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Page 1: The Emergency of 1975

THE EMERGENCY OF 1975-1977

SUBJECT: Political Science – I

SUBMITTED TO: Mr. Harathi Vageeshan

SUBMITTED BY: Anindita Mukherjee

Roll Number: 2010 – 11

First Year, First Semester.

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF LEGAL SCIENCE AND RESEARCH UNIVERSITY OF LAW, HYDERABAD

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1

1.1 Research Methodology..........................................................................................................1

1.2 Research Plan.........................................................................................................................2

1.2.1. Aims and Objectives –...................................................................................................2

1.2.2 Scope and limitations –...................................................................................................2

1.2.3. Chapterization –.............................................................................................................2

2. THE FRAMERS’ RATIONALE........................................................................................................4

3. REASONS FOR THE PROCLAMATION............................................................................................6

4. NINETEEN MONTHS OF EMERGENCY........................................................................................10

5. EFFECTS OF THE EMERGENCY...................................................................................................13

6. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................15

BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................ii

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1. INTRODUCTION

26th June, 1975. By 0700 hours, the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, went on radio

to announce that she had imposed an State of Emergency due to a threat from dangerous forces,

within the nation, that were out to destroy the country.

This was a move that had immense consequences for India – the Democracy as well as

India – a body of people who, until the proclamation of a State of Emergency, had not seen such

deprivation of Fundamental Rights by the State except in movies of Nazi Germany.1

The motivations behind the proclamation were many, the aiding factors – just as

numerous – and the ramifications – even greater. While the two year period of Emergency has

often been described as the greatest crisis ever faced since Indian independence, it is both

unreasonable and simplistic to blame only one faction for its imposition or believe that only ill

came out of it.

In the 35th year since the imposition of Emergency, it is worthwhile to look objectively at

the circumstances that led to such a drastic measure as well as the results that flowed from it. In

this project the researcher aims to analyse the myriad causes behind the proclamation of

Emergency and the immediate as well as long term effects of the same on Indian society, the

legal sphere as well as Indian politics.

1.1 Research Methodology

The researcher has adopted the doctrinal form of research in completing this project. As

the project is primarily study on the Emergency of 1975, an instance in the modern history of

India, the doctrinal form of research was most appropriate. Several sources of information have

been perused from the NALSAR Law Library and from the Internet. The above category of

material consists of books by eminent authors, articles on the subject and newspaper reports.

Also, secondary soft copy sources of information have been perused from online databases such

as JSTOR and GoogleBooks. No part of this project is plagiarized and it is the original work of

the researcher.

1Coomi Kapoor, “Night of the Long Knives” in Indian Express, 25/06/2000. Link at: http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000713/e2.htm - Last Visited: 11/10/2010.

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1.2 Research Plan

1.2.1. Aims and Objectives –

Through this project the researcher aims to provide the reader with a brief overview of the

Emergency of 1975 – the causes, the period of Emergency as well as the effects. The researcher

shall attempt to analyse the period in the modern context therefore, bringing neutrality and

objectivity into the project.

1.2.2 Scope and limitations –

Within the scope of this project the researcher will discuss the various facets of the Emergency

of 1975, namely – the causes, the major policy decisions made during the period of Emergency,

the short term effects of these decisions, the next Government’s attempt to undo them and the

long term effects from a current perspective. Due to paucity of space and time and due to the

vastness of the subject and the unmitigated controversy surrounding it, the researcher has to

restrict herself to a preliminary analysis of the same.

1.2.3. Chapterization –

The researcher has divided the project into the following chapters.

Introduction: The introduction aims at giving a short estimate of the common perception

of the Emergency of 1975-77 and speaks of the fallacies of this perception. It provides

brief information regarding the basics of the topic along with an idea of what is to come.

The Framers’ Rationale: Discusses the Constitution Assembly Debates about the

Emergency Provisions enshrined in Articles 352 and 356 of the Indian Constitution. In

doing so, the researcher has attempted to highlight the expectations and misgivings of the

framers as well as see whether a situation like the Emergency was foreseen by them.

Reasons for the Proclamation: Gives an overview of the lead up to the proclamation of

Emergency by looking at the political as well as social condition at the time. Through

this, the researcher has tried to reason out the proclamation of Emergency

dispassionately.

