The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: security expectations and outcomes

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The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: securityexpectations and outcomesRalf EmmersPublished online: 27 Sep 2010.

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The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: security

expectations and outcomes

Ralf Emmers

The article examines the extent to which Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have

gained from their participation in ASEAN. To assess the security and

diplomatic benefits of their membership, it identifies three expectations held

by the Indochinese states—enhanced international status, improved security

and relations vis-a-vis other ASEAN members, and more room for

manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The studydemonstrates, however, that while Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are less

isolated internationally after joining ASEAN, the actual benefits in terms of

their relations with the other ASEAN members as well as non-member states

have been more ambiguous. With ASEAN in mind, the article concludes by

discussing the possible costs and drawbacks of enlargement that can

transform any international organisation into a less influential and cohesive

institution.

Introduction

Since its establishment in August 1967, the original members of the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had hoped to unite the entire SoutheastAsian region under its auspices1. The end of the Cold War made this possible.While the Association had first been enlarged to include Brunei in January 1984,its post-Cold War expansion started with Vietnam in July 1995. Laos andMyanmar joined ASEAN in July 1997 while Cambodia gained its fullmembership in April 1999. The absence of specific political and economicconditions for admission enabled the candidates to rapidly enter the regionalgrouping. The Association that they joined in the second half of the 1990s was insome respects not comparable to the one that had been transformed by theCambodian conflict (1978–1991) into an institution well-respected by theinternational community. During the 1980s, ASEAN had succeeded inenhancing its international reputation as a regional organisation by successfullyopposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia at the United Nations (UN).However, by the time of its enlargement, ASEAN’s effectiveness and cohesionhad been undermined by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and the lossof Indonesian leadership after the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998.

Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 1,

pp. 71–88, March 2005

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/05/010071-18 q 2005 Australian Institute of International Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000332057

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Still, the new members anticipated that ASEAN would continue to operate as adiplomatic instrument promoting peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

This study examines the security and diplomatic benefits of the Indochineseenlargement of ASEAN, focusing on the perspective of the new members.Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have historically represented a geo-political areaand it is therefore relevant to examine how each of these states might have gainedfrom their participation in ASEAN. The article first addresses the initialresistance of the Indochinese states to ASEAN before discussing their turnaroundleading to their eventual membership in the Association It then assesses how theymay have gained from the Association by analysing the expectations of theIndochinese states. While the latter might have seen ASEAN as a successfuleconomic club2, the analysis concentrates on the security and diplomaticdimensions of enlargement. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia could expect to gainfrom their participation in terms of enhancing their international status,improving their security and relations vis-a-vis other ASEAN members, andextending their room for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. Thearticle demonstrates however that while the Indochinese states have gained fromASEAN in reducing their regional and international isolation, the actual benefitsof membership in terms of their relations with the other ASEAN members andnon-member states have been more ambiguous.

ASEAN-Indochinese relations: from resistance to membership

North Vietnam did not join the Association when it was first established inAugust 1967. Leifer explains that for Hanoi ‘ASEAN was a political fraud’(Leifer 1993: 271). Seen as a reformulation of the South-East Asia TreatyOrganisation (SEATO) created in February 19553, ASEAN was considered byHanoi as part of an American policy of containment. After its reunification inApril 1975, Vietnam refused the repeated invitations to attend ASEANgatherings as an observer. It also criticised the Zone of Peace, Freedom andNeutrality (ZOPFAN), a declaration signed by the ASEAN states in November1971 that registered a call for regional autonomy, and demanded instead in 1975the promotion of ‘independence, peace and genuine neutrality in Southeast Asia’.Despite its hostile position, the ASEAN countries invited Vietnam to adhere tothe Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed at the first ASEAN Summitof heads of state and government in Bali in February 1976. The TAC constitutesa norm-based code of conduct that enunciates ASEAN’s core principles,including the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of otherstates4. Vietnam refused to adhere to the TAC and thus thwarted ASEAN’sattempt to establish a new regional order in the region.

Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 caused ASEAN-Vietnamese relations to deteriorate drastically. The Association’s warinesstowards Hanoi had been increased just before the invasion by a Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty signed in November 1978. The occupation of

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Cambodia led to the establishment of a pro-Vietnamese puppet government inPhnom Penh, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). It terminatedASEAN’s hopes of establishing stable relations with Hanoi and violated its coreprinciples, namely, respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in theaffairs of other states. Moreover, it altered the strategic environment in mainlandSoutheast Asia by removing Cambodia as Thailand’s traditional buffer stateagainst Vietnam. In response, ASEAN condemned the Vietnamese occupation ofCambodia and sponsored yearly resolutions at the UN General Assembly duringthe 1980s that demanded a cease-fire in Cambodia and the withdrawal of allforeign troops and called for the right to self-determination for the Cambodianpeople.

