The Free Syrian Army

7/30/2019 The Free Syrian Army

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MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 9

Elizabeth OBagy

March 2013

The free Syrian army


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Cover Photo: The Bab al-Salameh border crossing under Syrian rebel control. Taken on January 31,2013 by Elizabeth OBagy.

all gts svd. Ptd t Utd Stts o ac. no pt ots publcto b poducd o tsttd o o b s, lctoc o ccl, cludg potocop, codg, o oto stog o tvl sst, wtout psso wtg ot publs.

2013 b t isttut o t Stud o W.

Publsd 2013 t Utd Stts o ac b t isttut o tStud o W.

1400 16t Stt nW, Sut 515 Wsgto, DC 20036.

ttp://www.udstdgw.og


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Elizabeth OBagy

The free Syrian army


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

elzbt OBgy s Sno rsc anlyst t t insttut o t Study o W, w s ocuss on Syn

poltcs nd scuty. S s n jont msts/PD pog n ab Studs nd Poltcl Scnc t Gogtown

Unvsty nd s wokng on dsstton on wons ltncy. Po to jonng iSW, s cvd t

Ctcl Lngug Scolsp to study abc t t acn Scool n Tng, moocco, nd studd abc

nd poltcl scnc t t acn Unvsty n Co, egypt. S olds bclos dg n t abcLngug nd ab Studs o Gogtown Unvsty.

S s t uto oSyrias Political Opposition ndJihad in Syria.

AcknOwlEdgEmEnTs

i would lk to tnk Jontn Dup o s ny contbutons to ts pot, ncludng t nvlubl

sc suppot povdd on t optons scton nd appndx 2. Tnks lso du to Josp holldy

o lpng s toug t nt pocss, s wll s Jssc Lws nd aon rs o t nsgtul vw

nd dtng o t txt. fnlly, mgg rckl dsvs ug ound o pplus o lpng to ot t nt

pot.

ABOUT THE InsTITUTE

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-prot, public policy research organization.ISW advances an informed understanding of military aairs through reliable research,trusted analysis, andovtv ducto. iSW s cottd to povg t tos blt to cut lt optos dspod to gg tts od to cv U.S. sttgc objctvs.

ABOUT OUR TEcHnOlOgy PARTnERs

iSW blvs supo sttgc sgt dvs o uso o tdtol socl scc sc dovtv tcologcl tods. iSW cogs tt t lst o t utu ust b bl to pocss wd

vt o oto, gg o psol tvws d stocl tcts to g volu stuctud

dt. iSW tks ts tcolog pts, Plt Tcologs d Psct altcs, o t suppot

ts ovtv dvo. i ptcul, t tcolog d pltto ssstc s suppotd

ctg o t ps d gpcs ts poduct.

Psct altcs s Vt Owd Sll Busss bsd ald,

Vg. Ou s to voluto ow t wold udstds

oto b powg ou custos wt t ltst ltc tools

d todologs. Cutl, Psct povds svl ctcl svcs

to ou govt d cocl clts: tg, bddd lss,plto tgto, d poduct custoto.

Plt Tcologs s wokg to dcll cg ow goups l

information. We currently oer a suite of software applications for

tgtg, vsulg d lg t wolds oto. W suppot

kds o dt cludg stuctud, ustuctud, ltol, tpol

d gosptl.


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TaBLe Of COnTenTS

ExEcUTIvE sUmmARy ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 06

InTROdUcTIOn ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 09

PREvIOUs ATTEmPTs AT UnIfIcATIOn ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 10

THE sUPREmE mIlITARy cOmmAnd .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 16

REBEl OPERATIOns On EAcH fROnT ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 25

Ad dR Ess Ing lI mIT AT IOn s An d fU TUR E OB sTAc lE s .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 28

cOnclUsIOn ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 34

AP PEnd Ix 1: wHOs wHO-sElEcTEd sUPREmE mIlITARy cOmmAnd mEmBERs .. . .. .. 36

AP PEnd Ix 2: OPPOsITIOn UnITs . ... .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 38

nOTEs ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 46

mAPs & fIgUREs

mAP 1 | syRIA lOcATIOns lIsTIng ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . 08

fIgURE 1 | jOInT cOmmAnd sTRUcTURE ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 12

PHOTO 1 | THE gEnERAl cOmmAnd .... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 13

PHOTO 2 | BRIgAdIER gEnERAl HUssEIn kOUlIyA ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 14PHOTO 3 | lOUAI mIqdAd And OkAB sAkR ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 15

fIgURE 2 | sUPREmE mIlITARy cOmmAnd sTRUcTURE ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 17

mAP 2 | AREA Of OPERATIOns fOR THE fIvE fROnTs ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 18

PHOTO 4 | sElEcTEd sUPREmE mIlITARy cOmmAnd mEmBERs ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . 19

PHOTO 5 | fAROUq TRAInIng sEssIOns ... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 20

mAP 3 | THE BATTlE fOR wAdI Al-dEIf ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 21

mAP 4 | OPPOsITIOn cAmPAIgn UPdATE ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 22

PHOTO 6 | sOc sEcRETARy gEnERAl mUsTAfA sABBAgH ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 23

mAP 5 | THE BATTlE fOR TAfTAnAz ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 24

mAP 6 | THE BATTlE fOR dAmAscUs ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 26

fIgURE 3 | gROUPs AffIlIATEd wITH THE syRIAn lIBERATIOn fROnT ... . . 28

PHOTO 7 | m60 REcOIllEss gUn In AqRABA ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 31

PHOTO 8 | RBg6 gREnAdE lAUncHER In HAmA ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . 32

PHOTO 9 | cOlOnEl AqIdI REcEIvEs wEAPOns ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 32

fIgURE 4 | OPPOsITIOn gROUPs By fROnT ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 39

miDDLe eaST SeCUriTy rePOrT 9 | The free Syrian army | eLizaBeTh OBaGy | marCh 2013


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6 www.UndERsTAndIngwAR.ORg

exeCUTiVe SUmmarymiDDLe eaST SeCUriTy rePOrT 9 | The free Syrian army | eLizaBeTh OBaGy | marCh 2013

fgtto d dsogto v plgud Ss d opposto sc pcul potstostook up s Dcb 2011 d bg og bl goups ud t ubll o t fSyrian Army. A lack of unity has made cooperation and coordination dicult on the battleeld andhas limited the eectiveness of rebel operations.

Sc t su o 2012, bl cods o t goud S v bgu to coodttctcll od to pl optos d cob soucs. Ts coopto s clttd important oensives and rebels have taken control of the majority of the eastern portion of thecountry, overrunning their rst provincial capital in March 2013 with the capture of al-Raqqa city.However, rebels have been unable to capitalize on these successes, and ghting has largely stalematedlog cut bttl ots ptcull t k s o alppo, hos d Dscus.

i od to ovco t cut lt stlt, t opposto ds to dvlop optollevel headquarters that can designate campaign priorities, task units to support priority missions, andresource these units with the proper equipment to execute their missions. Recently, the opposition

s stblsd w tol lt stuctu tt gow to sv ts pupos.

O Dcb 7, 2012, bl lds o coss S oucd t lcto o w 30-bunied command structure called the Supreme Joint Military Command Council, known as theSup mlt Cod (SmC). T Sup mlt Cod povs upo pvousattempts at armed opposition unication through higher integration of disparate rebel groups andcd coucto, wc suggst tt t could pov to b dug scut sttuto.

The SMC includes all of Syrias most important opposition eld commanders, and its authority isbased on the power and inuence of these rebel leaders. Its legitimacy is derived from the bottom-up, t t top-dow, d t s o sttutol lgtc pt o t lgtc o t

cods ssoctd wt t coucl. Tus, t SmC s ot stuctull cosv, d ts bltto oc cod d cotol s dpdt o t coopto o c o ts bs.

T copoto o bl twoks s sultd cs o cod tt ot uo cossthe ve fronts, with each sub-unit retaining their own unique authority structures.

T SmCs p ucto to dt s b to sv s plto o coodto. rgdlss ot lts o ts cut cod d cotol, t SmC s pld pott ol scg bloptos wt svl otbl succsss. it s llowd o gt oppotuts o collbotod coodto og t dspt bl goups optg S.

as t SmC dvlops ts sttutol cpct, ts blt to sst gt utot wll lkl dpd ots tsctol lgtc d ts blt to dstbut ctcl soucs to bl-ld couts.

To date, disparate sources of funding have signicantly handicapped the rebels ability to unite andcosoldt utot o tol lvl. altoug pvt soucs o udg wll lkl cotuoutsd t pts o t SmC, utg t suppot cls o bls stt sposos wllb udtl to sug t lgtc o t w ogto. T blt to povd soucsd tl suppot to ts sub-uts s t dtg cto wt o ot t SmC wll b blto ut bl ocs ud ts cod d stbls lvl o cod d cotol.


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exeCUTiVe SUmmary

T SmC s t pottl to sv s cck o dclto d lp to sst odt utot S. i t SmC c ct oug ctvs o odto t wll lkl b bl to glt ost dcl lts wt ts stuctu. To ts d, t SmC s cogd t potco t cluso o so o t o dcl ocs, wl stll dwg d l t t cluso o

ocs tt sk t dstucto o S stt, suc s jdst goups lk Jbt nus.

Ulttl, v t SmC ol svs s cs o gt coopto d coodto,it is a signicant development in that it has united the eorts of rebel commanders across Syria. Itis the rst attempt at unity that incorporates important commanders from all Syrian provinces ands oug lgtc o t goud to v bg t pocss o buldg stuctu cpbl opovdg tol-lvl c o cod.

Syrias state security apparatus will collapse as the Assad regime nishes its transformation into alt-lk tt. T Sup mlt Cod s cutl t ol ogto tt couldserve to ll the security vacuum left by this transformation. As the Syrian opposition begins to build

tstol govt, t SmC could ct wok o buldg Ss scut dgovg sttutos popl suppotd. T SmCs blt to ct s bss o tol dsinstitution will be an important component in lling the power vacuum left by Assads fall and willd scu d stbl S.

T ub o ctcl obstcls d o t SmC. T clud t copotoo stg cod twoks, wc wll v pct o cod d cotol d soucallocation; mitigating the strength of extremist groups; and managing disparate sources of nancing.Overcoming these obstacles will be dicult, especially as the nature of the conict transforms andt sct polto ks t o cllgg to ct stog lt sttuto d

possol d oc. altoug t SmC ust do ts pt tll to ovco ts obstcls,ts succss wll lgl dpd o gt ttol suppot d ccss to o soucs.

T gol bd U.S. suppot to t opposto sould b to buld oc o t goud tt scottd to buldg osct, stbl S, wt govt o lkl to spct actsts. Wokg wt t SmC could c acs posto vs--vs Ss d oppostod povd cs o stblt sould t assd g ll.



