The Ineffabilities of Mysticism

North American Philosophical Publications

The Ineffabilities of MysticismAuthor(s): J. KellenbergerSource: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 307-315Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American PhilosophicalPublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009772 .Accessed: 08/03/2014 19:38

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American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 16, Number 4, October 1979

VI. THE INEFFABILITIES OF MYSTICISM J. KELLENBERGER

I

MANY mystics sound the theme of ineffability.

They say of God, the Godhead, Brahman, or some other mystical object, that He, or It, cannot be described or expressed, or is free of all names, or

cannot be thought or perceived, or cannot be

known. Dionysius the Areopagite (the Pseudo Dionysius) and John of Ruysbroeck are illustrative. Dionysius says of the incomprehensible presence of God that it

"plunges the true initiate unto the Darkness of Unknowing wherein he renounces all

the apprehensions of his understanding [and is united] to Him that is wholly Unknowable."1 Ruysbroeck speaks of a "Divine fruition in the abyss of the Ineffable."2

There is attaching to such mystical utterances a

problem or paradox. Put one way it is this : How can

the mystical object be incapable of description or expression if it can correctly be said to be indescrib? able or beyond expression? How can it be ineffable if it can correctly be said to be ineffable? The paradox in this form is semantic. It has to do with describing

or expressing the mystical object as "ineffable"?a

description that it seems can succeed only if it defeats itself. William P. Alston some years ago pursued this

form of the paradox in his article "Ineffability."3 If we focus more on the quotation from Dionysius we

get a slightly different formulation of the paradox, one that is

epistemic : How can one be aware that the

mystical object is Unknowable unless It, or He, is knowable? The problem in this formulation is one of awareness or the possibility of awareness (a problem that Dionysius explicitly recognized, by the way).4

We have just encountered two broad accounts of

ineffability, one semantic and one epistemic, each of

which gives rise to a self-defeating paradox. Perhaps these two accounts come to the same thing.

Certainly they give rise to different versions of the same

self-defeating paradox. But there are other

finer-grained ways of understanding ineffability that

definitely are different from one another, fn fact, as

some attention to mystical literature will show us, there are a number of different fine-grained senses of

"ineffability" at work, many if not all of which escape self-defeating paradox. Indeed, a single

mystic may use several different meanings, even in

the same work.

II

In what follows we shall isolate and discuss a

number of the different concepts or constructions of

ineffability employed in mystical literature. We shall be concerned with several features of the

different ineffabilities we examine, including coher? ence, conceptual implications, and applicability of the concept. Our primary source will be what

mystics themselves have said ; although we shall also draw upon commentators on mysticism, such as

W. T. Stace and William James. Throughout we shall pay heed to the objects of the

various ineffability claims we examine. Many com?

mentators, it seems to me, have not paid adequate attention to the variety of mystical objects. There are at least four

significant classes to be noted. First, that which is said to be ineffable may be God, the

Godhead, or Brahman, etc. Here the mystical object is a Being or Being. Second, as for St. John of the

Cross, the mystical object may be an "inward wisdom" or, as in the Upanishads, a supreme

knowledge. Here the mystical object is a Truth. Third, the mystical object may be the self, as in the Hindu tradition, or the soul, as for Meister Eckhart.

And, fourth, the mystical object may be the mystical experience itself. Of course a single mystic might affirm ineffability of objects in two or even all four classes; but, on the other hand, it could be that, for

instance, an experience of God is ineffable in some

definite sense for a mystic while God is not. We shall endeavor to be attentive to such possibilities.

In the sections that follow some four primary

3?7

1 The Mystical Theology, I; Dionysius the Areopagite, tr. by C. E. Rolt (London, 1940), p. 194. 2 The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage, ch. 4; The Teachings of the Mystics, ed. by W. T. Stace (New York, i960), p. 169. 3 William P. Alston, "Ineffability," The Philosophical Review, vol. 65 (1956) pp. 506-22. 4 The Divine Names, VII, 3; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 151.


308 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

forms and various secondary forms of ineffability are

distinguished. More could be produced. Some could be combined. The categories offered are not meant

as a definitive typology of ineffability, but as a workable schema of distinguishable forms.