The two other Indochinese states also opposed the Association diplomatically.The Lao People’s Democratic Party took power in Laos in late 1975 and signedwith Vietnam a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1977. Laos did notrecognise ASEAN as a diplomatic entity and regarded the arrangement withhostility due to its anti-communist ideology. Laos refused to adhere to the TAC in1976 despite the fact that it had been made open to accession to all the SoutheastAsian nations. Cambodia’s initial response to ASEAN was influenced by concernsof neutrality. After independence in 1953, King Norodom Sihanouk had adopteda foreign policy of non-alignment. Cambodia declined the offer to take part inASEAN in 1967 as it regarded the arrangement ‘as a pro-US regional organisationand thus had no reason to upset its policy of neutrality’ (Kao 1999: 2). The KhmerRouge takeover of Phnom Penh in April 1975 led to the emergence of a radicalregime eventually overthrown by the Vietnamese. As a puppet regime of Hanoi,the PRK replicated Vietnam’s hostile approach towards ASEAN.

The turnaround of the Indochinese states towards ASEAN derived fromdomestic economic considerations and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict.The Sixth National Party Congress in Vietnam announced in December 1986 thepolicy of Doi Moi (Economic Renovation). Its objective was to end the decline ofthe Vietnamese economy by initiating a transition from central planning to amarket-orientated economy. Doi Moi was dependent on the resolution of theCambodian conflict5 and on an improvement in Vietnam’s relations withregional states. Changes also occurred within ASEAN. Thai Prime MinisterChatichai Choonhavan transformed his country’s stand on the Cambodian issuein 1988 by calling for the need ‘to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace’. Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in September 1989 and thesettlement of the conflict was reached at the International Conference onCambodia in Paris in October 1991. During that month, Vietnam’s PrimeMinister Vo Van Kiet visited Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and indicatedhis country’s desire to sign the TAC as a step towards becoming a member of theAssociation. Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam signed the TAC inJuly 1992 during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and was invited toparticipate as an observer at future meetings6. It thus took Hanoi 16 years to signa treaty that the original members had drawn up ‘to act as a political bridge

The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN 73

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between the Association and Vietnam’ (Williams 1992: 73). Vietnam’smembership in ASEAN was made official at the AMM of July 1995.

The end of the Cold War and the loss of Soviet economic support led Laos toimprove its relations with China and Thailand, which contributed to adiplomatic rapprochement with ASEAN. Laos acceded to the TAC at the 1992AMM. Together with Vietnam, its new relations with ASEAN were driven ‘byeconomic imperatives and also by those of national security shaped by greaterstrategic latitude enjoyed by China as a consequence of the end of the Cold War’(Leifer 1993: 273). Despite having signed the TAC in the same year as Vietnam,Laos adopted a ‘slow boat’ approach in seeking its membership. Its foreignminister only expressed his country’s intention to join ASEAN at the 1995AMM. At an informal summit in December 1996, the ASEAN leadersannounced that Laos would be admitted together with Cambodia and Myanmarin July 1997.

The formation of a Cambodian coalition government after the 1993 generalelections led to a new foreign policy outlook that abandoned the country’s pre-war isolationist stand. Cambodia improved its relations with Laos, Vietnam andThailand and reached out to ASEAN by signing the TAC at the 1995 AMM. Thecountry indicated its wish to become an ASEAN member in March 1996 and wasexpected to join in July 1997. However, domestic political developments delayedits participation. Antagonism between the two Cambodian Prime Ministers,Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, resulted in the latter seizing power on 5 July1997. ASEAN postponed Cambodia’s membership, which represented aviolation of its non-interference principle as it made Cambodia’s entryconditional upon domestic political change. This is significant as the Indochinesestates expected ASEAN to be essentially a status-quo maintenance mechanism.Admittance into the Association had never been made dependent on domesticpolitical conditions and Laos and Vietnam expressed their disappointment at thedecision to delay Cambodia’s membership. Elections were organised inCambodia in July 1998 leading to the formation of a new coalition governmentand the admission of the country was again discussed at the ASEAN summit inHanoi in December 1998. Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines wanted tofurther delay its membership while Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos andMyanmar favoured its immediate participation. As host of the summit, Vietnamlobbied hard to guarantee the Cambodian entry. The country finally joined theAssociation during an official ceremony in Hanoi on 30 April 1999.

The security and diplomatic benefits of the indochinese enlargement of ASEAN

The enlargement process institutionalised a process of reconciliation between theoriginal ASEAN members and the Indochinese states (Leifer 1999). A keymotivation for the new members was ‘to gain greater international politicalcredibility and legitimacy’ (Gates and Than 2001: 11). By participating in aregional organisation, they could also expect to gain from increased sub-regional

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stability, enabling them to pay closer attention to domestic economicdevelopment. Vietnam expected that membership would improve its diplomaticposition and integrate its security with the rest of Southeast Asia, therebypromoting a favourable environment for domestic economic growth (Hoang1993). Kao Kim Hourn also argues that ‘strategic interests have undoubtedlybeen the overriding motivation for Cambodia’s quest for ASEAN membership’(Kao 1998: 15). With the benefit of hindsight, it is now possible to examine howthe Indochinese members have benefited from their participation in theAssociation. In order to assess the possible gains of their membership, it is centralto first identify the expectations of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which arebased on ASEAN’s prior achievements7. The grouping could provide theIndochinese countries with three security and diplomatic advantages.