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mAP 1 | syRIA lOcATIOns lIsTIng

10 mi

20 km

TURKEY

IQ

JORDAN

LEBANON

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Latakia

Tartous Homs

Hama

Aleppo

IdlibAr Raqqah

Damascus

As SuwaydaDeraa

Deir ez-Zor

Hasakah

1 Abu Duhur 16 Dumayr Airbase 31 Khirbet Ghazaleh 46 Qalat al Madiq 61 Taftanaz Airbase

2 Abu Kamal 17 Furqlus 32 Kiswah 47 Qamishli 62 Tal Aybad3 Afrin 18 Haffeh 33 Laqbah 48 Qardahah 63 Tal Qartal

4 al Bab 19 Halfiyah 34 Maarat al Numan 49 Qataneh 64 Tal Rifat

5 al Lejah 20 Harim 35 Marea 50 Qbeir 65 Talbisseh

6 al Qusayr 21 Houleh 36 Marj Ruhayl Airbase 51 Qutayfah 66 Taqba Airbase

7 al Safir 22 Izraa 37 Mastouma / Shayrat Airbase 52 Rabia 67 Telkalakh

8 Ariha 23 J ableh 38 Masyaf 53 Rankous 68 Tiyas Airbase

9 Atareb 24 J arrah Airbase 39 Mayadin 54 Ras al Ayn 69 Wadi Nasariyah

10 Azaz 25 J asim & Inkhil 40 Minakh Airbase 55 Rastan 70 Yabrud

11 Bab Hawa 26 J ebal al-Zawiya 41 Mismiyah 56 Saiqal Airbase 71 Zabadani

12 Baniyas 27 J isr al-Shughour 42 Muhradeh 57 Sanamein

13 Binnish 28 Khalkalakh Airbase 43 Nasariyah Airbase 58 Saraqib

14 Dael 29 Khan Sheikhoun 44 Nawa 59 Suqalabiyah

15 Damascus Int'l Airport 30 Kherweis Airbase 45 Palmyra / Tadmor 60 Suwayda Airbase


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To achieve the tactical benets of uniting forces,bl cods o t goud v pld dcutd jot optos d coodtd soucs

beginning with rebel oensives in the summer and fallo 2012. howv, s bls v cd t lts ot blt to coot dd g stogolds,ghting has stalled along current battle lines. In orderto ovco t cut lt stlt, bls wlld to cosoldt gs, dvlop cpg sttg,d coodt t uvs t t optol lvl.These requirements depend upon the successful unity ofeort, if not command, across rebel groups throughoutS.

After numerous failed attempts at unication, rebel

cods v ctd w ctld ldspbod tt succd w ots v ld, gvsucient resources. On December 7, 2012, rebel leaderso coss S oucd t lcto o w 30-member unied command structure called the Supreme

Jot mlt Cod Coucl, o t Supmlt Cod (SmC). Ts ouctollowd t-d coc ld atl, Tuktt ws ttdd b o t 260 bl cods s

well as security ocials from the United States, Britain,fc, t Gul Stts, d Jod.1

So v dsssd t w Sup mltCod, gug tt bl ttpts to u vcontinuously oundered. These critics point to a numbero pvous ogtos tt d ld to cv ts objctv, cludg t fbu 2012 hgrvoluto Coucl d t Sptb 2012 JotCod. T Sup mlt Cod souldot b s s w ogto, owv. istd,t s copost o pvous ogtos wc bl

The free Syrian armyB elbt OBg


The opposition movement in Syria has been fragmented from its inception, a direct reection ofSs socl coplt d t dctld gssoots og o t upsg. Ts codto

s plgud Ss d opposto sc pcul potstos took up s d bg ogbl goups ud t ubll o t f S a (fSa) t su o 2011. a lckof unity has made cooperation and coordination dicult on the battleeld and has limited theeectiveness of rebel operations. It has also reduced the rebels ability to garner internationalsuppot d bckg.

commanders have improved by adapting to signicantlssos ld. most otbl, t w SmC bldsgssoots pstto wt ld dcto pts

d stblss cobt suppot d cobt svcsuppot uctos od to pov t dlv otl d soucs to bl ks.

Until now, disparate sources of funding have signicantlydcppd t bls blt to ut d cosoldtutot o tol lvl. as t SmC dvlopsts sttutol cpct, ts blt to sst gtutot d ut bl ocs ud ts cod wllkl dpd o ts tsctol lgtc, spcllts blt to dstbut ctcl soucs to bl-ld couts. T SmC ust dostt ts

lgtc b cosoldtg t suppot o bls stt sposos, v so pvt soucs o udgcontinue to ow to forces outside of its channels.

a w U.S. polc suppots t SmCs lgtcSct o Stt Jo f. K oucd o fbu28, 2013 tt t U.S. wll povd o-ltl d,cludg ood, dc, d tg ssstctoug t Sup mlt Cod o t fS a.2 This announcement represents the rstt tt t U.S. s publcl cottd tsl tosdg o-ltl suppot to Ss d opposto

T st s tdd to pow Ss odt ocsalthough it falls short of the weapons and equipment thatSyrian rebels have requested. The policy decision againstpovdg ltl d s lgl du to cocs ov tgc o powul islst bgds d tstgroups in Syria. By oering support through the newlt cod, t U.S. s lookg to buld bttltosp wt Ss d opposto d cck tdcl lts wt ts ks.


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PREvIOUs ATTEmPTs AT UnIfIcATIOn

Ss d opposto s otdscbd s ctous o bl goups. m goups to tslvs s bso t f S a, ofSa. Ts t, owv, s otused in reference to a specicogto, but t s sot

o ctc-ll bd gto t S d opposto gl. i ts w,t fSa lbl sould b udstood s so o tsstc, sl to la resistance fc dug WWii.

altoug t s tu to s tt t d opposto sb gl gtd bcus o t polto orebel group names and aliations, two organizational

ptts v gd ov t cous o t dstuggl tt lp k ss o ow Ss oppostois structured. Specically, rebel units can be looselyclassied into two dierent categories: localizedbttlos d lg cs bgds.

Locld bttlos td to ssoct tslvspdotl wt t fSa d ogd loosltoug t povcl mlt Coucls. Ts utsght within a limited geographical scope typically ds o t o vllg o tow, ldologcll dv, d udd b t ttol

ptos o t Jot Cod o ot fSa sposos.

O t ot d, cs bgds v gdtt td to b ld b cvls o ot low-kgdctos, o dologcll otvtd, d td tob ptod b pvt doos.3 T cs bgdssuch as the Farouq Battalions or Suqour al-Sham Brigade ot uc lg, coduct optos ultplpovcs coss S, d opt dpdtl o fSastuctus. altoug ts bl uts ot cooptd

with one another under the unied goal of defeatingt assd g, t bucto btw locld

battalions and franchise brigades has frequently led toinghting and fractures within rebel ranks.4

Another signicant obstacle to greater unicationhas been the gap between exiled leadership and eldcods optg sd o S. Sc t ctoo t f S a (fSa) ud t ldsp ord l-asd, cods wokg o outsd oS v pov ubl to dct cobt optosor signicantly aect events inside. This has resulted

as t U.S. looks to suppot Ss opposto wws, udstdg t coposto d stuctu o tSup mlt Cod wll b vtl dtgthe viability of the organization and the eect suchltd suppot wll v. altoug t ltsto ts cut cod d cotol, t SmC pls

pott ol scog bl optos.it s csd oppotuts o collboto dcoodto og t dspt bl goups optg S. it lso s t pottl to sv s cck odclto d lp to sst odt utot S. i t SmC c ct stog ctvs oodto, t wll lkl b bl to gl t ostdcl lts wt ts stuctu.

The SMC has made a concerted eort to bring armedrevolutionary groups under the umbrella of a uniedlt cod b buldg stog lks wt d

opposto goups sd S d ctg pltoo t dvlopt o coutwd lt sttg.

Yet despite the signicant progress the SMC has made, ub o ctcl obstcls l d. T cludt copoto o stg cod twoks,

wc wll v pct o cod d cotol dsouc llocto; tgtg t stgt o tstgoups lk t fog Tost Ogto JbtNusra; and managing disparate sources of nancing

wc pos pobls o povdg tl d tobl-ld couts. Ovcog ts obstcls

will be dicult, especially as the nature of the conicttsos d t sct polto ks t ocllgg to ct stog lt sttuto dpossol d oc. altoug t SmC ust dots pt tll to ovco ts obstcls, ts succss

wll dpd o gt ttol suppot d ccssto o soucs.

T SmC s cutl t ol ogto tt, properly supported, could ultimately help ll the vacuumctd b t collps o t stt scut pptus dstbls wok o buldg Ss scut d

govg sttutos. as Bs l-assds scutsttutos v dsd, gvg s to cs po-g lt ctvt, t cto o utd blot s ctcl stp buldg tstol stuctuthat can ll the security vacuum and ensure stability in apost-assd S. T Sup mlt Cod b t lst oppotut o t U.S. to lp pow organization that could serve to ll the security vacuumlt b ts tsoto.


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uts w bl to op coucto cls wtt ldsp bsd Tuk d lso gd ccssto o lbl suppl outs. altoug t Tuksgovt dd pt g t S bls Ss cld tt Tuks d lgt o tbod d b tud g, d lg cosgts

o wpos w bg opl suggld to S.10

T op sct o s tss cocdd wtdctos o Cia volvt log t bod dws tt Tuk d st up sct bs, log wt llsSud ab d Qt, od to dct vtl ltd couctos d to t bls.11 as ttocossus swug lgl t vo, t bls wbl to s upo tctcl gs d bod ccss toct d cto lbtd o ot S.

T opg o t Tuks-S bod d t

stblst o bl-cotolld ot Sallowed for the rst signicant attempt to bridget tl-tl dvd wt ldsp kso Ss opposto. i Sptb 2012, vdoposted on YouTube lmed inside Syria announced theoto o t Jot Cod o t rvolutosmlt Coucl. i t ouct vdo, BgdGeneral Mithqal al-Bateesh stated that he was formingt Jot Cod od to sco ocs osd d outsd t cout. followg Btssstatement, Major Mahir al-Nuaimi, former ocial FSAspoks, ddd tt t gol o t jot cod

ws to og d sst t cod stuctusin order to make our actions more eective against thisbutl g.12

T Jot Cod cludd ogd stuctuwith a well-dened chain of command. It prescribed Gl Cod tt would ovs d dctall rebel operations. The General Command had vemembers: Brigadier General Mithqal al-BateeshBgd Gl Sl idss, Bgd Gl abdlmjd Dbs, Bgd Gl zk Lol, d BgdGl zd fd. Blow t Gl Cod stout povcl mlt Coucls tt w dctlccoutbl to t Jot Cod d w sposblo cg out ts ods c o t povcs.

There was also a Coordination Oce that was responsibleo clttg coucto cls d lpgto su t coodto d coopto o tprovincial Military Councils. The Coordination Oceulttl c to pl dcsv ol t ppott

lttl tl coopto tkg plc o coss-province level, with eld commanders maintaining totalauthority over their specic forces.

itll substtl pdt ws posd b tisolation of defecting ocers and soldiers in ocer

cps Tuk. Ulk t ug cps tt wsituated closer to the border, these ocer camps wereloctd dp sd Tuk. T w lso uc otgtl cotolld b t Tuks govt.5 Tlocation and additional security requirements madeit dicult for ocers inside of the camps to connect

with eld commanders. Despite the obvious limitations cod d cotol, ts ldsp bod cldto pst ll bl goups optg sd o Sd ws cogd b og pows s t lds ot d opposto. howv, ts ld ldspbod ws ovd o vts o t goud d

upsttv o gssoots opposto goups.

altoug bls cotu to pldg llgc tord l-asd d oll cog s t ldo t fSa, t wdl ckowldg tt tsno inuence over the internal leadership of groupsoptg sd S.6 Sc t cto o t fSaud asd, vls wt t ks o t ldldsp v pptutd ts g s dsogdcommand. These rivalries have also led to some ocersbkg w o t ctl fSa ldsp bod od to stbls t ow cod stuctus, ostotbl Gl must Sk d t cto o thg rvoluto Coucl fbu 2012.7 ytSheikhs council faced the same diculties as did the FSAleadership in connecting with eld commanders, and itproved just as ineective. By the summer of 2012, Sheikhcocld wt asd, d t hg rvolutoCoucl ws jod wt t fSa ldsp Tuk,dspt cotug tso d vl btw ttwo.8 T coclto ws ttpt to t ss o lgtc d lvc s t utot wsincreasingly challenged by the growing inuence and

pow o bl cods sd S.

The Joint Command for the Revolutions Military Council

Dug t su o 2012, codtos log tTurkish border signicantly changed. Starting in May2012, a series of successful rebel oensives allowedbl uts to s lg swts o tto log tTuks-S bod.9 B cosoldtg t cotolov ub o pott bod cossgs, bl


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cout d ugt, d ub o dsputsos ov optos d sttg suc tt subodtbattalions broke o from the command.14

T Jot Cod ws lso cllgd b t s oprominent Islamist and Salast brigades in Syria. Fromts cpto, t ogto ttptd to glideologically aliated rebel units, fearing that anylgous cootto udd wt t sw s clusv, scul ovt. Ts ws dlbtdcso d b t Jot Cod od tog bod suppot o ot coutsd to ssu t ttol cout o togtos dc to doctc pcpls.15 ialso reected the credentials of the Joint Command

wc ws costtutd b dctos wo lookd tostbls possol bod bsd o t pcd kowldg o t S lt.