Ill i. First, then, to say that the mystical object is

ineffable is to say that it cannot be shown or revealed to those who have not seen or experienced it.

This sense seems to be the sense of Plotinus in the Enneads when he says : "The divine is not expressible, so the initiate is forbidden to speak of it to anyone who has not been fortunate enough to have beheld it himself."b Plotinus is referring to the practice of the mystery religions, but he accepts it as well-advised. Clearly he is not saying that nothing can be said of the divine : initiates are forbidden to speak of the divine because they might. Rather, Plotinus is saying that it is pointless or worse to speak of the divine to those

who lack the experience requisite for understanding.

Dionysius also employs this sense in The Divine Names when he says that it is not his purpose to reveal the Super-Essential Nature, which is "unutterable," but

"only to celebrate the Emanation of the Absolute Divine Essence."6 Again, Dionysius does not mean

that the Super-Essential Nature of God can in no sense be articulated, for he proceeds to "celebrate"

It or Its Emanation as the Cause and Creator of

Being, Existence, Substance and Nature, the Pre Existent from whom are all Eternity and Time, the

Absolute and Transcendent Goodness, the All

Transcendent Unity which penetrates all things. Does Dionysius suppose that he is articulating truths about God's Nature? He might well. Certainly he could consistently. But, like Plotinus, Dionysius does not suppose that his words reveal God's Nature to

the uninitiated. It remains, however, that this form

of ineffability is perfectly consistent with there being spoken truths about the divine or God, even in His

Super-Essential Nature. We should observe that the mystical object for

both Plotinus and Dionysius in these passages is the One or God. More exactly, for Plotinus, it is that with which the soul becomes One and, for Dionysius, it is God's Super-Essential Nature. But for neither in the passages cited is it the mystical experience.

2. In a second sense of "ineffability" to say that a

mystical object is ineffable is to say that it cannot be imparted or transferred to others who have not directly experienced it.

This sense, in contrast with the first, attaches

primarily to mystical experience and perhaps secon?

darily to mystical truth, but not to the other mystical objects. It is this sense, it seems, that St. John of the Cross employs in the Dark Night of the Soul when he says:

For, speaking mystically, as we are speaking here, Divine things and perfections [of union with God] are known and understood as they are, not when they are

being sought after and practiced, but when they have been found and practiced.7

James in The Varieties tells us :

The subject of it [a mystical state of mind] immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced ; it cannot

be imparted or transferred to others.8

James here gives us two senses of "ineffability," a

stronger and a weaker, the stronger of which he says entails the weaker. We shall turn to the stronger in a

moment, but it is the weaker that concerns us at

present?according to which the quality of a mysti? cal state cannot be imparted or transferred to those

who have not experienced it. James goes on to say

that

in this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of

feeling than like states of intellect. No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in

what the quality or worth of it consists.9

For James, it seems, mystical states are ineffable because feeling states are ineffable and mystical states are like feeling states. But let us ask: Must someone have had an experience for its quality to be imparted to him by a description or is it sufficient for him to have had similar experiences? And what is

meant by "impart the quality of a mystical state"? Does it mean induce the experience? Or does it mean communicate an idea of the experience? If James meant the former, then of course this sense of "ineffable"

would hold for all experience, but it would not rule out imparting mystical states in the sense of impart?

ing an idea of what they are like. If he meant the

5 Enneads, VI, 9, 11 ; The Essential Plotinus, tr. by Elmer O'Brien (Indianapolis, Indiana, 1964), p. 87. (My emphasis.) 6 The Divine Names, V, 1 ; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 131.

7 Dark Night of the Soul, tr. and ed. by E. Allison Peers (Garden City, N. Y., 1959), pp. 162-63. 8 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York, 1902), p. 371. 9 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 371.


THE INEFFABILITIES OF MYSTICISM 300,

latter, then it is not clear that feeling states in general are ineffable in the sense that emerges. Although, of course mystical states still could be.

In any case, whichever sense of "impart" is

intended, when something is ineffable in this second sense, it still can be described. Even if the mystical state were ineffable in accord with this sense, the

mystic still could describe, and possibly truly de? scribe, his experience as ecstatic or as union with

God.

