The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-Religious Minorities

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The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-Religious Minorities

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The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on GrievanceFormation by Ethno-Religious Minorities*

JONATHAN FOX

Department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University

j o u r n a l o f

peaceR E S E A R C H

© 1999 Journal of Peace Researchvol. 36, no. 3, 1999, pp. 289–307Sage Publications (London, ThousandOaks, CA and New Delhi)[0022-3433 (199905) 36:3; 289–307; 008048]

While there is considerable agreement that religion can bolster the legitimacy of governments, those whooppose them, and just about any political action by any individual or group, there has been no previous large-N cross-sectional study of the subject. This study tests the effects of religious legitimacy on grievanceformation by ethnic minorities using data on 105 ethno-religious minorities from the Minorities at RiskPhase 3 dataset as well as data on religion collected independently. For operational purposes, a minority is anethno-religious minority when at least 80% of that group’s members are of different religious denominationsthan that of the dominant ethnic group of the state in which they live. The findings show that religious legit-imacy does influence grievance formation but that influence is not the monolithically positive influence thatwould be expected. Religious legitimacy tends to facilitate the formation of grievances over non-religiousissues when religion is not an issue in the conflict but deters the formation of grievances over these issues whenreligion is an issue. The presence of religious legitimacy is also positively associated more indirectly and weaklywith the formation of religious grievances.

Religious Legitimacy

One of the few truisms in the study of poli-tics that seems to have near universal accep-tance is that religion can bolster thelegitimacy of both governments and opposi-tion movements, as well as just about anypolitical activity. This truism can be found

in textbooks1 and in the behavior of poli-ticians worldwide. Even Marxist govern-ments, which ideologically reject religion,accept the fact that it is a powerful legiti-mating force calling it the ‘opiate of themasses’. However, to date, this authorknows of no attempt to test this truism in across-sectional, large-N format.

Accordingly, this work tests whether reli-gious legitimacy influences the process ofgrievance formation by ethno-religiousminorities. That is, does religious legitimacyfacilitate the process by which ethno-reli-gious minorities form grievances over pol-itical issues such as discrimination andautonomy? Data on 105 ethno-religiousminorities from the Minorities at Risk

* I would like to thank Ted R. Gurr for his insights,advice, and criticism without which this work would nothave been possible. I would also like to thank JonathanWilkenfeld, Charles Butterworth, Ollie Johnson, WilliamStuart, and the anonymous reviewers from JPR for theirhelpful insights. The author alone is responsible for anyerrors of fact or interpretation that remain. All statisticspresented here were generated using SPSS for Windows 7.5using data from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 dataset aswell as additional data collected by the author. The fullMinorities at Risk dataset can be obtained from:http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar. The data used inthis article are also available at the Minorities at Riskwebsite. The author can contacted by email at:[email protected]. ac.il.

289

1 See, for example, Kamrava (1996: 163–165) and Meny(1993: 28–31).

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dataset, along with data on religion collectedindependently, are used in this study toanswer this question in a large-N cross-sec-tional format.

Theories of Religion and Legitimacy

There seems to be considerable agreementamong scholars that, as is argued here,religion can act as a legitimizing force insociety for both governments and those whooppose them. Kokosalakis (1985: 371)argues that even though the current justifica-tion of state power usually rests on ideologiessuch as nationalism, the pursuit of democ-racy, and humanitarian values, a ‘strongresidual element of religion, which clearlyexists even in Western societies, can stillperform basic legitimizing or oppositionalfunctions within such ideologies’. Geertz(1977: 267–268) similarly argues that‘thrones may be out of fashion andpageantry too; but political authority stillrequires a cultural framework in which todefine itself and advance its claims, and sodoes opposition to it’.

Little (1991: xx) also considers religionimportant to political legitimacy. He arguesthat ‘religion or similar beliefs often play anactive and prominent part in defining groupidentity and in picking out and legitimatingparticular ethnic and national objectives’.This is because of the human need to‘elevate given political and economicarrangements in reference to sacred orcosmic standards’.

Turner (1991: 178–198) engages in adetailed discussion of Christianity and thelegitimation of political power. This legit-imacy historically derives from a descendingtheory of legitimacy in which powerdescends from God to the rulers, known asthe doctrine of divine right. Based on thisdoctrine, people have no right of resistanceand no power over their ruler. However,over time, the Western world has switched

to an ascending theory of legitimacy inwhich power comes from the people, thusgiving them a right of resistance. He attri-butes the current ‘crisis of capitalism’, inpart, to ‘the inability of legal formalism toprovide a system of normative legitimation’(Turner, 1991: 197).

The concept that religion can legitimateboth governments and opposition move-ments is inherent in Lincoln’s (1985:268–281) discussion of three types of reli-gions. The first, a religion of the status quo,is basically a mutually beneficial social con-tract between religious elites and the statewhere the religious elites have the goal ofideological hegemony. That is, the religiouselites want their religious ideology to be theprimary or only accepted ideology in theirsociety. A religion of resistance is, in short,any religion other than the dominant one.The adherents of such religions tend to chal-lenge the ideological hegemony of the domi-nant religion because, by definition, theyusually advocate a religious ideology otherthan the dominant one. The main goal ofthe adherents of these religions is survivaland they usually do not attempt to spreadtheir influence outside of their own geo-graphical and social milieu. A religion ofresistance becomes a religion of revolutionwhen the objective conditions in societyworsen and its adherents ‘successfully articu-late a new theory of political legitimacy’(Lincoln, 1985: 276). This poses a challengeto the legitimacy of the dominant religionand allows the advocates of the religion ofrevolution to recruit new members from theadherents of the dominant religion. If suc-cessful, a religion of revolution becomes thenew religion of the status quo.

Several scholars argue that especially inthe Third World, secular governments aresuffering from a lack of legitimacy which hasresulted in religious challenges to theirregimes. Juergensmeyer (1993) makes pre-cisely this argument, grouping all of the

j ournal o f PE AC E RE S E A RC H volume 36 / number 3 / may 1999290




Western secular ideologies including nation-alism, liberalism (democracy combined withcapitalism), socialism, communism, andfascism into one category which he calls‘secular nationalism’. Both religion andsecular nationalism are ‘ideologies of order’.This means that they conceive of the worldin coherent manageable ways, provide expla-nations for worldly events, provide the auth-ority that gives social and political order itsreason for being, and define what is properindividual behavior. ( Juergensmeyer, 1993:30–31). Because of this, religion and secularnationalism are potential rivals.