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Nineteen Months of Emergency: Deals with the situation during the period that the

Emergency stayed in force and describes in detail the various policy decisions that were

made then as well as the violations of the State with regard to the rights of the people.

Effects: Goes over the effects of the proclamation of Emergency in 1975 and the

numerous landmark decisions (both political and legal) made during the 19 month period.

Also provides a modern perspective to the 1975-1977 period, making it not only a period

in the modern history of India but also an integral part of her present.

Conclusion - Finally the project is concluded with a concise summary of the various

facets of the Emergency along with the researcher’s views on the effects of it as seen in

India today.

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2. THE FRAMERS’ RATIONALE

Before one looks into the actual proclamation of the Emergency of 1975, it is imperative

that one examines the context in which the Articles that were invoked in doing so were framed.

The Emergency Articles were the subject of fierce debate in the Constituent Assembly and

several fears were brought up while the clauses in Article 3522 were being conceived.

While Article 352 was being discussed, there were two clear factions for and against the

great powers given to the Centre during the Declaration of an Emergency. One faction was of the

opinion that the Emergency clause was similar to provisions of the Weimar Constitution of the

Third Retch which was what Hitler exploited3. Also, at the time of the meeting of the Constituent

Assembly, the Weimar Constitution had been replaced by the Bonn Constitution which had no

such provisions. The fact that there was such great power given to the Centre was considered to

be a possible means of subversion of the Constitution4 and debate raged around the vague nature

of the term ‘internal disturbance’. It is interesting to note that the issue was mainly around the

lack of a clause binding the President to the Cabinet’s decision in this regard and, therefore, the

President would have unnatural powers that he/she could exercise as an individual5. Much of the

furore was quelled when the decision was made to bind the President to the Cabinet’s

assessment. The possibility of the Cabinet, in its entirety, giving rise to a dictatorship was not

one that the Constituent Assembly foresaw.

The other faction believed that it was essential, in a difference ridden nation like India, to

have greater powers given to the Centre for the welfare of the nation6. Also, given that the

Parliament consists of representatives from the states, they believed that there wasn’t any

requirement of apprehension with regard to the interest of the states being safe guarded. To quote

Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena, “I think this article gives you what we have wanted so far. We will

2 Article 275 of the Draft Constitution.3 Constituent Assembly Debate On 2 August, 1949, Volume IX, Link at: http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1655905/ - Last visited: 11/10/2010.4Constituent Assembly Debate On 4 August, 1949, Volume IX, Link at: http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1333892/ - Last visited: 11/10/2010.5 Supra, n.3.6Constituent Assembly Debate On 20 August, 1949, Volume IX, Link at: http://indiankanoon.org/doc/654563/- Last visited: 11/10/2010.

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have a strong Centre and in an emergency we shall be able to make a declaration of emergency

for the welfare and the defence of the State.”7

Another fact of interest it that a number of amendments were moved so as to limit the

period of Emergency until it was reasonably believed that the chances of it extending for

excessive periods of time had been reduced drastically8. Noticeably, the measures adopted did

not help in the face of a government aiming to extend the emergency indefinitely.

On the whole, the Emergency of 1975 was something that was seen as a possibility with

the given Article, but much hope was projected about the use of the Emergency Provisions only

in case of dire requirement. It is a subjective question as to whether the Emergency of 1975

qualifies as a situation of dire requirement.

7 Constituent Assembly Debate On 2 August, 1949, Volume IX, Link at: http://indiankanoon.org/doc/253809/ - Last visited: 11/10/2010.8 Supra, n.3 – quoting Shri H. V. Kamath.

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3. REASONS FOR THE PROCLAMATION

While events just prior to the 26th of June, 1975 did play a huge role in precipitating the

proclamation of Emergency on that fateful day, they weren’t the sole cause of the decision. To

understand the rationale behind the Emergency, it is essential to comprehend the situation in

which the nation was at that point as well as the mentality of the then Indian Prime Minister,

Indira Gandhi, and those in a position to influence her.9

The makers of the Indian Constitution translated the British Parliamentary system into the

Indian context, hoping to integrate a humongous population divided by caste, religion, language,

education and the like into a uniform voting public while the system that they emulated had

transformed over hundreds of years to include all those that it did, on the tiny Isles of the United

Kingdom.10 An ambitious dream, for sure. While a democratic set up requires the rule of law, the