3. Now let us look at James's stronger sense. In this sense to say that the mystical object is ineffable is to say that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words.

James applies this sense to mystical states, that is, mystical experience; but with only slight modifi? cation it can be applied to other mystical objects as

well. It is roughly this sense, applied to the Godhead, Brahman, and other mystical objects, that gives rise to the semantic paradox. If this sense were correct, then it appears that we could not describe at all

mystical experience or any other mystical object to which the sense was applicable.

However, let us try to put this sense into per?

spective as it relates to the mysticism of the mystics. If this sense entails that the mystical object cannot be described, then it seems that James does just what he should not do. He gives us four "marks" of mystical states, one of which is their ineffability. That is, he describes them. And so it seems he runs afoul of the semantic paradox. But if James fell into this prob? lem, he did, I suggest, because he was a com?

mentator and not a mystic. Although James had paranormal experiences induced by nitrous oxide in

which opposites seemed to merge and through which he gained a new appreciation of Hegel, he was not a

mystic in the sense that Dionysius or Eckhart was.

Why is this important? It is because commentators and mystics are to be understood in very different

ways. Commentators give us marks or criteria which we are to look upon as embodied in propositions with a clear sense, and from which, consequently, we are

justified in drawing implications. Mystics give us propositions whose gnomic sense is to be clarified by the context of mystical utterance and which, by themselves, may be quite opaque. Eckhart says that the Godhead is "free of all names and void of all forms." Alston uses this quotation to help generate the semantic paradox.10 But what Eckhart means by this is clearly compatible with one's saying that the

Godhead is one and simple, for he immediately says

that the Godhead, like God, is one and simple. In general, as we shall see, mystics' ineffability claims are better understood in the context of their utter? ance. It is true that some mystics, like St. John of the

Cross, come closer to affirming ineffability with the full force of this third sense, but the extent to which this third sense in its extreme construction, and its

paradox, are a creation of commentators may be

worth considering.

Setting aside this reservation, let us allow that the third sense in its extreme construction has

appli? cation. Still it would not rule out knowledge of the

mystical object to which it applies, only com? municating that knowledge in words. Moreover it would leave it open whether inexpressibility is a function of a) our languages and their concepts or b) the human ability, or inability, to understand and to

express.

IV

4. We turn now to what may be the most

pregnant category of mystical ineffability. To say that the mystical object is ineffable in this sense is to say that it transcends our concepts.

This is the sense employed when it is said that mystical union of the One or some other mystical object is not graspable with our limited concepts. This sense is distinguishable from the last in that, for this sense, the cause of the inapplicability of our concepts clearly lies with the concepts themselves, not with human limitations of expression. This sense too can be applied to the entire range of mystical

objects. In fact, however, there are a number of rather

different notions subsumable under this fourth pri? mary sense. We shall consider several.

4a. No name derived from sense experience can

be applied to the mystical object. The notion here is that

expressible concepts are

formed from sense experience, and if we lack sense

experience of the mystical object, the names we use in connection with our concepts will be inapplic? able. Interestingly enough, several mystics have, at least in places, paid heed to this quasi-philosophical theory of meaning. St. John of the Cross seems to

draw upon such a view when he tries to say why the secret wisdom cannot be named or described: it cannot because it is "so

simple, so general and so

spiritual that it has not entered into the understand?

ing enwrapped or cloaked in any form or image subject to sense."11 From this, for St. John of the

10 Alston, "Ineffability," op cit., p. 506. 11 Dark Night of the Soul, pp. 159-60.



Cross, it follows that it cannot be imagined and cannot be named or described.

Several comments should be made here, I think. First, we should observe that mystics are not im?

mune to theoretical assumptions. St. John of the

Cross relied upon a theory of meaning not utterly unlike that which the British Empiricists came to hold : if no sense experience, then no idea and no

meaningful name. There are problems with such a

theory as this, and to the extent a mystic's in?

effability claim rests upon such a theory it is heir to its problems. Although, of course, we should bear in

mind that mystics as well as nonmystics can give bad

reasons for a true claim. But, secondly, we should

observe this: however we are to understand the

ineffability claims of St. John of the Cross, they are to be understood as consistent with some things being sayable about the mystical object. St. John of the

Cross can still say of the secret wisdom that it relates to God and the soul's journey to union with God. We find here again, then, that a mystic's ineffability claim is better understood by seeking the light of further things said by the mystic than by deducing implications of what is assumed to be a clear

principle. 4b. Alston in his article on ineffability, near the

end, suggests four different constructions of in?

effability that are designed to escape the semantic

paradox.12 All four are species of our fourth sense.