T Jot Cods vowd sculs dd ot,however, reect conditions on the ground. By thesummer of 2012, protracted ghting had led to a surge lgost d cbtd sct ult ls. Tsstuto pvd t w o t polto o dologcgoups og t opposto. Ts goups btd

o t mlt Coucl lds t cog ud tcod o Sud psttvs wokg wt t

Joint Command. The eects of this Saudi inuence willb dscussd dtl t lt pot.

at ts cpto, t Jot Cod cld ttt ccoutd o 80 pct o d oppostogoups sd o S.13 While this gure has provento b ovsttd, o t Jot Codbs, ptcull t mlt Coucl ds, dddv lgtc o pc cobt gstgovt ocs, d codd bttlos dbgds sd S. i ts w, t Jot Codsought to unite important eld commanders with exiledlds wo d gt ccss to soucs d suppot

cls. it lso sougt to ct o clusvldsp tt could ccout o ot coutsb cludg lds suc s Cpt Bw must, Kuds cod o t Sl l-D Bgd, tot dcso-kg pocss.

From the beginning, the organization faced diculties sstg ts cotol ov t vous d ctossd o S. Wt t ogto, couctobtw lds o t sd d tos outsd o t

fIgURE 1 | jOInT cOmmAnd sTRUcTURE


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wt dspt soucs o tl udg povg tlgst obstcl. Two o t bls ost pott ptosSud ab d Qt, coptg wt c otfor power and inuence by supporting dierent groupssd o S. altoug t tll gd to utsuppot bd t Jot Cod, t sucd b

lt Octob 2012, w Sud psttvs wokgwt t Jot Cod blvd tt t Qts ddesigned the structure to enhance their inuence at theps o t Suds.20

Ts pcpto pvtd Sud d Qt spososo utg t suppot bd t Jot Codstd ldg t to slct dvdul lls oinside and outside the organization. This signicantlycotbutd to t lu o t Jot Cod bbpssg ts dstbuto css d ctgvls wt t ogto. as wll b dscussd

lt t cott o t w Sup mltCod, Sud d Qt soucs o udg ust bunited in order to create a single, unied command. Ift ot, dspt cls o udg wll cotuto gt t opposto d d ts dvloptto vbl post-assd lttv scut stuctu.

at t Jot Cods cpto, t Qtpsttvs w ocusd upo dg tgol mlt Coucls b dlvg goods to tmlt Coucl lds wo would t dstbutt to subodt bgds. howv, t Sud

representatives took control of the Coordination Oced bg ppotg cods d dputs lol tots ldsp d postog t to s w tSaudis had less inuence, likely as a means of counteringthe growing inuence of the Qataris and in an attemptto gain wider inuence over more independent rebelgroups. Thus, although the Coordination Oce wasogll ctd to lp suppot couctobtw t coucls d dl logstcs ol, t cto hold even more power than the oce of the GeneralCommand due to its ability to appoint and inuence

coucl ds.Ts gtl gd bls wo lt tt t wldsp d b ocd o t, d std tcos to lct t ow lds. Tus, w povcst w two uctog mlt Coucl ldst ppotd ld d t lctd ld. rvlsbtw ts ppotd d lctd lds cotudto fragment ghting forces inside Syria, and often ledto tl clss w o o t ot ld ws

signicant inuence on the ground. Consequently, theexclusion of Islamist and Salast commanders ultimatelyld to vls og t pot dpdtbgds d t mlt Coucls, spcll s

where Islamist or Salast Brigades like the Farouq

Battalions in Homs or the Suqour al-Sham Brigade inIdlib were more established and commanded signicantlylg ocs. i so css, ts vls dvolvd tod clss btw t dpdt bgds d tmlt Coucls.16 Dsgts ot ctd odstto o bl-cotolld s, cludg tpctc o stblsg lgous couts to dst

justice and ying the black ag typically associated withjdst ogtos lk l-Qd.17

Pt o t Jot Cods dsput wt islstand Salast brigades was due to the perception that

other religious gures had been included in the JointCod. T ogto ws tll ctcd bmany for its high-prole patron, controversial religiousgure Sheikh Adnan Arour. Arour is well known in Syriafor his ery tele-salast weekly satellite program, during

which he has vowed to grind the esh of pro-regimealwts d d t to t dogs.18

hs dscous s pld wll to t gs scttv, d govt ocs v dubbd topposto a, stcl pl o t abc plulo o aous . Dspt aous dost,t ovll coposto o t Jot Cod dodt. T Jot Cod d cludd aoubecause he was an eective fundraiser in the Gulf, andultpl soucs pot tt ws wd to tp sks o sk solto.19 Ovll, s cluso s oindicative of the importance of ideological nanciers in theGul t t tt o t Jot Cods dolog.

etl ctos lso lpd to gt t ldsp,

PHOTO 1 | THE gEnERAl cOmmAnd


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vots. Ts s spcll tu alppo, wTwd Bgd ld abdl Qd Sl cooptd

wt alppo mlt Coucl ld Colol abdl Jbal-Aqidi, despite ocially retaining a separate leadershipstructure. In an interview, Col. Aqidi stated that despitet ct tt t jot o goups ot alppo

wokd closl togt, t w ocd to wok udspt stuctus od to t ccss to vto udg soucs.26

Primarily as a consequence of disparate sources ofudg, t Jot Cod ws v bl to sstts ldsp ov t jot o bl goups. itld to plt cod d cotol bcus tsauthority was undermined by the growth and inuenceo dpdt bgds tt w dologcll dstctd d t ow soucs o udg. Ts goups

w bold to t suppls, bot pvt d sttsposos, d tus d spt optol ptvso tt o t Jot Cod. hc, optos

w coductd dpdtl, ltg t blt tocv sttgc objctv.

Ulttl, t Jot Cod ws ubl to ovcothese obstacles and establish a unied chain of commando bl ocs. m o ts lds, owv, ldfrom this rst major attempt to unify external andtl cod stuctus d cd ts lssosover to the Supreme Military Command. Three of the ve

cods o t Gl Cod ow st o tSMC, and ve of the provincial Military Council heads bs, wt ub o ots closl volvd

with the SMC although not ocially members.

The Five Fronts Command

i l novb 2012, t S opposto covd Do t ot ttpt to u ks. T Do

ocbl ld o t .21

T pl o t Sl, o costl, mlt Couclbest exemplies the problems that arose due to foreignnancing and inuence. The ocial head of the Sahelmlt Coucl, Bgd Gl huss Koul,

was appointed to the position by the Coordination Ocet t bst o t Sud psttvs, dspt vglttl utot ov bl ocs optg t Ltkpovc. Bg. G. Koul ws wdl dstustd othe ground, and rumors quickly circulated that he wasbot sp o Sud Pc Bd b Sult d Cia plt.22 i tg ld b bl goups tpovc, bl cods jctd s ldsp dstd lctd ad rl to sv s t d o Slmlt Coucl.

yt, bcus Koul cotolld t ccss to soucs,

bls w ocd to cotu wokg wt dsptoptol utot bg plcd t ds orl. Tus, o sot t ollowg t tg,bot rl d Koul w svg s t ld othe Sahel Military Council, which led to conictingcommands regarding rebel operations and inghtingov souc dstbuto.23 Ol toug t ctoo t Sup mlt Cod d t ppotto w ldsp bod o t costl s tsconict been resolved.24

T vots dspld b t bls ptos lso

cusd pobls o t dstbuto o s. T JotCods ldsp d tdd o t ogtoto sv s cs o dstbutg s dsoucs, t wpos w cotuousl dstbutd sct. Stt sposos, logsd pvt suppls,bg to wok outsd o t wok o t JotCod, skg pldgs o lolt o d goupssd t cout gdlss o wt t w ptof the organization. Colonel Af Suleiman, head of theidlb mlt Coucl, copld bout t poblscusd b dspt soucs o udg. i tvw

wt Time, sttd tt t Sud psttv to tJot Cod Okb Sk, Lbs busss,got volvd t ssu o wpos to splt ou ks,to dvd t volutos h od t wtt coucl, d w wokg to l ts t.25

i so css, t dpdt bgds d tmlt Coucls wokd closl togt but cos to ud spt ldsp stuctus od toexploit dierent channels of funding caused by patron

PHOTO 2 | BRIgAdIER gEnERAl HUssEIn kOUlIyA


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busss Okb Sk, t o Sud psttvto t Jot Cod tod pvousl, d s

wdl kow s bg lol to Sud ptog.33

Shortly after Miqdads announcement, a video waspostd o youTub tug hg mlt Coucl

head Mustafa Sheikh conrming the formation ofthe ve ghting fronts.34 Both Sheikhs and Miqdadsdost o t fv fots Cod suggsts tto t bgg, t ogto ws ssoctdo wt t tl fSa ldsp bod t wtocs o t goud. Ulk t Jot Cod, tfv fots Cod v cvd t bu- omany important eld commanders, and it failed to wint lolt o t jot o bl goups sd Sm bls blvd t to b cl ttpt b Sud

ab to pult S bl goups d ct

lol po oc.

35

Dspt t ct tt t cod dd ot copss jot o ocs o t goud, t td considerable amount of inuence due to its resourcesSome eld commanders reported that they attendedtgs wt t cod d ostsbl cooptd

wt t od to g ccss to udg d wposdespite viewing the outt with distrust.36 it ws lsobelieved that the Five Fronts Command oered rebelso sttgc sgt d gv btt tctcl dvc tt Jot Cod. O bl cod sttd tt

t fv fots Cod d sttgc vso, wct Jot Cod lckd, d t povdd bttpts o tctcl optos.37 Tus, t w ub o cods, suc s Colol Qss Sudl-D, wo wokd wt bot t Jot Cod dt fv fots Cod.38

altoug t fv fot Cod cvd lttlsuccss utg bl goups ud ts coodtot gogpcl dvso o S to ots s

tg ws publcd s poltcl coc to utt opposto bsd o t S ntol ittv,a proposal developed by prominent opposition gurerd S to ct w colto tt would copotll ctos o t S opposto d plc tlg S ntol Coucl (SnC) s t lgtt

psttv o t opposto.27 Ulk t SnC,wc ld to coct wt ocs o t goud dsuered from a lack of legitimacy, the Syrian Nationalittv sougt to o poltcl ldsp tt wsbsd o t cluso o t gssoots oppostotwoks cludg t f S a d otd goups.28

Wl ll s w o ts gtg o poltcllds, t Qts w lso oldg pvt tgo bl cods. T vtd ll povclmlt Coucl lds, t ost pot bl

cods o c o t lg bgds wt tJot Cod stuctu, d cods o tdpdt bgds. Wt poss o udg d

weapons along with signicant incentive money paidup ot o ttdc, pott codsgd to tvl to Do o t tg.29

T Suds sw ts scod Do tg s ttptto sideline their inuence among the oppositiond dcdd to ct t ow bl ogto bbkg w o t Jot Cod stuctu.They reportedly oered vast sums to Military Councillds d dpdt bgd lds to us tQt vtto d wok dctl wt Sud abstd.30 altoug o t ost pott blcommanders ignored the request and traveled to Doha, slct w cods cos to st S d sd

wt t Sud psttvs.