Indian freedom struggle has imbued Indians with a method of protest that involved defiance and

a total disregard for law – Satyagraha. To make the switch from defiance of law to the

acceptance of it was a difficult process, with gheraos, bandh, rasta rokos becoming the normal

mode of protest (a matter of who can disrupt normal life most effectively) as opposed to the

constitutional mode of redressal. Dr. B.R.Ambedkar foresaw such eventualities and wound up

the debate on the draft constitution with a dire warning regarding the preference of civil

disobedience, satyagraha and non co-operation over constitutional methods of achieving one’s

objectives.11

In such a situation, the Congress Government won the elections of 1971. It is said that it

was won, practically, due to the charisma of Indira Gandhi and the radical and populist image

portrayed by her after the nationalisation of banks.12 Thus began the age of ‘nominated’ chief

ministers who won their seats based on the Gandhi charm and owed their positions not to the

9 Aaron S. Klieman, “Indira's India: Democracy and Crisis Government” in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 96, No. 2 (Summer, 1981), pp. 241-259 (p.244)10 P. N. Dhar, “Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy”, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1 st

Edition(2000), p.227 quoting Anthony Eden.11 Dr. B. R. Ambedkar in Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume XI as quoted in P. N. Dhar, “Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy”, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1st Edition(2000), p.230.12 P. N. Dhar, “Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy”, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1 st

Edition(2000), p.232

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strength they commanded in the State legislative parties but to the wishes of her high command.

This had a demoralising effect on the party.

The overwhelming support for the Congress in the party system left opposition parties

emasculated. Efforts were made to overthrow Congress governments by forging alliances based

on the common ‘Indira Hatao’ plan. However, the varied ideologies disallowed such alliances to

prosper. Thus opposition parties were left hounding after any opportunity to strike at the

government.13

The economic calamity that precipitated after the Bangaladesh crisis, the Indo-Pak war

and the consequent stoppage of US aid, the failure of summer and winter rains in 1972-1973

followed by the OPEC increase of the price of crude oil four-fold overnight and the consequent

rise in the price of all essential commodities distanced the Congress government from the good

will of the people.14

In the midst of all of this economic turbulence came large scale industrial unrest and a

wave of strikes.15 The 22 day long all-India Railway strike of 1974 is a fitting example of how

disruption of the normal life was seen as an apt method of achieving one’s ends. George

Fernandes’ call to workers to strike against the Government to fight for their wants went

something like this: “Realise the strength which you possess. ‘Seven days’ strike of the Indian

Railways – every thermal station in the country would close down. A ten days’ strike of the

Indian Railways – every steel mill in India would close down and the industries in the country

would come to a halt for the next twelve months. If once the steel mill furnace is switched off, it

takes nine months to re-fire. A fifteen days’ strike in the Indian Railways – the country will

starve.”16 This kind of political arm wrenching caused firm retaliation by the Government (and

critics as well as well-wishers of the then government agree that there was no other option)

which further alienated the workers from the Government.

13 Norman D. Palmer, “India in 1975: Democracy in Eclipse” in Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1975: Part II (Feb., 1976), pp. 95-110(p.95)14 Bipin Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee & Aditya Mukherjee, “India After Independence 1947-2000”, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2nd Edition(2000), p.246.15 Ibid, p.247.16 Supra, n 12, p.242 see fn. 3.

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It is the belief of a number in the academia and political arena that the Emergency of

1975 and the centralising tendency shown through it wasn’t a one-off incident. It was the

culmination of a trend that had manifested itself in Indian politics ever since independence was

achieved by India. Centralisation of authority comes, first, from the Constitution and next, from

the socialist tendencies of Nehru’s government, highlighted by his towering personality. Indira

Gandhi, in an attempt to create and maintain a populist image, turned to the concept of

committed bureaucracy and committed judiciary.17 At the same time, there existed Indira

Gandhi’s view that she was in a situation ‘surrounded by idiots’ 18 and statements like

“Sometimes, I feel that our parliamentary system is moribund. Everything is debated and debated

and nothing gets done” and “Sometimes I wish we had a real revolution, like France or Russia, at

the time of independence"19 highlight Indira Gandhi’s inherent desire to do something drastic and

make changes without necessarily following the set procedure. A small coterie of people led by

her son, Sanjay Gandhi, were soon seen to be taking major decisions and riding rough-shod over

a complacent parliament.

