Department of Political Science

The paradox of anarchy

Why anarchy is a rational choice

Martin Lundqvist

Independent Research Project in Political Science, 30 credits

Master’s Programme in Political Science

Year, Term: 2016, Fall Term

Supervisor: Magnus Lundgren

Word count (excluding appendices): 19280

Abstract

A central paradox in neorealism is that the absence of world government is assumed to imply a

dangerous security dilemma, and yet few realists have argued in favor of world government while great

powers have historically resisted delegation of military force to supranational institutions. If

international anarchy causes costly security competition and war, powerful states should have a strong

incentive to unify and neorealist explanations for why states resist peaceful unification are either

underdeveloped or implicit. This paper develops a rational choice realist model which suggests that

anarchy is not a structural constraint which forces states to compete intensely for power, but a rational

choice that state leaders make to avoid the costs of world government. The model assumes that state

leaders face a delegation constraint which implies a tradeoff between eliminating the military burden

necessary to deter attacks in anarchy, and abstain from world government to avoid forced redistribution

of material resources pushed by poorer states or risk that the world government might turn tyrannical

and coerce the subjects it has been mandated to protect. The paper uses deductive method to deduce

actor preferences and illustrate the plausibility of the central predictions of the model. The model

predicts that income equality, democratization, nationalism and military defensive advantage makes

anarchy stable, a condition under which states have little reason to unify. On the other hand, high income

inequality, lack of democratic accountability, territorial revisionism, and military offensive advantage

make anarchy costly, but unification more difficult to achieve given the underlying conflicting

preferences. Hence, states rather take the risk of fighting in hopes of eliminating future military

competition than to agree on a world government where redistribution and cultural conflicts are likely

to make wealthy great powers with modest population sizes worse off than they would be in anarchy.

The paper concludes that anarchy is not a tragedy that makes world government impossible, but world

government is a potential tragedy that makes anarchy rational.

Contents

Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction and research puzzle ................................................................................................................................ 1

1.2 Research questions and strategy ................................................................................................................................. 2

Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................................................................................... 4

2.1 Previous research: introduction ................................................................................................................................... 4

2.2 The virtues of anarchy ................................................................................................................................................ 4

2.3 Territorial competition and the cost of anarchy .......................................................................................................... 7

2.4 Hobbesian contract between men but not between sovereigns ................................................................................... 8

2.5 International cooperation and institutional design ...................................................................................................... 8

2.6 The historical evolution of international anarchy ..................................................................................................... 10

Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 12

3.1 Method and operationalization: introduction ............................................................................................................ 12

3.2 The congruence method ............................................................................................................................................ 12

3.3 Deducing actor preferences ...................................................................................................................................... 13

3.4 Delimitations, reliability and validity ....................................................................................................................... 15

Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 17

4.1 Theoretical framework: Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 17

4.2 Fundamental assumptions ......................................................................................................................................... 18

4.3 Theoretical model ..................................................................................................................................................... 20

4.4 Power balancing and the cost of anarchy .................................................................................................................. 23

4.4 The role of uncertainty .............................................................................................................................................. 25

Chapter 5 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 27

5.1 Analysis: introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 27

5.2 Taming the leviathan ................................................................................................................................................ 28

5.3 Military technology and the offense/defense balance ............................................................................................... 29

5.4 Territorial greed and the cost of anarchy relative to world government ................................................................... 32

5.4.1 Income inequality and the redistribution commitment problem ............................................................................ 32

5.4.2 Regime-types: Autocrats vs democrats .................................................................................................................. 34

5.4.3 Nationalism and world government ....................................................................................................................... 37

5.4.4 Geographies of scale .............................................................................................................................................. 39

Chapter 6 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 44

6.1 Illustrative empirics: introduction ............................................................................................................................. 44

6.2 Unification vs balancing in contemporary Europe .................................................................................................... 44

6.3 When anarchy is a rational choice: The case of the American civil war ................................................................... 45

Chapter 7 .............................................................................................................................................................................. 49

7. 1 Alternative explanations for anarchy: The commercial peace hypothesis ............................................................... 49

7.2 Global governance vs global government ................................................................................................................. 50

7.3 Born to kill? .............................................................................................................................................................. 51

Chapter 8 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 52

8. Conclusion: The paradox of world government .......................................................................................................... 52

References ........................................................................................................................................................................... 54

1

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction and research puzzle

A central claim of neorealism is that the absence of world government has tragic implications

for international politics, causing uncertainty, conflict, and war.1 At the same time, realists tend

to be opposed to the idea of world government, and rational explanations for why powerful

states are reluctant to delegate military force when the absence of world government is assumed

to cause tragedy and war is largely absent in realist literature.2 Realist arguments for why

international politics takes place in anarchy when great powers should have rational reasons to

escape it (the paradox of anarchy) are underdeveloped and implicit, which indicates a gap in

the explanatory power of neorealism. This gap motivates a theory-developing study that can

provide a theoretically coherent solution to the paradox of anarchy.

The paper contributes to international relations theory by developing a realist model departing

from the assumption that anarchy is a rational choice rather than a deterministic structure. The

paper considers a modified version of Fearon’s realist two-state model which assumes that

territorial greed (determined by regime-type, congruence between national borders and national

identity and income inequality between states), military offense/defense balance (the

probability of winning for the attacker given the levels of arms held by the defender) and

geographic scale determine the cost of anarchy relative to world government.3 The paper tests

the validity of the model by illustrating how the independent variables affect the cost of anarchy

relative to world government in hypothetical two-state scenarios where states can choose to

attack unify or balance. The study proceeds by relaxing the two-state assumption to consider

the impact of geographic scale on territorial greed and the offense/defense balance, as well as

elucidating the logic of the model via empirical case illustrations. The paper suggests that when

anarchy is costly due to offensive advantage and high levels of territorial greed, states rather

take the chance of fighting to end future military competition than delegating military force to

a world government that might be captured by poor states, which would imply redistribution of

income from wealthy great powers.

1 See Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2014).

2 Ibid

3 Fearon (2015).

2

When military defense dominates and territorial greed is low, world government becomes more

achievable but anarchy less costly. Hence wealthy great powers are incentivized to balance in

anarchy with a small military burden rather than delegating their military capabilities to a world

government where they risk losing bargaining power gained from arming in anarchy.

Furthermore, geographies of scale can plausibly explain why governments have evolved at the

regional level but not the global level since military defense dominance increases with

geographic scale, hence causing international anarchy to be more stable than regional anarchy.

1.2 Research questions and strategy

The purpose of the study is to develop a theoretical model that can explain why rational states

abstain from delegating their sovereignty to a world government, when anarchy is assumed by

neorealist approaches to cause conflict and war. The study can hence be defined as theory-

developing and attempts to eliminate a central theoretical puzzle in neorealism, defined in the

study as the “the paradox of anarchy”. To solve the research puzzle the paper asks one

explanatory and one descriptive research question:

- If anarchy causes tragedy and war, then why are great powers reluctant to delegate their

sovereignty to a world government?

- What primary factors determine the cost of anarchy relative to world government?

Blaikie emphasizes that it is important to distinguish between understanding (reason

explanation) and explanation (causal explanation). Explanation refers to identifying the causal

mechanisms that produce an empirical phenomenon while understanding refers to the

motivation or account that social actors provide for their behavior.4 The realist model presented

in this paper is explanatory, and developed through deductive logic. The research strategy

applied in the paper can be defined as a hybrid between deductive and retroductive strategies

which are tailor-made for answering “why” questions, hence the most valid strategies for

answering the research question of why powerful states choose to abstain from unifying when

anarchy causes conflict and war.5

4 Blaikie (2010) p, 87.

5 Ibid.

3

The deductive research strategy implies that the researcher presents a tentative idea, in this case,

the idea that anarchy is a rational choice and not a structure which constrains state behavior

deterministically.6 Conclusions are then deduced from a set of axioms based on under what

conditions the proposed hypothesis are expected to hold. In the present case, the cost of anarchy

relative to world government as a function of military offense/defense balance, territorial greed

and geographic scale. The realist model suggested in the paper is underpinned by the positivistic

ontological assumption that social and political reality exists independently of our knowledge

of it. Causes and consequences in the social world area assumed to resemble those of the natural

world, thus social patterns are also natural phenomena, but since the actor preferences assumed

by the model are not directly observable, the model developed in the paper draws upon a critical

realist approach to social sciences.7

The paper will not test the theoretical model on a single empirical case analyzed in depth, since

the study is theory developing. Instead, it will utilize empirics mainly as illustrative examples,

thus resembling elements of a retroductive research strategy, which seeks to capture underlying

causal mechanisms in particular contexts. The first step in the retroductive research strategy is

to provide an adequate description of the empirical regularity to be explained. In this case, the

absence of world government. The second step is to identify contending mechanisms that can

explain the regularity, which is done in the previous research and alternative explanation

sections of the paper.8 The paper considers a two-state model where states can choose to arm

and attack, cooperate and divide gains from the issue at stake or delegate their sovereignty to a

world government. The model highlights the similarities between constructing political order

at the domestic and global level, the crucial difference being that preference heterogeneity and

military defensive advantage is greater at the global level due to geographies of scale. The

inquiry proceeds by illustrating how variation in military offense/defense balance, income

inequality, regime types, congruency between national identity and state borders as well as

geographies of scale, determines the cost of anarchy relative to world government.

6 Blaike (2010) p, 85.

7 Grix (2010) p, 87.

8 Blaike (2010) p, 87.

4

Chapter 2

2.1 Previous research: introduction

The chapter summarizes the central realist arguments for why great powers abstain from

delegating military force, ranging from Waltz argument that there is no natural harmony of

interests in the world to Hobbes argument that interstate competition is welfare improving for

the subjects of the rulers. I argue that while there are arguments scattered across realist

literature, they are largely implicit, informal and incoherent. The main flaw of previous realist

arguments relating to the rationale for anarchy is that anarchy is assumed as a structure that

deterministically forces states to compete for power, which leads to wasteful military spending

and war. The chapter also provides a brief overview of historical state formation to highlight

the impact of geographic scale on the cost of anarchy/world government. The chapter further

discusses neo-liberal institutionalist explanations for interstate cooperation, and concludes that

the concept of sovereignty costs which is a neoliberal explanation for why states do not want to

delegate armed forces is indicating the importance of nationalism as an obstacle to cooperation.

However, neo-liberal institutionalists do not explain explicitly why sovereignty is so important

to states and do not confront the fact that states could avoid wasteful military spending but

letting a global government guarantee their safety.

2.2 The virtues of anarchy

While most realists have opposed the idea of world government, realists Morgenthau and Hertz

argued in the 1950s that nuclear weapons made nation states defenseless, and called for the

necessity of a global government, although none of them thought it would be enforceable.9

While recognizing that world government is a logical solution to the dangers of anarchy,

Morgenthau and Hertz fail to realize that precisely because nuclear weapons imply mutual

assured destruction, great powers have a strong incentive to avoid fighting each other, hence

anarchy becomes less rather than more dangerous. The model proposed in the paper assumes

that nuclear weapons shifts the offense/defense balance in favor of defense, hence making

anarchy more stable and less costly relative to world government.

