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G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y , G O V T 4 5 1 , P r o f e s s o r K a r b e r .
The Korean Provisional Government: the war against Japan Soo K. Chae
Fall 12
08 Fall
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Table of Contents
Introduction pg. 3 I. The Shanghai Period: 1919~1932 pg. 4
• Weakness I: Geographic Location • Weakness II: Political Disputes, Left vs. Right • The Decline of the Korean Provisional Government • Military Accomplishments during Shanghai Period
II. The Moving Period: 1932~1940 pg. 10
• Sino-‐Japanese Tensions: The Manchuria Incident • Seizing the Opportunity: The Korean Independence Party • Hongk’ou Park Incident • Chinese Response: Sino-‐Korean Alliance Rises • Rising Korean Movement
III. The Chongqing Period: 1940~1945 pg. 21
• Government in the Making • Declaration of War against Japan • The Pacific War: The Imphal Front • The Eagle Project
Conclusion pg. 31 Bibliography pg. 33
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Introduction Modern form of Korean patriotism was prompted by Japan’s annexation of
Korea in 1910, and formally declared itself as a movement in March 1st, 1919. In this
day, known in history as “the March First Movement,” 33 representatives formally
declared Korea’s Declaration of Independence from Japanese imperialism, marking
the dawn of a long and enduring fight for national independence for the Korean
people. After 1910, overt nationalist movements became nearly impossible within
Korean territory because of severe Japanese oppression. Korean nationalists, both
left and right, fled outside of Korean borders, particularly Manchuria and Russian
Maritime Territory, to carry on their fight for independence1.
In April of 1919, the Korean Provisional Government was established in
Shanghai with a grand purpose of engineering Korean movement for independence.
Although whether the Provisional Government fulfilled its aspirations remains
debated even in South Korea, there is no doubt that this temporary government was
central to Korean resistance and the formation of modern South Korea in several
ways. Most importantly, the government was not a re-‐institution of old Chosun
monarchy—instead, it resembled, though not perfectly, a republic that is the earliest
appearance of democratic principles in Korean history. This foundation of modern
republic in Korea “reflected the power that Korean people had manifested in the
March First Movement.2”
Korean historians divide the timeline of Korean Provisional Government into
three segments based on its geographic locations: the “Shanghai period,” roughly
from 1919 to 1932, the “moving period,” from 1932 to 1940, and “the Chongqing
period,” from 1940 to 19453. This paper will examine each period, however with a
strong focus on the last of the three, the “Chongqing period,” and investigate its
successes and failures leading up to liberation of the Korean peninsula.
1 Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea, (Cambridge, MA: Published for the Harvard-Yenching Institute by Harvard UP, 1984), p. 338 2 Ibid., p. 344-345 3 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” Research on the Korean Independence Movement (Hanguk Dokripundongsa Yeongu), vol. 33, (2009): p. 62
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I. The Shanghai Period: 1919~1932 The establishment of a provisional government in Shanghai was Korea’s first
adoption of democratic principles. The structure of governance was far from
perfect—it only consisted of a deliberative and an administrative organ—but it was
hopeful in its start. Despite being a temporary government in exile, and thus lacking
direct contact with its population and main land, the Korean Provisional
Government began by regrouping independent resistance forces that were fighting
from Manchuria and Russia Maritime Territory. Contact with the Korean people was
maintained through liaisons that were assigned to every province, county and town
in the peninsula. This mechanism allowed for the government to accumulate
financial donations and garner participation from anyone in any part of Korea, at
least until Japanese supervision pivoted4.
However, the Korean Provisional Government during Shanghai period was
full of uncertainties. From simple questions like liaison assignments and fundraising
to more fundamental issues, notably who and which ideological faction should lead
the government and what the grand strategy of the Korean movement should be,
much was left unanswered. Hence, the Korean Provisional Government during
Shanghai period, despite its calling itself a government, was far from one; in fact, it
was just another resistance organization at best. This section of the paper will
analyze several setbacks that the temporary government encountered, and examine
the Korean independence movement as a military mission during this period.
Weakness I: Geographic Location As an esteemed international city, Shanghai provided many geographic
advantages; it facilitated transportation of resources and gathering of information,
and the French concession allowed political freedom that was rarely found
4 Lee, A New History of Korea, p. 345
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elsewhere5. However, it also Shanghai as a strategic location had little to no other
advantages—it was not a region heavily populated by Koreans, as had been the case
for Manchuria and Russia Maritime Territory6.
Table 1.
Region # Of Koreans in the area
Southeastern Manchuria 600,000
Maritime Province of Siberia (Russia Maritime Territory)
200,000
United States and Hawaii 6,000
Shanghai 400~700
Source: Lee, Chong-‐Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1963), p. 129-‐130 Created by Soo K. Chae
As evident from the table above, Manchuria and Russia Maritime Territory
were locations that were most heavily populated by Koreans at the time, and thus
were locations that maintained the closest historical and geographical ties to the
Korean peninsula. Naturally, organized resistance movements had been forming in
these regions long before the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government
in Shanghai. Hence, despite its reputation as an international city, Shanghai was not
the best location for a government, the focal point of Korean nationalism, to be
based on, most importantly due to its geographic distance from major Korean
revolutionaries7.
What made matters worse was China’s state of insecurity at the time. Social
movements, historically referred to as the May Fourth Movement, were spreading
throughout the nation, and Shanghai was no exception. Moreover, in addition to its
internal troubles, China was also under severe threat of Japanese expansionism.