O novb 5, 2012, wl t Do tgs wtkg plc, vdo ws postd o youTub oucgt oto o t fv fots Cod. i touct, spoks o t hg rvolutoCouncil Louai Miqdad stated that the FSA had deviseda new ve front command structure to unite rebelocs bsd o t sttgc lgt o ctareas into ve ghting fronts.31 T ouct

ws tud potl o Al-Arabiya d covd bAsharq al-Awsat, two Sud ab d coglots,ltoug t ws v potd o b t Qt dgt al-J.32 This detail conrms the role of Saudi

ab t oto o t fv fots Cod.Moreover, Louai Miqdad is a close associate of Lebanese

PHOTO 3 | lOUAI mIqdAd And OkAB sAkR


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lt, clud lctd postos.

The command is divided into ve geographic fronts withs lctd bs c: t st ot, t wst/ddl ot, t ot ot, t sout otand the Homs front. The ve fronts construction draws

upo t Sud pcdt o t fv fots Codd cosoldts t out mlt Coucls tove operational headquarters. The estimated geographicboundaries of the ve fronts are illustrated in Map 2.

Five military deputies and ve civilian assistant deputiesw ppotd b SmC bs to d c otTs ppots cogd o t tctclkowldg d cobt pc, d tus ss pott optol cods o c othe fronts. Each front also has ve departments topo cobt suppot d cobt svc suppot

uctos cludg Optos, itllgcSuppl d Pocssg, fcl d adsttv

Aairs, and Transitional Justice, with an appointeddpttl d to ovs d supvs t ctoso c dptt.43 B cotst, t Sup mltCod dos ot v cospodg dptts tthe Front level. Consequently, at this time, the SMC doesot v ogc suppot ssts, o dos t v cotolov t llocto o soucs tt obtd b tindividual fronts. The signicance of this formulation ists copoto o stg suppl cs d twoks

wt c o t ots od to vtull ct toug t ctld uts o t SmC. Utlts occus, t SmC wll pc dgdto tsblt to ocstt optol pots coss lots.

T SmC dos v two ctld dptts, scommittee and a nancial committee, each composedof ve representatives from among the councils 30bs.44 at t d o t cod s t C oSta, who is aided by a support oce, an arms oce,and a communication oce.

T Sup mlt Cod sould ot b s s w ogto tt ws ctd dug t-dt pod b bl cods. istd, t souldb udstood s t poduct o pocss tt sb udw o ots. rbl codsbot sd d outsd o S, v slowl bdvlopg t css d stuctul oudtoo ogto tt could ut bl goups to trequirements set by ground conditions, internationa

pcdt tt stll dus ud t w Supmlt Cod d s llk o cotud Sudinuence during its creation.

THE sUPREmE mIlITARy cOmmAnd

T Do tg l novb2012 sultd t cto o poltcl ogto, t SOpposto Colto (SOC). TColto ptll subsud tpvous SnC stuctu, copotgso o ts bs to w

poltcl ldsp. Sotl t SOCs cto, blcods dcdd to cov tl cocto discuss the unication of rebel groups. Many ofts cods d ttdd t tlks Do dd b coucto wt t poltcl lds

gtd t. T gd o ts tgs wta renewed interest in unication, in order to serve ast Sup mlt Cod outld b SOC tspl o t stblst o tstol govtsd S.39 i l Dcb 2012, ov 260 blcods o ll ov S gtd atl,Turkey to agree on a unied command structure, creatingt Sup mlt Cod wt t gol o svgs Ds mst o SOCs utu tstolgovt.40 T gtg ws opl ttdd bsecurity ocials from the United States, Britain, France,t Gul, Tuk, d Jod, d t ws otod bttol dlgts o uous couts.41

at t ds o tsv tlks, coc ttdsgd to ct oll ogd d stuctudcod clld t Sup Jot mlt Cod,ost cool tsltd s t Sup mltCod (SmC). T pssd t golsbd t cto o t SmC: to ut ocs o tgoud to pvt c; to sdl tl ltsand reduce their inuence over the fate of the Syrianpopl; d to pvt tst lts o tkg

ov cts o pow t cout.Oc t stuctu ws gd upo, ptcpts lctd30 bs to sv o t w cod, 11 oocers and 19 civilians.42 altoug t s gl uusulo t to b lctd postos wt ltcod, t opposto s sougt to d todoctc pcpls d oc lvl o ccoutbltb psg t potc o lctos. Tus, llcut opposto ldsp bods, bot poltcl d


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stuctu d t Sud-dsgd fv fot Codaltoug pvt soucs o udg wll lkl cotuto ow into Syria, aligning the resources of the two statesposos s sstl o t SmC to v tsctollgtc d t t blt to sv s lblcs o dstbuto o soucs.

Establishing a Chain of Command

i od to btt udstd t SmCs blt toestablish a chain of command, it is necessary to rstlook t ts ogtol pcdts, wc udlt SmCs oudto. Ud t Jot Cod, tmlt Coucl ds w t to pot dctlto t Gl Cod. i pctc, owv,t Gl Cod dd ot cs optol

pto dds, d t sv lttos posd bt optoll supo S govt ocs.The process has been highly uid, and the armedopposto s dptd s ccustcs v dcttd.Thus, each failed attempt at unication has contributedto opposto lds lg cuv, d t w SmCs sougt to ddss t pobls tt dd tsprevious structures ineective.

T SmC lso psts t covgc ottol pto tsts. a css codto ot SmCs cto ws gt btw Qt dSud ab, s t bls ost pott bcks, tocl t suppot toug o ogto. Tus,t SmC s lgto o t Qt-dsgd

Jot Cod d ts povcl mlt Coucl

TURKEY

IQ

JORDAN

LEBANON

Eastern FrontNorthern Front

Central Front

Homs Front

Southern Front

Latakia

Tartous

Homs

Hama

Aleppo

Idlib Al Raqqah

Damascus

As SuwaydaDeraa

Deir ez-Zor

Hasakah

Rastan

al Qusayr

Yabrud

Zabadani

Abu Kamal

Tal Aybad

Ras al Ain

Afrin

mAP 2 | AREA Of OPERATIOns fOR THE fIvE fROnTs


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dpdt bgds w copotd to t SmCt tl cs o utot d tct. Tsdecision has had two important eects. First, chains ofcommand are not uniform across the ve fronts, witheach sub-unit retaining their own unique authoritystuctus. Scod, lolt s t ds o tcod, t t to t w SmC codTus, t SmC s ot stuctull cosv, d tsblt to oc cod d cotol s dpdto t coopto o c o ts bs.

altoug t SmC s sttuto s lttl utott s sstd dg o cod d cotol tougocsttg t coopto o ts bs d

dputs. Wkl tgs ld to povd updtson current operations, coordinate eorts and actions,dvs o tctcs, d dscuss utu optos. Tsmeetings typically include reports from each of the veots d updts o t ovts d ctos ossoctd bl uts; sssst o cut stgtsd wksss; dbts o ow soucs sould bdstbutd d ow t c b btt utld; dcollctv dscusso o tctcs d optos. mtgsare often led by Deputy Chief of Sta Mustafa AbdelK, wo uctoll svs s t optocommander overseeing the ve fronts. He does not have

t utot to ssu cods, d dcsos td tob d collctvl. Tus, abdl Ks p olis to weigh rebel eorts with current resources, helpssss t plct o ssts, d dt btw tdiering needs of front commanders and members.47

For his part, the Chief of Sta, Major General SalimIdriss, is seen more as a political leader than as a eldcod. m bs o t SmC kd tthis election to the position of Chief of Sta was in part

cotol ov t coucls. Tus, t ogtos ddot sv s tol-lvl ogto, but std

w collcto o povcl-lvl ogtostt coductd optos d ogd logstcsdpdtl o o ot. ec mlt Couclfocused not on coordinating more eectively withll bl uts sd S, but t o gg tcoopto o bl uts wt t ltd s oopto.45

T mlt Coucls w lgl succssul stblsg dg o cod d cotol wtt gogpcl scop. Ts succss sultd tug povcl-lvl sugt stuctu toug

wc t SmC s ow lookg to plt tol-lvl c o cod.46 Tus, t SmC stds t tus o gssoots lt stuctu d ccllt sttuto. Ss d lts gdullttptg to tso to t lkss o tol b pplg ctld, ccl stuctu.

mlt dctos wokg wt t SmC v tdt sttutol lt pts. Ts dctos skg to ct t wok dd to buld ltsttuto tt suts t cctstcs o t oppostoocs d lts o t goud. SmC lds v

to d coposs btw totclstuctu d l-wold pplcto. Tus, wl tSmC would lk to ucto s Ds mst t td o ucotstd c o cod, t s cutlmore akin to a corps level headquarters that serves moreto coodt t to cod.

Signicant obstacles remain to creating an institutionalwok cpbl o cvg g lvl ooptol cod. W t mlt Coucls d

PHOTO 4 | sElEcTEd sUPREmE mIlITARy cOmmAnd mEmBERs


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g ocs d oucd tt t pckpswould b ttd s w psos d would ot blsd utl t S lt wtdw o t.49 Shortly after, a subsequent video disavowed thetl sttt d cld tt t Un ocs wbg ld o t ow potcto d w bg

ttd s gusts.50 T ct tt t youk mtsBgd plcd t ogl o ostl sttt

wt o coclto sttt dcts tt tbgd spodd postvl to pssu t cvd ot SmC s wll s llow bls t D povcRebel commanders from the Southern front conrmedtt t bgd bowd to pssu d llowd tpckps to b sl scotd to Jod.51

Wl t cs o t dtd Un pckps s posg sg o gt cod d cotol, tSmCs cut pss s o collctv dcso-

kg t t top-dow cods. rgdlsso t lts o ts cut cod d cotol, tSmC s pld pott ol scogbl optos. it s povdd gt oppotutso collboto d coodto og t dsptbl goups optg S. Toug t SmCbl cods t ot ow bl to bttcouct wt cods ctl d soutS d collctvl dscuss ws to pov teectiveness of operations, including the allocation ofocs d soucs w css.

T SmC s to cd t lvl o cooptot coss-povcl lvl. no log do bl bgdsopt soll wt dstct povcl gogpcboud. mo ot, bgds ldg ocs dlloctg soucs to d optos occug s outsd o t dstct ots d dvlopgcoss-povcl cpgs s pt o t lgsttg to tgt g stuctu. Ts log opersonnel to weight eort is particularly practiced byt lg cs bgds tt ogtollo dvlopd d v tl cs cpbl

o cod d cotol. Ulk t sll, locldbattalions, franchised brigades such as the FarouqBttlos d t Twd Bgd v boddt s o optos d sdg suppot to tot ots wc k bttls tkg plc. Tssuggsts gt coopto s tkg plc wt co t ots s wll s coss ots od to cvsttgc objctvs.

du to s blt to sv s dplot o t coucl.48He was not chosen because of his command of signicantground forces or his operational eectiveness, but instead

o s blt to sv s poltcl psttv ot coucl d o s psol ltosps to ogocials, and more importantly, to suppliers.

Sc s dcto Jul 2012, idss s wokd tout bl ocs d ct ogto tt couldstbls cod d cotol ov t. h ws pott lso to t Qt uds clttgt cto o t Jot Cod, d pld pott ol wt t ogto up utl ts gto t SmC. h lso s w ltosp wtSOC Sct-Gl must Sbbg. rgdlss o

whether Idriss relationship to Sabbagh and other ocialshas tangible benets or not, Idriss has gained a reputationo s blt to ccss soucs d dstbut t torebel groups ghting in Syria. Although this reputationhelped secure him the position of Chief of Sta, hes so stuggld to t pcttos d s cddiculty obtaining resources and distributing them tot ots. moov, bcus idss ol s pcvd tob o poltcl t lt, bl cods doot s s t d top-dow c o cod.Ts s ltd s blt to sst utot ov t

dvdul SmC cods wo cs t gstlvl o cod o t goud.

i sg o t SmCs cd utot, G. idss wsbl to t pssu o t youk mts Bgd tosu t ls o 21 U.n. Dsggt Obsvfoc (UnDOf) pckps wo w dtd bt bgd o mc 6, 2013. i vdo postd oldtl ollowg t dtto, t youkmts Bgd ccusd t Un toops o ssstg

PHOTO 5 | fAROUq TRAInIng sEssIOns


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btw bl goups optg t ot d t

south is signicant and its implications will be discussedlt ts pot. Tt coss-bgd d coss-ot

jot dvos tkg plc to ccout o t dvdd ct gt pt o ocs s tstt to tds o gt coopto d psts glvl o coodto t pvousl s.

