of the twelvefold chain of causation in itsprogressive and regressive orders. By preserving this version, the Kyapaparivarta,though an extremely important Mahyna text, seems to vouch for the authenticity of theKaccyanagotta-sutta as found in the Pali Nikyas and the Chinese gamas. Here, as inthe Nikya and gama statement, the two metaphysical theories are rejected and a middle

position embodying a causal description of the phenomenal world is presented.

The second version found in the Kyapaparivarta, though dealing with a middlepath between two extremes, is very different from the above. This statement reads:

Self (tma), Kyapa. is one extreme. No-self (nairtmya) is the second extreme.In between these two extremes is the middle position that is formless, nonindicative,


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supportless, noumenal, signless and nonconceptual. This, Kyapa, is called the middlepath, the correct perception of things.

28

Although the two extremes, self and no-self may relate to the two extremes,existence and nonexistence mentioned in the Kaccyanagotta-sutta, yet the statement as

such is conspicuous by its absence in the Nikyas and the gamas. There is no doubt thatthis second version is an innovation attempting to explain the development of thedoctrine. While the Hindu schools as well as Sarvstivda accepted a theory of self(tma) or something bordering on a theory of self, the Sautrntika school of Buddhismadamantly held on to a theory of no-self (nairtmya or nisvabhva). Naturally, theMahyna doctrine of ultimate reality, equated in the early Mahyna with the Buddha'sspiritual body, had to represent the middle position. But this middle position is notphenomenal. It is transcendental; hence the use of the negative characteristics to describeit.

In theMlamadhyamakakrik, Ngrjuna refers to theKtyyanvavda-stra (i.e.,Kaccyanagotta-sutta) and maintains that in this context the Buddha rejected the twoextremes of existence (asti) and nonexistence (nsti).29 A faithful disciple likeCandrakrti was, therefore, compelled to look at this Ktyyanvavda-stra. Afterobserving that this discourse is studied in all the schools of Buddhism, he quotes a sectionof the Kaccyanagotta-sutta in some original version (not in the Kyapaparivartaversion mentioned above).

30But when he had to comment on the middle path he ignores

all the versions which refer to the twelve-fold formula of causation and switches on to thesecond version from the Kyapaparivarta that has very little in common with theKaccyanagotta-sutta and which describes the middle path in negative terms.31

The Kyapaparivarta, therefore, is an invaluable text that explains one of mostcontroversial subjects in the history of Buddhist thought, namely, the transition from

early Buddhism to Mahyna. While preserving a statement of an empirical theory ofcausation presented in the background of two metaphysical ideas, it also puts forward aconception of a linguistically transcendent middle path, thereby relating itself to thePrajpramit doctrine of the indefinable and indescribable ultimate reality.

Let us examine this transcendentalism in more detail. Transcendentalism, aspointed out earlier, developed gradually in the Mahyna tradition in connection with theconception of Buddha and reached its culmination in the Prajpramit literature. On theother hand, the Abhidharma scholiasts, engrossed with the doctrines of moments andatoms, presented metaphysical theories of causation in their attempt to explain thephenomenal world. Both these trends convinced Ngrjuna of the futility of depending on

linguistic conventions (savti) as a means of explaining reality (paramrtha), except asa means of an end.

TheMlamadhyamakkarik represents one determined attempt to deny the reality ofarising (utpda) and ceasing (nirodha). This seems to have been necessary if one were tohold on to the Mahyna conception ofdharmakya as the eternal and permanent reality,also known as tathat, paramrtha sat, etc. Fortunately, for Ngrjuna, theSarvstivdins and the Sautrntikas have created the conflict in reason by explaining


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causality in such a metaphysical way that he either had to accept arising (utpda) ofthings on the basis of an underlying substance or substratum (svabhva) (i.e., thesatkrya-vda of the Sarvstivdins) or was compelled to deny a substance and thereforearising too (i.e., the logical conclusion of the Sautrntika asatkryavda). The theory ofmoments did not permit Ngrjuna to accept arising and passing away without positing a

substance.

Not only was he unable to explain arising and passing away, he was not in a positioneven to accept relativity as embodied in the statement: When this exists, that exists(asmin satdam bhavati).32 This means causation of any sort could not be explainedwithout falling into one of the two extremes, existence and nonexistence. It is thisselfsame idea that Candrakrti was attempting to substantiate by repeatedly quoting aquatrain from what was known to him asAnavataptahdpasakramaa-stra:

Whatever is born of causes is unborn for it has no arising through substance. Thatwhich is dependent on causes is empty. He who understands emptiness is diligent.

