THE MX MISSILE TEST PROGRAM AND ... - Minuteman of confidence required in each service's estimate of weapon system reliability. ... the Minuteman is likely to remain deployed through the end of

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  • THE MX MISSILE TEST PROGRAM

    AND ALTERNATIVES

    Staff Working Paper

    February 1986

    The Congress of the United StatesCongressional Budget Office

  • NOTE

    Unless otherwise specified, all costsare expressed in current dollars. Alldates, except those related withcosts, refer to calendar years. Datesrelated with costs refer to fiscalyears.

  • PREFACE

    Most of the MX missiles the Air Force plans to buy are earmarked for thetest program, which establishes and monitors system capability andreliability over the system life. Thus, though the Congress halved theplanned deployment of MX, the total system's sizeand hence its costhasnot fallen in proportion. As requested by the House Budget Committee, thispaper analyzes the basis for the planned test programdetermined largelyby statistical guidelines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staffandillustrates the risks and savings associated with a curtailed test program.This paper builds on an earlier study. In accordance with the CongressionalBudget Office's mandate to provide objective analysis, the paper makes noreco m mendations.

    Bonita J. Dombey of CBO's National Security Division prepared thestudy, under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and John D.Mayer, Jr. William P. Myers of CBO's Budget Analysis Division provideddetailed cost analysis. Jeffrey A. Merkley of CBO assisted with statisticalanalysis; Joel Slackman also provided assistance. Johanna Zacharias editedthe manuscript.

    Rudolph G. PennerDirector

    February 1986

    111

  • CONTENTS

    SECTION I.

    SECTION II.

    SUMMARY vi

    WEAPONS SYSTEM TESTING 1

    THE AIR FORCE'S MX TEST PROBLEM 3

    Research and Development Testing 3

    Operational Testing and Evaluation 4

    The Size of the Air Force's MX TestProgram Compared to Others 6

    The 3oint Chiefs' Standards forOperational Testing 6

    Statistical Approaches 9

    OPTIONS TO REDUCE THE TEST PROGRAM ... 15

    Option I: Limit Flexibility byReducing Phase II Testing 15

    Option II: Meet 3CS Guidelines EveryOther Year 18

    Option III: Minimal Operational Testing 18

    SECTION III.

    IV

  • TABLES AND FIGURES

    TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF TEST PROGRAMS FORSIX BALLISTIC MISSILES

    TABLE 2. PROCUREMENT RATES UNDER CURRENTBASELINE AND OPTIONS

    TABLE 3. OPTIONS FOR MX TESTING

    7

    16

    17

    FIGURE 1.

    FIGURE 2.

    MEETING JCS GUIDELINES FOR MISSILETESTING (CLASSICAL STATISTICALMETHOD)

    PROBABILITY OF MEETING JCS GUIDELINES

    10

    11

  • SUMMARY

    The MX, a highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carryingten nuclear warheads, has long been a source of contention. Debate centerson the 195,000-pound missile's production, basing, and cost. These issueshave been put to rest, at least temporarily, with fiscal year 1986 Congres-sional action specifying that no more than 50 MX missiles be deployed (inMinuteman silos) at any one time. Twelve MX missiles were authorized forfiscal year 1986, bringing the total number authorized thus far (including 20research and development test missiles) to 74enough to complete thedeployment.

    Though the planned deployment of MX has been numerically halved,from 100 to 50, the total purchase of missilesand hence the system's cost-has not been cut by a proportionate amount. The reason for this disparity isthat the program for testing the MX missile is not subject to change as theplanned deployment decreases. Of the total 193 MX missiles that have beenor will be bought (including Research and Development missiles), 143 aredesignated for testing. All 119 missiles still to be bought are earmarked forthe test program. Specifically, the Congress provided that from 12 to 21missiles be procured for this purpose in fiscal year 1987.

    In this paper, the Congressional Budget Office examines the basis forthat test program, which will consume about three-fourths of all MXmissiles purchased. The study focuses on Operational Testing and Evalua-tion (OT&E), which constitutes the largest segment of the test program andis to proceed in two phases:

    o Phase I of OT&E follows Research and Development (R&D)testing and is designed to establish an estimatewith a highdegree of confidenceof the accuracy and reliability of thesystem. This baseline estimate is important both for operationaland target planning, and for monitoring the MX system's capabil-ity over time. The Air Force program calls for 24 missiles to betested over three years (1988-1990) for Phase I.

    o Phase II of OT&E, designed to monitor degradation in systemperformance and reliability, then tests on a yearly basis over theremaining system life. A total of 84 missiles, or about seven peryear, are planned to be tested over the 12 years (1991-2003) ofPhase II.