Here are three of them :

( 1 ) Concepts are inapplicable to God in the sense that it is possible to speak only of His extrinsic features, not of His intrinsic nature.

(2) Concepts are inapplicable to God in the sense that He cannot be characterized with the precision of science.

While we can say of God that He is omnipotent, there is no question of quantifying His power.

(3) We can speak of God only in a highly abstract way.

While we can correctly speak of God's love,

mercy, and wisdom, we cannot with confidence

trace all the concrete manifestations of these

attributes.

None of these constructions is self-defeating in the

way "Nothing can be said of God" is when it is construed in the stong sense commentators use. Each

allows us to affirm ineffability of God (or of another mystical object, mutatis mutandis). Alston offers a fourth construction as well. We will discuss it under

the heading of the via negativa, or negative theology,

which comprises the next secondary sense to be

considered.

V

4c. The via negativa is traceable to Dionysius in the West, but even in his writings it is open to several

interpretations. Perhaps the most general statement

of it is this : the only possible characterizations of the mystical object are negative.

There are at least four subsidiary senses that

deserve attention:

(1) Only negative words are applicable to the mystical object; positive words are not.

This is a view that W. T. Stace attributes to

Dionysius.13 According to it, God can be said to be "Unknowable" and

"Darkness," for these are nega? tive words. The problem here, as Stace points out, is that the distinction between positive and negative

words is not absolute : Darkness may be taken as the

positive and Light, as the absence of Darkness, as the

negative.

(2) Whatever true description there is of the mystical object, it says what the mystical object is not.

This version of the via negativa, I believe, cor?

responds with Alston's fourth construction of in?

effability, which he expresses thus: "God cannot be positively characterized in literal terms." When

Dionysius in the last chapters of The Mystical Theology tells us the many things that God is not he is practising the via negativa understood in this way.

Clearly, if according to this view there are some

positive characterizations which are to be ruled out, then there must be a way of distinguishing between

negative and positive characterizations. And this

raises once more the problem of distinguishing between negative and positive. Is "God is ineffable" a

negative characterization? Alston assumes it is.

But might not ineffability be thought of just as well as the presence of something as the absence of

something? (3) Whatever term or characterization is chosen,

the mystical object is not-that, in the sense that no term or characterization can apply to it.

The mathematical truth that the square of five is

twenty-five is neither green nor not-green. Color

concepts do not apply to mathematical truths. In the

same way, in this third construction of the via

negativa, no concepts apply to God or to the mystical

object intended. This seems to be close to Dionysius' 12 Alston, "Ineffability," op cit., pp. 520-21. 13 Stace, The Teachings of the Mystics, p. 134.


THE INEFFABILITIES OF MYSTICISM 31 I

sense at the end of The Mystical Theology, where he says:

nor can the reason attain to It to name It or to know It, nor is It darkness, nor is It light, or error, or truth; nor can any affirmation or negation apply to It.14

This construction does not bring with it the problem of distinguishing between negative and positive terms and characterizations. On the other

hand it seems to reinstate Alston's paradox. It may be edifying, however, to look at what Dionysius goes on to say in the next few lines:

It transcends all affirmation by being the perfect and

unique Cause of all things, and transcends all negation by the pre-eminence of Its simple and absolute nature? free from every limitation and beyond them all.15

If we allow this passage to clarify Dionysius' intent, then perhaps we can allow that the Cause of all things, which transcends affirmation and negation,

may nevertheless consistently be said to be ineffable and beyond our concepts.

(4) Whatever term or characterization is chosen, the mystical object is not-that, in the sense that the resulting proposition will always be false.

