The Epistemology of Implicit Biases · Introduction The source of implicit biases From implicit biases to skepticism Aliefs Moral and political consequences of implicit biases I We

IntroductionThe source of implicit biases

From implicit biases to skepticismAliefs

The Epistemology of Implicit Biases

Carlotta Pavese

11.11.14

Carlotta Pavese The Epistemology of Implicit Biases



Outline

Introduction

The source of implicit biases

From implicit biases to skepticism

Aliefs




Outline

Introduction



Aliefs




What is an implicit bias?

I You must have taken some of the tests at:https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.

I On the basis of those tests, can you make aneducated guess as to what an implicit bias is?


https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/




I You must have taken some of the tests at:https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/.

I On the basis of those tests, can you make aneducated guess as to what an implicit bias is?


https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/




(Saul 2013, p. 144).




Examples

(Saul 2013, p. 144).Carlotta Pavese The Epistemology of Implicit Biases



Examples

(Saul 2013, p. 145).




Examples

(Saul 2013, p. 146).




How are implicit biases different from(explicit) beliefs?

I We are not aware of them.

I We may even disavow them if asked.I It is not clear that they are rationally revisable in the

way beliefs are.I Anything else?





I We are not aware of them.I We may even disavow them if asked.

I It is not clear that they are rationally revisable in theway beliefs are.

I Anything else?





I We are not aware of them.I We may even disavow them if asked.I It is not clear that they are rationally revisable in the

way beliefs are.

I Anything else?





I We are not aware of them.I We may even disavow them if asked.I It is not clear that they are rationally revisable in the

way beliefs are.I Anything else?




Moral and political consequences of implicitbiases

I We are very likely to make inaccurate judgmentsabout who is the best candidate for a job, if some ofthe top candidates are known to be from stigmatizedgroups.

I We are very likely to mark inaccurately, if social groupmembership is known to us and the group we aremarking is not socially homogeneous.

I We are very likely to make inaccurate judgmentsabout which papers deserve to be published, if socialgroup membership is known to us.


















Outline

Introduction



Aliefs




Why do we form implicit biases

(Gendler, p. 6).




The sources of implicit biases

I One source of implicit biases is that becausecategorization is driven by a goal of simplicity, there isa tendency to view individuals within a category inways that emphasize their similarities, and viewindividuals between categories in ways thatemphasize their differences; that is, there is atendency towards intracategory assimilation, andintercategory contrast.




The sources of implicit biases

I There is a process of confirmation bias:Stereotype-congruent information is attended to andencoded; stereotype-incongruent information isignored and unassimilated. Both the search for andinterpretation of information tends to be done in waysthat favor hypotheses that the subject already holds.




Aversive racism

I An example of stereotypical association: aversiveracism.

I The members of a minority group are associated witha stereotype, that includes a set of traits.

I These characteristics were identified as constitutingthe cultural stereotype even by those who rejectedtheir accuracy.

I Knowledge of the stereotype does not need tocorrelate in any way with measures of explicitprejudice.




Aversive racism








Aversive racism








Aversive racism








Aversive racism

I “aversive racism”—characteristic of those who“sympathize with the victims of past injustice, supportthe principle of racial equality, and regard themselvesas non-prejudiced”

I but who, because of their explicit or implicitawareness of the negative traits stereotypicallyassociated with members of the dominated racialgroup, exhibit behaviors indicative of negativefeelings and beliefs about blacks, which may beunconscious”.




Aversive racism

I “aversive racism”—characteristic of those who“sympathize with the victims of past injustice, supportthe principle of racial equality, and regard themselvesas non-prejudiced”

I but who, because of their explicit or implicitawareness of the negative traits stereotypicallyassociated with members of the dominated racialgroup, exhibit behaviors indicative of negativefeelings and beliefs about blacks, which may beunconscious”.




Example of Aversive racism

I Even among those who are explicitly and sincerelycommitted to anti-racism, the legacy of having lived ina society structured by hierarchical and hostile racialdivisions retains its imprint.

