The Genetics of Altruism. by Scott A. Boorman; Paul R. LevittReview by: Glenn R. CarrollSocial Forces, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Mar., 1983), pp. 937-939Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2578158 .

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Book Reviews / 937

population is distributed. Because the many rank systems are characterized by dif- ferent and usually incomparable "raw metrics," comparisons across rank systems must be standardized "by treating each rank system as a cumulative percentage distribution of the same population, and by using the cumulative percentage scale as a measure of status in any rank system." Such transformations completed, the now comparably measured rank systems may be juxtaposed, much like several ladders each possessing, say, five regions demarcated by four rungs (i.e., quintiles of population). Landecker's principal question at this point concerns the correla- tions among individuals' positions in each of the several "major rank systems." If everyone located in the nth quintile of one rank system is located in the same quin- tile of every other rank system, there is "perfect class crystallization." Conversely, if the correlations are zero, there is "lack of class crystallization," an absence of any- thing that could be called "class structure." Assuming at least some degree of class crystallization, the existence of "class boundaries" will be a function of the extent to which "occupants of contiguous sets of ranks of one rank system [are] separated in the other rank systems"-that is, the extent to which there are specific category effects on the correlations. Thus, while Marx defined Klasse an sich fundamentally in terms of control of the means of production and Weber defined "class" in terms of market functions of distribution and exchange of commodities, for Landecker "class" has no primacy. It is a derivative of other, allegedly more fundamental di- mensions of inequality in social structure (Landecker's most prominent examples of "major rank systems" are "occupation," "education," and "income"). Indeed, Landecker suggests that the concept of class is itself no longer so useful, because of its categorical character; it can be replaced by more readily quantifiable notions of "class crystallization" and "class boundary" which can tell us everything that older concepts of class could tell us, and more. One suspects that Landecker's approach could be generalized-used to displace other old concepts, such as "family," "state," and perhaps even "individual"-and could thereby bring some order to the analytic dispersion of our objects of study.

Landecker's monograph is a notable example of an approach to the study of social stratification that has reflected a certain Weberian legacy in U.S. sociology. Class Crystallization should be given very careful examination.

The Genetics of Altruism. By Scott A. Boorman and Paul R. Levitt. New York: Academic Press, 1980. 389 pp. $29.50.

Reviewer: GLEN14 R. CARROLL, University of California, Berkeley

Boorman and Levitt have given us a most impressive book on the evolution of social behavior. Unfortunately, for reasons having more to do with the orientation of sociological research on sociobiology than the authors, this scholarly work is un- likely to exert much influence on research in sociology.

Sociological research involving questions of genetics commonly seeks to as- sess the relative contributions of heredity and environment to social behavior. The continuing debate on this issue is familiar to most sociologists, and many of us have concluded that the problem, as currently defined, is unresolvable-at least in the immediate future. So, too, (most likely) have Boorman and Levitt decided; their

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938 / Social Forces Volume 61:3, March 1983

book wisely avoids attacking this question directly. Nonetheless, their effort should be of interest to sociobiologists because they examine fundamental questions of the genetic basis of social behavior.

The intellectual problem Boorman and Levitt address is: "Why, in all the animal kingdom, are the species exhibiting sociality so few?" By their estimate, of the approximately one million existing species, less than 50,000 ("at most a few 10,000") are social in that the "members of the species engage, at any point in the life cycle, in sustained intraspecific cooperation that goes beyond prenatal care and continued association of matched pairs."

Boorman and Levitt analyze this problem by developing in exhaustive detail three general selection models for the evolution of sociality. The first of these are reciprocity selection models. These are models in which cooperating individuals have their evolutionary fitness increased as a consequence of interaction. The sec- ond class of models are kin selection models. In these models, individuals lose individual fitness through interaction but their behavior contributes to an increased fitness of their kinship group. The third set of models concerns group selection. This is the case where a population is divided into isolated subgroups (sometimes referred to as "islands") each of which has a separate evolutionary fitness.