According to this construction, the proposition "God does not exist" is false and the proposition "God does exist" is equally false. Indeed any proposition relating to God will be false. This is the construction of Dionysius' view that Stace favors :

since for Dionysius God in himself is unknowable, everything we say of Him must, strictly speaking, be false, Stace says.16 Clearly, such a construction of the via negativa, and of ineffability, puts a strain on the

logical principle that if a proposition is false, then its denial is true. Religious propositions would not have denials, it seems. In fact this view?that everything said of God is, strictly speaking, false?was held by Stace himself in Time and Eternity, a work in which he held, not surprisingly, that the function of religious discourse was not descriptive, but solely evocative.

Such a view as this contains a unique resolution of

the semantic paradox: there is no paradox in

describing God as ineffable because God is not being described. However, the cost of such a resolution is

the utter unintelligibility of all those religious prac? tices (prayer, worship, and more) that require

religious beliefs about God. In the final sorting, this construction, I believe, is a philosophical creation and should not be conflated with the previous one as it was practically understood by Dionysius. As we

have seen, for Dionysius, though God transcends our

concepts still we can say truths of Him.

VI

4d. To say that the mystical object is ineffable is to say that it is beyond our concepts in that, when the

mystic uses our concepts to speak of it, he must resort

to contradictory statements to say what he means.

Here too supportive passages from mystical writ? ings can be cited, passages in which a mystic seems to fall into contradiction in trying to say what he would say. Stace provides an example from the Isa

Upanishad :

That One, though never stirring, is swifter than

thought...

Though standing still, it overtakes those who are

running ....

It stirs and it stirs not. It is far, and likewise near. It is inside all this, and it is outside all this.17

This view of ineffability has intrigued philo? sophers, and several have tried to explicate and defend it. Among those who have are Paul Henle18 and G. K. Pletcher,19 as well as W. T. Stace. Stace

adopts this view in Mysticism and Philosophy, sl work written eight years after Time and Eternity and one in which he rejects the evocative theory of mystical language that he held in the earlier work. In

Mysticism and Philosophy Stace insists that the mystic can

correctly say of his experience "It is x" and "It is

not-x," and, furthermore, this is a correct de?

scription.20 The language that the mystic is com?

pelled to use is contradictory. But he is not at fault, nor is there any fault attaching to language, for Stace. Given the mystic's experience, it is in the nature of things that his description will be con? tradictory. "The paradox which he has uttered has

correctly described his experience," Stace says, for "the language is only paradoxical because the experience is paradoxical." The contradiction mir? rors the experience.

14 The Mystical Theology, V; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, pp. 200-201. 15 The Mystical Theology, V; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 201. 16 Stace, The Teachings of the Mystics, p. 133. 17 W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (London, i960), p. 255. 18 Paul Henle, "Mysticism and Semantics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 9 (1949), pp. 416-22. 19 G. K. Pletcher, "Mysticism, Contradiction, and Ineffability," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 10 (1973) pp. 201-n. 20 Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, pp. 304-5.



As Stace recognizes, and emphasizes, it is an

implication of this view that contradictory state?

ments can be meaningful and correct. For Stace, in

mystical utterances there is no contradiction be? tween affirming and denying; that is, for Stace,

while the conjunction of both is fully contradictory, there is no contradiction in the sense that the conjunction is still descriptively correct. Stace, as he usually does, sees the mystical object as mystical experience, and he presents the mystic's linguistic perplexity as one that arises from his effort to describe his experience. Accordingly, Stace's apol? ogy for this concept of ineffability applies only when the mystical object is mystical experience. However, the mystical object said to be ineffable in this sense is

not always an experience. In fact in Stace's quo?

tation from the Upanishads it is the One. This construction of ineffability, it seems, if applicable at all, can be applied to any and all of the four classes of

mystical objects we noted. In support of this concept of ineffability Stace

quoted from the Isa Upanishad. But let us look at what the Isa Upanishad goes on to say. The One (or Self), it says,

has filled all; He is radiant, bodiless, invulnerable, devoid of sinews, pure, untouched by evil. He, the seer,

thinker, all-pervading, self-existent has duly distributed

through endless years the objects according to their natures.21

These things, it seems, can be said without con?

tradiction. Moreover, it is quite possible that those

mystics who use a contradictory mode of expression at least sometimes do not mean their utterances to be

understood as real contradictions. This may be the

case, for instance, for Dionysius in The Divine Names. While he says there that God is known from all

things and is not known from any, he has before

himself a distinction between knowledge "by Intuition, Language, or Name" and another know?

ledge that is obtained in a "communion which transcends the mind."22

VII

4e. To say that the mystical object is ineffable is to say that it is beyond our concepts in that it, or its

description, has a cognitive import that extends beyond a strict propositional expression.