Political and military insecurity within China significantly limited the scope of the
5 Hee-Kwon Kim, “The Korean Provisional Government I: The Shanghai Period (대한민국임시정부 I: 상해시기),” The History of Korean Independence Movement (한국독립운동의 역사), vol. 23, (2008): p. 303 6 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), (South Korea: The Independence Hall of Korea, 1989), p. 6 7 Ibid.
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young government8. Hence, geographic weakness of Shanghai resulted in prolonged
uncertainty with regards to the path of the Korean Provisional Government.
Weakness II: Political Disputes, Left vs. Right
In addition to its geographic fragility, the government failed to mitigate
ideological differences among major leaders of the independence movement.
Political dissensions were created by conflicting ideologies within the government,
and thus generated irresolvable confusion as to how the movement should proceed.
There were three major factions. First was the “pro-‐American” group, led by
President Lee Seung-‐Man, which advocated diplomatic solutions and believed that
eventually, the United States would assist Korea as an ally. This group prevailed
during the 1920s, but was challenged by a significant leftist faction. Its argument
was fundamentally incompatible with that of “the Siberia-‐Manchuria” group, most
notably Li Tong-‐Hui and Park Yong-‐Man, which challenged the former’s reliance on
the United States. This leftist group consisted of hawkish fighters who had been
battling guerrilla warfare for years, and called for militarized operations against
Japan, including those as ambitious as sending troops to drive Japanese forces out of
the Korean peninsula. At this point, the Shanghai government had roughly 6,000
troops in the Korean Independence Army, albeit not yet a national army. While this
leftist faction had little faith in potential aid from the United States or the United
Nations, it aligned with the Soviet Union9.
Third was a minor nationalist group led by Ahn Chang-‐Ho, a renowned figure
in Korean history. Ahn supported fortification of national power through patriotic
self-‐awareness. Ahn claimed that the independence movement should aim for a
long-‐term achievement, which he defined as Korea’s national empowerment
through means including self-‐education and awareness10.
Hence, despite that leaders of the independence movement assembled in
Shanghai, a truly united nationalist front was far into the future. 8 Ibid., p. 17 9 Nym Wales, “Rebel Korea,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 15, No. 1, (1942): p. 36 10 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 28
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The Decline of the Korean Provisional Government
The conflicting ideological strands weakened the authority and cohesion of
the Korean Provisional Government to the extent of near anarchy. What made it
most obvious were continuous resignations of key figures. In early 1920s, leftist
Park Yong-‐Man refused to take a seat in the government when he saw that the pro-‐
American group prevailed—he proceeded to create his own, anti-‐Provisional
Government sector11. More resignations ensued, including leftist Yi Tong-‐Hui,
nationalist Ahn Chang-‐Ho and Kim Kyu-‐Sik. These major leaders denounced the
Korean Provisional Government as incompetent and damaged—their resignation
statements read, “correcting the confused state of the government would only cause
a greater struggle.12”
In other words, the Korean Provisional Government lacked the authoritative
influence that any government would be entitled to. Revolutionaries could not only
leave the government, but also could create an anti-‐governmental institution,
whenever they felt dissatisfied with its direction. Those that remained in the
Shanghai government, such as President Lee Seung-‐Man, made several attempts to
resolve its internal breakings, but did so with no fruitful results. In 1924, Korean
People’s Delegates Congress assembled in Shanghai in an effort to reach an
agreement about the government’s future. In an event attended by approximately
6,000 delegates fighting in Manchuria, Russia, Korea and the United States, two
antagonistic strands were at odds with no room for cooperation—one side argued
that the existing Shanghai government should be reorganized in order to strengthen
its lead in the independence movement, while the other advocated a foundation of a
single, revolutionary party modeled after that of Sun Yat-‐Sen of China13.
While President Lee Seung-‐Man is often blamed for his lack of leadership and
breaking of the government, it is difficult to imagine that Shanghai Period would
have evolved differently, had there been another leadership in place. Factionalism 11 Ibid. 12Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, (Berkley, CA: University of California, 1963), p. 150 13 Wales, “Rebel Korea,” p. 36-37
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and ideological clashes were inevitable, as Korean nationalists were exposed to
diverse ideologies, across the United States, China and Russia, none of which were in
pre-‐colonial Korea, since their exile from Korea in 1910 These internal conflicts
were aggravated due to the fact that the Korean Provisional Government was in
exile, far from its own land, and thus was consistently subject to financial
difficulties14. Uncertainty about the government’s identity and chronic shortage of
resources dominated during the Shanghai Period, gradually implicating the decline
of the once ambitious, Korean Provisional Government.
Military Accomplishments during Shanghai Period
Figure A. Independent military campaigns during the Shanghai Period
*Yellow: Region heavily populated by Koreans *Purple: Location of major guerrilla units
Source: "Military Independence Army, Resistance Battles." Map. Lee Kyung Chan's Korean History Class. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://leekcp.new21.org/>.
14 Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 153-154.
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Regardless of disappointing records of the young government, many Korean
nationalists were continuing their pursuit of national independence. Due to the fact
that the government was too exhausted from political disruptions and that it was
without a national army, most military operations during this period were pursued
by independent guerrilla units until 1931. Many nationalists carried out military
campaigns, especially in Manchuria and Siberia, and several of the major battles
were successful15.
Map of the above displays the major battles that were executed during this
period. It is noteworthy that independent guerrilla units engineered these battles
with no significant assistance from the government or any foreign powers. The
slight differences in names of the units are because these units, while fighting for the
same cause, were independent of one another.