First, ASEAN offers its members regional and international recognition. Asmentioned above, the Cambodian conflict transformed the institution into aninternationally respected arrangement. By the mid-1990s, ASEAN had alsoestablished the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)8 and taken the initiative over theAsia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The latter, inaugurated in Bangkok in March1996, brings together the heads of state and government from the Europe Union(EU) and ASEAN as well as from Japan, South Korea and China. TheAssociation has thus been recognised regionally and internationally as adiplomatic player with some clout. Consequently, membership offered toVietnam, Laos and Cambodia an opportunity to reverse decades of politicalisolation and to acquire regional and international recognition. This involvedbeing recognised by and gaining access to foreign donors and internationalinstitutions as well as being better integrated diplomatically within the rest ofSoutheast Asia.

Second, ASEAN seeks to avoid the occurrence of conflict among its membersand thus contributes to the management of intra-mural relations. Singapore’sForeign Minister Professor S. Jayakumar affirmed in 1998 that ASEAN’sprimary role is ‘to manage relationships which have been and could otherwisestill, all too easily turn conflictual’ (Jayakumar 1998). The Association hasimproved the climate of regional relations by containing peacefully, rather thansolving, differences between its members. Its approach to conflict managementhas been characterised by the absence of concrete confidence-building measures.Instead, the regional grouping has relied on dialogue and consultation, thepractices of self-restraint and consensus-building and on the principles ofnational sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.Critical to this approach has been the TAC. Hence ASEAN provided Vietnam,Laos and Cambodia with a diplomatic instrument to enhance their security byregistering their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In particular,membership offered the two smaller Indochinese states with a means to increasetheir security vis-a-vis their mightier ASEAN neighbours. Any aggressive actiontowards them from another ASEAN member would violate the Association’score principles and disturb its cooperative premises.


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Third, ASEAN provides its members with some diplomatic leverage and moreroom for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. The Association hassucceeded to a certain extent in redefining relations with non-members by actingas a cohesive group. In addition to its managerial role in the ARF, the regionalgrouping has maintained diplomatic contacts with key external actors, includingthe United States, Japan and the EU, through the ASEAN Post-MinisterialConference (ASEAN-PMC)9. In short, ASEAN provided the Indochinesecountries with more leverage in their diplomatic dealings with non-memberstates. Vietnam in particular expected that its participation in ASEAN wouldinternationalise its territorial dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea andas a result lead to greater Chinese restraint towards the Vietnamese claims.

Vietnam

Vietnam has since 1995 gained regional and international recognition from itsparticipation in the Association. Its membership has ‘marked the end of itsisolation in international politics and laid to rest its image as an intruder inregional politics’ (Singh 1997: 227). Vietnam was also one of the foundingparticipants at the inauguration of the ARF held in Singapore in July 1993.ASEAN has given Hanoi an opportunity to integrate into mainstreaminternational affairs and to diversify its external relations, especially withregional states. In that sense, membership has enabled the country to benefitfrom a greater freedom in the making of its ‘omni-directional’ foreign policy. Itsmore diversified foreign policy since the early 1990s has consisted of avoidingforming new alliances with any of the great powers, creating new friendships,and promoting economic and trade links. In short, Vietnam’s increasedinternational recognition and regional integration has helped Hanoi inre-orientating its foreign policy ‘from its intense preoccupation with big powers,particularly China, to a more balanced position in which regional cooperationwith other Southeast Asian states plays a significant role’ (Kim Ninh 1998: 454).

The benefits of membership in terms of its management of relations with otherASEAN members have to some extent been forthcoming. Vietnam has taken partin the Association with the objective of securing a stable and peaceful securityenvironment and guaranteeing its national security against external threats(Thayer 1997: 367). The Vietnamese participation has symbolised theinstitutionalisation of a process of diplomatic reconciliation between Hanoiand the original member states and strengthened the diplomatic cohesion ofSoutheast Asia. The original members were at first concerned about the attitudeVietnam would adopt in the Association. ASEAN’s informal process ofinteraction, the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ through which the members relate toeach other, has been characterised by the practice of quiet diplomacy, acontinuing process of dialogue, a willingness to exercise self-restraint, and thepractices of consensus-building and conflict avoidance. With its long tradition ofconfrontation and intransigent diplomatic demands, many member states were

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apprehensive that Vietnam would ignore the ‘ASEAN Way’ and behave as adisruptive actor. These fears have not materialised. Vietnam has adopted since1995 an accommodating approach towards the Association, as indicated byHanoi’s willingness to accept the joint ASEAN decision to postpone Cambodia’smembership after Hun Sen’s coup in July 1997 despite its support for PhnomPenh’s immediate entry.