In this construction it is allowed that, to some

extent, the mystical object can be expressed in

language. If the mystical object is a spiritual wis? dom, this construction allows that it itself can be

given a propositional expression in language. If the mystical object is God or the soul or mystical experience, it allows a description consisting of expressed propositions. Where then, one might ask, is the ineffability ? The ineffability being posited here attaches to an area of import that extends beyond

propositional meaning. This area is such that it is

cognitive but not captured by the strict sense of propositions. It is as though mystical propositions had a cognitive shadow, beyond language and beyond the strict import of propositions spoken or

unspoken, in which lay their greater significance. Mystics who draw upon this sense of "ineffability"

are inclined to distinguish between two kinds of knowing or understanding. Dionysius may be one

such mystic, and shortly we shall look at what he says pertinent to this construction. One not unfruitful way to understand this distinction is as that between knowing that a proposition is true and understanding the

full significance of what is known. So understood the crucial distinction is between knowing that and a kind of understanding. The first has as its object a proposition's truth. The second does not. The first is possible without the second. The second goes be?

yond the first. Knowledge that cannot deepen. This understanding, like understanding generally, can

deepen. However, let us not confuse this distinction

with others. The distinction here is not that between knowing that some proposition is true and understanding what is known in the sense of being able to deduce all that is entailed by that proposition. Nor is it the distinction between knowing that some proposition is true and having some understanding (or knowledge) of the objects named by that proposition. Mystics may well understand what they know in both these senses, but neither is the sense we need here. The distinction we need, rather, is that between knowing that some proposition is true and an

understanding of that proposition's extrasematic

import?an understanding which by its nature resists

articulation and is inexpressible in propositional form.

Now let us look for an illustration. As a matter of fact, we need not go as far as mysticism. Let us recall

Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych and his realization that, truly, he would die. What he realized was not the truth of the proposition "I shall die." He had known all

along that that proposition was true. Moreover, when we try to specify Ivan's cognitive change, we

find no new truth that he has realized. He has 21 The Principal Upanishads, tr. and ed. by S. Radhakrishnan (London, 1953), p. 573. 22 The Divine Names, VII, 3; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 152.


THE INEFFABILITIES OF MYSTICISM 31 3

deduced no new proposition. Nor has he empirically discovered a new truth, not even "I shall soon die," for this too he had already come to know. Rather he has more deeply realized the import of an old truth, something he cannot satisfactorily articulate as the old truth or as any new truth. It is his arriving at this new

understanding that is marked by Ivan Ilych's profound emotional and behavioral change.

In the case of mystical truths it is sometimes deeply felt by the mystic that it is not accurate to give what can be formulated in language as the object of understanding. Given such an insight, there are still two courses

open to the mystic. On the one hand he

might say that the mystical truth cannot be ex?

pressed in language: the proposition itself resists statement. This is the reaction of St. John of the

Cross regarding the secret wisdom. This course

allows that there are expressible propositions about a

mystical truth, but denies that it itself can be formulated as an expressible proposition. The second course would be for the mystic to say that,

while his mystical truth can be stated as a prop? osition, its greater cognitive significance is not

thereby captured but lies elsewhere in another

logical area which is beyond language. This reaction issues in the concept of ineffability we have before us.