According to Juergensmeyer, it is secularnationalism that currently serves these soci-etal functions in the modern world, butreligion waits as potential challenger. Thischallenge has become more potent becausesecular nationalism is suffering from a ‘lossof faith’ which has led to a ‘crisis of legit-imacy’. He cites several reasons for this lossof faith. First, many governments followingsecular nationalist ideologies have promisedpolitical freedom, economic prosperity, andsocial justice but have failed to fulfill thesepromises. Second, secular nationalism is per-ceived by many in the non-Western world asa foreign ideology imposed from outside. Itdoes not have any local authenticity or legit-imacy. Third, and along a similar vein,secular nationalism has become identifiedwith the issues of colonialism and culturalcolonialism. The imposition of secularnationalism by governments in formercolonies has led to the accusation that theleaders of these former colonies are perpetu-ating colonialism through their espousal ofsecular nationalism. Furthermore, it is saidto be eroding the traditional aspects ofsociety along with the influence of religionin society. Advocates of secular nationalismare seen to be in league with the West (theenemy) in a global conspiracy againstreligion. In fact, secular nationalism is seenas a ‘sinister religious entity’ that is respon-

sible for society’s moral decline. This has, insome cases, been taken to the point whereanything the West does is part of this plotand anything secular is considered, by defi-nition, illegitimate. The lack of legitimacyfor secular governments and ideologies thatthese factors are causing has resulted in the search for a different source of legiti-macy which has often turned out to bereligion.

Sahliyeh (1990) connects this crisis oflegitimacy to the process of modernization.He argues that inconclusive modernizationefforts and the failure of much of the non-Western world to end its dependence on theWest have added to the grievances of reli-gious movements. While this alone isenough to undermine the legitimacy ofsecular regimes, there have also been manyunsettling social and intellectual conse-quences of modernization. Modernizationhas contributed to a ‘widespread feeling ofdislocation, alienation and disorientationresulting from the process of modernizationand from the rapid disappearance of habituallifestyles and traditions’ (Sahliyeh, 1990: 9)as well as the breakdown of communityvalues.

Haynes (1994: 31–34) makes a similarargument:

The arrival and consolidation of contem-porary religious militancy is rooted in thefailed promise of modernity. Our era is onewhere God was in danger of being supersededby a gospel of technical progress and econ-omic growth, a process identified ... as ‘mod-ernization’. Yet all of this is very confusingand (especially over the past 50 years) hasbeen very swift, with traditional habits, beliefsand cultures under constant pressure to adapt.In an increasingly materialist world, one’sindividual worth is increasingly measuredaccording to standards of wealth and status,and hence, power … The result of [this] cul-tural and economic confusion was to providefertile ground for the growth of religious mil-itancy and conservatism.

Marty & Appleby (1991: 602, 620) in their

291Jonathan Fox TH E IN F LU E N C E O F RE L I G I O U S LE G I T I M AC Y




landmark study on the nature of religiousfundamentalism make arguments similar tothese assessments. They argue that thecurrent resurgence of religious fundamen-talism is primarily due to a combination offactors. First, rapid modernization in for-merly traditional societies has caused a con-siderable amount of social and personaldislocation. Second, the absence of medi-ating institutions capable of meeting thehuman needs caused by this dislocation hasexacerbated the problem. Accordingly, reli-gious fundamentalism is concerned withdefining, restoring, and reinforcing the basisof personal and communal identity that isbeing shaken or destroyed by modern dislo-cations and crises.

Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘clash of civ-ilizations’ thesis also indirectly addressesthe issue of religious legitimacy. Hunt-ington argues that the Cold War’s focus onconflicts between democracy and commu-nism (both Western ideologies), is beingreplaced by conflicts between civilizations,specifically between the West and the non-West. This is because modernization tendsto produce renewed commitment to indige-nous cultures. This process has acceleratedsince the decline in Western (American)power since the end of the Cold War.

Huntington defines a civilization as ‘thehighest cultural grouping of people and thebroadest level of cultural identity peoplehave short of what distinguishes humansfrom other species. It is defined by bothcommon language, history, religion,customs, institutions and by the subjectiveself identification of people’ (Huntington,1993: 24).2 While his definition does notemphasize religion, his selection of civiliza-tions does seem to focus on religious group-ings.3 Thus, Huntington is, in part, arguing

that the lifting of the Cold War restraintshas allowed religious legitimacy to play alarger role in international politics.

Although this argument is controversial,his critics, including Ajami (1993), Binyan(1993) and Kirkpatrick et al. (1993) do notseem to be able to agree among themselvesas to exactly what is wrong withHuntington’s argument. Be that as it may,it is clear that the end of the Cold Warcannot be the only cause of the recent reli-gious resurgence. Gurr (1993a) documentsthe trend of a more or less continuous riseof ethnic conflict in general, and ethno-religious conflict specifically, since WorldWar II. Also, Gurr (1994: 356–358),through a quantitative analysis of post-Cold War conflicts, finds that there is noevidence that civilizational or religiouscleavages are becoming more importantas a source of ethno-political conflict.However, the ‘end of the Cold War’ argu-ment has merit. It is reasonable to arguethat the end of the Cold War has removedmany systemic restrictions on religiousconflict. States no longer have as much of aneed for a superpower sponsor which islikely to restrain their actions and supportthem in struggles against religious groupswithin their borders. This allows otherfactors, such as religious legitimacy, toplay a larger role in the post-Cold Warera.

Although there seems to be general agree-ment that religious legitimacy is animportant factor in politics, there is a largebody of literature that contradicts this prop-osition known as modernization or seculariz-ation theory. This body of theory posits thatmodernization should reduce the politicalsignificance of ethnicity and religion. Factorsinherent in modernization, including econ-omic development, urbanization, growingrates of literacy and education, as well asadvancements in science and technology,should inevitably cause the demise of


2 Italics added for emphasis.3 Huntington’s list of civilizations includes the Western,Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,Latin American, and (possibly) African civilizations.




the role of ethnicity and religion in poli-tics.4

Current events have led to a re-evaluationof this theory. The watershed event whichseems to have caused this re-evaluation wasthe Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then,religious movements worldwide have pro-vided further proof that modernizationtheory is flawed. Most critics of moderniza-tion theory argue that religion never ceasedbeing relevant.5 As discussed earlier, manycontend that it was the process of modern-ization itself that led to a revitalization ofreligion in the modern era. While thesearguments tend to focus on the ThirdWorld, they are also applicable to moredeveloped countries.