However, the ASEAN membership has not modified Vietnam’s securityoutlook towards some of the original members. Vietnam and Indonesia havecontinued to perceive each other as allies against China’s regional ambitions.Jakarta has traditionally regarded Vietnam as a buffer state against China’shegemonic aspirations in Southeast Asia and has therefore actively supported itsparticipation in ASEAN. Due to geopolitical concerns and historical baggage,Vietnam has however continued to be in competition with Thailand overinfluence in Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi has been concerned with Bangkok’ssearch for economic and political leadership in mainland Southeast Asia. Thiscompetition with Thailand has been exacerbated under the leadership of thecurrent Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. Thailand also ‘views Vietnam,not China, as its traditional rival for influence on the Indochinese peninsula’(Zagoria 1997: 157). For Bangkok, the danger of Vietnamese hegemony inIndochina was realised during the occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s, whichled to the deployment of hostile Vietnamese military forces along Thailand’sEastern border. In short, Thai-Vietnamese mistrust and competition overinfluence in Indochina have continued, although in a non-military sense, despiteVietnam’s membership in ASEAN.

Vietnam’s relations with some ASEAN members have also continued to becomplicated by bilateral border disputes. For example, Vietnam and Malaysiaare claiming overlapping continental shelf areas in different parts of the SouthChina Sea. Nonetheless, the introduction of additional territorial disputes withinthe geographical boundaries of ASEAN has not been a significant development,as most disputes among the original members have remained unresolved since1967. This highlights ASEAN’s shortcomings as a diplomatic instrument toresolve sources of conflict between its members. Rather than addressing thesedifferences, ASEAN has contributed to their avoidance and management. Hence,rather than seeking their resolution, Vietnam’s membership has at least provided‘for a situation which is conducive to the peaceful management of existing inter-states disputes and potential future disputes’ (Amer 2004: 21).

For Vietnam, the third beneficial expectation of ASEAN, namely, the increasedroom for manoeuvre when dealing with non-member states, has also beenimportant. Critical for Hanoi has been the desire to improve its bargainingpower vis-a-vis China and to constrain its actions towards the Vietnamese claimsin the South China Sea10. Vietnam has hoped to transform its territorial disputeswith China over the South China Sea into a multilateral dispute involving Beijingand ASEAN. Ang argues that ‘Vietnam’s best and perhaps only solution in orderto pre-empt a fait accompli in the Spratlys is to depend on ASEAN support and to


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“internationalise” the issue as much as it possibly can’ (Ang 1998: 28). Togetherwith the Philippines, Vietnam has been actively involved in negotiating acode of conduct on the South China Sea but Hanoi has remained doubtfulwhether ‘ASEAN is able to engender genuine cooperation with China’(Odgaard 2003: 19).

The ASEAN foreign ministers and China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Wang Yi,signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea on thesidelines of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh in early November 2002. Theagreement was intended to prevent further tensions over the disputed territoriesand to reduce the risks of military conflict in the South China Sea. The partiesagreed to resolve their territorial disputes by peaceful means and pledged topractise self-restraint in activities that could spark disputes, such as occupyingstill uninhabited features (ASEAN 2002). After years of ASEAN-Chinanegotiations, the declaration represented a move away from the originalASEAN goal of reaching a binding code of conduct on the South China Sea.Moreover, Vietnam was forced to accept some important concessions. It haddemanded that the declaration include a commitment not to build new structureson the islands, which was rejected by China. Vietnam had also insisted that theParacel Islands be mentioned. The declaration eventually made no reference toits specific geographical scope, as China opposed any mention of the Paracels.

Consequently, ASEAN has provided Vietnam with an institutional vehicle tointernationalise its territorial dispute over the South China Sea with Beijing.Hanoi has therefore gained in bargaining power on this issue. Yet, the benefits ofthis multilateral process should not be overestimated. Hanoi has failed in thecontext of the Sino-ASEAN negotiations to include the Paracels, asdemonstrated by its omission in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties,and has thus lost room for manoeuvre on half of its territorial claims. Moreover,while the 2002 declaration ought to be seen as an ASEAN diplomatic exercise insocialising China and in promoting peaceful co-existence with Beijing, it fallsshort of Vietnam’s preference for a binding code of conduct. In particular, itoffers no guarantees to Hanoi against the occurrence of new incidents overterritorial claims in the South China Sea.

Laos

The ASEAN membership has benefited Laos in terms of increasing its regionaland international status. The country had a lot to gain from increasedinternational exposure to enhance its ties with external donors and promote itseconomic development, which has remained highly dependent on foreign aid.After having adhered to the TAC in 1992, Laos also became one of the foundingparticipants of the ARF. The Laotian Foreign Minister, Phoune Sipaseuth,attended, together with 17 other foreign ministers, its inauguration in July 1993.The Association has therefore relieved Laos from its state of internationalisolation. Laos’s participation in ASEAN was also an attempt to better integrate

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the country economically and diplomatically with the rest of Southeast Asia aswell as to strengthen its bilateral relations with individual ASEAN states. Laoshas benefited from stronger ties with Malaysia, Singapore and other SoutheastAsian countries. For example, during the visit of the Laotian Prime Minister toMalaysia in 1998, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, pledged inaccordance with the ASEAN spirit to assist Laos in its nation-building efforts(Schneider 1999).