The eects of a coordinated dialogue on operations areld ppt ub o ct bl succsssFor example, unlike previous oensives that tended tob dsogd d pool coodtd b w loosllkd bgds, t optos tgtg Wd l-Dlt bs v b cull pld d pt o

wd sttg to ttck t gs ocd stuctusmultpl uts o coss S v ptcptd toperations, and many have brought signicant resourcesto b ts k bttlot.54 altoug t SmC ddot tk t ogtol ld ts cs, t dd lpto cltt t ovt o ocs d llocto osoucs o ot ots.55

Pt o ts cd coopto og bl goupsincludes new training courses being oered by someo t lg bgds to t ocs o coss tve fronts. Videos have surfaced on YouTube of troopso t D mlt Coucl bg td b twocommanders from the Farouq Battalions. The trainingclasses are part of an organized eort by the Fajr al-IslamBattalion in conjunction with experienced and ecientcommanders from the Farouq Battalions.52 accodg tosttts d dug t vdo, ts copsvtraining courses include physical tness and weaponstg, wt o obust lt sllbus to b

developed in the future. Such cooperation is unique asthe Farouq Battalions do not have active units in Deraa,and these dierent groups have not previously shown theclto to wok togt.

T vdo lso oucs tt ts goup s ts scodgraduating class, and part of a larger eort to unifyislc bgds t sout d ll t wt goups t ot.53 To ts d, toops t sout bgtd b cods o t ot. T dvso

Opposition Elements Involved

Jabhat Nusra

Syrian Liberation Front

Tafanaz

Idlib Military Council

(Suquor al-Sham)

Wadi al-Deif

Maarr Shamshah

Heesh

To Hama

Maarrat al-Numan

To Aleppo

Wadi al-Deif Airbase sits along theprimary highway that connects Aleppoto Hama City.

In mid-October 2012 the airbase cameunder siege by the Opposition. isoperation is still ongoing. Beginning inFebruary 2013, a council of religious

clerics led by Jabhat Nusra tookorganizational lead for operations.

e council has brought dozens ofgroups from across Idlib province toparticipate in operations at Wadi al-Deif,including the SMC-aliated IdlibMilitary Council and Suqour al-Sham.Four operations rooms with sevenpersonnel each have been established tocoordinate this operation. Eachoperations room oversees between30-40 baalions.

is aack demonstrates coordinationamong coalitions and Jabhat Nusra priorto the establishment of the NorthernFront command. e operationalsymbols on this map approximate literaloperational movements.

mAP 3 | THE BATTlE fOR wAdI Al-dEIf


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In Aleppo, the SMC has also had a signicant impacton the overall eectiveness of rebel operations. Formonths, rebels have been concentrating eorts onbss wt ltd succss. Dug tg btwot ot cods d ots o t SmC, wc t cut stt o optos ws dscussd, t

ws gd tt t bst w to ovu cucl bssin Aleppo would be rst to take control of the securitycopl tskd wt t pscl scut. Tscods wokd togt to dvs dtld plso opto gst t gs 80t gtheadquarters, known as Base 80.56 Ts clt wssposbl o t scut o nb lt bs,

wc ss clt wt alppo ittolAirport. These plans included specic tactical trainingo bl uts d ultpl suvllc ssos poto t opto, suggstg uc o ogd d

eective approach being undertaken by rebels.57 Tksin part to weapons acquired by the arms committeeo t SmC, bls succssull ov t bs dcptud lg stockpl o uto.58 Ts wst scod S lt stllto to ll wt twods, wt bls tkg cotol o l-J bs td bo.59

T SmC s lso povdd gt tspc, so ttbl goups o w o wo s cg o wcsctos c gogpcl . it s lso tddts cod d cotol b cobg dpdtoptos oos d oldg wkl tgs obgds. Ulttl, v t SmC ol svs s cs o gt coopto d coodtoit represents a signicant development because it hasunited the eorts of rebel commanders across Syria. It

mAP 4 | OPPOsITIOn cAmPAIgn UPdATE

TURKEY

IQ

JORDAN

LEBANON

LEGEND

Fixed-Wing Airbase

Rotary-Wing Airbase

Overrun

Under Siege

Minakh

Taftanaz

Abu DuhurTaqba

Jarah

Rasin el Aboud / Kerweis

Aleppo Intl / Nayrab

Deir ez-Zor

Hamadan

Palmyra

Hama

al Qusayr

Basil al-Assad Intl

Shayrat

Tiyas

Nasariyah

SaiqalDumayr

Suwayda

Khalkalakh

Marj Ruhayyil / Baly

Mazzeh Damascus Intl

Qabr al-Sitt

Marj e-Sultan

Latakia

Tartous

Homs

Hama

Aleppo

IdlibAl Raqqah

Damascus

As SuwaydaDeraa

Deir ez-Zor

Hasakah


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t v b ctcd b cvl cods otheir inability to develop eective tactics and operationsgv cut goud codtos d ltd soucsTus, dctos pl pott ol lpg toct sttutol wok, but t lssinuential in the planning and coordination of specictctcl optos.60

Operations and Tactics

G. idss s publcl sttd tt SmC copots lpg to dct v bttl, ctg clos cooptobtw t bttlos cg out t optos dt SmC Optos roo loctd sd S. as pto ovsg optos o t goud, idss d sdput abdl K dscb two-ps pl bgg

wt t w o t pots ollowd b t w otll d ssls.61 These sequenced concepts ofopto glgt t s tt t bls dt st gs cts o gvt: ts pow d wpossupot. B tgtg t stuctu o tscts o gvt, bl cods ttptg tocoduct spg optos tt wll goud t S

a foc d lt t gs wpo cpbltsacvg ts two gols, tu, wll ct tconditions enabling their success in the nal battle forDscus, ccodg to SmC lds.

Ts pl vls sopstctd optol dsgbased on the SMCs identication of what will be the

is the rst attempt at unity that incorporates importantcods o ll S povcs d s ouglgtc o t goud to v bg t pocss obuldg stuctu cpbl o povdg tol-lvlc o cod. as t SmC dvlops ts sttutolcpct, wt t wll sst gt utot wll lkl

dpd o ts blt to dstbut ctcl soucs tobl-ld couts.

Overcoming the Internal External Divide

The most signicant dierence between the SMC andpvous ogtos s tt ts ldsp s coposdtl o bl cods o sd S. Ulkpvous ogtos tt sougt to copoteld commanders but vested nal authority in thetl ldsp bod, t SmCs utot s bsdon the power and inuence of the eld commanders.

A concerted eort was made to include all of Syriasmost important eld commanders, and to create anogto tt ws bsd o t ldsp o Sscut d uts.

Wt w cptos, c b o t SmC, cludgpsttvs d dputs, s t cod osignicant forces on the ground, and all are widelyspctd o t ol ldg optos gst tregime. Important eld commander who are now part oft SmC clud: abdl Qd Sl, d o t Twd

Bgd alppo; must abdl K, d o tSld o t rvoluto Bgd; ad iss, d oSuqour al-Sham Brigade in Idlib; Jamal Marouf, heado t S mts Bgd idlb; Os l-Jd,head of the Farouq Battalions; and Gen. Ziad al-Fahd,d o t Dscus mlt Coucl.

autot wt t coucl s ot bsd o o k,d t s o tl c copsd o dctosd cvls. istd, utot s bsd o c bsoperational eectiveness and the amount of forces hecotols. i t w cptos w bs ot

cod o goud ocs, suc s fj houdal-Faraj with the Eastern Front, they retain inuence aspott dstbutos wo povd ccss to soucsd suppls to bl-ld couts. i css,ccss to soucs s lpd boost t utot ocvl cods wt t SmC, ctg pt pow btw cvl cods d dctgocers. While defectors are valued for their experienced bg pott sttutol o lpg toso t SmC to uctog mst o Ds, PHOTO 6 | sOc sEcRETARy gEnERAl mUsTAfA sABBAgH

SOC Syrian Opposition Coalition

SNC Syrian National Council

FSA Free Syrian Army

SMC Supreme Military Command

SLFSyrian Liberation Front

SIF Syrian Islamist Front


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The recent rebel oensive in Damascus is dierento t ots. it dos ot pp to b dsgd toold tto, but to kp assd o s bck oot. Tbls v tk postos, wtdw, d t otpostos, sttg tt pps to b wokg. Po tothis oensive, the front lines of battle in Damascus were D. now, t pps tt assd b bdoghis ght there to concentrate on holding the easterndstcts o t cptl.

it s pott to ot tt ct succsss ot dct sult o t optol cotol o t SmC, d

t s lttl vdc to sow tt t SmC s pld ogtol ol ts optos. howvts succsss ttbutbl to cd cooptoog bl cods tt s b d possbltoug SmC cls. i ts w, t SmC s povto b pott cs o gt cooptoIt has brought together eld commanders from all acrossS d povdd upcdtd stuctu ocoodto.

ost dcsv bttl t cpg cobd wt udstdg o wt optos dd to stconditions for the decisive eort. Connecting currenttctcl succsss toug ts optol lvl o w

wll b ctcl cvg t sttgc objctv oassds dt. Coodto t t optol lvl sw t SmC wll b bl to cv t gtst pcton rebel eectiveness.

Unlike previous oensives that tended to be disorganizedd pool coodtd b w gogpcll-lkdbrigades, recent rebel oensives have demonstrated a

g-lvl o plg d coodto. i clgwll-ddd g postos alppo povc,idlb povc, d D -zou, bls w bl toconcentrate adequate forces, coordinate their actions,bg v wpos to b, d sust optos wlud g ttck.62 Ts dostts kdpovt t optol poc, dsuggsts tt bls ovcog t ogtollttos.

Taanaz Airbase sits along thesecondary highway that connectsIdlib City to Aleppo.

On January 11, 2013, the airbasewas overrun by the Opposition,disrupting this vital line ofcommunication.

ree factions took part in thesiege: Jabhat Nusra, the SyrianIslamic Front (Ahrar al-Sham,Jamaat al-Taliah al-Islamiyah,and Harakat al-Fajr al-Islamiyah)and the Syrian Liberation Front(Liwa Dawoud of Suqoral-Sham, and the FarouqBaalions).

e operational symbols on thismap do not indicate literal

operational movements.

Opposition Elements Involved

Jabhat Nusra

Syrian Islamic Front

Syrian Liberation Front

Idlib

Tafanaz

mAP 5 | THE BATTlE fOR TAfTnATAz


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The SMCs Relationship to the Syrian Opposition Coalition

The SMC is ocially operating on behalf of the SyrianOpposto Colto, d ts stblst s cosstt

wt t Do gt. Bot G. idss d SOpposto Colto (SOC) Psdt mo l-Ktb

v cotd o t clos ltosp btwSOC d t SmC, d t two co-sgd docutdtg tt t ogtos objctv ws tll o t g d t dstlg o t scutpptuss.63 Tt t two ogtos tclos ltos s pott to t SmC bcus o tstto to sv s Ds mst o tstolgovt, s wll s ts op tt t wll cv bttsuppot d soucs b cultvtg ts ltosp

wt t ttoll cogd colto. To tsd, SOC s suppotd t wok o t SmC bconducting outreach with foreign ocials on behalf oft ogto d ttptg to ul o ltd to t SmC. at t d o fbu 2013, Sct oStt Jo K oucd tt t US would povdo-ltl suppot to t SmC, v t Colto. Tus,t ltosp s poducd tl d to t SmC,ltoug ts d lls sot o t dsd wpos darms capability requested.64

T ltosp btw t two ogtos s lgldvd o t psol bod btw SOC SctGl must Sbbg d G. idss, d t two

are in frequent communication with one another oftenttdg tgs sd b sd. Sbbg s oS ntol Coucl (SnC) b. altoug

ws lstd s dpdt b o t SnC,Sbbg s dp ts to t musl Botood. as pto t SnCs lt buu, ws potdl o ot ost pott dstbutos o musl Botoodudg to t S opposto dug t l stgsof the conict.65 Ts cuss so coc og SmCbs wo dstust bot t musl Botoodd t SnCs cotud ol wt SOC.