A relatively recent trend within the soci-ology of religion literature may help toprovide an explanation for why religionslend their legitimacy to governments and/oropposition groups. This approach to thestudy of religion, known as the rationalchoice or economic approach, applies econ-omic rational choice theory to religiousmovements in a similar manner to the wayin which Olson (1971) applied it to socialmovement theory. Iannaccone (1995a: 77),one of the major proponents of thisapproach,6 describes its three fundamental

simplifications and/or assumptions. Themost fundamental simplification/assump-tion is that individuals engage in maximizingbehavior, otherwise known as using a cost-benefit analysis, in selecting their religions.The other two simplifications/assumptionsfollow from this one. First, religious ‘pro-ducers’ attempt to maximize ‘members, netresources, government support, or someother basic determinant of institutionalsuccess. The actions of church and clergy arethus modeled as rational responses to theconstraints and opportunities found in thereligious marketplace’. Second, the com-bined actions of religious ‘consumers’ and‘producers’ in a free religious marketplacetend toward equilibrium.

For our purposes, the relevant simplifica-tion/assumption is the first one which positsthat religious ‘producers’ seek to maximizetheir access to whatever resources they deemmost important. If these ‘producers’ seekpolitical and economic support or at leasttolerance from the government, a logicalway to maximize these resources would befor the ‘producers’ to lend some of theirlegitimacy to the government.7 If these ‘pro-ducers’ wish to increase their active member-ship, taking on popular causes, includingopposition to the government, would belikely to make their religious product moreattractive to the religious ‘consumers’.Religious ‘producers’ would be especiallylikely to take this course if they have no hopeof government support or are actively perse-cuted by the government.

Religion and Ethnicity

Most agree that religion is an aspect of


4 While modernization and secularization theory aresimilar in their content, I distinguish between thembecause they differ in their focus. The modernizationliterature, based mostly in political science writings,focuses on ethnicity in general. Its predictions are appliedspecifically to religion as a side point. For examples of thisliterature, see Almond (1960), Apter (1965), and Deutsch(1953). Secularization theory, found mostly within socio-logical writings, focuses specifically on religion. Westhus(1976: 314) shows that since World War II, sociologistshave subscribed to secularization theory. Appleby (1994:7–8), Turner (1991: 40–51, 71–80, 134–135, 187–193),and Shupe (1990: 18) argue that this body of theory datesback to 18th and 19th-century social thinkers includingVoltaire, Comte, Durkheim, Toennies, Weber, Marx, andNietzsche. For a more detailed discussion of moderniza-tion/secularization theory and the counter-argumentsagainst it, see Fox (1997).5 See, for example, Barnhart (1990: 28), Greenwalt(1988), and McNeill (1993: 561–566).6 Other proponents of this approach include Warner

(1993). Critics of this approach include Chaves (1995),Demerath (1995), Ellison (1995), and Verweij & Naut.(1997). Iannaccone (1995b) replies to some of these cri-tiques.7 For a discussion of various forms of government supportfor religious institutions, see Durham (1996).




ethnicity. For example, Gurr (1993a: 3)argues that:

… in essence, communal [ethnic] groups arepsychological communities: groups whosecore members share a distinctive and en-during collective identity based on culturaltraits and lifeways that matter to them and toothers with whom they interact. People havemany possible bases for communal identity:shared historical experiences or myths, reli-gious beliefs, language, ethnicity, region of res-idence, and, in caste-like systems, customaryoccupations. Communal groups – which arealso referred to as ethnic groups, minorities,and peoples – usually are distinguished byseveral re-enforcing traits. The key to ident-ifying communal groups is not the presence ofa particular trait or combination of traits, butrather the shared perception that the definingtraits set the group apart.8

Thus, Gurr defines religion as salient toethnicity when it is a defining trait thatsets a group apart in that group’s owneyes and/or in the eyes of others. Becausethe importance of religion to ethnicidentity is based on perceptions, this rel-evance of religion can vary over time.Horowitz (1985: 64–74) makes a similarargument.

Thus, religion is an aspect of ethnicitywith its importance varying over time andplace. While it can be the single mostimportant factor in some ethnic identities,it can have little relevance to others. Thekey factor which determines whetherreligion will be salient is the perception ofthe group itself. Accordingly, the defi-nition of ethnicity used here is basedupon this view of ethnicity by Gurr. Anethnic group is considered an ethnicgroup if its members believe themselves tobe an ethnic group. Any conflict betweentwo such groups is considered an ethnicconflict. Ethnic conflicts are consideredhere to be potential ethno-religious con-flicts if the two groups that are in a con-

flict are primarily of different religions.Given this, it is possible, although notalways the case, that religion can be thesole factor that differentiates betweenethnic groups. That is, if religion con-tributes sufficiently to the perception ofotherness, it can be the sole factor thatdefines an ethnic identity.

Research Design and Data

The essential question asked here is whatrole does religious legitimacy play in theprocess of ethnic conflict? Operationally,this question is placed within the context ofGurr’s (1993a,b) Minorities at Risk modelfor ethnic conflict. Gurr posits that discrimi-nation against an ethnic minority causes theminority to form grievances9 over that dis-crimination. These grievances cause theminority group to mobilize for either protestor rebellion, and this mobilization, in turn,leads to actual protest and rebellion. Thismodel is based on a combination of rela-tive deprivation theory10 and mobilizationtheory.11 Gurr also controls for numerousother factors.12


8 Italics added for emphasis.

9 As explained in Gurr (1993b: 173), ‘active grievances arethe demands or grievances articulated by group spokesmen’.10 For some examples of relative deprivation theory, seeGurr (1970), Davies (1962), Olson (1963), Feierabend &Feierabend (1973), and Huntington (1968). For a furtherdiscussion and criticism of relative deprivation theory, seeRule (1988).11 For a more comprehensive discussion on mobilizationtheory, see Chong (1991), Hannigan (1991), Oberschall(1993), Rule (1988), Snow & Rochford (1986), Tilly(1978), and Webb (1983).12 These other factors include: repressive control by thedominant group, which increases the level of groupcohesion and identity and decreases minority groups’ability to mobilize; group size and concentration, whichincrease a minority group’s ability to mobilize; collectivedisadvantages as well as engagement in communal protestor rebellion, which increase minority groups’ cohesion andidentity; the level of minority groups’ cohesion andidentity, which increases the likelihood of mobilizationand the formation of grievances; international support fora state which increases its ability to engage in repressivecontrol; international support for an ethnic minorities,which increases their cohesion and identity; the processes ofstate expansion and economic development, which increase