  • Analysis of Current Plans

    The Joint Chiefs of Staff have established general guidelines for weaponssystems included in the strategic nuclear war planalso known as the SingleIntegrated Operational Plan (SIOP)designed to ensure an acceptable levelof testing. These guidelines form the foundation for the sizing of a ballisticmissile test program. They specify annual testing to maintain the statisticallevel of confidence required in each service's estimate of weapon systemreliability. However, the guidelines leave the statistical analysis and detailsof the test program to the individual services. The services often prefer totest to more strict criteria than specified by the JCS, especially in Phase IIwhere the guidelines are less stringent.

    The CBO analysis finds that the 24 missiles allocated by the Air Forcefor Phase I testing might not suffice to meet the statistical guidelines setout by the JCS and the Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC).Assessment based on the Air Force's assumptions and Classical statisticaltechniques indicates that at least 36 missiles would be needed. The AirForce rationale for using only 24 missiles for Phase I testing, however, restson experience with land-based missiles and a judgment that, in light ofconstraints on the total test program, additional test missiles should beshifted to Phase II of the program.

    The seven missiles per year allocated to Phase II slightly exceednumbers necessary to meet 3CS guidelines as interpreted by the Air Force:about six missiles per year would suffice. The Air Force wants more PhaseII missiles, because it believes JCS guidelines for Phase II are not demandingenough, and also because the Air Force wants flexibility to meet diverseneeds. Extra test missiles would be needed, for instance, if the MXremained in service longer than the 15 years currently plannedas hashappened with past generations of U.S. land-based missilesor if the MX atsome point requires a major modification. Minuteman II missiles have beendeployed for about 20 years, and although there are only 26 test missilesremaining, the Minuteman is likely to remain deployed through the end ofthis century.

    Given the objectives of a ballistic missile test program, when Phases Iand II are considered together, the MX test program seems modest in size.Phase I is actually too small as judged by Classical statistical techniques;the extra missiles in Phase II might be needed if the MX stays in theinventory for more than 15 years. The MX test program is also modest insize compared to test programs for other U.S. ballistic missiles.

    VII

  • Alternative Test Programs

    Nonetheless, the test program will consume Ik percent of all MX missilespurchased, including those designated for R&D. In light of the small planneddeployment of the MX, the Congress might consider options that provideless testinghence less confidence in system performancein order to holddown costs. The options examined here focus on Phase II of the OperationalTest program, the portion that accounts for the bulk of operational testmissiles.

    Option I would reduce Phase II testing to about six missiles per year,thus reducing the remaining purchase of MX missiles by 12 from 119 to 107.This option would not meet the more stringent criteria for Phase II testingthat the Air Force prefers. Nor would it provide as much of a hedge as docurrent plans against a possibly longer service life or other contingencies.If, for example, the history of the Minuteman missile were repeated and MXservice life were extended, there would be even fewer test assets thanunder the current plan to accommodate an extension. This reduction in thetest program would also eliminate flexibility for additional testing. Theneed for additional testing could arise as a result of unforeseen degradationof some components, requiring replacement or modification. Or it couldarise from a need to test later improvements to the missile's capability topreserve its utility in the face of improved Soviet abilities.

    This option would, however, meet JCS guidance standards. Moreover,depending on how it was implemented, the option could save from 0.8 to$1.8 billion. (See Summary Tables 1 and 2). Assuming a baseline program of21 missiles per year, cutting the missiles from the end of the baseline buywould yield total savings of $1.8 billion. J7 However, this method would notyield any savings over the five years 1987-1991, and would actually increasecosts relative to the baseline in 1991 in order to end the programefficiently. On the other hand, proportional reductions in the program overthe same period as in the baseline would mean purchase of 19 missiles peryear, and would yield savings of about $0.6 billion over the next five years,with total savings of about $0.8 billion. Proportional reductions in theoptions would not affect deployment; nor would it slow the test program.However, this method would increase unit costs, owing to less efficientproduction rates, and thus lower the total savin