Furthermore, the ASEAN participation has enhanced Vientiane’s politicalcredibility. By including Laos regardless of its one-party system, ASEAN hasenabled the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party to strengthen its politicallegitimacy abroad. Bourdet writes that a ‘tangible advantage of ASEANmembership is that it can make it easier for Laos to resist the pressures exerted bydonor countries to make democratic reforms’ (Bourdet 1997: 156). However,Laos’s increased recognition has involved some substantial expenses due toASEAN’s initial deposit of US$1 million and annual dues of US$700,000 as wellas the costs of attending more than 200 meetings a year. Even more problematicfor Laos has been the shortage of adequately trained personnel with the technicalexpertise and a good command of English to attend these numerous gatherings.

For ASEAN and Laos itself, the benefits of membership in terms of intra-muralrelations have been less evident. To discuss this point, it is important to examineLaos’s participation in the Association from the perspective of its bilateralrelations with its immediate ASEAN neighbours. Laos is the only landlockedcountry in Southeast Asia and it shares borders with Cambodia, China,Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Its security and economic development havethus been strongly influenced by its border relations (Nguyen 1996). Laos’ssecurity and foreign policy-making are dictated by its geo-strategic reality. LikeCambodia, Laos has acted as a buffer state between its two mightier and morepopulated neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. Since the early 1990s, Laos hasmaintained close ties with Vietnam derived from strong ideological affinities anda common historical legacy. In contrast, Laos has continued to have ambivalentand volatile relations with Thailand. External influence in Laos shifted in the1990s from Vietnam’s political and military dominance to Thailand’s culturalinfluence and economic leadership. Focusing on its own economic growth,Vietnam was not able to compete with Thailand in terms of economic leverageand presence in Laos. In March 1996, the Sixth Laotian Party Congressindicated, however, that Vietnam remained Laos’s primary partner (Zasloff1998). Vientiane’s expression of its special relationship with Hanoi was made inthe light of the need to balance Thailand’s rising influence in Laos (Bourdet1997).

The ASEAN membership was meant to put Laos on the same footing as itsASEAN neighbours. Laos expected its participation in the regional grouping tohelp it manage its relations with Thailand. In particular, Vientiane hoped that itsmembership would enable Laos to become less dependent on its neighbour.Stuart-Fox argued even before the Laotian entry in 1997 that ‘the need to


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balance relations with Thailand by relations with the other states that share acommon border with Laos must be seen as a factor in the LPDR’s eagerness totake part in subregional integration’ (Stuart-Fox 1995: 191–192). Ironically,Thailand’s influence in Laos was not reduced by the country’s entry into ASEANbut instead by the Asian financial crisis that the Association found itselfincapable of responding to. The collapse of the Thai Baht in July 1997 caused adramatic reduction in Thai investments in Laos.

Rather than being an asset to the Association, Laos has largely been a liability,particularly to Thailand. Thailand’s reduced influence in Laos has not beenfollowed by an improvement in relations. Thai-Laotian ties have remaineddifficult due to several issues despite their common membership in theAssociation. One important detrimental factor has been the question of theownership of several disputed islands on the Mekong River, which delineatesmost of the Thai-Laotian border. Open conflict over this issue even seemedimminent in September 2000 (Lintner 2001). At the time, ASEAN was incapableof contributing to a more peaceful management of the dispute. Moreover, Thai-Laotian relations have been complicated by Hmong insurgency operations inLaos11. A Hmong offensive in early 2000 led to the deployment of Vietnamesemilitary personnel to support the Laotian army. The presence of Vietnameseunits in Laos alarmed Thailand (Lintner 2001). Bangkok’s reaction wasunsurprising in light of Vietnam’s past military presence in Laos, whichnumbered more than 50,000 troops at the time of its withdrawal in 1987–88(Stuart-Fox 1991). The destabilising events of 2000 indicated that Laos’smembership in ASEAN did ‘not seem to have brought the country any nearer tothe notion of belonging to a harmonious family of nations in the region’ (Lintner2001). By late 2002, Laos and Thailand had agreed, however, on most of theirland border demarcation. In the meantime, bilateral relations have again beenstrained as a result of Thailand’s refusal to hand over 16 Laotian rebels allegedlyinvolved in the attack on a Laotian check-post in July 2000 before taking refugeacross the frontier (Freeman 2002: 152).

In short, the intra-mural security benefits of Laos’s membership have beendisappointing. So far, Laos’s entry has not modified the vulnerability of itsrelationship with Thailand nor has it contributed to an improvement in theclimate of relations. The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party has maintained itsspecial ties with Vietnam but this has not been achieved through ASEAN butrather as a result of ideological affinities and a common historical legacy. A closerparticipation of Laos in ASEAN is therefore dependent on a significantimprovement of ties between Bangkok and Vientiane and on at least a better andmore peaceful management of their bilateral disputes and other differences.ASEAN itself is ill-equipped to solve sources of conflict or to deal with pressingmatters between its member countries, as indicated by its non-interference in theLaotian-Thai border problems and also by ongoing bilateral mistrust anddisputes between some of its original members. Singapore-Malaysian ties havecontinued, for instance, to be influenced by feelings of suspicion and

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competition. ASEAN has never used its own dispute resolution mechanism, theHigh Council, included in the TAC of 1976 to mediate or settle conflicts amongits member countries. At this stage, it seems best therefore not to be toooptimistic about a more successful integration of Laos in the process of overallSoutheast Asian community building.