Boorman and Levitt begin by assuming that social behavior has a gehetic basis and that we can identify, at least abstractly, social and asocial genes. Asocial genes do not imply solitude: they are defined technically as "relative to whatever level of sociality has already been attained by the species." Boorman and Levitt's analysis consists of identifying the evolutionary conditions under which the social gene will spread through an entire population. For the models of reciprocity selec- tion, they show that takeover by the social gene depends on its frequency relative to a selection threshold level. In most instances, the initial frequency of a social gene is expected to be below this threshold and the model predicts it will disappear. Boor- man and Levitt develop the interesting exception to this rule. They show that given a viscous population with pockets of subgroups, the social gene can sometimes take over despite an initial frequency below the threshold. This process they call a cas- cade. It is shown to be an irreversible and rare occurrence. Moreover, it has the fascinating ability to eliminate the viscosity that initially allowed it to operate.

Boorman and Levitt show that the kinship selection models can generate stable polymorphism as well as stable fixation. Unlike the reciprocity selection models, these models imply a process that is not necessarily irreversible: a popula- tion with a fixed social gene can become polymorphic. The tendency to revert to polymorphism depends inversely on the effectiveness of a sib altruistic trait.

The analysis of group selection models shows that when group selection favors a social gene but individual selection disfavors it, polymorphism results. This outcome depends on the initial conditions and the dominance of the social gene.

These models should interest many sociobiologists; all but the most techni- cally inclined, however, will find the material tough going. Despite a technical ap- pendix and claims to the contrary, much of the book assumes more than an elemen- tary background in population genetics. Indeed, the literature cited and the issues pursued in detail indicate that the book is addressed more to population geneticists than to social scientists.

Sociologists with the fortitude to learn the material necessary to study this

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Book Reviews / 939

book will profit from the experience, but they will have criticisms. As with much cross-disciplinary work, the most serious reservations about the analysis will prob- ably concern the assumptions of the models: the concept of a social gene, the as- sumption of recognition capacities among social members of a population, the as- sumed levels of viscosity in populations. Those familiar with mathematical model- ing in sociology may also feel that this work is incomplete: evidence is used only anecdotally as support for qualitative results derived from the models. Such an approach is common in bioecology, but it is nonetheless much less satisfying than the practice in sociology of estimating the actual parameters of models. To their credit, Boorman and Levitt recognize that they are standing on weak empirical ground and outline a number of possible tests of the models. Many of these tests seem difficult to implement, given the enormous data-collection problems. Nonetheless, further advance in the study of these questions seems to depend on creative empirical work.

Temporal Man: The Meaning and Uses of Social Time. By Robert H. Lauer. Nezw York: Praeger, 1981. 179 pp.

Reviewer: EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, Columbia University

Robert Lauer's Temporal Man is an attempt to introduce readers to the complex rela- tions between man and time. The book covers many aspects of these relations and suggests the tremendous richness of the topic. The author appears to have done much reading on the subject of temporality and throughout the book provides a useful review of a considerable body of literature.

The book would have probably been much better had Lauer committed him- self exclusively to the sociological concern with time and not ventured unnecessar- ily into philosophical and psychological perspectives. A two-page section on "Philosophical Time," for example, should not even have been included in the book. As it stands, it is an embarrassingly shallow and partial presentation of the philosophical concem with temporality over the last two and a half millennia and gives the reader a misleading idea of what the philosophy of time is all about. In general, Temporal Man is characterized by a style of jumping from one topic to another without exhausting any, and the lack of a coherent analytical framework will probably disturb many a theoretically oriented reader. The book certainly promises much more than it actually delivers. The author seems to have tried to do too much in one short book, and it is obvious that topical breadth was achieved only at the very conspicuous expense of theoretical depth.

The loose manner in which Lauer handles his concepts is evident even from the title and subtitle. I still do not fully comprehend what "temporal man" means, and the concept "social time" (as distinct from "philosophical time" and "psychological time") is no clearer. Nor do I understand why the author insisted on titling a section "Social Time versus Clock Time" when he himself admits that the latter is only a particular case of the former. Also, when Lauer mentions in one breath clock time, the utilitarian doctrine that "time is money," and the quantitative view of temporality, he falls to note that, although all three coincide empirically in the modern West, they are by no means identical and, from a theoretical

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