While St. John of the Cross where he speaks of inward wisdom follows the first course, Dionysius in

places perhaps follows the second course. As we have

seen, Dionysius supposes, or at least allows, that

truths can be articulated about the Super-Essential Nature of God or Its Emanation (sec. Ill above); and, as we have seen, in The Mystical Theology he says of It that It transcends all affirmation and negation by being the Cause of all things and by the pre? eminence of Its simple and absolute nature (sec. V

above). But at the same time Dionysius could insist that there is a realm of

understanding not touched

by these propositions. In fact he draws just the sort of distinction?a distinction between kinds of knowing?that I suggested is typically drawn by those mystics who are inclined toward this sense of

"ineffability." In The Mystical Theology he speaks of the true initiate being

united by his highest faculty to Him that is wholly Unknowable, of whom thus by a rejection of all knowledge he possesses a knowledge that exceeds his

understanding.23

And in The Divine Names, as we have seen, Dionysius draws the distinction again. There he says that "the

Divinest Knowledge of God" is obtained in that communion which transcends the mind, and he

contrasts this with the knowledge of God that employs language.24

It is not an implication of this construction of ineffability that we cannot discover and speak truths about God or some other mystical object. Rather it is an implication that these truths have realms of

significance opaque to our understanding of strict

propositional sense. While this construction would insist upon the cognitive shadow of mystical prop? ositions, it would not deny that they have express? ible content qua propositions. A mystic affirming ineffability in this construction, then, could, like St.

Anselm or St. Thomas Aquinas, seek to trace the

logical implications of religious propositions arising from their strict

meaning. However, he would not

think that such an enterprise could even in principle exhaust the cognitive import of those propositions' full significance or begin to touch upon "the Divinest Knowledge of God."

VIII We have just seen four primary ways to under?

stand mystical ineffability. While these four cate? gories are not exhaustive or definitive, they do serve, I think, to acquaint us with the range of meanings that may be intended by the mystics. There is more than one mystical ineffability, it turns out.

It now remains to accomplish two small but useful

tasks. First, we should set before ourselves a number of divers things mystics say about the mystical object even though they conceive it to be ineffable in some sense. Second, we should take a brief look at the

functions of ineffability claims. The first we shall do in this section, the second in the next and last section.

Some of the divers things mystics say about the

mystical object, even though they conceive it to be ineffable, we have seen; many others we have not.

Here is a sample of the range :

For Dionysius in The Divine Names, as we have seen, the unutterable Super-Essential Nature of God can in some sense be articulated in the "celebration" of It or Its Emanation. Elsewhere in the same work Dionysius allows that the ineffable Super-Essential Godhead can be said to be the Cause and Origin and Being and Life of all creation, but also, to those who have fallen away, a Voice that recalls them, and a

Power of Renewal and Reform to those who have stumbled. These things and more are known, for

23 The Mystical Theology, I; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 194. 24 The Divine Names, VII, 3; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, p. 152.


3H AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Dionysius, because they are revealed in Scripture.25 Like many nonmystical believers Dionysius, it emer?

ges, saw Scripture as a source of divine truth?

despite, and compatibly with, God's being the Unknowable.

For Eckhart in places God is unknowable and beyond what can be named. In other places he

distinguishes between the Godhead, of which we cannot

speak, and God, of whom we can speak. Earlier we saw that Eckhart nevertheless affirms of

the Godhead that it is one and simple. Eckhart also says that there is nothing to talk about in the

Godhead because in the Godhead there is only unity ; and, he goes on to affirm, the difference between

God and the Godhead is the difference between action and nonaction.26

St. John of the Cross says, or would say, of the ineffable inward wisdom that it is simple, general,

and spiritual. He surely would say this, for, as we

have seen, his reason for saying that it cannot be

expressed is that it is so simple, so general, and so

spiritual. Also St. John of the Cross would say, because he does say, that the wisdom of Divine

contemplation is the language of God to the soul, that through its mystical knowledge the soul pen? etrates "the veins of the science of love," and that it

is the road whereby the soul journeys to union with God.27

These examples could be multiplied, drawing upon other mystical traditions as well. Quite clearly, even when a mystic makes an ineffability claim, he

may proceed to talk about, describe, or express the

mystical object. Nor is he using only metaphor. For St. John of the Cross the inward wisdom is literally spiritual. It is perhaps worth noting that in examples such as these several characterizations keep re?

curring: simple, absolute, unlimited, nonactive, Whether the mystical object is God, the soul, a truth,

or mystical experience, mystics tend to find these

characterizations applicable alongside and com?

plementary to the mystical object's ineffability. There are two ways we can reason here. We can

reason that if the mystical object is ineffable, then nothing can be said about it and the mystic is confused. Or we can reason that the mystic is not

confused and we shall be helped to understand better what he means by "ineffable," or a surrogate

expression, by looking at what else he says.