The operational question here iswhether religious legitimacy affects thegrievance formation process. Does religiouslegitimacy facilitate grievance formationand, if so, under what circumstances? It islogical to argue that this occurs because if acause is perceived as more legitimate, itshould be easier to form and express griev-ances associated with that cause. If this isin fact the case, it is important to theprocess of ethnic conflict because, as hasbeen demonstrated in previous empiricalstudies by Gurr (1993a,b) and Gurr &Moore (1997), grievances are one of themost important causes of mobilization forconflict as well as direct causes of con-flict.13

In this article, the effects of religious legit-imacy are tested on both non-religious andreligious grievances. What differentiatesthese two variables is the subject of the griev-ances, not the motivation behind the dis-crimination that caused them. Grievancesexpressed on specifically non-religious issues,such as economic issues, are treated as non-religious grievances even if the economicdiscrimination that caused the formation ofthese grievances was motivated by religiousconcerns. Similarly, the religious grievancesvariable focuses on grievances expressed overspecifically religious issues such as restric-tions on public celebrations of religious fes-tivals. Thus, the grievances the Bahai in Iranover the numerous political and economic

restrictions imposed upon them are coded aseconomic and political grievances, althoughthe discrimination against them is almostcertainly motivated by the religious concernsof Iran’s theocratic government. Only thosegrievances expressed over specifically reli-gious issues are coded as religious grievances.This is done because ultimately it is imposs-ible to be certain of the motivations formany of the actions taken by the groupsinvolved in the conflicts that are the subjectof this study. Focusing upon concreteactions, as opposed to guesses as to what isgoing on in the minds of the actors in theseconflicts, is a necessary compromise in astudy such as this one. Actions can be measured objectively with reasonably goodlevels of reproducibility and transparency.Measuring unexpressed motivations is, atbest, guesswork that is likely to be subject toa significant level of disagreement. Thenecessity of this compromise is one of theshortcomings of the large-N events dataapproach but it is unavoidable. It is arguedhere that, despite this compromise, muchcan still be learned from the results of thisand similar analyses.

The variables used in this analysis comefrom two sources. The ethnic conflict vari-ables are taken from Gurr’s Minorities atRisk Phase 3 dataset (MAR3). The unit ofanalysis is the ethnic minority. There are268 ethnic minorities coded in the MAR3dataset, of which 105 are ethno-religiousminorities. For operational purposes a min-ority is an ethno-religious minority when atleast 80% of that group’s members are of adifferent religious denomination than that ofthe dominant ethnic group.14 While a few ofthese ethnic minorities are differentiated


the level of minority grievances as well as the level of statepower; the levels of state power and institutional democ-racy which both increase the likelihood that communalaction will take the form of protest rather than rebellion;the process of democratization, with a tendency to be desta-bilizing, which increases the likelihood of both communalprotest and rebellion; the processes of contagion and dif-fusion which both postulate that the level of communalprotest and rebellion by similar groups elsewhere increasethe likelihood of communal protest and rebellion at home.13 Gurr (1993a,b) uses the Phase I version of theMinorities at Risk dataset to test these assertions, whileGurr & Moore (1997) use the Phase III version which isused also in this article. The dependent variables for ethnicconflict used in all of these studies are protest and rebellion.

14 Protestant and Catholic Christianity are considered sep-arate religions for the purposes of this study. However,Orthodox Christianity is not considered sufficiently dif-ferent from either Protestantism or Catholicism for suchconflicts to be included. The Sunni and Shi’i branches ofIslam are considered separate religions for the purpose ofthis study.




from the dominant group in their state pri-marily on the basis of religion, they are allconsidered ethnic minorities by the Min-orities at Risk project. As discussed above, itis possible for religion to be the sole factorthat defines an ethnic identity. Further,these groups are included in this study onlyif there is a viable government that is incontrol of the state in question. This isbecause the data are designed to analyze therelationship between ethnic minorities andthe state. For this reason, cases such as thecivil wars in Bosnia and Afghanistan are notincluded. Additional religion data on these105 groups were coded for the larger studyof which this work is part.

Most of the variables are judgementalordinal variables or composite variablescreated from several judgemental ordinalvariables. That is, the variables were assignedvalues by a coder using an ordinal scale basedon specified criteria. Each of the 268 cases inthe MAR3 dataset was coded based on back-ground reports and chronologies assembledby the project staff. The same staff memberwho prepared the report generally coded thedata using pre-prepared codesheets.15

Although no systematic reliability tests havebeen performed on the MAR3 dataset, allMAR3 codings were reviewed by the MAR3project coordinator and Gurr, both at theinitial coding and on each update. Gurrargues that this provides a considerable levelof internal consistency and therefore relia-bility for the MAR3 data.16

The religion variables were coded separ-ately by this author. Reliability tests for thereligion variables are presented after thedescriptions of these variables.

Religion VariablesThese variables are not part of the MAR3dataset and were coded specifically for the

larger study of which this work is part. Toreiterate, the discrimination and grievancevariables described here focus on the specifictopic of the discrimination itself and theissues over which grievances are formed.Religious discrimination is discriminationthat somehow infringes upon religious prac-tices and religious grievances are thosegrievances expressed over such discrimi-nation. Religious motivations for othertypes of discrimination and/or any griev-ances formed resulting from it are notincluded in these variables but are includedin the general ethnic conflict variablesdescribed later.

Religious Grievances Religious grievancesare defined as grievances publicly expressedby group leaders over what they perceive asreligious discrimination against them. Thisvariable is coded for two time periods1992–93 (RELGRVX93), and 1994–95(RELGRVX95). It is measured on a scale of0–24 and is a composite variable measuringthe grievances expressed by minority groupsover specifically religious issues.17

Religious Discrimination Religious dis-crimination is defined here as the extent to


15 These chronologies and codesheets can be obtainedfrom: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar.16 Personal communication from Ted R. Gurr.