9 Bell (2010) p, 105.

5

Mearsheimer along with Hertz argue that anarchy implies a security dilemma, since states

cannot gain in security without making other states less secure. Hence states are incentivized to

acquire more and more power at others states expense, causing fierce security competition.10

The puzzle is that if anarchy forces all states to compete intensely for power, rational states

should anticipate fierce security competition and agree on a world government to eliminate the

security dilemma. Furthermore, I argue that survival which is the principle goal of states

according to offensive realism is not a precondition for all other possible ends since states could

expand their consumption frontier by unifying and spend close to zero on arms just or keep

down revolts from their subjects.11

In Theory of international politics Waltz argued that what distinguishes the national from the

international realm is that national governments possess a legitimate monopoly on violence,

while the international realm is a self-help system.12 Waltz compares the international “self-

help” system to an oligopolistic market and argues that firms are constrained to strike a

compromise between maximizing profit and minimizing the danger of being demised. The

realist relative gains assumption which is one of the primary realist arguments for why

international politics is competitive rather than cooperative appears to have its theoretical

foundation in Waltz’s argument that firms should always abstain from maximizing profit in

order to maintain their market share.13 However, Waltz model of market share maximizing

firms was developed prior to the game theoretical idea that repeated interactions could allow

firms to construct self-enforcing agreements that would sustain higher profits.14 Powell argued

in response that realism does not need a relative gains assumption since states in anarchy could

arm to convert relative advantage into absolute gains.15 Depending on military technology and

costs for fighting, this possibility might prevent states from cooperating despite a “shadow of

the future” (i.e., repeated interactions).16

10 Mearsheimer (2014) p, 36.

11 Mearsheimer (2014) p, 33.

12 Waltz (1979) p, 104.

13 Waltz (1979), p, 106.

14 Fearon (2015) p2.

15 Powell (1991) p, 1306.

16 Fearon (2015) p2.

6

The paper departs from Powell’s assumption that states seek absolute gains like firms on a

market, but while Powell does not explain why states cannot unify to avoid the costs of anarchy,

this paper shows how concerns over loosing relative bargaining power once military power has

been delegated to a world government incentives states to choose anarchy.

Waltz implicit argument for why states may not be able to unify in order to escape anarchy is

that anarchy forces even good states that argue for world government to settle for balance of

power as an unhappy alternative.17 Waltz also argues that the same is true for domestic politics

since men are products of the societies they live in, but why then has governments emerged at

the local level and not at the global level? Waltz implicit answer is that because there is no

natural harmony of interests among states and no global leviathan to prevent war, there is a

latent risk that states will use force to achieve their apparent issue indivisible ends.18 If there

are no natural harmony of interest in anarchy, the logical negation of the argument would be

that there would be a natural harmony of interest under hierarchy and this is indeed what is

assumed to be true at the domestic level in Waltz realist analysis.19 The national interest would

be impossible to define without assuming that citizens have mutual interests that aggregates

into a national interest which is defined in terms of power. If all states have the same rational

objectives under anarchy, then it is puzzling why great powers wouldn’t have incentives to

federate to avoid the violent clash of interests in anarchy.

Waltz elaborates on the undesirability of world government by arguing that: “It would be an

invitation to civil war since a global central authority could not mobilize sufficient resources to

regulate and manage its parts”.20 A more explicit formalization of Waltz argument would be

that states may fear that global governmental institutions might not be robust against capture,

which together with fear of redistribution of resources determines the cost of world government

in the RCR (rational choice realist) model suggested in this paper. Global civil war would not

occur if there were no conflicting preferences however, hence income inequality which causes

redistribution disputes and nationalism which causes cultural and territorial disputes are central

independent variables in the RCR model.

17 Waltz (1954) p, 122.

18 Ibid

19 Ibid

20 Waltz (1979), p, 112.

7

That nationalism reinforces anarchy tend to be an implicit assumption in realist analysis but

rational explanations for why states are inherently nationalistic are largely absent. Waltz argues

that states like people are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom.21 What states

want freedom from is not explained however, and while Mearsheimer is more explicit about

the role of nationalism in international relations by arguing that nationalism cases glorification

of the state, he does not provide rational arguments for why states should prefer sovereignty in

an anarchic system where costly arming is required to remain sovereign.22

2.3 Territorial competition and the cost of anarchy

One of the most convincing neorealist arguments for why anarchy would prevent global

unification is provided by Jervis who interpret international cooperation as a commitment

problem where each state has an incentive to defect because: a) States currently supporting the

status quo might get dissatisfied in the future. b) States tend to seek control over resources

beyond their borders to assure that the necessary supplies will continue to flow during war-

time.23 Jervis argues that if there would to be an international authority (world government) that

could guarantee access to external resources, the motive for controlling territory would

disappear.24 Thus, Jervis highlights that if a world government existed, the resource-problem

would be eliminated but he doesn’t really explain why rational great powers wouldn’t prefer to

delegate force to a global leviathan to end the commitment problems arising from anarchy.

Jervis appear to assume by default that states find themselves in a security dilemma in which

they can’t trust each other’s intentions. The realist argument that states need to secure external

resources provides a valuable concept that will be incorporated in the RCR model, where

territorial greed is assumed to have a decisive impact on arms levels and cost of anarchy relative

to world government.

21 Waltz (1979), p, 112.

22 Mearsheimer (2001) p, 85.

23 Jervis (1978) p, 168.

24 Ibid.

8

2.4 Hobbesian contract between men but not between sovereigns

In contrast to neorealism, classical realism assumes that it is not the structure of the international

system but human nature that is the primary cause of international conflict.25 However, classical

realist Hobbes implicitly provides a tentative answer to neorealist paradox of anarchy by

arguing that while domestic anarchy implies misery, anarchy between sovereign authorities’

forces rulers to uphold the industries of their subjects in order to compete successfully with

their rivals.26 Hobbes argue that men are inclined to domestic peace by the passions of fear of

death and desire for commodious necessities.27 The puzzle is that while the sovereign’s subjects

may have their wealth and security protected by the sovereign, the sovereigns themselves

should have rational reasons to eliminate the “fear of death” in the international realm by

surrendering their military force to a global sovereign, hence converting their military burden

to wealth and enjoy the protection of a global leviathan.

2.5 International cooperation and institutional design

Neoliberal institutionalism, representing the main theoretical competitor to realism within the

rationalist spectra, has provided extensive theoretical arguments for why world unification

might be prevented despite costs to anarchy. Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal asks what prevents

international cooperation if it is always possible through repeated games (Folk theorem)

implying that international anarchy should be overcome after repeated interactions between

states.28 Koremenos et al argues that the Folk theorem has been relying simple 2x2 prisoner’s

dilemma game where there is only one equilibria outcome while in reality there are often

many.29 Morrow, Krasner and Fearon have also shown how distributional differences can

undermine cooperation, and based on mainly the work of Fearon, income-inequality will figure

as one of the primary variables determining the cost of anarchy relative to world government.

Koremenos et al concludes that distribution problems are as significant of an obstacle to

international cooperation as enforcement problems.30

25 Mearsheimer (2001) p, 10.

26 Hobbes (2004) p, 79.

27 Ibid

28 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) p, 764.

29 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001), p, 765.

30 Ibid

9

Uncertainty and “noise” (observe other actors actions clearly) is another problem, because

states are often reluctant to disclose vital information that could make them more vulnerable.31

Koremenos et al also argue that large number of players complicates cooperation since some

states are richer and more powerful than others.32 This paper revises the argument, since the

premise appears to be that more players implies more diversity and more diversity implies less

cooperation, which motivates nationalism, income inequality and regime-types as central

variables determining the cost of anarchy relative to world government in the RCR model.

Furthermore, Koremenos et al. argue that concerns about sovereignty explains why states

abstain from delegating strong coercive capacities in spite of possible gains that could be made

from centralization, but it is unclear why states find sovereignty critically important when

enforcement problems and transaction costs can be reduced by agreeing on maximum global

centralization of bargaining (world government).33 The RCR model provides firmer

justification for the sovereignty cost argument by emphasizing the importance of nationalism

as an obstacle to cooperation in the military realm, where nationalism is treated as a rational

tool for state leaders to enhance national unity and fighting efficiency, hence reducing the cost

of domestic hierarchy and international anarchy.

Oye has argued that states can arrive at mutually beneficiary cooperative equilibria by

prolonging the shadow of the future.34 Schelling and Axelrod suggest tactics of decomposition

over time to lengthen the shadow of the future, thus reducing the risk of defection by splitting

up for example a deal to delegate all military force to a supranational world government into

several periods of bargaining where some military capability is delegated step by step in

exchange for reduced military burdens and influence over the world government.35 However,

Fearon has argued that the shadow of the future does not eliminate the war constraint, which he

defines as the incentive for state A to attack and conquer state B if state B would to disarm,

since state A then could arm a little and conquer B at very low costs relative to the benefit of

resource extraction from state B.36

31 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001), p, 765.

32 Ibid

33 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) p, 790.

34 Oye (1985) p, 17. 35 Ibid 36 Fearon (2015) p, 10.

10

Thus, the shadow of the future might not be prolonged such that states would disarms

completely, which means that if states would delegate military force to a world government in

repeated games, incentives to defect and attack a delegator temporally weakened by

disarmament could prevent a completion of the delegation process and risk war and mutual

defection. Oye makes the fundamental assumption that because there is no central authority to

impose limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests, anarchy gives rise to diverse outcomes,

without explicitly recognizing that the absence of world government is an equilibria outcome

of heterogeneous national interests. Oye also appears to make a tautological argument for why

states do not want to delegate their sovereignty by assuming that the absence of world

government precludes that states would cede ultimate control over their conduct to a supra-

national sovereign.37 Hence, Oye fails to answer the question of how world government would

solve the commitment problems arising from diverse national interests such that it would

eliminate tragedies of anarchy.38

2.6 The historical evolution of international anarchy

The central premise of the rational choice realist approach is that anarchy is an outcome of

rational calculus. However, states evolved bottom-up, not top down, which motivates a

historical summary of the evolution of the state system which constitutes contemporary

international relations. Thus far, the paper has been posing the question of why world

government has not been enforced by contract, but world history shows that state formation has

been largely driven by coercive bargaining and war.39 The predatory approach to state formation

advocated by Tilly suggests that states in medieval Europe built fearsome coercive means to

deprive civilian populations of access to those means, and relied on capitalists to reorganize

coercion.40 Tilly does not make explicit assumptions about exactly what the fundamental goal

of rulers are, whether they are assumed to be security seekers or greedy territorial expanders,

but instead assumes that men who control concentrated means of coercion wants to extend them

over population and resources over which they wield power.41

37 Oye (1985) p, 1.

38 Ibid

39 Tilly (1992) p, 69.

40 Ibid

41 Tilly (1992) p, 14.

11

Furthermore, Tilly implicitly makes the offensive neorealist assumption that whenever they

encounter other rulers with no comparable control of coercion, they have an incentive to

conquer, and when faced with a comparable strong rival they make war.42 Rulers are

constrained with significant limits to its range of control, which causes either military defeat or

fragmentation of control, thus hinting that international anarchy is a product of a lack of global

concentration of the means of coercion. Because of a lack of external control Tilly argues that

rulers historically settled for a combination of conquest, protection against powerful rivals and

cooperation with neighbors.43 Since the dawn of civilization, rulers have attempted to establish

a secure territory within which they could enjoy returns from coercion and a fortified buffer

zone to protect that territory. When the effort was successful the buffer zone became a secure

area, which incentivized the ruler to acquire additional buffer zones surrounding the old. Since

all rulers where assumed to follow the same logic, adjacent rulers inevitable engaged in military

conflict.44 Small kingdoms evolved into nation states when armies were nationalized and

specialized after the 1750s through a process of bargaining out access to households and

enterprises, hence sweeping out autonomous intermediaries.45 Hence, coercion and asymmetric

bargaining interacted to concentrate capital and coercion.

The paper argues that since it requires more offensive capability to control a large geographic

area than a small one, geographic scale is an important factor explaining why hierarchy emerged

at the local level but not the global level. On the other hand, Tilly highlights that even if states

had significant bargaining leverage over its subjects, rulers often bargained peacefully with

revolting subject to avoid the costs of coercion.46 Moreover, Tilly’s emphasis on the

effectiveness of coercion largely neglects the wars inefficiency puzzle. War is costly and

rational rulers should have an incentive to federate with their competitors, so to spend just

enough on arms to keep down revolts from their subjects and protect wealth from capture.

Predatory theories of state formation which are consistent with a fundamentally realist

understanding of state behavior may explain how anarchy evolved into local hierarchy trough

coercion and asymmetrical bargaining, but fails to explain why rational rulers shouldn’t have

an incentive to federate at the global level to spend just enough on arms to prevent revolts and

protect wealth from capture.