The immediate cause of the Emergency is, of course, stated to be the ‘extra-

constitutional’ challenge20 posed by the Nav Nirman21 movement in Gujarat and the Jayaprakash

Narayan led (and Nav Nirman motivated) movement in Bihar to displace the government22. The

movements reeked of utter disregard for any form of constitutionality and were, in the truest

sense, a depiction of all that Dr. B.R.Ambedkar foresaw of what could go wrong in case of

unconstitutional modes being preferred over a respect for the rule of law. On proclamation of

emergency, the Quakers sent Joe Elder to India to try to fathom why Indira Gandhi would

imprison Jayaprakash Narayan, a man who was closely allied with Nehru. He found it hard to

side with either, stating that JP’s ideas were rather naïve, untested and unconvincing and his

17 Granville Austin, “Working a Democratic Constitution”, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1 st Edition (1999), p. 298, fn.5 – quoting B. K. Nehru.18 Balraj Puri, “A Fuller View of the Emergency” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 30, No. 28 (Jul. 15, 1995), pp. 1736-1744.19 Interview with Ved Mehta in 1966 in Portrait of India.20 Ramachandra Guha, “INDIA AFTER GANDHI – The History of the World’s Largest Democracy”, Picador, Indian Edition (2008), p.494 – quoting Indira Gandhi’s interview in Sunday Times.21 The movement involved students in Gujarat agitating against increased mess charges in colleges. It was spurred on by politicians culminating in a demand for the resignation of the ministry. The Congress government, with a majority of 140 in a House of 168, was forced to resign due to strikes that took on a rather violent nature resulting in the death of 95 people and 933being injured.22 For further reference: supra, n.12, p.247-254.

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allies belied credibility (what with the amount of violence that became part and parcel of the

movement) while Indira Gandhi clearly over reacted in imposing emergency to counteract such a

movement.23

With regard to Indira Gandhi, the person, the Emergency proclamation can also be seen

as the precipitation of a personal crisis. The decision by Justice Jagmohan Sinha of the Allahabad

High Court to set aside her election to the Lok Sabha on grounds of electoral malpractices came

as a red letter day for all opposition leaders24. The Times compared this decision to one

attempting to depose a leader on a traffic ticket25. Regardless of Mrs. Gandhi’s right to appeal at

the Supreme Court, the pressure mounted for her to resign from the post of Prime Minister and

exactly a fortnight after the announcement of the decision in the Raj Narain case, India was

declared to be in a state of emergency.

It is evident, therefore, that the rationale behind the proclamation of emergency is quite

complex and to point fingers at one or the other cause would be a futile exercise.

23 Ramachandra Guha, “INDIA AFTER GANDHI – The History of the World’s Largest Democracy”, Picador, Indian Edition (2008), p.497, see end note 7.24 State of U.P. v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 86525 Supra, n.12, p.301.

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4. NINETEEN MONTHS OF EMERGENCY

The first impact of the Emergency was the lock up of all dissenting parties. Across India,

people who spoke up against the government were picked up and jailed.26 Thousands of people

were arrested under MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act) that was supposedly meant for

smugglers and black-marketeers27 so much so it came to be called the Maintenance of Indira and

Sanjay Act by its victims.28

With all the opposition MPs locked up, the chance to make changes undeterred was

exploited by the Gandhi government to the hilt. The 38th Amendment29 passed on 22 July 1975

barred judicial review of the emergency. The 39 th Amendment stated that the election of the

prime minister could not be challenged by the Supreme Court but only by a body constituted by

Parliament – an action that was clearly retrospective and meant to keep Indira Gandhi in office 30.

It has been said that when her law minister H R Gokhale told her that he had ensured, through

necessary legal and constitutional changes 99 per cent chances of getting the high court decision

on her election reversed in the Supreme Court, she is reported to have insisted "make it cent per

cent”31. A few months later, the Supreme Court did the government a greater favour still. In the

ADM Jabalpur case32, the court held that those arrested under MISA (some 3600033 people, by

then) did not have the right to habeas corpus with only one of a five member judge bench

presenting a dissenting view (a powerful one at that – Khanna34’s statement of ‘detention without

trial is an anathema to all those who love personal liberty’ goes down in modern Indian history).