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This is supplemented by two quotations, (a) from the Majurpripcch and (b)from ryadhyyitamui-stra. These quotations are found at the end of his commentaryto the very important chapter of the Krikon the Examination of the Noble Truths(ryasatyapark).34 Both quotations explain the manner in which one should try tocomprehend the four Noble Truths. The latter maintains:

By him, Majur, who has seen all dharmas as unborn, unsatisfactoriness isunderstood. For him who has seen all dharmas as unproduced arising is eliminated. By

him who has seen all dharmas as completely extinguished nirvana is realized. By himwho has seen all dharmas as absolutely empty the path has been cultivated.

This is the very opposite of the argument in the early discourses where things wereconsidered to be unsatisfactory primarily because they are impermanent (anicca), whichis a synonym for arising and passing away (uppdavaya).35 As the eight negationsindicate, not only arising (utpda) and ceasing (nirodha), but also permanence (vata)and annihilation (uccheda), identity (ekrtha) and difference (nnrtha), coming (gama)and going (nirgama) are concepts not applicable to reality.

36Thus not only the

metaphysical concepts like permanence and annihilation, but even nonmetaphysicalconcepts like arising and ceasing cannot be applied to reality. The Prajpramitdoctrine of the indescribability of ultimate reality finds perfect philosophical justificationhere. The nature and function of language appear in a different light. Conventional terms(sammuti), which in early Buddhism were symbols agreed upon by popular consent to

denote the various experiences or combinations of experiences, are now looked upon asdeceptive veils (varaa) concealing in every way (samantd) the true nature of things:hence savti.37 Even the dichotomy between knowledge and the object of knowledge(jnajeya) (not subject and object) is valid only at this level. Ultimate reality is freefrom such dichotomy.

38This ultimate reality (paramrtha) is independent, peaceful,

nonconceptual, and is to be experienced (vedya not known, jeya) for or withinoneself (pratytma) by the wise one. It cannot be indicated [as this or that] nor can it beknown (najyate).39


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Thus, the Mdhyamikas deny the ability to know ultimate reality as an objectivephenomenon. The dichotomy between knowledge and the known is emphatically denied.But the possibility of realizing the nature of ultimate reality within oneself is recognized.This seems also the conclusion of the very important chapter on the Examination ofElements (Dhtupark) of the Mlamadhyamakakrik which emphasizes the

pacification of the object (draavya-upasama),40

rather than the pacification of views(diupasama), implying thereby that the latter could not be achieved without achievingthe former. This also explains the basic difference between early Buddhism andMdhyamika thought as far as another of the important concepts is concerned, namely,the concept ofpapaca.

The term papaca in early Buddhism is understood as obsession. Hence,papacupasama as a definition of nibbna implies pacification of all obsessions. Aperson who has eliminated these obsessions can continue not only to know things in theexternal world as they are (yathbhta) but also to use the linguistic conventions(sammuti) without overstepping their limits, i.e., without using them to designate thingsnot given in experience. For example, he will be able to use the term self ( atta, Sk.tman) as a reflexive pronoun without implying by this the existence of a transempiricalentity, permanent and eternal. This is because he has eliminated the root of all obsessions,namely, craving (tah). Hence, papacavpasama becomes a synonym for dihi-vpasama, pacification of all views, where dihi refers to the manner of seeing. Forthis purpose it is not necessary to attain draavyopasama or pacification of the object,i.e., the complete elimination of the object from one's understanding. But in theMdhyamika system, since there is a recognition of an ultimate reality (paramrtha)which is nonconceptual (nirvikalpa) as opposed to the conventional (savti), papacacomes to mean conceptual proliferation. For this reason, the Mdhyamikas will not beable to entertain the very idea of object, hence draavyopasama. It is extremelysignificant to note that this pacification of the object is presented by Ngrjuna as amiddle position between the two extremes of existence (astitva) and nonexistence(nstitva). How far this position is related to the Yogcra standpoint that the object(lambana) is not real seems to be an interesting question.

In the light of what has been stated above, I propose to analyse the meaning andsignificance of theMlamadhyamakakrik statement of the middle path. It runs thus:

Whatever dependent arising is, that we call emptiness. That (i.e., emptiness) is adependent concept and that itself is the middle path.

(Ya prattyasamutpdanyat pracakmahe. S prajaptir updya pratipat

saiva madhyam)41

Candrakrti's assistance in unraveling the rather abstruse meaning of this quatrain isextremely valuable. We have already referred to the Mdhyamika argument that whateveris caused or is dependently arisen is really uncaused or unborn because it does not ariseas a result of substance (svabhvennutpatti). Causation cannot be explained withoutadmitting a substance. But a substance does not exist in reality. Therefore, causation ordependent arising is empty. But what about this emptiness (nyat) itself? Is emptiness