42 Tilly (1992) p, 15.

43 Ibid

44 Tilly (1992) p, 184.

45 Tilly (1992) p, 103.

46 Tilly (1992) p, 102.

12

Chapter 3

3.1 Method and operationalization: introduction

The paper utilizes Frieden’s method of deducing actor preferences to generate predictions about

how observable variations in state properties should change state preferences over international

political order (anarchy or world government as comparative static) given an underlying profit

motive derived from microeconomic assumptions about firm. The congruence method will be

applied to test if the predictions of the RCR model are congruent with empirical outcomes in

illustrative cases, but since the paper is theory developing, empirics will mainly be utilized to

illustrate the logic of the RCR model.

3.2 The congruence method

The congruence method implies that the researcher ascertains the value of the independent

variable and predicts, based on the theory used, what outcome of the dependent variable that

should follow.47 George and Bennet emphasize that the congruence method is useful in studies

that work with deductive theories that “black-box” decision-making and strategic interaction,

in this case, state leaders choosing between anarchy and world government in two-state game

scenarios.48 Hypothetical two-state scenarios can be thought of as artificial small-n case studies

that illustrates macro-political dynamics by analyzing strategic interactions between two states.

The first step in a theory developing study that black-box internal decision-making processes

is to formulate a formal version of the deductive theory employed.49 The formal model

developed in this paper which will be assessed in detail in chapter 4 can be defined as a rational

choice realist model where two states can choose to unify to eliminate arms spending, balance

to maintain deterrence or fight in hopes of eliminating future military competition. Costs and

benefits of unification, balancing and war are determined by the military offense-defense

balance and territorial greed.

47 George and Bennet (2005) p, 181.

48 George and Bennet (2005) p, 200.

49 Ibid

13

The second step is to identify historical cases that enables refinement of the theory’s

explanatory power.50 In this case, the absence of an outcome is the dependent variable to be

explained, but since the outcome (world government) has never occurred, there is no empirical

variance in the dependent variable unless anarchy is treated as a variable varying between less

or more anarchy rather than pure anarchy and world government. However, since the paper

assumes anarchy (absence of world government) to be a rational choice, the dependent variable

(international order) can vary between anarchy and world government since great powers could

potentially choose to unify.

A third and last step in the application of the congruence method is to test how congruent the

predictions of the RCR model are with empirical outcomes, which will be done by assessing

the German-French plans for a European defense union which if realized would be a case of

peaceful unification in the RCR model, while the American civil war will be analyzed as a case

of where regional “world government” dissolved into temporal anarchy.51

3.3 Deducing actor preferences

Friedens method of deducing actor preferences provides a plausible tradeoff between methods

of observation that tend to confuse preferences with outcomes and methods of assumption that

neglects how variation in state properties affect preferences.52 Deducing actor preferences

implies assuming a fundamental exogenous preference derived from previous theory and then

determine preferences over specific issues given identifiable characteristics of actors and their

environment.53 Based on the realist firm-state analogy, The RCR model assumes that state

leaders have a fundamental preference for maximizing consumption, but whether state leaders

will prefer anarchy or world government is determined by variation in observable comparative

statics (regime-types, relative income, congruency between the national and political unit) and

structural factors (military technology and geographic setting). Frieden argue that the deductive

method is analytically valuable because comparative statics are more readily observed than

preferences, hence the RCR model can make predictions about how state preferences are likely

to change given variation in observable state properties and the military offense-defense

balance.54

50 George and Bennet (2005) p, 200.

51 George and Bennet (2005) p, 201.

52 Frieden (1999) p, 56.

53 Frieden (1999), p, 61.

54 Frieden (1999), p, 62.

14

Frieden highlights the importance of keeping preferences separate from the characteristics of

strategic settings, or else the causal role of actor interests and their environment cannot be

distinguished.55 In any given setting, an actor prefers certain outcomes over others and pursue

strategies to achieve the most preferred outcome. In this paper, states are assumed to be the

primary actors in international politics and their principal goal is consumption maximization of

material and symbolic goods. State leaders can choose three different strategies to obtain this

goal. Conquest (outcome: world government), power balancing (outcome: anarchy), or

delegation of force to supranational institutions (outcome: world government). Frieden

highlights that blending national preferences, strategies and the environment into a single

explanatory factor makes it difficult to know how outcomes are affected by international power

relations, national interests and features of the environment.56 Frieden argues that the two main

analytical problems related to the blending of state interests, strategies and strategic setting are

sins of commission which means that it is an analytical mistake to assume that variation in

outcomes is solely due to variation in preferences, and sins of omission which implies that

variation in outcome has nothing to do with variation in preferences.57 The sin of omission can

be avoided by holding environmental factors constant while letting comparative statics vary,

which is done in the RCR model by assuming two-state scenarios where geographic scale is

held constant, while relative incomes, offense/defense balance, regime types and congruency

between national identity and borders vary. Likewise, the sin of commission can be avoided by

holding comparative statics (state properties) constant while varying environmental factors

(geographic scale in the RCR model).

55 Frieden (1999) p, 39.

56 Frieden (1999) p, 51.

57 Ibid.

15

3.4 Delimitations, reliability and validity

Realist and game-theoretical approaches can usually only make very general probabilistic

predictions and George and Bennet argue that probabilistic prediction is not adequate for

assuming a causal relationship unless other outcome explanations are assessed and eliminated.58

Thus, it is important to assess whether the independent variable is a necessary or sufficient

condition for the outcome to occur. In the RCR model, each independent variable is a necessary

but not sufficient condition for an outcome to occur.

George and Bennet claim that structural realism and game-theories lack operationalization and

even when operationalized may fail to identify satisfactory accounts of causal mechanisms but

I argue that causal mechanisms are implicit in the internal logic of the deductive realist

theoretical model and if the model generates successful predictions it needs no further

explanation or demonstration.59

The RCR model has high external validity (generalizability) due to its causal theoretical

mechanisms, but its conceptual validity is lower due to that it relies on a series of assumptions

that can be disputed. George and Bennet mention that statistical studies run the risk of

conceptual stretching, which is also true for grand theoretical models, hence the simple

dichotomy between “anarchy” and world government” may be disputed.60 The model also faces

an equifinality problem since the absence of world government could be attributed to human

nature (emotional fear of the intentions of other states due to anarchy) or lack of a common

enemy which would prevent unification, given that power balancing is the only rational motive

for cooperation.61The paper will deal with the equifinality problem by discussing alternative

realist and neoliberal explanations for anarchy in chapter 7. The issue of conceptual validity

also implies reliability problems. Small changes in the assumed institutional framework of a

potential world government could imply large fluctuations in the cost of anarchy. However, the

study does not attempt to provide and exact measurement of the cost of anarchy relative to

world government, but rather provides a logically feasible realist model that can explain why

state leaders prefer anarchy over unification.

58 George and Bennet (2005) p, 202.

59 George and Bennet (2005) p, 203.

60 George and Bennet (2005) p, 19.

61 George and Bennet (2005) p, 10.

16

Even if the potential costs of world government cannot be empirically measured since world

politics has always been anarchic, Fearon has shown that all levels of governance share the

same basic commitment problem.62 In the same way as an ethnic majority in a civil war would

not be able to credibly commit not to exploit the greater bargaining leverage it would gain over

ethnic minorities if a new state would be consolidated, a large poor state would have a difficult

time credibly committing not exploit the greater bargaining leverage it would gain if it unified

with a richer smaller state. Hence, the small wealthy state has rational reasons to abstain from

unification to avoid redistribution of income.

Since domestic and global politics share the same basic commitment problems, two-state

scenarios are useful as illustrative cases of how competing nationalisms, differences in relative

income, variation in regime-types and military offense-defense balance can affect the cost of

world government relative to anarchy.

Measuring the cost of anarchy is less problematic since military spending provides a plausible

empirical indicator of how much states have to spend on the military to maintain deterrence.

However, there are balance of power dynamics that affect the validity and reliability of military

spending as a rough estimate of the cost of anarchy relative to world government. Fearon argues

that there is a tendency for the smaller state in a dyadic rivalry to make a larger military effort

relative to its resource base, but there are two have to offsetting effects for the wealthier state

in the dyad.63 The wealthier state can spend a smaller fraction of GDP on the military to sustain

deterrence, but also has to spend more to keep the poorer state from invading it since war is

partly caused by undefended wealth.64 These offsetting effects imply that m (offensive

advantage) and µ-c (territorial greed-other war costs) has to be large in order for differences in

relative resources to decisively impact military burdens.65 Given that relative material resources

has implications for military spending never the less indicates that arms levels are not solely

dependent on m and µ-c, but also relative resources.

62 Fearon (1995) p, 3.

63 Fearon (2015) p, 31.

64 Ibid.

65 Fearon (2015) p, 32.

17

Chapter 4

4.1 Theoretical framework: Introduction

This chapter introduces a modified version of Fearon’s two-state baseline model where a third

possible equilibrium outcome and a constraint tied to that outcome is added. In the original two-

state model, anarchy is taken as a structural given where states can choose between balancing

and attacking in successive periods, and because states inevitably must arm to deter each other

(the war constraint), full cooperation in anarchy is not possible. The modified model, denoted

as the RCR (rational choice realist) model assumes that anarchy is not a structural constraint

which produces deterministic outcomes but a rational choice that state leaders make in

preference to world government. The RCR-model extends the implications of Fearon’s two-

state model by introducing a delegation constraint, which explains why states abstain from

peaceful unification. The delegation constrain holds that states can eliminate the war constraint

by unifying and avoid costly deterrence, but rich powerful states may lose bargaining power by

disarming, since they might be forced to redistribute material goods to poor states if the world

government is democratic. However, if the world government is autocratic with insufficient

checks and balances, the war constraint holds, since the world government may become

tyrannical and coerce its subjects.

The RCR-model extends the implications of the Fearonian model by showing how military

defense dominance (determined by military technology) and low levels of territorial greed

(determined by the congruency between national identities and borders, income inequality and

regime-types) makes anarchy stable and world government less urgent, while offense

dominance and high levels of territorial greed makes anarchy costly, but also world government

fundamentally unstable. Hence states rather take the chance of going to war to eliminate future

military competition than unifying with greedy competitors that might grab supranational

military forces to impose their cultural preferences on other states or push for redistribution of

resources. Moreover, the RCR model adds the independent variable “geographic scale” which

accounts for why anarchy is more stable at the global than the regional level, hence explaining

why there are national governments, but no world government. Furthermore, the model assumes

democracy to be an institutional constraint, not an ideational factor that fundamentally changes

the preferences of state leaders.

18

Likewise, nationalism is treated as an instrumental variable that leaders promote to enhance the

fighting morale of soldiers, hence providing rational arguments for why nationalism and

regime-types should figure in a formal realist model.

4.2 Fundamental assumptions

Neorealist approaches typically depart from the assumption that the principal goal of states is

survival and to survive states relentlessly seek security by maximizing their relative share of

world power.66 I argue that the survival motive is logically problematic since it assumes that

states exist for self-preservation purposes, based on a state-individual analogy.67 While

individuals have to survive to pursue other ends, state survival is not a precondition for other

ends that individuals may pursue since state unification could enhance per capita consumption.

The paper argues that a more feasible fundamental principle goal of state leaders is consumption

maximization of symbolic and material goods. The consumption maximization assumption

solves the puzzle arising from the common realist assumption that the primary motive of states

is to survive, and yet state autonomy may block economic gains from unification. Under

anarchy, the consumption frontier for any state is suboptimal since a fraction of the potential

consumption must be spent on arms to deter potential aggression and gain bargaining power.

The paper therefore assumes arms spending to be an inefficiency cost that states want to

minimize. Mearsheimer argues that non-security goals sometimes complement the hunt for

relative power and that greater economic prosperity has significant security-implications due to

the long-run harmony between wealth and power.68 The preference order should hence be

reversed, since latent power (wealth) is a precondition for real power (military power).