17 This variable measures grievances publically expressedby group leaders over discrimination. The level each typeof grievance is coded on the following scale, the totals ofwhich are added to form a scale of 0–24: (3 = issueimportant for most of the group; 2 = issue is significant butits relative importance cannot be judged; 1 = issue is oflesser importance, or of major concern to only one factionof the group; and 0 = issue is not judged to be of any sig-nificant importance). The activities so coded are: Generalreligious grievances – code only when no other morespecific category can be coded; Grievances over restrictionson public observance of religious services, festivals and/orholidays; Grievances over restrictions on building,repairing and/or maintaining places of worship; Forcedobservance of religious laws of other group; Grievancesover restrictions on formal religious organizations;Grievances over restrictions on the running of religiousschools and/or religious education in general; Grievancesover restrictions on the observance of religious laws con-cerning personal status, including marriage and divorce;Grievances over restrictions on the ordination of and/oraccess to clergy; and Grievances over restrictions on othertypes of observance of religious law.




which religious practices are restricted eitherdue to public policy or widespread socialpractice. The variable used here is a com-posite variable created for the 1992–93period from two component variables. Thefirst codes the severity of religious discrimi-nation on a judgemental scale of 0–4.18 Thesecond religious discrimination variable, ona scale of 0–8, is a composite indicator of thescope of discrimination which combinesseveral coded variables.19 These two variablesare combined on a scale of 0–9.

Religious Legitimacy Religious legitimacyis defined here as the extent to which it islegitimate to invoke religion in political dis-course. The variable (RLEG93) is coded forthe 1992–93 period.20 It is measured on ascale of 0–4 and is a composite indicator

based upon codings for four factors. Thepresence of each of these factors is posited toindicate indirectly that it is legitimate toinvoke religion in political discourse. Eachof the following factors is coded as 1 if foundto be present, and RLEG93 is the total ofthese four factors: a history of religiousinvolvement in politics and/or conflict; reli-gious leaders are actively using religiousrhetoric to mobilize the population; religionis offered as the solution to non-religiouseconomic, political and/or social problems;and the presence of an official religion in thestate’s constitution, laws, or de facto publicpolicy. The final of these components of thereligious legitimacy variable (RLEG493) isalso used independently in this study.

Relevance of Religion This variable(RRELVNT) was assigned a value based onthe strength of religious discrimination andgrievances compared to discrimination andgrievances over political, economic, cultural,and autonomy issues.21 The relevance ofreligion to the conflict is decided solely onthe level of discrimination and grievancesexpressed over specifically religious issues ascompared to discrimination and grievancesover all other types of issues (measured bythe variables described below). Religiousmotivations for non-religious discriminationare not taken into account. It was codedonly once for the entire 1990–95 period andis measured on a scale of 0–5.

In order to verify the reliability of thereligion data tested here (coded by theauthor), 21 out of the 105 cases wererecoded by backup coders. The backup


18 The scale is constructed as follows: 0 = None.I = Substantial religious discrimination in society due togeneral prejudice in society. Explicit public policies protectand/or improve the position of the group’s ability to prac-tice its religion. II = Substantial religious discrimination insociety due to general prejudice in society. Public policiesare neutral, or if positive inadequate to offset discrimi-natory practices. III = Public policies of formal restrictionson religious observance. Religious activities are somewhatrestricted by public policy. This includes religions that aretolerated but given a formal second class status (e.g.Christian sects in many Muslim states). IV = Public poli-cies of formal restrictions on religious observance.Religious activity is sharply restricted or banned (e.g.Bahais in Iran).19 Each of the following specific types of religious dis-crimination was coded on a scale of 0–2 (2 = the activityis prohibited or sharply restricted for most or all groupmembers; 1 = the activity is slightly restricted for most orall group members or sharply restricted for some of them;and 0 = not significantly restricted for any). The codedvalues for the eight variables were added and the sum wasdivided by two to create a set of indicators (one for eachbiennium) with values on a scale of 0–8. The activities socoded are: Restrictions on public observance of religiousservices, festivals and/or holidays; Restrictions on building,repairing and/or maintaining places of worship; Forcedobservance of religious laws of other group; Restrictions onformal religious organizations; Restrictions on the runningof religious schools and/or religious education in general;Restrictions on the observance of religious laws concerningpersonal status, including marriage and divorce;Restrictions on the ordination of and/or access to clergy;and Restrictions on other types of observance of religiouslaw.20 Codings are also available for the 1990–91 and1994–95 periods but are not used in this study.

21 The variable was coded on the following scale:0 = None. I = Marginal relevance. Issues are basically of anon-religious nature but religion is being used to legitimizethose issues and/or mobilize the group. II = Religiousissues are significant but are less important than other non-religious issues. III = Religion is one of several significantissues which are of roughly equal importance.IV = Religion is the primary issue of the conflict but thereare other significant issues involved. V = Religion is theonly issue relevant to the conflict.




coders were all coders who collected andcoded the data for the MAR3 dataset (asopposed to the religion variables, which werecoded separately). Each coder was asked toselect randomly several of the cases for whichhe or she coded the general Minorities atRisk dataset, for backup codings of thereligion data. The results from these caseswere then correlated with the original codingas presented in Table I. All of the correla-tions have a significance of greater than0.001 and all of the correlations, except forthose for religious legitimacy, are above0.75. Considering the judgemental nature ofthese variables, these results are sufficientlyhigh to verify the reliability of these vari-ables. Separate codings for the RLEG493component of the religious legitimacy variable are not available in the backupcodings.

The use of five separate religion variablesin this study may be slightly confusing tosome readers. Each of these variables is dis-tinct and necessary to this study. This studytests the influence of religious legitimacy ongrievance formation by ethnic minorities.Thus, the two religious legitimacy variablesare the major independent variables beingtested here. Similarly, religious grievancescomprise one of the dependant variables.The relevance of a religion variable isnecessary because whether religion isimportant in a conflict significantly affectsthe process of non-religious grievance forma-tion. Finally, religious discrimination is

necessary because it is a major factor in theformation of religious grievances.

Ethnic Conflict VariablesUnless otherwise noted, these variables aretaken from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3dataset and cover the 1992–93 period.22

Economic Discrimination This variable is acomposite variable measuring the level ofeconomic discrimination against a minority.It is based on the level of poverty in the min-ority group compared to other groups andwhether the government’s policies areintended to improve the minority’s econ-omic status or are discriminatory. It is mea-sured on a scale of 0–9.

Political Discrimination This variable is acomposite variable measuring the level ofpolitical discrimination against a minority.It is measured on a scale of 0–9 and is basedon two factors. First, the presence andstrength of political restrictions on freedomof expression; free movement; place of resi-dence; rights in judicial proceedings; pol-itical organization; restrictions on voting;recruitment to the police and/or the mili-tary; access to the civil service; and attain-ment of high office. Second, whether thegovernment’s policies are intended to


Table I. Variable Reliability for Religion Variables

21 Cases Religious Discrimination Religious Grievances1990–91 1992–93 1994–95 1990–91 1992–93 1994–95

Correlation 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.76 0.77 0.78

21 Cases Religious Legitimacy Relevance of Religion1990–91 1992–93 1994–95

Correlation 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.95

All correlations have a significance of 0.001 or lower in two-tailed correlations.