Anti-‐Japanese militarism was quite active even in the absence of
governmental leadership; the Greater Korean Independence Army, the largest unit
then, consisted about 3,500 men across three battalions. Despite being chronically
relocated from Manchuria, to Chientao area, to Siberia, these guerrilla units were
continuously at war16. Most notable of the victories is the Battle of Qingshanli in
1920, when a Korean military unit led by Kim Cha-‐Jin conducted a surprise attack on
Japanese forces from three directions in a narrow valley, resulting in thousands of
Japanese casualties at the cost of only several hundred Korean lives.
Therefore, failure of the Korean Provisional Government should not imply
that the Korean independence movement at large was in decline. While segregated
and lacking a grand strategy, many militarist leaders chased their dream of national
independence.
15 Ibid., p. 158 16 Ibid., p. 159
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II. The Moving Period: 1932~1940 The second of the three segments in the history of the Korean Provisional
Government is called the “Moving Period.” It is a period that succeeded the
uncertainties and failures of the Shanghai period; despite its grand ambitions, the
Korean Provisional Government could accomplish little with its premature form of
republican governance and ongoing internal dissents. Lacking the crucial skeleton of
what comprises an effective government, the Korea Provisional Government in the
1920s merely resembled just another resistance organization at best.
The Moving Period was a period that breathed life into a declining
government and a broken movement. It was not only the most turbulent period for
the Korean independence movement, but also a period of growth—there were many
factors that contributed to the astonishing expansion of Korean resistance during
this period, but this paper will argue that what summarily identified such
development was the unraveling Sino-‐Japanese relationship, and consequent
formation of Sino-‐Korean alliance against Japanese expansionism.
Sino-‐Japanese Tensions: The Manchuria Incident
Figure B. The extent of Japanese expansion
Source: Peck, Ira, and Steven Deyle. "Japanese Expansion." Map. South China Morning Post. N.p., 19 Sept. 2012. Web. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1040212/mukden-‐incident-‐saw-‐japanese-‐military-‐invent-‐excuse-‐invasion>.
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Two major events characterized mounting Sino-‐Japanese tensions in the
beginning of 1930s. First was the invasion of Manchuria by the Imperial Japanese
Army in September of 1931, historically known as the Manchuria Incident, and
second was the Shanghai Incident in January of 193217.
The eruption of the Manchuria Incident, a series of battles between China
and Japan and Japanese occupation of Manchuria as a result, had both positive and
negative effects on the Korean Provisional Government. It was damaging because
Manchuria historically had two grave advantages: first, it was a strategic base for
Korean operations across Siberia, Manchuria and China; second, it had been a
sanctuary for Korean exiles and military organizations who fled away from Japanese
oppression, ever since Japan’s annexation of Korea in 191018. Establishment of a
Japanese puppet regime in 1932 in the area therefore was a serious blow to the
Korean movement at large—all military operations based on Manchuria and
significant number of Korean patriots were subject to Japanese assaults. This was
further distressing because Koreans had already lost Siberia to Bolshevik power by
this point, and there weren’t as much militarist activities in Mainland China19.
However, Japanese occupation of Manchuria had an interesting side effect.
Expansion of Japanese power created an unusual ally in Northeast Asia—As
Manchuria fell under Japanese control, Japanese expansionism was established as
the foremost enemy to the Chinese people20. In other words, the prospect of Sino-‐
Korean alliance gained mobility as the pre-‐existing antagonism towards Japan,
established during World War I, dispersed among Chinese nationalists21.
Shanghai Incident in January 28, 1932, further cultivated Chinese antagonism
towards Japan. Shanghai Incident was a military clash between China and Japan,
sparked by Japanese Marines’ attack of the Nineteenth Route Army located in
Shanghai. Though Japan won a victory, it bled to earn it, as normal Chinese citizens, 17 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 41 18 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 181 19 Ibid., p. 182 20 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 41 21 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 182
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among which were students and workers, fought alongside the nation’s military22.
Previously, China had restrained form expressing direct hostility against Japan due
to high level of economic interdependence between the two nations; however,
several outbreaks of hostile warfare led to reeling Sino-‐Japanese relations in the
1930s; this generated hope, especially among Korean nationalists, of a potentially
powerful alliance that could alter the dynamics of Northeast Asia23.
Seizing the Opportunity: the Korean Independence Party
As a shrimp caught in the middle of two whales, Koreans struggled to secure
its place as the conflict between two great Asian powers deepened. It was
recognized that its foremost task was to overcome the shadows of the Shanghai
Period—tensions between political parties of conflicting ideologies inflamed to the
point of near anarchy in Shanghai—following the impeachment of President Lee
Seung-‐Man, another nationalist leader, Kim Ku, the Police Minister to the
Provisional Government, rose to prominence. Kim was a right-‐wing nationalist
leader who had deep faith in the success of the Provisional Government24—in order
to grasp the developments brought by Kim’s leadership in the 1930s, it is important
to understand two major institutions that significantly transformed the fate of the
Provisional Government: The Korean Independence Party (KIP) and the Korean
Patriotic Legion.
Founded by Kim Ku and other right-‐wing nationalists, the Korean
Independence Party was initially a secret institution. It didn’t officially declare its
establishment until February of 1930—however, efforts to create a nationalist party,
without significant rightist or leftist identities, had been going on for several years
22 Ibid. 23 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), (Seoul, South Korea: Hyean, 2001), p. 530 24 James Hoare and Susan Pares, Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999), p. 80
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at the least. The Korean Independence Party later became the foundation of the
Korean Provisional Government25.