I Likewise, participants playing a video game arequicker at deciding to shoot an unarmed black targetthan an unarmed black target, even when bothtargets are armed at equal rates in the context of thegame (Correll et al., 2002).





I Even among those who are explicitly and sincerelycommitted to anti-racism, the legacy of having lived ina society structured by hierarchical and hostile racialdivisions retains its imprint.

I Likewise, participants playing a video game arequicker at deciding to shoot an unarmed black targetthan an unarmed black target, even when bothtargets are armed at equal rates in the context of thegame (Correll et al., 2002).





I State legislators are less likely to respond to requestsfor help with voter registration when the requestscome from individuals with stereotypically blacknames (Butler Broockman, 2011).

I Black cab drivers receive lower tips than white cabdrivers (Ayres et al., 2004).





I State legislators are less likely to respond to requestsfor help with voter registration when the requestscome from individuals with stereotypically blacknames (Butler Broockman, 2011).

I Black cab drivers receive lower tips than white cabdrivers (Ayres et al., 2004).




Example of Aversive racismIndeed, even those who devote their lives tocounteracting such stereotypical associationsare not immune from them. Consider thefollowing quotation:

There is nothing more painful to me atthis stage in my life than to walk downthe street and hear footsteps and startthinking about robbery. Then lookaround and see somebody White andfeel relieved.

Its utterer is none other than Jesse Jackson(“Jesse Jackson” 2011).




Outline

Introduction



Aliefs




Jennifer SaulCast of Characters

I Philosopher of language at University ofSheffield (UK)

I PhD in philosophy at PrincetonUniversity.

I Her most recent book is Lying,Misleading and What is Said: AnExploration in Philosophy of Languageand in Ethics (Oxford University Press2012).




Tamara GendlerCast of Characters

I Professor of Philosophy at YaleUniversity.

I PhD in philosophy at Harvard University.I Author of many books, among which

Intuition, Imagination and PhilosophicalMethodology, 2010; The Elements ofPhilosophy: Readings from Past andPresent; Conceivability and Possibility;Thought Experiment: On the Powers andLimits of Imaginary Cases.




from Implicit biases to skepticism

I Implicit biases have clear epistemic costs.

I On their basis, we form beliefs that are likely to bewrong.





I Implicit biases have clear epistemic costs.I On their basis, we form beliefs that are likely to be

wrong.









I Jennifer Saul thinks that the widespread presence ofimplicit bias gives rise to a distinctive kind ofskepticism, different from the traditional one.

I It is different partly because of its clear practicalrelevance.





I Jennifer Saul thinks that the widespread presence ofimplicit bias gives rise to a distinctive kind ofskepticism, different from the traditional one.

I It is different partly because of its clear practicalrelevance.









I Even though implicit biases are not themselvesepistemically assessable, they give rise to beliefs thatare.

I Beliefs based on implicit biases are very likely to bewrong.

I That means that in a variety of cases, the implicitbiases we do have are likely to lead us astray fromthe truth.


















Gendler on The costs of implicit biases

I The costs are ones that arise simply from havingencoded the stereotypes, whether or not the subjectendorses them.

I Gendler argues that the costs are diverse.




Gendler on The costs of implicit biases

I The costs are ones that arise simply from havingencoded the stereotypes, whether or not the subjectendorses them.

I Gendler argues that the costs are diverse.




First kind of cost

I It affects your ability to encode individuatinginformation about faces of persons that youapprehend as belonging to a different racialgroup—even if you explicitly avow racial equality.

I Across hundreds of studies in dozens of cultures,psychologists have shown a tendency for participantsto exhibit superior recognitional capacities forown-race as compared to other-race faces (cf.Meissner Brigham 2001).




First kind of cost

I It affects your ability to encode individuatinginformation about faces of persons that youapprehend as belonging to a different racialgroup—even if you explicitly avow racial equality.

I Across hundreds of studies in dozens of cultures,psychologists have shown a tendency for participantsto exhibit superior recognitional capacities forown-race as compared to other-race faces (cf.Meissner Brigham 2001).