What is most disheartening is that the sole dissenter was superseded in consideration of the post

of Chief Justice of India, a strong blow to the independence of the judiciary35. The New York

Times in an editorial titled ‘Fading Hopes in India’36 stated that ‘the submission of an

26Ramachandra Guha, “INDIA AFTER GANDHI – The History of the World’s Largest Democracy”, Picador, Indian Edition (2008), p.494.27 Ibid, see end note 3.28 Supra, n.26.29 The Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975, date of assent: 1/08/1975.30 Supra, n.26, p.499.31 Supra, n.18.32 A.D.M Jabalpur  v. Shivakant Shukla , AIR 1976 SC 1207.33 Supra, n.26.34 Rajindar Sachar, “ADM Jabalpur case: A Supreme Mistake”, Link at: http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Law/2006/adm_jabalpur.html - last visited: 12/10/2010.35 Supra, n.26, p.500.36 New York Times, 30th April, 1976.

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independent judiciary to an absolutist government is virtually the last step in the destruction of a

democratic society’. But there were steps waiting to be taken. The mini Constitution, a twenty

page long 42nd Amendment37, gave unprecedented powers to the Parliament. It could now extend

its tenure, which it immediately did; laws passed by the legislature gained further immunity from

judicial review; and the centre gained greater powers over the states. President’s rule in states

became an easy option – when the DMK term in Tamil Nadu ended in January 1976 President’s

Rule was preferred over the announcement of fresh elections as was the case in Gujarat a couple

of months later.38

The emergency saw another prisoner in the form of the press. Censored and curtailed,

the press was kept from printing anything that criticized the government in any manner, be it

reports on strikes and processions, or of political opposition, or of conditions in jails. All national

news, therefore, began to sound like stories in praise of the government. Satire, humour and

other literary devices were also cracked down upon, what with Cho Ramaswamy’s cartoon of the

prime minister and Sanjay Gandhi talking above the caption: ‘A national debate on the

Constitutional Amendments’ being censored out. As the emergency proceeded, the government

tightened its hold over the dissemination of information; the Press Trust of India and the United

News of India were amalgamated with two other agencies into the state controlled Samachar.

The Press Council, an autonomous body, was abolished; immunity that was earlier granted to

journalists covering the Parliament was retracted; as many as 253 journalists were arrested.39 If

newspapers resisted (as Indian Express and the Statesman did) they found power cuts and fines

dogging their footsteps and most fell in line with the government’s regulation. Small journals

and magazines were often bankrupted and driven out of circulation by being forced to pay

prohibitively high deposits as guarantees of ‘good behaviour’. However, some amount of

criticism did make its way into the newspapers. An anonymous democrat managed to smuggle in

an obituary in the Times of India announcing the ‘Death of D. E. M. O’Cracy, mourned by his

wife T. Ruth, his son L. I. Bertie, and his daughters Faith, Hope and Justice.’40

Society’s response to the emergency was, to say the least, unexpected. The first few

months of emergency were treated as a welcome relief from the angry crowds and the strife filled 37 The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. 38 Supra, n.14, p.254.39 Ibid.40 Supra, n.26, p.502.

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decade preceding it.41 The middle class was elated by the turn of events – the crime rates had

fallen, business went on normally, a good monsoon led to lower prices, trade union leaders no

longer created problems.42 Even stalwarts like J. R. D. Tata, in the first few months, were pro-

emergency because of the new-found peace it created.43 The twenty point programme,

announced five days after the declaration of emergency, held out hope for the alleviation of

poverty for the rural poor. The programme included implementation of land ceiling legislation, a

big increase in the allotment of house sites for the landless, a moratorium on rural debts to give

relief to small farmers, village artisans and landless farmers, and the abolition of bonded labour.

The adoption of these measures was possible only under this regime as the issues they addressed

were often in the State List. All these measures, put together, provided the emergency with some

legitimate social and political purpose, for a while.44

As weeks passed into months, the ground realities began reasserting themselves causing

the close to utopian world of India in emergency to come to an end. Before the emergency,

Indira Gandhi mourned her lack of power to implement policies that she believed India required,

but as the emergency progressed, it became evident that she didn’t have an outline of a socio-

economic framework for the realization of which her power could be used. What’s worse is that

Sanjay Gandhi and his clique didn’t have one either. All the plans made were short or medium

term ones, with Sanjay giving no consideration to the will of the people – his nationwide

sterilization drive and the removal of slums in Delhi standing testimony to this claim. The five

point scheme that he came up with while in charge of Delhi didn’t work as he had claimed it

would.45 It has been said that the only good thing the emergency gave us was the Maruti car, the

allotment of the production of which to Sanjay Gandhi also reeks of corruption and nepotism46.