What distinguished the KIP from other factional parties was that it was
created by a group of nationalists, albeit with a slight rightist touch, to mitigate the
differences between the left and the right26. However, more importantly, what made
it remarkable was its alignment to terrorist tactics. Kim Ku, one of the founders of
the KIP, had concluded that diplomatic focus of the Shanghai Period achieved little
to none, and began seeking military operations that would attract the world’s
attention and hopefully, support27. However, his party lacked military capabilities of
its own, and the government was without a national army—hence, Kim resorted to
terrorist activities28.
Consequently, Kim covertly engineered the creation of the Korean Patriotic
Legion in 1931. The Korean Patriotic Legion was a secret institution comprised of
young patriots who were specially trained for terrorist activities against Japan,
including destruction of public sites of importance and “executions” of critical
Japanese figures29. In regards to the objective of this secretive institution, Kim Ku
recorded:
“Hanyin Ae Guk Dan (Korean Patriotic Legion) is an organization created by me [Kim Ku] and other Korean patriotic independence comrades in order to save our nation through military efforts…We have trained [individuals] them to endure hostile treatments from enemies through courage and skills.30”
25 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 39 26 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government (Thesis. Wesleyan University, 2009), (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, 2009), p. 48 27 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 531 28 James Hoare and Susan Pares, Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia, p. 90 29 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 49 30 Ibid., p. 51
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Though not an official military, missions sought by the Korean Patriotic
Legion were as ambitious as full-‐scale warfare. On January 8, 1932, a Korean patriot
named Lee Bong-‐Chang threw a hand grenade during a state procession in Tokyo,
with the intention of murdering the Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Lee’s mission failed,
leading to his arrest and death sentence. However, this incident reflected both the
fact that missions aimed by the Korean Patriotic Legion were far from trivial, and
the extent of Chinese antagonism towards Japan. Following the incident, China’s
newspaper called “Minkuo Jihpao” under Guomindang reported, “A Korean, Yi Pong-‐
Ch’ang, sniped at the Japanese emperor, but unfortunately missed”31.
Hungk’ou Park Incident Despite Lee’s failed mission, the Korean Patriotic Legion continued to pursue
ambitious terrorist attacks—its greatest success was the Hongk’ou Park Incident.
On April 29, the day in celebration of the Japanese emperor’s birthday, Yoon Bong-‐
Gil, a 22 year old Korean patriot, threw a bomb that successfully exploded in the
middle of a military parade in Hungk’ou Park, Shanghai—this incident injured many
Japanese officials, among which were Shigemitsu, Japanese minister plenipotentiary
to China, Major General Ueda, commander of the Ninth Division, and Admiral
Nomura, commander of the Third Fleet, and killed General Shirakawa, the
commander of Japanese forces in Shanghai32.
Soon, Kim Ku, the leader of the KIP, announced that the incident was carried
out by his orders—Yoon Bong-‐Gil, who was arrested at the spot and executed at age
22, was an ardent member of the Korean Patriotic Legion. Yoon had made the
following oath to the Korean Provisional Government:
“I make this oath as a member of the Korean Patriotic Legion to kill the military leaders of the enemy who are invading China in order to
31 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 184 32 Ibid., p. 185
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redeem the independence and freedom of our country.33”
This incident was among many other “assassinations” the Korean leadership
pursued throughout China and Taiwan. The series of terrorist activities formulated
an active movement to demolish major factors of Japanese imperialism. Hence,
lacking the great military power that would have been necessary to challenge
Japanese expansionism, Koreans sought covert campaigns against the top of Japan’s
power ladder34.
Figure C. The picture of Yoon’s arrest, Hungk’ou Park Incident
Source: Patriot Yun Bong-Gil. N.d. Photograph. Yun Bong-Gil.or.kr, n.p Chinese Response: Sino-‐Korean Alliance Rises
Terrorist activities sought by the Korean Provisional Government had
serious ramifications. The government had to take flight from city to city in order to
escape Japanese forces—the years of fleeing began shortly after Hungk’ou Park
Incident in Shanghai, and continued for approximately eight years, through out eight
cities:
33 "Patriot Yun Bong-Gil." Yun Bong-Gil.or.kr. Web. <http://yunbonggil.or.kr/language/english.html>. 34 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 530
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Figure C: The Travel Route of the Provisional Government Shanghai (1919~1932)à Hang Zhou (1932) à Jia Xing (1935) à Zhuan Jiang (1937) à Chang Sha (1937) à Guang Zhou (1938) à Liu Zhou (1938) à Che Jiang (1939) à Chongqing (1940)35
Source: "Travel Route of the Korean Provisional Government." Map. History Course. Arim.pe.kr, Web.
However, armament of the Korean Provisional Government succeeded in
grasping the attention of Chinese nationalists. Following the success in Hungk’ou
Park, both leftist and rightist strands of the Korean movement began to build Sino-‐
Korean alliance that would last until national independence of Korea. Although
Chiang Kai-‐Shek was initially reluctant to provoke Japan, it soon became apparent
that Sino-‐Japanese relationship had reached a dead end—consequently, Chiang Kai-‐
Shek simultaneously supported Korea’s right and left36.
Chiang Kai-‐Shek and Korea’s Right
35 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 52 36 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 536
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Yoon’s success and the Korean Patriotic Legion’s bold missions enraged
Japan, but cultivated precisely what Kim Ku had targeted—it attracted Chiang Kai-‐
Shek of Guomindang. Kim Ku’s commitment to terrorist activities did have direct
effects on their own, but from the beginning Kim had a greater purpose of proving to
Chinese nationalists his resolution to fight Japan, thereby elevating Sino-‐Korean ties
in their common fight against Japanese expansionism37.