Philosophers like to trace the implications of prop? ositions without undue concern with a speaker's intentions : after all, it is felt, the implications of a

position are what they are regardless of what the

speaker wants them to be. Accordingly, philosophers and others tend to favor the first way of reasoning. But there is a danger here of refuting without

understanding, or of generating a paradox that is

ours but not the mystic's. The second approach, on

the other hand, would assume, until shown other?

wise, that the mystic is trying to say something coherent with his ineffability claim and would look to the details of the mystic's writings to discern what it is, leaving open the possibility that several senses of "ineffability" will be encountered.

IX

Finally let us reflect on the functions ineffability claims perform in mystical literature. At one level, of course, the function of the claim is to assert in?

effability in one or another sense. But there are

secondary functions as well, relating to the reasons

mystics feel compelled to assert ineffability. These bear a clear

relationship to, and are accommodated

by, some of the different concepts of ineffability we have discussed.

Some of the secondary functions of the ineffability claim relate to the mystic's experience. One such

function is to express the intensity of the bliss or ecstasy of the mystical experience, even though this

is done by insisting that the experience, in some sense, cannot be expressed. Closely related may be

the mystic's effort to signal the depth of his sense of profundity. Both of these functions have to do with the affective dimension of mystical experience.

When mystical experience is imageless, another

function of an ineffability claim may be to indicate that there is

nothing to describe in terms appropriate to images.28

Other secondary functions relate to mystical

objects other than experience. One such function

having to do with the cognitive dimension of

mysticism is to admit that the mystical object is beyond human imagination, human conception, or

human comprehension. If the mystical object is God or Brahman or even Nirvana, such an admission can

25 The Divine Names, I, 2-3; Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, pp. 52-55. 26 Sermon 27; Meister Eckhart, tr. by Raymond B. Blakney (New York, 1941), p. 226. For Eckhart the inner process of virtue "draws its value from God?from the very heart of God," while visible actions are at one

remove and "derive their goodness from the inner process of virtue." {The Book of Divine Comfort in Blakney, Meister Eckhart, p. 60.) 27 Dark Night of the Soul, pp. 161-63. 28

Regarding this function and the first cf. Ninian Smart, Reasons and Faiths (London, 1958), p. 71.


THE INEFFABILITIES OF MYSTICISM 315

serve to help define the mystic's relationship to the mystical object. If the mystical object is God, this function is not unrelated to the admission that

God's ways cannot be fully comprehended. Other functions as well have to do with the

mystic's relationship to the mystical object. For instance, the mystic may be concerned to give due

respect to the Mystery of the Godhead ; or he may be

striving to avoid belittling God or to avoid limiting the One; or he may be striving to set aside the conceit of his knowledge. Again the mystic may be

endeavoring to approach the mystical object with reverence and humility, to worship with reverent

silence, as was Dionysius.

All of these concerns are discernible in mystical literature, including those last named, which have to

do with the mystic's relationship to such a mystical object as God or the One or Being. Many of these last concerns

spring from religious motives. Most if not

all of the great mystics were religious, we should recall. And this recollection should help us to

appreciate that the mystics had good reason to speak as well as good reason to remain silent. They did speak. The categories of this paper, I hope, help us to understand how they could speak, even of the ineffable mystical object, and do so consistently with their ineffability claims.29

California State University, Northridge Received October 31, igj8

291 am grateful to William Jacobs for his comments on a first draft of this paper.


Article Contentsp. 307p. 308p. 309p. 310p. 311p. 312p. 313p. 314p. 315

Issue Table of ContentsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 247-344Justified Inconsistent Beliefs [pp. 247-257]Direct Measurement [pp. 259-272]Recent Work on Hegel [pp. 273-284]Hume on Heaps and Bundles [pp. 285-295]Epicurus on Self-Perception [pp. 297-306]The Ineffabilities of Mysticism [pp. 307-315]Truth in Beauty [pp. 317-325]Do Pains Make a Difference to Our Behavior? [pp. 327-334]The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism [pp. 335-341]Books Received [p. 343-343]

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The Ineffabilities of Mysticism