Mearsheimer agrees that states cannot build powerful militaries without the money and

technology to equip them but views wealth as means to the end of survival, not survival as

means to the end of consumption.69 The empirical feasibility of the consumption maximization

motive can be exemplified by the US post war grand strategy to secure open markets in Europe

and Asia, since the CIA concluded in 1947 that a possible collapse of the western European

market was the greatest security threat to the US.70

66 Mearsheimer (2014) p, 11.

67 Fearon (2015) p, 202.

68 Mearsheimer (2014) p, 46.

69 Mearsheimer (2014) p, 61.

70 Ikenbeery (2011) p, 174.

19

Furthermore, Roosevelt concluded that the US could not continue to thrive a superpower after

the Second World War without access to markets outside the western hemisphere that could

fuel post war growth.71

Another core assumption in structural realism is that states are concerned with relative gains

which implies that cooperation becomes difficult if states are unable to divide gains such that

relative bargaining power will not change in the future.72 If states seek relative gains the state-

firm analogy does not hold however, since modern microeconomics assumes that firms are

profit maximizers, not market share maximizers. The RCR model therefor assumes Powell’s

proposition that states in anarchy seek relative military advantage to maximize absolute gains.73

Neorealist approaches typically assume states to be unitary actors.74 The RCR model assumes

state leaders, not states, to be the primary actors in international politics, which allows the RCR

model to captures how regime-type constrains the ability of state leaders to maximize their

consumption. The regime-type constraint implies that autocrats are less obligated to share

benefits of territorial conquest among subjects than democratically elected leaders since citizens

in a democracy have more bargaining power. Democrats and autocrats have the same basic

objective, to maximize consumption, but because they face different institutional constraints,

the paper makes the simplified assumption that democracies spend resources not devoted to

arms on public goods while autocracies are assumed to be rent maximizers. The RCR model

also assumes that state leaders are boundedly relational due to imperfect information which

incentivizes them to fear that other state leaders will not credibly commit to not take advantage

of shifts in bargaining power between states, if they would to unify into a world government.

71 Ikenbeery (2011) p, 169.

72 Fearon (1998) p, 297.

73 Powell (1991) p, 1306.

74 See Waltz (1979).

20

4.3 Theoretical model

The basic Fearonian model with no variation in relative power assumes that two states choose

arms levels simultaneously in successive periods, and calculate whether to attack or continue

to bargaining over issue y (international order in this case).75 In the RCR model, states do not

only choose between anarchy or world government through acquisition, but can also choose to

peacefully unify. Either war breaks out and state A conquers the territory of state B (world

government through acquisition) or both states agree on zero arms spending and delegates their

military forces to a world government, hence peaceful unification results. In both cases, anarchy

is overcome and the game ends. If the balance of power (arms levels) is stable, anarchy results.

The RCR model considers the impact of geographic scale when relaxing the two-state scenario

and allows for a third possible outcome, world government by institution as well as introducing

a delegation constraint (the constraint state leaders face when delegating military force to

supranational institutions, losing potential bargaining power but gain potential consumption by

reducing wasteful arms spending).76 While the RCR model assumes that state leaders are

fundamentally rational, imperfect information incentivizes them to fear that their adversaries

will be unable to credibly commit to not attempt to capture world governmental military forces

or push for redistribution of economic resources from rich to poor regions.

The paper argues that when the two-state assumption is relaxed, geographic scale makes the

equilibria outcome war by acquisition unlikely due to that defensive advantage increases with

geographic scale. The model also predicts that if there is a third balancer in the game that would

intervene on behalf of state A if state B would to attack, cooperation between state A and B

becomes easier, defense spending lower and anarchy less costly. If a third state threatens the

security and prosperity of both state A and B, they are likely to form a coalition to balance

against state C. The paper will first present the basic intuition of the Fearonian two-state model

and proceed with implications of relaxing the two-state scenario.

75 Fearon (2015) p, 6.

21

The basic intuition of the Fearonian model is that if military force levels are (a1, a2) and neither

state choose to attack, then state 1s payoff is 1 − 𝑎1 +𝑦𝑝 ( 𝑎1,𝑎1) while state 2 gets 1 − 𝑎2 +

𝑦(1 − 𝑝(𝑎1, 𝑎2) implying that if war does not break out, state leaders gain what they don’t

spend on arms plus value for issue resolution. State 1s share of the division of y is a number

between zero and one. Increasing arms levels enhance bargaining power and gives state leaders

a larger share of gains from issue y. P (𝑎1, 𝑎2) is the probability that state 1 wins the war if

bargaining over y fails. States are denoted as “i” and “j” while “m” indexes offensive advantage

in the offense-defense balance.77 State i wins with probability 𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗 ; 𝑚) If state I attacks

and j defends. For values of m less than 1, the defender gets an advantage against the attacker,

assuming equal force sizes.78 State i`s expected payoff in period “t” from attacking j yields: 1 −

𝑎𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗)y−𝑐+𝛿 (1+µ)

1−𝛿 . Arms levels are denoted as “a” and “µ" measures how much state

leaders value each other’s territory (territorial greed) which depends on regime types

(democrat’s vs autocrats), income inequality (rich vs poor) and congruency between national

identity and border (congruent vs incongruent nationalists). The parameter c denoted additional

war costs.79

Theoretically, full cooperation should be possible on any a (arms levels) < a NE (arms levels

in Nash equilibrium) if war is so costly that states would not consider it, which would be the

case if territorial greed is zero, and defense dominance is overwhelming. The model assumes

two temptations that prevents the outcome full cooperation in anarchy. The first temptation is

the war constraint which concept implies that if state A disarms in anarchy, state B can conquer

state A at a war-cost lower than the benefit of conquest, resulting in world government through

acquisition. The implication is that state A has to arm at least a little in order to not incentivize

state B to attack.80 Simplified, the war constraint yields: 1 − â +𝑦

2≥ 𝑝i (1, â)(𝑦 − 𝑐 + 1 + µ).

For the remainder of the paper, y (disputed issue) will be gains from world government.

77 Fearon (2015), p, 7.

78 Ibid.

79 Fearon (2015), p, 8.

80 Fearon (2015), p, 10.

22

In the RCR model, arming for deterrence is a choice, not a constraint, implying that the war

constraint can be eliminated if the negotiating states delegate their monopoly on arms in one

shot (implying m=0). As mentioned earlier, a one-shot agreement might be difficult to achieve

however and prolonging the shadow of the future could make mutual delegation more attractive,

but delegating in repeated games activates the war constraint, and states may have incentives

to break out and attack when their competitors are military weakened in the delegation phase.

Preference heterogeneity must therefore be such that world government can be agreed upon as

a one-shot deal, because otherwise, the shadow of the future must be prolonged to arrive at

mutual agreement and the war constraint risk to prevent the shadow of the future from resulting

in such equilibria. The second constraint which can be labeled the bargaining constraint still

holds however, that is, states can gain bargaining leverage over competitors by arming.81

The implication of the bargaining constraint for great powers that choose to agree on world

government is that a delegation constraint results. If rich great powers with small populations

choose to delegate their military capabilities, the balance of bargaining power shifts in favor of

less wealthy populous great powers, that could, within the framework of a democratic world

government, push for redistribution of resources, thus the rich great power gain consumption

by delegating its military capabilities but could also lose consumption if the world government

decides to redistribute resources from the rich the poorer great power. Hence great powers

would push for veto rights, but then the world government could would risk being paralyzed

and could not operate efficiently. Worse still, if the world government would to be autocratic,

there would be an asymmetrical war constraint since the world government could abuse its

military power to coerce its subjects that would be unable to arm in defense. Hence, states only

have an incentive to delegate their military capabilities if the marginal benefit of delegation is

larger than the marginal sovereignty cost which is true if the marginal benefit from delegating

is larger than the marginal cost of arming under anarchy.

The basic intuition is that great powers have little reason to choose world government over

stable anarchy when territorial greed is close to zero and defense dominates, because little arms

are needed to deter possible attacks. This implies that state leaders would only have strong

rational reasons to choose world government when there is strong offense dominance (m close

to 1) and high levels of territorial greed (µ close to one).

81 Fearon (2015), p, 9.

23

But under these circumstances, the perceived gains from military conquest are so high that

states rather choose to fight to eliminate military competition and gain all of its competitor’s

resources than to cooperate and agree on world government. War can however only end

international anarchy if a state or a collation has such a strong offensive advantage that the

defensive effects of geographic scale can be offset, which is highly unlikely at the global level.

In the two-state model, anarchy can end trough military conquest but at the global level the

structural constraint of geographic scale ensures that a state can hardly gain enough offense

dominance to accomplish world conquest. If these tentative conclusion are correct, then world

government is most likely when it is least possible, and most likely when it is least desired. In

order to test the validity of this proposition the paper will elaborate on the logical and empirical

validity of its assumptions, as well as alternative explanations for anarchy. Since the values of

µ and m determines the cost of anarchy relative to world government, the analysis will elaborate

on the validity of the variables assumed by the model to cause variance in the independent

variables µ (territorial greed which is cluster variable determined by variation in regime type,

congruency between the national and the political unit and income inequality) and m (indexes

military offense/defense balance).

4.4 Power balancing and the cost of anarchy

The primary justification for showing the basic intuition of the RCR model in two-state

scenarios is that dynamic balance of power models are extremely complex and yet leaves out

important geopolitical dynamics, hence supporting few general results.82 Models with more

than two states where coalitions can form typically assume that any state or coalition can

equally well attack any other state (conditional on relative resources).83 In reality geography

has crucial importance for how coalitions are likely to form since it is easier to invade a

bordering state than an insular state, which also motivates the RCR assumption that geographies

of scale affects the offense/defense balance.84 Even if some historically important dynamics are

neglected in two-state scenarios, the implications of a multipolar scenario with more than two

states is straightforward, and follows the logic of the Fearonian model.

82 Fearon (2015) p, 32.

83 Ibid

84 Ibid

24

If there is a “balancing” state C that would form a coalition with state A if state B would to

attack A, then the odds of victory decrease for state B which implies defensive dominance

(smaller m) and lower costs to anarchy relative to world government in the RCR model.85

However, if state B is growing disproportionality powerful so that B cannot be successfully

contained even if A would ally with C to balance against B, then A and C have rational reasons

to ally with or at least accept the dominant position of B (an empirical example being

contemporary USA) since opposing B would ensure military defeat. A dynamic balance of

power version of the RCR model would hence predict that a unipolar balance of power provides

even stronger defense dominance than symmetrical multipolar balance of power which explains

the absence of a counterbalancing coalitions against the US and the expansion of global trade

and cooperation after the cold war.86 A unipolar world order makes it easier for the leading state

to enforce world government since weaker states faces high costs if they would to resist. On the

other hand, the leading state faces little security competition in anarchy and has therefor little

incentive to promote world government. The defensive advantage provided by hegemonic

stability can explain why the United States chose a national grand strategy designed to prevent

the emergence of peer competitors rather than promoting an American led world government

in the 1990s when the US enjoyed a unipolar moment.87

A general implication of a dynamic version of the RCR model would hence be that shifts in the

balance of power between three or more states makes anarchy more or less costly, all else equal.

However, as the paper will illustrate, there are strong realist arguments for assuming that unit

level factors such as regime-type, relative wealth, congruency between national identity and

border as well as structural facts about the military offense/defense balance have major

implications for if a leading state would be a status quo or revisionist power. Furthermore, if

there would be no variation in the characteristics of states then world government would be

appealing no matter the balance of power, since there would be no conflicting interests over

distribution of material and symbolic goods. Hence, delegation of military force would bear

little risk and unification would be a rationale choice given the cost of maintaining a stable

balance of power in anarchy.