Not only did Kim Ku escape Japanese oppression with the help of Chinese
nationalists, he sat in a meeting with Chiang Kai-‐Shek between 1932 and 1933—
hence, an unusual alliance between China and the Korean right had begun to take
shape38. Uncomfortable relations of the past were resolved, and China appraised
that a few Koreans achieved what a million Chinese could not39.
Meeting between Kim and Chiang Kai-‐Shek was productive—Kim confirmed
financial assistance of 2,500 yuan a month, and also garnered military backings.
Acknowledging that assassinating important figures could only be effective to a
certain point, Chiang Kai-‐Shek suggested that Koreans soldiers be trained for bigger
military operations. Consequently, Chiang launched a special training faction in
Loyang branch for Korean men at the Chinese Military Academy in 1933; these men
were to be located in Chinese Army and Air Force for safety reasons40.
Chiang Kai-‐Shek and Korea’s Left
As Kim Ku and his rightist forces rose to prominence, a new figure, Kim Won
Bong, elevated from the left to lead the Korean resistance movement. Kim had been
leading the “Righteous Patriotic Corps,” a militarized activist organization that
operated in and out of Korea. Although it previously disengaged itself form the
Provisional Government in the 1920s, Kim Won Bong later joined the Provisional
Government, having realized that segregated acts of violence without political
37 James Hoare and Susan Pares, Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia, p. 80 38 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 186 39 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p 531 40 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 186
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foundation and structure would never be enough to liberate Korea41. By 1935, Kim
Won Bong established the Korean National Revolutionary Party with apparent
commitment to communism, as opposition to the Korean Independence Party42.
Sino-‐Korean alliance was also a critical part of Kim Won Bong’s vision of
Korean independence movement. In his competition to prevail over rightist Kim Ku
in the Provisional Government, Kim Won Bong also sought assistance from Chiang
Kai-‐Shek. Perhaps inevitably due to ideological alignments, Kim Won Bong also
received significant aid from Guomindang and Chinese nationalists.
Kim Won Bong’s relationship with Chiang Kai-‐Shek and Guomindang was
tighter than that of Kim Ku and his rightist faction. In 1932, Kim Won Bong
succeeded in formally establishing Sino-‐Korean alliance with Guomindang, even
receiving Chiang To, a significant Chinese official, to direct his strategies.
Furthermore, Chiang granted economic assistance reaching 3,000 yuan a month for
resistance activities, in addition to permission to utilize Chinese training facilities in
Chinese Military Commission to train his leftist military forces; for safety purposes,
Chiang provided military training and education of Chinese doctrines in the Sixth
Branch Unit to Kim and his men43.
Rising Korean Movement
What further empowered the Sino-‐Korean alliance, and thus the Korean
Provisional Government, was the eruption of the Second Sino-‐Japanese War in 1937.
Having concluded that Korea’s determination for national independence was a
crucial factor to their military strategy against Japan, Guomindang increased its
support for the Provisional Government44. The Korean rightists and the leftists saw
this as a tremendous opportunity to solidify Sino-‐Korean alliance, which they also
41 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, (Folkstone, Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2005), p. 70 42 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 194 43 Ibid., p. 190 44 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 537
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considered to be vital to the Korean independence movement, and began to
mitigate—or at least, put behind—their ideological differences.
From this point, where Sino-‐Japanese antagonism pivoted to the point of full-‐
scale warfare, the Korean Provisional Government began to flourish—the political
conflicts that marred its ambitions in Shanghai appeared to fade, at least
temporarily. By August of 1937, Kim Ku led the Korean Restoration Movement,
creating a rightist coalition. On the opposite side, Kim Won Bong and his Korean
National Revolutionary Party were collaborating with other leftist factions45. Hence,
with Kim Won Bong uniting the left and Kim Ku the right, independent factions that
had failed to come together gradually formed meaningful coalitions.
However, efforts for a united Korean front broke from the left, as Kim Won
Bong collided with Communist Choi Chang-‐Ik. While Kim Won Bong dreamt a
republic, built in collaboration with the right, as Korea’s ultimate future, Choi
envisioned a Communist Korea46. As unification of Korean forces was challenged,
Chiang Kai-‐Shek came to its aid—in meetings with Kim Ku and Kim Won Bong held
in 1939, Chiang advocated that two ideologically conflicting factions unite for a
greater cause47. The outcome was a joint statement, “the Open Letter to Comrades
and Compatriots,” that read the following:
“Feeling pain over the mistakes that have been made frequently in the past, these two persons promise to cooperate with one mind in order to accomplish the great task of the sacred liberation of the Korean nation48.”
At the end of the day, complete unification of left and right was not
achieved—despite that the two leaders displayed willingness to abide by Chiang
45 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, p. 73 46 Hee-Gon Kim, Research on the Provisional Government of Korea (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), (Seoul, South Korea: Jishik Sanupsa, 2004), p. 241 47 Ibid., p. 242 48 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, p. 73
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Kai-‐Shek’s proposal, their followers did not. According to Japanese records at the
time, the two factions functioned separately regardless of the declaration:
“The two groups are still working separately. Kim Won-‐bong is relying on the Korean Volunteer Corps. In order to counter this, Kim Ku organized the Revoluationary Front Combat Area Maneuvering Unit in Liuchou, Kwangsi Province, in early February, 1939.49”
However, what characterized the Moving Period and made it successful was
the deepening involvement of Chiang Kai-‐Shek and Chinese nationalists in the
Korean independence movement. Particularly following the outbreak of the Second
Sino-‐Japanese War, Koreans were considered to be essential to China’s war against
Japan. With regards to China’s military strategy, specially trained Koreans in Japan
could be used to engineer covert military operations, to gather information, or to
execute special assassinations and confusion tactics50.