41 Supra, n.14, p.255.42 Supra, n.26, p.503.43 Ibid, quoting J. R. D. Tata as in the New York Times, see end note 33.44 Supra, n.12, p.265.45 Supra, n.17, p.193.46 Supra, n.14, p.247.

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5. EFFECTS OF THE EMERGENCY

When Indira Gandhi, in January 1977, announced general elections, she shocked an

entire nation, including her favoured son – Sanjay Gandhi47. Her opponents were being freed

from jail even as the announcement was made on the All India Radio. Congress lost the elections

by a wide margin and a coalition called the Janata Party formed the government.48 For the first

time in thirty years, a party other than the Congress governed at the centre.

The very first thing that the coalition did was scuffle for the post of Prime Minister. The

race was between Jagjivan Ram, Charan Singh and Morarji Desai. The final decision was taken

by J. B. Kripalani and Jayaprakash Narayan and Morarji Desai became Prime Minister.49

The Janata government dissolved all Congress led State Assemblies and held fresh

elections there.50 Once they established control, pan India, they were able to select N Sanjeeva

Reddy as the President unanimously. It, through the 44th Amendment to the Constitution repealed

several of the policy changes made by the Indira Gandhi government in the 42nd Amendment.

The right of judicial review was restored to the judiciary and the rights of the people were

reinstated.51 One long lasting effect of the emergency is the inclusion of ‘socialist secular’ in the

preamble, adding legal backing to a pre-existing facet of Indian politics. Also, fundamental

duties have continued to exist in the Constitution.

While large scale changes were in motion, one of the most far reaching impacts of the

Janata rule was the inclusion of 2-inch foam on second class sleeper berths. This cumulatively

benefitted hundreds of millions of travellers.52 The charisma of the Janata leadership wore out

quickly. The absence of a common ideology and a visible non performance in administration,

implementation of developmental policies, and realizing social justice caused much

47 Supra, n.26, p.523.48 The coalition consisted of the Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal, Socialist Party and Morarji Desai’s own Congress(O). Congressman Jagjivan Ram also left the Congress, formed the Congress for Democracy and sided with the Janata Party. This came as a shock given that it was Mr. Ram who had moved the resolution in the Lok Sabha endorsing the emergency.49 Third time lucky, given that he almost got the post in 1964 and again in 1967.50 Supra, n.14, p.262.51 Ibid.52 Supra, n.26, p.527.

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discontentment amongst the people. This is what led to Indira Gandhi’s emphatic victory in the

1980 elections.

Moving away from the most obvious outcome of the emergency (the Janata government),

there were several changes that occurred within the Congress in the interim period. The split in

the Congress into Congress (I) – for Indira – and Congress (U) – for Devraj Urs was seen to have

revitalized the party. There was no longer the clash of ideology that existed prior to the split.

Further, the emergency was also heralded as one reason for the political pariah of India’s, i.e. the

RSS’, loss of ‘untouchable’ status in Indian politics and its entry into main stream politics.53

The emergency is infamous for initiating the epic war between the judiciary and the

executive and legislature beginning with the supersession and the curtailment of judicial review.

The tussle continues. The ADM Jabalpur decision continues to haunt the judiciary as precedent

that one certainly does not want to follow, yet it does affect interpretation of law.

Sanjay Gandhi’s draconian policy of forced sterilization is said to have caused a major

shift in the negative direction in people’s acceptance of family planning programmes. It also

served to reduce all further governments’ zeal towards implementing the policy. 54

An interesting question that has been brought up is whether the emergency caused the

Bhopal Gas tragedy. For five years, the company's application for an industrial licence lay

pending, with officials in what was then called the Union Ministry of Industrial Development

feeling that its “technology was obsolete” and being “dumped in India”. Finally, four months

after the Emergency was declared, the licence was granted and the decision is said to have been

taken at the ‘higher levels’. If this was the case, then the allegations of corruption against the

Indira Gandhi government stand justified.