First kind of costI Cross-race recognition deficit is the phenomenon

whereby faces of the out-group are recognized(misses) or remembered (false alarms) less well thanfaces of the in-group.

I According to the asymmetric feature selectionhypothesis, at least part of the explanation is thefollowing: when participants encounter other-racefaces, one of the visual features they typically encodeis information about race, whereas no suchinformation is typically encoded for same-race faces.This leaves her with more cognitive space to encodean additional fact about the same-race face—say,“eyebrows there.”




First kind of costI Cross-race recognition deficit is the phenomenon

whereby faces of the out-group are recognized(misses) or remembered (false alarms) less well thanfaces of the in-group.

I According to the asymmetric feature selectionhypothesis, at least part of the explanation is thefollowing: when participants encounter other-racefaces, one of the visual features they typically encodeis information about race, whereas no suchinformation is typically encoded for same-race faces.This leaves her with more cognitive space to encodean additional fact about the same-race face—say,“eyebrows there.”




First kind of cost

I So, for example, when a white subject sees a novelblack face, in addition to coding information like “eyeshere”, “nose there”, “ears there,” she also uses someof her limited cognitive resources to encode “black;?”

I whereas, typically, when she sees a novel white face,the category of race is not encoded as such.




First kind of cost

I So, for example, when a white subject sees a novelblack face, in addition to coding information like “eyeshere”, “nose there”, “ears there,” she also uses someof her limited cognitive resources to encode “black;?”

I whereas, typically, when she sees a novel white face,the category of race is not encoded as such.




First kind of cost

I Since other-race faces are processed as raciallymarked, cognitive resources that would otherwise beavailable for encoding specific information about theface are deployed to encode coarse-grainedinformation about category-membership;

I Since same-race faces are processed as raciallyunmarked, the subject’s limited cognitive resourcescan be deployed to encode more fine-grainedinformation.




First kind of cost

I Since other-race faces are processed as raciallymarked, cognitive resources that would otherwise beavailable for encoding specific information about theface are deployed to encode coarse-grainedinformation about category-membership;

I Since same-race faces are processed as raciallyunmarked, the subject’s limited cognitive resourcescan be deployed to encode more fine-grainedinformation.




A second epistemic cost: Stereotype threat

I The presence of implicit biases impairs cognitiveperformance when a negative stereotype about agroup with which you self-identify is brought tosalience—even if you explicitly believe those negativeassociations to be false.

I Stereotype threat is a well-documented phenomenonwhereby activating an individual’s thoughts about hermembership in a group that is associated withimpaired performance in a particular domainincreases her tendency to perform in astereotype-confirming manner.





I The presence of implicit biases impairs cognitiveperformance when a negative stereotype about agroup with which you self-identify is brought tosalience—even if you explicitly believe those negativeassociations to be false.

I Stereotype threat is a well-documented phenomenonwhereby activating an individual’s thoughts about hermembership in a group that is associated withimpaired performance in a particular domainincreases her tendency to perform in astereotype-confirming manner.




A second epistemic cost: Stereotype threatIn one of the most striking demonstrations of thephenomenon, young girls of Asian- American descentwho ranged in age from kindergarten to 8th gradewere given tasks that rendered salient either theirfemale identity, their Asian identity, or neither identity(control). Subsequently, they were given a series ofitems from a grade-appropriate standardized mathtest. Girls from lower-elementary and middle schoolgrades showed a striking pattern of results: thosewhose Asian identity had been emphasized showedan improvement in scores when compared withcontrols, whereas those whose female identity hadbeen emphasized showed a decrement.





I Stereotype threat appears to interfere with knowledgein at least two ways.

I Participants may temporarily lose access to thecontents of certain of their true beliefs.

I And participants may temporarily lose confidence intheir true beliefs.


















Issues for discussion

I If they are implicit, and may be unaware of them, inwhat sense are we (morally and epistemically)responsible for them?

I Possible replies: individually, we may be unaware ofthem, but we are aware that they exist because thereis plenty of psychological evidence for their existence.