Well aware of this fact, the Korean Provisional Government officially
declared its commitment to war against Japan alongside China. For example, in 1939,
Korean young men in Shanghai and other parts of China established the Korean
Youths Battlefield Mission Corps and fought alongside Chinese guerrilla units with
the purpose of successfully pioneering militarized independence movement51.
49 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 211 50 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 538 51 Ibid., p. 539
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III. Chongqing Period: 1940~1945 After eight years of fighting on the move, the Korean Provisional Government
finally settled in Chongqing in 1940. The previous section analyzed how the Korean
government developed from just another resistance institution to “men with guns.”
Chongqing Period, while it lasted only for five years, which is the shortest of the
three period divisions, was a period of rewards—in other words, the Korean
Provisional Government finally established itself as what could truly be called a
“government.” It re-‐organized its executive leadership, resolved structural defects of
political parties, and most importantly, finally established a national military. Hence,
the government could finally function as the centerpiece to the Korean
independence movement.
This section of the paper will analyze the structural developments of the
Korean Provisional Government in the 1940s, examine how the world order during
this period affected the fate of the government, and finally, discuss the role and
successes of the government leading up to the liberation of the Korean peninsula.
“Government” in the making
Well aware of the benefits it could gain from struggling great powers, the
leadership of the Provisional Government perceived a need to respond to turbulent
world affairs and began to prepare for war itself. Preparing for war, in this case,
meant rearranging the structure at large and instituting a government that would
actually be capable of waging a war. This process had three big steps.
First was fundamental—solidification of executive leadership. A consensus
was reached that the Korean Provisional Government needed a stronger, more
centralized leadership, if it should prepare its people for war. In October of 1940,
the government executed major constitutional reform, which altered its governance
from collective leadership to one-‐man leadership. Under the previous collective
leadership system, the elected president was at best regarded as a host for Cabinet
meetings, and thus could not engineer with presidential leadership. Constitutional
reform of 1940 altered this so that the elected president would symbolize the
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Provisional Government, just like any president of a state would, and enabled him to
hold powerful executive leadership over the Cabinet, as well as operate as the
Commander-‐in-‐Chief of the national army52.
Second was the unification of left and right. In addition to centralization of
government leadership, the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing achieved
what it couldn’t for the previous two decades; it absorbed the Korean lefts to the
government. Most notably, the Confederation of Chosun National Liberation
formally joined the Provisional Government in December 1st, 1941—this
organization was a communist organization with a history of withdrawing from the
Provisional Government during the Conference of Seven Organization for
Unification of the Korean Revolutionary Movement53. Finally, after two decades of
contentions, the left addressed its commitment to “unifying the nation by
committing to focusing all anti-‐Japanese capabilities to the Provisional
Government.54”
Third was the military. Kim Ku, the President of the Korean Provisional
Government, realized the dire need for a national army. President Kim submitted a
proposal to create the Korean Restoration Army in March of 1940—by April, Kim
not only received permission to establish the Korean Restoration Army, which
would be the national army of the Korean Provisional Government, but also
confirmed significant aid from Guomindang55, however under the condition that it
would abide by “the Nine-‐Clause Fixed Rules of Conduct.56” By September of 1940,
the Provisional Government celebrated the inauguration of the official headquarters
of the Korean Restoration Army57. Its inauguration declaration read:
52 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” Research on the Korean Independence Movement (Hanguk Dokripundongsa Yeongu), vol. 33, (2009): p. 7 53 Ibid., p. 10 54 Ibid., p. 9 55 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 59 56 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, p. 75 57 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 60
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“The Restoration Army of Korea shall continue its war of resistance in cooperation with the people of the Republic of China as part of the Allied Forces in order to defeat the Japanese imperialist, the common enemy, for the purpose of restoring the independence of our two nations.58”
The establishment of the national army was further strengthened as
President Kim pioneered military unification of left and right. The left, including Kim
Won Bong’s Korean Volunteer Corps, exceeded the right in its military capabilities,
and President Kim saw it was imperative that the Korean military capabilities,
historically segregated, merge together. Hence, in May of 1942, Kim Won Bong’s
Korean Volunteer Corps was absorbed into the Korean Restoration Army59, with
Kim Won Bong, the communist-‐oriented man, as the Minister of Military Affairs to
the Provisional Government60. However, the Korean national army was comprised
of less than 1,000 men, who had been trained in Chinese military training centers,
and was highly dependent on financial assistance form China61.
Hence, the Korean Provisional Government finally instituted what any
functioning government should be entitled to—executive power, secure Cabinet and
political parties, and a national military. Korean nationalists, finally, achieved a
“government.” What’s remarkable is that China continued to play a significant role
during the process—as requested by President Kim Ku, Guomindang continued to
provide economic assistance, ranging from a few hundreds to several thousand
yuans a month62. However, it is noteworthy that Chiang Kai-‐Shek never formally
recognized the Provisional Government, despite his years of commitment to
providing economic and military assistance, perhaps because of his reluctance to
58 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 68 59 Ibid., p. 10 60 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 70 61 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948-1953, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 26 62 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 542
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further provoke Japan. In other words, Sino-‐Korean alliance was a diplomatic choice
based on each state’s needs to collaborate against a common enemy63.