22 A more detailed discussion of these variables and theirinfluence on ethnic conflict can be found in Gurr(1993a,b), Gurr & Moore (1997), and the Minorities atRisk website at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar.




improve the minority’s political status or arediscriminatory.

Cultural Restrictions This variable(CULRES92) measures the restrictions thatare placed on the pursuit or expression of thegroup’s cultural interests. These restrictionsinclude: restrictions on observance ofgroup’s religion; restrictions on speaking andpublishing in the group’s language ordialect; restrictions on instruction in thegroup’s language; restrictions on celebrationof group’s holidays, ceremonies, and culturalevents; restrictions on dress, appearance, andbehavior; restrictions on marriage, familylife; restrictions on organizations thatpromote the group’s cultural interests. Thecodings are summed and divided by two,creating an indicator that is measured on ascale of 0–10.5.

Lost Autonomy This variable measureswhether the group had greater autonomyin the past. It is measured on a scale of0–1.

Non-Religious Grievances This variablewas constructed for the 1992–93 and1994–95 periods by adding together fourgrievance variables, each focusing on a dif-ferent issue: political, economic, cultural,and autonomy. Each of these componentvariables is measured on a scale of 0–10, cre-ating an indicator that is measured on a scaleof 0–40.23

Democracy This variable is included in theMinorities at Risk dataset and is taken fromthe 1994 version of the Polity III dataset. Itshows the level of a state’s institutionaldemocracy in 1994 and are measured on ascale of 0–10 based on the following factors:competitiveness of political participation;competitiveness of executive recruitment;

openness of executive recruitment; and con-straints on the chief executive.24

Democracy-Squared This variable wascreated by taking the above democracy vari-able, subtracting 5 and squaring the result.This variable was added because it was foundin previous studies, including Hegre et al.(1998), and Ellingsen & Gleditsch (1997),that domestic conflict is most likely in semi-democratic countries due to the fact thatdemocracies tend to accommodate minorityconcerns and autocracies tend to repressthem. The resulting measure puts such semi-democracies close to or at 0 and themost democratic or autocratic of states at 25.

Per-Capita GNP This measure is intendedto control for the level of economic develop-ment in the state in which the ethno-reli-gious conflicts occur. The data are for 1995and are taken from the 1995 UN StatisticalYearbook.

Group Cohesiveness This variable measuresthe strength of a group’s unity and commonidentity based on factors including thenumber of factions or other groupingswithin the group and the strength andimportance of the group’s shared values and objectives. It is measured on a scale of0–5.

Demographic Stress This variable is an‘intensity weighted sum of coded categoriesof demographic and ecological disadvan-tages’ (Gurr & Moore, 1997: 1090).

Methodology

There are two dependant variables testedhere, non-religious grievances and religiousgrievances. The non-religious grievancesvariable, as noted above, includes grievancesover economic, political, cultural, and


23 For more details on the construction of these compo-nent variables see Gurr (1993a,b). A similar variable isused by Gurr & Moore (1997).

24 For more details and reliability tests on this variable, seeJaggers & Gurr (1995: 472).




autonomy issues. Four tests are performedon non-religious grievances and two on reli-gious grievances. First, the relationshipbetween religious legitimacy and both ofthese variables is tested using simple corre-lation. Second, a further set of correlationsbetween non-religious grievances and reli-gious legitimacy is performed, controllingfor the level of relevance of religion to theconflict by performing two separate correla-tions, one for all cases in which relevance ofreligion is coded as 0 and one for all othercases. The reason for this is that a prelimi-nary analysis showed that the direction of therelationship between religious legitimacy andnon-religious grievances differs substantiallydepending on whether religion is relevant tothe conflict. Including the relevance ofreligion variable in multiple regressions, asdemonstrated below, does not effectivelycontrol for this difference. This test is notperformed on religious grievances because itis one of the component variables for con-structing the religious relevance variable,making the two unacceptably covariant.

Third, the relationship between religiouslegitimacy and both dependant variables istested using multiple regression and con-trolling for other variables that affect griev-ance formation in ethnic conflict. Gurr(1993a,b) and Gurr & Moore (1997) havealready performed tests to determine howethnic grievances are formed, using theMinorities at Risk dataset. Accordingly,similar control variables are used here. Themost important of these variables are dis-crimination variables. Included in the testsperformed here are religious, economic,political, and cultural discrimination vari-ables. Because there is no such thing asautonomy discrimination, whether theethnic minority in question has had someform of autonomy is the past is usedinstead. This variable is especially appro-priate because Gurr (1993a,b) found it tobe the single best predictor of grievances

over autonomy issues.25 In order to accountfor other group hardships that can con-tribute to grievance formation, a demo-graphic stress variable is included as acontrol. Group cohesion is included as acontrol because, it is argued, a more cohe-sive group is better able to organize andexpress its grievances. Democracy is addedas a control because grievances are easierto express in a democratic setting.Democracy-squared is added for thereasons described earlier. Per-capita GNP isadded to control for the general level ofeconomic development. Finally, the rel-evance of religion to the conflict is added asa control. As these control factors, with theexception of religious relevance, are fullydiscussed in the above studies, discussion ofthem will be limited to their influence onthe issues at hand here.26

Fourth, a further set of regressions is per-formed on the non-religious grievancesdependent variable, using the same controlvariables but controlling for the level of rel-evance of religion to the conflict by per-forming two separate regressions, one for allcases in which relevance of religion is codedas 0 and one for all other cases. The rel-evance of religion to the conflict is removedas a normal control for these regressions.The reason for this test is similar to thereason for doing the same in the correlationsdescribed above. This test is not performedon religious grievances, for the reasonsdescribed above.


25 The correlation between lost autonomy and grievancesover autonomy in 1993 for the 105 ethno-religiousminorities in the MAR3 dataset is 0.481 ( p < 0.001)26 One anonymous reviewer suggested including a controlvariable for history of violent conflict. While the authoragrees that this is an important factor in ethnic conflict, itis not an appropriate variable for predicting religious griev-ances. Previous studies of the Minorities at Risk dataset,including Gurr (1993b), have found that past violent con-flict is strongly correlated with present violent conflict. Inaddition, the same studies also found that all forms ofgrievances are major causes of violent conflict.Accordingly, including past history of violent conflictwould cause problems of covariance.