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(nyat) an empty and misleading concept (savti), like substance (svabhva)? Thisis the last thing the Mdhyamikas would want to admit. In fact, a major portion of thechapter on The Examination of the Noble Truths (ryasatyapark) is devoted to arefutation of the view that emptiness (nyat) is nothingness or nihilism(nstitva). Thus, the Mdhyamikas are forced to accept at least one concept that is

dependent or denotative (updya prajapti), and that is nyat. nyat is not amere empty concept (savti) but the ultimate truth (paramrtha satya), and therefore,the use of the term updya prajapti instead ofsavti to refer to it (although of course,the terms sammuti, in its original meaning, andpaatti were used synonymously in earlyBuddhism). It is identical with tathat, dharmakya, Buddha, and evenprattyasamutpda (in spite of the earlier criticism), all of which were transcendental andhence described in negative characteristics only. It is also what has to be experienced orfelt (vedya) for oneself (pratytman) with the attainment of perfect enlightenment(samyaksambodhi).

Does this mean that emptiness (nyat) is substantial? The Mdhyamika reply willcertainly be in the negative. Emptiness is not substantial in the same way as substance issubstantial. Similarly, emptiness is not empty in the same way as substance is empty.Emptiness is empty of conceptual proliferation (papacanya) and, therefore,nonconceptual (nirvikalpa). This is the significance of another oft-quoted statementdefining ultimate reality:

Independent, peaceful, conceptually nonproliferated, nonconceptual, nondiversifiedthis is the characteristic of reality (tattva).

Aparapratyaya nta aprapacita nirvikalpa annrtham etat tattvasyalakaa.42

Now we are in a position to analyse the nature of the middle path (madhyampratipat) referred to in the quatrain quoted earlier. Of the two extremes, there seems to bedifficulty in identifying the first, i.e., existence (astitva). For Ngrjuna and for all theMaadhyamikas, existence meant the existence of a substantial entity (an tma orsvabhva) in phenomena (dharma). Nonexistence (nstitva), therefore, would mean theabsence of any such substantial entity, in other words, absolute nonexistence or nihilism.The middle path that steers clear of these two extremes is, therefore, the reality (tathat,paramrtha sat) that transcends all linguistic expression (savti). This explains theMdhyamika, or even the Mahyna, characterization of the middle path with negativeepithets such as formless, nonindicative, supportless, noumenal, signless, nonconceptual.This is not at all different from the philosophy of the Prajpramit which emphasizes

the linguistic transcendence of ultimate reality (paramrthasatya).

T.R.V. Murti is credited with having written the most authoritative account ofMdhyamika philosophy. His interpretation, therefore, has in some way or otherinfluenced the understanding of the doctrines of this school. Unfortunately, in spite of theexcellent analysis of Mdhyamika ideas by Murti, one mistaken interpretation on his parthas prevailed in the Western understanding of Mdhyamika philosophy. The mistakeninterpretation is of the following quatrain:


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Existence and nonexistence are two extremes.Purity and impurity - these too are extremes.Therefore, having given up the two extremes.The wise one takes no position in the middle.

Astti nstti ubhe pi antsuddhasuddhti ime 'pi anttasmd ubhe anta vivarjayitvmadhye 'pi sthna na karoti paita.43

The conclusion which Murti arrives at on the basis of this statement is expressed inthe following quotation: It may be thought that in avoiding the two extremes, the

Mdhyamika takes a middle position in between the two. No; he does not hold anymiddle position. Or, the middle position is no position;...

44this analysis seems to be the

basis of the very popular view: Mdhyamika position is no position.

Unfortunately, Murti's seems to be a rather strange conclusion. To say that one should

give up two extremes and also the middle position is not tantamount to saying there is no

middle position. If it does, it certainly seems to be a confusion ( viparysa) not only oflinguistic usage but also of logic. It is one thing to say that one should not grasp on to a

middle position; yet another to say that there is no middle position. In fact, strange as it

may seem, Murti himself then goes on to say, on the basis of the passages from theKyapaparivarta and the Mdhyamikavtti quoted earlier, that the middle position istranscendental in that it is beyond concept and speech.

45This interpretation of

Mdhyamika philosophy by Murti has caught the fascination of many a Western scholarwho got involved in the study of the Chinese Buddhist tradition, especially Chan or itsJapanese counterpart Zen. Chan is generally understood as denying any form of

transcendentalism even though it seems to contribute to a theory of linguistic

transcendence of ultimate reality. The influence of Mdhyamika thought on thedevelopment of Chan goes uncontroverted. Therefore, Murti's interpretation of

Mdhyamika philosophy as a doctrine of no position has received wide acceptance,especially because it harmonizes with the current interpretation ofChan.