Figure D. Photograph: Inaugural ceremony of the Korean Restoration Army, 1940.
Source: Headquarters of the Korean Restoration Army (광복군 총사령부). 1940. Photograph. Korea815, <korea815.org>
Declaration of War against Japan
The Chongqing Period was an era of global turmoil. While People’s Republic
of China continued its battle against Japan, World War II erupted in Europe in 1939.
For the Provisional Government, global state of war was considered to be a grand
opportunity to strengthen its movement, as was true for the Second Sino-‐Japanese
War of 1937. This was perhaps because of the realization that Korean power alone
would not be enough to defeat the great Japanese empire.
What the Korean leadership both wanted and predicted was an eruption of a
great war in the Pacific theatre—and this projection proved to be right on target.
Japanese imperialism was continuing to expand with no apparent limit—since its
annexation of Korea in 1910, it occupied Manchuria in 1931, and embarked on a
63 Ibid., p. 543
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full-‐scale war against China in 1937. It wasn’t long before Japanese expansionism
reached Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, and
proceeded to stretch out to India and Burma, with the goal of assembling with
Germany in the Middle East64. The map below displays Japanese-‐occupied regions in
East Asia by year 1942.
Figure E. The Japanese Empire, 1942
Source: US Army, "The Japanese Empire 1942." Map. Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Time Money and Blood, n.d. Web. <http://www.timemoneyandblood.com/HTML/PearlHarbor/co-prosperity.html>.
Considering Japan’s unstoppable drives for conquest and escalating national
power, the Korean leadership had forecasted an international war involving China,
Japan and the United States. Hence, the United States’ entering into the Second
World War and thus leading the pacific theatre to burst into flames, as provoked by
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, was the final opportunity for national
64 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” p. 21
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independence for the Korean Provisional Government. The grand strategy of the
government had been for the Korean forces to fight against Japan alongside Chinese
and American powers65. This strategy worked well, as proven by Chiang Kai-‐Shek’s
acknowledgement of the Korean Provisional Government as the sole recipient of
Chinese aid in the Pacific War66.
Consequently, approximately two days after Pearl Harbor, as soon as a war
erupted between the United States and Japan, the Provisional Government officially
declared war against Japan. The declaration of war read67:
“1941. 12. 9: Declaration of War against Japan In the name of thirty million Koreans and their government, we
sincerely endorse the declaration of war on Japan by China, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia, and other nations, because it is the most effective means of defeating Japan and recognizing East Asia. We hereby declare as follow68:
1. The people of Korea, having already joined the anti-‐imperialist front, and as a formal battle unit, declare war on the Axis Powers.
2. 1910 treaty of annexation and all other unequal treaties are not effective. Also, we declare that lawful privileges earned by non-‐aggression powers in Korea will be honored.
3. We will fight until Japanese forces are relinquished completely from Korea, China and the Pacific.
4. We will not recognize Chang-‐ch’un and Nanking regimes created under Japanese forces
5. We uphold that the Roosevelt-‐Churchill declaration must be implemented in bringing forth national independence of Korea, and celebrate in advance the victory of the democratic front.69” *
65 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” p. 81 66 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 541 67 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” p. 81 68 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 69 69 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” p. 82 * Translated from Korean to English by Soo K. Chae
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This declaration reiterated that Korea was also an active participant of anti-‐
imperialist front, implicating a demand that Korea be deemed as legitimate as other
allied states, including China, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Austria. Moreover,
the Korean Provisional Government declared that war on Japan would continue
until Japanese forces are completely expelled from the Pacific, while admitting
privileges earned by non-‐aggression states within Korea during period of Japanese
colonization.
Furthermore, the Provisional Government declared war on Germany in order
to gain a seat in the San Francisco Conference, which was to be held in 1945. This
conference was only admitted for states that had declared war on Germany prior to
March 1st, 194570.
The Korean Provisional Government expressed to Washington its
aforementioned desire to participate in the Pacific War through Chinese diplomatic
channels. T. V. Soong, the Chinese foreign minister to the United States, and
President Roosevelt had many discussions to resolve the Korean dilemma; despite
that the effect of the Korean military itself was minimal, the two acknowledged that
the Korean military’s uniqueness could be utilized in secret operations across Korea,
China and Japan. Consequently, Secretary of State Sumner Welles confirmed that the
allied powers would assist Korean military with its organization, military equipment
and strategies to operate from Chinese bases. However, neither of the great powers
formally recognized the legitimacy of the Korean Provisional Government. Hence,
while deeming the Korean military as useful, the Korean Provisional Government
was not considered as equal71.
The Pacific War: The Imphal Front
As the Korean Restoration Army entered the Pacific War, Japanese forces
were successfully expanding into Southeast Asia. Taking Malaysia and Singapore in
the spring of 1942, Japan proceeded to reach Burma with the hope of assembling
70 Ibid., p. 83 71 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948-1953, p. 27
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with German forces in the Middle East. This inevitably resulted in hostilities
between British and Japanese forces located in Burma. With the request of the
British military, the Korean Restoration Army was dispatched to the British military
in 194372.
Despite its lacking military capabilities, Korean Restoration Army proved its
worth through means other than direct battles. The British army needed agents
speaking fluent Japanese to gain information or interrogate its captives; this was
especially true in this particular front, because information was especially useful in
guerrilla wars. In 1944, soldiers of the Korean Restoration Army fought alongside
British forces in the Imphal front, a region heavily attacked by Japanese forces, and
contributed to British victory. The Korean Restoration Army fought with British
military until July of 1945, when Japanese forces were completely expelled from
Burma73.