This brings us to a third anticipated advantage of membership. Contrary toVietnam, it is unclear whether Laos had ever anticipated that its ASEANparticipation would give it more room for manoeuvre in its diplomatic dealingswith China. Instead, its decision in the mid-1990 s to join the Association maywell have been a case of bandwagoning with a then prosperous ASEAN. Ofsignificance, however, is how China has succeeded in the case of Laos to act as amore powerful balancer relative to the Association. China’s influence in Laos hasrisen since 1997, in contrast to the expectation by Indonesia and other originalmembers that its entry into ASEAN would reduce outside intervention in thecountry and help in the development of an autonomous regional order inSoutheast Asia. The lack of support for Laotian economic interests from theother members has pushed Laos further into the Chinese orbit. The Asianfinancial crisis of 1997/98 enabled China to increase its role in Laos’s domesticaffairs. The country suffered economically from the consequences of the crisisand its currency, the kip, depreciated sharply. ASEAN was unable to make asubstantial contribution to economic recovery. If Laos had expected to joina successful economic club, its expectation did not materialise in light ofASEAN’s response to the financial crisis. China on the other hand helped Laosstabilise its currency in 1999 by providing interest-free loans and exportsubsidies. Since the end of the financial crisis, China has become the leadingforeign investor in Laos (Freeman 2004). One should expect China’s influenceand presence in Laos to further increase if Beijing and ASEAN succeed in theirattempt to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA)12. Despite its strong economicrelations with China, Laos has not yet endorsed some form of Chinesepatronage. Rather than regarding ASEAN as a countervailing factor to itsgrowing reliance on China, Laos has instead continued to rely on its relationshipwith Vietnam.

Cambodia

As with Vietnam and Laos, ASEAN has provided Cambodia with a means toincrease its regional and international exposure. By taking part in multilateraldiplomacy, Cambodia has succeeded in terminating its isolation. Besides itsimmediate Southeast Asian neighbours, the Association has also providedCambodia with better access to other powers through forums like the ARF andthe ASEAN-PMC (Kao 1998). Cambodia was admitted as a participant to theARF in July 1995 during its second ministerial meeting in Brunei, even beforebecoming a member of ASEAN. In addition to increasing Cambodia’sinternational status, the process of regional integration has also contributed to


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the country’s new foreign policy outlook. The latter has shifted since the early1990s from a policy of non-alignment and bilateral diplomacy to a strategy‘defined by an open door policy, integration and multilateral engagement’ (Kao1999: 1).

Cambodia’s membership in ASEAN has had some positive effect on theinternational relations of Southeast Asia. After the dramatic consequences of theCambodian conflict, the ASEAN states had an obvious interest in seeing a stable,independent and peaceful Cambodia as part of their regional grouping. Evenbefore its entry, Cambodia’s Foreign Minister, Ung Huot, had stated that hiscountry regarded regional cooperation as ‘a first step in maintaining peace andstability’ (Ung Huot 1996: 200). Cambodia’s membership in 1999 also fulfilledthe hope of the original members of uniting the entire Southeast Asian regionunder ASEAN auspices. Given the factors of geography and new foreign policydisposition in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian participation in the Association wasa natural and logical consequence of its return to full sovereignty and territorialintegrity. Membership has led to a better diplomatic integration of a previouslyisolationist country. This was indicated by its successful chairmanship of theAssociation from July 2002 to June 2003 and its hosting of the 8th ASEANSummit in Phnom Penh in November 2002. Yet, it is questionable whetherCambodia’s membership has helped in promoting stability within the country.Political struggles between Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh and risingcrime problems with transnational repercussions have concerned its neighbour-ing ASEAN members13. Due to its belief in the principle of non-interference, theregional grouping has not been in a position to address such issues directly oreffectively.

Cambodia has, to some extent, benefited from ASEAN in terms of managingits relations with other member states. Membership has put Cambodia ‘on thesame playing field with other members’ (Kao 1998: 18). The grouping helpsPhnom Penh increase its security from external interference. The TAC constitutesa form of diplomatic guarantee, as it operates as a regional code of conduct basedon the respect for national sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention in theaffairs of other states and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Specifically, theTAC provides Cambodia with an instrument to manage its relations with bothThailand and Vietnam. Cambodia’s relations with its two larger neighbours havetraditionally been strained by feelings of animosity, differences in ethnic identity,border disputes and historical legacy. Cambodia has been the victim of theirstruggle for dominance in Indochina and has continued to regard its mightierneighbours as potentially dangerous for its security. Cambodia’s strategic interesthas thus been ‘to keep the two powers from expanding into its territory’(Kao 1998: 15). This is precisely why the TAC and its standard principles aresignificant for Cambodia’s relations with its ASEAN neighbours. In contrast toLaos which has maintained its good relations with Hanoi independently fromASEAN, the importance of the TAC needs to be emphasised in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations, as it has functioned as a source of reciprocal constraint.