53 Arvind Rajagopal, “Sangh's Role in the Emergency” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 27 (Jul. 5-11, 2003), pp. 2797-2798.54 V. A. Pai Panandiker and P. K. Umashankar, “Fertility Control and Politics in India” in Population and Development Review, Vol. 20.

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6. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is fitting to say that the emergency of 1975 was far more complex a

situation than can be judged purely on the basis of the personality of a couple of people or the

occurrences of a short period of time. In the same manner, it is also true that its effects belie

listing for they are diverse and numerous.

The emergency came in a period when the existence of democracy in India was at stake.

People were ready to live in an authoritarian set up just to get back the peace and security that

went missing at some point in free Indian history. Yet democracy survived. And, ironically, post

the emergency of 1975, the questions of a presidential form of government or the wish for an

authoritarian government have not arisen. Whether the emergency precipitated a control centre at

Delhi or was the effect of such a centre is an arguable topic. While many believe that the

emergency was the culmination of power building at the centre, another school of thought stands

convinced that the power to the centre was only solidified by the emergency.

The separation of powers was certainly powerfully hit by the emergency period. The

indiscriminate supersession of judges, nonsensical judicial decisions in favour of those in power

reek strongly of the concept of a ‘committed judiciary’. Similarly, the executive becoming a

pawn in the hands of those in power seems to be highlighted by the frenzy with which Sanjay

Gandhi’s slum demolition and sterility drives were carried out without a single question asked.

Another long term effect that India has suffered because of is coalition politics. Successive

governments have been formed by resorting to coalitions that often show no ideological cohesion

and therefore give rise to difficulties in making coherent policies.

The then head of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, P. N. Dhar makes an apt conclusion.

“Notwithstanding the economic gains of the period, the Emergency regime did not succeed in

bringing about the much-needed reform in economic policies. Neither did it bring about changes

in political practice that would have made the restoration of democracy possible on a more

viable basis. The group that had gained closest proximity to the prime minister during the

Emergency was more interested in the exercise of power for personal aggrandisement than for

larger political and social ends. Without a clear sense of direction in which to take the country,

they converted the regime into a personal despotism of rule by sycophants.”

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Page 18: The Emergency of 1975

THE EMERGENCY OF 1975-1977

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

P. N. Dhar, “Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’, and Indian Democracy”, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1st Edition(2000)

Bipin Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee & Aditya Mukherjee, “India After Independence 1947-2000”, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2nd Edition(2000)

Granville Austin, “Working a Democratic Constitution”, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1st

Edition (1999)

Ramachandra Guha, “INDIA AFTER GANDHI – The History of the World’s Largest Democracy”, Picador, Indian Edition (2008)

ARTICLES:

Balraj Puri “A Fuller View of the Emergency” in Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 30 No. 28 (Jul. 15, 1995) pp. 1736-1744.

Balraj Puri “Afterthoughts on the Emergency Debate” in Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 35 No. 33 (Aug. 12-18, 2000) pp. 2913-2914

V. A. Pai Panandiker and P. K. Umashankar “Fertility Control and Politics in India” in Population and Development Review, Vol. 20, Supplement: The New Politics of Population: Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning (1994), pp. 89-104

Harry W. Blair “Mrs Gandhi's Emergency, The Indian Elections of 1977, Pluralism and Marxism: Problems with Paradigms” in Modern Asian Studies Vol. 14 No. 2 (1980) pp. 237-271

Norman D. Palmer “India in 1975: Democracy in Eclipse” in Asian Survey Vol. 16 No. 2 A Survey of Asia in 1975: Part II (Feb., 1976), pp. 95-110

Sudipta Kaviraj “Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics” in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 38/39 (Sep. 20-27, 1986), pp. 1697-1708

Aaron S. Klieman “Indira's India: Democracy and Crisis Government” in Political Science Quarterly Vol. 96 No. 2 (Summer, 1981) pp. 241-259

Arvind Rajagopal “Sangh's Role in the Emergency” in Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 38 No. 27 (Jul. 5-11, 2003) pp. 2797-2798

Oliver Mendelsohn “The Collapse of the Indian National Congress” in Pacific Affairs Vol. 51 No. 1 (Spring, 1978) pp. 41-66

Krishna K. Tummala “The Indian Union and Emergency Powers” in International Political Science Review Vol.17 No. 4 New Trends in Federalism (Oct., 1996) pp.373-384

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