The Eagle Project
During the last months of the Pacific War, the Korean Restoration Army
collaborated with the United States’ Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to launch a
forcible entry operation into Korea. Despite that the United States was reluctant to
formally recognize the Korean Provisional Government, it allowed the OSS to train
soldiers of the Korean army with the purpose of dispatching them into Korea and
relinquishing Japanese forces74. The Korean peninsula was geographically crucial
region for the U.S., as it was a bridging region between China and Japan, and served
many strategic opportunities like penetrating into Japanese bases. As a result, the
United States’ OSS had been training soldiers of the Korean Restoration Army since
the spring of 1943 with the goal of executing joint operations with the allied forces75.
72 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” p. 84 73 Ibid., p. 85 74 Chae-Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006), p. 19 75 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948-1953, p. 27
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Figure F. Activities of the Korean Restoration Army This map summarizes military operations sought by the Korean Restoration Army.
Source: "Activities of the Korean Restoration Army (한국광복군의 활동)." Map. History Course. Arim.pe.kr, Web.
The Eagle Project, designed by the OSS, consisted of three stages. First was
for the Korean Restoration Army to penetrate into Seoul through U.S. submarines;
second, for them to construct a strategic base within Korea and generate public
sentiment for an uprising; third, to contact the OSS, acquire military weapons
through U.S. military aircrafts, and initiate strikes against Japanese forces76. One
hundred Korean soldiers were trained under the commander of the Eagle Project,
76 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” p. 88
The Eagle Project: The Korean Restoration Army’s plan to penetrate into Korea
Chongqing, Headquarters of the KRA
Korean Restoration Army dispatched to India, Myanmar front, 1943
1941: Declaration of War against Japan and Germany
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Captain Clyde B. Sargent, in Tuchao77. President Kim Ku approved this plan in April
3rd, 194578.
Unfortunately, however, the Eagle Project was never actually carried out.
Before the mission could take place, Japan declared its surrender through the
Potsdam Declaration. President Kim Ku was nonetheless willing to proceed with the
Eagle Project, and made concessions with OSS to dispatch Korean Advance Corps
into Korean peninsula in August 16, 1945. After two failed attempts, the Korean
Advance Corps was forced by Japanese military to return to Chongqing, not having
executed their planned operations.79 Had the war lasted a little big longer, and had
the Eagle Project been performed, it is possible that the history of modern Korea
would have unraveled quite differently.
77 Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 226 78 Si-Jun Han, “The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period (중경시기 대한민국임시정부의 위상과 역할),” p. 87 79 Ibid., p. 90
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Conclusion Surprisingly, leadership of the Korean Provisional Government did not
welcome Japan’s surrender in the Pacific War. The Eagle Project, which it
considered to be the final chance for Korean independence, was shattered as the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 resulted in an abrupt end of the Second
World War. With Japan’s complete surrender in August 15, the hope of national
independence was also surrendered. Kim Ku, the President of the Korean
Provisional Government, recorded in his biography:
“I have received news that the Japanese surrendered. The news is by no means a good one. I feel like our last hope is gone. All preparations that we put in so much effort for many years have become obsolete. Our well-‐trained soldiers who were supposed to be provided with secret weapons, and be sent to Korea in American marine ships so that they can attack major Japanese military headquarters…now all the fights have ended.
-‐ Kim Ku, Baekbumilji80”
Throughout its journey, the Korean Provisional Government was largely
dependent on its alliance with China and the United States. It was evident from the
beginning that Korean power alone would not suffice to bring forth national
independence against the Great Japanese Empire. However, even after gaining what
he so long fought for, President Kim perhaps predicted the era of turmoil that would
consume the Korean peninsula once again.
The Korean Provisional Government, even at the dawn of national
independence, failed to resolve two major predicaments that would later lead the
peninsula to another great war. It failed to mitigate the ideological differences that
dominated the independence movement; while the left and the right collaborated
temporarily under the name of nationalism, they were bound to clash to an even 80 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 74
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greater extent when that nationalist sentiment faded and the common enemy, Japan,
was expelled.
Furthermore, the Korean Provisional Government was still under severe
foreign influence, albeit not in an imperialist sense. Throughout the movement, and
especially since the Moving Period, the government depended on Chiang Kai-‐Shek’s
military and economic assistance; with the eruption of the Pacific War, it relied on
the United States. It was perhaps inevitable that even when the Korean peninsula
was finally liberated, the stakeholders of the Korean movement would clash for
their own interests.
The dream of national independence sought by the Korean Provisional
Government was a difficult one. Throughout three major periods, the Shanghai
Period, the Moving Period, and the Chongqing Period, the Korean Provisional
Government gradually developed from a fragmented independence group, to “men
with guns,” to, finally, a government. Though in a largely simplified form, this paper
analyzed the evolution of the Korean Provisional Government and the independence
movement it pursued. To conclude, this paper will close with lasting questions.
What if the Pacific War lasted several days longer and the Eagle Project was carried
out successfully? What if the government had found more effective means of
resolving the ideological differences between the communist-‐oriented left and the
democratic right, like any mature government would have done? What if the Korean
Provisional Government didn’t rely so much on China and the United States? And
finally, did the Korean Provisional Government succeed?
These questions have been heavily debated in Korean history, and many
experts remain skeptical about the successes of the Korean Provisional Government.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that this first form of republican governance in
Korean history significantly altered the fate of the Korean peninsula.
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