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Nevertheless, as for Laotian-Thai relations, Cambodia’s participation in ASEANhas not modified the vulnerability of its bilateral ties with its direct neighbours.In that sense, Cambodia’s membership has generally failed to contribute to animprovement in intra-mural relations. Anti-Vietnamese feelings in Cambodia arestill strong and regularly exploited by the political elite. Since the Vietnamesewithdrawal in 1989, relations with Hanoi have been strained by two outstandingissues: the demarcation of their common land and sea borders and the ethnicVietnamese refugees living in Cambodia (Ang 2000). The question of borderdisputes with Vietnam is made more volatile politically due to accusations by theCambodian opposition that Prime Minister Hun Sen is too closely linked toHanoi (Marston 2002). A frightening illustration of the vulnerability of Thai-Cambodian relationships occurred in early 2003. Anti-Thai riots broke out inPhnom Penh on 29 January 2003 following comments allegedly made by a Thaimovie star on the Thai origins of Angkor Wat and the required restitution of thearchaeological site to Thailand. The riots led to the storming of the ThaiEmbassy and the destruction of Thai business interests in Phnom Penh. Thailandrefused to normalise its relations with Cambodia until full compensation waspaid. Although this represented the ‘worst episode in Cambodia-Thai relationsfor a decade’ (Tin 2004: 83), ASEAN did not get involved in the dispute andmade no contribution to its resolution. This further questioned its ability tomanage intra-regional disputes and deal with pressing matters between itsmembers. Ironically, Cambodia was more the focus of ASEAN’s intervention inthe 1980s and early 1990s than since becoming a member of the Association.

Lastly, Cambodia’s membership may have changed its relations with non-members, particularly China. Under ASEAN, Cambodia has broadened itspolicy options beyond its traditional reliance on neutrality and/or a tacit alliancewith a single great power. In that sense, it has been able to widen its diplomaticroom for manoeuvre in international relations. The other ASEAN countrieshoped that Cambodia’s membership would reduce the risk of Chineseintervention in the country or of Phnom Penh having to align itself once morewith Beijing to guarantee its security. An isolated Cambodia left out of theAssociation could have been forced to develop new security links with Beijing,which would have had a destabilising impact on the broader Southeast Asianregion. Cambodia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ung Huot had alreadyannounced in 1998 that if his country was not a member, it ‘would constitutea weak link for ASEAN, and it could be a channel or a source of outsideintervention’ (Ung Huot 1998: 18).

Hence, Cambodia was prevented from falling again into the Chinese orbit. YetBeijing may still gradually succeed in acting as a more powerful balancer relativeto the Association. China has sought to increase its influence in Cambodia sinceit joined ASEAN in 1999. Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited the country inNovember 2000, followed in 2001 by four separate visits of senior Chineseofficials. At the ASEAN summit hosted by Cambodia in November 2002,China’s Premier, Zhu Rongji, announced that China had decided to write off


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Cambodia’s old debts to Beijing. As for Laos, a China-ASEAN FTA may furtherincrease Beijing’s influence and presence in Cambodia. Cambodia’s participationin ASEAN has also led Vietnam and China to compete to exert superior influenceover Phnom Penh. Cambodia’s warmer ties with Beijing ‘have not replaced HunSen’s close association with Vietnam, but China’s much greater power andcapacity to offer aid have certainly qualified Cambodia’s relationship with itsimmediate eastern neighbour’ (Osborne 2003: 90).

Conclusion

International institutions usually expand their membership to fulfil originalambitions and to reunite natural geographical areas as well as to increase theirinfluence and diplomatic centrality at a broader regional and/or internationallevel. These motives and ambitions can, for example, be found in the dynamicsthat led to the enlargement of the EU to include ten new member states in May2004. Similar motivations existed in the case of ASEAN which, in addition toreuniting the ten Southeast Asian countries under its auspices, hoped to preserveits diplomatic position in the post-Cold War era and to increase its influence inEast Asia. Of crucial importance was the need to further develop its stabilisingrole in Southeast Asian relations through its own expansion process and to avoidbeing excluded from a strategic architecture in East Asia that was primarilydependent on a Sino-Japanese-US triangle.

The study of any expansion process demands a close examination of themotives and expectations of a new member state, as has been the focus of thisarticle in the case of the Indochinese countries. Before their membership,Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia may have expected to benefit from their ASEANparticipation in terms of enhancing their international status, improving theirsecurity and relations vis-a-vis other members, and extending their room formanoeuvre when dealing with non-member states. Our analysis has indicated,however, that while the Indochinese states have gained from ASEAN in reducingtheir regional and international isolation, the actual benefits in terms of theirrelations with the other ASEAN members as well as non-member stateshave been more ambiguous. Vietnam has succeeded in institutionalisingits reconciliation with the original ASEAN members and in internationalisingits territorial dispute with China over the Spratlys. Yet it has failed to include theParacels in the Sino-ASEAN negotiations and the Declaration on the Conduct ofParties has fallen short of its preference for a binding code of conduct on theSouth China Sea. Membership has put Cambodia and Laos on the same footingas their ASEAN neighbours. In particular, the standard principles of the TAChave provided the two Indochinese states with an instrument to constrain andmanage their ties with Vietnam and Thailand. Relations with Bangkok haveremained volatile, however, as demonstrated by the Laotian-Thai borderproblems in September 2000 and the anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh in January2003. ASEAN did not get involved in these clashes and has generally failed to

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modify the vulnerability of the bilateral ties or to contribute to an improvementin the climate of relations. Finally, despite their ASEAN participation, China hassucceeded, in the case of Laos and to a lesser extent Cambodia, in increasing itsinfluence in their domestic affairs and in acting as a more powerful balancerrelative to the Association.