Tks to succssul g popgd cpg, tmusl Botood s wdl std o t goudo ts ol t h ssc 1982, d Ss dstust t ogto.66 Ts s d toctcs o t SnC o bg too closl lld wtt musl Botood. moov, bl codsv doucd t ld colto o bg too ovd o t bttls ougt o t goud.67

Ts gtv vw o t SnC d t muslBotood s t tt t jot o SmCbs p to kp t pow stuctus dsouc cls ovd o t colto. Tus,although ocially operating within SOCs frameworkrebel commanders are quick to point out that the Supreme

mlt Cod uctos o ts ow utot ds dpdt bod.68

moov, w ltos btw t two ogtos twtd b t SmCs ctcs o t Colto olg to ct tstol govt. G. idsss ptdl dscussd t potc o tstogovt lvg t pssu o t ltcoucls d bl goups wo cutl sposblo dstg bl-ld s.69 h ot coplstt bl ocs ubl to coctt o optosand eectively consolidate due to governance concerns

tt t sposblt o t SOC.

Rebels have had to take on civic roles, including eorts tosto lctct suppls d dl wt bd sotgsTs s ducd t bls optol cpct, sultg optol puss s bls c t tsolds odvc. Bcus t d opposto dos ot vt cpct to povd svcs d bsc cssts tobl-ld couts, t locl popultos ottu o t bls. Ts s cucl cosdto toulto o pls o optos k cts sucs alppo d Dscus. Wtout t suppot o locl

couts, bls wll cotu to stuggl tkgub cts.

REBEl OPERATIOns On EAcH fROnT

North

Optos t ot povcs o idlb d alppov ovd w o tg to g tto joub cts d std v ocusd o dgdg tgs pow b tgtg bss. T cptu oTt lt pot idlb povc o Ju

11, 2013 through the combined eorts of multiple rebeluts s b t lgst bs cptud b t blopposto, d pcvd b to b dctoo woud sttgc cpblts.70 altoug soreports denied a SMC role in the oensive, Gen. Idriss

ws volvd plg optos d ub oSmC copot uts ptcptd t Ttcampaign, including the Farouq battalions.71


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Sc Ju 2013, t d opposto s cotud

pplg pssu to t mk, nb, d Kwslt pots alppo povc, ctl cptugt l-J bs d Bs 80, wc llowd o tpso o optos gst nb d alppoittol apot.72 Bsds tgtg bss,coodtd ttcks v lso b wd gst tsttgc Wd l-D lt bs loctd mtnu, idlb povc. Optos gst t ltbs v b udtk to vous dgs scOctob o lst , but t coodto pltdb Jbt nus coopto wt t S islcfot d SmC sub-uts psts pvouslutd ppoc.73 SmC coopto wt Jbt nusd ot tst goups S wll b ddssd -dpt t lt pot.

East

Jbt nus s lgl spdd optos tst ot cludg t cptu o t l-Twdolctc d, Ss lgst. T cptu o l-

Tw bgs t totl ub o ds opposto

possession to three: al-Thawra, al-Raqqa provinceBaath dam, al-Raqqa province, and Tishrin, Aleppopovc.74 While these victories have given signicantlvg to Jbt nus, ot bl uts v bcoductg stks gst t gs g scto the east, expelling government forces from two oileldsand a gas eld by early December 2012.75 O novb22, 2012, t opposto ws bl ut to cosoldtt cotol ov t coutsd D -zou bcptug t k tll bs t , md.7

Sc t, t v cocttd t ttto ocptug D -zou ct, plcg t D -zoult pot ud sg o ots, pssug t133t brigade headquarters, and pushing into the Ommald mt Qd gbooods.77

In early March 2013, rebels successfully overran al-Raqqacity. This is signicant because it is the rst provincialcapital to fall into rebel hands, and represents the rstsuccssul ttpt b bls to ull cptu ubct.78

mAP 6 | THE BATTlE fOR dAmAscUs


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to bk toug govt ls t ot d wstto loos t ots-log sg o t stogoldsin the center of Homs, despite coming under ercel bobdt. i clcultd opto, blgoups bsd t b povcs o hos d idlbdvcd o t ot wl bgds o ul hos

ttckd govt postos t soutwstdstct o Bb a. Svl odblocks t dstctfell to rebel ghters and dozens of regime troops wereforced to ee to the regime-held neighborhood of JobarT g spodd b ttckg t g bstogolds o Kld d l-Qusou otHoms city in an attempt to repel the rebel oensive.8

Heavy ghting between the two sides was ongoing at thet o publcto o ts pot.

South

rbl gs st Dscus, otbl t cptuo t mj l-Sult lt pot o novb25, 2012, v ocd t g to cd tto ot pps o t ct d coctt t ocslog t lt stogolds d alw-jotgbooods loctd t ot d wst.88 a pcovd o t s d o S rpublc Gudsoldier and distributed through social media conrmedthese positions, and listed Daraya (southwest), Aqraba(sout), d B (otst) s gbooods udcotto btw t g d t opposto.89

Heavy ghting and aerial bombardment throughout thect d t suoudg go psstd, wt ctvstspotg g octs podcll st tot sttgc soutwst gbooods o D dmoud.90

Volc Dscus s ctl scltd, to lvlssome activists compare to the July 2012 oensive forcotol o t ct.91 T w pus s coodtdeort among six rebel groups led by Jabhat Nusra, whohave dubbed the eort Operation Epic in the capital oft Ods, d t f S a. fgtg d

regime airstrikes have been ercest in Jobar, Zamalka, al-zblt, Qbou, d t Dscus g od.92 Trebels, who were able to briey close the major highwayug o Dscus to t ot, s, Ts s ott bttl o Dscus. Ts bttl s to pp o tt to Dscus.93

Central/West

i t wst, bl ocs soldg postos Jbll-akd d Jbl l-Tuk. as sult, t locl

Alawi population has ed in force to Tartus, Latakia,d t alw mouts, ot lvg t vllgs

bdod.79

T S stll cotols t sk,owv, d t s td std bobdto t bl-ld go.80 rbl cods o tgoud s t ppg o jo vso oLtk oc alppo s b tk d suppl lsscud, d t wll b bl to dw o ougl 10,000ghters from Jabal al-Akrad and Jabal al-Turkman.81

i Dcb 2012, t opposto cd out ubo optos gst g d alwt stogolds h povc, cptug hl d pts o mok.82The regime responded by launching a counter-oensive,

tkg so pott cckpots log t alppo-to-Dscus gw, d puttg t blso t dsv. Ts ocd bl goups to -llocttoops d soucs o ot optos t ot od to t t cotol o sttgc potslog t gw. Tks pt to cd wpothat surfaced in the hands of SMC-aliated units inl fbu 2013, t bls succssull plld number of regime attacks, quickly recovering from lossesthat occurred during the regime oensive, and they haveoc g put t g o t dsv.83

Homs

rbl optos t hos ot v bcoptvl ltd sc t gs butl sllgcpg o fbu d mc 2012 ocd bls to

wtdw o hos ct. Sc t, t g sconcentrated its eorts to control Homs city and thesttgc out o Dscus to t cost. followg sll uptck clss ttd b bl goups t dug d-Ju 2013, t g stocts to t ct.84 fo tt t, t gs b cg out std bobdt cpggst t ct, wl lso ovg gst rst dcptug Job d K.85 Shabiha, po-glt, ccopd t g toops to tpovc, d blvd to b bd t ssc oov 100 cvls Bst l-hs o Ju 17,2013.86

Bgg l mc 2013, bls lucd jooensive to retake parts of Homs city. Rebels managed


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spt o t psol lgtc o ts bswll b s cucl to t coucls blt to ct tsttutol bss o Ds mst s ts stuctu d ogtol ucto.

Ovll, t SmC s d ltd succss stblsg

c o cod. T ogtol dvgco lt cs d locl twoks s ltdt blt o ctl ldsp bod to cosoldt unied armed opposition force. In this way, the SMCs b bl to sv s pott plto outul coopto d coodto, but bod ttt s stuggld to sst gt utot. Ts cllgss ptl bcus t SmC s gv ts copotsw ctvs to subsu t stg twoks udt SmCs sct c. Utl gt tlsuppot o t SmC tls, ts uts otlkl to cd lt utot to t SmC, pg

to t t optol pogtv tt cos wtindependent sources of nancing.

Cod stuctus bsd o twoks t tcs llow t cto o vcuu o gd-upo stdds. Wtout gd-upo pcpls ttc b pusd dow stblsd c o cod,dvdul cods td to ct cods o coductunique to those under their direct authority and aret sposbl o sug dc.95 Ts vcuus sultd codtos tt v b coducv tolootg d v ld to popul pcptos o blcommanders as warlords. Signicant portions of thepopulto v tus b ltd o t bls, condition which has in turn limited their ability to ght ub cts. i od to b s s possollt cod, t SmC ust v t blt topolc tsl to su tt ts tp o bvo s otcodod wt ts ks. Ts cluds t cpct

AddREssIng lImITATIOns And fUTURE

OBsTAclEs

The SMC has made a concerted eort to bring armedvoluto goups ud t ubll o cotolldlt cod b buldg stog lks wt t

locld bttlos d cs bgds d ctg plto o t dvlopt o coutwdlt sttg. it s lso tk ub o stps togl tst goups b sug tt ll fSabttlos upold t Gv Covto, posgstrict age requirements for new recruits, and cutting outs tt bk t uls o cvg ltl d o-ltl suppot.94 Yet despite the signicant progresst SmC s d, t ub o ctclobstacles ahead. Overcoming them will be dicult andpos cllg to ctg stog lt sttutod possol d oc t w S.

Converting Networks to Military Hierarchies

T jot o bls stll dt wt dvdullds, t t wt ut s o ltcoucls. Psol twoks t k dtt llcs d lolts. rsouc llocto dideological aliation weigh in as distant, secondaryctos. Tus, t SmC s ld o t psolputto o dvdul cods o lgtc tts dvd o t botto up, t t top dow.T SmC s o sttutol lgtc tt s spt

o t lgtc o t cods ssoctd wtt cod. altoug t SmC s b succssulin incorporating important gures and their personalnetworks, it nevertheless faces a signicant challenge inbuldg ss o tol dtt tt c tscdpsol ltosps d su log-t lolt tot Cod. Buldg up ts sttutol lgtc,

fIgURE 3 | gROUPs AffIlIATEd wITH THE syRIAn lIBERATIOn fROnT sOURcE: sIf fAcEBOOk PAgE


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Ts two ctos v ctd dscpc powstuctus btw ot d sout bl goupsnot ol ot bl goups lg, bttorganized, and tactically more eective, but they alsov cotol ov t suppl ls ug o Tuk

as sult, bl cods t ot v o

authority and inuence within the Supreme MilitaryCod t do t coutpts t sout.9

So cods cocd b t polt o ocs t ot d t sout, ptcull gv tt tmain focus remains on the nal battle for Damascus.

Whether this cleavage will aect resource allocation andt dcto o utu optos s to b s.