85 Fearon (2015) p, 34.

86 Ikenberry (2011), p, 126.

87 The national security archive: Defense Planning Guidance, 1992.

25

4.4 The role of uncertainty

The defensive neorealist argument that deeper cooperation is possible in equilibrium when it is

harder to successfully attack a state for any given army size (defense dominance) has been

justified by the argument that states are uncertain about each other’s preferences over territory

or issues (u and y in the two-state model). Guessing wrong is more dangerous when offense is

relatively advantaged and defensive advantage implies that states can afford to be more relaxed

about their uncertainty concerning the other side’s type, now or in the future. Derivatives of the

core idea hold that offensive advantage makes “spirals of hostility” and preemptive war more

likely between what are in fact “security seeking” states.88 Fearon has revealed a crucial

weakness in these arguments, which is that it appears unclear why genuinely security seeking

states that have no territorial or issue conflicts would be unable to credibly signal this to each

other over time (prolong the shadow of the future in neoliberal terms).89 Another argument

against standard security-dilemma assumptions is that is doubtful whether any state has ever

been a pure security seeker in the sense assumed.90

If all states are at least somewhat “greedy” for territory, then it is less clear how strongly defense

dominance would favor cooperation. For example, defense dominance could make it safer for

a revisionist state to pursue aggressive policies abroad. In the Fearonian model, states have no

uncertainty at all about each other’s preferences, and neither is a pure security seeker (if u > 0

or y > 0), implying that the standard “security dilemma” arguments do not apply. Instead,

relative advantage for offense increases arming and lowers cooperation because more arms are

needed to deter “break out,” and deterrence is needed because states are at least somewhat

greedy for territory. Fearons model assumes that offensive advantage have a perverse multiplier

effect because the more arms a state needs to deter attacks from potential adversaries, the less

desirable the status quo becomes for that states, hence making war relatively more attractive.

This implies that the other state has to spend more, which makes the status quo less appealing

for that state too, hence increasing the cost of anarchy.91

88 Fearon (2015), p, 22.

89 Fearon (2015) p, 22.

90 Ibid

91 Ibid.

26

The RCR model accepts Fearon’s argument that when there are no conflicting preferences,

states have little uncertainty about each other’s preferences, but in the real world, y=0 rarely

holds, hence uncertainty arises, but not as a consequence of anarchy but of heterogeneous

preference attributed to the characteristics of states. Furthermore, Fearon assumes uncertainty

about preferences to be eliminated when y=0 and u=0, which I interpret as unrealistic

arguments, since information no matter how exact or symmetric, will be interpreted somewhat

differently by different decision makers for contextual reasons.92

To put it differently, even if there would be no conflicting preferences in a period, states still

have rational reasons to hide their intentions and capabilities because a state’s preferences can

change in future periods. Fear of changes in future preferences incentivize rational states to arm

today to safeguard against shifting preferences in the future. The RCR model thus assumes that

fear of that y>0 in future periods, incentivizes states to arm in the current period even if y=0.

This constraint can be referred as “uncertainty” constraint, arising from fear of that preferences

will not be static, since prolonging the shadow of the future can only make states more certain

about each other’s preferences, but not such that deviations from expectations about preferences

can be eliminated completely. The uncertainty constraint also explains why wealthy states fear

that poorer more populous states would have a hard time credibly committing not to push for

redistribution of resources if world government would to be enforced.

92 Fearon (2015) p, 22.

27

Chapter 5

5.1 Analysis: introduction

This chapter analyzes the validity of the RCR model as well as the implications of relaxing the

two-state scenario when considering the impact of geographic scale. The chapter concludes that

income inequality between states enhances territorial revisionism (territorial greed) since

poorer states have incentives to conquer rich ones to extract resources and the richer state also

have an incentive to increase military spending to protect its wealth. Furthermore, income

inequality activates the delegation constraint, since the rich state will fear that the poor state

will push for redistribution if the world government is democratic. Result: income inequality

increases territorial greed, which makes anarchy less appealing but also peaceful unification

less appealing, and hence war prone anarchy should result. Next, defensive military technology

makes anarchy more stable and world government less appealing, since mutual assured

destruction makes great power war unlikely. Democracy reduces territorial greed since

democratically accountable leaders have to share gains from conquest more evenly and

empirical estimates show that military spending reduces when states turn democratic.

Incongruent nationalism (incongruence between national and political units) increases

territorial greed and makes anarchy costlier, but nationalism also affects the offense/defense

balance since it’s more difficult to conquer a highly nationalistic population, hence nationalism

creates a form of defense bias.

Moving from a local context with two states to a global context, the RCR model predicts that

defensive advantage increases with geographic scale, rendering world government through

acquisition unlikely. Cultural differences also increase with geographic distance, hence

incongruent nationalism is more prevalent at the global level than in local contexts where

groups of people can easier unify under a centralized governing structure. High levels of

territorial greed and offensive advantage makes anarchy expensive but world government less

stable, since states rather utilize their offensive advantage to eliminate future military

completion trough conquest. When territorial greed is low and defensive advantage dominates,

world government is relatively more attractive, but so is anarchy, hence no scenario provides

rulers with strong incentives to unify in spite of the military burden necessary to deter attacks

in anarchy.

28

5.2 Taming the leviathan

World government is in this paper is defined as a minimalistic sovereign night watcher state

authorized to use military force when necessary to guarantee global stability. The argument for

why states world have an incentive to opt for a sovereign world government rather than a

hybrid-solution where nation-states remain sovereign is based on political philosopher Torbjörn

Tännsjö’s argument that if a conflict commences between the states in a world federation of

shared sovereignty, the world government need sanctioning authority to avoid that hierarchy

brakes down into interstate anarchy. The problem of shared sovereignty can be illustrated by

the EU, where Germany and France has not been able to credibly commit to the stability pact

since there is no supranational severing to force them into compliance.93 The only realist

alternative to anarchy is therefore a sovereign world government where nation-states are

deprived of their sovereignty, but delegating sovereignty is costly for the following reasons.

First, a sovereign world government might become tyrannical as happened trough democratic

means in the Weimar republic.94 Tännsjö argues that the military forces of the world

government need not be that strong, since it would only have to yield enough military power so

to maintain peace and order, while being deprived from the capabilities of world conquest.95

However, Tännsjö’s argument may be contradictory since he states that UN forces (world

government) would not challenge the supremacy of US military forces, hence the US would

have an incentive to surrender its military forces to the UN.96 I argue that the US could not

possibly remain militarily supreme if its forces where surrendered, but could indeed have its

borders secured by the UN if it did so. Furthermore, the delegation constraint implies that the

US would lose bargaining leverage if it surrendered its military forces to the UN, and since

Chinas is more populous and parallel the US in terms of economic size, the bargaining position

of the US would certainly decline. Hence, the delegation constraint holds that the US would

only surrender its military forces to the UN if the economic gains from spending nothing on

arms would outweigh the economic loss from having its bargaining power reduced under world

government.

93 Tännsjö (2013) p, 126.

94 Ibid

95 Tännsjö (2013), p, 127.

96 Tännsjö (2013), p, 128.

29

Furthermore, if the world government is going to be able to provide global peace and stability

it must arguably be even more powerful than the US military is today and wield unprecedented

capabilities to deter possible world uprisings mobilizing millions of people.

Tännsjö acknowledges that fundamentalists might mobilize political leverage in the world

parliament and attempt to enforce illiberal laws on the world, which is a serious risk especially

concerning the rich liberal and less populous democracies of the world.97 While Tännsjö argues

that the risk of fundamentalist takeover is a cost that states have to bear if they are normatively

committed to world government, the realist framework in this paper assumes that states have

no major normative commitments since their principal goal is to maximize consumption and

security. This implies that fear of possible failures of global institutions to check fundamentalist

policies or violent takeover of global military forces is a serious cost that incentivizes great

powers to avoid unification unless there is little or zero cultural and material preference

heterogeneity between them. With world government defined and its major risks elaborated on,

the paper will proceed by deductively evaluate the validity of the independent variables

determining the cost of anarchy relative to world government as well as test the predictions of

the RCR model against tentative empirics.

5.3 Military technology and the offense/defense balance

The RCR model expects military offensive advantage (larger m ) to bring the cost of anarchy

up and the cost of world government down since larger peacetime military forces are needed to

deter attacks, hence increasing the military burden in anarchy. The model departs from Fearons

definition of offense/defense balance since it provides a clear distinction between offensive

advantage and probability of winning at equilibrium force levels. Conventional offense/defense

balance theory maintains that defense was relatively favored at the outbreak of world war two

due to machineguns and improved artillery which appears to be confirmed by the stalemate at

the western front. However, railroads and mass conscription allowed for quick deployment of

large forces that could deliver a quick initial blow, hence incentivizing states to increase

peacetime force levels which made outbreak attacks less likely to succeed.98

97 Tännsjö (2013), p, 129.

98 Fearon (2015) p, 25.

30

Likewise, the nuclear revolution has been paralleled by an absence of war among the great

powers since 1945 and declines in peacetime force levels, which indicates that nuclear weapons

provides defensive advantage, hence making anarchy less costly and world government less

appealing.99 Great powers possessing nuclear forces with second strike capabilities face the

prospects of mutually assured destruction (MAD), hence incentivizing them to abstain from

initiating war.100

Furthermore, the possibility to eliminate many enemy missiles by launching a few multiple war

head missiles activates the “ex post ex ante” dilemma. The ex post ex ante dilemma means that

if state B attacks state A, A can choose to retaliate by either targeting the silos or cities of B but

since it might be unclear which of B:s silos that are empty it could lead to retaliation.101

Likewise, if A choose to attack B:s cities, B can retaliate by attacking the cities of A. Hence it

might be rational for A not to respond to nuclear attacks by B to avoid retaliation, thus

incentivizing aggressors to make counterforce first strikes.102 The impossibility of working out

how to rationally response to nuclear attacks implies that deterrence can work even without a

rational actor assumption, since the very possibility of irrationality makes deterrence effective.

However, future development of sophisticated antiballistic missiles (ABMs) might cause an

endless arms race in which one side deploys ABMs and the other counters by adding enough

offensive missiles equipped with penetration aids to swamp the missile defense systems.103

Future technological development might therefore alter the offense/defense balance such that

offense dominance prevails once again, but in the contemporary world nuclear weapons

remains vital for anarchic stability.

A potential problem with the concept of offense/defense balance is that state leaders might not

be able to clearly distinguish offensive from defensive posture. If it cannot be distinguished

whether the types of arms a state deploys imply defensive or offensive posture, states are left

with arms levels as the best rough measure of offensive/defensive posture, but since states could

arm for both defensive and offensive purposes, it will be difficult to know if states are security

seekers or territorial expanders.104

99 Fearon (2015) p, 28.

100 Buzan and Hansen (2009) p, 77.

101 Buzan and Hansen (2009) p, 78.

102 Ibid.

103 Buzan and Hansen (2009) p, 79.

104 Jervis (1978) p, 212.

31

When taking into account the possibility that defensive and offensive posture might not be

distinguishable, the RCR model yields the following four equilibria, based on Jervis four world

scenarios, holding variables affecting territorial greed constant:

Offensive advantage Defensive advantage

1: Anarchy unstable.

Outcome: World

government by acquisition

2: Anarchy stable.

Outcome: No world government.

3: Anarchy unstable.

Outcome: World government

by acquisition likely

4: Anarchy stable:

Outcome: World government by

institution possible.

In the first scenario, offense dominates and defensive and offensive posture cannot be

distinguished, implying that state leaders will anticipate aggression even if adversaries arm for

defensive purpose, holding other variables determining territorial greed constant. In the second

scenario, defense dominates but let assume that the two states in this scenario do not possess

nuclear second strike capability and can therefore not cannot distinguish clearly between

offensive and defensive posture. State leaders abstain from unifying in this scenario due to fear

of that the other state will cheat on the agreement, ramp up and attack. In the third scenario

offense has the advantage but offensive posture can be distinguished from defensive posture,

implying that arms racing is not inevitable but aggression is still likely. In the fourth scenario,

defense has the advantage and both state possess secure nuclear second strike forces. In this

scenario, states anticipate mutual assured destruction if war breaks out, hence anarchy is stable

and world government possible, but since states can operate in anarchy with a low defense

burden, gains from world government are small, all else equal. The equilibria outcome is stable

anarchy with a possible but weak incentives for unification. In addition to military technology,

geography is also an important determinant of offense/defense balance but since the basic two-

state scenario does not allow for variation in geographic distance, the impact of geographies of

scale on the cost of anarchy relative to world government will be elaborated on in section 5.4

where the two-state assumption is relaxed.