In addition to the above unwarranted analysis of the Mdhyamika statement, theinterpretation of Mdhyamika philosophy as one of no position seems to stem from theundue emphasis on, or, more specifically, the wrong understanding of the purpose of, the

reductio ad absurdum (prsagika) method adopted by Ngrjuna. It is true that in therefutation of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence Ngrjuna utilized thereductio ad absurdum method of not accepting any one of the views, but merely using

one to refute the other. His use of this method was confined to a refutation of thephenomenal reality only. But he does not appear to have used it in order to reject the two

truths, phenomenal or conventional (savti) and ultimate (paramrtha), though these insome way may be taken to constitute two extremes like purity and impurity referredto in the above quatrain quoted from Candrakrti. On the contrary, he emphaticallyasserted the existence of ultimate reality or truth (paramrthasat), though he held it to bebeyond conceptual thinking. Everything else, existent or nonexistent, fall under thecategory of conventional (savti).


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In conclusion, it may be said that the last major school of Indian Buddhism

Yogcra as represented in the Madhyntavibhga (Examination of the Middle Path andthe Extremes) to Maitreya openly admitted the existence (sat) of the middle positionbetween the two extremes of existence (sat) and nonexistence (asat).

46Existence, for

them, was of constructive ideation (abhtaparikalpa, i.e., ideation with regard to

nonexistent phenomena). Nonexistence was of substance (dravya as svabhva). Inbetween these two extremes, says Vasubandhu in his Madhyntavibhgahaya, isexistence (sattva) of emptiness (nyat), which is the middle path between absoluteemptiness (ekntena nya) and absolute non-emptiness (ekntennya). This,according to Vasubandhu, is in conformity with the Prajpramit statements such as:All is neither empty nor nonempty.

47

This analysis of the middle path creates another problem. If absolute emptiness is one

extreme and absolute non-emptiness is another, what could be the middle position? TheMdhyamikas maintained that the middle position is nonconceptual and therefore,indefinable and indescribable. But for the Yogcrins, this is existence, i.e.,

transcendental existence (paramrtha sat). If so, what remains is the phenomenal whichthe Mdhyamikas had treated under the conventional (savti). For the Yogcrins, thisis not a sensible position, for the phenomenal is not always identical with the

conventional considered to be absolutely empty (nya). On the other hand, there areconventions that are absolutely empty, hence abhtaparikalpa, i.e., mere conceptualconstruction. There are, on the other hand, conventions that embody phenomenal reality.

This third level of truth or reality is substantial (dravyata sat), although it is not identicalwith the Sarvstivda substance (svabhva). It is comparable to the Sautrntikaconception of specific characteristic (svalakaa) (discussed above).48 The recognitionof this third level of truth or reality seems to have been prompted by the need to

accommodate the phenomenal reality which the Mdhyamikas denied when theyconsidered all concepts (except those such as nyat indicating the ultimate reality) tobe empty and unreal. Hence the Madhyntavibhga statement refers to the three degreesof truth (1)sat or existence, i.e., ultimate reality (paramrtha sat). (2) asat ornonexistence, i.e., emptiness with regard to substance (svabhva) or self (tman), i.e.,conceptual construction and (3)sator existence, i.e., existence of specific characteristics

(svalakaata sat). These were the very same degrees of truth embodied in the morepopular triple(l)the ultimate (parinipanna). (2) the conceptual (parikalpita) and (3)the relative (paratantra) respectively. This middle position is rather unique in that it is

not a middle position between two rejected extremes, but a third position.

These different interpretations of the middle path in the later Buddhist schools wouldcertainly enable the unprejudiced scholar to trace the manner in which the Buddhistdoctrine underwent development throughout the centuries since its first enunciation bySiddhrtha Gautama at Buddhyagay.

1Mdhyamikavtti (Madhyamakakriks), (abbr.MKV) ed. L. de la Valle Poussin, (St. Petersburg: TheImperial Academy of Sciences, 1903 - 13), p. 269: Ida ca stra sarvanikyeu pahyate.2Sayutta-nikya, ed. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, 1960), 2.16-17.


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37Ibid., p. 492.38Ibid., p. 493; See also p. 135.39Ibid.40Mlamadhyamakakrik 5.7.41Ibid. 24.18.42

Ibid. 18.9; See alsoMKV, 491, 493.43MKV,pp. 135. 270.44The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin), 1970, p. 129.45Ibid. Sec note 4.46Madhyntavibhga 1.2. SeeMadhyntavibhgabhya, ed. G. M. Nagao (Tokyo: Suzuki ResearchFoundation, 1964), p. 18. nanya npi cnya tasmt sarva vidhyate satvd asatvt satvc camadhyam pratipac ca s.47Madhyntavibhgabhya , p. 18.48Sakv, p. 524, Trividha hi Yogcrn sat, paramrtha savti-sat dravya-sac ca. Dravyatasvalakaata sad dravya-sad iti. Note the nonuse of the termsvabhva to define dravya, although,defining the Sarvstivda conception, Yaomitra (p. 529) said:svabhva evai svalakaa (See note11).

Documents

The Early Buddhist Notion of the Middle Path Kalupahana1