I Although we may have no control on them asindividual, there may be ways in which we maycontrol their developments by changing certainfeatures of society.


















Overcoming implicit biases

I Can implicit biases, and the skepticism they give riseto, be overcome?

I How could we overcome implicit biases?





I Can implicit biases, and the skepticism they give riseto, be overcome?

I How could we overcome implicit biases?





I The problem is: if the processes by which we acquireimplicit biases are not under our control, it is not clearthat more reflectiveness on our beliefs and behaviorwill actually help.

I After all, if we are wired to acquire implicit biasesfrom the world surrounding us, then it looks like weneed to alter the world itself.





I The problem is: if the processes by which we acquireimplicit biases are not under our control, it is not clearthat more reflectiveness on our beliefs and behaviorwill actually help.

I After all, if we are wired to acquire implicit biasesfrom the world surrounding us, then it looks like weneed to alter the world itself.








Outline

Introduction



Aliefs




Gendler’s Aliefs = implicit biases?




Example I of alief

Below the floor’s five layers of glass (protectedfrom scratches by the booties) can be seen thecracked, sharp-edged rock face of the canyon’srim and a drop of thousands of feet to the chasmbelow. The promise is the dizzying thrill ofvertigo. And indeed, last week some visitors tothis steel-supported walkway anchored in rockfelt precisely that. One woman, her left handdesperately grasping the 60- inch-high glasssides and the other clutching the arm of a patientsecurity guard, didn’t dare move toward thetransparent center of the walkway.




Comments

How should we describe the cognitive state ofthose who manage to stride to the Skywalk’scenter? Surely they believe that the walkway willhold: no one would willingly step onto a mile-highplatform if they had even a scintilla of doubtconcerning its stability. But alongside that beliefthere is something else going on. Although theventuresome souls wholeheartedly believe thatthe walkway is completely safe, they also alievesomething very different. The alief has roughlythe following content: “Really high up, long longway down. Not a safe place to be! Get off!!”




Example II of alief

Charles is watching a horror movie about aterrible green slime. He cringes in his seat as theslime oozes slowly but relentlessly over the earthdestroying everything in its path. Soon a greasyhead emerges from the undulating mass, andtwo beady eyes roll around, finally fixing on thecamera. The slime, picking up speed, oozes on anew course straight towards the viewers.Charles emits a shriek and clutches desperatelyat his chair.




Comments

How should we describe Charles’ cognitivestate? Surely he does not believe that that he isin physical peril; as Walton writes “Charlesknows perfectly well that the slime is not real andthat he is in no danger.” But alongside that beliefthere is something else going on. AlthoughCharles believes that he is sitting safely in a chairin a theater in front of a movie screen, he alsoalieves something very different. The alief hasroughly the following content: “Dangeroustwo-eyed creature heading towards me! H-e-l-p. . . ! Activate fight or flight adrenaline now!”




Characterization of aliefs

alief is associative, action-generating,affect-laden, arational, automatic, agnostic withrespect to its content, shared with animals, anddevelopmentally and conceptually antecedent toother cognitive attitudes.




Aliefs/implicit biases

I Are Gendler’s aliefs the same kind of implicit attitudesas implicit biases?

I The content of aliefs seems to serve someevolutionary purpose—protect us from danger, forexample.

I No similar justification there can be for the content ofimplicit biases.

I It is interesting and puzzling that Gendler mixestogether aliefs and implicit biases under the sameheading. Do not you think?





























I In an important sense, we do not seem to beresponsible for being afraid of height.

I No we should try to revise those aliefs, because it ishelpful to have those kind of implicit fears.

I But are not we responsible for our gendered andsexist beliefs?

I And should not we try to revise them?
































I It is interesting and puzzling that Gendler mixestogether aliens and implicit biases under the sameheading. Do not you think?


























Documents

The Epistemology of Implicit Biases · Introduction The source of implicit biases From implicit biases to skepticism Aliefs Moral and political consequences of implicit biases I We