Incorporating Independent Units

T SmCs tl succss s dvd o ccoutgo t d oppostos two dvgg tds: t

locld bttlos ssoctd wt t f Sa, d t lg dpdt cs bgdsd t llcs. T SmC s copotd tstuctu o t Jot Cod d t ldsp ot mlt Coucls, wl lso cludg codso t lgst d ost powul dpdtfranchise brigades, including the Al-Farouq Battalionsin Homs, the Suqour al-Sham Brigade in Idlib, andt Twd Bgd alppo. Ts s t tt tSmC cluds bod spctu o opposto ocst pvous ogtos, d t copsss wdg o dvdul ctos d dologs.

altoug t SmC s b cul to pudt t osttst lts o t S opposto, spcllt fog Tost Ogto-dsgtd Jbtnus, t s ttptd to copot dologclldvs goups d sow wllgss to wok wtcommanders of all ideological aliations, bringingtogether secular, Islamist, and Salast commandersicluso o dpdt dologcl bgds s pott pt o t SmCs blt to sv s cs o tol-lvl utot d pltcod d cotol ov t dspt dopposto ocs.

howv, ts goups ptcpto t SmCraises the question of radicalization within the Syrianopposition. Specically, the SMC has included memberso bot t S Lbto fot d t SIslamic Front and has worked with the Sala-jihadgoup a l-S, cusg coc og tsttol ptos, ptcull wst lls lookg

to stbls o cod o lt justc d pussubodt uts tt volt t.

OvercomingtheNorthSouthDivide

altoug t opg o t Tuks bod su2012 lpd to coct t d oppostos tlleadership with eld commanders inside Syria, it created scs btw bl goups optg t otd tos optg t sout. B gg cotol octcl bod cossgs t ot, t bls tcould more easily bring in ghters, weapons, fuel, andot logstcl suppot to ot S. rblcommanders noted that Turkish ocials were more

wllg to dl wt t oc t d stblsd dcto lbtd tto, wc gv t gt loclutot.96

T blt to coss t Tuks bod l d ovog vllgs wtout o coutg g ocssultd dtc cg bl cpblt tot. not bl goups bc uc stog tt coutpts t sout. T ks swlld, td ccss to uctog suppl ls, d t d tspc to uv ws tt w possbl o tosoperating in the south. Commenting on the dierentcodtos o bls optg t ot d tos t sout, ad Kl, bl wo s ougt

Aleppo and Damascus, stated In Damascus, it is dicultto gt gus d suppls, but alppo, t s s.97

Ts scs s copoudd b t ct tt tstgroups have been the most eective at operating undercodtos t sout. Bcus o t sctv tuand highly-organized, hierarchical network, Sala-

jdst goups lk Jbt nus v dotd bloptos t sout. Wl tst goups s

wol ot btt soucd d v btt tctclkowldg t ot bl goups tougout S, tdvd btw odt d tst goups s ucmore signicant in the south.98 Other than the Sala-

jdst uts t sout, w o t lg csbgds opt t vct. most bl uts td tob gl locld d otd o t sl-ds otheir communities, rather than on oensive operationsagainst the regime. Consequently, moderate forces areud-dvlopd d oud Dscus, bcus tlck t ogto d soucs to copt wt tSalast-jihadist groups.


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o S ud islc clpt.105 moov, ulkt SLf, wc uctos o s llc t s unied leadership command, SIF sub-units have begungg ocs d ldsp stuctus ud occl c o cod.

aog t Sifs ost otbl bl uts t aal-Sham Battalions, the al-Haqq Brigade in Homs, andhkt l-fj l-isl alppo. altoug tSifs ldsp stuctu s ot b copotdto t SmC s ull s tt o t SLf, pottdvdul lds wt t Sif bs o tSmC, cludg abdl r Soss, d o t l-Haqq Brigade in Homs. Moreover, SIF sub-units havepott ts d coctos to bttlos d bgdsssoctd wt t SmC. Ts s llowd o low-lvlo copoto o t Sif to t SmC, d t pvst w o coopto btw t two stuctus wt

t SmC gol o vtull copotg Sif ldspwoll wt ts wok.

Despite not being ocially represented on the SMC,bs o a l-S ttdd t atlcoc d w pt to dscussos ov tcoucls cto. a l-S uts v lso stadvisors and representatives to subsequent councimeetings, and SMC commanders conrmed that Ahrarl-S s b cooptg o t goud wt utsssoctd wt t SmC, ptcull t povcso hos d alppo, w a l-S utsv po ltosps wt ol dpdtogtos d lds suc s t not fotDeputy Chief of Sta Colonel Abdel Basset al-Tawil.10

Consequently, it is not surprising that recent rumorssuggst tt a l-S s lookg to jo t SmCin an ocial capacity.107

There is no question that Islamist forces have earneduc spct o Ss, d tt t lkl to pla signicant role in Syrias future government. Thus, its pott o t SmCs lgtc d cdblt to

clud suc ocs. So , t SmC s cogd tpotc o t cluso, wl dwg d lt t cluso o ocs tt sk t dstucto o S stt.

The SMCs ties to Islamist and Salast forces insideo S do wt so coc, owv. T fSaldsp, s pottl tol-lvl utot, slog b cogd o ts tolstc cctd dc to scul, plulstc vso o

o plto toug wc t c povd gtsuppot to t opposto.

Ogll clld t islc fot to Lbt S, tS Lbto fot (SLf) ws oudd Sptb2012 s colto o oud twt islst uts.

T colto s dd b Sk ad iss, d tsost pott uts clud t pvousl todSuqour al-Sham Brigade, the Farouq Battalions, andt Twd Bgd; s wll s t isl Bgd d tD -zou rvoluto Coucl.100 Sotl t toto o t S Lbto fot, ad isslsd sttt oucg tt t goup dto t botl ltos wt t fSa but usdto oer full support to FSA leadership that remained inTuk.101

Tt t S Lbto fot sw t tl

leadership cadres as the most signicant problem fort fSa dostts w ovcog t tl-tl ldsp dvd s so ctcl o t SmC. fot SmC, cluso o SLf uts s ctcl bcus t t lgst llc optg S d ccouto jot o ocs o t goud. T SLf lsooers a collection of charismatic, publicly-recognizedlds wo ld gt lgtc to t ogtosaliated with them.102 Wtout t ptcpto, tSmC would b ocd to copt wt SLf uts opower and inuence a competition that it would likelylos.

To dt, t SLf s vwd t SmC s cdbltl ldsp bod, d ts ldsp stuctus b lost tl copotd to t SmC

with Ahmed Issa of Suqour al-Sham, Abdel Qadir Salahof Tawhid, and Osama al-Jinidi of Farouq all serving ont coucl.

altoug lsts v pssd t coctowds t SLf o ts pss o islc dttd dc to islc lw, t ogto lcks dened ideology or political platform. In fact, the SLF ispcvd o t goud to b ltvl odt, wtmost of the more hard-line Islamist and Salast groupscoosg to jo t S islst fot std.103 TS islst fot (Sif) ws oucd o Dcb21, 2012 vdo sttt d out b t goupsocial spokesman Abu Abdel Rahman al-Suri.104 Tadhere to a fairly dogmatic Salast ideology, insisting on atoctc stt uld b su coucl. T Snationalists, however, and do not call for the unication


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islc clpt d bd b t cut bodsstblsd ud t 1916 Sks-Pcot agt.10

i lss o t wt pp, Col Bul dscussst gowg t btw Jbt nus d Sif ovcoptg vws o t S stt vsus islcclpt s wll s ptcpto poltcl pocsss

Jbt nus bs jct doctc poltcpocsss s llgtt d sk t stblst o islc clpt. O t ot d, Sif bslgl blv t tgt o S stt d

wllg to ptcpt so doctc pocssscludg lctos. Bul ots t sot postoo Sif, sg, Tts just t kd o sot stc tt

JN [Jabhat Nusra] jihadists and the authors of theShumukh strategy seem intent on opposing.110 Tssentiment was conrmed by a group of Ahrar al-Shamghters who reportedly clashed with a Jabhat Nusra

bttlo alppo t bg clld too wk ot spt towds t S stt.111 Ts vlstt v og t o dcl goups S tcotu to bt tolst stt d pso o o doctc pocsss, owv ltd.

i dscussg t ts o cluso vsus clusoo o dcl ocs wt t SmC, t potco ut og ll bl goups sould tk pcdcPsdt assd s lkl coutg o collpsg tattempts at a unied rebel strategy through the brutalityo s ocs d t cost o bttl. Oc tt pps,

lkl pcts bl ks to gt d o dcllts, lk Jbt nus, to co to t o. at ttpot would b posto to kt sl s tsole guarantor against terrorism and chaos. Inghtingamong rebel units only benets Assads strategy. Unity,regardless of ideological aliation, will be important todtg t g d sug stblt post-

assd S.

future Syria. However, with the inuence of the morelgousl cosvtv ocs ow svg o t SmC,so tt odt, plulstc utu o S sendangered. This begs the question of whether the SMC,s doctc sttuto, s cpbl o copotgostl lgous ctos, d so, wt wll b t log-

term political eects of inclusion on the SMC and itssub-uts.

altoug t tt o ts sould ot budsttd, t SmC s t pottl to sv s moderating authority among radicalized factions ghtingo t goud. T ptus o d-dclto slgl stuctud b sttgc clcultos d poltcloppotuts. i t SmC c ct oug ctvso odto, t wll lkl b bl to gl tost dcl lts wt ts stuctu. To ts d, tSmC s cogd t potc o t cluso oso o t o dcl ocs, wl stll dwg dl t t cluso o ocs tt sk t dstucto o S stt, suc s jdst goups lk Jbt nus.T cs o t dtd Un pckps todpreviously is an example of the positive inuence thatt SmC c v ov o dcl goups.

So o t o lgousl cosvtv goups lsocog t dg posd b ts jdst goups,ctg pottl oppotut o t SmC. rctinghting between some of the more Salast rebel units

d Jbt nus s postv sg o t bls dsto cck jdst btos S. i l fbu2012, clss bok out btw Twd Bgdsub-uts d Jbt nus bttlos, wt Twdttptg to stbls ts utot ov tt o Jbtnus. m alpp bls pssd cocs tt

Jbt nus s ollowg og gd d s tsow gols tt ot lgd wt t ll o t g.fut clss btw Twd d Jbt nus vctd o gowg tso ov t Kuds ssu,

wt cods g t Jbt nus o dvtgresources to ght Kurdish units rather than the regime,

d ov t dstbuto o ut d.108

a scs s lso gd btw Jbt nus dts ost lbl ll, t S islc fot. Dsptdg to o dcl tptto o islclw, wt Sifs ks suppot so tp odoctc govc. i wtpp postd o tShumukh al-Islam jd ou o t stuggl S,t Suuk sttgsts w o t dgs o llg

wt sculst-islsts wo oppos t cto o PHOTO 7 | m60 REcOIllEss gUn In AqRABA


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goud bg tt tst goups btt uddTks to gous suppot o pvt soucs Sud ab d ot Ps Gul stts, tstocs, ptcull Jbt nus, ot bttd t scul ocs, wc v b dpvdo soucs b Wst luctc to pt ltl d

Overcoming this decit will be dicult for the SMC, andit will require a concerted eort from the internationalcout. T ct ouct tt t U.S. wllpovd o-ltl d to t SmC, cludg tgssstc, s postv sg o t SmC.114 Wt sucltd suppot wll b oug to pow t SmC suct, spcll sc t lls sot o povdg tuc-ddd wpos d s s s css todtg t assd g.

Sud ab d Qt v potdl dcdd to ult suppot toug t SmC s pt o gt

btw t two ptos to g t po stuctusto o ogto. altoug pvt soucs oudg wll lkl cotu outsd t pts o tSmC, utg t suppot cls o bls sttsposos wll b udtl to sug t lgtco t w ogto.

Dspt t gt btw t two bcks, SmCbs v copld tt t v ot cvdt suppot tt t w posd. Ts bsstated that weapon ows to rebels are drying up.11

O cod cottd tt t sts owpos tt oc poud to ot S owol tcklg.116 it s gll pcvd tt t U.Sd ts wst lls v put pssu o dstbutosto halt the ow of weapons due to the recent designationo Jbt nus s fog Tost Ogto dgowg s o dcl ocs wt t opposto.117

T blt to povd soucs d tl suppotto ts sub-uts s t dtg cto wto ot t SmC wll b bl to ut bl ocs ud

Ulttl, wt t SmC s bl to stbls lvl outot o t o dcl lts, o t dcllts d up ovpowg t o odtocs, s to b s. Pt o t SmCs blt tostbls lvl o utot ov ts goups wll bdpdt o t SmCs ccss to soucs d blt

to dstbut goods d povd svcs to bl-ldcouts.