Offensive posture

not distuinguishable

from defensive one

Offensive posture

distuinguishable

from defensive one

32

5.4 Territorial greed and the cost of anarchy relative to world government

5.4.1 Income inequality and the redistribution commitment problem

Assuming a two-state model where both states are income-maximizers and one state is populous

and poor while the other is rich and less populous, the main concern for the smaller rich states

is that if a democratic world government would be established the larger poor state would vote

for redistribution of income from the rich to the poor state. The poor populous state has in this

scenario an incentive to merger with the richer state while the richer state has an incentive to

remain in anarchy to avoid welfare-losses. The problem then becomes how the poor populous

state is going to credibly commit to not push for redistribution of income so to incentivize the

richer state to agree on world government. The commitment problem in a domestic context is

essentially the same, game-theoretically illustrated in Fearon’s 1995 paper on ethnic war. In the

two-period game, an ethnic minority choose whether to fight or acquiesce in the first period. If

they choose acquiesce the majority will make demands x E (0, 1) in the second period, and in

the third period the minority choose acquiesce or fight, given demands x.105

Using the domestic-global analogy the large poor state must credibly commit not to make

redistribution demands in period 2 to prevent the rich small state from abstaining from

agreement in period 1. Once the contract is enforced the rich small state might lack bargaining

leverage to reverse redistribution demands in period 2 and might therefor attempt defecting in

period 3, causing civil world war. The implication is that high levels of income inequality

between great powers generate lower costs to anarchy relative to world government. The

graphical illustration below shows maximum possible consumption frontier for both states if

they would merge is compared to the maximum consumption frontier when remaining in

anarchy. The smaller consumption frontier under anarchy is caused by wasteful arms spending

that is necessary to deter potential attacks and gain bargaining leverage. As an empirical

example, the two most powerful states in the world today are the US followed by China as the

emerging challenger, and the redistributive commitment problem between these states is

obvious since Chinas population is four times larger than the US while US GDP per capita

income is substantially higher than Chinas.

105 Fearon (1995) p, 7-8.

33

Even if perfect information is assumed, states may in special circumstances fail to commit

themselves to uphold a deal, because it is unclear how an institutional setup can be designed

such that poor populous states wouldn’t be able to push for redistribution from smaller richer

ones, and global institutions might fail and redistribution might be enforced by military

means.106

Graph: 1

Recall the equation 1 − 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑝𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑎𝑗)y−𝑐+𝛿 (1+µ)

1−𝛿 and let’s now assume that this is the poor

states payoff from attacking the rich state. Theoretically, the poor state should gain more from

invading the rich state while the rich state should increase arms spending to defend its wealth

from capture. The historical record supports the assumption and shows that the tide of war tends

to flow from poor to rich lands and fortifications along borders between ploughed an

unploughed land is a recurrent historical phenomenon, hence pointing towards a historical

tension between rich and poor communities or states.107 Income inequality between states hence

yield higher levels of territorial greed which makes anarchy less appealing, but since income

inequality also makes world government less appealing, war becomes relatively attractive, all

else equal.

106 Alesina and Spolaore (2005) p, 113.

107 Keegan (1993) p, 74.

Small rich countries per capita income

Lar

ge

poo

r co

un

trie

s p

er c

apit

a in

com

e

Possible income

distribution under

world government

Status quo in anarchy

34

5.4.2 Regime-types: Autocrats vs democrats

The RCR model assumes that variation in regime types should cause variation in the

independent variable territorial greed, which together with offense-defense balance determines

the dependent variable international order (anarchy or world government). The RCR model

predicts that the more democratic a state is, the less expansionist it should be, and since less

territorial greed implies less arms spending, world government becomes less appealing and

stable anarchy results, all else equal. While there are both normative and institutional arguments

for why democracies should be less greedy for territory than autocracies, only institutional

(structural) arguments are compatible with a rational choice realist model since it would be

irrational for selfish consumption maximizing leaders to extend citizenship rights to conquered

territory when material gains could be made from enslavement. To not extend democratic rights

to conquered territory could imply normative costs for democratically elected leaders if the

electorate prefer such policies but since the RCR model assumes that citizens like leaders, are

consumption maximizers, there is no realist reason to assume that citizens in a democracy are

intrinsically opposed to colonialism.

A more plausible realist explanation for why democracies should be less greedy for territory is

that political accountability drives tax-policy, hence democratically elected leaders are

institutionally constrained to divide gains from conquest.108 With inspiration from Alesina and

Spolaores optimal size of nations model, the RCR model assumes that democracies are per

capita income maximizers (what is not spent on arms is spent on public goods that benefit the

electorate) while autocrats are assumed to be rent-maximizers (what is not spent on arms is

spent on goods benefitting the autocrat and his associates).109

An unaccountable autocrat not facing constraints of border derivations or reasonable taxations

levels would supply a minimum possible amount of public goods and tax at the maximum

feasible level, hence extracting larger rents by ruling more territory, while providing few public

goods.110 The RCR model thus assumes that the optimal equilibria outcome for an autocrat is

World Empire, implying that autocratic governance increases territorial greed, arms spending

and the cost of anarchy relative to world government.

108 Fearon (2015), p, 18.

109 Alesina and Spolaore (2005) p, 769.

110 Alesina and Spolaore (2005) p, 70.

35

While world empire is a possible equilibria outcome in two-state scenarios, geographies of scale

prevents that outcome in a “maximum number of states” scenario, since geographies of scale

makes local anarchy fragile but global anarchy stable which is an assumption that will be

elaborated upon in section 5.4.

Recognizing that even autocrats must guarantee a minimum level of welfare to prevent revolts

a larger empire also implies that more has to be spent on welfare and arms to maintain order,

hence autocrats gain declining returns to territorial conquest.111 Even in two-state scenarios

where the independent variable geographic scale is held constant, “welfare sensitive” citizens

may revolt if the autocrat pursue rent-maximizing policies, implying that differences in

territorial revisionism between autocracies and democracies may not be as decisive as the RCR

model assumes. To investigate if the RCR assumption about regime-types is congruent with

empirical evidence, observable differences in military spending as percentage of GDP (military

burden) between autocracies and democracies is a feasible starting point, since a larger military

burden makes anarchy less appealing. Based on the Polity IV dataset which is widely used for

measuring levels of democracy, the SIPRI military expenditure database shows that that in

2014, only three out of 20 states with a military burden larger than 4% were democracies, hence

lending support to the RCR assumption that democracy reduces territorial greed and the cost of

anarchy.112

In addition, there is some empirical evidence for that democratically elected leaders suffers a

greater risk of losing office if they launch unsuccessful wars. Goemans’ study on the manner

and consequences of losing office concludes that initiating conflict has little effect on the hazard

of regular removal from office in democracies, autocracies or mixed regime types. However,

when faced with domestic challengers, autocrats and mixed regimes greatly reduce the hazard

of irregular removal if they initiate international conflicts. For all regime-types types defeat in

war increases the risk of irregular removal from office. The net effect yields that autocracies

and mixed-regimes may benefit from conflict, while democracies do not.113 Goemans’ findings

supports the assumption that democracies face institutional constraints that make them less

greedy for territory.

111 Ibid.

112 SIPRI Fact Sheet (2015) p, 7.

113 Goemans (2008) p, 789.

36

However, Weeks finds that while juntas and “strong-men” regimes are more belligerent than

democracies, autocratic civilian regimes with powerful elite audiences are no more belligerent

than democracies.114 Furthermore, in a dyadic rivalry between an extremely greedy autocracy

and a status quo democracy, the democratic state have an incentive to prefer war to eliminate

the greedy autocrat so to avoid costly deterrence, exemplified by the US invasion of Iraq in

2003 and the US entry in world war two.115 Furthermore, Snyder and Mansfield concludes

that states become more belligerent during the transition phase from autocracy to democracy

due to domestic institutional weakening, implying that while democratic governance makes

anarchy more stable, regime change makes anarchy temporally less stable.116

Hence, democracy makes anarchy more appealing relative to world government if state leaders

in dyadic rivalry are constrained by democratic institutions but in dyadic rivalries between

sufficiently greedy autocrats and status quo democracies, anarchy is no more stable than in

dyadic rivalries between autocracies. While anarchy is more costly for greedy autocrats than

status quo democracies, the delegation constraint is tighter for autocrats since an autocratic

world government without the checks and balances provided by democratic institutions could

turn tyrannical, hence autocrats prefer war to eliminate future need for deterrence rather than

bargaining for unification with greedy autocratic rivals that could cheat on the agreement in an

attempt to achieve world domination. The delegation constraint is less tight for democracies

since their domestic political systems can work as role models for an accountable world

government, but democracies also gain less from unification since they can operate in anarchy

with a small military burden.

114 Weeks (2012) p, 326.

115 Fearon (2015) p, 32.

116 Snyder and Mansfield (2002) p, 398.

37

5.4.3 Nationalism and world government

The last sub variable that determines territorial greed in the RCR model is nationalisms as a

symbolic good with instrumental importance for fighting morale and domestic stability. The

paper assumes Gellner and Breuillys definition of the nationalist principle which holds that the

national and the political unit should be congruent.117 While nationalism can be interpreted as

a ideational constraint that cuts against a fundamental realist approach to international politics,

the RCR model assumes, and for good realist reasons, that nationalism has great instrumental

value for state leaders. Classical realist Morgenthau has provided realist arguments for the

rationality of nationalism by arguing that national morale is a central component of national

power and thus have implications for a nation’s capability to wage and win wars.118 A

government which is not actively supported by its people cannot efficiently fight wars, and

nationalism also makes resistance against intervention from foreign powers more effective.

Nationalism therefore has a rationalist purpose neglected by neorealist approaches succeeding

Morgenthau’s classical realism.119

Furthermore, Mouffe has argued, based on the works of classical realist Carl Schmitt, that

collective identities are created through differentiation (antagonism). Hence, collective identity

is not only a rational instrument for enhancing combat efficiency but requires a constitutive

outside to make its very existence possible.120 If in addition collective identity is an inherent

human need (for survivalist purposes) and such identity cannot exist outside of a friend-enemy

relation, then a world government would be risky enterprise since states may not be able to

consume as much immaterial goods (collective identity and cultural particularity) as they could

under anarchy. To summarize, rational state leaders have strong incentives to promote

nationalism since it is provides defensive advantage, hence reducing the cost of anarchy.121 On

the other hand, incongruent nationalism (incongruence between the national and political unit)

promotes territorial expansion and makes anarchy less appealing relative to world government.

117 Gellner and Breuilly (2006) p, 1.

118 Morgenthau (2006) p, 147.

119 Ibid.

120 Mouffe (2016) p, 46.

121 Jervis (1978) p, 195.

38

Empirically, arms levels appear to be higher and regional integration less evident in areas

characterized by incongruent nationalism, exemplified by the rivalry between North and South

Korea or Israel and its neighbors.122 Military historian Keegan has also concluded that people

of the same language and religion rarely fight each other on a grand scale.123 Moreover,

defensive realist van Evera has shown that incongruence between national identities and borders

in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the balance of power towards

stateless nationalisms which probably fueled secessionist wars and raised the regional cost of

anarchy.124 Van Evera also finds post war nationalism in Western Europe has been benign

because the congruency between nations and statehood was largely completed by the end of

world war two.125

The RCR model predicts that when the political and national unit is incongruent, territorial

greed increases thus incentivizing more arms spending than would be the case if y=0 which is

true when there are no conflicting preferences among states. Nationalism, no matter if

congruent or incongruent also provides defensive advantage (lower m) since peoples strongly

committed to nationalism are harder to subdue.126 Territorial greed (µ) increased with

incongruent nationalism and decreases with congruent nationalism. Furthermore, competing

nationalisms creates the same commitment problem as income inequality since world

government could imply undesired redistribution of cultural goods either through a global coup

d'état enacted by militant cultural minorities or trough democratic procedures. In addition, the

prevalence of nationalism arguably makes it difficult for a world government to forge a

cosmopolitan identity in the short run, hence potentially causing civil unrest among nationalists

unsatisfied with the new world order. Hence, while nationalism effectively promotes stability

within states it would also promote instability between them if they would choose to unify.