Having discussed the mixed security and diplomatic benefits of ASEAN’sIndochinese enlargement from the perspective of the new members, it isimportant to stress that any expansion process brings costs and drawbacks thatmay transform an inter-state organisation into a less influential and cohesiveinstitution. Enlargement can weaken the effectiveness of an internationalinstitution by complicating the process of consultation and decision-making aswell as by damaging intra-mural relations due to an increased diversity ofpolitical views and the incorporation of additional rivalries. An expansionprocess can thus undermine the relative homogeneity in interests and affect anexisting familiar atmosphere leading to the watering down of long-termaspirations. Many believers in a European federation view, for instance, anenlarged EU with 25 members or more as an end to their dream of establishing astrong political union. ASEAN has also been affected by its rapid expansionprocess. The latter has undermined the achievement of consensus that governsdecision-making and questioned the applicability of the ‘ASEAN Way’. Togetherwith Myanmar, the Indochinese states have also been resistant to institutionalchange, preferring the Association to remain a diplomatic arrangement relianton a strict application of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.Consequently, they have not been receptive to a recent Indonesian idea offorming an ASEAN Security Community and have criticised related proposals ofestablishing an ASEAN peacekeeping force and of promoting democracy andhuman rights in Southeast Asia. The Indochinese states have instead indicatedtheir wish to maintain the status quo in ASEAN and to water down proposalspresented by Indonesia, the largest and natural leader of the Association. Suchdebates may lead in the long term to a multi-layered and two-speed institutionbringing together countries opting for the current level of inter-state cooperationand others moving the Association forward through incremental changes inspecific areas.

Notes

1. The original ASEAN members were: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and

Thailand. The offer to participate had been declined by Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos before

the founding meeting in Bangkok in August 1967.

2. For discussions on the economic implications of the ASEAN enlargement, see Gates (2001)

and Nesadurai (2003).

3. SEATO was the institutional structure of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty signed

in Manila in September 1954 by the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand,

Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.


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4. The TAC also mentions other principles of the UN Charter and the principles endorsed at the

Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955.

5. This was especially true after 1987 when Vietnam was no longer able to rely on Soviet

assistance to fund its military activities in Cambodia. The Soviet attempt to reach detente with

China after the coming to power of Mikhael Gorbachev had led to the cessation of Soviet

support for the occupation.

6. The AMM is an annual gathering of the ASEAN foreign ministers. It is a key instrument of

regional diplomacy where security matters are commonly discussed.

7. For example, Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that the three most important functions of ASEAN

are to enhance regional harmony, to promote an autonomous regional order, and to act as an

international bargaining tool, (Anwar 2001).

8. The ARF was inaugurated in Singapore in July 1993. Its initial participants were: Australia,

Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, New

Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the

United States and Vietnam. Cambodia was admitted in 1995, India and Myanmar in 1996,

Mongolia in 1998, North Korea in 2000, and Pakistan in 2004.

9. The ASEAN-PMC takes place just after the annual AMM and consists of bilateral serial

discussions with ASEAN’s dialogue partners that include Australia, New Zealand, EU, the

United States, Japan, South Korea, and Canada.

10. The overlapping territorial claims over the Spratly Islands represent a difficult case of disputed

features between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. The Paracel

archipelago has been under Chinese control since 1974 and is also claimed by Vietnam and

Taiwan. Vietnam has laid claims on both the Spratlys and the Paracels based on historical

claims of discovery and occupation. It has also established a 200 nautical mile Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ). China views the South China Sea as an exclusive Chinese sea and

claims nearly its entire territory. The territorial dispute has already led to military clashes

between China and Vietnam in the Paracel archipelago in January 1974 and in the Spratlys in

March 1988 resulting in Vietnamese casualties and the Chinese seizure of territory.

11. An indigenous ethnic group from Southern China, the Hmong are an ethnic minority in Laos

and Vietnam. They played an important role during the Vietnam War by helping the

Americans counter communist forces. Many left Laos after the communist take-over in 1975

and found refuge in Thailand, Australia, France and the United States.

12. The ASEAN-China FTA is expected to be a comprehensive agreement based on the

progressive liberalisation of goods, services and investments. A Free Trade Area for Goods is

to be established by 2010 among Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,

Thailand and China, and by 2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.

13. The 2003 general elections in Cambodia were followed by 11 months of political deadlock

due to the failure of Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh and their respective political

parties, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the FUNCINPEC (National United Front for

an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) to form a coalition

government. Cambodia has also experienced a re-emergence of transnational crime in recent

years and become a transit route for the trafficking of people.

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Documents

The Indochinese enlargement of ASEAN: security expectations and outcomes