Financing and Access to Resources

Ctg ctl cl o uds d s to blgoups gos d--d wt ctg ctldldsp. To dt, dspt soucs o udg vsignicantly handicapped the rebels ability to united cosoldt utot o tol lvl. Pvousttpts to ct ctld lt cod wstd b bcks gog toug psol cotcts,

pckg vots, d stg vl d jlous ogthe rebels. Consequently, rebels adopted the commonpctc o ssoctg wt o t o ogto od to dvs ccss to udg.112 i ot css,tl w ogtos w ctd soll o tpupos o cvg o d wpos.

T cs o t novb 2012 Do tg povds stk pl o ow dvs udg sts cbtt pobl o gtto og bls. O t od, bl cods w pd b Qt sposos tottd t tg. O t ot d, Sud sposos

pd bl cods ot to ttd t tg. Tus, od to cv uds o bot sposos, blogtos oll splt, sdg o codto Do wt t ot stg S. altoug utdud t s ldsp stuctus, codsclaimed to be associated with dierent rebel groups andoften professed aliation to rival units.113

moov, cut sts o udg td to powo dcl ocs, wt t coo pcpto o t

PHOTO 8 | RBg6 gREnAdE lAUncHER In HAmA

PHOTO 9 | cOlOnEl AqIdI REcEIvEs wEAPOns


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gs ls o coucto d suppl btw tsstogold cts bg sousl ttd. rblocs v sd cokolds o t outs tt lkthe strongholds of the regime to the active battleeldso ot d st S. Ts cokpots t ulcu upo wc t otus o idlb, alppo,

al-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour Provinces will be decidedi od to cptl o ts succsss d succssulldvc o t ub cts t suoud, t bls

wll d to dstbut cd wpos cpblt tothose actively ghting in these battles.

it s ulkl cocdc tt wl suggld wposo t o yugoslv dd up t ds o b o t SmC s cott d tt slows of weapons seem to be going to groups aligned

wt t SmC.124 Ts suggsts tt t SmC s t lstptll svg s cl o t dstbuto o

udg d wpos. it lso psts dlbteort to place more advanced weapons into the hands ofo odt ocs, t t tsts. i t sindeed a new, organized, and well-funded eort behindt SmC, t could lp to pow o odt bocs.

nvtlss, od to st t lt cpgin their favor, rebel forces will need to acquire thecss soucs to bk t cut stlt

advcd t-ct d t-tk wpos, s wlas secure communications equipment and intelligencesupport, are a prerequisite for rebel success in Syriascts w g ocs v cosoldtd d cc out stks gst bl ocs wtout otlto. T SmCs lgtc wll dpd o tsblt to ccss ts soucs d dstbut t toits sub-units in ways that suciently balance resourcesd ssts wtout ctg tl vls. howvthe SMCs eorts to unify will be futile if its backers,spcll Qt d Sud ab, dcd to wokoutsd t SmC.

Outsd o dct udg d wpos spts, GIdriss has formally requested U.S. help in training elitebl uts. i ltt dtd fbu 4, 2013, Gidss sks U.S. ssstc tg o: (1) spcoptos; (2) ttol ut lw; d(3) in chemical weapons security. He also requested

vous suppls o ts lt uts, cludg: (1)cobt o; (2) gt vso goggls; (3) d ldmonocular and longer range spotting equipment; (4)sttgc couctos; (5) wtto pcks

ts cod d stbls lvl o cod dcotol. i cotg o t SmCs blt to svs ctld cod, t cod o ltbttlo ot idlb povc, ad l-Qt,sttd, T stuctu s good, but ll o t codtott w gt sotg.118 T ct tt t SmC s so

ld to povd wpos d soucs to ts sub-utshas caused some of the commanders to question theirltosp wt t SmC. Ts s lso ptl t sott bl uts cotu to pot t bgd obttlo s d p to dt wt t ollcs t t wt t SmC.

yt coplts ov t lck o wpos cotdctpots tt bls v ctl cvd substtlboost t o o v wpos. rct youTubfootage suggests that rebels are receiving better qualitys, cludg t-tk wpo, ockt lucs,

and more powerful ries.119 Specically, rebels havebegun receiving signicantly better weapons starting inl fbu 2013 toug t Jod bod tsout povc o D. T wpos, wc cludrPG-22 ockt lucs, m79 Os ockt lucs,M60 recoilless ries, and Milkor MGL/RBG-6 grenadelucs, w ll dsgd, uctud, d usd t o yugoslv, d o o t pto t S lt sl.120 This inux of newog wpos lpd spk ss o sups ttckscptug svl tows, bod cossgs, d ods

D povc. Ts wpos v lso b lkd tothe oensive in Damascus, and reports suggest that theyare playing a key role in the ght for the capital.121

a vdo postd l fbu 2013 o youTubshows Col. Aqidi, SMC member and part of the SMCs cott, sttg wt m79 ockt luc s optos oo t Sk Sd dstct t sout o alppo ct.122 Lttl o t wkafter the video was posted, rebels launched an oensivegst lt bcks t ot o alppo ctin which they brought a signicant amount of repower

dow o t bcks, blg t cptu o tbuldg.123 This oensive, combined with other rebeloptos tougout t ct, suggst tt t s pt o w, coodtd sttg to t t g postos d

wk assds old o t ct.

Ts sttg vls wt t bl cods ss t gs ct o gvt t ogog bttlo cotol o ot S d suggsts tt td stuggl s tg ctcl w ps. T


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povd o-ltl d to t SmC, cludg tgassistance, is a signicant step in this direction. However

wt suc ltd suppot wll b oug to powt SmC s to b s.

T gol bd U.S. suppot to t opposto sould

b to buld oc o t goud tt s cottdto buldg osct, stbl S d s lklto spct ac tsts. Povdg gtsuppot to t SmC dos tl t sk o utddconsequences. Some of this support may ow to the moredcl ocs wt t SmC. But t cut polco cto cs uc o sk. Ts polc s otprevented extremists from acquiring arms. Instead, ithas prevented more moderate forces from acquirings d cosoldtg t utot wl llowgt tst ocs to dvlop t ow dpdtsoucs o suppot tt lss sl otod.

T codtos dd to bg bout t S gds slowl bg t, cludg t pptcolscc o t oppostos dspt poltcl dlt tts, log wt t ltst dvcs ot goud alppo d Dscus. russ Dputfog mst mkl Bogdov ctl oucdtt t assd g ll, wl S VcPresident Farouq al-Sharaa commented that the Syrian cot dt bl ocs. motu s stg vo o t opposto.128

Ss stt scut pptus wll ll pt s t assdregime nishes its transformation into a militia-likett.129 T Sup mlt Cod s cutlthe only organization that could serve to ll thescut vcuu lt b ts tsoto. i poplsuppotd, t SmC could stbls oopol o oc S d pottll sv s t t S aEmpowering a unied and accountable leadership fort opposto, ld poltcll b SOC Psdt moal-Khatib and militarily by SMC Chief of Sta GenSl idss, s ot ol pott o cod

d cotol pspctv. Ts stuctu, dvlopdpopl, c ct wok o buldg Sssecurity and governing institutions in order to ll thepow vcuu lt b assds ll d lp to d secure and stable Syria. To quote Gen. Salim IdrissT buldg o t w S stt s ld bgud t fSa bttlos o tod ust b tsodto t post-assd lt o tooow.130

d (6) tctcl couctos.125 G. idss dot bl cods blv tt ctg ltcodo oc could lp cck Ss dt towdbg ld stt toug t cto o possoloc tt s bl to sl-polc d su ul o lw. Sofar, there has been no response to Gen. Idriss request.

howv, opposto soucs s tt gottos underway for the training, if not equipping, of a specialtsk oc Tuk.126

T o-ltl suppot posd to t SmC s logw o t tp o tl d bl cods dto ct possol d opposto tt wll lpduc t sks o sct st, vg ttcks, d potctd cvl w t t ll o assd. as potd outb Pul mutt o Syria Comment, t $60 llo dpromised to rebels is equal to a mere one weeks worth ofUS dct lt d to isl d st ds wot o

dct lt d to egpt.127 Povdg gt suppotto t ogto s css bcus t SmC wlllkl lv o d o ts blt to povd o bl-ldcouts. Ctg stog lt sttuto wll bcucl to Ss doctc tsto, d t SupMilitary Command is the rst step in ensuring that thecouts s possol, osct oc ttsubts to cvl govc d t ul o lw.

cOnclUsIOn

i od to ccopls ts gols t SmC wll dgt ttol suppot, wt t o ogreater nancing or provision of weapons. As the armedopposto dvcs, t wll b sposbl o povdgsvcs lbtd s d dstbutg l d.Ts wll st t bls ltd soucs d custension with local populations, if they are not adequatelyequipped to participate in the process of rebuilding thestt. Ulttl, t SmCs blt to sv s vblldsp bod wll st o ts blt to povd obl couts.

T SmC psts bot cllg d oppotuto t U.S. as polcks stuggl to su lvlof American inuence within the connes of the

adsttos ocottl polc, wokg wt tSmC could c t U.S. posto vs--vs Ssd opposto d povd cs o stbltsould t assd g ll. howv, s o islstsd pc o couttos solutos possignicant obstacles to greater cooperation with theSmC. T ct ouct tt t U.S. wll


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APPEndIx 1: wHO s wH O sE lEc TEd sUP REm E mIl ITAR y cOm mAn d mEmBE Rs

MAJOR GENERAL

SALIM IDRISS

Maj. Gen. Salim Idriss is the Chief of Staff for theSupreme Military Council. He previously served on the

General Command for the Joint Command Council,and played an important role within the organizationuntil its merger into the SMC in December 2013. Hehas a reputation for his ability to access resourcesand distribute them to rebel groups. He also has a

close relationship with Syrian National CoalitionSecretary-General Mustafa Sabbagh.

MAJOR OMAR TIRAD

Bassam al-Dada is the spokesman for the SupremeMilitary Council. Before serving on the Supreme

Military Council, al-Dada was the political advisor tothe Free Syrian Army. He is most known for accusingHezbollah of supporting the regime and threatening

to retaliate if the support continues.

BASSAM AL-DADA

FARAJ HAMMOUD

AL-FARAJ

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

MOHAMMAD AL-ABBOUD

Area of Operation: Eastern Front

Faraj Hammoud al-Faraj is originally from al-Raqqaprovince and currently a resident of Saudi Arabia. Heis a member of the Syrian National Council, formallylisted as part of the Revolutionary Motion politicalbloc. Faraj is widely known for his ability to procure

funding and supplies.


Lt. Col. Mohammad al-Abboud was the head of theDeir ez-Zour Military Council under the Joint

Command Council. He is now serving as the DeputyChief of Staff for the Eastern Front.


Maj. Omar Tirad is the head of the Intelligencedepartment for the Eastern Front. He is the former

leader of the Bashar al-Kheir battalion in Abu Kamal.His unit was instrumental in overrunning the air

defense base in Abu Kamal.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

ADNAN MOHAMMAD

AL-KOKIB


Lt. Col. Adnan Mohammad al-Kokib was anintelligence officer prior to his defection in late

February 2012. Since then, he has been providingintelligence support to rebel commanders in theeastern region. He also serves on the recently

established military court in the Eastern Front. He is amember of the SMC financial committee.

Area of Operation: Northern Front

Sheikh Ahmed Issa is the leader of the powerful Suqour

al-Sham brigade in Idlib province, and the head of the Syrian

Liberation Front. He is one of the most influential rebel

commanders in Idlib province, and his brigade is known for

being disciplined, trained and well-resourced. Suqour al-Sham

is also known a

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