122 Fearon (2015) p, 17.

123 Keegan (1993) p, 74.

124 Van Evera (1994) p, 31. 125 Van Evera (1994) P, 11.

126 Jervis (1978) p, 195.

39

5.4.4 Geographies of scale

In the two-state model, country scale is held constant and does not affect offense/defense

balance or territorial greed, but when allowing for geographic scale to vary from a local to

global, the expanded model assumes that larger country scale implies stronger defense

dominance and more territorial greed. The justification for these assumptions are imported from

Alesina and Spolaores “optimal size of nations” model which assumes that there is a basic

tradeoff between economics of scale and preference heterogeneity.127 A larger population

implies lower per capita defense costs, implying that territorial expansion could reduce the per

capita military burden while allowing for larger defense budget, thus enhancing military power

while slashing military per capita military spending.128

However, a larger state also implies higher administrative costs, but more importantly, cultural

heterogeneity tends to increase with country scale, which can lead to violent conflict over the

policies of the central government.129 The congruency between national identity and geographic

borders should thus decrease as states grow larger which implies that a world government would

fuel incongruent nationalism and incentivize states to abstain from unification. While anarchy

incentives incongruent nationalists to expand, world government incentives them to secede.

Mearsheimer implicitly recognized the tradeoff between country scale and preference

heterogeneity when he argued in 1993 that peace in former Yugoslavia could be achieved by

braking up Yugoslavia into ethnically homogenous states, which cuts against the offensive

realist assumption that anarchy inevitably incentives states to behave offensively.130

Country scale does not only affect territorial greed but also the military offense/defense balance

which is an important realist explanation for why there is hierarchy within states but anarchy

between them. The RCR model assumes that defensive advantage increases with geographic

distance based on the Jervis argument that conquest usually becomes more difficult as the

attacker pushes deeper into the defender’s territory.131

127 Alesina and Spolaore (2005), p, 38.

128 Alesina and Spolaore (2005), p, 3.

129 Alesina and Spolaore (2005), p, 5.

130 Mearsheimer (1993). 131 Jervis (1978) p, 195.

40

Hirshleifer has also argued that geographic size operates against offensive advantage, hence

explaining how geographic overextension caused empires to fall apart.132 In addition, military

historian Keegan has concluded that 70% of the world’s dry land is too cold, too waterless or too high

for the conduct of military operations.133 While offensive advantage (all else equal) results in world

government through acquisition in the two-state scenario, the share size of the world operates

against such outcome at the global level, rendering world empire extremely unlikely, although

not impossible given enough offensive advantage that could potentially be provided by new

military technologies. Mearsheimers argument that the stopping power of water makes world

hegemony unlikely is coherent with the offense/defense balance logic of the RCR model,

implying that insular superpowers such as the US should have little incentive to escape anarchy

since they enjoy a “natural” defensive advantage.134

While cultural heterogenetic increases as states grow larger no matter regime-type, the RCR

model assumes that geographies of scale have different implications for democracies and

autocracies for the following reason. Suppose the ideal type democracy suggested by Alesina

and Spolaore where the median voter determines the quality and quantity of public goods and

citizens can vote over political borders.135 If all great powers of the world were democracies

and they chose to unify to take advantage of lower defense spending and more cross border

investment, world government could dissolve into anarchy for the following reason. If citizens

on the periphery of a nation of optimal size (the world is the optimal size in this scenario) pay

the same price for public goods as those near the center but get public goods less well suited to

their preferences, in can be in the majority’s interest to divide the nation in half, increasing the

average cost of public goods, but in exchange getting more nearly the public goods they

desire.136 In a global context, this implies that world unification maximizes consumption for all

states all else equal, but given underlying competing nationalisms and income differences, the

benefits of world unification will be distributed unevenly, leaving some states better off in

anarchy and incentivizing them to vote for secession. To conclude, anarchy is not only more

stable in a democratic world due to institutional constraints that reduces territorial greed but

world government, once implemented, is also unlikely to be sustained when states can vote to

leave without fighting for independence.

132 Hirshleifer, (1995) p, 45.

133 Keegan (1993) p, 68-69.

134 Mearsheimer (2014) p, 83.

135 Alesina and Spolaore (2005) p, 46.

136 Alesina and Spolaore (2005) p, 36.

41

As an historical example, Scotland and England voted for unification in 1709 but the unification

was followed by jacobine revolts in Scotland in 1715.137 In 2014 Scotland held a national

referendum of Scottish independence, which however resulted in a slight victory for the

advocates of the Union.138

For autocrats, geographies of scale have a slightly different implication. World Empire is the

first best equilibria outcome for autocrats but cultural heterogeneity makes the empire more

difficult to hold together as it expands. However, autocrats can reduce heterogeneity costs by

promoting nationalism, which provides further justification for the assumption that leaders have

rational reasons to promote nationalism.139 While nationalism reduces preference heterogeneity

within states, the opposite is true between them. To motivate further territorial expansion as

well as maintaining internal order, autocrats have an incentive to promote incongruent

nationalism, which increases territorial greed and makes war relatively more attractive than

peaceful unification. However, since the share size of the world provides strong defense

dominance, World Empire is not possible, and war prone anarchy results.

To summarize, cultural preferences tend to become more diverse as the size of nations expands

which explains why rational state leaders prefer anarchy over world government given the

incongruence between national identities and borders that would arise if the great powers of the

world would unify peacefully. Since incongruent nationalism implies higher levels of territorial

greed, world unification is likely to cause secessionist wars that are costlier than the military

burden states must carry in anarchy to keep a stable balance of power. Furthermore, defensive

advantage increases with geographic scale, which explains why the outcome “world

government by acquisition” can occur in a local two-state context but unlikely to ever occur at

a global level.

137 Parliament.uk: Living heritage: The 1715 rebellion.

138 Gov.uk: Scottish independence referendum.

139 Alesina and Spolaore (2005), p, 70.

42

The graph below illustrates how territorial greed (µ) and offense/defense balance (m) affects

the cost of anarchy (Ca) and world government (Cwg), while also showing how Cwg and Ca

shifts when considering geographies of scale. Moving from a local two-state scenario to a world

scenario with more actors, Cwg2 shifts to Cwgn since geographies of scale imply more defense

dominance, ending up in anarchy (A) as an equilibria outcome (E1). However, state

heterogeneity with respect to incomes, nationalist doctrines, and regime-types also increase as

the game moves from a two-state scenario to a world scenario, hence µ increases as well,

increasing the cost of anarchy from Ca2 to Can, ending up at the break-even equilibria E2 where

the cost of world government (Cwg) equals the cost of anarchy (Ca), which incentivizes states

to remain in anarchy since the net benefit of enforcing world government is zero.

For world government to materialize (E3: WG), the cost of anarchy must increase while the

cost of world government remains constant, thus shifting down the Ca-curve to equilibria E3,

or the cost of world government must decrease while the cost of anarchy remains constant so

that the Cwg-curve shifts down in level with equilibria E3. The RCR model does not allow for

these scenarios since preference heterogeneity is assumed to increase with geographic distance,

and so is defense dominance, rendering equilibria E3 impossible unless all great powers in the

world are homogenous with respect to incomes, regime-types, and nationalism is largely absent.

In a scenario where the cost of world government goes down due to decreasing territorial greed

among great powers, the Cwg-curve would shift downwards and world government would

result, but less territorial greed also implies more defense dominance, hence shifting the Ca-

curve upwards, and anarchy results.

43

Graph: 2

µ: 0,5

µ: 0

m: 0

m: 1

m: 0,5

µ: 1

E3: WG

E1: A

E2: Cwg=Ca

44

Chapter 6

6.1 Illustrative empirics: introduction

This chapter conducts tentative tests (plausibility probes) of the model by showing how the

concepts of territorial greed and offense/defense balance can be operationalized empirically.

The chapter assesses the tentative plans by Germany and France to establish an EU defense

union and analyses the British resistance to these plans as well. Furthermore, the chapter

analyses the American civil war as a two-state scenario where the outcome of the game was

regional “world government” trough conquest. The American civil war highlights the dangers

of governmental setups incapable of preventing civil war when groups of states push for session

(incongruent nationalism).

6.2 Unification vs balancing in contemporary Europe

The German and French plans to take steps towards a European defense union provides an

opportunity to test the core assumptions of the RCR model.140 The model predicts that France

and Germany should have little incentive to unify since both states are democracies, congruent

nationalists, have similar income levels and possess or enjoy protection from nuclear weapons.

However, the dynamic RCR model which allows for a third balancing state predicts that the

presence of Russia as an incongruent nationalist great power greedy for territory causes the

regional cost of anarchy to increase and incentivize France and Germany to promote a common

defense union in order to counterbalance.141 However, if Russian military buildup and territorial

rivalries with bordering states incentivize France and Germany to consider a common defense

union, then why has Britain resisted such plans?142 The RCR model suggests that because

Britain is an insular state, it enjoys defensive advantage due to geographies of scale and should

therefore have less incentive to escape anarchy than Germany which is relatively close to

Russia. The British defense minister has also argued that a defense union would imply costs in

terms of more bureaucracy at the EU level, hence anarchy remains a rational choice for Britain

given its geographic location.143

140 Rettman (2016).

141 Arnold (2016).

142 Rettman (2016).

143 Rettman (2016).

45

Balance of power logic can hardly operate as a catalyst for global unification however, because

as Schmittt has argued, humanity as a whole has no enemy, at least not on this planet.144 World

government would only be considered as a counter balancing measure if an alien invasion

threatened all of humanity, which would incentive the great powers to centralize their military

forces to deal with the extra-terrestrial threat.145 In absence of an alien invasion, states only

have each other to balance against, and it makes realist sense to form strong military alliances

against a neighboring state which is greedy for territory due to incongruent nationalism and

lack of democratic mechanisms that constrain rent seeking.

However, the development of the EU raises the question of whether a world government could

be institutionally designed, such that the commitment problems associated with world

government could be overcome since a global European Union with checks and balances may

theoretically be a compelling mix of institutional features suited for a global government.

However, since cultural, economic and regime diversity at the global level remain significantly

larger than within the EU, world government comes with higher heterogeneity costs that

incentives great powers to prefer anarchy.

6.3 When anarchy is a rational choice: The case of the American civil war

The formation of the United States shows that a regional miniature of world government is

possible but the American civil war also indicates that the step from agreement to compliance

is risky and potentially violent, hence exemplifying how a world government might dissolve

into anarchy. The debate between the federalists and antifederalists during the founding

moment of the United States also exemplifies the conflicts likely to commence between the

great powers of the world, if world government would to be negotiated.

Aristotle argued that the size of a polity should be small enough such that everybody knew

everybody else, since he believed that experience had shown that it is possible if not impossible

to govern a populous polity efficiently.146 In a similar manner, Montesquieu argued that in a

large republic the common good is sacrificed to a thousand different considerations, while in a

smaller republic the public good is more strongly felt.

144 Schmitt (1932) p, 54.

145 Ibid.

146 Alesia and Spolaore (2005) p, 5.

46

During the US constitutional convention of 1787 the antifederalists argued that such a large

territory inhabited by such a heterogeneous population was an absurdity and contrary to the

whole experience of mankind.147 The federalist response was provided by Madison who argued

that the larger the territory the smaller the risk that one group of interests would dominate over

the others, hence larger size could work as a deterrent against majority tyranny.148 Madison’s

argument implies that it should be extremely difficult for minority groups to impose their

preferences on others in a world state since the world is far more heterogeneous than the US.

The American Civil War casts doubts over Madison’s argument and is a critical case of how

incongruent nationalism, fear of income redistribution and belief in military defensive

advantage promotes anarchy. The Missouri compromise of 1820 which outlawed slavery north

of the 36°30' parallel fused tensions between the north and south on the issue of slavery which

threatened to dissolve the Union.149 However, The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 violated the

Missouri compromise by allowing settlers to hold legal claim to the territories of Nebraska and

Kansas, hence allowing for slavery in these territories. The Nebraska-Kansas act fueled tensions

between the north and south that ultimately led to civil war.150 The north-side divide that

destabilized the US during the first half of the 19th century lends support to the RCR prediction

that congruency between national identity and borders decrease with geographic distance,

which in turn increases territorial greed and the cost of world government.