Data Analysis

Religious Legitimacy and Non-ReligiousGrievancesSimple correlations between non-religiousgrievances and religious legitimacy, pre-sented in Table II, show no relationshipbetween the two variables. However, intiered correlations and controlling for therelevance of religion to the conflict, the cor-relation is weakly but not significantly posi-tive when religion is not relevant to theconflict (relevance of religion = 0) andweakly negative when religion is relevant.This relationship is considerably strongerwhen considering whether the state has anofficial religion as a surrogate variable forreligious legitimacy. When religion is notrelevant to the conflict, this variable has astrong and significant positive correlationwith non-religious grievances, and whenreligion is relevant it is significantly nega-tively correlated with non-religious griev-ances. In sum, the correlations show thatreligious legitimacy appears to facilitate theformation of non-religious grievances whenreligion is not an important factor in a con-flict, and that it inhibits them when religionis an important factor.

This relationship between religious legit-imacy, as measured by whether the state hasan official religion, and non-religious griev-ances holds up in multiple regressions, con-trolling for other aspects of ethnic conflict asis shown in Table III. In the simple multipleregression, religious legitimacy is not astrong factor in predicting non-religiousgrievances. However, when we control forthe level of religious relevance to the conflictby running separate regressions for whenreligion is relevant to a conflict and for whenit is not, religious legitimacy becomes a sig-nificant factor. When religion is not relevantto the conflict, religious legitimacy signifi-cantly adds to non-religious grievances,having the highest beta in the regression.When religion is relevant to the conflict,religious legitimacy significantly detractsfrom non-religious grievances. Several rela-tive deprivation variables and the level ofdemocracy are also significant factors.

These results show that religious legit-imacy does influence non-religious grievanceformation. However, this influence is notthe positively monolithic influence we mighthave suspected. The results indicate that reli-gious legitimacy facilitates non-religiousgrievances when religion is not relevant to


Table II. Correlations Between Religious Legitimacy and Non-Religious Grievances1

Control Variable No. of Cases Non-Religious Grievances————————— ––––––––––––––––––––––Variable Value 1992–93 1994–95

Religious Legitimacy None All 105 –0.075 –0.0651992–93

Relevance = 0 28 0.187 _0.223of Religion1

$ 1 77 –0.220* –0.205*State Has Official Religion None All 105 –0.055 –0.0591992–93

Relevance = 0 28 0.490*** _0.496***of Religion1

$ 1 77 –0.263** –0.269**

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 1 These correlations are controlled by running separate correlations for differentlevels of the relevance of religion variable.




the conflict but inhibits them when religionis relevant. Explanations for these results arediscussed later in the context of the entirebody of results of this study.

In addition, adding religious legitimacyto the explanation for non-religious griev-ances adds to the explanatory power. Theadjusted R 2 of the simple multiple regressionpresented here (0.317) is somewhat higherthe adjusted R 2 predicting non-religiousgrievances in Gurr and Moore’s (1997:1091) study of ethnic conflict (0.26).27

Furthermore, the adjusted R2s for the mul-tiple regressions controlling for religious rel-

evance are considerably higher (0.412 and0.349). Thus, not only is religious legit-imacy shown to be a significant factor innon-religious grievance formation, it alsoadds to the variance explained by previousstudies.

Religious Legitimacy and ReligiousGrievancesThe relationship between religious legit-imacy and religious grievances shows apattern that is considerably different fromthe relationship between religious legitimacynon-religious grievances. Simple correla-tions, shown in Table IV, between religiouslegitimacy and religious grievances arestrong, significant, and positive. The simplecorrelations between whether the state hasan official religion and religious grievancesare also significant and positive but weaker.


Table III. Regressions Predicting Non-Religious Grievances

Variables (all for 1992–93 Non-Religious Grievances 1992–93unless otherwise noted) ——————————————————————————

All Cases Relevance of Religion1

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––Not Relevant (0) Relevant ( $ 1)

State Has Official Religion (–0.004) –(0.366* –0.222*Religious Discrimination –(0.078) –(0.080) (–0.011)Economic Discrimination 0.318*** –(0.361* (0.115)Political Discrimination –(0.057) –(0.056) (0.159)Cultural Restrictions 0.285** (–0.157) 0.336**Lost Autonomy 0.252** –(0.191) 0.296**Group Cohesion (–0.049) –(0.124) (–0.093)Demographic Stress –(0.017) –(0.033) 0.294*Democracy in 1994 –(0.127) (–0.010) (0.192)Democracy-Squared 1995 –0.313** –(0.166) –0.353**Per-Capita GNP 1995 –(0.054)– –(0.268 (0.018)Relevance of Religion –0.205* –(– –Degrees of Freedom 96 027 68Adjusted-R 2 0.317 –(0.412 0.349

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 1 These correlations are controlled by running separate correlations for different levels of the relevance of religionvariable. All of the coefficients in the chart are beta values. The numbers in parentheses indicate that the variable wasnot included in the regression. These numbers are the value the beta would have been had that variable been includedin the regression.

27 One reason why the simple multiple regression pre-sented here and the multiple regression in Gurr & Moore(1997) are not identical, even though both use the samedataset, is that Gurr and Moore performed their tests on all268 ethnic minorities in the Minorities at Risk Phase 3dataset, while the tests performed here include only the105 ethno-religious minorities found in the dataset.




However, in multiple regression control-ling for other aspects of ethnic conflict, asshown in Table V, religious legitimacy doesnot significantly affect the level of religiousgrievances. In this multiple regression, reli-gious discrimination is by far the most sig-nificant variable, but group cohesion anddemocracy-squared also play a role. Morecohesive groups are more likely to form reli-gious grievances, as are groups living insemi-democratic states.

Discussion

The analysis reported here reveals three sig-nificant findings about the influence of reli-

gious legitimacy on ethno-religious griev-ance formation. First, religious legitimacyhas an influence on grievance formation, butthat influence is not always positive. Second,the relationship between religious legitimacyand non-religious grievance formation isstrongly affected by the relevance of religionto the conflict. Third, there is a differencebetween the effect of religious legitimacy onnon-religious (cultural, economic, political,and autonomy) grievance formation andreligious grievance formation.