To recapitulate, The RCR model predicts that territorial greed increases with income-

differences, incongruent nationalism and nondemocratic governance, hence making world

government unstable but also anarchy costlier since territorial rivalry intensifies. In 1860, the

Union resisted the declaration of independence by the Confederacy, which indicates that the

Union was greedy for territory, and the secession from the Union also shows that the

Confederacy was an incongruent nationalist state.151 The confederacy feared that the election

of Lincoln as president in 1860 would imply economic redistribution since the confederacy

benefited economically from the slavery that Lincoln wanted to abolish. The cost of remaining

in the Union thus exceed the cost of seceding for the Confederacy.152

147 Alesia and Spolaore (2005) p, 5.

148 Ibid

149 UShistory.org: 31a. The Kansas-Nebraska Act.

150 Ibid.

151 Black (2005) p, 56.

152 Ibid.

47

The importance of the regime-type variable in the case of the American civil war is less clear,

but recall the assumption that as a democratic state grows larger, per capita public goods

spending goes down, but public goods also become less congruent with the preferences of

citizens living at the periphery, hence incentivizing them to vote for session.153 There may have

been gains to be made from economics of scale by remaining in the union, but the right to own

slaves was a preference the Confederacy could not compromise with, hence the US in 1860 is

a historical example of a large democratic states where a group of regions declared

independence, but since the Union was greedy for territory it would not let the Confederacy

secede without war.

While both states where greedy for territory and the conference knew in 1860 that the Union

had and offensive posture, it is less clear if available military technology in 1860 favored

offensive or defensive advantage. The RCR model predicts that military offensive advantage in

two-state scenarios makes anarchy unstable and world government trough war likely. Likewise,

defensive advantage should make world government unstable and secessions likely. Available

evidence yields mixed results. The extensive railway networks of the Union allowed it to

mobilize and direct its resources and troops efficiently, hence implying offensive advantage.154

On the other hand, the vast territory of the US provided an advantage for the defending

Confederacy. Leiber has argued that railroads might have prolonged to war by allowing the

Confederacy to concentrate separated forces against key segments of the advancing Union

army.155 Furthermore, assaults on prepared troops caused heavy losses due to the new rapid

firing weaponry and an inability for opposing artillery to effectively suppress entrenched troops.

156 On balance, geographies of scale and viable military technology appears to have favored the

defending side hence lending support to the RCR assumption that defensive advantage increases

with geographic distance and that would government becomes less stable and anarchy more

appealing when technology and geography provides defensive advantage. However, geographic

scale was not vast enough and defensive advantage provided by trenches and percussion rifles

large not large enough to make anarchy persist.

153 Alesina and Spolaore (2005) p, 36.

154 Black (2005) p, 57.

155 Lieber (2000) p, 84. 156 Black (2005) p, 61.

48

To summarize, the confederate secession in 1860 lends support to the RCR model by illustrating

that when regions within a state are strongly divided economically and lack a sense of common

national identity, groups with common interests have rational reasons to secede since they fear

that they will lack enough bargaining power under world government to optimally maximize

consumption of material (gains from slavery) and symbolic (state sovereignty) goods. Initial

defensive advantage also gave the Confederacy rational reasons to believe that sovereignty

could be defended, but the geographic distance between the adversaries was to short and the

distribution of material capabilities of uneven to make anarchy sustainable.157 The union was

eventually restored, but it took the bloodiest war in US history to achieve it, which highlights

the potential dangers of unification that incentivizes rational great powers to prefer anarchy.

157 Black (2005) p, 57.

49

Chapter 7

7. 1 Alternative explanations for anarchy: The commercial peace hypothesis

An alternative explanation for that anarchy is perceived by great powers to be less costly than

world government is the liberal commercial peace hypothesis which predicts that mutual

economic interdependence will eliminate incentives for interstate war, hence ensure stable

anarchy. The commercial peace hypothesis suffers from a number of empirical problems

however. First of all, the historical record shows striking failures of the commercial peace

hypothesis as there was significant economic interdependence between the great powers of

Europe prior to both world wars that appear to have little restraining effect.158 Second, the

commercial peace hypothesis implicitly assumes that material consumption is the only goal of

states, but the rivalry between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands suggests that

incongruent nationalism is also an important source of conflict between states. Third, great

powers usually do not have more than a tiny fraction of their GDP tied up with single states,

and war tend to be initiated against one or two states at a time, hence inflicting little overall

economic damage.159 Furthermore, a regional or global economic crisis can undermine the gains

from economic interdependence and fuel instability and conflict, exemplified by the return

geopolitics in Asia after the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.160 Lastly, war can be economically

profitable even in an economically interdependent world. Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 mainly

due to that Kuwait exceeded its oil production quotas set by OPEC.161 The parameter c (other

costs of war) in the Fearonian model takes the impact of economic interdependence on the cost

of war into account, but it is not treated as a central determinant of the cost of anarchy relative

to world government in the RCR model. Instead, the RCR model emphasizes how income

inequality between states fuels territorial greed in anarchy while at the same time making world

government less appealing since unification threaten to fuel distributional conflicts as well.

158 Mearsheimer (2014) p, 53.

159 Mearsheimer (2001) p, 87.

160 Ibid

161 Ibid.

50

7.2 Global governance vs global government

An alternative explanation for anarchy that should be taken seriously is that global governance

makes anarchy stable by providing collective security, reducing transaction costs and enhances

trust between states that have incentives to cheat in “pure” anarchy. However, liberal

institutionalists neglect the relative gains problem that can arise when military technology

favors the offense.162 Snidal has argued that in a multipolar scenario where power is evenly

distributed between states, relative gains do not matter even when offense dominates because

states can deter aggression by forming coalitions.163 Historically the balance of power tends to

be asymmetrical, however, and the number of great powers in the system few, hence relative

gains is probably more often than not an obstacle to cooperation that global institutions have a

hard time solving since they lack the enforcement capabilities of a world government. Security

theory emphasizes how collective security armaments can foster international norms of

nonaggression and punish aggressors by collective, but collective security is demanding.164A

few greedy states in the system might be enough to offset collective security since it is difficult

for collective action to be coordinated efficiently to deal with more than one enemy at a time.

It took the US six months to mobilize the collation that liberated Kuwait from Iraq.165

There is evidence for that the UN has lowered the cost of anarchy to some extent since the

number of preventive diplomatic missions mounted by the UN between 1990-2002 increased

six-fold, and over the same period peacekeeping activities increased fourfold, while the number

of sanctions against regimes eleven-fold between 1990-2003.166 These statistics are problematic

however since they do not show that these measures would have been sufficient, had the

conflicts been slightly worse. Furthermore, The Human Security Report investigates a short

period in history during which the balance of power has been unipolar.167 The rise of China and

the return to a multipolar balance of power might cause the UN to operate less efficiently.168

Moreover, the UNs predecessor, the League of Nations did not prevent world war two, hence

unable to deter war in the face of military offensive dominance and incongruent nationalism.169

162 Mearsheimer (1995) p, 18.

163 Mearsheimer (1995), p, 19.

164 Mearsheimer (1995) p, 26.

165 Mearsheimer (1995), p, 28.

166 Tännsjö (2013) p, 26.

167 Ibid.

168 Tännsjö (2013) p, 27.

169 Mearsheimer (1995) p, 29.

51

7.3 Born to kill?

Human nature realism assumes that the principal driving force in international politics is the

will to power inherent in man that pushes states to strive for supremacy.170 If humans have a

fundamental biological will to power, then the absence of world government is explained by

the fact that states much like individuals are selfish power maximizers who do not want to share

power with others, nor do they care much about security or consumption, since world

domination is their primary goal. Human nature realism has a difficult time accounting for

variation in international stability over time however, since human nature is a constant, but war

is not. Morgenthau’s argument that there are revisionist and status quo powers therefor appear

contradictory since all sates are assumed to have an inherent will to power.171 Moreover,

modern neuroscience has concluded that human aggression is a function of the lower brain

which is amendable to control by the higher brain, and aggression appears from a biological

perspective to be a response to imminent threats rather than an inherent will to power.172

170 Mearsheimer (1995) p, 29. 171 Mearsheimer (2001) p, 107.

172 Keegan (1993) p, 81.

52

Chapter 8

8. Conclusion: The paradox of world government

To solve the paradox of anarchy the paper departed from the following research questions: If

anarchy causes tragedy and war, then why are great powers reluctant to delegate their

sovereignty to a world government? What primary factors determine the cost of anarchy

relative to world government? To answer the research questions the paper has developed a

rational choice realist model which contributes to IR theory by revising the realist assumption

that the primary goal of states is survival, that anarchy inevitably causes intense security

competition, and that world government would solve the security dilemma.

First, the rational choice realist approach revises the neorealist assumption that the primary goal

of states is survival since states could eliminate military spending by unifying. The paper

suggests that realism should instead depart from the fundamental assumption that states are

consumers of material and symbolic goods, and that consumption is maximized in stable

anarchy where the military burden is small and the risk of redistribution that could result from

unification avoided. Furthermore, the rational choice realist approach suggests that domestic

politics sheer the basic dynamics of international relations, hence not only explaining why

world government could be more risky than international anarchy, but also why war within

states are now more common than war between them. Hence, realism would benefit from

dropping the assumption that anarchy is a precondition for conflict and hierarchy a precondition

for peace, and embrace the assumption that anarchy can be and probably is welfare improving

in a world which lacks a natural harmony of interests. However, the implications of the rational

choice realist approach may be even more tragic than that of structural realism, since the cause

of conflict is assumed to stem from differences between the units in the system and not the

nature of the system itself, implying that there is no more hope for eternal peace and stability

in a world without borders than in a world of nation-states.

Second, the RCR model suggests that anarchy is not a structural constraint that forces states to

balance, but that balancing is a rational choice that produces anarchy as an equilibria outcome.

The paper introduces a delegation constraint to explain why states choose anarchy in preference

to world government when income inequality is high and competing nationalisms not congruent

with national borders.

53

States can gain bargaining leverage in anarchy by arming while gaining consumption by

unifying and eliminate the national military burden. If anarchy is stable, little arms costs are

needed for deterrence and bargaining however, hence rich states risk losing substantial

bargaining power in exchange for eliminating an already small military burden. The RCR model

also provides more robust realist arguments for the implications of nationalism on the cost of

anarchy, by assuming that nationalism is a rational feature of nation-states to enhance fighting

morale and make it more difficult for other states to successfully invade. The prevalence of the

universal doctrine of nationalism justifies the common realist argument that there is no natural

harmony of interests in the world, hence the anticipated latent risk that a militant minority with

deviant cultural preferences would attempt to capture global armed forces and impose their

preferences on the other regions.

Third, the RCR model contributes to IR theory by showing that the cost of anarchy is

determined by unit-level factors, but also that anarchy does imply a set of inescapable costs

since states must arm to deter attacks and gain bargaining power. However, states are willing

to absorb those costs since the delegation constraint and the risk of global institutional failure

could venture the security and wealth of great powers such that arming is anarchy is more

preferable than bargaining for preferable outcomes in a world parliament.

It should be recognized that The RCR model relies on a series of simplified assumptions that

each need firmer treatment, including how varieties in autocratic regime types affect their

propensity to initiate conflict and whether nuclear weapons have a strong deterring effect

independent of geographic setting. Furthermore, it is not clear why the risks associated with

world government could not be eliminated by intelligent institutional design. However, not even

the US with its checks and balances could avoid civil war and the European union whit its

clever design features have not incentives states to delegate military power although tentative

plans for further defense integration has been on the table recently. Until it can be shown that

world government can be designed such that it would be a rational alternative to stable anarchy,

the RCR model provides the most solid realist explanation for why anarchy is a rational choice.

54

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