The first two significant findings combineto create an interesting question: why doesreligious legitimacy facilitate non-religiousgrievances when religion is not relevant to


Table IV. Correlations Between Religious Legitimacy and Religious Grievances

Control Variable No. of Cases Religious Grievances————————— ––––––––––––––––––––––Variable Value 1992–93 1994–95

Religious Legitimacy None All 105 0.430*** 0.424***1992–93State Has Official Religion None All 105 0.287*** 0.284***1992–93

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table V. Regressions Predicting Religious Grievances

Variables (all for 1992–93 Religious Grievances 1992–93unless otherwise noted) —————————————

All Cases

Religious Legitimacy (0.092)Religious Discrimination (0.820***Economic Discrimination (–0.048)Political Discrimination –0.128Cultural Restrictions (0.144Lost Autonomy (–0.002)Group Cohesion (0.152*Demographic Stress (–0.004)Democracy in 1994 (0.055)Democracy-Squared 1995 –0.138*Per-Capita GNP 1995 (0.017)Degrees of Freedom 96Adjusted-R 2 (0.623

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses indicate that the variable was not included in theregression. These numbers are the value the beta would have been had that variable been included in the regression.




the conflict but inhibit non-religious griev-ances when religion is relevant? Thisdynamic is at odds with the monolithicallypositive relationship we would haveexpected. One possible explanation for thispattern is that when religion is relevant tothe conflict, higher levels of religious legit-imacy cause the religious minority in ques-tion to focus on religious issues, rather thannon-religious issues. Thus, religious legit-imacy is most likely to mobilize people todeal with religious issues, whereas in theabsence of such issues it can be used tomobilize groups for non-religious issues.However, as soon as religious issues becomeimportant, the use of religious legitimacywill cause ethno-religious minorities to focuson religious issues and, if anything, detractfrom any attention given to non-religiousissues.

However, this possible explanation maybe at odds with the findings for the influenceof religious legitimacy on religious grievanceformation. With no controls, religious legit-imacy has a significant positive affect on religious grievances but this affect is over-shadowed by religious discrimination,democracy-squared, and group cohesion inmultiple regressions. These results indicatethat while religious legitimacy may be animportant variable in forming religiousgrievances, it is clear that other variables areconsiderably more important. This is consis-tent with the findings in Gurr (1993a,b) andGurr & Moore (1997) that discriminationand other relative deprivation variables arethe most important factors in grievance for-mation. Moreover, religious legitimacy isstrongly correlated with religious discrimi-nation (0.435, p < 0.001). Given this, it isnot surprising that religious discriminationovershadows religious legitimacy in multipleregressions.

This strong correlation between religiouslegitimacy and religious discrimination indi-cates that religious discrimination is more

likely to occur in societies with higher levelsof religious legitimacy. Accordingly, reli-gious legitimacy has an indirect influence onreligious grievances: the presence of religiouslegitimacy in a state makes religious dis-crimination more likely, which, in turn,causes the formation of religious grievances.

Thus it is arguable that the dynamicsbetween religious legitimacy and grievanceformation are as follows. Religious legit-imacy facilitates non-religious grievanceswhen religion is not relevant to the conflict.When religion is relevant to the conflict, asindicated by the presence of religious dis-crimination, the effects of religious legit-imacy tend to be overshadowed by religiousdiscrimination but still play an importantrole in facilitating the formation of religiousgrievances. This occurs through the indirectprocess of religious legitimacy facilitatingreligious discrimination which, in turn,causes the target of that discrimination toform grievances. Also, the direct effects ofreligious legitimacy on this grievance for-mation process cannot be completely ruledout.

Another matter that should be discussedis the religious legitimacy variables usedhere. The first religious legitimacy variableused is a composite variable which is theproduct of four variables measuring whetherthe use of religion in politics and conflict isacceptable in the society in question. Whilethis composite variable does help to establishthe relationship between religious legitimacyand non-religious grievances, by itself it doesnot suffice. In fact, the second religious legit-imacy variable used here, whether the statehas an official religion, which often showsbetter results, is one of the component vari-ables of the composite religious legitimacyvariable. That these results are found eventhough this component variable has onlytwo possible values is even more striking. Allof this would seem to indicate that, althoughadequate, the religious legitimacy variables





could be much improved. This might bepossible through the construction of a moredetailed indicator of the official relationshipbetween church and state.

Another significant finding is that thisanalysis confirms the results of other studieson the nature of the relationship betweendemocracy and internal conflict. As notedearlier, Hegre et al. (1998), among others,found that domestic conflict is most likely inthose states that are neither very democraticnor very autocratic. This is because autocra-cies tend to repress conflicts and democraciestend to diffuse them through politicalcompromises. In all of the multiple regres-sions where it was significant, the democ-racy-squared variable was negative. Thismeans that grievances are less likely to beexpressed in states that are very democraticor very autocratic, and are more likely to beexpressed in states that are somewherebetween these two extremes.

Conclusion

The findings reported here show that thepresence of religious legitimacy does have aninfluence on the process of grievance forma-tion among ethno-religious minorities, butnot the monolithically positive influencethat we would expect. The presence of reli-gious legitimacy seems to facilitate the for-mation of non-religious grievances whenreligion is not relevant to the conflict anddeter it when religion becomes relevant tothe conflict. Moreover, the presence of reli-gious legitimacy is associated more weaklyand indirectly with religious grievance for-mation.

The explanation offered here for thispattern is that religious legitimacy facili-tates non-religious grievances only whenreligion is not an issue. When it is, thefocus shifts to religious issues at theexpense of non-religious ones. While thisexplanation, in retrospect, seems logical

and may be applicable to other types ofconflict, it should be noted that theseresults pertain only to ethno-religiousconflicts. Also, as discussed above, thevariables for religious legitimacy used hereare less than perfect. It is clear that morework needs to be done on this topic. Thefuture research agenda should include animproved religious legitimacy variable aswell as the application of quantitativemethodology to the role of religious legit-imacy in non-ethnic settings.

Despite these limitations, these resultsare important for several reasons. First,they provide, to this author’s knowledge,the first and only clear empirical evidencefor a connection between religious legit-imacy and grievance formation. This isespecially important because grievance for-mation is a key element of most, if not all,ethnic conflicts. Second, they show thatthis relationship is not the monolithicallypositive relationship that might have beenexpected. Third, they demonstrate thefruitfulness of applying large-N, cross-sec-tional methodology to the study of reli-gious legitimacy.

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JONATHAN FOX, b. 1968, PhD inGovernment and Politics (University ofMaryland, 1997); Instructor, Bar IlanUniversity, Ramat Gan, Israel (1997– ).Current research interest: the quantitativestudy of religion and conflict.





Documents

The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno-Religious Minorities